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THE TURKMEN

KURDISH AND ISRAELI ASPIRATION IN KIRKUK



Mofak Salman Kerkuklu

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PURPOSE AND SCOPE

Turkmen are the third largest ethnic group in Iraq after Arabs and Kurds. Turkmen of Iraq have been settled in Iraq since before the Ottoman Empire in 1516 A.D. Today, the Iraqi Turkmen population is estimated to be at around 2.5 to 3 million, considering all available estimates of towns and townships in which they live. The Turkmen may constitute around 10% of the population in Iraq; however, earlier sources estimate the Turkmen to be as much as 14%-16% of the Iraqi population. Turkmen speak the Turkmen language which is one of the Turkish languages like the Azerbaijani language.

In general terms, 60% of Iraqi Turkmen are Sunni, while 40% of them are *Shi'a* Muslims. In addition, there are also Christian Turkmen living in Kirkuk (*Qalla Gawerri*). The Turkmen in modern Iraqi history has been undergoing decades of assimilation campaigns in Iraq, often in a more brutal fashion than the one conducted against Kurds by the Saddam Hussein government. This book was written with several clear purposes in mind.

Firstly, to assess the position of Turkmen in Turkmen Eli and to highlight the oppression of Turkmen after the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003.

Secondly, to introduce a brief history of the Turkmen in Iraq to the world, and to draw the world's attention to the situation and oppression of Turkmen in Iraq. Thirdly, to highlight the assimilation, and changing the demography of Kirkuk, the support, and the Israeli interference in northern Iraq, reveal the Turkmen reaction to the Kurdish referendum, and finally reveal the Kurdish forces' defeat in Kirkuk, and Kurdish and Israeli aspiration in northern of Iraq in general and especially the city of Kirkuk.

I would like to dedicate this book to every Turkmen who has been detained in Iraqi prisons; to Turkmen who died due to being tortured in Iraqi prisons; to all Turkmen whose sons and daughters were executed by the Iraqi regime; to all Turkmen who fought and died without seeing a free Turkmen homeland; and to the Turkmen city of Kirkuk, Erbil, Telfer an Tuz Khormatu, which are a bastion of cultural and political life for those Turkmen resisting the Kurdish occupation. This book would not have been written without the support of

Turkmen all over the world. Therefore, primarily, my sincere thanks are to my son Bozkurt Cormac Salman. I would also like to thank my family, and finally, my thanks go to my martyred brother, surgeon Dr. Burhan Salman Kirkuklü, who motivated and encouraged me from childhood to fight for the Turkmen cause in the Turkmen Eli.

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1.0 CHAPTER ONE

1.1 BRIEF HISTORY OF IRAQI TURKMEN

This will be a key to understanding why the maintenance of Iraq's territorial integrity, and viewed by many as critical, the knowledge of the country's enormous ethnic and religious diversity, and the aspirations of these groups and the problems they now face. One of these ethnolinguistic groups is the Turkmen, [1] who have made a major effort to define themselves, both internally and to the world community.

The actual Turkmen population has always been suppressed by the authorities in Iraq for political reasons and is officially estimated at 2%, while their number should be between 2.5 and 3 million, i.e., 12% of the Iraqi population.

The Turkmen of Iraq settled in Turkmen Eli “Turkmen land.” [2] Over the centuries, Turkmen have played a constructive role in Iraq, either by defending against foreign invaders or by bringing civilisation. Monuments made by Turkmen, and architectural remains exist all over Iraq, and the Turkmen lived in harmony with all ethnic groups. They lived with justice and tolerance. The Turkmen are a Turkic

¹ Turkoman: The Iraqi Turkoman lives in an area that they call “Turcomania” in Latin or “Turkmen Eli” which means, “Land of the Turkoman.” The British geographer William Guthrie referred to it as “Turcomania” in 1785. The Turkoman are Turkic groups that have a unique heritage and culture as well as linguistic, historical, and cultural links with the surrounding Turkic groups such as those in Turkey and Azerbaijan. Their spoken language is closer to Azeri but their official written language is like the Turkish spoken in present-day Turkey. Their real population has always been suppressed by the authorities in Iraq for political reasons and estimated at 2%, whereas their numbers are more realistically between 2.5 to 3 million, i.e., 12% of the Iraqi population.

² Turkmen Eli is a diagonal strip of land stretching from the Syrian and Turkish border areas from around Telafer in the north of Iraq, reaching down to the town of Mandeli on the Iranian border in Central Iraq. The Turkoman of Iraq settled in Turkmen Eli in three successive and constant migrations from Central Asia, which increased their numbers and enabled them to establish six states in Iraq.

group with a unique heritage and culture, as well as linguistic, historical, and cultural links with the surrounding Turkic groups, such as those in Türkiye and Azerbaijan. Their spoken language is closer to Azerbaijani, but their official written language is like the Turkish spoken in present-day Türkiye.

Some writers show that the presence of Turkmen in Iraq goes back to the Ottoman Empire. This is not the truth because the Turkmen were in Iraq much earlier than the Ottoman Empire period. Several researchers show that the Turkmen settlement in Iraq goes back to the Sumerian period they moved from central Asia and settled around the river Tigris, and they were originally ancestors of Turkmen. This argument is based on some similarities that have been found between Sumerian and the Turkish language, as there are around six hundred words that are like one another. In addition, there have been similarities between the Mongolian Turks and the Sumerians in general, especially in the shape of their skulls!

The Iraqi historian *Abbas Al-Azwai* reveals in his book “*Iraqi History Between Two Occupations*” that Turkmen came from Turkmenistan and lived in *Khorasan*. The Turkmen then migrated from *Khorasan* which is currently the Republic Islamic of Iran to various parts of the Turkmen Eli. This differs from the Russian historian, *Bartold*, in his book “*History of Turk in Central Asia* “ who stated that the tribes of the *Akaz*, *Al_Karlok*, *Al_Tokaz* or *Alguz* lived in the area extending from the *Khazar Sea* to the Chinese border which then formed the two biggest Empires in the history of *Seljuk* and the *Ottoman Empires*.

The Turkmens moved to Iraq in successive periods of Islamic invasion, or more specifically terms during the *Caliphate* of *Omar Al_Kattab*, while other historians claim that 2,000 Turkmen fighters came to Iraq during the *Umayyad dynasty*; later more Turkmens arrived and settled during the *Abbasid dynasty*. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the name Turkmen is a synonym of *Oghuz*, which encapsulates all the Turkish population that live in southwestern Central Asia. This includes the Turkish population of Türkiye, Republic of Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan of Iran, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Northern Cyprus, Turkmen of Lebanon, Turkmen of Afghanistan, the Turkmen of Iran, and Bulgaria.

Other historians define the word of Turkmen as a derivative word from of Turk and *men/man*. In the Turkish language, *men/man* means, *me, I am*, powerful, magnificent, pure, and original; so, Turkmen in Turkish means a pure/original Turk, or *I am Turkish*. Also, other historians and researchers state that Turkmen means Turkish man or Turkish fighter. The Turkmen of Iraq settled in Turkmen Eli in three successive and constant migrations from Central Asia, and their number has increased during this time. They were used in the army for their bravery and use of archery, and this helped the Turkmen to set up six states in Iraq. [3] Turkmen have been living in present Iraq for over a millennium. Yet, since they were left outside the borders of a new Türkiye in an artificially created Iraq, Turkmen felt the heavy-handed treatment by successive Arab rulers, the worst of whom were the *Ba'ath* Party.

Since the foundation of Iraq in the aftermath of the First World War, the existence of Turkmen had been denied by the official regimes in Baghdad by the state's policy. It was the attempt at sealing the border with Türkiye that motivated the Baghdad regime, and their protector Britain, to deliberately ignore the existence of the Turkmen people in the early years of Iraq. The Iraqi Turkmen have suffered immensely from intimidation by the central government, Kurds, and extrajudicial militia groups for religious and ethnic reasons, 'Arabisation' assimilation policies during the Saddam Hussein regime, and the "Kurdization" policy after 2003. Since 2003, various groups including extrajudicial militia have targeted Turkmens via car bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, arbitrary arrests, harassment, and torture, with impunity and torture. The most recent events by *Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant* (ISIL) attacks on Turkmens did not come as a surprise; it is an extension of decades of assimilations, and intimidations by Arabs and Kurds, to forcefully displace them from their homeland where they had been living for centuries. The official combination of the assimilation policy and the decomposition policy

³ Kerkük'te Selçuklular Döneminden Kalan Gök Kümbet "Tarihini ve düşmanını bilmeyen millet, kolayca düşer, yok olur." (Atasözü) Ali Kerküklü (Irak'a Özgürlük Operasyonu ve Kerkük Kitabının Yazarı).

was successfully played out for years, but assimilation and decomposition would not have been enough to erase or eradicate Turkmens and the languages of the Iraqi Turkmens. There is no clear sign that official Turkish positions on the Iraqi Turkmens will change. However, changes to improve the present conditions and to solve the Iraqi Turkmen problems within the Iraqi sovereignty may be prompt, especially with a view to the Kurdish Spring in northern Iraq.

The Kurdish Spring, encouraged by the United States, the European Union, Russia, and others, needs to be emulated by the Iraqi Turkmens who cannot afford to be isolated from northern Iraq geographically or politically, and least of all, economically. It is noticeably clear that various policymakers of Western countries call to divide Iraq into three states: Arab *Shi'a* in the south, Kurds in the north, and *Sunnis* in the west, ignoring the human rights and existence of the Turkmen people in this land and other ethnic minorities.

However, Turkmens should not be a danger to Iraqi sovereignty but as a credit to strengthen Iraqi stability and as a part of the big mosaic of Iraqi unity. The Iraqi government must guarantee human rights for all citizens, regardless of ethnicity, and reach an agreement about these issues, with representation from Turkmens, Kurds, and Arabs. They should present a regional security plan in which the Turkmens are given a role to play. The second stipulation concerning Turkmens is that the world should be reminded of the Turkmens' presence in Iraq. The central government in Baghdad should be aware of this presence, and it should be noted that supplying certain rights and guarantees to Turkmens would contribute to the ending of the division of the country.

1.2 LANGUAGE OF TURKMENS

The main spoken language in Turkmen Eli is a Turkmen dialect. This is a part of the western Turkish language group that also includes Turkish spoken in Türkiye, Cyprus, the Balkans, Iranian Azerbaijan (Republic of South Azerbaijan) and Republic of Azerbaijan (north), northern Syria, Iranian Turkmen (*Turkmen Al-Sahra*), Turkmenistan and southern Turkistan and northern Afghanistan. The Turkmen language, with its various accents, is closer to the Turkish spoken language in both Azerbaijan and Urfa in south-eastern Türkiye rather than the Turkmen language in the Republic of Turkmenistan.

Spoken language is the foundation of Iraqi Turkmen culture, folk literature, group identity, ethnic consciousness, and world outlook. The spoken native language is naturally passed on to new generations and this, naturally, creates a strong bond uniting the *Turkish-speaking* peoples of Iraq. However, there is a group of Turkmen called *Christian Turkmen* of Kirkuk Citadel “*Kala Kaveri*,” which has for centuries, lived in Kirkuk amongst Turkmen.

They have their script, bible, and mourning songs. However, all these activities are practiced in the Turkmen language. Unfortunately, compulsory education in Arabic by the successive Arabic governments in general and by the Saddam Hussein government especially has led to the weakening and deterioration of spoken Turkish from generation to generation. The older generation with no formal education speaks pure and more correct Turkish than the current generation.

Formal written Turkish is the second major source of the Turkish language in Iraq. Local dialects have not found their place in written literature. Turkmen have adopted formal Anatolian Turkish as the written language.

Up until the 16th Century, the literary works of Turkmen were written in *Azerbaijani* dialect using Arabic letters, but from the second half of that century onwards, the written literature of Turkmen came under the influence of the rising Ottoman language, a Western Turkish dialect. However, after the First World War with the separation of Türkiye, Turkmen continued with their preference for Anatolian Turkish by using Arabic letters. After the fall of the Saddam Hussein

government in 2003, numerous Turkmen magazines, television, and schools have been set up.

The overwhelming majority of the Turkmen schools in Turkmen Eli began using the Turkish Latin alphabet. In addition, many Turkmen students were sent to Türkiye for further education in various subjects, and this helped a lot in reviving the Turkmen language.

1.3 POPULATION OF TURKMENS

Turkmen are the third largest ethnic group in Iraq after Arabs and Kurds. The Iraqi Turkmen population is estimated to be around 2.5-3 million, considering all available estimates of towns and townships in which they live. They may make up around 10% of the population; however, earlier sources supplied estimates as much as 14%-16% of the Iraqi population. In general terms, 60% of Iraqi Turkmen are *Sunni* and 40% of them are *Shi'a* Muslims. In addition, Christian Turkmen are living in Kirkuk.

Turkmen in recent Iraqi history has been undergoing decades of assimilation campaigns, often in a more brutal fashion than the ones conducted against Kurds by the Saddam Hussein government.

Some sources generously estimate that Turkmen consist of up to 16% of the Iraqi population, and others estimate 10% of the Iraqi population. If the current Iraqi population is thirty million, this means that the Turkmen population would be more than three million as shown in Table (1).

YEAR	IRAQI POPULATION	TURKMEN POPULATION
1947	3.468.000	280.130
1957	6.276.000	567.000
1987/British Innalguiry Journal		1.500.000 - 2.000.000
Current		>3.000.000

Table (1) Iraqi and Turkmen population in Iraq

There is no exact census of the number of Turkmen in Iraq. In recent years, there are only estimates for distinct reasons: Turkmen have

been subject to systematic assimilation and deliberate displacement over decades for ethnic cleansing. For instance, they had been displaced from the land where they had been living for hundreds of years. After the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, various parties and foreign countries began dividing the Iraqi people based on ethnic groups and sectarianism.

The Turkmen people themselves need to wake up, with its various fractions; *Shi'a*, *Sunni*, Muslim, and non-Muslims should come together and extend their hands to each other to help their wounded and shattered people with many, many orphaned children and women who were left defenceless, and who were struggling day by day. To take them back to their homeland!

During Saddam's ruling era, between 1970 and 2003, many Turkmen people were forced to change their national identity and ethnicity to Arab. Turkmen had no rights to build up or own land in Kirkuk unless they changed their national identity and became Arab.

In addition, Turkmen were forced by the *Ministry of Planning* in Iraq and were being paid as little as five hundred Iraqi *dinars* to do so. They could sell their land, but not buy land in Turkmen populated areas in general and especially not in Kirkuk. Arabs were given free grants and land to come to live in Kirkuk to change the demographic nature of the city and dilute the Turkmen into Arab society.



Figure (1) Turkmen's students in their traditional clothes, Turkmen Eli

After Saddam's ruling period in 2003, the situation of Turkmen has not been better off, with many feelings that the post-Saddam period was worse under Kurdish control when Kurds took control of Kirkuk. All the government buildings, empty houses, as well as military campuses, were turned into houses for Kurdish families which were also bought illegally, to change the demographics of the city. This was done hurriedly in a very speedy manner.

There were thousands of disputed lands and assets confiscated from Turkmen citizens during the *Ba'ath* regime, which have not been returned to their original owners, in Telafer, Erbil, Mosul, Altun Kopru, Kirkuk, Yaychi, Tesin, Terkalan, Taza, and Tuz Khormatu and many other Turkmen towns and villages.

1.4 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF TURKMENS

The Turkmen territories are considered as a buffer zone separating Arabs from Kurds. Cultural, social, religious, economic, and political factors have influenced the relations and distribution of the population of Turkmen in the area. The Turkmen of Iraq are merchants, manual laborers, and professionals.

Turkmen are concentrated in the northern and central regions of Iraq. This is a diagonal strip of land stretching from Telafer at the north-Syrian border to Diyala province in the middle part of Iraq.



Figure (2) Map of Iraq showing the Turkmen inhabitant area in Turkmen Eli.

There are several major cities and some smaller districts where Turkmen are currently living. These are four provinces of Iraq: *Erbil*, *Kirkuk*, *Saladin*, and *Diyala*. In addition to these, historically Turkmen populated areas that have encompassed Telafer; the towns and villages around Mosul such as *Al_Rashadiya*, *Shierkan*, *Telafer*, *Ewathiya*, *Nabi Younis*; villages of *Shabak* around Erbil, *Altun Kopru*, *Kirkuk city*, *Tassain*, *Taza Khormatu*, *Daquq (Taook)*, *Bashir*, *Tuz Khormatu*, *Amerli*, *Bastamali*, *Yengejeh*, *Brawachilli*, *Karanaz*, *Shasewan*, and many other villages around *Amerli*, *Kifri*, *Karatepe*, *Karaghan (Jalwalaa)*, *Sharaban (Maqdadia)*, *Kizilarbatt (Alsayadia)*, *Khanaqin*, *Mandeli*, and *Kazania*.

An estimated ten thousand Turkmen live in the capital city of Baghdad too: in *Ragiba Katoon*, *Al_Fathal*, *Al_Aathamia*, *Al_Salyiagh*, *Kanbar Ali*, *Hay Adan*, *Zyuna*, *Al_Ssahab* city and in other places of *Al_Karagh* part of Baghdad. There are Turkmen in other middle and southern parts of Iraq as well, from *Albayat*, *Alkarghol*, *Alsalahi*, *Amerli*, *Alatragchji*, *Babal*, *Al-Messan*, *Karbala*, and *Basra*. Turkmen are known as a community attached to their national consciousness, traditions, and religion.

1.5 TURKMEN FAMILIES AND THEIR SOCIAL LIFE

There are some similarities between Turkmen Arabic and Kurdish societies. In the rural areas, it is mostly tribal, where people and heads of families will be loyal to the head of the tribe. You will find that the family will be proud of their origins and that they are using their tribal titles and family names, some of which may come from their grandfathers' or great-grandfathers' names.

There are some positive aspects to such allegiances, where the families will be competing for various economic, social, and political affairs. However, there are some negative aspects such that they must be adherent to their cultural rules such as paying a ransom or using these tribes as a means of gaining political or economic gain. Unfortunately, this issue has been used recently during the *Ba'ath* era to gain political seats in parliament.

Turkmen people living in urban parts and cities are more loyal to their families than to their tribes. In recent times, this issue may have contributed to Turkmens losing in the elections and the failure of a fairer representation. Turkmens are weak in such gains, as they have been divided amongst themselves, between religious groups, some being *Sunni* and others *Shi'a*. Some of them will be secular against being Islamic, while others are with the extremist versus moderate groups. Some are nationalist and others are loyal to Türkiye, Iran, or Saudi Arabia. All the above issues have caused significant damage to the whole of Turkmen society in the recent political climate of the new Iraqi political system. Another reason that Turkmen have been less represented is that Turkmen have lived in harmony with many other groups such as *Arabs*, *Kurds*, *Christians*, *Shabaks*, and *Yazidis* in Mosul province, and the past with the Jewish community. Turkmen people have accepted the intermarriage between themselves and other communities which may have also led to further underrepresentation.



Figure (3) Turkmen in their traditional clothes in the coffee shop which is known as Chaykhana.



Figure (4) Turkmen relaxing at the Mahmoud Tea shop (Cayhana) in Teseen neighbourhood, Kirkuk 1959



Figure (5) Jut Kahwa market, Turkmen wearing Dishdasha and traditional dress in 1970, Kirkuk, Turkmeneli.



Figure (6) Eski Teseen Mehelesi Mehelasii, Chaykahan Ukgu., Khalil Najar Chaykhanesi, 1968, Kirkuk, Turkmeneli.

1.6 TURKMENS LIVING IN HARMONY WITH ANOTHER IRAQI ETHNIC

The Turkmen in general, and especially the Christian Turkmen who lived in Kirkuk citadel "*Kirkuk Kalesi*," have lived in harmony with Jewish people, especially before 1948, as since then, most of them have left Iraq for Israel. Turkmen were, and still are, easy to mix with and live in harmony with Arabs and Kurds, through intermarriages happening between Sunni and *Shi'a*, as well as with other ethnic groups.

The old religions of the Turkmen were *Al-Shamaniya*, *Judaism*, *Buddhism*, and *Zaradishet*, but Turkmen converted to Islam after the Islamic forces' conquest of Central. Most Turkmen are Muslims, and they are divided into two Muslim faiths: *Shi'a* and *Sunni*. In addition, there are about 30,000 *Christian Turks* living in Iraq, and they are known as Kala Gaveri. These two Turkmen Muslim and Christian sects helped Turkmen to be more dynamic in Iraqi society. They eased mixed marriages with Arabs and Kurds; therefore, many Arab tribes have originated from Turkmen, such as *Al_bayati*. There is no difference at all between the *Sunni* and *Shi'a* Turkmen about the dialogue, language, or culture. Intermarriage between the *Shi'a* and *Sunni* Turkmen is common. However, the Iraqi government and Kurdish militias have been trying to use various methods to divide the Turkmen community by conducting a policy of divide and conquer.

The *Shi'a* in Türkiye is known as Alevi and there are smaller Ja'afari communities. Outside of Turkey, Ja'afaris (a reference to the role of Jafar al-Sadiq in developing *Shi'a* jurisprudence) are called Ithna-Asheri or "Twelvers" for their belief that twelve imams succeeded the Prophet Muhammad. The Alevies in Turkey are not practically committed to the Shiite Ja'afari fiqh because of being influenced by "Batini" (mystical) beliefs (though they are theoretically committed to the Shiite jurisprudence).



Figure (7) a photo from the Ottoman era, Ashura walks in Istanbul. Husseiniya procession in the streets of Escodar in the middle of Istanbul in the time of the Ottoman Empire.



Figure (8) a photo from the Ottoman era, Ashura walks in Istanbul. Hussainiya procession in the streets of Escodar in the middle of Istanbul in the time of the Ottoman Empire.

1.7 TURKMENS' CONTRIBUTIONS TO BUILDING UP IRAQI SOCIETY

Many well-announced Turkmen scholars contributed to various fields of education, culture, academia, military, and medical studies for building up Iraqi civilization in the recent history of Iraq:

Surgeon Doctor Burhan Mehmet Salman Kerkuklu was chosen as the first Turkmen councillor in *Kilis* province in Türkiye from the *MHP* party. Professor *Mustafa Jawad*, *Dr. Ihsan Dođramacı*, who was the ambassador of UNICEF, who lived in Türkiye and refused to be the Turkish president. *Dr. Salam Al Dođramacı* was one of the leading professors in paediatric oncology and haematology in Iraq for many years and *Ershad Humuzli* was the adviser to the Turkish president of *Abdullah Gul*.

Turkmens gave birth to two well-known poets: *Fazooly Al Baghdadi*, who has been buried in the *Imam Hussain's Mosque* in *Karbala*. *Dr. Ibrahim Al Dakookly* wrote the first letter in *Al Aalam in the Arab world* in 1972. He produced weekly newspapers and a news journal about the role of the media in the Arab world. Other Turkmen intellectuals, artists, musicians, and songwriters have played a tremendous role in promoting the Iraqi culture.

1.8 TURKMEN IN THE MONARCHY ERA

For decades, since the creation of the Iraqi State in 1921, the Turkmen of Iraq and their plight have been completely ignored by the international community. They have been the least listened to outside Iraq and the least defended by their government. Indeed, for decades, the Turkmen have been denied their basic human rights in Iraq and have faced total indifference from the international community.

The disregard of the Turkmen's historical role and achievements in Iraq, the denial of their true representation as the third largest ethnic group, and, so, their marginalisation in Iraq, was started by the British colonial authorities at the end of World War I in 1918, for geopolitical and economic reasons.

The fall of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East was caused by the

Arabs' betrayal and treason. During *WWI* thousands of Turkish soldiers were killed by the Arabs and the Turkish garrisons were attacked and burned by the Arabs with the help of British agents. Throughout the history of the *Middle East*, the Arab nations have been guilty of betrayal, treason, uprising, and revolt.




Figure (9) announcement the truce, between the British forces and the Ottoman army, in Baghdad in 1918

After the British invasion of Iraq in 1918, the British facilitated the separation of the *Mosul Vilayat 'Mosul Province'* “which now represents five Iraqi provinces: *Mosul, Kirkuk, Erbil, Duhok* and *Sulymaniya* “from the Ottoman Empire, to control the huge oil reserves of Kirkuk, which was inhabited by the Turkmen, as it had been for centuries.

During the British invasion of Iraq, the Turkmen began to experience a different situation. They were branded unjustly as being loyal to *Türkiye*: they were removed from the administration, pushed into isolation, and ignored. Then, their fundamental human rights in culture and education were violated by the closure of their schools between 1933 and 1937, and control of their Iraqi oil and its export was withdrawn.

They coaxed thousands of *British* from the *United Kingdom* to the Iraq petroleum production with extremely high pay. During the occupation of Iraq, all oil production; mineral, economic, and political interests were fully controlled by the British. Billions of dollars worth of Iraqi oil were taken out of Iraq by the British, and billions of dollars worth of goods were imported from Britain to Iraq.

All the cars, manufacturing, food, heavy machinery, and oil drilling equipment were imported from Britain. Iraq became a reliable source of monetary profit for the Britain economy. This then enabled the British to run the country with an 'iron vest' with the aid of Arabs.

These Arabs were carefully selected and were consequently completely loyal to the British administration in Iraq. So, it was difficult for the Iraqi people to rise against the British, and it was also impossible for the British troops to leave Iraq due to needing to keep control of the oil and for economic reasons.



Figure (10) British troops parading in front of Qishla barracks in Kirkuk 1918



Figure (11) Turkish prisoners at the Kirkuk Kishla captured by the British occupation of Kirkuk, 7th May 1918, in the photo the people of Kirkuk trying to help the Turkish prisoners.



Figure (12) British troops marching in front of Kirkuk Castle passing through Khasa Su, during the occupation of Kirkuk 1918.



Figure (13) British troops marching in front of Kirkuk Castle passing through Khasa Su, during the occupation of Kirkuk 1918.



Figure (14) British troops marching in front of Kirkuk Castle passing through Khasa Su, during the occupation of Kirkuk 1918



Figure (15) British troops marching across Khasa Su, and Kirkuk citadel is shown behind the troops.




Figure (16) British troops parading in front of Kirkuk Castle, Kirkuk 1918




Figure (17) British military camps in Arafah neighbourhood holding several airplanes, soldiers, and offices in Kirkuk 1919.




Figure (18) the capture of the Ottoman army soldier's prisoners by British troops in WWI during the occupation of Baghdad in 1917.



Figure (19) the capture of the Ottoman army soldiers by a British Troop in WWI in Baghdad in 1917.



Figure (20) Ahmed Agha in Kirkuk in the 1945, Kirkuk, Turkmen Eli.

Under the constitution, drawn up in 1932, the Kurds and the Turkmen had the right to use their languages in schools and government offices, and to have their language press. With the Arabs, the Kurds were recognised in the first constitution of monarchical Iraq as one of the three main part groups of the Iraqi nation, but these rights have been gradually taken from the Turkmen by successive Iraqi governments. However, constitutional rights were acknowledged to minorities in Iraq, with the Royal Constitution of 21st March 1925, Article 16: stating, “As determined by a general programme prescribed by law, each of the minorities originating from various nations has the right to set up schools where education is provided in the language used by that minority and is entitled to be in charge of these schools.” It was said in the *Royal Constitution*, which was valid until 1958, that the *Iraqi State* consisted of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and other minorities. Moreover, according to *Article 14* of the same constitution, Turkmen, like other minorities, were also entitled to receive an education in their language and to oversee their educational institutions. In fact, until the proclamation of the republic, various constitutional amendments did not cause ethnic or political discrimination. However, in 1933, the definitive version of *Article 17* of the constitution declared Arabic as the official language, with legally defined exceptions. *Legislation Number 74*, published in 1931, and entitled ‘*Native Languages*’ had stipulated these exceptions.

This law allowed all judicial processes to be conducted in the Turkmen language and primary school education to be in the Turkish language in all regions where Turkmen lived; foremost amongst these being Kirkuk and Erbil, and these rights were under constitutional guarantee. However, in 1936, after the resignation of *Hikmet Suleiman*, the brother of *Sadrazam* “*grand vizier*” *Mahmud Sevket Pasha*, from the post of Prime Minister to which he had been appointed two years previously, the new military regime began a campaign of taking back the rights given by the constitution. Thus, the Turkmen of Iraq lost the right to be educated in their native language. The period of monarchy, from 1932 to 1958, saw the removal of Turkmen from government posts and their deportation to Arab areas.



Figure (23) Iraqi king, Faisal I the founder of the Iraqi state upon arrival in London on 26th of August 1925

The suppression of the Turkmen peaked in 1946 when they were subjected to what is historically known as the *Gaver Baghi* massacre when the police opened fire on unarmed protesters among the Iraqi oil workers in Kirkuk. Since then, and despite the formal independence of Iraq from Great Britain and the end of the British mandate in 1932, successive Iraqi governments have applied the same policies of marginalisation and discrimination towards the Turkmen as those that were started and applied by the British in 1918, and for the same geopolitical and economic reasons.

By the time King *Faisal II* conducted the national census in 1957, most of the Turkmen population was already feeling oppressed by the Baghdad authorities. Many of the Turkmen who participated in the process filed false returns by listing themselves as Arabs to avoid further persecution.

Before and during the census, leading Turkmen activists were seized and interrogated by the police. Gathering places frequented primarily by Turkmen nationalists, such as cafés and clubs, were either shut down or kept under surveillance to intimidate them. The efforts were successful as the official census record shows just 137,800 registered Turkmens.



Figure (24) Iraq Kirkuk paving a street by the IPC in the late 1940s the black oil resulting from the liquidation of crude oil to spray the ground.



Figure (25) Iraq, Kirkuk train station in the 1940s

1.9 THE ABDELKARIM QASIM PERIOD “1958-1963”

The king of Iraq Faisal II succeeded to the throne after his father, Ghazi I, died in an automobile accident. King *Faisal II* formally assumed the throne on May 2, 1953, on his 18th birthday, but later he was assassinated during the coup d'état of July 1958 which was conducted by General *Abdul Karim Qasim*. However, the Turkmens were not the only ones weary of the political situation, whereby King *Faisal II* imposed British policy in exchange for military protection.



Figure (26) King Faisal II with his uncle Abdul Ilah wearing a military uniform, 1939



Figure (27) Saud Bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud visited Iraq in 1957 with Faisal II “1935-58”, king of Iraq.



Figure (28) General Abdul Karim Qasim is receiving a reward from Prince Abdullah after winning a reward in one of the military sports competitions on the 18th of March 1948.1953



Figure (29) King Fasil visits various Baghdad neighborhoods after his coronation in 1953.



Figure (30) King Faisal II's office at the royal palace burning.

By 1958, the quest for independence had manifested itself into a popular movement led by *Abdul Karim Qasim*. Once ignited into an open revolution, the troops loyal to 23-year-old *King Faisal II* offered little resistance. General *Abdul Karim Qasim* quickly secured power, declared himself prime minister, pronounced Iraq to be a *Republic*, and ordered the execution of *Faisal* and his top officers and at this point, the ties to Britain were officially cut.

Along with *Abdul Karim Qasim* and other Iraqi military officers, *Abdul Salam Arif* was a member of the clandestine organisation, the *Free Officers of Iraq*. During the summer of 1958, Prime Minister of Iraq *Nuri as-Saeed* ordered Iraqi troops under *Abdul Salam Arif* to aid Jordan, as part of an agreement of the *Arab Federation*. Instead, however, he led his army units into Baghdad and on July 14th launched a coup against the *Hashemite Monarchy*.

General *Abdul Karim Qasim* formed a government under the newly proclaimed republic and *Abdul Salam Arif*, his chief aide, was appointed deputy prime minister, interior minister, and deputy commander-in-chief of the armed forces.




Figure (31) Letter from Mullah Mustafa Al-barzani to the Israeli Mossad

The military coup of 1958 that toppled the first brought rays of hope for the Turkmen when they heard radio announcements by coup leader General *Abdul Karim Qasim* and his deputy *General Abdul Salam Arif* that Iraq was to be made up of three main ethnic groups, and that Turkmen were to be one of them. Turkmen interpreted these statements as the end of the suppression. However, happy days did not last long. After the coup of 1958, General *Abdul Karim Qasim* declared an amnesty and because of this, a Kurdish rebel leader *Mullah Mustafa Barzani* returned from the Soviet Union and started negotiating for a Kurdish autonomous region.



Figure (32) From the left is the retired Israeli Mossad officer Sagi Chori, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, and Idris Barzani in northern Iraq in 1966. Sagi Chori was an Israeli General and in the early 1966-67 came to the North of Iraq from Israel to help and train the Kurdish rebels to fight against the Iraqi army.

The Kurdish rebel leader *Mullah Mustafa Barzani* returned from the Soviet Union and started negotiating for a *Kurdish Autonomous Region* with the Iraqi government. The Kurdish leadership then continued and keep closely in touch with the Israeli secret service. The Israeli government continuously provided the Kurdish rebels with military advisers and financial support. The Israelis' goal for

supporting and recommending the Kurdish was to destabilise and weaken Iraq. During the Kurdish rebellion, there was continuous contact between the Israeli secret service and the Kurds. There were several visits by the Israeli agents to northern Iraq, and there were also several visits via the Kurdish leadership to Israel, and the Israeli government continuously provided the Kurds with financial support and military advisers.



Figure (33) from left to right Masoud Barzani, Menahem Nahik Navut (the head of Mossad 1984–1986), Mahmud Othman who was a member of the Iraqi parliament, head of Mossad Zvi Zamir in 1968-1976, head of the Mossad Nahum Admoni (1982 – 1989) and Kurdish bodyguard. The photo was taken in Northern Iraq



Figure (34) In 1969, Mullah Mustafa Barzani the father of the president of KRG Mossad Barzani with Israeli Mossad agents Ahron Cohen and Nissim Veraham in northern Iraq in 1966.



Figure (35) from the left, Rehavam Zeevi, Maier Amit, and Mustafa Barzani



Figure (36) Barzani with the head of the Mossad, Meir Amit



Figure (45) The Israeli Mossad chief Rehavaám Zeévi with Mustafa Barzani in front of the paper plate: "Xestehaneya Kurdistan" means The Kurdistan Hospital.

1.10 THE PRESENCE OF THE ISRAELIS IN THE NORTH OF IRAQ

Arabs, Turkmen, Turks, and Persians see the Kurds as a recalcitrant nomadic mountain tribe and stooge of Israeli interests. In the mid-1960s and 70s, Israel cooperated with Iran, then a US ally under the *Shah*, to fight against its Arab enemies - Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. As part of the cooperation, the *Mossad* sent *Lt. Colonel Tzuri Sagi* to develop plans for and to build up a Kurdish army to fight Iraqi troops in northern Iraq. *Tzuri Sagi* was also responsible for the Israeli assassination tries against *Saddam Hussein*. His Kurdish cooperation partner was the leader of the *Barzani* clan, *Mullah Mustafa Barzani*. The Kurdish army that the Israelis created is now known as *Peshmerga*. The son of *Mullah Mustafa Barzani*, *Masoud Barzani*, was the illegitimate president of the Kurdish region of Iraq.

The *KDP's* relationship with Israel dates to the 1960s when *Mullah Mustafa Barzani* met extensively with the *Mossad* coordinators *David Khajawa Keno* and *Haim Levakov*. [4] Kurds in northern Iraq received first aid from the *Mossad*, through the training that *Jewish* Kurds received from Israeli soldiers. The Israeli Prime Minister *Levi Eshkol* built a hospital for *Barzani's* supporters. Israeli diplomats who were sent to the region by Foreign Minister *Aba Eban* in the mid-1960s met *Mullah Mustafa Barzani* to talk to him on behalf of Prime Minister *Eshkol*. [5] The authors *Ian Black & Benny Morris* explain this relationship based on correspondence between the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the *Mossad*. In the introduction, the authors note that Israeli military officials reviewed the book before it was printed, and this is evidence of the correctness of the information held there. *Mullah Mustafa Barzani* paid his first visit to Israel in 1966, where he was received by Israeli Defense Minister *Moshe Dayan*.

⁴ Salom Nakdimon, *Israeli-Kurdish Connection 1963-1975*, Telaviv-1996, page 23.

⁵ Ian Black & Benny Morris, *Israel's Secret Wars: History of the Israeli Secret Service*, Grove Press, New York, 1992, pp. 184-185.



Figure (37) Barzani with the Israeli Mossad agents in northern Iraq



Figure (38) General Eliezer Tsafir an Israeli Mossad agent in northern Iraq.



Figure (48) Israeli Mossad agents in northern Iraq helped the Kurdish rebels in mid of the mid-sixties of the last century.



Figure (39) from the left to the right head of Mossad General Meir Amit, Safti Barzani, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Shemsettin Mufti, and Mossad agent in Iraq David Kron in Israel.



Figure (40) Mustafa Barzani in Israel



Figure (41) at the house of the Israeli Defense Minister Moshi Dayan, from left to right, David Kron, Libkrib, Hrobin, Mahmud Osman, Rehavam Zeevi, Mustafa Barzani, Israeli Defense Minister Moshi Dayan, Meir Amit, and Shemsettin Mufti - Israel in 1968.



Figure (42) Shneur Zelman Rubashov the third president of Israel from 1963 to 1973 met the Kurdish rebel leader Mustafa Barzani in 1968 in Israel



Figure (43) Mossad chiefs presented the military degree to the Kurdish rebel leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani



Figure (44) Israeli Doctors and paramedics with Mustafa Barzani in front of Field Hospital in northern Iraq in 1966 with Safti Barzani, Ahron Cohen, Nissim Avraham, Sherko Sebri, and Diyar Kurdi Israel.



Figure (46) Mustafa Barzani visits one of the Israeli Air Force Squadron.



Figure (47) the Kurdish rebel leader Mustafa Barzani with the Israeli president Shneur Zalman Rubashov as the third president of Israel from 1963 to 1973.

Mustafa Barzani visited Israel; Barzani presented the Israeli official with a gift, a Kurdish dagger with a blueprint for the Kirkuk oil refinery, which was struck in cooperation between the Kurdish Party and the *Mossad*. The attack was conducted by *Mossad* agent *Yakov Nimrodi*, who was at the same time a military *attaché* to the embassy of his entity in the Iranian capital Tehran. He also played a role in Barzani's acquisition of Soviet weapons. [6]

The *Mossad*'s support for the Kurds dates to the beginning of the 1960s when the Israeli military advisers in 1963 equipped them with weapons and ammunition.

In August 1965, the Israelis opened training camps for Kurdish officers. In June 1966, Israeli Prime Minister *Levi Eshkol* met *Mullah Mustafa Barzani*, and a year later they were assisted by Kurds over six days with weapons and the allocation of monthly financial aid to them by half a million dollars. *Mullah Mustafa Barzani* visited Israel twice,

⁶ Ian Black & Benny Morris, *Israel's Secret Wars: History of the Israeli Secret Service*, Grove Press, New York, 1992, pp. 329-327.

first in September 1967 and again in September 1973, where he held private meetings with *Moshe Dayan*. [7]

Mustafa Barzani on his second visit to Israel stayed at the home of Jewish Kurd *David Gabbay*, who has been living there since 1950. *Gabbay* spoke Kurdish well and managed to sort out the relationship between *Mossad* and *Barzani*. According to reports from the *CIA*, *Mossad* chief *Ze'evi* visited *Barzani* headquarters in northern Iraq, asking him to intensify attacks against the central government in Baghdad. Efforts to establish a Kurdish state in northern Iraq have been influenced by Israel since the early 1970s when Israeli aid to *Barzani* had not ceased until that period. Until it came to the *Mossad* chief in that period, *Meir Amit* personally visited the north and gave promises to the Kurds to help. [8]

During the 1973 war, the *Mossad* asked *Mullah Mustafa Barzani* to attack Iraqi oil wells. The latter accepted the request and attacked. The Kurds, especially the *Kurdistan Democratic Party* led by *Massoud Barzani*, did not hide their relationship with Israel and their desire to develop this relationship, which they denied before the occupation of Iraq to remove suspicions about them and avoid angering some forces in the region.

The Barzani faction maintained its relationship with him until his fall in April 2003 but after the occupation of Iraq by the United States and its allies and the fall of the Saddam Hussein government in 2003. Hundreds of the *Mossad* agents accompanied the US forces. The Israeli forces' duties were assassinating Palestinian opposition who were on the Israeli secret services wanted list and assassinating the Iraqi scientists and pilots who were considered a great danger to Israeli state security.

During the occupation of Iraq in 2003 hundreds of Palestinians were taken and killed in very strange and ambiguous circumstances. The objective of the Israeli *Mossad* presence in Iraq was to eliminate the

⁷ Benjamin Beate Halahmi, *Israeli Communications*, IB Torres Ltd, London 1988, page 19.

⁸ Denis Ashinberg Ury Dan-Lee Landau, *Mossad - The Israeli Secret Service*, Paddington Press, 1978, p. 267-268.

intellectual, technical, and biological scientists and to destroy the foundational structure of the country.

The Israeli *Mossad* and secret service were responsible for the destruction of the Iraqi museum and for stealing many historical books and artifacts that were related to Jewish culture. In fact, within a few months of the occupation of Iraq, hundreds of Iraqi military pilots, scientists, and university lecturers were kidnapped and assassinated; the Iraqi people blamed the assassinations on both Iranian and Israeli agents.

The Israeli interference in the internal affairs of Iraq did not stop there but extended to the north of Iraq. Israeli *Special Forces* and *Israeli Paramilitary* volunteer forces flocked to northern Iraq under various companies and organisational names. Their objective was to gain lucrative profits by establishing training camps, training the Kurdish Peshmerga, and advising the KRG against fighting the terrorists, security training, gathering information and intelligence.

Israeli security companies were also involved in training the Kurds on the gathering of information, communication, and interception of phone calls. In addition, the Israelis were heavily involved in the establishment of the Kurdish security forces which are known as *Asayish* who are responsible for the kidnapping and assassination of the Turkmen and Arabs in the north of Iraq and especially in Kirkuk.

To strengthen his relationship with this entity, *Massoud Barzani* officially allowed the monthly magazine *Israel-Kurd* to be published in Erbil, where the Kurdish editor of the magazine published articles and documented meetings with current and former Israeli officials and officials who spoke about their relations with the Kurds and the Kurdish movement, and their support for the Kurdish armed movement in the 1960s and 1970s.



Figure (49) Masoud Barzani allowed the monthly magazine Israel-Kurd to be published in Erbil.

The Israeli *Mossad* has been visiting Northern Iraq for the past century and these visits have increased dramatically after the fall of the Saddam Hussein government. The visits by Kurdish officials to Israel also increased.

After the fall of Saddam Hussein, the ex-Israeli army flooded into Northern Iraq, taking advantage of the lack of security in place. They did this by training the Kurds on the utilization of the latest military equipment and urban fighting. Also, many of the Israeli secret services came to northern Iraq to set up various companies. They were often set up under other foreign national's credentials to mask the true ownership.

In addition, several Kurdish offices were opened in Israel and a Kurdish-Israeli magazine was established.

The Israeli-Kurds magazine was established to strengthen the relationship between Israel and Kurds. The magazine was providing cheap propaganda and harming the relationship between Iraqi ethnic groups as it was continuously calling the Palestinians terrorists and was providing cheap propaganda for the state of Israel. However, during the Kurdish independent referendum, the state of Israel was the only openly state that supported the Kurdish referendum, and Israeli state media promoted the Kurdish independent referendum. Also, the

Jews in the US had lobbied to promote the Kurdish referendum and several media conferences were held in various parts of the US supporting the Kurdish independent referendum.

Officially the US was also against an independent Kurdish state. Israel was the only state that supported the referendum. *Chuck Schumer*, Democratic Senate leader and a reliable *Zionist* tool, called on the *Trump* administration to recognise an independent *Kurdistan*. Trump could not do so because it would put the US in opposition to its allies in Türkiye and the Iraqi government. But the official position was different from what the US did on the ground. US arms still flowed to Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria.

The state of Israel was hoping for the success of the Kurdish independent referendum this would allow the creation of a second Israeli state in northern Iraq.

The Israelis were looking forward to a Kurdish independent state for several reasons; Iraq was to be divided into three states; Arabs (*Sunni*), Arabs (*Shi'a*), and the Kurdish state, and the division of Iraq would be less of a threat to the state if Israel, also the state of Israel would be able to open an embassy in a newly established Kurdish state which would give the Israeli's easy access to destabilize Iran, Türkiye and easy access for the collection of military information about Iran in general, and especially about the Iranian nuclear activities.

Also, the newly established Kurdish state would be a lucrative market for Israeli products to be sold and provide Israeli access to so-called Israeli religious shrines in Northern Iraq in general, especially in Mosul and Kirkuk.

In addition to this, the Israelis would be able to get cheap oil and water from a newly established Kurdish state in return Israel would provide the Kurds with heavy military equipment such as tanks, artillery, and military airplanes.

Moreover, under the pretext of fighting the ISIL and terrorist organisations in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, the Israeli pilots were flying US aircraft, operating well outside authorities, and agreed-upon operational zones, and hitting Iranian and *Hezbollah Militia* forces inside Syria. Sources say that *Netanyahu* had become a regular visitor to Erbil, meeting with *Barzani* on at least three separate occasions,

assuring Kurdistan of Israeli backing against ISIL and the federal central government in Baghdad.

Israel has been training Kurds to move into key oil regions of Iraq and supporting the Kurds in occupying the city of Kirkuk when ISIL occupied the city of Mosul. The Kurds began transporting oil as early as late 2014, while Israel assisted ISIL, with US help, in taking Mosul and the Anbar province. [9]

The Kurdish aspiration and dream for controlling the oil of Kirkuk goes further back into Iraqi history, with the military coup of 1958 bringing rays of hope for the Turkmens after the coup of 1958 General *Abdul Karim Qasim* declared an amnesty and, after the Kurdish rebel leader *Mullah Mustafa Barzani* returned from the Soviet Union, started negotiating for a Kurdish autonomous region.

The situation of the Turkmens deteriorated dramatically and drastically because of the hegemonic ambitions of *Mullah Mustafa Barzani* and his plans for an independent Kurdish state in the north of Iraq, as well as his demand for the oil wealth of Kirkuk, which was not only a necessity but also the main motivation.

The existence of Turkmens in the north of Iraq, side-by-side with the Kurds, and the Turkmens presence in great numbers in Kirkuk, where for centuries they represented the majority, were seen and felt by *Mullah Mustafa Barzani* as obstacles to the realization of his dreams for an independent Kurdish state and the control of Kirkuk's oil wealth.

⁹ <http://www.rojikurd.net/en/2017/10/08/is-israel-giving-their-allies-the-kurds-and-air-force-to-fight-iraq-and-turkey/> and Israel Giving the Kurds an Air Force to Fight Baghdad (updated), By Gordon Duff, Senior Editor, and October 4, 2017.



Figure (50) The flow of oil in the Baba Gurgur field, near Kirkuk City on 27 October 1927




Figure (52) the flow of oil in the first oil well in the Baba Gurgur field in Kirkuk.

During the time of General *Abdul Karim Qasim*, the Turkmen suffered from marginalization and discrimination from both the Kurds and the Iraqi communists who dominated the regime in Iraq. The Turkmen faced internal deportation, exile, arbitrary arrest, and detention,

confiscation of properties and agricultural land, and, worst of all, the massacre of 120 of their intellectuals and community leaders on the eve of the first anniversary of the revolution.

On 14th July 1959, the Kurdish rebel leader *Mullah Mustafa Barzani* and his Kurdish followers allied with the Iraqi *communists*.

The city of Kirkuk was put under curfew and its population was slaughtered by communists and Kurds.

The streets of Kirkuk were filled with blood and saw one of its more brutal moments in history.

The Turkmen in Kirkuk were attacked and killed under the false pretext that they helped the Mosul resistance against the central government. The Kirkuk massacre was disregarded by the world and the whole of humanity ignored it. It was only after this massacre that the communist Kurds became aggressive enough to negotiate for the inclusion of Kirkuk in their autonomous region.

During this period “1958-1963”, a mass migration of the Kurds, from their villages in the north-east of Iraq to the Turkmen region and especially to the cities of Kirkuk and *Tuz Khormatu*, was organised and implemented to increase the Kurdish presence in Kirkuk and alter the demography of the town.

The Turkmen of Iraq had actively supported *Abdul Karim Qasim* July 14 coup and hoped that in the wake of colonial rule, a new order could be set up wherein all ethnic groups received equal opportunity and representation.

On the first anniversary of the 1959 revolution, the Turkmen proved to show their support for the new president General *Abdul Karim Qasim*, tens of thousands of Turkmen deliberately ignored the existing curfew and drove to Baghdad from *Kirkuk, Mosul, Erbil, Telafer, Tuz Khormatu* and numerous smaller villages.

General *Abdul Karim Qasim* welcomed the crowd of Turkmen and received their leaders inside the main hall of the Ministry. Playing to the assembled crowd, the self-appointed prime minister assured the Turkmen that the ‘new Iraq’ would be a utopian world where “all ethnic groups in Iraq were brethren and the Turkmen would be given thoughtful attention by the new regime to enable them to enjoy full citizens’ rights.



Figure (53) Turkmen celebrating the first anniversary of the 1959 revolution prior to the mascara of the Turkmen by the Kurds and communists in 1959.

As proof of his sincerity in respecting the Turkmen, *Abdul Karim Qasim* released the previously suppressed census data which showed the Turkmen's actual population per the census of 1957 was 567,000. Encouraged by these developments, Turkmen intellectuals began to publish their weekly newspaper in both Arabic and Turkish entitled *Al-Bashir*.



Figure (54) Turkmen wearing their traditional clothes waiting for the start of the ceremony of the first anniversary of the 1959 revolution prior to the mascara of the Turkmen by the Kurds and communists in 1959.



Figure (55) Turkmen wearing their traditional clothes waiting for the start of the ceremony of the first anniversary of the 1959 revolution prior to the mascara of the Turkmen by the Kurds and communists in 1959.

However, the honeymoon between the newly liberated Turkmen ethnic and *Abdul Karim Qasim* administration did not last long. To complicate matters, trouble also started brewing between the Turkmen and rival Kurdish warlords. At the same time, the communist movement was sweeping across Iraq, unions were gaining political power and *Abdul Karim Qasim* was having difficulty keeping his military officers under control.

When *Abdul Karim Qasim* seized power in Iraq in 1958, the CIA established a covert cell known as the *Health Alteration Committee*. In addition, in plotting *Abdul Karim Qassim's* assassination, the Americans conspired with their Turkish counterparts on several military contingency plans. Dubbed *Operation Cannon Bone*, a joint US and Türkiye task force was to invade northern Iraq and seize the oilfields should a disruption in Iraqi oil exports ever occur.

One of *Abdul Karim Qassim* key initiatives were the development of the international association which became known as the *Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries* (OPEC). This vital commodity cartel held its first meeting in Baghdad in September 1960. Such a development was not considered to be in America's long-term best

interest. Against this explosive international backdrop, General *Abdul Karim Qassim* faced a more serious challenge from within.

Following an aborted coup attempt, *Nadhim Al-Tabakchil*, the commander of the 2nd Army Division in Kirkuk was relieved of his command, and his replacement, Brigadier *Dawood Al-Janabi*, immediately initiated a crackdown on Turkmens under pretext of the nationalism and one of his first directives was to close the *Al-Bashir* newspaper just 26 weeks after it had begun publishing.

Abdul Karim Qasim under *Dawood Al-Janabi's* instructions, the military police conducted weapons searches and seized the private arsenals of many innocent Turkmen political leaders, once again teachers and intellectuals were rounded up; many were arrested and deported to Baghdad.

In Iraq, the Kurdish communists were given free rein by *Dawood Al-Janabi*, and the Kurdish militia and communists soon began a campaign of violence against unarmed innocent Turkmen civilians of Kirkuk.

Out of fear and frustration, a delegation of Turkmen sought an audience with *Abdul Karim Qasim* in Baghdad to advise him of the deteriorating security situation in the north in general and especially in Kirkuk. The Kurdish communists in Iraq armed with the propaganda pamphlets and hate literature that had been openly distributed deliberately by the communists clearly were persuaded to remove Brigadier *Dawood Al-Janabi* from power in Kirkuk.

This move angered the Kurdish communists and the followers of Chieftain *Mullah Barzani*. In the meantime, Prime Minister General *Abdul Karim Qasim* had personally assured the Turkmens delegation that their security in Kirkuk was a priority.

In June 1959, *Abdul Karim Qasim* overturned many of the deportation orders that had been issued to the Turkmen dissidents, and they were free to make their way back to Kirkuk from their brief relocation. What the Turkmen did not realize was that *Abdul Karim Qassim's* promise of a safe environment was not being respected by the Kurds and communist party members in Kirkuk.

On July 14, preparations were being made across Iraq to celebrate the first anniversary of the new republic. *Abdul Karim Qassim* government had issued a decree urging numerous organisations and

ethnic groups to participate as a show of solidarity with the 1958 revolution which toppled the monarchy. The Turkmen's leaders responded by organising a march through the streets of Kirkuk and other Turkmen's populated areas.

On 14th July 1959, the first anniversary of the setting up of the Republic of Iraq the city of Kirkuk was decorated with triumphal arches. Ahead of festivities and ceremonies that day the city had a true sense of a feast atmosphere. Turkmen's children, women and men, and the people of Kirkuk were dressed in their traditional and national clothes as they were waiting for the ceremony celebrations to start.

The labour unions, civil service organisations, professional guilds, and student groups all encouraged their constituents to attend the official march, while many other smaller associations planned their general processions. [10]



Figure (56) On the 14th of July 1959, Turkmen celebrated the 1st anniversary of the Republic and the photo shows the Turkmen celebrating the anniversary of the Republic prior to the Turkmen being massacred by the Kurds and communists in 1959.

¹⁰ The public began to fill the street and they began singing, playing national games with the joy of a feast and the official parade began. (WE HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN THE KIRKUK MASSACRE, Ali Kerkuklu, the author of a book titled " Irak'a Özgürlük Operasyonu ve Kerkuk Book)



Figure (57) On the 14th of July 1959, Turkmen celebrated the first anniversary of the Republic and the photo shows the Turkmen celebrating the anniversary of the Republic prior to the Turkmen being massacred by the Kurds and communists in 1959.



Figure (58) On the 14th of July 1959, Turkmen celebrated the first anniversary of the Republic.



Figure (59) On the 14th of July 1959, Turkmen celebrate the first anniversary of the Republic.



Figure (60) On the 14th of July 1959, Turkmen celebrating the first anniversary of the Republic; prior to the mascara of the Turkmen by the Kurdish communists.



Figure (61) The Turkmen protesting the massacre of the Turkmen by the Kurdish militia and communists in 1959.



Figure (62) The Turkmen protesting the massacre of the Turkmen by the Kurdish militia and communists in 1959.

However, as the ranks of the various parades converged at the head of *Atlas Street* in Kirkuk, near the main marketplace, the Kurdish followers of Chieftain *Mullah Mustafa Barzani* sprung their well-

coordinated trap. Scattered throughout the Turkmen marchers were scores of *Barzani's* shooters posing as demonstrators. At a pre-arranged signal, they threw down their banners and pulled out hidden firearms. As machine gun bullets ripped through the densely packed crowds the terrified people dispersed.

During the chaos, Kurdish assailants began to execute a methodical program of brutal assassination by searching out prominent Turkmen activists: many of these individuals were hunted down in their homes. The lucky ones were killed outright, while the unfortunate ones were dragged into the streets, their legs tied to the bumper of a car and then dragged at high speeds until their bloodied bodies resembled sides of freshly butchered meat.

The innocent Turkmen citizens in Kirkuk were caught by surprise at the scale of the Kurdish militia attack, the local authorities issued a curfew, but there were too few police officers to enforce the directive. As the police and soldiers bunkered down, the Kurdish militia continued to rampage throughout the streets and the Turkmen businesses were looted and burned, and both the landmark *Atlas Street* and *Al-Alamain Movie Theatres* were destroyed by mortar fire. With the entrances to the city blocked off, the carnage continued unabated for three days. [11]

Many Turkmen leaders were taken to Kirkuk barracks from their homes on the grounds that they were wanted by the *2nd Division Command*. Here, in the so-called *People's Courts*, the leaders were tried in five to ten minutes and then were shot.

Some Turkmen had ropes attached to two of their feet which two jeeps headed in opposite directions tore them apart. After the corpses that were dragged street after street were left exposed, they were then passed over by trucks and tractors.

Turkmen intellectuals, artisans who had the soul of the country beating in their hearts, and the youth, were being killed by unbelievable methods. They were stuck behind motor vehicles hung onto the electricity poles and were left under the fierce hot sun; some had been buried alive. Other Turkmen had their eyes gouged out.

¹¹ *The massacre of Turkomans in Kirkuk on 14th July 1959. Among the others – Encounters with the forgotten Turkoman of Iraq* by Scott Taylor.

Apart from the dead, there were also hundreds of wounded Turkmen and the people who saw this brutality went mad and lost their minds. Hospitals in the city of Kirkuk were filled with casualties; a lot of schools were used as prisons because there were no more spaces left in detention centers and prisons. While these atrocities were being committed by the Kurds and communist party members, the stores, commercial centers, and houses that belonged to Turkmen were being looted by Kurdish brigands.

In addition to their own safety, Turkmen had also lost their goods when they were plundered by Kurdish looters and transported by trucks to the northern regions. In the middle of the prevailing uncertainties, was the rise of fires everywhere in Kirkuk. [12]

Although the military commander had let Baghdad know of the ethnic clashes and Kurdish atrocities conducted against the Turkmen and requested reinforcements, it was the heroic action of Turkmen general *Abdullah Abdul Rahman* who took a great personal risk to travel from Kirkuk and to Baghdad. Only after a personal meeting with Prime Minister *Abdul Karim Qasim*, then *Abdul Karim Qasim* did he realise the gravity of the situation in Kirkuk. After that, *Abdul Karim Qasim* dispatched a brigade of infantry to Kirkuk to stop the Kurdish militia carnage against the Turkmen.

However, even after the soldiers arrived to restore order, the Kurds continued to hamper the efforts to bring the fires and fighting under control. Although the Kurdish militia did not use their weapons on the soldiers, the Kurdish militia and communist members blocked the streets and prevented fire brigades and ambulances from entering the central square to clear away the bloated and rotting corpses.[13]

The tragedy, atrocity, and carnage that had been conducted by the communist party members and Kurdish made the Turkmen hate the communist party and because of that seldom you will see a Turkmen individual supporting the communist party.

¹² We have not forgotten the Kirkuk massacre, Ali Kerkuklu, the author of book titled "Irak'a Özgürlük Operasyonu ve Kerkuk Book.

¹³ The massacre of Turkomans in Kirkuk on 14th July 1959. Among the others – Encounters with the forgotten Turkoman of Iraq" by *Scott Taylor*.



Figure (63) Jihad Fakhreddin, an innocent unarmed Turkmen killed by the Kurds and communists in 1959 and the Turkmen who were murdered, later were hanged to poles, and were dragged by the car along the streets.



Figure (64) Emal Mukhtar, an innocent Turkmen girl who was brutally killed by the Kurdish militia and communists in Kirkuk in 1959



Figure (65) Atta Khyrullah, an innocent unarmed Turkmen killed by the Kurds and communists in 1959.



Figure (66) Ihsan Khyrullah, an innocent unarmed Turkmen civilian was killed by the communists



Figure (67) Abdullah Bayati, an innocent unarmed Turkmen killed by the Kurdish militia and communists in Kirkuk.



Figure (68) Kamal Abdulsamad, an innocent unarmed Turkmen killed by the Kurds and communists.




Figure (69) Nooruddin Aziz, an innocent unarmed Turkmen killed by the Kurdish and communists in 1959, and his body was dragged by a car along the streets in Kirkuk, Kirkuk, and Turkmen Eli.



Figure (70) Adil Abdulmajeed, an innocent unarmed Turkmen killed by the Kurds and communists in 1959, Kirkuk, Turkmen Eli.



Figure (71) Mohammed Awchi, an innocent unarmed Turkmen killed by the Kurds and communists in 1959, and his body was dragged along the streets in Kirkuk



Figure (72) Salahaddin Awchi, a Turkman killed by the Kurds and communists in 1959, Kirkuk, Turkmen Eli.



Figure (73) Corpses of Turkmen killed by the Kurds and communists in 1959.



Figure (74) Corpses of innocent unarmed Turkmen killed by the Kurds and communists in 1959, Turkmen that were murdered, hanged to poles, and dragged along the streets.



Figure (75) Corpses of innocent unarmed Turkmen killed by the Kurds and communists in 1959, Kirkuk.




Figure (76) Corpses of innocent unarmed Turkmen killed by the Kurds and communists in 1959, Kirkuk, Turkmen Eli.



Figure (77) The Massacre targeting Kirkuk's Turkmen conducted by Kurdish and communist perpetrators lasted 3 days between 14 and 16 July 1959 which resulted in the loss of many lives including children women and the elderly.



Figure (78) Turkmen killed by the Kurdish communists in 1959 in kirkuk



Figure (79) Turkmen killed by the Kurdish communists in 1959 in kirkuk



Figure (80) Turkmen killed by the Kurdish communists in 1959 in Kirkuk



Figure (81) Turkmen protest after the mascara of the Turkmen by the Kurds and communists in 1959



Figure (82) Turkmen's protest after the mascara of the Turkmen by the Kurds and communists in 1959



Figure (83) the graveyard where the Turkmen were buried after being killed by the Kurds and communists in 1959, Kirkuk, and Turkmen Eli.

1.11 THE SOCIAL ERA OF GENERAL ABDUL SALAM ARIF “1963-1967”

Almost immediately after the military coup of 1958 that toppled the monarchy, tensions rose between the pan-Arabs *Abdul Salam Arif* and Iraqi nationalist *Abdul Karim Qasim* who also had the support of the *Iraqi Communist Party*. The former supported a union with the *United Arab Republic “UAR”* composed of Egypt and Syria under President *Jamal Abdul Nasser*, but the latter opposed merging with the *UAR*. As a result, the two leaders engaged in a power struggle, ending in General *Abdul Karim Qasim* prevailing and the removal of *Abdul Salam Arif* from his positions on the 12th of September 1958. He was appointed to the low-ranking post of ambassador to *Bonn*.

Abdul Salam Arif refused to accept the post and upon returning to Baghdad on the 4th of November 1958, he was promptly arrested for plotting against the state. *Abdul Salam Arif* was sentenced to death along with *Rashid Ali al-Gaylani* in February 1959 but General *Abdul Karim Qasim* had him released in November 1961.

A new organisation, the *Arab Socialist Resurrection Party*, known as the *Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party*, persuaded the army that *Abdul Karim Qasim* should be overthrown. General *Abdul Karim Qasim* was overthrown on the 8th of February 1963, by a coalition of *Ba’athists*, army units, and other *pan-Arab* groups that was led by the leader of the *Arab Socialist Resurrection Party*, *Ahmad Hassan al-Baker* and established the rule of the *National Council for Revolutionary Command* with a non-*Baathist* president, *Abdul Salam Muhammad Arif*.

Abdul Salam Arif had previously been selected as the leader of the *Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council* and after the coup he was elected president of Iraq due to his popularity. General *Abdul Karim Qasim* pleaded with *Arif* to be exiled instead of executed and reminded *Arif* that he had commuted his death sentence two years before.

Nonetheless, *Arif* demanded that General *Abdul Karim Qasim* swear to the holy Qur'an that it was he, *Abdul Salam Muhammad Arif*, who had been the real leader of the 1958 coup. *Abdul Karim Qasim* refused his request and consequently, *Abdul Karim Qasim* was executed.



Figure (84) Abdul Karim Qasim after receiving treatment in hospital after surviving an assassination attempt in 1959.



Figure (85) General Abdul Karim Qasim was killed in the coup in 1963.

The ensuing era of General Abdul Salam Arif “1963-1967” was one of the best periods for Turkmen in Iraq. The culprits of the 1959 Kirkuk massacre was arrested and tried, and they were sentenced to death. They were hanged in the two big squares of Kirkuk by the government. During the General Abdul Salam Arif, the Turkmen could run cultural associations, schools publish magazines and

newspapers in the Turkish Latin characters and Turkmens were given some high posts in government.



Figure (86) From the left Abdul Salam Mohammed Arif Aljumaily is sitting next to Abdul Karim Qasim and on the left General Abdul Rahman Mohammed Arif



Figure (87) Abdul Salam Mohammed Arif Aljumaily and Ibrahim Faisal al_Ansari during a visit to Kirkuk, in Musalla neighbourhood in 1964

This made the Turkmens happy, and they demonstrated excellently that as citizens of Iraq, they could work for their country and live in cooperation with other Iraqis.

Abdul Salam Arif rose to power in a bloodless military coup in 1963, and his time in power is remembered for his policy of working towards economic union with *Jamal Abdul Nasser's* Egypt. He supported the idea of a pan-Arab alliance between Arabian nations and gathered Iraq's Arab nationalists under the umbrella of the *Arab*

Socialist Union. Although he was chosen as president, more power was held by the *Ba'athist* prime minister, *Ahmed Hassan al-Baker*.



Figure (88) Abdul Salam Mohammed Arif Aljumaily during a visit to Baghdad

Following a *Ba'athists-led* coup in Syria in March 1963, *Arif* entered his country into reunification talks with Syria and Egypt which had split from the *UAR* in 1961. After the fallout with *Jamal Abdul Nasser* in July, the *Ba'athist* government of Iraq removed all non-*Ba'athist* members from the cabinet, despite *Arif's* support for *Nasser*. On November 18, *Abdul Salam Arif*, with the support of disaffected elements in the military, took advantage of a split between the *Ba'ath* which weakened the party and ousted their members from the government. *Abdul Salam Arif* formed a new cabinet, retaining a few *Ba'athists*, but mostly made up of *Nasserist* army officers and technocrats. He maintained his presidency and appointed himself chief of staff.

A month later, he handed the latter post to his brother General *Abdul Rahman Arif*, and the premiership to his confidant Lieutenant-General *Tahir Yahiya*. In the fall of 1964, the *Ba'ath* attempted to depose *Abdul*

Salam Arif but failed when their plot was unveiled. *Abdul Salam Arif* had the conspirators, including Saddam Hussein, arrested.

On May 26, 1964, *Abdul Salam Arif* established the *Joint Presidency Council with Egypt*. On July 14, the anniversary of the revolution, he declared the establishment of the *Arab Socialist Union "ASU"* of Iraq, commending it as the "threshold of the building of the unity of the Arab nation under Arab socialism.

It was identical in structure to the *ASU* of Egypt and like in Egypt; many of the Arab nationalist parties were dissolved and absorbed by the *ASU*. Also, all banks and over thirty major Iraqi businesses were nationalized. *Arif* undertook these measures to bring Iraq closer to Egypt to help foster unity and on December 20, plans for a union were announced.

Despite this, in July 1965, the *Nasserist* ministers resigned from the Iraqi cabinet. President *Abdul Salam Arif* played a significant role in Iraq's construction and development of its infrastructure. On April 13, 1966, *Abdul Salam Mohammed Arif* was killed in a mysterious helicopter crash, on the banks of the Shatt-al-Arab River in Southern Iraq. *Abdul Rahman Al-Bazzaz* became acting president of Iraq for three days, and a power struggle for the presidency occurred.

In the first meeting of the *Defense Council* and cabinet to elect a president, *Al-Bazzaz* needed a two-thirds majority to win the presidency. *Al-Bazzaz* was unsuccessful, and *Abdul Rahman Arif* was elected president who was elder brother, Major General *Abdul Rahman Mohammed Arif*. On 17th July 1968 General *Abdul Rahman Arif's* government was overthrown, and Major General *Ahmed Hassan al-Baker*, a former premier, was appointed head of the *Revolutionary Command Council*.

1.12 THE BA'ATH PERIOD “1968–2003”

After the coup of 17 July 1968 a bloodless revolution coup in Iraq led by *Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr*, *Abd ar-Razzaq an-Naif*, and *Abd ar-Rahman al-Dawud* that ousted President *Abdul Rahman Arif* and Prime Minister *Tahir Yahiya* and brought the *Iraqi Regional Branch* of the *Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party* to power in Iraq, efforts were made to end the Kurdish rebellion in the north-east of the country.

Generous incentives were presented to the Kurdish rebel leader, *Mullah Mustafa Barzani*, by the *Ba'ath* regime in 1970 to put an end to his rebellion by offering him an autonomous Kurdish region with Erbil city another Turkmen city as its capital.



Figure (89) Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr gave a speech on the 1968 revolution.

In doing this, the Iraqi government acted in total disregard of the Turkmen's interests in Iraq and particularly of those of the 300,000 unfortunate Turkmen of Erbil, who were sacrificed by the *Ba'ath* regime and offered as a ‘present’ to *Mullah Mustafa Barzani* in return for his acceptance to end the Kurdish rebellion.

In the 1970s, as it became more and more clear that *Mullah Mustafa Barzani's* ambitions and plans were to take over Kirkuk, control its oil wealth, and declare an independent Kurdish state, the Iraqi government “*Ba'ath* regime” acted to maintain Iraq's territorial unity and to counter

Barzani's ambitions. However, the Iraqi government refused to accede to the Kurdish rebels' demands to include the Turkmen city of Kirkuk as part of the Kurdish autonomous region for economic and political reasons and because most of the population in Kirkuk were Turkmen. Moreover, *Saddam Hussein's* government did not conduct the agreement of 1970; thus, the Kurdish rebels renewed their fight against the central government in Baghdad. Nevertheless, the *Ba'ath* party period beginning in 1968 opened one of the darkest chapters in Turkmen's history.



Figure (90) Iraqi President Abdul Salam Arif and Algerian President Houari Boumediene and Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr in Baghdad 1963.



Figure (91) Field Marshal Ahmed Hussein al-Baker, president since 1968, and Saddam Hussein. In July 1968 General Abdul Rahman Arif's government was overthrown, and Major General Ahmed Hassan al-Baker, a former premier, was appointed head of the Revolutionary Command Council

The Turkmen Cultural Directorate which was originally set up by the government to bring Turkmen under strict control was not working according to the government's plans. Thus, *Saddam Hussein's* regime started a new policy, which is commonly referred to as *Arabisation* "*Ta'rib*", invoked by the Iraqi government program.

Arab families resettled from southern Iraq to replace and dilute the Turkmen population but the Turkmen opposed policies of the *Ba'ath* regime and vigorously contested the regime's authoritarian Arabisation policy. By 1972, the Iraqi government prohibited both the study of the Turkmen language and Turkmen's media, and in 1973, any reference to the Turkmen was omitted from the provisional constitution. During the 1980s, the regime, the *Ba'ath* Party, prohibited even public use of the Turkmen language and the constitution of 1990 only states that the 'people of Iraq' consist of 'Arabs and Kurds'.

As I have stated, to reduce the concentration of the Turkmen population in *Turkmen Eli* regions in general, and Kirkuk in particular, the Iraqi government established an *Arabisation* policy, which can be defined as the systematic forcible transfer of the Turkmen and Kurdish populations, aimed at changing the demographic nature of northern

Iraq. Arab families who were brought from southern Iraq to replace and dilute the Turkmen and Kurd populations were conducted under the Iraqi government's program of *Arabisation*. The forced and arbitrary transfer of populations is not permissible under international law and is a crime against humanity. Nevertheless, *Saddam Hussein's* government sought to alter the demographic makeup of northern Iraq to reduce the political power and presence of Turkmen and Kurds and to consolidate control over this oil-rich region; these covered areas reaching from the town of *Mandeli*, close to the Iranian border, to the Syrian and Turkish border areas around Telafer.

During the *Arabisation* policy, many Turkmen and Kurdish villages were bulldozed, and new Arab settlements were built nearby. The main object of the *Arabisation* policy was to reduce the Turkmen population in Kirkuk and the surrounding regions. Therefore, the Iraqi government annexed the district of *Tuz Khurmatu*, which was linked to Kirkuk City until 1970. Because of the *Arabisation* policy, the *Ba'ath* regime decided to link it to a newly established province, called *Salahaddin "Tikrit"*, which is 130 km from Kirkuk, while *Tuz Khormatu* is 75 km from Kirkuk. Nevertheless, the district of *Tuz Khurmatu* city was annexed to the *Salahaddin* province by official government legislation number 434, which was issued on 11th September 1989. [14]

In addition, the *Ba'ath* regime linked the *Kifri* district to the *Diyala* province. The Turkmen district of *Altunköprü*, which was annexed from Erbil, governed the Kirkuk province; thus, the area that Kirkuk governed was reduced from 19,543 km² to 9,426 km², becoming the fourth largest province in Iraq. [15]

The properties and most other assets seized from the Turkmen victims were distributed amongst the new Arab arrivals as part of a package of economic incentives. Simultaneously, the Iraqi government brought in landless Arabs from the nearby *Al-Jazeera* desert in Northern Iraq and others from central and southern Iraq to settle in the Turkmen region. Furthermore, titles for the rich agricultural lands seized from the

¹⁴ Aziz Kadir Samanci, *Political History for The Iraqi Turkoman*, Page 34, First Edition, Year 1999, Published by Dar Al_Saqi, London, United Kingdom.

¹⁵ *Ibid* Page 34

Kurds and Turkmen were invalidated upon their expulsion, and the land was then leased under annual contracts to Arab farmers. Many of those expelled Turkmen have been living in camps for the internally displaced people in the northern Kurdish-controlled area.

The forced mass displacement of populations based on their ethnic identity and attempts to Arabise Kirkuk and Tuz Khormatu date back to the discovery of major oil reserves in Kirkuk City in the 1920s, while Iraq was still under British mandate. The oil from the Kirkuk fields was not successfully extracted by the government until 1927, but oil rights were first conceded to the Iraqi Petroleum Company consortium on 14th March 1925. The Arabisation policy first occurred on a massive scale in the second half of the 1970s.

During the Arabisation period, Saddam Hussein's government controlled the oil industry. In addition, the *Ba'ath* regime brought in large numbers of Arab workers instead of employing local Turkmen and Kurds in the Iraqi Petroleum Company. The Turkmen were also excluded by the Iraqi government when the Iraqi government embarked on massive irrigation projects that began in the 1930s on the *Haifa*, *Qaraj* and *Kara Tepe* plains around Kirkuk, which became a rich agricultural region. Later projects helped the Iraqi government to settle several large nomadic Arab tribes from southern Iraq on these newly fertile lands.

1.13 THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF 1970

The provisional constitution announced by the president of Iraq, General *Ahmed Hassan Baker*, on 24th January 1970, Article 5, said that the people of Iraq consisted of two groups: Arabs and Kurds. The national and legal rights of all ethnic minorities were acknowledged by the Iraqi government within the unity of Iraq. The cultural rights were set to include the cultural rights of the minorities in Iraq. In this declaration, the section of the Turkmen rights showed that:

- The Turkmen shall receive primary education in Turkish in the region where they live and the Turkmen language will be the medium of instruction at the primary education stage.
- A directorate of Turkmen education shall be established and

attached to the Ministry of Culture and Information.

- Turkmen publications shall be encouraged and assisted, and this shall be attached to a union of Iraqi writers.
- A weekly newspaper and a monthly magazine in the Turkish language shall be published.
- The number of Turkmen TV programs in the Turkmen language on Kirkuk TV shall be increased.

In 1972, at the height of the *Cold War*, Iraq signed a 15-year treaty with the *Soviet Union*. *Saddam Hussein's* regime undertook wide-ranging social and economic reforms to try to increase its popularity. By March 1970, an agreement was reached between the Iraqi government and the *Kurdish Democratic Party "KDP"* over the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region. The government also nationalised the Iraqi *Petroleum Company*, which had been set up under the British administration and was pumping cheap oil to the West.

Soaring oil revenues resulting from the 1973 oil crises, the Iraqi government invested in industry, education, and healthcare, raising Iraq's standard of living to one of the highest in the Arab world. However, *Saddam Hussein's* government did not conduct the agreement of 1970; thus, a conflict broke out between the Kurds and the government's armed forces in the spring of 1974.



Figure (92) Houari Boumediene presidents of Algeria, Saddam Hussein and Shah of Iran, Mohammed Riza Pahlavi

The Kurdish rebels in the north of Iraq by Mullah Mustafa Barzani funded by the *Shah* of Iran, *Mohammed Riza Pahlavi* to rebel against the central government in Baghdad.

The intensity of the conflict and the economic damage caused to the Iraqi economy pushed Baghdad to the negotiating table with Iran, in a famous agreement that was signed between the *Shah* of Iran, *Mohammed Riza Pahlavi*, and *Saddam Hussein* in Algeria, where Iraq agreed to share control of the disputed Sha'tt al-Arab waterway with Iran.

The *Shah* of Iran, *Mohammed Riza Pahlavi* cut off the Kurds' funds and the Iraqi regime put down their uprising. In addition, Saddam Hussein extended his grip on power, stationing relatives and allies in key government and business roles. In 1978, the *Ba'ath* regime passed a new law, under which membership of opposition parties became punishable by death. The following year, Saddam Hussein forced General *Ahmed Hassan al-Baker's* resignation officially, because of ill health – and assumed the presidency. He executed dozens of his rivals within days of taking power.



Figure (93) On the 20th of March 1970, Saddam Hussein “right”, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and Assistant Secretary of the Socialist Arab Ba’ath Party, visited Erbil to meet with Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.



Figure (94) is a handwritten letter written by General Ahmed Hassan al-Baker showing a submission of his resignation due to family matters.

During the Saddam government, ten of the thousands of Iraqi paramilitary Kurds, who were known by the Iraqi government as *Fursans*, were established and armed by the Iraqi government. The *Fursans* mainly consisted of Kurds and were employed and supported with light arms and government cars. These Kurdish paramilitary *Fursans* were mainly used to quell any uprising and pass information to the Iraqi secret services about the opposition groups and deserters from the Iraqi army.

The pro-Iraqi government Kurdish forces called *Furans*, also called by the Kurdish rebels and opposition groups as *Jash* which stands for a small donkey in the Kurdish language. The *Fursan's* salary was paid by the Iraqi government and militarily equipped by the Saddam Hussein government.

They were responsible for the death of thousands of Turkmen and Kurds. They worked as informers, and they were provided with light arms AK-47s and cars by the Iraqi government. These *Fursans* also were leaking information to the Kurdish rebels about the Iraqi security plans, and army movements and storming the opposition houses. After

the fall of the Saddam Hussein government in 2003, all the *Fursans* who worked for the Iraqi government switched sides, joined the Peshmerga forces, and took an exceedingly elevated position within the *KRG*. Instead of these criminals being arrested and tried for the crimes they committed against the Turkmen and innocent Kurds, both Kurdish parties rewarded them.

In addition to this, during Saddam Hussein's government rule, hundreds of thousands of Shi'a Arabs were working and supporting the Saddam Hussein government - they were known by the Iraqi government as *Al_Jaysh Al_Shaibi*.

The *Al_Jaysh Al_Shaibi* supported the Iraqi government quelling various uprisings in Iraq, passing information to the Iraqi secret services about the opposition groups, and informing and arresting deserters from the Iraqi army. *Al_Jaysh Al_Shaibi* worked jointly with the Iraqi Secret Service in arresting people and patrolled the streets at night to protect the security and governmental building and protection of the Ba'ath party headquarters. There were thousands of secret service police working for the Saddam Hussein government in the north of Iraq, especially in Kirkuk. The overwhelming majority of these secret police were brought by the Iraqi regime from Southern Iraq, and they were *Shi'a* sectarian. These police were heavily involved in arresting, abusing, torturing, and imprisonment of people, harassing innocent Turkmen people, and killing Turkmen people. However, after the fall of the Saddam Hussein government, most of these secret police were at large and joined the government that was established by the allied forces, whereas the hundreds of thousands of the *Al_Jaysh Al_Shaibi* who supported the *Ba'ath* party joined the political parties that were established after the fall Saddam Hussein regime.

These *Al_Jaysh Al_Shaibi* members had taken a prominent position in the various Iraq governments that had become established after the fall of Saddam Hussein, while the hard cores of the Saddam Hussein government supporters and hierarchy officers joined the rebel groups such as *Al-Qaida* and ISIL.

The Geography of Iraq literature taught in secondary schools published by the prime minister and defense minister of Iraq in 1929 Taha Al Hashemi clearly showed on page 243 that the population of

the city of Kirkuk in 1920 is 92,000 and overwhelming majority of the population are Turkmen then followed by the Kurds and then Arabs as shown in the figures (94a) and (94b)




Figure (94a) An example of a Geography of Iraq book published by the prime minister and defense minister of Iraq in 1929 Taha Al_hashemi.

نفوس اللوآء في تقدير سنة ١٩٢٠ (٩٢٠٠٠) نسمة اكثرهم اترك ،
ثم يلهم في العدد الاكراذ والعرب . وفي التسجيل الاخير بلغ نفوس
قضاء كركوك (٥٩٢١٦) نسمة ونفوس قضاء كفرى (٣٣٧٨٩) نسمة .
ونفوس قضائي كيل وجميال فيلنت (٣٥٠٥٤) نسمة .

مرور اللوآء وسفوف الصبيبي . بلاد اللوآء من الشمال لوآء اربيل وقسم
من لوآء الموصل ، ومن الشرق لوآء السلجانية ولوآء ديالة ، ومن الجنوب
لوآء ديالة ولوآء بغداد ، ومن الغرب لوآء بغداد .
القسم الشرقى من ارض اللوآء جيلى ، أما القسم الغربى منه سهل .
ترتبه خصبة ، صالحة جدا للزراعة ، فيه مزارع واسعة لزراع الحبوب ،
ولاسيا في القسم السهل والمتنوع المحاذى لمنطقة الجبل حيث تسقيه
الوديان المتعددة التى تنصب في شط العظيم وهى : خاصة صو وداقوق صو
وأق صو . يفرق الزاب الاسفل ارض اللوآء من ارض اربيل .
كذلك لوآء ديالة في اتجاهه من الشمال الى الجنوب الشرقى يفصل ما بين لوآء
كركوك ولوآء ديالة . فتروى التوابع العديدة التربة . تكثر في اللوآء
مزارع الحبوب كالحنطة والشعير التى تنمو على مياه الامطار ويزرع الرز والتبغ
على مجارى المياه . والحنطة التى تزرع في السهل الواقع بين طوز خورماتو
وكفرى ، تعد من افخر اجناس الحنطة في العراق وهى حنطة داودة .
جبال اللوآء جرداء ، فيها بعض الاذغال ؛ اما البساتين ففى اتجاه
القرى والتصبات في كركوك وتازه خورماتو وداقوق وطوز خورماتو
وكفرى . . . الخ . وقد بلغ عددها في التقرير الاخير زهاء (١٣٠٤٧٤)
شجرة من حاملة وفسيلة . اما عدد النخيل في قرية كفرى وقوتية
وطوز خورماتو فقد بلغ (٣٦٠١) نخلة حاملة .
اللوآء غنى بالمعادن . ففيه النفط العزيز في بابا كركوك وفي بولسكخانه
بالقرب من حوز خورماتو وفي جوار جبل حميرين . . . الخ ولقد دلت

Figure (94b) Figure (94a) An example of a Geography of Iraq book published by the prime minister and defense minister of Iraq in 1929 Taha Al-Hashemi.

1.14 KURDS MET THE CIA PRIOR THE US INVASION OF IRAQ 2003

Before the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, many American troops were already stationed in military camps in Kuwait. Before launching their military invasion against Saddam Hussein's government, an Israeli Mossad team arrived in Kuwait and provided the American troops with the names of Iraqi scientists, particularly those who had participated in developing Iraq's nuclear program and biological weapons.

The Israeli Mossad's recommendations to the U.S. military forces before the invasion were to arrest the Iraqi scientists involved in these programs, transfer them to the U.S., and benefit from their scientific expertise. Scientists who refused to cooperate with U.S. military forces were to be eliminated.

One of the Iraqi scientists sought by the Americans was Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash, often demonized as "Mrs. Anthrax" by the Anglo-American media due to her alleged but unproven association with Iraq's discontinued biological weapons program—a part of the propaganda campaign to justify the Iraq War. Ammash was number 53 on the Pentagon's list of the fifty-five most wanted individuals in Iraq, represented as the five of hearts in the deck of most-wanted Iraqi playing cards, and the only woman to be featured. She surrendered to coalition forces on May 9, 2003, and was one of two Iraqi women known to be in U.S. custody as of April 2005. However, she was later released without being charged.

In August 2005, the American Association for the Advancement of Science called for Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash to either be sent to trial or released. Although she has neither been charged with a crime nor brought to trial, the Iraqi scientist remains in prison, accused by the U.S. government of being the head of Saddam Hussein's biowarfare program for which no evidence has been found.

Another scientist, Dr. Rihab Taha, led Iraq's biological weapons program until 1995. American troops transferred over 70 Iraqi scientists to the U.S., where they were coerced into cooperating with the U.S. government. In contrast, more than 310 Iraqi scientists and

academics were eliminated by the U.S. and Israeli secret services in Iraq for refusing to cooperate with U.S. forces.

An interview was conducted by Ghasan Sherbel, the chief editor of the Middle Eastern newspaper "Al-Sharq Al-Awsat," with Masoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) before the toppling of Saddam Hussein.

Mr. Barzani stated that he and Jalal Talabani, who was the president of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), were informed by a delegation from Washington that the U.S. government had decided to topple Saddam Hussein's government. The delegation arrived in northern Iraq and invited them to the U.S. to discuss the impending governmental changes in Iraq. Consequently, Masoud Barzani, Jalal Talabani, and I travelled to the U.S., where we had a meeting with a U.S. official. During the meeting, we were told that there had been significant changes and developments in the region, and the decision had been made to change the regime in Iraq.

Mr. Barzani further stated that the meeting included a representative from the U.S. State Department responsible for Middle Eastern affairs, the CIA deputy chief, and officials from the Pentagon. During this meeting, they were informed that the U.S. government had firmly decided to initiate a regime change in Iraq and sought their opinions and recommendations on the matter.

In the interview, Barzani mentioned that the U.S. needed political coverage and support before conducting the operation to topple Saddam Hussein's regime. From the Kurdish perspective, Barzani acknowledged that the Americans had already made their decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein's government. The Kurds understood their opinion would not significantly influence the U.S. decision, whether they supported or opposed the operation.

Masoud Barzani stated that they had informed the Americans about the importance of what would happen to the Kurds after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime. The Americans requested that we hold a political conference, including all Iraqi opposition forces, to decide the type of government that would be established in Iraq. In December 2002, we approached all the Iraqi opposition parties regarding this American proposal. After consulting with most of

them, it became clear that while many were in favour, a section of the opposition objected.

Barzani's meeting with U.S. officials lasted three days. On returning to Iraq, he visited Damascus and met with President Bashar al-Assad and Abdul-Halim Khaddam, the former Syrian Vice President, and Foreign Minister, who later defected to France in 2005. In the meeting, Barzani informed them that the Americans had decided to topple the regime in Iraq. President Bashar al-Assad did not object and advised us to do what was most beneficial for the Kurds, while Abdul-Halim Khaddam's response was notably ambiguous.

Masoud Barzani stated in his interview that he had informed Iranian government officials during his visit to Tehran. At that time, President Rafsanjani and Qassim Soleimani agreed with the American proposal for regime change in Iraq. Barzani also requested that the Iranian government apply pressure on Iraqi opposition forces and factions aligned with them.

Additionally, Barzani mentioned in his interview that he had conveyed the American proposal to the Turkish government. The Turkish officials informed Barzani that they would accept the proposal only if the U.S. allowed two Turkish military units to enter the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk.

1.15 ISRAELI SPECIAL FORCES INVOLVEMENT IN THE ASSASSINATION OF THE PALESTINIAN IN IRAQ AND SUPPORTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A KURDISH ESTATE.

After the fall of the Saddam Hussein government in 2003, a significant number of Israeli Mossad agents and former Israeli military personnel entered Iraq. With the assistance of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), they established several training camps in northern Iraq. These ex-Israeli armed forces members were offered lucrative incentives by the KRG. The primary objective of the Israeli military advisers was to train the Kurdish militia, special police, and secret police in the use of various weapons, anti-terrorism combat techniques, and street fighting and to provide military advice to the KRG forces.

The Israeli military advisers were generously compensated by the KRG, funded by money from smuggled oil via the Kirkuk pipelines. However, even before the U.S. and U.K. invasion of Iraq, the Israeli military, in collaboration with U.S. armed forces, had established special teams responsible for targeting, arresting, kidnapping, assassinating, and interrogating Palestinians, particularly Palestinian leadership members who had settled and established political bases in Iraq. Additionally, these Israeli forces were involved in the assassination of Iraqi scientists and pilots.

Israeli security forces arrested the wanted Palestinians in Baghdad with the assistance of American forces. Many of the arrested Palestinians were killed during interrogations conducted with the help of U.S. forces in Iraq. Additionally, Israeli Special Forces played a significant role in the interrogation and torture of both Iraqis and Palestinians in Abu Ghraib prison.

The Israeli military advisers in Iraq provided the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) with specialized communication interception equipment to monitor the phone calls of ISIL terrorists, particularly targeting key Iraqi intellectuals, members of political parties, and Iraqi parliamentarians. This equipment was also used to intercept communications of Turkish intelligence personnel and monitor the activities of Turkish companies in northern Iraq, with a special focus on the Turkish secret service, Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (MIT), which was involved in gathering information on PKK militants in the region.

In addition, Israeli special forces in Iraq were extensively involved in aiding, planning, advising, and providing consultation to the KRG, particularly regarding the annexation of the city of Kirkuk. The Israeli support did not end there but continued with the establishment of various espionage cells throughout northern Iraq, especially in the city of Erbil. These cells operated under various company names and charitable organisations. The primary objectives of these Israeli operations in northern Iraq were to gather intelligence on ISIS terrorist groups, pro-Iranian militias, and Turkish activities in the region.

Israeli activity in northern Iraq became particularly evident during the Kurdish referendum. Both Israeli and U.S. media supported the

Kurdish push to annex Kirkuk from Iraq. Israeli support for the referendum peaked in U.S. media, influenced by the fact that a significant portion of the media in the U.S. is controlled by Jewish interests. However, Israeli backing for the Kurdish referendum was not driven by a genuine affinity for the Kurdish nation but was aimed at furthering Israel's interests. This support aligned with a long-term political strategy to divide and disintegrate Iraq while securing control over the oil and mineral wealth in northern Iraq through the KRG.

1.16 THE DANGER OF ESTABLISHING NEWS KURDISH ESTATE IN NORTHERN IRAQ WITH THE PRESENCE OF ISRAELI TROOPS

Many Iraqis have wondered why Israel is so keen and invested in supporting and establishing political and economic ties with the Kurds, as opposed to other ethnic groups. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq sees Israel as a crucial ally, particularly after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, for several reasons.

The Kurdish leadership in northern Iraq believes that Israel could serve as a powerful advocate for Kurdish statehood in the West. This was underscored when President Shimon Peres raised the issue of Kurdish independence during a June 2014 meeting with President Barack Obama. The KRG understands the significant value of support from Jewish and Israeli opinion leaders in advancing the Kurdish cause in the international arena.

Israel is highly interested in establishing a close relationship with the KRG, as the creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq could bring substantial benefits to Israel. The strategic importance of this relationship can be summarized as follows:

The establishment of a Kurdish state would significantly bolster Israel's political, economic, and military position, and contribute to regional stability. It would also help to divide the Arab world, thereby creating a setback for the Palestinian issue. This division would weaken the Palestinian cause in the international arena and among Arab states, while simultaneously introducing additional instability into the Middle East.

Furthermore, the political focus of the Arab world would likely shift towards the newly established Kurdish state in northern Iraq, redirecting attention away from Israel. This diversion of attention could be advantageous for Israel in the region's complex geopolitical landscape.

Establishing a new state in northern Iraq would significantly benefit Israel by undermining the stability, security, and territorial integrity of neighbouring countries such as the Republic of Iraq, the Republic of Syria, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Republic of Türkiye. These countries are staunchly opposed to the creation of a Kurdish state in the region.

The establishment of a Kurdish state would enable Israel to monitor the activities of various pro-Iranian militias and terrorist organisations across Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Türkiye. Furthermore, it would facilitate Israel's ability to train Kurdish rebels from Syria, Iraq, and Iran in modern warfare techniques. This training could encourage these Kurdish rebels to increase their attacks and sabotage efforts against the interests of Iran, Syria, and Türkiye. Additionally, the creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq would enhance Israel's military, economic, and political power, allowing it to play a more influential role in shaping the future of the region.

In addition, establishing a Kurdish state in northern Iraq would provide Israel with substantial control over the KRG's oil resources, significantly impacting the region's economic landscape. This control would impose a considerable obstacle on the Republic of Iraq's ability to export its oil and gas through the Kirkuk–Ceyhan Pipeline. The creation of a Kurdish state would also facilitate the establishment of Israeli military bases in the area, granting Israel comprehensive access to all lands under KRG control. With this presence, Israel would be able to offer full support to the Kurds, including military training and strategic advice. The presence of Israeli military forces in northern Iraq would likely create substantial challenges for neighbouring countries, particularly the Republic of Türkiye. Additionally, northern Iraq could become a haven for Kurdish terrorists from the surrounding regions, including the PKK. This situation would contribute to the destabilization of the central government in Baghdad, both politically and economically.

Furthermore, northern Iraq would become a crucial market for the consumption and exportation of Israeli military, agricultural, medical, and pharmaceutical products. This would pose a significant threat to and potentially disrupt the markets of Türkiye, Iran, and Iraq, leading to the closure of some manufacturers and potentially causing an increase in unemployment in those regions. Establishing a Kurdish state in northern Iraq would also boost the Israeli economy by allowing control over natural resources, the tourism sector, livestock, and agricultural resources within the Kurdish Regional Government area. This control would enable Israel to leverage these resources for economic growth and stability. Furthermore, a Kurdish state in northern Iraq would likely encourage Israel, Greece, Armenia, and the U.S. to establish military bases in the region. Such a development would pose a significant threat to the integrity, unity, and stability of Syria, Iran, and Türkiye, all of which would be strongly opposed to this outcome.

The creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq could lead to considerable internal and external destabilization. The region might face inevitable civil conflict among Arabs, Turkmen, and Kurds, resulting in major migration and displacement of ethnic groups residing in the Kurdish Regional Government area. This conflict could lead to widespread human rights abuses, alter the demographic composition of the region, and present a threat of ethnic cleansing. The displacement of indigenous people from northern Iraq would likely increase the burden on European economies due to an influx of refugees. Additionally, such instability could revive illegal arms sales in the region, leading to further tragedies and loss of life. In addition to this, a Kurdish state in northern Iraq would significantly facilitate operations for the PKK terrorist militia, enabling them to launch more frequent and impactful military attacks against Turkish armed forces and villages. This would contribute to major instability in the region.

Furthermore, this would allow Israeli forces to train Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, supporting their military activities against the Islamic Republic of Iran. This setup would also provide Israel with easier access to gather intelligence on Iranian activities in the region. Such developments would enable Israel to meddle more effectively

in the internal affairs of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Türkiye. A Kurdish state within northern Iraq would aid the Israeli Air Force in conducting military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. It would also enhance Israel's capabilities in gathering intelligence and monitoring activities across Iraq and its neighbouring regions. Northern Iraq would become a significant hub for Israeli espionage operations. This would further threaten Iranian and Turkish economies by disrupting the flow of Turkish-manufactured products and goods into Iraqi and Gulf state markets. This disruption would impact the trade dynamics and economic stability of these countries. The spark of a Kurdish revolution and uprising in neighbouring countries would lead to significant regional instability. Northern Iraq could become a focal point for drug traffickers, a haven for arms dealers, and a refuge for mercenaries from around the world. This situation would exacerbate regional conflicts and contribute to further instability. The presence of Israeli forces in northern Iraq would serve as a stepping-stone toward the creation of a Greater Kurdistan, which is perceived by Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Türkiye as a significant threat. These nations view the establishment of a Kurdish state as a potential second "terror state" of Israel within the heart of the Islamic region.

The formation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq would likely prompt the Israeli regime to revive and advance the Bunyas oil pipeline project. In turn, Israel would supply the newly established Kurdish state with military equipment and training, which would greatly benefit the Israeli economy. Additionally, Israel would openly support the Kurdish state and seek to control the major Iraqi rivers' water flows and electricity power stations. This control could lead to severe shortages of water and electricity in Iraq, impacting agriculture, industry, and employment, as many Iraqis rely on these resources for their livelihoods. There is also a concern that the diverted water flows could be used to irrigate Israeli agricultural lands. Along with the presence of Israeli forces, would enable Israel to develop both military and civilian airports in the region. These facilities would be heavily funded, constructed, and operated by Israel, thereby enhancing its influence over Iraqi airspace, and revitalizing Israeli aviation interests in the area.

Furthermore, this development could encourage Jewish migration to northern Iraq under the pretext of visiting Jewish religious sites. Such migration would pose a serious threat to the cultural identity of the Turkmen and Christian communities in the region, potentially leading to their erosion and displacement. The state of Israel would use northern Iraq as a base for targeting Iraqi armed forces, Iranian-backed militia positions, and Popular Mobilization Forces, like their previous operations. The establishment of a Kurdish state and the presence of Israeli forces in the region would likely exacerbate instability, potentially inciting civil conflict and altering the region's demographic composition. This scenario could also encourage other ethnic groups to pursue their aspirations for separate states, further complicating the regional dynamics.

Israel views northern Iraq as a highly strategic location for recruiting informers and agents to support its regime. The region is also crucial for gathering intelligence on Iranian militias, Iraqi Hezbollah, and Popular Mobilization Forces. Moreover, it prevents Hamas leaders from utilizing northern Iraq as a military base and haven, thereby avoiding potential tracking, targeting, and capture by Israeli special forces. Establishing a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, coupled with the presence of Israeli troops, would offer the Israeli military enhanced opportunities to train pilots in the challenging mountainous terrain of the region. This training would refine their flying skills and experiences. Additionally, an Israeli military base in northern Iraq could streamline operational tasks for pilots, particularly in potential strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, by leveraging the Kurdish Regional Government's airspace.

1.17 THE ISRAELI SABOTAGE ACTIONS AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF TÜRKIYE

The Republic of Türkiye's rising military, political, and economic power has intensified anxiety and pressure on the state of Israel. Israel perceives Türkiye's ascent as a significant threat to its regional stability, integrity, and security. Under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party, Türkiye's close ties with various Palestinian factions have further deepened Israeli concerns. The party's vocal support for the Palestinian cause exacerbates Israel's apprehensions, particularly as Israel has consistently resisted acknowledging Palestinian rights, despite numerous efforts by Arab nations.

The Justice and Development Party has consistently supported the Palestinian people both politically and economically. This commitment was strongly affirmed when the Aram Jerusalem Center for Israeli Strategies and Security published a study by senior researchers, warning that Türkiye has become a powerful and influential country in the Middle East, threatening Israel's regional interests. The study highlights that since 2002, the Justice and Development Party has actively worked to restore Türkiye's political, military, and economic influence on both regional and international stages.

According to the report, Israel is increasingly concerned about Türkiye's expanding political and economic influence in the Middle East, as evidenced by Türkiye's military bases in Qatar, Libya, Somalia, Azerbaijan, and Northern Syria, as well as its military presence in Iraq and Syria. The study also indicates that Türkiye has strengthened its influence in Lebanon, the Balkans, and among Hamas leadership, further escalating Israeli concerns.

Additionally, many Israeli politicians believe that Türkiye has garnered widespread support across Arab countries due to its strong stance against Israel, particularly regarding human rights abuses, the oppression of Palestinians, and the expansion of Israeli settlements on occupied Palestinian lands. Israel perceives that Türkiye is taking significant steps that threaten its regional interests, particularly regarding oil and gas exploration in the Mediterranean Sea. Türkiye's

growing influence has emerged as a major obstacle to Israel's plans to transport Israeli and Egyptian gas to Europe via the Mediterranean.

In response, powerful Israeli lobbies in the United States have been working vigorously, cautiously, and persistently behind the scenes to undermine Türkiye's interests, both in Europe and especially in the U.S. These efforts aim to hinder Türkiye's development and its rise as a regional power in the Middle East. The Israeli lobby in the U.S. has actively campaigned to prevent Türkiye from acquiring F-35 fighter jets, block the modernization of its F-16 fleet, and impose sanctions on U.S. imports of Turkish goods, particularly aluminium and steel.

The Israeli campaign against the Republic of Türkiye has extended beyond mere diplomatic efforts, as Israel has also supported the Greek government both politically and militarily. This support includes providing intelligence and satellite imagery of Turkish military bases and activities in the Mediterranean Sea. However, Israel is fully aware that it is not in its best interest to make Türkiye an enemy, recognizing that Türkiye's influence and power in the region are indispensable, and a direct conflict could lead to the destruction of the state of Israel.

Furthermore, Israeli intelligence has secretly maintained contact with both the PKK and YPG, although Israel has refrained from openly acknowledging its support for these groups, knowing that the consequences would be severe. Despite Türkiye's concerns about its national security and stability, it has continuously waged military campaigns against the YPG and PKK-affiliated terrorist groups in northern Syria.

Although Türkiye is a NATO member, like the U.S., the U.S. administration, along with the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, has indirectly aided the YPG and PKK, particularly during Turkish military operations against these groups. In my opinion, the opposition from these countries to Türkiye's military incursions in northern Syria was driven by a singular objective: to weaken President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's government and undermine Türkiye's unity.

Israel firmly believes that the most effective way to contain the rise of Türkiye economically, politically, and militarily is through leveraging its lobby in the U.S. to pressure Washington to curb Türkiye's influence. However, the political clout of the Israeli lobby in the U.S. diminished significantly following the departure of President Donald Trump and the arrival of President Joseph R. Biden, particularly after Israel's military attack on Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in 2021.

The partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from northern Syria and Iraq, along with the meeting between President Biden and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the G7 summit in 2021, signalled a willingness on both sides to make concessions and mend the rift in U.S.-Turkish relations.

Despite this, the strained relationship between Türkiye and the U.S. has emboldened Israel to act more freely against Türkiye on various fronts, particularly concerning the delivery of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye. Israel has played a pivotal role in obstructing Türkiye's gas and oil exploration in the Mediterranean Sea, creating significant obstacles by aligning with both Egypt and Greece. Additionally, behind the scenes, the Israeli lobby has been instrumental in the U.S., contributing to the devaluation of the Turkish lira by pressuring the U.S. administration to increase tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminium. As a result, the tariff on Turkish steel was raised to 50%, while the import tax on aluminium was increased to 20%.

Israel's efforts to undermine Türkiye's interests did not stop there. Israel forged an alliance with Egypt, Greece, and the United Arab Emirates, establishing a military pact against Türkiye and supporting French and Greek opposition to Turkish gas and oil exploration in the Mediterranean. This alliance also demanded that the Turkish military withdraw its forces from Libya, portraying Türkiye as a threat to Israel and regional stability.

Furthermore, Israel conducted joint military drills with Greece, deployed tanks to the Republic of Cyprus, and sent F-16 fighter jets to Greece—actions that Türkiye viewed as provocative.

Amid Türkiye's growing military power and its pursuit of multiple nuclear power stations, Israel has become increasingly vigilant, closely monitoring Türkiye's nuclear activities. Israel is not only

keeping a continuous watch on Turkish nuclear power stations but also attempting to gather detailed intelligence on these reactors by recruiting Turkish citizens and Russian scientists currently working on them.

Israel views Türkiye's acquisition of nuclear power infrastructure as a significant threat to its security. As a result, Israel has been working discreetly with Egypt, France, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf states to undermine Türkiye's influence. Some of these countries are also acting behind the scenes to weaken the Justice and Development Party in Türkiye, supporting Turkish political opposition at home and providing financial, logistical, and military aid to the YPG and PKK-affiliated terrorist groups.

Several of these countries were involved in financing the coup attempt against the Justice and Development Party led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In addition, Israel has consistently collaborated with certain European countries to block the transfer of advanced technology and equipment to Türkiye, particularly those used in military applications. Israel's objective is to hinder Türkiye's military development and maintain its military superiority.

Israel has also been coordinating with European nations to sabotage Türkiye's progress in military manufacturing by spying on high-tech Turkish companies that are competing with Israeli firms in the export of military equipment. These Turkish companies are deeply engaged in the research and development of cutting-edge military projects. To undermine them, Israel has been attempting to deplete the talent pool of these Turkish firms by offering lucrative incentives and excessive salaries to lure away their scientists, software developers, engineers, and key personnel.

These preliminary measures by the state of Israel are part of a broader strategy to weaken Türkiye's military industry and hinder its advancement in high-tech manufacturing. In my opinion, Israel's aggressive stance against Türkiye stems from President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's outspoken support for the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation. President Erdoğan has consistently condemned Israeli aggression and the assassination of innocent Palestinians on the international stage. Furthermore, Türkiye's firm insistence on equal rights for oil and gas exploration in the

Mediterranean Sea has angered the Israeli government, prompting a more hostile approach towards Türkiye.

The Turkish government's insistence on equal rights for oil and gas exploration in the Mediterranean Sea has heightened tensions with both the Greek and Israeli governments, leading to increased hostility towards Türkiye. In response, Israel and Greece lobbied aggressively in the United States during the Trump administration to block Türkiye from acquiring F-35 fighter jets, aiming to maintain their military advantage in the region and diminish Türkiye's influence.

The Israeli lobby in the U.S. began urging the White House to remove Türkiye from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program soon after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan approved the purchase of the S-400 missile defense system from Russia. The powerful Israeli and Greek lobbies in Washington exerted tremendous pressure on the U.S. administration to cancel the sale of these advanced aircraft and prevent Türkiye from acquiring advanced F-16 fighter jets.

Their efforts culminated in July 2019 when Türkiye was removed from the F-35 program, with the U.S. administration citing Türkiye's decision to purchase the Russian S-400 air defense system as the primary reason. The White House stated, "The F-35 cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence collection platform that will be used to learn about its advanced capabilities," making continued involvement with Türkiye in the program impossible.

The U.S. administration further argued that the Russian S-400 air defense systems could compromise the security of its F-35 fighter jets, claiming that the presence of sophisticated Russian equipment in Syria would enable the encryption and interception of the jets' sensitive operations. The Turkish government responded to this narrative by pointing out that the same F-35 fighter jets provided to Israel by the U.S. were the ones Türkiye had requested. Türkiye expressed clear dissatisfaction with the U.S. decision to supply Israel with F-35 jets, especially given that Israel was not part of the consortium that participated in the manufacturing of the F-35s.

Despite this, Israel, backed by its strong lobby in the U.S., successfully acquired the F-35 jets. Ironically, these jets were stationed at an Israeli military base not far from Russia's Al-Hamem

military airbase in Syria, making it arguably easier for Russian forces to intercept and decrypt the jets' operations than if the jets were stationed in Türkiye. This situation highlights what can be seen as hypocrisy and a double standard in how the U.S. deals with the Republic of Türkiye.

This scenario underscores that the U.S. may not be a fully reliable or trustworthy ally for Türkiye. Despite the Turkish government's strong opposition to the U.S. pretext, significant pressure was exerted by the Israeli lobby on the U.S. administration to harm and punish Türkiye, particularly over its support for the Palestinians. However, President Donald Trump resisted calls to penalize Türkiye with economic sanctions over the S-400 issue, even in the face of additional pressure from Congress and within his own administration.

This also reflects the double standards applied by European countries, particularly Germany. It is ironic that while Germany decided to send contingents of Leopard tanks to Ukraine, it previously requested that Türkiye refrain from using German Leopard tanks, which had been purchased by Türkiye, in operations against the PKK and PYD terrorists in northern Syria, citing that German military equipment should not be used outside NATO member states' borders.

1.18 THE ISRAELI PRESENCE IN NORTHERN IRAQ AND KIRKUK

After the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, Kurdish militias from both major Kurdish parties took control of Kirkuk, seizing key positions throughout the city. As a result, Israeli agents, and Iraqi Jews, particularly those of Kurdish descent, began returning to northern Iraq, especially to the cities of Erbil and Kirkuk. These returning Jews started purchasing land and property, often paying twice the original price.

This influx of Jews into Iraq reminded the Arab and Turkmen populations in northern Iraq of the events that transpired before 1948 in Palestine when many Jews from Europe, Russia, and South

America migrated to Palestine under the pretext of fleeing persecution by Adolf Hitler. The growing presence of Israeli Jews in Kirkuk and Erbil raised concerns among Iraqis, prompting questions about the underlying Israeli interests in these cities.

Israeli interests in Kirkuk can be attributed to several factors. Following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, large numbers of Israeli Mossad agents entered Iraq under the guise of various fictitious companies, such as Raffedin, which were primarily based in northern Iraq, particularly in Erbil. These companies were protected by Kurdish militias linked to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Over a thousand Mossad agents infiltrated Iraq after the occupation, establishing units in various towns. Their primary mission involved kidnapping, assassinating, arresting, and summarily executing prominent Iraqi politicians, lawyers, intellectuals, military pilots, scientists, writers, and Palestinians who opposed Israeli policies and had sought refuge in Iraq.

Initially, most Mossad agents were stationed in Baghdad, assisting U.S. forces with the interrogation of Iraqi army generals, pilots, and scientists. The Mossad agents' objective was to dismantle Iraq's foundational structures by eliminating Iraqi scientists and pilots, whom Israel perceived as major threats to its national security. As the security situation in Iraq deteriorated and resistance against U.S. and British forces intensified, many Mossad agents relocated to Kirkuk and Erbil. They resided in various houses around Kirkuk's government buildings and registered their companies under fictitious names, including charity organisations. The Mossad agents, who spoke fluent Arabic with Iraqi accents, easily integrated into Iraqi society. Many Kurdish operatives trained by Mossad and the CIA before Saddam's downfall also joined these teams.

The Mossad teams based in Kirkuk began purchasing agricultural land on the outskirts of the city. The Kurdish control of Kirkuk facilitated Mossad activities by providing safe havens, logistical support, and intelligence on former Iraqi officers from Saddam's army. Israeli agents were heavily involved in the assassination of Iraqi intellectuals, ex-army members, and politicians from both Turkmen and Arab ethnicities. Their primary goal was to ignite sectarian strife among the ethnic groups in Kirkuk. Despite some

Mossad team members dying under mysterious circumstances, Israeli operations continued in Kirkuk, supported by Kurdish security forces and police. The lack of legitimacy within Baghdad's central government and the overall insecurity in Iraq greatly aided Mossad's activities, making it difficult for local Iraqi police to expose them.

Another reason for the influx of Iraqi Jews into northern Iraq was to gain control over the region's oil resources, particularly in Kirkuk, which boasts some of the world's finest oil. Kirkuk's oil reserves account for nearly 60% of Iraq's total oil reserves, and increasing its production to about five million barrels per day requires substantial investment in infrastructure rehabilitation, estimated at over \$10 billion. This lucrative potential drove Israel's interest in establishing a foothold in the region, potentially facilitating direct investments if the U.S. pushed Iraq to normalize relations with Israel through these companies.

Israel also made an offer to the KRG leaders, promising protection from threats within Iraq and from neighbouring Türkiye, Syria, and Iran. The U.S. plan to make Kirkuk the capital of a future Kurdish state made the presence of Jews in northern Iraq a strategic necessity due to its proximity to these countries. Many analysts believe that one of the motivations behind the U.S. invasion of Iraq was to protect Israel, establishing it as the dominant power in the region, installing friendly regimes in Baghdad, erasing Iraq's historical identity, and severing ties with its ancient civilization.

Israel has been the only country openly supporting Kurdish independence in northern Iraq in international forums. The main objective of this support is to fulfil Israel's long-term strategic goal of weakening and dividing Iraq. The creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq would encourage Israeli Jews to migrate to the region under various pretexts, such as visiting Jewish religious sites, particularly the Tomb of Prophet Daniel in Kirkuk. This migration would be justified as reclaiming lands confiscated by the Iraqi government after the establishment of Israel in 1948. The Israeli migration to Iraq echoes the Nakba (Catastrophe) of 1948 when Palestinian society was destroyed, and most Palestinians were permanently displaced. During the Nakba, thousands of Jews from

around the world migrated to Palestine with the help of the United Kingdom, often under the guise of temporary work visas. One striking example is Shimon Peres, who was born Szymon Perski in Poland and arrived in Palestine with a temporary work visa as a cleaner. He later became the president of Israel and played a key role in establishing numerous Israeli settlements in Palestine. Today, many Jews settled in occupied Palestine claim to be the indigenous people of the land, but many of the descendant migrants came from Russia, Ethiopia, Eastern Europe, and South America. During the U.S. and Kurdish occupation of Kirkuk, Israeli advisors encouraged the Kurds to employ similar tactics in northern Iraq, particularly in Kirkuk. However, after the Kurdish forces were defeated in Kirkuk by Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, many Mossad agents fled to Erbil, under the control of the Kurdish Democratic Party led by Masoud Barzani, dashing the Kurdish and Israeli dream of establishing an independent Kurdish state aligned with Israel.




Figure (95) the ID of Shimon Peres who was born Szymon Perskie, on 2 August 1923 applying for a visa to enter the Palestinian state ironically had written in the application form I swear to God that I will be loyal and faithful to the state of Palestine.



Figure (96) A work permit for Shimon Peres in Palestine in the year 1935 issued by the Government of Palestine, the Immigration Department, to work as a cleaner.

1.19 WHY ISRAELI IS SUPPORTING THE KURDS

During the Kurdish independence referendum process conducted by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) on September 25, 2017, the preliminary results showed that approximately 92.73% of Kurdish votes were cast in favour of secession from Iraq. However, the federal government of Iraq completely rejected the legality of this referendum. The only state that supported Kurdish secession was Israel, which even celebrated the outcome of the referendum, where an overwhelming majority of Iraqi Kurds voted to break away from Baghdad.

Israeli enthusiasm for Kurdish independence had little to do with compassion for the Kurds, whether in Iraq or elsewhere, and more to do with geopolitical interests. It is deeply ironic that Israel, a state founded and sustained through brutal military occupation and apartheid in Palestinian lands, would champion freedom for the Kurds or any other group. Israel not only denies self-determination to the Palestinian people, but also has a notorious record of human rights abuses, including land confiscation, arbitrary arrests, torture of innocent Palestinians, and active political and military support for oppressive regimes in Central and South America, as well as the former apartheid regime in South Africa.

Moreover, Israel has never supported any other national liberation movement in its history except for the Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq and the Lebanese Christian militia during the occupation of southern Lebanon. Both groups were utilized to serve Israel's strategic agenda. It is evident to all intellectuals and politicians that Israel's support for Kurdish independence was driven solely by geopolitical and military reasons.

Israeli support for the Kurds increased dramatically, especially after the toppling of Saddam Hussein's government in 2003. Israel aimed to secure the flow of oil supplies from the Kurdish Autonomous Region to Israel, but more importantly, it sought to establish a pro-Israeli entity that could disrupt the Arab world and threaten the integrity and unity of both the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Türkiye. In fact, after the fall of Saddam Hussein's government in 2003, Israel imported 77% of its oil supplies from Iraq's Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) region. These cheap oil imports from the Kurdish region are vital for Israel, which lacks access to the natural resources of the oil-rich Gulf States.

Israel also believes that an independent Kurdish state could serve as a potential foothold for Israeli military and intelligence operations, giving Israel leverage against Iran, Syria, Türkiye, and Iraq. The Israeli hope for the creation of an independent Kurdish state in the Middle East aligns perfectly with Oded Yinon's 1982 report, "A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties." Yinon, an Israeli journalist formerly attached to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, proposed that to maintain its regional power superiority, Israel should fragment the surrounding Arab states into smaller units using the British strategy of "Divide and Rule." This strategy involves disseminating propaganda within enemy states to sow doubts about alliances, weakening or dissolving them, and creating a vacuum that allows Israel to achieve military dominance.

The Israeli government's plan for the Middle East involves splitting the Arab world along ethnic and sectarian lines to strengthen Israel's hegemony and maintain its regional superiority. Israeli backing for Kurdish secession from Iraq dates to the mid-1960s. Israel perceives a future Kurdish state as a potential non-Arab ally in the region—an ally not directly affected by the Palestinian cause. As part of this

strategy, Israel reached out to Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani, the father of current Kurdish President Masoud Barzani, several times during his time in office. The Kurds were supported financially, politically, and militarily by the Israeli government to weaken the Iraqi government, which was openly and fully supporting the Palestinian cause.

As a result of these efforts, Mustafa Barzani visited Israel twice, once in 1968 and again in 1973, where he met key figures and Mossad officials. Despite these efforts, they did not amount to much for the Kurds at the time. However, the ordinary Kurdish population, especially those with Islamic roots, did not show fervent support for Israel or animosity toward the Arab world, particularly the Palestinians.

After the fall of Saddam Hussein's government, Israeli influence in Iraq grew significantly. The sight of Israeli flags flying in KRG towns during the referendum, along with reported slogans such as "We are the second Israel," suggests a shift in Kurdish political culture and a break from the past, when Kurdish fighters trained and fought alongside members of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO).

Since then, Israel has succeeded with the help of Kurdish leaders like President Masoud Barzani, who was responsible for the deaths of thousands of Iraqi soldiers during his rebellion against the Iraqi government. Masoud Barzani was also responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Turkmen and Kurds when he sided with Saddam Hussein's regime during the storming of Erbil and the expulsion of the Kurdish PUK party led by Jalal Talabani. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, Israel managed to infiltrate Kurdish society and partially sever its links with the broader Muslim world.

In my view, there were two major turning points in Kurdish-Arab relations: the Kurdish uprising in 1991, which led to the imposition of a no-fly zone by Western countries that effectively separated the Kurdish region from Iraq, and the 2003 U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq. Many Iraqis believe that the no-fly zone was a stepping-stone for implementing the strategy of creating a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. However, the catastrophic invasion of Iraq by the U.S. and U.K. triggered internal strife that further alienated the

Kurds from the rest of the country and allowed for increased Israeli presence in the area.

In its declared and enthusiastic support for Kurdish independence, Israel has openly and continuously tried to draw parallels between its history and the Kurdish struggle for statehood. By doing so, Israel seeks to obscure the similarities between the Kurdish and Palestinian struggles against colonialism and oppression.

1.20 WHY ARE THE ISRAELI & US ADMINISTRATIONS SUPPORTING THE KURDS IN NORTH OF SYRIA

After the fall of Saddam Hussein's government, Israel's plan for the Middle East involved splitting the Arab world along ethnic and sectarian lines, to support Kurdish independence to strengthen Israel, expand its hegemony, and maintain its regional superiority over the Arab world. Both Israel and the United States openly backed Kurdish secession from Iraq, further fuelling Arab suspicions that this move was a step toward the disintegration of the Arab world, Iran, Syria, and Türkiye, ensuring Israel's continued military dominance in the region.

To implement this long-term strategy, the U.S. government openly supported Kurdish secession from Iraq and has continuously provided weapons and political, financial, and logistical support to the PKK and YPG Kurdish militia groups in northern Syria. The U.S. support for the PKK did not stop there; it also orchestrated the unification of various Kurdish militia groups under the umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in 2015. The U.S. created the SDF under the pretext of supporting the U.S.-led coalition in the war against ISIL. However, the U.S. aimed to threaten the unity and integrity of Türkiye.

The U.S. considers the SDF a broad-spectrum security apparatus that conducts counterinsurgency operations, local patrols, checkpoint operations, detention operations, and clearance patrols. However, the SDF is primarily composed of Kurdish YPG and PKK militants, whose activities were not only used to support the U.S.-led coalition against ISIL but also to launch attacks on Turkish military posts and towns along the Syrian border.

When Türkiye launched an offensive to drive the PKK and PYD (the political wing of YPG) forces back from its borders with Syria, it faced a furious international backlash, primarily fuelled by media in France, Israel, and the U.S. This backlash was ostensibly due to concerns about the threat to civilians and fears that the operation could enable the resurgence of ISIL. However, after U.S. President Donald Trump decided to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria, Türkiye's operation against the PKK groups in northern Syria proceeded, leading to criticism from Israel, France, and the U.S.

Despite international criticism, the Turkish operation received widespread support within Türkiye. The Turkish population, from far-right to left-wing factions, voiced their support for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Turkish military's efforts to end the threat posed by the PKK and YPG and to protect Turkish towns and villages from terrorist attacks.

During the operation, various Israeli TV stations, newspapers, and pundits from across the political spectrum expressed support for the Kurdish cause, invoking the historical connection between the Kurds and Jewish people. Many Israelis voiced their support for the formation of an independent Kurdish entity on territories that currently belong to Türkiye, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Israeli military reservists even signed a petition calling on the Israeli government to provide not only humanitarian aid but also military and intelligence assistance to the PKK and YPG.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu quickly condemned Türkiye's operation, stating that "Israel is prepared to offer humanitarian aid to the Kurds in Syria." This statement, along with Netanyahu's tweet aiding the "gallant Kurdish people," was seen by many in Türkiye as a clear provocation and support for PKK and YPG militants.

Further escalating tensions, Ayelet Shaked, Chairwoman of the New Right Party in Israel, made statements in support of the PKK and YPG, condemning Turkish violence against the Kurds. However, many Turks viewed her statements as hypocritical, given Israel's history of violence, oppression, and human rights abuses against Palestinians.

The sudden withdrawal of U.S. forces from northern Syria allowed Türkiye to consolidate its position as a major force in the Syrian conflict, but this also created concerns for Israel. The departure of U.S. forces, coupled with Türkiye's increased influence, posed a security problem for Israel, which views Türkiye as a hostile military force due to its support for Hamas and the Palestinian struggle. Israel's concern was that the new situation in northern Syria, dominated by Türkiye, Russia, and Iranian militias, would limit Israel's ability to operate freely in this strategic area.

Throughout the Syrian conflict, the Israeli air force repeatedly struck Syrian military targets and pro-Iranian militia positions, fearing that an increase in Iranian influence in Syria would enhance Hezbollah's ability to transport weapons from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon, posing a serious security threat to Israel.

In response to these developments, Israel showed extraordinary concern over Türkiye's operation against the PKK and YPG in northern Syria. Israeli media and the Israeli lobby in Washington continued to support the Kurdish cause, emphasizing the security implications of the U.S. withdrawal from Syria and the rise of Turkish influence in the region. Despite Türkiye's ongoing struggle against PKK and YPG terrorist attacks, the U.S. continued to provide support to Kurdish forces, leading President Erdoğan to condemn the U.S. for building what he described as a "terror army" along Türkiye's border.

The PKK and YPG have been responsible for the deaths of over 40,000 innocent Turkish citizens, yet the U.S. argued that any Turkish military operation against these groups could destabilize the region. Meanwhile, Israeli media provided a platform for Kurdish leaders to appeal for support, hoping that the Israeli lobby in Washington would act to protect Kurdish interests in northern Syria.

1.21 WHY WOULD TÜRKIYE WANT TO ATTACK THE SYRIAN DEMOCRATIC FORCES (SDF)

Türkiye views the Kurdish YPG, the main force within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which it considers a terrorist organisation that has long terrorized the Turkish state. However, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan initiated military action against the PKK and YPG in northeast Syria, it stirred up significant controversy. The Kurds, alongside local Arab and Christian allies, had established a stable, de facto autonomous region amid the chaos of the Syrian civil war. For the Turkish government, however, the SDF represents more than just a military threat; it poses a significant ideological and political challenge to Türkiye.

The SDF's experiment with "democratic autonomy," inspired by the libertarian socialist principles of Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned PKK leader, stands in direct opposition to Türkiye's interests. Türkiye fears that the territorial and political gains made by the Syrian Kurds could embolden its Kurdish population and lead to the creation of a PKK-controlled state along its border. This prospect is deeply concerning for Türkiye, as it threatens both national security and territorial integrity. The joint military, political, and territorial strength of the Syrian Kurds has given them significant leverage in any political resolution to the Syrian conflict, and their demands for recognition of Kurdish rights and the decentralization of state power further exacerbate Türkiye's concerns.

The Syrian conflict saw the Kurds, with the help of U.S. forces, establish the SDF as a significant political player in the region. The U.S. administration, seeing the potential for a future Kurdish state in northern Syria as a non-Arab ally, provided extensive military, financial, and political support to the SDF. This support included the transfer of large quantities of heavy military equipment, armoured vehicles, and ammunition, as well as training for SDF forces in their use. From Türkiye's perspective, the U.S. support for the SDF terrorists is a direct threat to its national security.

As the civil war raged on, the Syrian opposition, which had formed in response to the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad, received support from Türkiye, which provided them with arms and training. However, despite initial promises of support from Western countries, including the U.S., the Syrian opposition was ultimately left to fend for itself, leading to significant internal displacement and a refugee crisis. Millions of Syrian citizens fled their homes, with approximately 3.64 million Syrian refugees seeking refuge in Türkiye. This massive influx of refugees placed a significant economic burden on Türkiye, while only a few hundred were accepted by countries like Germany, and Poland refused to take in any Syrian refugees altogether, despite later opening its borders to over two million Ukrainian refugees during the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. This stark contrast in response highlighted the double standards of Western countries toward Middle Eastern refugees.

As the conflict between the Syrian opposition and government forces continued, Türkiye sought to address the humanitarian crisis by setting up a safe zone for Syrian civilians. The goal of the Turkish government was to provide humanitarian aid and support to displaced Syrian refugees while preventing Syrian government forces and pro-Assad militias from further oppressing ordinary citizens. In July 2022, Türkiye proposed creating a 32-kilometer-deep, 480-kilometer-long corridor inside Syria along the border to protect its security and provide a safe zone for unarmed Syrian refugees.

Türkiye's plan included the resettlement of one million of its 3.6 million Syrian refugees, who hailed from other parts of Syria, within the safe zone. The Turkish government indicated that the buffer zone might only extend a few kilometres inside Syria and could be formed around several pockets, with the operation conducted in stages. With the support of the Turkish military, the plan was to utilize a diverse group of Syrian fighters to handle much of the ground fighting and territorial control. However, the scope of the Turkish military operation was significantly hindered when the U.S. military closed Syrian airspace to Turkish warplanes and warned Türkiye against

any major operation. Additionally, opposition from Iran and Russia further complicated Türkiye's plans.

Despite these challenges, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remained determined to implement the plan to protect Syrian civilians from government oppression. In July 2022, Erdoğan met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Tehran to discuss the situation in Syria. During the meeting, Türkiye made it clear that it could not stand idly by while terrorist organisations threatened its security. The Turkish government strongly emphasized that it expected support from both Russia and Iran in its fight against the PKK and SDF terrorists. However, before the trilateral meeting, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned Erdoğan against launching such an offensive. A U.S. official from President Biden's administration also expressed concerns, stating that a Turkish incursion into northern Syria would have devastating humanitarian consequences and pose a serious risk to the ongoing U.S.-led counter-ISIS campaign.

The complex dynamics of the Syrian conflict and the competing interests of regional and global powers continue to shape the situation. Türkiye's insistence on securing its borders and protecting its national security remains at the forefront of its actions, even as it navigates the intricate web of alliances and rivalries that characterize the conflict in Syria.

1.22 WHY IS ISRAEL SUPPORTING THE KURDISH SECESSION FROM NORTH OF SYRIA, IRAQ, AND IRAN?

After the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, members of the Israeli Mossad reportedly entered northern Syria in coordination with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdish Regional Government. The Mossad's primary objectives included training and advising the SDF, gathering intelligence on the Syrian government, and monitoring various military militias operating in northern Syria, such as Hezbollah and pro-Iranian militias. A key focus of their efforts was tracking Hezbollah's activities in smuggling Iranian weapons to Lebanon.

The Mossad's involvement extended to collaborating with U.S. forces stationed in northern Syria, particularly in interrogating captured ISIS terrorists with the coordination of the SDF. Beyond military and intelligence support, the Mossad also played a role in advising the SDF on both political and military matters. This support became especially evident when Türkiye planned a major military operation against the PKK and YPG, the latter being part of the SDF, in July 2022. Behind the scenes, pro-Israel organisations quietly lobbied the Biden administration, urging it to pressure Türkiye against invading northern Syria. The Israeli government also conducted a secret campaign in the U.S., advocating for the SDF and applying significant pressure on U.S. officials to oppose Türkiye's military actions, as Israel views the SDF as a useful tool against pro-Iranian militias in northern Syria.

Israel's support for the SDF is rooted in strategic considerations. The presence of the SDF in northern Syria is seen as a counterbalance to Iranian influence in the region, particularly in disrupting Iran's ambitions to transport oil and gas to Europe through Syria. Additionally, Israel perceives a future Kurdish state in northern Syria as a potential non-Arab ally in the region, one that would not be directly affected by the Palestinian issue and would weaken Syria's ability to resist Israeli interests.

For years, Israel has supported the Syrian Kurds diplomatically, politically, and through other means. Leaked information from the U.S. government revealed that Israeli National Security Adviser Eyal Hulata informed his U.S. counterpart, Jake Sullivan, that a new Turkish incursion into northern Syria, as proposed by President Erdoğan in July 2022, would significantly harm Israeli interests in the region. Hulata emphasized that such an operation would strengthen Iranian influence, harm the Syrian Kurds, and ultimately benefit Iran and its allies. Other Israeli officials conveyed similar messages to the U.S. government, stressing the importance of protecting the SDF from Turkish military actions.

In the lead-up to a potential Turkish operation against the PKK and SDF, President Biden warned President Erdoğan against launching the incursion, following discussions at the NATO summit in late June

2022. Although Erdoğan appeared to put the military operation on hold after these warnings, he revived the possibility in response to continued attacks by PKK and YPG terrorists on Turkish territory.

The U.S. justification for supporting the SDF has been framed around the SDF's role in fighting ISIS. However, many observers believe that the U.S. has broader objectives, including establishing an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Syria, controlling Syrian oil resources, reducing Iranian military influence in the region, and threatening the unity of the Republic of Türkiye, all while protecting Israel's national security.

The prospect of an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Syria is a source of concern for Türkiye, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, as they fear it could inspire Kurdish populations in their own countries to demand independence, potentially leading to the disintegration of Türkiye and Iran. Additionally, Israel's regional strategy aims to divert attention from its treatment of Palestinians by fostering conflicts and supporting various groups that align with its interests.

Israel has been actively campaigning behind the scenes in the U.S. to protect the Kurdish militia in Syria and to prevent the Turkish government from launching a military operation against the SDF and PKK terrorists in northern Syria, an operation that was planned for August 2022.

1.23 ISRAEL MEGA FUTURE STRATEGY PLAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Israel's long-term strategic vision in the Middle East includes a significant project aimed at transporting natural gas from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to Europe through an overland route via Saudi Arabia and Jordan, eventually reaching Israeli ports. This ambitious endeavour, if realized, would not only bolster Israel's economy but also enhance its influence across the region in several key areas: military, economic, and political.

For Israel to actualize this project, the approval and cooperation of the Saudi Arabian government are crucial. Achieving this would allow Israel to hit two significant strategic targets. First, it would block Qatar's plan to transport its gas and oil to Europe via Saudi

Arabia, Syria, and Türkiye a project that could challenge Israel's energy dominance in the region. Second, it would thwart Iran's attempts to transport its oil and gas to Europe via Iraq and Syria, thereby further tightening the economic stranglehold on Tehran.

Since normalizing diplomatic relations with the UAE, Israel has actively pursued measures to weaken the Iranian economy. One key proposal Israel has put forward to the UAE is the transportation of Emirati gas to Europe through Israeli infrastructure. However, for this project to materialize, Saudi Arabia would need to normalize diplomatic ties with Israel a move that has yet to be formalized but is subject to ongoing negotiations.

The realization of this project would significantly enhance Israel's economic prospects and regional influence while also enabling Saudi Arabia and the UAE to limit Qatar's capacity to export gas to Europe, potentially crippling Qatar's economy in the long term.

Israel has maintained secretive but active contact with the Saudi government, focusing particularly on security, energy, and military cooperation. While the current scope of collaboration between Israel and Saudi Arabia is officially limited to counterterrorism efforts and intelligence-sharing, the two countries have been exploring broader cooperation in various fields, particularly energy and security.

Israel has provided Saudi Arabia with advanced surveillance technology, including highly sophisticated listening devices and monitoring software capable of tracking and intercepting communications of individuals deemed a threat to the Saudi regime. In addition to these security measures, Israeli and U.S. companies have been involved in negotiations for contracts in Saudi Arabia, particularly in the energy sector, with a strong focus on solar energy projects.

Moreover, Israel and Saudi Arabia share a common interest in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel has supported Saudi Arabia's military efforts in Yemen, providing intelligence on Iranian arms shipments to the Houthi militia and supplying satellite imagery to monitor Houthi movements. This collaboration underscores the deepening, albeit unofficial, ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia, driven by mutual concerns over Iran's influence in the region and their shared goal of curbing Tehran's ambitions.

Israel's future strategy in the Middle East revolves around the potential UAE-Israel gas pipeline project, which, if executed, would significantly alter the regional power dynamics, weaken adversarial states like Iran and Qatar, and enhance Israel's economic and political clout. The project hinges on the gradual normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, a process that, while still in progress, holds the potential to reshape the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East.

1.24 THE ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT NORTH OF IRAQ AND ASSASSINATIONS OF THE IRANIAN SCIENTISTS

Many Iraqis view the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime as just the first chapter in a broader American-Israeli conspiracy aimed at eliminating threats to their strategic interests and redrawing the map of the Middle East. [16]

Since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, there have been persistent reports among Iraqis of Israelis operating within the autonomous region of Kurdistan, despite Israeli laws prohibiting the export of military equipment to other countries without prior authorization. [17]

Israeli involvement in northern Iraq dates to the 1960s, with Israel consistently supporting the Kurds to advance its strategic agenda. Despite this, Israel has consistently denied its involvement in Iraq. In the past, reports have surfaced about Israel's close diplomatic ties with the Kurds in Iraq, with claims that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Mossad operatives had trained these Kurdish groups. However, Israel has always denied conducting operations in northern Iraq.

The extent of Israeli involvement was publicly exposed by France's second-largest national newspaper, *Le Figaro*. The Paris-based daily, citing a 'security source in Baghdad,' reported that Israeli intelligence

16 Israelis 'train Kurdish forces' By Magdi Abdelhadi, Arab affairs analyst, BBC News; BBC NEWS | World | Middle East, Israelis 'train Kurdish forces'.

17 Israelis 'train Kurdish forces' By Magdi Abdelhadi, Arab affairs analyst, BBC News; BBC NEWS | World | Middle East | Israelis 'train Kurdish forces'

agents were recruiting and training Iranian dissidents at clandestine bases within Iraq's Kurdish region. According to *Le Figaro's* source, the Israeli Mossad is actively recruiting and utilizing Iranian exiles and Kurdish oppositionists to the regime in Iran, many of whom are living as refugees in the Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq. [18]

According to *Le Figaro's* source, most of these Iranian exiles are Kurds, members of Iran's Kurdish minority who oppose the Iranian regime. Mossad has trained them in espionage and sabotage techniques, both in northern Iraq and Israel, as part of Israel's broader sabotage program against sensitive Iranian nuclear facilities. This program includes targeted assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists and experts.

The revelations by *Le Figaro* align with a series of assassinations that occurred between 2010 and 2020. During this period, four Iranian nuclear scientists Masoud Ali Mohammadi, Majid Shahriari, Darioush Rezaeinejad, and Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan were killed, while Fereydon Abbasi narrowly survived an assassination attempt. In November 2020, another scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was assassinated with a magnetic bomb attached to his car. Darioush Rezaeinejad was shot dead, and Masoud Ali Mohammadi was killed in a motorcycle bomb explosion. The Iranian government accused Israel of complicity in these killings, an accusation Israel did not officially respond to.

Additionally, between 2011 and 2012, Iranian authorities arrested a large number of suspects involved in carrying out the assassination campaign on behalf of Mossad. Many Western intelligence services and U.S. officials confirmed Israel's connection to the assassinations of Iranian scientists. The primary goal of Israel's sabotage program has been to prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb. This includes targeting and eliminating Iranian nuclear scientists to delay Iran's progress toward developing nuclear weapons.

18 Israeli Mossad training Iranian exiles in Kurdistan: French newspaper daily Le Figaro, January 11, 2012, By JOSEPH FITSANAKIS Intel News.org, News you may have missed #663 News you may have missed #664

In response, voices within the Iranian Revolutionary Guards have called for revenge by targeting Israeli scientists attending nuclear science events or meetings outside of Israel. To protect its national security, Israel has continued to recruit Iranian opposition members and Kurdish exiles in northern Iraq, using them against the Iranian government. This was further confirmed when two senior U.S. officials disclosed to NBC that the People's Mujahedin of Iran (MEK) was financed, trained, and armed by Israel to carry out these assassinations. Although a Senior State Department Official later denied that the MEK was involved in the assassinations, the private American intelligence agency Stratfor reported that Mossad poisoned a fifth Iranian scientist in 2007. [19]

The Israeli involvement in the targeting and assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists and experts is not the first-time allegations of Israeli intelligence activities have surfaced in the international press. Israeli operations in Kurdistan have also been exposed. In 2006, the BBC's flagship investigative program *Newsnight* obtained compelling evidence of Israeli operatives providing military training to Kurdish militia members in northern Iraq. The program aired video footage showing Israeli experts drilling members of Kurdish armed groups in shooting techniques and guerrilla tactics.

In September 2010, the Lebanese government arrested three Kurds in Jounieh, a coastal town fifteen kilometers north of Beirut, accusing them of working for Israeli intelligence. All three Kurds were members of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a designated terrorist organisation. These arrests were part of a broader Lebanese counterintelligence operation that netted over one hundred alleged Israeli agents in Lebanon since April 2009.[20] News of the detention of three members of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) intensified ongoing debates in Türkiye about alleged covert links

19 Borger, Julia; Kamali Dehghan, Saeed (5 December 2010). "Covert war against Iran's nuclear aims takes chilling turn". *The Guardian*, Archived from the original on 3 March 2016. Retrieved 7 February 2016.

20 Lebanon charges PKK Kurds with spying for Israel by Ian Alleni Intel News.org. 27th September 2010; Lebanon charges PKK Kurds with spying for Israel | intelNews.org

between Israeli intelligence agencies and Kurdish separatists operating in Türkiye, Iraq, and Syria.

Nevertheless, both the Turkish National Intelligence Organisation and the Iranian National Intelligence share a common interest in combating the Kurdish nationalist movement, which operates across Syria, Iraq, and Türkiye. For years, Türkiye and Iran have closely collaborated in their fight against these Kurdish terrorist movements on both sides of the border. However, Israel has been leveraging these Kurdish groups to serve its political agenda. Israeli intelligence has reportedly run part of its Iranian spy network through Türkiye, taking advantage of the ease of movement across the Turkish-Iranian border. [21]

The revelation of the names of Kurdish agents working for Israel by the Turkish MIT was a significant intelligence setback and a blow to Israel. According to leaked reports, Israel strongly believes that former Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan was responsible for disclosing the identities of these agents due to his close ties with the Republic of Iran. [22]

Israeli intelligence has operated part of its Iranian spy network through Türkiye, taking advantage of the ease with which members of the Iranian Kurdish movement can cross the border undetected. [23] Many Turkish citizens and politicians have long believed that Israel is aiding PKK and Kurdish separatist terrorist groups both in Türkiye and neighbouring Iraq. Israel's support for Kurdish separatist groups in Iraq was exposed in a comprehensive report by the BBC TV program *Newsnight*, which showed Israeli experts and advisers in northern Iraq training Kurdish militias in shooting techniques with various military weapons. This revelation created significant problems for the Kurds, not only in Iraq but across the wider region.

21 Spies in Iran - apparently Kurds, Washington Post's, Ron Ben Yishai, Date of publication 10/07/2013, 'Spies' in Iran - apparently Kurds (ynetnews.com)

22 Israelis 'train Kurdish forces' By Magdi Abdelhadi, Arab affairs analyst, BBC News; BBC NEWS | World | Middle East | Israelis 'train Kurdish forces'

23 Spies in Iran - apparently Kurds, Washington Post's, Ron Ben Yishai, Date of publication 10/07/2013, 'Spies' in Iran - apparently Kurds (ynetnews.com).

[24] Israel has long been viewed as a formidable adversary by many Arabs and Muslims, both within Iraq and across the broader Arab and Muslim world. This perception has been deeply entrenched due to decades of regional conflicts and political tensions. Within this context, the dynamics between the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq and Israel have often gone unnoticed by the public, partly due to the complexities and sensitivities involved.

For many Iraqi citizens, the idea that Kurdish politicians would face scrutiny or pressure to justify their government's interactions with Israel seemed unlikely. The KRG, operating with a degree of autonomy from the central government in Baghdad, has managed its affairs in ways that often elude the influence or oversight of Iraq's central authorities. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the central government in Baghdad has struggled with internal challenges and lacks the cohesive leadership necessary to address or challenge the actions of the KRG effectively. As a result, most Iraqis do not expect the central government to take any significant action against Kurdish leaders or to demand accountability for their engagements with Israel.

In the eyes of many Iraqis, it would be difficult for Israeli security experts to work within the KRG's jurisdiction without the knowledge and explicit approval of its authorities. This perception is grounded in the understanding that the KRG operates with a high degree of control over its internal security matters. Despite the official stance or public rhetoric, the reality is that the KRG has been coordinating with Israel on a range of issues, reflecting a longstanding, albeit discreet, relationship.

One significant example of this cooperation was highlighted in a BBC News report, which revealed that Israeli military experts were active in northern Iraq, training the Kurdish Peshmerga and other security forces linked to the KRG. These experts were involved in providing training on shooting drills and various combat techniques, thereby enhancing the military capabilities of Kurdish forces. Interestingly, despite the potential for these revelations to ignite

24 Israelis 'train Kurdish forces' By Magdi Abdelhadi, Arab affairs analyst, BBC News; BBC NEWS | World | Middle East | Israelis 'train Kurdish forces'

tensions, the response within the wider Iraqi community was surprisingly muted. The limited reaction can be attributed to the fact that it is widely known, both regionally and internationally, that the Kurds have maintained a collaborative relationship with Israel for many years. This longstanding relationship has, in many ways, been accepted as a strategic reality, even if it is not openly acknowledged. The involvement of Israel in Iraq's internal affairs is not a recent development. Since the 1960s, Israel has played a discreet yet significant role in the region, particularly in its interactions with the Kurds. During this time, the Kurds embarked on a secessionist agenda, seeking greater autonomy and, ultimately, the establishment of a greater Kurdistan. This aspiration aligned with Israel's strategic interests in the region, leading to the establishment of covert ties between the two. These relations began in the mid-1960s, during a period of intense regional upheaval, and have continued intermittently ever since.

For much of this time, the relationship between Israel and the Kurdish political parties has remained shrouded in secrecy. The complexity of these ties is further compounded by the fact that Israel's dealings with the Kurds are not limited to Iraq alone. Israel engages separately with Kurdish factions across four countries—Türkiye, Iran, Iraq, and Syria—each of which hosts significant Kurdish communities and political organisations. The nature of these relationships is incredibly nuanced, as each Kurdish group has its distinct political agenda, its approach toward Israel, and its own set of geostrategic considerations within its respective state.

In Türkiye, for instance, the Kurdish issue is deeply entwined with the country's internal politics and its relationship with the West. In Iran, the Kurdish population faces a different set of challenges, with Israel's interactions being shaped by the broader geopolitical tensions between Israel and Iran. In Syria, the situation is further complicated by the ongoing civil conflict and the diverse array of Kurdish factions vying for influence.

Thus, Israel's involvement with the Kurds is not merely a bilateral issue between Israel and the KRG but is part of a broader, more intricate web of relationships that span multiple countries and political contexts. This multifaceted involvement underscores the

complexity of the Kurdish-Israeli relationship and the strategic calculations that underpin it. While the ties between Israel and the Kurdish political entities are complex and often opaque, they are undeniably significant, influencing the broader geopolitical landscape of the region.

The Middle East has undergone significant upheavals, particularly following the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime, the subsequent occupation of Iraq by the United States and the United Kingdom, and the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Northern Syria. Amid these transformations, Israel recognised the Kurds as a highly effective military force that could be leveraged against the growing threat of the Islamic State. However, Israel's interest in the Kurds extends far beyond the recent conflicts. Since the mid-1960s, Israel has viewed the Kurds as junior partners in David Ben-Gurion's peripheral strategy, a doctrine designed to forge alliances with non-Arab states and minority groups in the region as a counterbalance to hostile Arab neighbours.

Historically, Israel has consistently interfered in the internal affairs of Arab countries, with Iraq being a particular focus. Over the years, Israel provided substantial support to Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq, supplying them with arms, ammunition, logistical support, and military advisers in their struggle against successive Iraqi governments. This alliance served Israel's broader strategic objectives, helping to destabilize a key regional adversary while bolstering Kurdish aspirations for autonomy.

However, the relationship between Israel and the Kurdish rebels was not without its tensions. During the October 1973 war, Israel became frustrated and disappointed when the Kurdish rebels hesitated to engage the Iraqi army, a move that could have alleviated some of the pressure on Israel's military forces. This reluctance on the part of the Kurds created a significant rift in their relationship with Israel. Conversely, the Kurds themselves became disillusioned in 1975 when Israel abruptly ceased its support following the Algiers Agreement. This agreement, brokered between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, with the mediation of Algerian President Houari Boumediene, led to the collapse of the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq. Deprived of

Israeli arms and ammunition, the Kurdish rebels faced a devastating defeat, resulting in a mass exodus of Kurds to Europe and the United States.

Despite this period of mutual disillusionment, the secret relationship between the Kurds and Israel was rekindled after the 1991 Gulf War. The bonds between the two entities grew even stronger following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, reaching a peak during the fight against the Islamic State. Both Israel and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) recognised their growing mutual need for cooperation to push ISIL out of the region. The Kurds' renewed relationship with Israel was driven by two main objectives: acquiring weapons and military training, which Israel had been providing even before the emergence of the Islamic State and securing strategic economic support.

In terms of economic strategy, Israel played a crucial role in supporting the KRG by purchasing Kurdish oil in 2015, at a time when no other country was willing to do so due to Baghdad's threats of legal action. This financial lifeline was critical for the KRG, allowing it to maintain its autonomy and continue its military operations against ISIL.

In recent years, the relationship between Israel and the Kurds has been increasingly acknowledged at the political level. Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, President Shimon Peres, and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, have openly advocated for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq. This public support reflects Israel's longstanding strategic interest in the Kurds as a key ally in a volatile region, as well as the deepening ties that have developed over decades of covert and overt cooperation.

1.25 THE ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT IN THE TRAINING THE KURDS

Israel's interest in the Kurds of northern Iraq is rooted in two primary factors. First is the enduring geopolitical strategy of forming peripheral alliances, and second is the deep-seated affinity between two small nations both of which have struggled for regional legitimacy over an extended period. The rise of the Islamic State in

Iraq and Syria, along with the broader disruptions triggered by the so-called Arab Spring, has introduced additional strategic considerations for Israel.

From Israel's perspective, the dramatic shifts occurring in Iraq and Syria, coupled with the Kurdish military successes in northern Syria, have demonstrated that the Kurds can serve as a formidable barrier against hostile forces, particularly those emerging from radical Sunni and Shi'a Islamist groups. The Kurds' ability to challenge these forces aligns with Israel's broader security objectives, providing a buffer against the expansion of anti-Israeli ideologies and actions in the region.

In Türkiye, however, the situation is viewed quite differently. The involvement of Kurdish groups, particularly the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) and the YPG (People's Protection Units), in the fight against the Islamic State has complicated U.S. policy in the region. U.S. support for these Kurdish groups, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), has placed the United States in a difficult position, creating tensions with Türkiye, a key NATO ally. Despite these complications, Israel, with American assistance, has strategically utilized northern Iraq and Syria as a stable base for gathering intelligence. This intelligence-gathering effort focuses on various targets, including Iraq's Local Popular Mobilization Forces, other opposition military groups in northern Syria, and Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shi'a Islamist political and militant organisation.

For Israel, the fall of the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, and the rise to power of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 marked a significant turning point. Since then, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq has become an essential hub for Israeli intelligence operations, particularly in monitoring the activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and pro-Iranian militias stationed in Iraq and northern Syria. The KRG's strategic location and its relatively autonomous status have allowed Israel to maintain a critical foothold in the region, enabling it to gather vital intelligence on Iran and its proxies. This ongoing relationship highlights the Kurds' strategic importance to Israel, not just as military allies but as crucial partners

in Israel's broader regional intelligence and security network. [25] Following the overthrow of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in Iran, Israel continued to maintain its covert support for the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq. These ties remained largely hidden from public view, reflecting the sensitive nature of the relationship. However, in January 2012, the French newspaper *Le Figaro* reported that Israeli intelligence agents were allegedly recruiting and training Iranian dissidents at secret bases located within Iraq's Kurdish region. This revelation highlighted the ongoing, albeit discreet, collaboration between Israel and the KRG, particularly in their shared opposition to the Iranian regime. The report underscored the strategic importance of the Kurdish region as a base for Israeli intelligence operations, aimed at countering Iranian influence in the Middle East. [26]

A year later, in a significant development, *The Washington Post* disclosed that Türkiye had informed Iranian intelligence about a network of Israeli spies operating in Iran. This network reportedly included ten individuals, believed to be Kurds, who had allegedly met with Mossad agents in Türkiye. The revelation highlighted the intricate and often perilous nature of Israel's covert operations in the region, as well as the complex relationships between regional powers. Türkiye's decision to expose the Israeli spy network to Iran not only strained its ties with Israel but also underscored the delicate balancing act Ankara was attempting to maintain amid shifting regional alliances. The incident further illustrated the risks faced by the Kurds involved in these covert activities, who found themselves at the intersection of larger geopolitical conflicts.

25 <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/03/18/israel-and-the-kurds-love-by-proxy/>

26 Israeli Mossad training Iranian, exiles in Kurdistan: French newspaper, JANUARY 11, 2012 BY JOSEPH FITSANAKIS 13 COMMENTS; Israeli Mossad training Iranian exiles in Kurdistan: French newspaper intelNews.org

1.26 ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP WITH PKK & YGP KURDISH TERRORIST ORGANISATION

The upheavals across the Middle East, particularly in northern Iraq and Syria, have deepened the mutual interests between Israel and the Kurds. As the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq functions as a nascent state surrounded by Arab and Muslim nations, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) remains extremely cautious about publicizing any connections with Israel. This delicate balancing act reflects the KDP's awareness of the sensitive geopolitical landscape and the potential repercussions of openly aligning with Israel. This was true when the Kurdish Regional Government was looking for regional support for fulfilling its project and aspiration of establishing a Kurdish state in the north of Iraq. The KRG is especially wary of Türkiye and Iran, and both openly oppose the establishment of a Kurdish state in the region.

The Kurdish Regional Government is extremely anxious not to be seen as allied with the state of Israel, which would certainly antagonize Iran, Iraq, and Türkiye. In addition, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) which is a historical ally of Israel and became a major power on the ground in Iraq after the fall of the Saddam Hussein government, must take into consideration the position of its partners in the KRG, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), who is allied with Iran and opposes to have a relation with Israel and for a political reason the KRG doesn't want to identify itself as an ally with Israel.

Due to the economic crisis and corruption within the KRG administration, the KRG solely is interested in the normalization of relations between the state of Israel. Also, amongst other reasons, KRG is interested in the normalization of relations between the state of Israel and KRG to secure the shipment of smuggled Kirkuk and Erbil oil to Israel via Türkiye. On the one hand, the KRG always looked forward to benefiting from strong Israeli support for their cause, especially from the strong Israeli lobbies in the United States. On the other hand, the KRG is trying to keep a good relationship with the central government in Baghdad. After the fall of the Saddam Hussein government and the occupation of Iraq by the US and the

United Kingdom. The KRG's power in northern Iraq has increased dramatically and made the KRG open a Jewish representation office at the Ministry of Endowments (Waqif) and Religious Affairs. This was a symbolic move by the KRG to please the Israeli government although only a few Jews are living in the KRG region.

Similarly, on several occasions, the KRG had invited Israeli rabbis to visit the Kurdish Regional Government and meet officials there, and from time to time, the KRG calls on Jews to return to the KRG-controlled area.

The continuous support of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) for Israel is driven by a desire to gain the sympathy of American Jews, who have long lobbied in favour of Kurdish aspirations for establishing a greater Kurdish-inhabited area in the Middle East. This Kurdish-Israeli relationship extends beyond mere political alliances. The KRG has even imposed restrictions on Kurdish imams, banning them from denouncing Israeli actions and atrocities in occupied Palestine.

The relationship between the Kurds and Israel also involves the Kurdish-Turkish group, Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK), which has been responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent, unarmed Turkish citizens. Despite the PKK's historical ties with Israel's adversaries, including the Syrian government and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) during the 1980s and 1990s when Israel maintained strong relations with Türkiye the bond between the PKK and Israeli intelligence flourished, especially as relations between Türkiye and Israel deteriorated. This decline in relations reached a critical point following the brutal actions of Israeli soldiers against the Gaza Freedom Flotilla on the night of May 30, 2010, an incident known as the 'Mavi Marmara' incident. The Israeli attack on the flotilla resulted in the deaths of ten civilian aid volunteers and injuries to over fifty others at the hands of Israeli Special Forces.

1.27 ISRAELI RELATION WITH THE SYRIAN KURDS AND IRANIAN KURDS

The role of the Syrian Kurds as a key bulwark against ISIL during the upheavals in Syria did not go unnoticed by Israel and the U.S. government. Despite the presence of numerous Kurdish rebel groups operating freely across Türkiye, Syria, and Iran, many of these factions have received arms and support from the U.S. and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

These Kurdish groups, driven by a shared ideology rooted in socialism and revolutionary Marxism, have long been united in their fight for a separate state.

The main operative Kurdish terrorist organisation is the Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat (PYD), an offshoot of the PKK. The PYD's armed wings, the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG) and Yekîneyên Parastina Jin (YPJ) consist of guerrilla fighters on the ground. In addition to these, other key Kurdish groups include the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan and the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), along with the Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas and the Organisation of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas.

These Kurdish Iranian parties have operated freely in northern Iraq, particularly within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) areas. They are primarily stationed in Erbil and especially Sulaymaniyah, while the Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas have been based in Diyala province, in eastern Iraq.

After the fall of Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq, a new pro-Iranian government was established in Baghdad, fully aligned with Tehran. As a result, this new Iraqi government came under pressure to act against the Iranian opposition group, the People's Mujahidin Organisation of Iran (PMOI), also known as Mujahidin-e-Khalq (MEK), whose ideology is rooted in a blend of Islam and revolutionary Marxism.

Under Saddam Hussein's regime, the MEK had been stationed in a military camp on Iraqi territory near the Iranian border. However, following the change in government, the Iraqi army launched a military operation against the MEK, seizing their heavy weaponry

and military equipment. The group was subsequently expelled from Iraq, with the vast majority of its members relocating to Europe. Ironically, the same pro-Iranian government in Baghdad has failed to expel the PKK terrorists who have been stationed in northern Iraq. Despite numerous requests from the Turkish government to remove these PKK militants, who have used northern Iraq as a haven for launching attacks against Türkiye, the central government in Baghdad has consistently ignored these appeals.

In a strategic move to protect its security and interests in the region, the Israeli Mossad has established ties with the YPG, PKK, and Iranian opposition Kurds. This relationship is mutually beneficial: the YPG and PKK rebels seek weapons from Israel, while Israel is interested in gathering intelligence from these groups. To facilitate this, Mossad, under the guise of various charitable organisations, has sent numerous humanitarian aid shipments to these terrorist organisations through routes controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government.

Israel has been extremely cautious in its dealings with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and its rivals, the PKK and PYD terrorist organisations responsible for the deaths of over forty thousand innocent, unarmed Turkish civilians. Israel has also had to consider the PYD's continued links to the Syrian Assad regime and its strong ties with Russia. However, Israel's stance shifted following the Syrian Kurds' declaration on March 17th of their intent to create a federal region along the border with Türkiye.

This move by the Syrian Kurds encouraged Israel to develop more significant ties with this emerging entity. On the other hand, Israel's relations with Iranian Kurdish terrorist organisations have posed less of a dilemma, given that Iran has openly vowed to eliminate Israel and has been waging a proxy war against it on several fronts.

1.28 ARABIZATION PERIOD (1970-2003)

The Ba'ath party era was the darkest chapter in Turkmen history. Saddam Hussein's government utilized the Arabization policy to integrate and dilute the Turkmen into Arab society and eliminate their existence.

During the Saddam Hussein time, the Ba'ath party forced people to sign petitions asking for the closure of Turkish language schools and to appoint Arab administrators in Turkmen areas, and the Turkmen people, who boycotted the government decision, were arrested, and punished severely.

Large numbers of Turkmen traders and professionals were arrested, imprisoned, and detained without trial. In early 1970, Mr. Mohammad Salah, who was the Head of the Kirkuk Trade Union, was the first Iraqi executed by Ba'ath rulers together with many Turkmen intellectuals and human rights activists.

In 1971, the artist Hussein Ali Damerchi was killed along with many students, teachers, and professionals after a peaceful demonstration, as the Turkmen-speaking schools were abolished, and all Turkmen rights were cancelled after only a year of having been issued.

In November 1979, four of the most influential Turkmen people were captured by the Saddam Hussein government Dr. Najidat Kojak, lecturing at the engineering department of Baghdad University; Abdullah Abdul Al Rahman, who was a retired general, who was the chair of Turkmen Brotherhood Club; Professor Riza Damerchi, the Chief Director of Forests, in Iraqi Agriculture Ministry and the well-known trade man, Adil Sharif.

They were subjected to the worst physical abuse and torture by the Saddam Hussein government, and later in January 1980, they were executed without even charging them with any criminal charges or court proceedings. The 1980s saw the execution of countless Turkmen leaders and elders who were, often falsely, accused of spying for Türkiye or Iran. During the Iran-Iraq war, dozens of Turkmen villages were bulldozed to the ground.

Many young Turkmen people especially from the Shi'a community were arrested and executed; they were accused of being part of Islamic movements and of being loyal to Iran and others were accused of

being loyal to the Turkish government. [27] Furthermore, he published another list of 75 Turkmens who were killed by shooting in the uprising of 28th of March 1991.

All those people were professionals, university students, and others who served in the military services. He documented a further list of 103 Turkmens who were imprisoned and another thirteen people who disappeared and never returned to their families.

The Turkmen Cultural Directorate that was set up by the government to bring Turkmens under strict control was not working according to the government plans. [28] Therefore, the Iraqi government started a new strategy to replace all Turkmen teachers with Arab teachers; they also sent all Turkmen teachers to non-Turkmen areas. An all-out assimilation campaign against Turkmens was unleashed. Young Turkmen people holding university degrees were given jobs in non-Turkmen areas.

Arabs were encouraged to settle in Turkmen areas with rewards of 10,000 Iraqi Dinars to each person. Those Arabs who bought farmlands were offered an extra reward ranging between 7,000 and 10,000 Dinars (approximately \$30,000 in the seventies), and the lands confiscated from Turkmens under various pretexts, were given to Arabs. Young Arab men were encouraged to marry Turkmen girls with offers of 10,000 Iraqi Dinars. All this was designed to change the demographic balance of the Turkmen-dominated region, with its capital city Kirkuk.

This was followed by government decrees that changed Kirkuk's name to that of Al-Tamim and changed its administrative borders, taking other Turkmen towns like Tuz Khormatu and Kifri from Kirkuk to other provinces. Subsequently, the Ba'ath government banned the use of the Turkmen language in public. Religious leaders, who did not speak Arabic, were forced to deliver sermons in Arabic, and when they failed to, they were executed. While the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmens, in their well-documented book, published in detail, the

27 Mr. Aziz Kadir Alsamanji in his book published in 1999 in London, "The political history of Turkoman of Iraq", a list of 283 Turkoman people were executed by Saddam's regime between 1980-1990, Aziz Kadir Samanji, Political history of Turkoman of Iraq, 1993, London, UK

28 Mofak Salman, Turkoman of Iraq, 2007, Dublin. Ireland.

name of 432 Turkmen people, who were executed and assassinated by Saddam's regime during 1979-1991. [29]

The Chief of Iraqi Revolution, said to the retired General Abdul Hussein Mullah Ibrahim originally from Tuz Khormatu, when he read his execution order, that he should be hanged and killed twice, once for being Turkmen and a second time for being Shi'a. However, Abdul Hussein could not tolerate the brutality and passed away from the torture.

Turkmens have been severely intimidated into silence, and they have been waiting helplessly, not knowing what to do. Here, I would like to mention the 1987 national census in Iraq, as it is relevant to several ethnic groups. In this census, Turkmens were openly threatened to declare themselves as either Arabs or Kurds. If they declared themselves as Turkmen, they would be deported to Saudi.

Atrocities against the Turkmens continued in general and especially during the battle of Erbil a battle that took place in the city of Erbil during the Iraqi-Kurdish Civil War between the two Kurdish parties and Saddam Hussein's regime on 31st August 1996 that resulted, in many Turkmens were captured by the Saddam Hussein regime with the help of the Kurdish Democratic Party and 25 Turkmen citizens were executed on 2nd of September 1996 by the Saddam Hussein's regime. [30] The decomposition of the Iraqi Turkmen was an Iraqi policy inherited from one government to the subsequent one. The aim was to remove Turkmen from the oil-rich northern region and to disperse them to the south of Iraq.

29 Turkmens Martyrs, by Islamic Iraqi Turkoman, 1999, London, UK.

30 <http://www.tuzkhormato.com/>

1.29 IRAQ AND IRAN WAR 1980-1988” THE FIRST GULF WAR”

One of the Turkmen’s most painful tragedies unfolded during the Iran–Iraq war “from 1980 to 1988”. While tens of thousands of young Turkmen were enrolled and all Turkmen reservists were called back to serve in the Iraqi army to fight against the Iranians, their families in Turkmen Eli were discriminated against.

Thousands of Turkmen were forcibly displaced, and their property was confiscated under the pretext that they were opposing the war and were members of the outlawed ‘Da’wa’ political party.

The Iraqi government's Ba’ath regime used the Turkmen as a scapegoat during the Iraq-Iran War the ‘First Gulf War’. Whereas Arabs and, especially members of the Ba’ath Party, were stationed in safe places, providing planning and logistical support, the Ba’ath regime deliberately brought the Turkmen to the front line during the Gulf War and the liberation of Kuwait and because of these wars, thousands of Iraqi Turkmen lost their lives – they either were killed in battle or went missing in action.

The Iraqi Turkmen suffered severely under the dictatorship of the Socialist Arab Ba’ath Party, whereas the Kurds were exempt from carrying out military service.

Moreover, the 1980s saw the execution of countless Turkmen leaders and elders who were often falsely accused of spying for Türkiye or Iran. During the Iran–Iraq war, Turkmen were not allowed to establish any political party or to form any political or cultural organisation. The only party that could function in Iraq was the Ba’ath party.

The official combination of the assimilation policy and the decomposition policy against the Turkmen by Saddam Hussein’s regime successfully played out for years, but assimilation and decomposition would not have been enough to erase or eradicate the Turkish character and the language of the Iraqi Turkmen.

The repressive policies of Iraqi governments were always the order of the day; for fear that, the Iraqi Turkmen would become a headache as the Iraqi Kurds and the Shi’aa Arabs in the South.

Repressive measures by the Ba’ath regime was intensified or relaxed depending on the opinions and the relations of the Iraqi government,

especially with the Iraqi Kurds. Moreover, in the interim constitution year, 1973, no reference was made to the Turkmen population in Iraq. The Ba'ath regime prohibited public use of the Turkish language in 1980, and the new constitution of 1990 only states that the Iraqi people consist of Arabs and Kurds.

1.30 THE UPRISING OF 1991

During the Gulf War in 1991, an operation known as 'Provide Comfort' was launched by the Allied forces to ensure a haven through an air exclusion zone, which prohibited Iraqi aircraft from flying north of the 36th parallel. This haven caused the division of the Turkmen into separate communities in the Kurdish autonomous region and under the Iraqi administration. During this period, the Kurdish political party enjoyed unprecedented autonomy in administering their political affairs.

However, the treatment of the Turkmen under their control illustrates a pattern of systematic human rights violations. Almost immediately, after Iraq accepted the cease-fire on 3rd March 1991, uprisings began to spread from dissident areas in the north and south of the country.

The Shi'aa in Basra city and the Najaf and Karbala in southern Iraq took to the streets in protest of the regime. During the uprising, Sulaymaniyah City, which is a Kurdish-populated area in the north of Iraq, was the first large city to fall. Within a week, the Kurds controlled the Kurdish Autonomous Region and the nearby city of Kirkuk.

In mid-February, President George Bush "Snr." called on the Iraqi people and the military to take matters into their own hands. Despite this call to arms, promised US support never arrived but, instead, Iraqi helicopter gunships arrived to quell the uprising.

Civilians and suspected activists in the revolt were arrested by the Iraqi armed forces and were executed; moreover, hospitals, schools, mosques, shrines, and columns of escaping refugees were bombed and shelled.

According to US intelligence, between 30,000 and 60,000 people were killed by Saddam Hussein's military. The Turkmen people took the lion's share of this atrocity in Altunköprü, Tuz Khormatu, and Kirkuk.

Altunköprü is a small Turkmen town located 40 km north of the Turkmen city of Kirkuk and the name means ‘Golden Bridge’ in the Turkmen language. The Indigenous inhabitants of Altunköprü are Turkmen, but in recent years, many Kurds migrated to this town seeking work as economic migrants, especially after the Kurdish rebels in 1975 were suppressed by the Iraqi regime.

During the uprising in March 1991 against the Iraqi regime, the inhabitants of Altunköprü decided to leave the town after they had heard that Kirkuk City was retaken by the Iraqi government and that looting, burning property, and summary execution were taking place. With the news of the summary executions, opposition to the Iraqi regime quickly spread to Altunköprü.

To avoid reprisal, persecution, and revenge from the Iraqi secret service and republican guards, the inhabitants of the town decided to escape and shelter in safe areas. The fleeing population from Altunköprü were ambushed and rounded up by the Iraqi army and the consequence was that all males were separated from females and the Iraqi armed forces and Iraqi secret service executed hundreds of Iraqi Turkmen and Kurds on the spot.

It was two weeks after this despicable crime against the civilian people before the dead bodies could be removed and buried by their families. The Iraqi government then confiscated the properties of these martyrs. The dead were buried in a mass grave in Altunköprü. In the meantime, in 1991, the people in Tuz Khormatu also revolted against the Ba’ath regime.

The consequence of this uprising was the occupation of the city of Tuz Khormatu by the Kurdish militia for a brief period.

During the occupation of Tuz Khormatu by the Kurds, the Turkmen carried arms and fought vigorously against Saddam’s army alongside the Kurdish rebels. However, the Turkmen paid an exceedingly high price for their participation in the uprising when the Kurdish leadership made a secret deal with the Iraqi government “Ba’ath regime” by withdrawing their forces from Tuz Khormatu so as not to be attacked by the Iraqi armed forces.

The deal between the Kurds and the Ba’ath regime was conducted secretly and without the knowledge of the Turkmen, and this led to the Kurdish militia withdrawing from the city of Tuz Khormatu in the

middle of the night, leaving the Turkmen to suffer the consequences. After the Kurdish militia withdrew from Tuz Khormatu, the Iraqi army entered the city, but they faced vicious resistance and a street war commenced in the district.

The fighting between the opposition and government forces lasted for several hours and some of the opposition fighters withdrew their limited resources and headed to the mountains surrounding Tuz Khormatu, while the remaining fighters melted away into the city's houses. While the fighters headed towards the mountains, military helicopters attacked them.

In the meantime, the Iraqi army and security forces entered the district of Tuz Khormatu, and large numbers of fighters were arrested and executed on the spot by Iraqi security forces under the pretext of helping the Kurdish rebels or fighting against the Iraqi government.

The Turkmen people in Tuz Khormatu suffered from neglect and persecution through ethnic and sectarian division by the former totalitarian regime, which itself had executed hundreds of young people and imprisoned many of its children in the early 1980s. Nevertheless, as part of the Iraqi government's regime of legalising its ethnic cleansing policies, on 6 September 2001, in an unprecedented move, it passed resolution number 199, giving all non-Arab Iraqis over 18 the right to change their ethnic identity to that of Arab. Such legislation is contrary to all the principles of human rights and was politically motivated.

The Ba'ath council banned Turkmen from acquiring real estate in Kirkuk, with its resolution number 434, dated 11th September 1989, and its resolution number 418, dated 8 April 1984. Turkmen who owned arable land were deported to the southern regions by force. In the 1987 national census in Iraq, Turkmen were openly threatened to declare themselves as either Arabs or Kurds. If they declared themselves Turks, they would be deported to South Iraq.

1.31 THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE BA'ATH PARTY IN 1971

The National Congress of the *Ba'ath* Party that was held in Baghdad in 1971 decided to make Kirkuk city and the surrounding area an Arab city by the end of the 1980s. Also, in accordance with this decision, the following measures were taken: All primary, intermittent, and secondary education in Iraq in Iraq shall be entirely in the Arabic language.

The Turkmen schools teaching in the Turkmen language were closed by the governments. The names of the Turkmen schools were changed to Arabic names and Arabic education became compulsory in all Turkmen populated areas.

The Turkmen teachers at the schools were transferred to other areas against their wishes and all these steps were taken by the *Ba'ath* regime to assimilate the Turkmen into Arab society and to prevent them from reviving their cultural development.

During the Saddam Hussein government, there were 137 schools in 1970 and by 1971 this figure fell to sixty-eight.

The decomposition of Iraqi Turkmen was an Iraqi policy passed down from one government to the next. The Arabization policy also involved moving the Turkmens from the north to the south of Iraq and spreading them all over the country to decompose their national identity.

In brief, the Turkmens received almost no attention from the Western media, despite being the third largest demographic part of Iraq.

From 1970, the Iraqi Government resorted to various means to assimilate the Turkmen into the Arab society and to 'Arabise' the region. For example, tens of thousands of Turkmen families were deported against their will into the south of Iraq and hundreds of Turkmen villages were destroyed by the Iraqi regime under a variety of pretexts. Simultaneously, the Iraqi government brought in landless Arabs from southern Iraq and other parts of Iraq to settle in their place, enticing them with free housing and other economic incentives. The Arabisation policy implemented by the Saddam Hussein government was aimed at bringing about demographic changes designed to reduce the political power and presence of Turkmen,

thereby consolidating the government's control over this region.

The Arabization policy by the Iraqi government against the Turkmen did not stop there but Turkmen teachers were transferred to the south of Iraq and a variety of legislation was introduced by the *Revolutionary Command Council* to prevent the Turkmen from seeking any employment in Turkmen-populated regions, especially Kirkuk City. Turkmen leaders and elders were often falsely accused of spying on behalf of Türkiye or Iran or accused of being members of illegal organisations. All these steps were conducted intentionally, to change the demography of the Turkmen populated region.

The *Arabisation* of Turkmen became a state policy in 1971 when the *General Assembly* of the *Ba'ath* Party decided to Arabise Kirkuk and this policy continued until 1980. The Administrative boundaries of the Turkmen city of Kirkuk were changed in 1974 to divide Turkmen concentrations.

Since the mid-1970s, Arabs enjoyed special incentives and rights, encouraging them to move to historically Turkmen regions, including particularly the oil-rich cities of Kirkuk and Mosul.

Turkmen societies, institutions and properties were officially *Arabise*.' This meant that the Iraqi administration not only prohibited the people from speaking Turkish in public but also punished even those who spoke privately in that language. The names of many Turkmen villages and towns were changed to Arabic by the Iraqi regime. The name of the Kirkuk city was officially changed to *Al_Tamim* "literally: 'nationalisation', marking the nationalisation of the *Western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company* in 1972" by resolution number 41 of the *Council of the Revolutionary Command*, dated 29th January 1976. The largest township there, *Tuz Khormatu*, was administratively attached to *Tikrit*, which was the place of birth of Saddam Hussein.

The province of Kirkuk has continually shrunk in size with successive administrative decrees and thus the size of Kirkuk province, which was 20,000 square kilometres in 1975, reduced to half that figure.

Consequently, Kirkuk, with 4.2% of the land area and formerly the fourth largest province of Iraq, is now presently only the 14th largest province, with only 2% of the land area. The Turkmen names of all the streets, shops, supermarkets, mosques, graveyards, parks, sports centres, and entertainment centres were changed to Arabic names. The

towns of *Tuz Khormatu*, *Kifri*, and *Chamchamal* were affiliated to neighbouring provinces.

Elsewhere, in the oil-rich regions, the government had already resorted to re-drawing Iraq's administrative map to alter the demographic makeup of disputed areas for the last time. The boundaries of Kirkuk province was redrawn such that an Arab majority could ensure in key areas. Several major towns with a clear Turkmen majority were reallocated to existing neighbouring provinces or the newly created Salahaddin province. The authorities then embarked on a massive campaign of forced relocation: tens of thousands of residents were evicted from their homes in areas with significant oil deposits, as well as in disputed areas.

These included *Kirkuk*, *Khanaqin*, *Mandeli*, and *Shaikhan*, where most deportees were removed to locations in southern Iraq; many were abandoned without any shelter. Others were housed in rudimentary camps along major routes under military control. In their place came Arab families from various southern tribes, encouraged by the government with financial rewards and other benefits.

Many Turkmen quarters, towns, and villages were changed and replaced with Arabic names following a decision taken by the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, on the 20th of May 1976, to rename Turkish villages with Arabic names.

In accordance with the directives given by the *Revolutionary Command Council* in 1985, the Ba'ath party authorities contacted the eldest people of the Turkmen tribe and informed them about the new Arabic surnames that they were to use.

The authorities prepared false lineage registers and replaced the Turkmen names with Arabic ones. These pressures were also implemented in educational and cultural fields.

The names of Turkmen schools were changed, and Arabic names were assigned following the plan of assimilating the Turkmen amongst the Arabs. As in the other *Arabise* areas, the Iraqi government replaced the expelled Kurdish and Turkmen populations of Kirkuk with Arabs, the majority of the *Shi'a* families were brought to Kirkuk from southern Iraq where pro Saddam Hussein government was brought from the south and settled in Kirkuk. Arabs took over the homes of expelled Kurdish and Turkmen families and gave them to Arabs who

were members of the Ba'ath party.

The Iraqi government also constructed entirely new Arab neighbourhoods, such as *al-Nasr*, *al-Hurriya* and *Al_adisiyya*, to alter drastically the ethnic demographics of Kirkuk the very aim of *Arabisation*. The Arabs who came to Kirkuk tended to be more urbanised, middle-class professionals than the Arab farmers who settled in rural villages. In addition, the Iraqi government offered the newly arrived Arabs a free plot of land and 10,000 Dinars as an incentive.

To reduce the potential power and influence of Turkmen in Kirkuk and the surrounding region, only the Arabs were selected for employment in a new workshop set up in Kirkuk. None of the Turkmen who had applied for employment were accepted.

It was most unfair that there was not one single Turkmen employed in Kirkuk City amongst the 750 officials who were appointed to the municipality of Kirkuk. Previously, 80% of the employees were Turkmen. This shows the discrimination of the Iraqi government against the Turkmen.

Saddam Hussein's regime introduced various legislations to change the demography of the Turkmen-populated area especially the city of Kirkuk. The aim and the goal of the *Ba'ath* regime was to dilute the Turkmen within the Arab society.

One of these legislations that was introduced by Saddam Hussein's regime passed a decree that Turkmen graduates in general, but particularly those who had graduated from Turkish universities were not to be employed in Kirkuk and the surrounding areas.

The Iraqi government discouraged the Iraqi Turkmen from taking higher education in Türkiye by endorsing stamps on the Turkmen ethnic passport saying that the holder of the passport could travel to all countries except Israel and Türkiye. Moreover, the Iraqi government used a variety of methods to prevent Turkmen families from sending any financial support to their children. Turkmen were forbidden from owning and running a petrol station in Kirkuk and the surrounding areas. Moreover, Turkmen was forbidden from making export or import bids. *Arabise* policy was included to place restrictions on employment and transfer of government employees to posts outside the Turkmen region.

The *Ba'ath* regime issued legislation stipulated that the Turkmen were prohibited from working in important governmental jobs and positions, for example in the secret service and police, as pilots in the air force, officers in the army, or as ministers and councillors.

Turkmen civil servants were assigned to the south and banned from living in *Turkmen Eli* and especially the city of Kirkuk after being graduated. The Turkmen employees and their families were transferred by force from the government offices in Kirkuk to other government organisations, especially to the South of Iraq.

To change the demography of Kirkuk city and to reduce the political influence of the Turkmen in Northern Iraq in general, and particularly in Kirkuk, the Iraqi government adopted various laws to transfer the Turkmen without their consent into various purpose-built settlements in the south of Iraq. These settlements were built by the Iraqi government and under the direct instruction of Saddam Hussein.

The *Ba'ath* Party administration had formed the most tragic days for the Turkmen nation. The tyrannical regime of Saddam had committed inhuman acts of violence to silence the Turkmen. The Turkmen nation was oppressed and persecuted, and their leaders were fabricated with false accusations and executed, although they were not guilty. Tens of thousands of the Turkmen's political activists and ordinary citizens were subjected to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, summary execution, torture by beating and burning, electric shock, starvation, mutilation, and rape.

The wives of Turkmen prisoners were tortured in front of their husbands and children were tortured in the presence of their parents, the horrors of which were concealed from the world by the application of a totalitarian state. Because of a strike that was conducted by Turkmen students in conjunction with the Turkmen Teaching Union on the 2nd of January 1971, Saddam Hussein's government reduced the number of Turkmen schools that were to be open in Turkmen-populated areas. The arrested Turkmen union members were interrogated by the *Directorate of Security of Kirkuk*, which at that time was run by *Taha Al-Jazrawi*.

The *Ba'ath* regime found a good opportunity in the Turkmen student strike to arrest and execution of a prominent Turkmen actor *Hussein Ali Musa Demirci*. By 1972, the Iraqi government had issued new

legislation prohibiting the study of Turkmen languages in Turkmen schools. The *Ba'ath* regime banned Turkmen's publicity and media. The *Ba'ath* regime, under a variety of pretexts, demolished the houses of Turkmen-populated areas in Kirkuk City, as well as many other Turkmen villages demolished by the Iraqi government. For example, Turkmen houses in Tuz Khormatu, Beshir, Kompetler and Yaychi were destroyed, and the residents of those villages were left homeless. Moreover, many Turkmen houses were confiscated, to split up the Turkmen localities.

Arab families were brought to Kirkuk from the south of Iraq and resettled by force, with the financial support of the government, to change the demography of the area. Turkmen who wanted to buy or sell their properties in Kirkuk were held under obligation to obtain official permission from governmental authorities.

Under resolution number 1081, dated 27th September 1984, which was legislated by the *Ba'ath* regime; the Turkmen lands were confiscated and allotted to the Arabs who were brought from the south. There was an extremely strict ban on all sales of real estate in Turkmen regions, and the Turkmen were only able to sell their lands and houses to Arabs. Turkmen could neither obtain building permission on their lands nor buy real estate. The Turkmen religious leaders who did not speak Arabic were forced to deliver sermons in Arabic, and when they did not, they were imprisoned. The 1980s saw the execution of countless Turkmen leaders and elders during the *Ba'ath* regime, who were often falsely accused of spying for Iran or being pro-Türkiye. During the Iran–Iraq war, dozens of Turkmen villages were bulldozed totally to the ground. Turkmen were severely intimidated by the *Ba'ath* regime into silence during the 1987 national census in Iraq, as it was relevant to the number of ethnic groups in the country.

In this census, Turkmen were openly threatened by the *Ba'ath* regime to declare themselves as either Arabs or Kurds. If they declared themselves Turkmen, they would be deported to the Saudi border and the south of Iraq.

1.32 OCCUPATION ERA 2003

After the fall of Saddam Hussein's government in 2003, hundreds of Kurdish militia members from both Kurdish parties poured into the Turkmen city of Kirkuk. The first things implemented by the Kurdish militia ransacked the municipality buildings in Kirkuk, government offices, and military buildings.



Figure (97) of Kirkuk Kalesi (Kirkuk Kishla)



Figure (98) of Kirkuk Kalesi (Kirkuk Kishla)

The land deeds for the Turkmen were deliberately taken by Kurdish militia from the Registry Office, making it difficult for the Turkmen to set up themselves as original inhabitants of the province.

A historical military barracks in the city which was built in the Ottoman era was set alight by Kurdish rebels, along with Turkmen shops and houses, including the land registry office.

The invasion of Kirkuk in 2003 by the Kurdish militia was a mirror image of the events from 1991 during the uprising against Saddam Hussein after *Operation Desert Storm*.

In addition, thousands of internally displaced Kurds and Turkmen were returned to Kirkuk and other Arabise regions to reclaim their homes and lands that had been occupied by Arabs from central and southern Iraq. Some of the returnees were forcibly expelled from their homes by the government of Saddam Hussein during the 1980s and 1990s.

Most of the returning Kurds were not originally from Kirkuk but were brought to Kirkuk with the help of two Kurdish parties and the reasoning behind this was to change the demography of the city and to win the referendum that was planned to be carried out by 31 December 2007. Also, to decide whether Kirkuk could formally join the Kurdish-administered region, an outcome that Arabs and Turkmen in Kirkuk staunchly opposed.

However, the unresolved issue was the future of Kirkuk, an oil-rich city in northern Iraq, which is home to a substantial number of Turkmen, Kurds, and Arabs.

This mixture within the city made it a powder keg. The Turkmen, Arabs, and Chaldo Assyrians had grand expectations of the interim administration set up after April 9, 2003.

After the fall of Saddam Hussein's government in 2003, the Turkmen expected to see democracy, fairness, an end to discrimination, the right to self-determination, and an end to violence. Unfortunately, the opposite had occurred about the human rights situation in Iraq, concerning the Iraqi Turkmen.

The campaigns the Turkmen were subjected to by the Kurds in Turkmen Eli, were carried out in a far more brutal fashion, than on the Kurds under the Saddam Hussein regime.

The Kirkuk city holds a strategic as well as a symbolic value for the Iraqi people in general and especially for the Turkmen. The ocean of oil beneath its surface the city of Kirkuk could be used to drive the economy of an independent Kurdistan, the goal for many Kurds.

The Kurdish militia hopes to make the city of Kirkuk and its vast oil reserves part of an autonomous Kurdistan, while the Turkmen, Chaldo Assyrians, and Arabs are fiercely and staunchly opposing the inclusion of Kirkuk into the Kurdish Regional Government.

The strategic importance of the city of Kirkuk became extremely important for the Kurds and the fight over the control of the province has proved to be one of the focal points of the conflict in northern Iraq.

In the view of many intellectuals, the Kurdish control over Kirkuk could fuel Kurdish nationalism in the region and undermine the rights of Turkmen, Arabs, and Chaldo Assyrians residents in Kirkuk.

During the Kurdish occupation of the city of Kirkuk in 2003, the city of Kirkuk itself became almost synonymous with the abusive *Kurdization* campaign, which illustrated the persistence of the designs that the Kurds had on Kirkuk.

The fate of the city of Kirkuk has been one of the thorniest issues of Iraq's constitutional process. Under Article 140 of the document ratified by Iraqis on 15 Oct. 2005, a referendum on the status of Kirkuk is to be implemented in the province no later than 31 December 2007.

This was to happen only after the Iraqi government had taken measures to repatriate former Arab residents, resettle Turkmen and Kurds or compensate them, implement normalization, and conduct the census in Kirkuk.

After the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, the Kurds intensified their *Kurdization* campaign in the city of Kirkuk. Kurdish officials working at the administration of the *Kirkuk Municipality* confiscated real estate and lands belonging to the town administration and granted them to ethnic Kurds who were newly arrived in Kirkuk and who were not originally from the town.

The Kurdish party KDP had openly provided \$5000 to each repatriated Kurdish family in Kirkuk and they brought tens of thousands of Kurds and resettled them in the Kirkuk and surrounding.

The Kurdish parties used various methods to eliminate Turkmen identity and the aim of this was to dilute the Turkmen into the Kurdish culture.

After the Kurdish occupation of the city of Kirkuk, the economic, political, and cultural aspects of the Turkmen completely changed especially when the Kurdish parties brought over 600,000 Kurds to the city of Kirkuk and this was organised and orchestrated by both Kurdish parties to change the demography of Kirkuk.

Both Kurdish parties encouraged and offered financial support to all Kurdish families that were brought from various regions to the city of Kirkuk. The demographic structure of Kirkuk was seriously changed and distorted as Kurds migrated into the city in large groups claiming to be original residents; the latter were backed by armed *Peshmerga* and US forces.

The Kurdification policy against the Turkmen did not stop there but also continued outside of Iraq and this Kurdification scandal was discovered and denounced by the Swedish Migration Minister, Mr. *Tobias Billstrom* in February 2007, when he revealed that the Iraqi Ambassador who was a Kurd (*Ahmed Bamarni*) had been issuing Iraqi passports to non-Iraqi Kurds from Syria, Iran, Türkiye, and Lebanon and these none Iraqi citizens later were allowed to vote during the Iraqi election.

Also, the Swedish authorities in Sweden said the Iraqi embassy in Sweden alone had issued twenty-six thousand passports to non-Iraqis and that all these passport holders were supposed to have been born in Kirkuk.

But after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, thousands of internally displaced Kurds and Turkmen returned to Kirkuk and other Arabised regions to reclaim their homes and lands, which had been occupied by Arabs from central and southern Iraq. These returnees were forcibly expelled from their homes by the government of Saddam Hussein during the 1980s and 1990s. However, the majority of Kurdish returnees were not from Kirkuk, but they came to Kirkuk for economic reasons also they were brought by the Kurdish parties.

According to the *Ration Card Data Base* that was issued by the Iraqi government and considered by the United Nations to and Iraqi government as the most reliable source for information on the Iraqi

population”; some 12,000 inhabitants were expelled from Kirkuk under the previous regime, one-third being Turkmen.

On 10 April 2003, Kirkuk had 810,000 inhabitants after the occupation of Kirkuk. The Kurdish parties brought to Kirkuk over 700,000 Kurds and this massive influx of Kurds to Kirkuk, the population of Kirkuk reached over 1.5 million inhabitants; all newcomers are Kurds.

Most of the returning Kurds were not originally from Kirkuk but had been brought in to help win the referendum that was expected to be implemented before December 2007 to decide whether Kirkuk could formally join the Kurdish-administered region.

To win the referendum, the Kurdish parties in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah have legislated new legislation by forcing pregnant Kurdish women to deliver their babies in Kirkuk hospitals.

Also, the Kurds have set up a committee who was responsible for transferring the pregnant women to deliver their babies in Kirkuk and ensuring the new babies have a Kirkuk birth certificate so in the future a referendum can be carried out by the UN and other international organisation would show clearly that the Kurds are the majority.

During the occupation of the city of Kirkuk, and according to leaked documents from *Kirkuk Delivery Hospital*, it showed that the number of Kurdish registered babies after the occupation of Kirkuk was twenty times more Kurdish babies born than Turkmen and Arab babies compared to the previous years.

However, after the occupation of Kirkuk by the Kurdish militia, the Arabs, and Turkmen in Kirkuk staunchly opposed the Kurdish occupation because the demography of the city had been changed dramatically in favour of the Kurds.

In addition to the demographic changes, it would be impossible to have a referendum since the country was under occupation, as there was a lack of security and stability in Iraq. In the meantime, *James Baker & Lee Hamilton* called for a major delay to the constitutional referendum on the grounds that holding a census could lead to regional conflict and the risks of further violence sparked by a

referendum are likely and with the possibility of violent clashes among the ethnic groups and even a civil war across Iraq.[31]

In the view of many politicians and intellectuals, the referendum could lead to the disintegration of Iraq. Still, there was also the great possibility that Iran, Syria, and Türkiye would intervene to protect the Turkmens.

Also, Türkiye was conscious of the need to preserve and maintain its capability of protecting its sovereign rights, territorial integrity, stability in the region, and national and international interests.

The Kurds also knew that any clashes in Kirkuk between the Turkmen and Kurds would provoke the Turkish government to some form of action.

During the occupation of Iraq in 2003, the situation in Kirkuk was very strained as a result of this, the *Iraqi Study Group Report* on the Kirkuk issue, submitted by *James Baker* and *Lee Hamilton*, was considered by the Turkmen to be a realistic, constructive, well-structured, and comprehensive document that covered all aspects that related to Iraqi issues and provided new hope for the future of Iraq. It was of the utmost importance that the status of Kirkuk should be delayed: as quoted on page number 45, Recommendation 30 on the *Iraq Study Group Report (James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton, 2007)*. [32]

Reference also was made on page 19 of the same report for further corroboration of this point. The Kurdish militia insisted that the constitution required a referendum by December 2007 to decide whether Kirkuk could formally join the Kurdish administration region. The Arabs and Turkmen in Kirkuk staunchly opposed this because the demography of the city had changed so dramatically in favour of the Kurds.

³¹ Mofak Salman, *Turkoman of Iraq*, 2007, Dublin. Ireland.

³² Aziz Samanji, *Political history of Turkoman of Iraq*, 1993, London, UK




Figure (99) Taha Yassin Ramadan “left” Saddam Hussein “2nd left” holding a Koran, Abdullah Kazim Ruwayyid “2nd Right”, and Mizhar Abdullah Ruwayyid “Right” stand at their trial held in Baghdad November 28, 2005. The trial of Saddam and seven aides on charges of crimes against humanity

Turkey and Iran were concerned about the implementation of the Kurdish independent referendum, both countries weary of the greatening risk of further violence it could catalyse, with the possibility of violent clashes among the ethnic groups and even a civil war across Iraq. In the view of the Turkmens and Arabs in Iraq, the implementation of the referendum by the Kurdish Regional Government not only could lead to the disintegration and instability of Iraq but there was also the great possibility that Iran, Syria, and Türkiye.



Figure (100) from the left, Jalal Talabani ex-president of Iraq, and PKK terrorist leader Abdullah Ocalan who was responsible for the death of over 40,000 innocent Turkish citizens.



Figure (101) from the left, Berham Salah ex_president of Iraq, and PKK terrorist leader Abdullah Ocalan who responsible for the death of over 40,000 innocent Turkish citizens

1.33 THE NEW IRAQI CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 140

Following the occupation of Iraq by the United States, United Kingdom, and Kurdish militia, the Kurdish militia aspired to make the city of Kirkuk and its vast oil reserves a part of an autonomous *Kurdistan*. While the *Turkmen*, *Chaldo Assyrians*, and *Arabs* were fiercely and staunchly opposing the inclusion of Kirkuk in an autonomous region.

After the abolishment of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, a new constitution was legislated by the Iraqi opposition parties who were stationed in Iran.



Figure (102) Representative of the Chaldo Assyrian of Iraq holds the signed final new constitution.

The Kurds and the foreign military occupation wrote the new Iraqi constitution, which was set up after the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime. Article 140 was imposed by the Kurds and was added at the last minute to the New Constitution.

Article 140 was aimed at Türkiye, acting as a legislative punishment for the Turkmen after the *Turkish Parliament* rejected using its territory to invade northern Iraq from Türkiye.

Article 140 dealt with particularly important and sensitive issues, not only for the Turkmen of Iraq but also for all Iraqis, except for the

Kurdish minority who wrote it with their foreign consultants to suit their special agenda and self-interest.

To the Kurds, this article 140 would help them to ease the seizing control of the city of Kirkuk, and its annexation to the Kurdish Autonomous Region. Article 140 gave the Kurds legal means by which they could seize control of the huge oil wealth of this historical Iraqi Turkmen city of Kirkuk.

One of the anomalies of Article 140 of the *New Permanent Iraqi Constitution* is that it imposed a fixed time limit for its implementation, saying it must be completed before the 31st of December 2007. Furthermore, article 140 deals with the normalization process of the Kirkuk governorship, a process which consists of three major steps, each one with its time limit:

The return to Kirkuk of all its forcefully displaced inhabitants by the *Ba'ath* Regime during the *Arabisation* processes of the province by the regime, and the reoccupation of their confiscated lands and properties to be completed before 31st of March 2007. Enforcing a new population census for the original population of the province to be held before 31 August 2007.

To conduct a referendum to decide whether Kirkuk should be attached to the Kurdish Autonomous Region or not, and the voting shall be implemented prior to 31st December 2007. Article 140 expired on the 31st of December 2007 without being implemented.

According to the new Iraqi constitution that was established after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, article 140 cannot be modified or extended since it has a fixed time limit for its implementation, stating that it must be completed before 31st of December 2007. Therefore, at the end of 2007, article 140 was no longer valid and automatically expired losing its constitutional validity.

The Iraqi constitution also clearly said that any extension or amendment to the article needed the approval of two-thirds of the Iraqi parliament's members and the approval of the public in the form of a referendum and Article 140 appeared to be dead in the water.

Unfortunately, the UN representative in Erbil, *Staffan de Mistura* recommended the extension of the expiry date of article 140 for a further six months; this happened after he had private meetings with

the Kurdish regional Government members, and he accepted an invitation to attend the Kurdish regional Government parliament.

The Turkmen considered *Staffan de Mistura* recommended extension of the expiry date of article 140 a further six months suggestion unwise, biased, and was a direct interference in the internal affairs of the republic of Iraq since *Staffan de Mistura* had failed to pay any attention to the Iraqi Constitution. *Staffan de Mistura* had, in fact, bent to the pressure that was applied on him by both Kurdish parties in northern Iraq, but the *Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri al-Maliki* did not support the initiative because he said that any extension after the time limit was unconstitutional.

The Turkmen parties in Kirkuk responded to *Staffan de Mistura's* recommendation it would be more beneficial for the UN to open an office in Kirkuk city instead of opening an office in Erbil city in northern Iraq. This would enable the UN to listen to the suggestions, demands, and complaints of the ethnic groups in Kirkuk rather than issuing generalized and irrational edicts.

In addition, in the view of many Iraqi politicians and intellectuals the UN representative *Staffan de Mistura* was not entitled and qualified to change, extend, or even change any article within the Iraqi constitution.

Iraq is a sovereign country and not under a UN mandate, therefore *Staffan de Mistura* should have consulted with his central office and with the people of Kirkuk before tabling his motion. Nevertheless, the suggestion of *Stephan de Mistura* was totally opposed by the Turkmen and the Iraqi Turkmen Front leader; *S. Ergerj* met with *Stephan de Mistura* about his suggestion and *S. Ergerj* expressed his deepest concern about the extension of Article 140. Furthermore, other Turkmen political parties condemned *Staffan de Mistura's* action.

The problem of Kirkuk was not a constitutional one but lies in the ambiguity of *Article 140*. According to *Article 140* of the Iraqi constitution, the problem of the disputed areas, notably the oil-rich province of Kirkuk, addressed three stages of normalisation and then to conduct a census amongst the population, followed by a referendum on the fate of areas which will decide whether Kirkuk will join the Conservatives or the Kurdistan region.

It was supposed to conduct those stages during the largest period up to 31st December 2007, a deadline extended by the United Nations representative without the approval of the central government for six months ending on June 30.

However, the 24 members of the 41-member *Kirkuk Governorate Council* presented a request to the *Kurdistan Region Government* and the Iraqi parliament to make the governorate part of the *Kurdistan Region* as they believe that *Article 140* of the constitution was not implemented and that *Article 24* of the *Provincial Council Election Draft Law* did not meet their ambitions whereas the Turkmen and Arabs regarded this extraordinary session as illegal.

In addition, the Turkmen leadership has requested to replace the Kurdish police in Kirkuk with army forces from central and southern Iraq, the postponement of the elections and adaptation of the division of Kirkuk to the three constituencies include the proportion of 32 % for both Arabs and Kurds and Turkmen and 4% for Assyrians.

In the meantime, on the 31st of July 2008, a statement by the *Turkish Foreign Ministry* was released regarding the issue of Kirkuk, which said that the *Turkish Foreign Ministry* was concerned and deeply alarmed about the demand by members of the governorate of Kirkuk, about a Kurdish list to join the *Northern Department*. The *Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs* released a statement: ‘*We in Türkiye express our deep concern on what we see and what happened in the governorate of Kirkuk, where some members agreed to join the Council in Kirkuk to the north of Iraq and Türkiye's position on Kirkuk would not have ever changed in the present and future and the Arab and Turkmen called this move by the Kurd as a provocation*’.

[33]

³³ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/28/content_8828848.htm



Figure (103) This is Kirkuk Kopru Bashi (Head of the Bridge) in the sixties of the last centuries; it shows the organisation and cleanliness.



Figure (104) The Kirkuk Kalesi (Kirkuk Citadel) In the sixties of the last centuries, Turkmens enjoyed sipping tea and relaxing in front of the Kirkuk Kalesi in Kirkuk



Figure (105) The Kirkuk Kalesi (Kirkuk Citadel) In the sixties of the last centuries, Turkmens enjoyed sipping tea and relaxing in front of the Kirkuk Qalesi in Kirkuk



Figure (106) This is Kirkuk Kopru Bashi (Head of the Bridge) in the sixties of the last centuries; it shows the organisation and cleanliness.



Figure (107) This is Kirkuk Kopru Bashi (Head of the Bridge) in the sixties of the last centuries; it shows the organisation and cleanliness.



Figure (108) This is Kirkuk Kopru Bashi (Head of the Bridge) in 2017 after the Kurdish occupation and they converted the area to wastelands.

1.34 THE ATTACK ON THE IRAQI TURKMEN FRONT IN KIRKUK

In July 2008, Iraq's parliament reached an agreement on the *Provincial Council Election Law*, particularly about *Paragraph 24* of the law, which deals with the election mechanism in the Kirkuk Governorate.

The postponement of the elections and adaptation of the division of Kirkuk to the three constituencies include the proportion of 32 % for Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen and 4% for Assyrians ethnic in addition, the Turkmen, Arab, and Assyrians proposed equal distribution of provincial council seats in the Kirkuk region which was outside the Kurdish territory.

This proposal was voted on by *President Jalal Talabani* and his deputy, *Adel Abdul Mahdi*, and before the voting, the Kurds rejected a secret ballot while the opposition had requested a secret ballot and the members of the Iraqi parliament voted open and secret voting.

However, most members had decided on secret voting and the deputy parliamentary speaker *Khalid al-Attiyah*, a *Shi'a*, said the secret ballot was unconstitutional and accused the lawmakers of "*arm-twisting*."

But on 22nd of July 2008, a decision was made by 127 Iraqi members of parliament voted in favour of the *Provincial Council Election Law*, particularly about *Paragraph 24* of the law, which deals with the election mechanism in the Kirkuk Governorate and the distribution of power that included the proportion of 32% for Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen and 4% for Assyrians.

Also, the resolution decided that the security of the town must controlled by the central government rather than the current military forces stationed in the town and the security forces linked to the political parties must leave the city of Kirkuk.

The bill was approved by 127 out of 140 deputies who attended the meeting, and ten of those members decided not to vote. Two of them decided to vote against and one MP gave a blank ballot paper, but Iraq's parliament still passed the law.

The Kurds, along with the two deputy parliamentary speakers, walked out of the chamber after lawmakers decided to hold a secret ballot on a

power-sharing item in the law for the disputed, oil-rich city of Kirkuk this was voted by President *Jalal Talabani* and his deputy, *Adel Abdul Mahdi*.

But on the 27th of July 2008, the secret police linked to both Kurdish parties distributed leaflets informing the people of Kirkuk, especially the Turkmen citizens. In order to force them to participate in a protest that had been organised by the Kurds against the adoption of the law of elections for provincial assemblies causing a postponement of elections in the city for an indefinite period.

In addition, the Kurdish police who went with the Kurdish Asayish informed the Turkmen shop owners to close their shops and anyone who opened their shop would be subject to punishment by the Kurdish police and his shop would be ransacked.

Also, the Kurdish Asayish separated roamers so that all the governmental buildings would be closed and the Kurdish directors in Kirkuk informed the Turkmen employees to be absent from work and anyone not doing so he/she could be punished, and their wages cut.

As a result of this, the Turkmen population in the Kirkuk was extremely worried and concerned as this event reminded the Turkmen of the Kurdish massacre of the Turkmen in 1959, the mass burning and killing of Turkmen. During the time of this massacre, the arrested Turkmen at the hands of the Kurdish Communists were tied by ropes and pulled behind cars in the main street of Kirkuk by the Kurds and communist party members.

This reminder of the Kurdish massacre of the Turkmen in 1959, caused panic amongst the Turkmen population in Kirkuk caused them to approach the Turkmen member of the Kirkuk governing council Mr. *Hassan Turan*, and Turkmen Chief of Police *Burhan Tayyip*, asking for advice and help.

Therefore, on 27 July Turkmen member of the Kirkuk governing council Mr. *Hassan Turan* approached the Kirkuk governor Mr. *Mustafa Abdulrahman* who was a Kurd. After a lengthy meeting and discussion with him on this subject, Mr. *Mustafa Abdulrahman* acknowledged to Mr. *Hassan Tuan* that a Kurdish protest had been organised and he assured Mr. *Hassan Turan* that all the government offices must be open, and the participation in the demonstration is not compulsory.

But on the afternoon and evening of the 27th of July Mr. *Hassan Turan*, Turkmen Chief Police in Kirkuk Mr. *Burhan Tayyip*, and *Turhan Abdulrahman* appeared on Turkmen Eli TV advising the worried Turkmen population about the demonstration, what they must do, measures that needed to be taken and both advised the Turkmen citizens to carry out their normal business.

Also said that the shopkeepers would be free to open their shops, all governmental offices would be open, and no one must force the Turkmen to take part in this demonstration. Both also mentioned that the Kurds have the right to express their protest and recommended that the population remain calm and avoid any provocation towards the Kurds.

In the meantime, the Kirkuk governor Mr. *Mustafa Abdulrahman* who is a Kurd never appeared on the TV or on radio to assure the population in Kirkuk this is going to be a Kurdish demonstration, and no one is forced to attend this protest. Whereas the Kurdish directors for government offices have openly threatened Turkmen staff, that their salaries would be cut if they do not take part in the protest. The Kurdish police have threatened the shopkeepers to close their shops and any shop that opens would be looted by the Kurds and destroyed. However, on 27th July, minibus drivers owned by the Turkmen were taken by force by Kurdish police, and their car discs and insurance certificates were confiscated. The Kurds informed them their car disc would return when the driver transported the Kurdish demonstrators to the meeting point free of charge.

The tension between the Turkmen and Kurds continued and reached its peak, and on the 28th of July, before the demonstration, the local government in Kirkuk controlled by the Kurds and both Kurdish parties' personnel blocked all road access to government places.

The Kurds set up various checking points to prevent the people from going to their work. The Turkmen shopkeepers were forced to close their shops and Kurdish directors in various governmental offices locked the main doors to prevent the people from attending their workplace and forced the employees to take part in the demonstration. At about 9.00 am, approximately three thousand Kurdish protesters gathered near Turkmen Kirkuk Castel (*Kerkuk Kalasi*) as a meeting point to commence their protest towards the Kirkuk governing to

show their anger and to condemn the adoption of the law of elections for provincial assemblies and causing a postponement of elections in the city for an indefinite period by the Iraqi government.

Since the security of the town was controlled by both the US forces and the police in Kirkuk, thus they were obliged to guarantee the safety and security of the people in Kirkuk, but it was negligence on behalf of the US forces to grant permission for the Kurdish protest to go ahead and especially allowing the Kurdish protestors to pass through a route that is mainly Turkmen neighbourhood.

The Kurds designed this protest to show their musells and to provoke the Turkmen population in the town. Nevertheless, the Kurdish demonstration began from *Kirkuk Kalesi* toward the Kirkuk governing office to demand the holding of elections and the application of Article 140 for the normalization of the situation in the province.

The Kurdish demonstrators, Kurdish police wearing civil clothes also were brought from Erbil and Sulymaniya by minibuses and private cars to Kirkuk and this was designed to mislead the media and to show the world that the overwhelming population of Kirkuk was refusing the decision of the Iraqi central government towards the adoption of the law of elections for provincial assemblies causing a postponement of elections in the city for an indefinite period.

The Kurdish demonstrators before they began the demonstration; were carrying automatic weapons AK-47s, pistols, iron bars, baseball bats, and Kurdish flags. Also, the Kurdish protestors were escorted and protected by the local Kurdish police which consisted of Kurds and Asayish.

The Kurdish protestors walked through the street of Kirkuk chanting patriotic songs and provocation slogans against the Arabs and the Turkmen.

At 11.00 am on the 28th of July 2008 at the “*Nafura*” fountain area opposite the Kirkuk governate, an explosion occurred, and according to the Kurdish police, the explosion was conducted by a female suicide bomber killing twenty-two and injured at least 120 while the Kurdish were showing but no one claimed responsibility for the bombing.

But in the view of the Iraqi people in Kirkuk, the fanatic Kurds conducted the explosion to create civil unrest in Kirkuk. Nonetheless, people in the crowd blamed Kurds extremists for the attack.

After the explosion, the Kurdish guards started opening fire, shooting into the air as “*Najat Hassam*, a senior member of the *Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)*, quoted by *AFP* as saying.” *More people responded to the gunfire with heavy shooting.*”

The rumours in the town were that the Kurdish police conducted this attack to create chaos, and instability and to show the world that they were the victims, but the more realistic reason was to create a civil war, thus the Kurdish militia would have a good reason to enter the town with large numbers of Kurdish militia.

However, within a few minutes, rumours and misleading information were spread by the Kurdish police saying, that the Turkmens caused the explosion, and, this was false information, and it was a good and legitimate excuse for the Kurds to attack the Turkmens in Kirkuk. Then *Asayish* “Kurdish police” started directing the Kurdish protestors to attack the Turkmen targets in the city of Kirkuk. Elsewhere, the Kurdish media started broadcasting in various Kurdish news media sources claiming that the *Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF)* guards opened fire on the Kurdish demonstrators and that the Kurdish demonstrators defended themselves by replying.

Then the Kurdish protesters attacked the headquarters of the Iraqi Turkmen Front “*ITF*,” the headquarters for the Turkmen of the political prisoners and families of martyrs, *Sunubber Hotel*, Turkmen shops, and Turkmen properties.

The most striking thing was that the *Turkmen Eli TV Station* was attacked by the Kurdish demonstrators and had its contents burnt before the blast. The ITF head office is a distance of one kilometer away from the site of the blast, and the ITF headquarters is in a residential area and is not on the main street as stated by the Kurdish media. Then Kurdish armed demonstrators escorted by Kurdish police opened heavy fire with automatic machine guns toward the Turkmen guards who were guarding the ITF building. The Kurdish attacks on the ITF building resulted in injury to one of the guards, including the head of the security personnel. Then the Kurds set ablaze their vehicles that belonged to the ITF. The Kurdish demonstrators later

attacked Turkmen properties and then set a light on the cars and properties of the Turkmen people.

The Kurdish attack in Kirkuk did not stop there, it continued with the Kurdish Asayish attacking the ITF building with a heavy machine gun. One of the ITF guards was wounded during the Kurdish assaults on the ITF, and the Turkmen guards protecting the ITF built resistance then after they ran out of ammunition. The Iraqi Turkmen Front members requested support from the police, but no help arrived to protect the ITF members from the police. Then the Kurdish Asayish and Kurdish armed demonstrators stormed the ITF building. The Kurdish Asayish took the five Turkmen guards including the injured guard to the undisclosed location.

Also, the content of the Iraqi Turkmen Front “ITF” building was ransacked, and its content was set on fire, which caused tremendous damage to the ITF building and its contents. In addition, the ITF staff cars were set on fire, and all this happened in the presence of the local Kirkuk police who are Kurds.

All these atrocities occurred in front of the eyes of the US forces and local police. The police did not take any action against the Kurdish protesters but kept watching them.

However, the most interesting thing was that after the explosion, Mr. *Yahiya Al_barzenchi*, a Kurdish-origin camera operator who was working for *Associated Press* was attacked when he was taking images for the Kurdish protestors, the protestors thought Mr. *Yahiya Al_barzenchi* was a Turkmen citizen working for the *Turkmen Eli TV* station as a camera operator.

Mr. *Yahiya Albrecht* was at once attacked by the Kurdish crowds with fists, sticks, and iron bars and kicked while he was lying on the ground unconscious.

The footage of the attack on Mr. *Yahiya Al_barzenchi* the camera operator working for *Associated Press* was continually shown on the *Turkmen Eli TV Satellite* on 30th July 2008. The *Turkmen Eli TV* showed how the Kurdish mobs had beaten Mr. *Yahiya Al_barzenchi* even when he was unconscious on the ground. Nevertheless, before this film footage, the Kurdish police announced that Mr. *Yahiya Al_barzenchi* was among the dead during the blast. After the explosion, the Kurdish police set up a checkpoint on the roads that led

in and out of Kirkuk and had all cars stopped and searched. Turkmen individuals were taken out of the car by the Kurds and attacked, beaten, abused and their cars smashed before leaving the checkpoint. The attack on the Turkmen was widely condemned by Iraqi politicians, civil organisations, and Turkmen organisations, but the most striking thing was that the Kirkuk governor and Iraqi president *Jalal Talabani* both of whom are Kurds did not condemn the attack on the Turkmen in Kirkuk.

1.35 CHANGING THE DEMOGRAPHY OF KIRKUK BY KURDISH PARTIES

The Turkmen are one of these ethnolinguistic groups in Iraq in general and especially in Kirkuk, the Turkmen have made a major effort to define themselves, both internally and to the world community.

Their real population has always been suppressed by the authorities in Iraq for political reasons and is officially estimated at 2%, while their number should be between 2.5 and 3 million, i.e., 12% of the Iraqi population. The Turkmen of Iraq settled in Turkmen Eli and its capital city of Kerkuk. The Kirkuk city holds strategic as well as symbolic value for the Iraqi people in general and the Turkmen especially.

The Turkmen consider the city of Kirkuk as a pumping mechanism for their survival. The city holds about 60% of Iraq's oil reserves, and 4% of the world's oil reserves and it is one of the finest types of crude oil in the world.

The city of Kirkuk is important because of gas and the ocean of oil beneath its surface. Since 25% of the Iraqi oil lies beneath the city of Kirkuk and expert estimate, the oil and natural resources in Kirkuk would be enough to fuel independent Kurdistan, the goal for many Kurds. Thus, the city is important for the Kurds only for economic reasons and source of an independent homeland.

In the view of many historians, the Kurds have no historical link in the city but the Kurdish migration and settlement in the city of Kirkuk are summarized in several stages.

Firstly, the establishment of the *Iraqi Petrol Company* "IPC" by the British in the twenties encouraged the Kurdish population to move to the city of Kirkuk, looking for employment as a worker for the IPC oil

company. In the view of many Iraqis and historians, this Kurdish migration is considered the first wave of Kurdish settlement in the city.

The second wave of Kurdish migration and settlement in Kirkuk was due to commercial and business reasons, especially when Kurdish middle-class businessmen migrated to Kirkuk from the city of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah to sell their products in general and especially their smuggled cheap products that were smuggled from Iran to be sold with a good profit in Kirkuk and the surrounding region.

The third wave of the Kurdish migration to the city of Kirkuk commenced after the establishment of the Kirkuk to Erbil railway line, which encouraged and eased the migration of a substantial number of Kurds to Kirkuk, seeking jobs and affording an opportunity for a better life.

The fourth wave of Kurdish migrations to the city of Kirkuk was during the establishment of the military command for the Iraqi army in Kirkuk which resulted in building of several military compounds in and around Kirkuk. The establishment of the military compounds in the city of Kirkuk had encouraged several thousands of Kurds to be recruited by the Iraqi army as soldiers and the overwhelming majority of these recruited soldiers were accommodated in the military compounds. In addition, these soldiers brought their families to settle in Kirkuk.

The fifth wave of the Kurdish migration to Kirkuk was after the coup of 1958 when the General *Abdul-Karim Qasim Socialist Government* built several neighbourhoods in Kirkuk and these neighbourhoods were filled with Kurds. Moreover, the Kurdish revolt and rebellion against the Iraqi government caused the Iraqi government to retaliate against the Kurdish rebels by bombarding their villages and forcing them to leave their villages in the mountains and settle in cities such as Erbil, Turkmen sub-district of *Tuz Khormatu*. The Kurdish migration to the Turkmen Eli dramatically increased especially when thousands of Kurdish families were forced by the Saddam Hussein regime during the *Enfal* era to be settled in Turkmen Eli.

The final Kurdish migration and settlement in the Kirkuk region was after the fall of the Saddam Hussein government when the Kurdish parties brought over 700,000 Kurdish settlers into the city of Kirkuk

with the help of the US forces under the pretext the Kurdish settlers that were expelled by the earlier Saddam Hussein government during the Arabization policy.

However, many returned Kurds to Kirkuk after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime were not originally from Kirkuk, but they were brought from various towns by both Kurdish parties to alter the demography of the town.

In the view of many Iraqis, Kirkuk belongs to the Iraqis, and it is a part of Iraq. During a successive Arab government that had ruled Iraq, most of the lands of Kirkuk belonged to the Turkmen.

Throughout the history of Iraq, the Kurds had no historical link to the city of Kirkuk, and the city itself was never a part of the Kurdish Regional Government as the Kurds claim.

The Kurdish militia hopes to make the city of Kirkuk and its vast oil reserves part of an autonomous Kurdistan, while the Turkmen, Chaldo Assyrians, and Arabs are fiercely and staunchly opposing the inclusion of Kirkuk into the Kurdish autonomous region.

For the Kurds, Kirkuk is important because of the Kirkuk oil and gas. Experts estimate the oil and natural resources would be enough to fuel an independent Kurdistan.

After the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, the Turkmen, Arabs, and Chaldo Assyrians had lofty expectations, of the interim administration set up after the 9th of April 2003.

The Turkmen expected to see democracy, justice, equality, fairness, an end to discrimination, the right to self-determination, and an end to violence. Unfortunately, the opposite occurred about the human rights situation in Iraq, concerning the Iraqi Turkmen.

To suppress the Turkmen voice in northern Iraq, the Kurdish militias had set up several puppet Turkmen parties to serve their purpose.

All the Turkmen parties, which were set up by the Kurdish militia, are of Kurdish origin and working for the Kurdish party and all the bodyguards are from the Kurdish militia. The Turkmen parties set up by the Kurds were designed to divide the Turkmen people and were used to smear the name of the Turkmen's Republic in Iraq and to discredit the real representatives of the Turkmen.

The demographic change in the city of Kirkuk that was conducted by the Kurds after 2003 was worse than that carried by the Saddam Hussein government within 35 years.

The city has been changing, with a wave of Kurdish migrants moving to Kirkuk since 2003. With the help of both Kurdish parties stretches of the recently built house pup up everywhere, and there is visual testimony the city is shifting demographics.

The Turkmen and the Arabs saw the mass Kurdish migration as a potential political manoeuvring and demographic takeover. Most of the returned Kurds were not from Kirkuk, and never even lived in Kirkuk. Before if they were genuine from Kirkuk, they should claim their properties, since they were not thus, they settled in and lived in the football stadium and properties belonging to the previous government, military camps, and houses belonging to the previous Iraqi army compound.

After the Kurdish occupation, of the city of Kirkuk in 2003, the economic, political, and cultural aspects of the Turkmens completely changed when the Kurds brought over approximately 700,000 settlers to Kirkuk from North Iraq, Syria, Türkiye, and Iran.

Most of the returning Kurds settlers were not originally from Kirkuk but they were brought to Kirkuk with the help of two Kurdish parties. In the meantime, both Kurdish parties used a more aggressive ethnic cleansing policy by changing the demography of the Kirkuk. For instance, the Kurds were deported by the Saddam Hussein government from Kirkuk and were working as civil servants in the Kurdish-controlled provinces such as Sulaymaniyah and Erbil but were forcibly transferred to Kirkuk against his will.

The Kurds were also prevented from buying land or properties in the cities of Sulymaniya and Erbil they were also forced to register their children in Kirkuk although they were born in Sulymaniya this clearly shows the degree of the demographic changes that have been used by the Kurds in the north of Iraq.

The demographic structure of Kirkuk was changed seriously and distorted as Kurds, backed by armed Peshmerga forces, migrated into the city in large groups claiming to be original residents.

After 2003, thousands of Kurdish settlers backed by the Kurdish militia had poured into Kirkuk and occupied houses, government

buildings, football stadiums, military camps, and Ba'ath party Head Quarters and later the deeds of these properties were transferred illegally into their names.

The demographic city of Kirkuk has dramatically altered especially during the Kirkuk governor Dr. Najmaddin Omer. During the Najmaddin Omer era, the Kurdish party KDP with the help of Dr. Najmaddin Omer brought thousands of Kurds from various places to settle in Kirkuk.

The Najmaddin Omer employed only Kurds in the governmental offices and forced all the Turkmen and Arab managing directors to early retirement and replaced them with Kurds.

In addition, the Kurdish parties forced the Kurdish pregnant women to have their baby to be born in Kirkuk hospitals so that they would have Kirkuk birth certificates. In the future, the Kurds will be able to say most of the population in the city of Kirkuk is Kurds, especially if the United Nations committee interfered to decide the future of the city of Kirkuk.

During the occupation of the city of Kirkuk in 2003, all the Kirkuk project development contracts were given to the Kurdish contractors by the Kirkuk governor Najmaddin Omer, and Kurds squatted the Turkmen and governmental lands and buildings with the help of the Kurdish militia. Several petrol stations and private refineries were set up by the Kurds with the help of the Kurdish militia and all the oil was stolen from the main Kirkuk export line to Türkiye.

During the rule of Najmaddin Omer, the demographic changes carried out in Kirkuk became intolerable” Although article 23 of the Iraqi Constitution stipulates that infringing on public and private property for demographic change rejected, the Kurdish militia infringements continued by the political parties who do not live in Kirkuk.

Commercial and housing plots were distributed illegally to Kurdish political party members to change the city's demography.

After the fall of Saddam's regime, the Kurds intensified their Kurdisation campaign in the city of Kirkuk. The Turkmen have been subject to campaigns by the Kurds in Turkmen Eli in an often more brutal fashion than conducted on Kurds by Saddam Hussein. Turkmen and Arabs have been kidnapped, assassinated, imprisoned, and arbitrarily arrested.

During the Arabization policy that was conducted by Saddam Hussein's regime. The regime expelled Turkmen and Kurds from Kirkuk to change the demography of the Turkmen-populated area in general and especially the city of Kirkuk by encouraging the Arab population to migrate and settle in the city of Kirkuk.

The population of the city of Kirkuk according to a ration card, which was dated the 10th of April 2003, Kirkuk had 810,000 inhabitants, but in the year 2010, after the occupation of Kirkuk by the Kurdish militia, the city of city noticed a massive Kurdish influx, the population in the city reached and had exceeded 1.5 million.

The Kurdish militia brought over 700,000 Kurdish settlers from the Northern Iraqi, republic of Türkiye, Syria, and Iran to Kirkuk.

The KRG issued many passports for the Kurds who were living outside of Iraq and according to the Syrian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KRG has issued over 270,000 passports for the Syrian Kurds.

The demographic structure of Kirkuk after 2003 had changed seriously and distorted as Kurds, backed by armed Peshmerga forces, migrated into the city in large groups claiming to be original residents but in reality, the majority of the returning Kurds were not originally from Kirkuk, but they have been brought to Kirkuk with the help of the two Kurdish parties in order to change the demography of the city and to win the referendum that was planned by the KRG, whereas the Kurds claims these returnees were forcibly expelled from their homes by the government of Saddam Hussein during the 1980s and 1990s.

The KRG leader Mr. Barzani in one of his interviews declared that 250,000 Turkmen and Kurds were expelled from Kirkuk, however according to the ration cards that were issued by the Saddam Hussein government until 30/3/2003 11,568 people this clearly shows inconsistency in the Kurdish statement.

Additionally, an article was published in the Kurdish *al-Ta'akhi* newspaper reporting prior to the fall of the Saddam Hussein government, the number of people that were expelled from Kirkuk by Saddam Hussein exceeded 60,000 whereas the statistical data were taken from the *Ministry of Commerce*, showing the number of people who were transferred in/out of Kirkuk according to ration cards.

1. The number of people registered in Kirkuk according to the ration cards up to 19/3/2003 was 834,973 persons.
2. The last ration card number that was transferred before 20/3/2003 outside of Kirkuk is 136512 and was issued under the name of Mr. *Delir Hassan Ibrahim*.
3. The last ration card number that was transferred to Kirkuk before 20/3/2007 is 179898 and was issued to Mr. *Azad Kadir Jaber*.
4. The number of ration cards transferred to Kirkuk up to 30/9/2004 was 43,386.
5. The number of people transferred to Kirkuk according to the ration cards is 347,818 persons, all of whom originate from *Suleimaniyah*, Erbil, and *Duhok* towns.
6. The actual number of deportees from all ethnic groups in Kirkuk according to the ration cards until 30/3/2003 was 11,568 people.

After the fall of Saddam Hussein's government, the Kurdish militia ransacked the municipality building in Kirkuk, and the land deeds for the Turkmens were deliberately taken from the *Registry Office* making it difficult for the Turkmens to set up themselves as original inhabitants of the province.

Moreover, the Kurdish parties had brought substantial numbers of Kurds to the city of Kirkuk. The new Kurdish settlers were paid \$4000 (5 million dinars) to each repatriated Kurdish family. The Kurdish families were promised a piece of land to build a small house. This incentive made tens of thousands" of Kurds resettle in Kirkuk and form villages with the help of both Kurdish parties. The Kurdish parties aimed to motivate more Kurds to vote for a Kurdish independent referendum under *Article 140*.

Article 140, dealt with especially important and sensitive issues, not only for the Turkmens of Iraq but also for all Iraqis. Furthermore, *Article 140* deals with the normalization process of the situation in the Kirkuk governate, a process which consists of three major steps, each one with its time limit:-

- *The return to Kirkuk of all its forcefully displaced inhabitants by the Ba'ath Regime during the Arabisation processes of the*

province by the regime and the recuperation of their confiscated lands and properties shall be completed before 31 March 2007.

- *A new population census for the original population of the province is to be held before 31 August 2007.*
- *A referendum for the future of Kirkuk to be attached to the Kurdish Autonomous Region or not, to be voted before 31 December 2007.*

One of the anomalies of Article 140 of the New Permanent Iraqi Constitution, it imposed a fixed time limit for its implementation, saying that it must be completed before 31 December 2007. The fate of Kirkuk has been one of the thorniest issues of Iraq's constitutional process. *Under Article 140* of the document that was ratified by Iraqis on 15th Oct.2005, a referendum on the status of Kirkuk was implemented in the province no later than Dec. 31, 2007.

This will happen only after the Iraqi government takes measures to repatriate former Arab residents and resettle Turkmen and Kurds or compensate them and conduct the normalization and census.

Article 140 expired on the 31st of Dec. 2007, and according to the Iraqi constitution. Article 140 should not be changed or extended since it was imposed a fixed time limit for its implementation, saying that Article 140 must be implemented before 31st December 2007.

Therefore, at the end of the 31st of December 2007, article 140 automatically expired and lost its constitutional validity since the article was not fully implemented before the end of 2007.

In addition, the Iraqi constitution clearly says that any extension or amendment to the article needs the approval of 2/3 of the Iraqi parliament's members and the approval of the public in the form of a referendum.

Unfortunately, the UN representative in Erbil Mr. *Staffan de Mistura* recommended extending the expiry date of article 140 for a further six months, this happened. Mr. *Staffan de Mistura's* suggestion amongst the Turkmen was considered unwise and biased since he did not pay any attention to the Iraqi constitutional, but *Prime Minister of Iraq Mr. Nuri al-Maliki* did not support the initiative because he said that any extension of the work to rule 140 after the time limit was unconstitutional.

In addition, article 140 is an Iraqi internal matter, and the UN representative was not entitled and had no full authority and constitutional right to change, extend, and even change any article within the Iraqi constitution.

Iraq is a sovereign country, and it was not under the UN mandate therefore a UN employee working in Iraq had no authority to suggest, recommend, and an extension for any article within Iraq.

In the middle of July 2008, Iraq's parliament reached an agreement on the *Provincial Council Election Law*, particularly about *Paragraph 24* of the law, which deals with the election mechanism in the Kirkuk Governorate.

The postponement of the elections and adaptation of the division of Kirkuk to three constituencies that includes the distribution of power that includes the proportion of 32% for Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens and 4% for Assyrians.

The Turkmens, Arabs, and Assyrians proposed equal distribution of provincial council seats in the Kirkuk region which is outside the Kurdish territory.

On 22nd July 2008, a decision was made by 127 Iraqi members of parliament. They voted in favour of the *Provincial Council Election Law*, particularly regarding *Paragraph 24* of the law, which deals with the election mechanism in the Kirkuk Governorate.

The distribution of power includes the proportion of 32% for Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens and 4% for Assyrians the central government military forces would station in the town rather than the Kurdish forces, and the central government military forces would control the security of the city of Kirkuk.

Also, the military militias that are linked to the Kurdish political parties must leave the city of Kirkuk to reduce the tension amongst the ethnic groups that are living in Kirkuk.

The number of deputies who attended the meeting at the Iraqi Parliament was 140, and 127 out of 140 deputies that attended the meeting approved the bill, and the Iraqi parliament still passed the law and both President *Jalal Talabani* and his deputy, *Adel Abdul Mahdi*, vetoed on this bill.

Nevertheless, the *Kurdish Brotherhood List* at the *Kirkuk Governorate Council* held a meeting on 31 July 2008. The twenty-four members of

the 41-member *Kirkuk Governorate Council* presented a request to the *Kurdistan Region Government* and the Iraqi parliament to make the governorate of Kirkuk part of the *Kurdistan Region* while the Turkmen and Arabs regarded this extraordinary session as illegal.

In addition, because of the chaos in Kirkuk and Kurdish police power abuse, the Turkmen leadership in Kirkuk had requested to replace the Kurdish police in Kirkuk with central governmental police.

Although, the Kurds are considered a minority in the city of Musul in comparison to the *Sunni Arabs* and the generous size of the Turkmen population in the province of Musul.

However, after the fall of the Saddam Hussein government, both the Turkmen and *Sunni Arabs* boycotted the election that was conducted in 2005 in protest of the US occupation of Iraq.

Therefore, the Kurdish parties utilized the absence of the Turkmen and Sunni Arabs. As a result of this, the Musul governor was controlled by a minority of Kurds who belonged to the *KDP party*, and while the Kurds were in power they began changing the demography of the city and took more land that did not belong to them. Carrying out an ethnic cleansing policy by forcing a large number of villages, districts, and Turkmen in the populated area of *Telafer* to evacuate their lands.


However, in the provincial election in 2009, the *Sunni Arabs* and Turkmen decided to take part in the election as a consequence the Sunni Arabs and the overall whelming majority of seats were won by the *Sunni Arabs*. In response to the *Sunni Arabs*, victory the Kurdish politicians and parties have rejected the *Sunni Arabs'* won and have refused to take part in the collation government that was set up by the Arabs.

In the view of many Iraqi and international observers, the Kurds had a dream to set up to prove a state of Kurdistan and *Sunni Arabs* won a setback to the Kurdish dream.

In the view of many Iraqis, the Kurds should realise, accept the reality that the province of Musul is not a part of Kurdistan, and accept the provincial election result as a democratic election. The Kurds should accept the result of a fair election and democracy.

Many Iraqis believe that greater Kurdistan cannot be achieved without controlling more strategic areas such as Kirkuk and Mosul, which the

Kurds do lay claim to, Kirkuk and Mosul are disputed territories. At present, the Kurds cannot realize their dream, due to the weakness of the economic resources, lack of geographical interconnectedness, lack access of to the seaport, and opposition of the neighbouring countries.



Document (1)

Kurdish Regional Government
Ministry of Health
The General Directory for Health Issues

Issue: 1224

Date: 12/4/2003

Ministerial order

We decided to appoint Dr. Sabah Amin Ahmed Aldawedi as the director general for Health for Kirkuk province and this shall be implemented from the date been issued.

Dr. Mohammed Kadir Khoshnaw
Ministry of Health

Document (1)

بهم الله الرحمن الرحيم

جمهورية العراق

المديرية العامة للتربية في محافظة كربلاء

مكتب المدير العام

العدد :

التاريخ : ٢٠٠٣ / ١٢ / ٧ م

الى / وزارة التربية / مكتب الوزير

م / نقل مشرفين

تحية طيبة

بناء على طلب سيادتكم خلال الاجتماع الموسع للمدراء العاملين عام ٢٠٠٣/١٢/٦
برفع مذكرة حول نقل المشرفين وصلتنا قوائم من محافظتي اربيل والسليمانية تتضمن اسماء اكثر من (٤٠) مشرف
تربوي يطلبون النقل الى محافظة كركوك علماً ان نقل هذا العدد من المشرفين سيؤدي الى نوع من الحساسيه وخلق
مشاكل نحن في غنى عنها بسبب التركيبة القومية للمحافظة وهناك اعتراضات من قبل القوميات الاخرى والذين حرموا
سنيين عديدة من التقديم للاشراف التربوي لانهم كانوا غير منتمين للحزب المنهار والان وجدوا كتاب وزارة التربية
المديرية العامة للتفتيش والاشرف التربوي المرقم ٨٣٨٥ في ٢ / ١٢ / ٢٠٠٣ يفتح باب التقديم الى الاشراف التربوي
فرصتهم للانخراط في جهاز الاشراف التربوي فتحققت امالهم وامنياتهم ومن اجل خلق نوع من التوازن والعدالة بان
لايكون غالبية جهاز الاشراف من قومية واحدة وبناءً على صدور الكتاب المرقم ٧٩٤٠ في ٢٠ / ١١ / ٢٠٠٣ من
وزارة التربية المديرية العامة للتفتيش والاشرف التربوي حيث الغى الفقرة الاولى منه كافة الاوامر الصادرة الخاصة
بتعيين المشرفين التربويين والاختصاصيين بعد ٩ / ٤ / ٢٠٠٣ من أي جهة كانت وان معظم الراغبين بالنقل من اربيل
والسليمانية من المعينين حديثاً في الاشراف التربوي كما ان المنقولين للاشراف الاختصاصي الينا معظمهم كانوا
مقاعدين وتم اعادتهم وتعيينهم مشرفين اختصاصيين من قبل اقليم كردستان ويتعارض مع كتاب الوزارة اعلاه يرجى
التفضل بالاطلاع ورتأني بالترتيب في امر نقلهم
وان يقدم جميع القوميات طلباتهم للانخراط في الاشراف بشكل عادل ومتوازي ثم يصدر اوامر تعيينهم علماً لم يتم تعيين
أي مشرف تربوي واختصاصي من قبلنا .. مع التقدير

ابراهيم اسماعيل توفيق

المدير العام

٢٠٠٣ / ١٢ / ٧ م

قمت الا...

نسخه منه الى ١٦/١١/٠٣

Document (2)

Republic of Iraq

Issue: 28413

Date: 07/12/2003

The general directory for education in Kirkuk

The general directorate office

To the Ministry of Education/ Ministry office

Subject: Transfer supervisors

Transfer people from the north of Iraq to Kirkuk to change the demography of Kirkuk, increase the Kurdish population, and transfer unskilled Kurdish people to Kirkuk. The entire transferring policy by the Kurds from North of Iraq was a clear discrimination policy against the Turkmen and Arabs, although thousands of unemployed graduates and highly qualified Turkmens were seeking jobs in Kirkuk unfortunately this was deliberately designed by the Kurdish administration in Kirkuk to force the Arabs and Turkmens out of the town.

It was ironic to see that the Kurdish Regional Government did not transfer Kurdish doctors, engineers, pharmacists, and teachers to Kirkuk so that the people of Kirkuk from benefit from their skills and expertise.

Document (2)

أقليم كردستان

وزارة الصحة
دائرة صحاربييل
التنقلات

العدد /
التاريخ / ٢٠٠٥ / ١٢ / ٢٧

٩٤٤

أمر اداري / ٢/١٢ / ٢٠٠٥

بناء على ما جاء بالامر الوزاري الصادر من وزارة الصحة لأقليم كردستان المرقم (٢٢٠) في ٢٠٠٥/٢/٧
المستند على الامر الوزاري الصادر من وزارة صحة بغداد - دائرة الاداريه والماليه والقانونية المرقم (١١٢٧٨)
في ٢٠٠٤/١٢/٢٣ تقرر ما يلي :-

نقل خدمات المدرجة أسمائهم وعناوين وظائفهم من ملاك دائرتنا الاماكن المؤشرة أزاء اسم كل واحد منهم الى
ملك دائرة صحة محافظة كركوك مع درجتهم الوظيفية اعتباراً من تاريخ انفكاكهم في ٢٠٠٥/٢/٢٨

الاسم الثلاثي	عنوان الوظيفة	مكان الاشتغال
١- بيان حميد رشيد	م - محاسبة	قسم التخطيط
٢- وريا محمد درويش	سائق	=
٣- زوربوستم عزيز	م - محاسب	=
٤- محمد قادر حمد امين	رزام	=
٥- عبدالله صابر خورشيد	م- مصلح كهربائي	=
٦- مريوان عبيد مصطفى	م- مخزن	=
٧- الهام سعيد امين	م - ملاحظ فني	=
٨- صلاح الدين نجم الدين محمد	كاتب	=
٩- سرتيب افندي كريم	م- مصلح كهرباء	=
١٠- انور مصطفى قادر	م- مصلح سيارات	=
١١- عدنان محمد كريم	م - محاسب	=
١٢- لؤي صباح صديق	م- ملاحظ قانوني	قسم التخطيط
١٣- سعدالله خضر مولود	كاتب	=
١٤- سردار امين عمر	م - مصلح كهرباء	=
١٥- ظاهر مجيد جواهير	سائق	=
١٦- امل سلام عبيد	م- محاسبة	قسم التخطيط
١٧- سعاد حميد رشيد	م - محاسبة	=
١٨- حازم عزيز على	كاتب	=
١٩- ريزان عز الدين مصطفى	رزامه	=
٢٠- محمد نجم الدين فتاح	م - مصلح كهرباء	=
٢١- نوال سلام عبيد	رزامه	=
٢٢- علي حيدر محمد	موظف كومبيوتر	قسم التخطيط
٢٣- دلشاد - سهان محمد امين	م- مصلح الكتف	=

Document (3)

Kurdish Regional Government

Ministry of Health

Erbil Health Office

Transfer Department

Date: 27/2/2007

Subject: Administrative resolution 2/1/3

Per the ministry decision issued from the Ministry of Health of Kurdish Regional Government numbered 320 on 07/02/2005 per released document from Ministry of Health in Baghdad numbered 11387 on 23/12/2004, decided the following:

	NAME	JOB DESCRIPTION	DEPARTMENT
1	Bayan Hamid Rasheed	Accounting	Planning Dep
2	Werya Mohammed Dervish	Driver	Planning Dep
3	Zoo Rustim Aziz	Accounting	Planning Dep
4	Mohammed Kadir Hamed Amin	Clerk	Planning Dep
5	Abdullah Sabir Khorshid	electrician	Planning Dep
6	Mariwan Abdullah Mustafa	Store	Planning Dep
7	Elham Saed Amin	Technician	Planning Dep
8	Salahadin Najmadin Mohammed	clerk	Planning Dep
9	Setib Afendi Karim	Electrician	Planning Dep
10	Answer Mustafa Kadir	Car Mechanics	Planning Dep
11	Adnan Mohammed Karim	Accounted	Planning Dep
12	Loea Sabah Sidik	Clerk	Planning Dep
13	Sadullah Khther Mavlod	Clerk	Planning Dep
14	Serdar Amin Omer	Electrician	Planning Dep
15	Tahir Majeed Jawehir	Driver	Planning Dep
16	Amel Salem Ubid	Accountant	Planning Dep
17	Suaad Hamid Rasheed	Clerk	Planning Dep
18	Hazim Aziz Ali	Clerk	Planning Dep
19	Rayzam Azedin Mustafa	Clerk	Planning Dep
20	Mohammed Najmadin Fatah	Electrician	Planning Dep
21	Nawal Salem Ubid	Clerk	Planning Dep
22	Ali Hayder Mohammed	Computer Opr.	Planning Dep
23	Delsha Mohammed Rasul Amin	Computer Tech.	Planning Dep

Document (3)

قهاحة حورفا معاظلة شروخند
 ((الاحارة))
 العدد ١٧٩٠
 التاريخ ٢٠٠٥ / نيسان / ٥



مفر ماخذ هوى بوليسى پاريزماهى مخر شوخند
 (احارة)
 زماره ١٧٩٠
 بهروزار ٢٧٠٥ / ٥

امر ادارى

بناءً على ما جاء بكتاب مجلس الوزراء - وزارة الداخلية - السلطانية المكتب الخاص المرقم ٤٩٤٤ في ٢٠٠٥/٤/١٩ الموجه الى وزارة الداخلية في بغداد والمتضمن نقل خدمات الضباط المدرجة اسمائهم ادناه والذي تبدأ بالتسلسل (١) المقدم شوان كريم حسن و تنتهي بالتسلسل (١٥) باسم الملازم صباح كاكه جوامير درويش من سلاك وزارة الداخلية اقليم كردستان السلطانية الى ملاك وزارة الداخلية بغداد - قيادة قوات شرطة محافظة كركوك و بتاريخ ٢٠٠٥/٤/٣٠ التحق الضباط المذكورين و تم تنسيبهم كما يلي :

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| ١. المقدم شوان كريم حسن | مركز المقداد |
| ٢. المقدم نجاه حسن عبدالرحمن احمد | مركز العروبة |
| ٣. الرائد عبدالقادر فخر الدين سليمان | مركز العدالة |
| ٤. الرائد عبدالباسط حمه صالح سليمان | مركز دس |
| ٥. الرائد نزار اكرم مردان | مديرية الطوارئ |
| ٦. نقيب اكرم عمر رحيم قادر | مركز المقداد ضابط تحقيق |
| ٧. نقيب جليل ابوبكر محمد اسماعيل | مركز قره هنجير |
| ٨. نقيب مازن غريب عبدالرحمن | مركز قره هنجير |
| ٩. م.أول نوزاد رفعت توفيق | مركز رحيم اوه |
| ١٠. = = ناسو خالد قادر كريم | مديرية الطوارئ |
| ١١. = = عبدالله ابراهيم نعمة هواس | مركز الدبس |
| ١٢. = = احمد علي عثمان شريف | مركز العدالة |
| ١٣. ملازم دلير عزيز رشيد عزيز | مركز قره هنجير |
| ١٤. = سامان اسماعيل كريم حسن | مركز العروبة |
| ١٥. = صباح كاكه جوامير درويش | مركز العدالة |

لواء الشرطة
 شيركو تانكو حكيم
 قائد شرطة محافظة كركوك
 نيسان / ٢٠٠٥

نسخة منه الى : مكتب الوكيل لشؤون الشرطة // كتاب مجلس الوزراء - وزارة الداخلية سلطانية اعلاه
 وزارة الداخلية - مكتب الوكيل لشؤون الشرطة // كتاب مجلس الوزراء - وزارة الداخلية سلطانية اعلاه
 رجاء ...

Document (4)

Kurdish Regional Government

Number: 1797

Date: 02/05/2005

Administration: Decision

According to the ministry council, internal ministry, Sulaymaniyah Province, the special office document number 4944 dated 19/04/2005 which was sent to the ministry of internal affair in Baghdad contains the transfer of the listed names of the following police officers that began from number 1 colonel Shiwan Karim Hassan and ended with number 15 Lieutenant Sabah Kaka Jowamir Dervish from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kurdish Regional Government to Kirkuk provinces police forces on the 30/04/2005:

1. Shiwan Karim Hassan
2. Najat Hassan Abdulrahman Ahmed
3. Abdulkadir Fahrudin Sulyman
4. Abdulbasit Hamma Salih Sulyman
5. Nazar Akram Merdan
6. Akram Omer Rahim Kadir
7. Jalil Abubakir Mohammed Ismail
8. Mazin Ghrib Abdulrahman
9. Nowzad Refat Tawfek
10. Nasir Khalid Karim
11. Abdulah Ibrahim Nuema Hawas
12. Ahmed Ali Othman Sherif
13. Delir Aziz Rasheed Aziz
14. Saman Ismail Karim Hassan
15. Sabah Kaka Jawameer dervish

Police Brigadier

Sherku Shakir Karim

March 2005

Document (4)

قائمة بالأسماء والمناصب لمديرات مديرية شرطة كركوك من القومية الكردية

الترتيب	الأسماء	المناصب	القومية
١	عبد	مدير شرطة كركوك	كردية
٢	عبد	مدير قسم منى كركوك	كردية
٣	عبد	مدير شرطة نظم التسلل	كردية
٤	عبد	مدير حماية مشاتل كركوك	كردية
٥	عبد	مدير مرور كركوك	كردية
٦	عبد	مدير قسم أمن الأفراد	كردية
٧	عبد	مدير المخابرات شرطة النفط	كردية
٨	عبد	مدير شرطة الاقتصادية والموالي كركوك	كردية
٩	عبد	مدير مركز شرب كركوك	كردية
١٠	عبد	مدير ادارة مديرية شرطة كركوك (مقر المديرية)	كردية
١١	عبد	مدير شؤون مشاتل كركوك	كردية
١٢	عبد	مدير قسم شرطة المحافظة	كردية
١٣	عبد	مدير شؤون فوج الطوارئ	كردية
١٤	عبد	مدير شرطة الاحداث	كردية
١٥	عبد	مدير مكتب مكافحة المخدرات	كردية
١٦	عبد	مدير مكافحة اجرام كركوك	كردية
١٧	عبد	مدير فوج الطوارئ الاول	كردية
١٨	عبد	مدير مكافحة التهرب المنظمة	كردية
١٩	عبد	مدير مراكز شرطة رجم اوه	كردية

٥٦	مقدم	مردان محمد فرج سعيد الكلي	مناصب مكتب مكافحة اجرام الدين	كردية
٥٥	مقدم	سلمان رضا صوفي لطيف التواتي	مدير شعبة الدفاعة القانونية (مقر المديرية)	كردية
٥٦	مقدم	عبدان صالح رشيد خضير	مدير مكافحة المتفجرات	كردية
٥٧	مقدم	مروود عبد الله محمد محمود الجالف	مدير قسم المتدوخ الاثني (مديرية الفرات)	كردية
٥٨	مقدم	الخير غازي مسونيل	مدير مركز شرطة عرفة	كردية
٥٩	مقدم	نشأت شاهوزير خورشيد علي الطالقاتي	مدير جوازات كركوك	كردية
٦٠	رائد	جلال كاشل حسين سلويان	مدير قسم البواد المتعاقدة والمتسابقة (مديرية الفرات)	كردية
٦١	رائد	ابراهيم عثمان ابراهيم جرجيس كلور	مدير مركز الشرطة للتهريب	كردية
٦٢	الرائد	عبد الباقى الكاكي	مدير قسم معمل التسليح التسلل (مديرية الفرات)	كردية
٦٣	رائد	نزار الكرم مردان مراد الجالف	امور سرية المخابرات	كردية
٦٤	اللقيب	قيوان عبد الله محمد عزيز	مدير قسم الخدمات (مقر المديرية)	كردية
٦٥	لقيب	ابيد فؤاد الياس بطرس النوكه	مدير شعبة الاجازات (مقر المديرية)	كردية
٦٦	لقيب	عيسى حسن محمد محمود	مدير الامور الطبية	كردية
٦٧	لقيب	موسى حسن محمد محمود البرزنجي	مدير شعبة الترقية لقسم الادارة (مقر المديرية)	كردية

Document (5)

A list of the police positions in the city of Kirkuk from the Kurdish ethnicity.

	Rank	Name	Position	Ethnicity	comments
1	Brigadier	Khattab Omer Arif Weli	Directorate of Kirkuk police	Kurdish	
2	Brigadier	Meqdad Ahmed Kadir	Directorate of Kirkuk police	Kurdish	
3	Brigadier	Foud Mohammed Reza Shewani		Kurdish	
4	Brigadier	Sherzad Arif Ahmed		Kurdish	
5	Brigadier	Sherzad Ahmed Mohammed		Kurdish	
6	Brigadier	Fahmi Foud Ahmed		Kurdish	
7	Brigadier	Kaka Bra Ramadan		Kurdish	
8	Brigadier	Sehad Kadir Mohammed Amin		Kurdish	
9	Brigadier	Kawa Gharib Abdulrahman		Kurdish	
10	Brigadier	Tahsin Ali dervish Mohammed		Kurdish	
11	Brigadier	Karim Jamwamir Salihi		Kurdish	
12	colonel	Samir Tahri Rashid Salihi		Kurdish	
13	colonel	Delir Hassan Mahmood Aziz		Kurdish	
14	colonel	Gharib Anwer Arif		Kurdish	
15	colonel	Farooq Abdulkarim Sattar		Kurdish	
16	colonel	Hussein Mohamed Ferag Majid		Kurdish	
17	colonel	Tahsin Sidik Mohammed Mohidin		Kurdish	
18	colonel	Ghazi Ali Rashid		Kurdish	
19	colonel	Nowzad Sater Sherif Zenkana		Kurdish	
54	Lieutenant	Serdar Mohammed Faraj		Kurdish	
55	Lieutenant	Saman Riza Sufi		Kurdish	
56	Lieutenant	Adnan Salih Rasheed		Kurdish	
57	Lieutenant	Surod Abdullah Mohammed		Kurdish	
58	Captain	Athir Ghazi Samuel		Kurdish	
59	Captain	Neshet Shwez Khorshid Ali		Kurdish	
60	Captain	Jalel Kamil Hussein Solyman		Kurdish	
61	Captain	Ibrahim Othman Ibrahim		Kurdish	
62	Commander	Abdulbaqi Kaki		Kurdish	
63	Commander	Nazer Akram Merdan Murad		Kurdish	
64	Commander	Qawan Abdul Mohamed Aziz		Kurdish	
65	Commander	Ayad Foud Alyas Butris		Kurdish	
66	Commander	Issa Hassan Mohammed Mahmud		Kurdish	
	Commander	Musa Hassan Mohammed Barzanchi		Kurdish	

Document (5)

2. CHAPTER TWO

2.0 THE OCCUPATION OF THE CITY OF MOSUL



Figure (109) controlled area by the ISIL in 2016

After the fall of the Saddam Hussein government in 2003, Iraq became a sectarian and ethnically divided country. The Shi'a became targeted by the Arab Sunnis for their collaboration with American forces. The members of the remnant of Saddam Hussein's army and ISIL terrorists targeted the Shi'a. As a result of the sectarian war, the Turkmen Shi'a were subjected to a continuous brutal attack from the *Sunni Arabs* and Kurds.

The Turkmen Shi'a were systematically targeted by ISIS terrorists in diverse ways, although the attack was on *Shi'a* Turkmen; however, *Sunni* Turkmen also had their share as people mixed, living next to each other, and married to each other.

On June 10, 2014, the city of Mosul was stormed and occupied by ISIL and the ISIL militants established full control over Mosul within

days the Iraqi security forces who were in control of the city escaped from their positions as the ISIL took over the Mosul.

The troop shortages in the city of Mosul and fighting among top officers caused disorder among the Iraqi political leaders fueled panic that led to the city's abandonment.

Before the occupation of Mosul by ISIL, the Kurdish intelligence and security forces were warned by a reliable source in early 2014 that Mosul was going to be attacked by ISIL and ex-Baathists, but the Kurdish regional government forces did not do anything about the warning. After the occupation of Mosul, the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his defense minister turned down repeated offers of help from the Peshmerga although half a million people escaped on foot or by car in the next 2 days from the ISIL attack.

During the occupation of Mosul, the ISIL militant managed to acquire three divisions' worth of up-to-date American arms and munitions, including M1129 Stryker 120-mm mortars and at least seven hundred armored Humvee vehicles from the fleeing Iraqi army.

Many residents in the city of Mosul initially welcomed ISIL and the view of the many Iraqi politicians and intellectuals, the city of Mosul fell because the people living there were fed up with the sectarianism of the *Shi'a-dominated* Iraqi government.

The capture of the city of Mosul by ISIL militants brought overwhelming shame to the Iraqi armed forces. The Iraqi armed forces did not put any resistance towards the ISIL, although they had trained and were heavily equipped with the latest military equipment sourced by the Americans.

Following the defeats of the Iraqi army to the ISIL, the Iraqi soldiers escaped by removing their military uniforms and using civilian clothes to ensure they were not detected by the ISIL militants. Everyone in Iraq was surprised when the city of Mosul had fallen to the hands of ISIL within hours, and the Iraqi armed forces putting any resistance.

There were questions on the minds of the people in Iraq. How did ISIL militants manage to defeat well-trained and equipped Iraqi forces by the Americans? How the Americans with their high-tech equipment, satellite, and intelligence were not able to detect the movement of ISIL militants from Syria to Iraq? Why did the Americans not take immediate action against ISIL?

The fall of the city of Mosul was a disaster for the Iraqi government and a huge setback. However, the Iraqi Parliament Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi described the capture of the key city of Mosul by ISIL militants as a foreign occupation, and this was a foreign occupation by terrorist groups coming from around the world to kill innocent people and undermine the state.

The ISIL seized Mosul without almost any resistance from both the Kurdish militia and the government armed forces and this was not surprising to anyone familiar with the region and post-2003 Iraq.

The governor of Mosul Al-Nujaifi, who made a statement from Erbil, where he had fled, asserted that there was no more fighting spirit left in the Iraqi army, which was an admission that there is no longer an Iraqi state.

The governor of Mosul Al-Nujaifi blamed Iraqi security forces for the loss of Mosul to the ISIL. The governor of Nineveh had provided security officials with information about the militants' plan to seize the province, but the security forces still failed to stop the terrorists.

The governor of Mosul Al-Nujaifi asserted that security officials neglected intelligence about concentrations of terrorist groups.

As the battle raged with ISIL, security forces dropped their weapons and abandoned arms depots, prisons, and airports, all of which fell into the militants' hands. In the meantime, the Iraqi parliament speaker went on to demand that negligent security and military officials be questioned, urging the deployment of forces capable of stopping and defeating the terrorist advance.

After the seizure of Telafer, Sinjar, and Mosul by the ISIS terrorists. The Kurdish media began a full offensive against ISIL and the Kurds started showing their suffering, they began with huge media propaganda showing the danger of ISIL.

The Kurdish media clearly stated the Kurds were able to fight the ISIL radical terrorist militia if they were armed and equipped with more advanced and sophisticated military equipment. The Kurdish militia was fitted with the latest military equipment that was provided by the US armed forces. Still, the biggest problem was the Kurdish unwillingness to fight the ISIS terrorists.

The occupation of the cities of Mosul, Telfer, and Sinjar by the ISIL militants led to the deportation, kidnapping, and execution of

thousands of innocent Turkmen citizens especially the Turkmen who settled in the district of Telafer and surrounding Turkmen villages.

The Turkmen were kidnapped and killed only for ethnic identity and for being a Turkmen Shi'a.

After the occupation of the city of Mosul, the Kurds continuously invited foreign journalists and the press showing them the Kurdish Peshmerga could fight ISIL but they lacked military equipment, and their pretext was that they had no heavy equipment. But in reality, after the fall of the Saddam Hussein government in 2003; most of the Iraqi military Battalion was stationed in northern Iraq especially in Kirkuk and Mosul confiscated by the Kurdish militia, the Kurdish militia took the opportunity to loot the entire Iraqi military hardware, especially after the heavy allied air force bombardments.

After the plight of the Kurdish militia in Western countries due to the dangers of the ISIL in Iraq, the allied forces United States, France, United States, Jordan, Netherlands, and Canada immediately commenced supporting the Kurds by bombarding the ISIL positions especially when ISIL started threatening the city of Erbil and adjacent district and villages around it.

In the view of many Western countries, the fall of the city of Erbil under the hand of ISIL will be considered a disaster for the US and Great Britain. It was the end of the plan for the division of Iraq and the creation of a Kurdish state which was suggested by John Biden.

On the other front near Erbil, the ISIL forces ran over the Kurdish Peshmerga, and the Peshmerga forces escaped, without putting up a fight against the ISIL as a result of the forcing the ISIL the city of Erbil was in jeopardy.

As a consequence, the Allied forces began bombarding the ISIL forces near Erbil and the surrounding area forcing them to withdraw, and without the Allied bombarding the city of Erbil, it would have fallen into the hands of the ISIL. The Allied forces' heavy bombardment forced the ISIL forces to withdraw from the area near the city of Erbil. During the initial fighting between the ISIL and Kurdish forces around the villages near the city of Erbil, initially, the Kurdish forces did not put up any fight against ISIL, and they were run over by the ISIL forces, but allied forces bombardment and with the support of the

PKK terrorist forced the ISIL to withdraw, and the city of Erbil was secured from the hand of ISIL.

2.1 THE OCCUPATION OF TELAFER

Amongst the towns highly influenced by the state of conflict during and after the United States invasion in Iraq, the district of Telafer, which is part of Mosul province and populated by Turkmens.

The district of Telafer fell to ISIL following an expected operation after ISIL created the zones of control in Mosul, Salah ad Din, Diyala, Anbar, and some parts of Kirkuk. The district of Telafer experienced one of the biggest disasters again after the US attacks in 2004-2005. While ISIL was taking control in and around Telafer, the citizens massively fled from the town and the Iraqi army conducted air operations on Telafer. [34]

The district of Telafer collapsed due to both the ISIL terror and the air operations of the Iraqi army which was targeting the insurgents in the district. However, the central town of Telafer, which had a population of approximately 510,000 people, and the districts of Rabia, Zummar, and Iyaziye and there where 230,000 people were living, were fully composed of Turkmens. Both the center of Iyaziye and the surrounding villages of Zummar and Rabia were heavily populated by the Turkmens. While the Turkmens compose 70 % of Telafer, the Arabs, Kurds, Yazidis and Gergeris live out of the town center, as well. The ISIL targeted the town center of Telafer and the operation of ISIL targeted only the Turkmens.

Before the operation of ISIL in Mosul and Telafer, the district had witnessed violence many times. The ethnic and religious division in Iraq had negatively reflected on Telafer and many conflicts had taken place in the town. Especially Al Qaida-inspired organisations had seized the town to create a transit point. In response, the multinational forces led by the US and the Peshmerga troops started an operation known as Black Typhoon on 9 September 2004 to restore security in the town and establish control of the government formed by the US in Iraq. Thereupon, in September 2005, the United States, alongside the Iraqi security forces, conducted a massive new operation called

³⁴ <http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=2652>. The fall of Telafer and the Situation of Turkmens, Bilgay Duman, ORSAM Middle East Researchers.

Restoring Rights. It is said that nearly 70 % of the citizens left Telafer during these operations. The conflict dynamic took root in Telafer after the operations increased.

After the al Al_Askari Mosque in the city of Samarra was supposed to be bombed by the ISIL in February 2006, sectarian tensions arose in Telafer, too. The state of conflict intensively continued until 2009 and many families who had left the town between 2004 and 2009 were not able to return to Telafer.

Along with the decrease of the sectarian conflict in Iraq after 2009 and the agreement between the tribes in Telafer, the efforts of Türkiye to consolidate the tribes produced some positive results and the acts of violence in Telafer decreased. However, the sectarian tension showed continuity and accordingly, the town center in Telafer took a bi-zonal form.

Yet, Telafer remained under pressure because of its strategic position; the biggest part of this pressure was due to the struggle between the Iraqi central government and the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government with the effect of the ethnic and sectarian division. In addition, the repercussions of the incidents in Syria have kept the tension in Telafer at an important level even if there has been no concrete violence and conflict, and although, all other ethnic and religious groups in Iraq had been affected by the developments in Telafer.

As the Kurds have created pressure on Telafer, which is considered a buffer zone preventing the unification of the KRG borders and the region of Sinjar that the KRG dominates; the town became a part of administrative, political, and energy discussions between the central government and the KRG.

Besides, Telafer became the focus of the Iraqi central government's pressures on the Sunnis particularly in Mosul which had made the people in the town a part of this polarization. However, the approval of Telafer as a province by the Iraqi Council of Ministers in January 2014 became the most significant example of this situation. The *Sunni* Turkmens in Telafer who had previously demanded the town to become a province opposed the approval, as they refrained from the government's pressure which had influenced Mosul as well, while the *Shi'a* Turkmens who had previously opposed the idea of Telafer's

becoming a province persistently defended the approval as they were encouraged by the Iraqi central government.

After the incidents in Syria, Telafer acquired importance again and some arguments were asserted claiming that the armed people who went to Syria to fight were using the passageway of Telafer. Again, Telafer received attention with the pressure of ISIL, which blockaded the town to expand its area of control and enable border crossing between Syria and Iraq after the seizure of Mosul.

After the army withdrew from Telafer in addition to the other cities captured by ISIL, the local police composed of the townspeople and the public attempted to restore security on their own. After the help of the Peshmerga for the restoration of security in Telafer, the prominent tribes and authorities in Telafer and the KRG held meetings.

Although the Peshmerga accepted to restore security with a demand from the public to hand in their weapons to them and a precondition to enter the town center, the Telafer side who refrained from allowing the Peshmerga to enter the town center refused to hand in their weapons to them and the sides could not agree.

Also, the Turkmens of Telafer had difficulties entering the KRG, because the KRG demanded controlled passage. Moreover, neither Sinjar nor Rabia had the capacity to host the population escaping from Telafer.

The Turkmen's escape from Mosul and Telafer caused a tremendous human tragedy and extremely important levels of temperature ratings because the summer conditions also negatively affected the Turkmen displaced people. There were some difficulties in sustaining the basic needs of these displaced Turkmen such as water, food, medicine, and shelter. The Turkmen people from Telafer took refuge in the mosques and school buildings. However, these are temporary precautions and permanent solutions that need to be generated and the ISIL occupation of Mosul and Telafer and the surrounding region caused the displacement of 350.000 Turkmens in Iraq.



Figure (110) Telafer people are carrying arms to defend their land and people from the ISIL terrorist group in northern Iraq.



Figure (111) Turkmens fleeing from Telafer and villages after being attacked by ISIL (in June 2014).



Figure (112) photo above: Turkmens fleeing from Telafer and villages after being attacked by ISIL (in June 2014)



Figure (113) Turkmen trying to protect themselves from the scorching heat.



Figure (114) Turkmens were taken to transit camps by trucks to BAHARKA Transit Camp which is an old warehouse located 10km north of Erbil. After waiting for several days in the scorching heat, with hardly any water and food, 5.000 Internally Displaced Turkmens arriving from Telafer which is a Turkmen city in the northwest of Iraq were finally allowed to enter Erbil.



Figure (115) Turkmens refugees escaping ISIL whereabouts of many Turkmen IDPs are still unknown.



Figure (116) Water being delivered by the Turkmen community of Erbil to the Turkmen children (of Telafer) at Camp Baharka near Erbil – Apart from two Turkish Aid Agencies and the Iraqi Turkmen Front, no one is providing humanitarian help to the poor IDPs.



Figure (119) Turkmen were taken to BAHARKA transit camps by trucks. BAHARKA Transit Camp is an old warehouse that is located 10km north of Erbil. After waiting for several days in the scorching heat, with hardly any water and food, 5,000 Internally Displaced Turkmen who arrived from Telafer which is a Turkmen city in the northwest of Iraq were finally allowed to enter Erbil.



Figure (120) Displaced Turkmen by ISIL arrived from Telafer which is a Turkmen city in the northwest of Iraq sitting in the scorching heat, with hardly any water and food in Erbil.

During the occupation of Telafer, the Turkmen were displaced in various parts of Iraq, such as Kerkuk, Najaf, and other towns in southern Iraq. However, the displaced Turkmen in Iraq were not able to return to their cities and villages which were occupied and controlled by ISIL and or by their Sunni Arab allies, or by the Kurdish Peshmerga. The Turkmen who were transferred to the south of Iraq were Arabized while those who remain in the north of Iraq will be Kurdified.

The Kurdish militia took advantage of the chaos in northern Iraq and the weakness of the Iraqi central government, by advancing their forces beyond the Kurdish autonomous region. The Kurdish militia did not try to resist when ISIL attacked Mosul.

The Kurdish Regional Government decided to send their militants, known as Peshmerga to occupy the oil field in Kirkuk fighting the advanced ISIL troops in northern Iraq.

In the absence of the Iraqi central troops in Kirkuk and the surrounding region, the Kurdish militia managed to control all Turkmen cities and towns in the four provinces in the north of Iraq, Mosul, Kirkuk, Salahuddin, and Diyala.

In the meantime, the overwhelming majority of Sunni Arab tribes in the north of Iraq, Salahaddin, and Anbar region supported ISIL militants. The Turkmen internally displaced people had lost everything; their houses were looted after they were forced to flee to save their lives. They are now homeless and landless. The atrocities committed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham did not end there, the Turkmen historical and religious shrine places were destroyed and bulldozed by the radical ISIL forces.




Figure (121) photo showing the Telafer citadel partially destroyed by the terrorist ISIL militants in Telafer, Iraq.

The Turkmen mosques, heritage places, and religious places were destroyed and blown up by the radical ISIL.



Figure (122) ISIL militants destroying the shrine of Nabi Younis in the city of Mosul.



Figure (123) The radical ISIL militants destroying the monument called "The Girl's Tomb" in Mosul.



Figure (124) ISIL using bulldozer destroying Ahmed al-Rifai shrine and tomb in Mahlabiya district outside of Telafer,



Figure (125) ISIL militants using a bulldozer to destroy Ahmed al-Rifai shrine and tomb in Mahlabiya district outside of Telafer.



Figure (126) ISIL blowing up the Turkmen *Shi'a's* Saad bin Aqeel Husseiniya shrine in Telafer, Iraq.



Figure (127) ISIL blew up the Turkmen *Shi'a's* Saad bin Aqeel Husseiniya shrine in Telafer,



Figure (128) ISIL blowing up the Turkmen *Shi'a's* Al-Qubba Husseiniya mosque in Telafer.



Figure (129) ISIL blew up the Turkmen *Shi'a's* Al-Qubba Husseiniya mosque in Telafer

2.2 THE REACTION OF THE KURDISH REGIONAL GOVERNMENT “KRG” TO THE OCCUPATION OF MOSUL BY ISIL

In the meantime, the Iraqi parliamentarian urged Masoud Barzani, president of the KRG in northern Iraq, to deploy his Peshmerga “Kurdish forces” to fight the militants alongside government troops but Masoud Barzani rejected the Iraqi parliamentarian. Masoud Barzani instead of deploying his Kurdish forces to fight the militants alongside government troops sent the Kurdish forces to Kirkuk to occupy the Kirkuk oil field after the withdrawal of an Iraqi army from Kirkuk.

In addition, the Mosul governor al-Nujaifi stated "We have also called for the intervention of the international community to help repel this attack, which targets not only Iraq but the entire region," he added. Al-Nujaifi said he had contacted the US ambassador in Iraq to request US support in line with a previous security pact between the two countries.

2.3 OCCUPATION OF THE OIL FIELDS AND REFINERIES IN KIRKUK

During the attack of the ISIL on the districts of Sinjar, Telafer, and the city of Mosul in northern Iraq. Kurdish parties instead of sending their well-trained and equipped troops by the US to fight against the ISIL but instead of that the Kurds sent their militia to occupy the oil fields and refineries in the city of Kirkuk leaving thousands of innocent civilians of Yazidis, Christians, and Turkmen were kept under the mercy of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant militia.

The objective of sending the Kurdish militia to Kirkuk was to control the hub of oil of the city of Kirkuk for several reasons; to put more pressure on the central government in Baghdad and to fulfill their dream and aspiration by annexing the city of Kirkuk into KRG and to have Kirkuk as a live source for the inspired Kurdish state in northern of Iraq.

Although the Kurdish militia initially promised the Yazidis in the district of Sinjar would be protected by Peshmerga from the ISIL, as usual, the Kurdish Peshmerga broke their promise and withdrew from Sinjar without putting any fight against the ISIL as the result of thousands of Yezidis, Turkmen, and Christian were killed and thousands of Turkmen women were taken by the ISIL as booty, and they were sold as slaves.

The Kurdish forces known as the Peshmerga plan was not to fight against the ISIL so the world would see the ISIL as the aggressor and the Kurds as a scapegoat so that they would be able to acquire arms, logistical support, and the possibility of the land invasion by the west. The sudden withdrawals of Kurdish Peshmerga from Sinjar and Telafer resulted in the occupation of the district of Sinjar, Telafer city of Mosul.

During the occupation of the districts of Telafer and Sinjar, thousands of Turkmens were killed by the ISIL and over 100,000 Turkmen were forced out of their homes by ISIL most of the Turkmen went to Erbil, Kirkuk, and the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala.

During the occupation of the city of Mosul and there was a power vacuum in the city of Kirkuk, the Kurdish forces took an opportunity and controlled the northern oil city of Kirkuk after government troops abandoned their posts in the face of a triumphant Sunni Islamist rebel march towards Baghdad that threatens Iraq's future as a unified state.

In the meantime, the stunning advance of ISIL, which aims to build a Caliphate ruled on medieval Sunni Islamic principles across Syria and Iraq, was the biggest threat to Iraq since US troops withdrew in 2011. Hundreds of thousands of people have fled their homes in fear as the militants seized the main cities of the Tigris Valley north of Baghdad in a matter of days.

The security forces of Iraq's autonomous Kurdish north, known as the Peshmerga, took over bases in Kirkuk vacated by the army. The whole of Kirkuk fell into the hands of the Peshmerga. The Kurds have long dreamed of taking Kirkuk and its huge oil reserves. They regard the city, just outside their autonomous region, as their historical capital and Peshmerga units were already present in an uneasy balance with government forces. The swift move by their highly organised security forces to seize full control proves how this week's sudden advance by

ISIL has redrawn Iraq's map - and potentially that of the entire Middle East.

The army of the Shi'ite Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's government in Baghdad had evaporated in the face of the onslaught, abandoning bases, and US-supplied weapons. The administration of US President Barack Obama came under fire for not doing enough to shore up the government in Baghdad before pulling out its troops.

In the west of Iraq, the ISIL fighters overran the town of Baiji, the site of the main oil refinery that meets Iraq's domestic demand for fuel. In the meantime, in Tikrit, video footage showed dozens of members of a police Special Forces battalion held prisoner, paraded before a crowd by fighters who overran their base, and the militants set up military councils to run the towns they captured.

Security was stepped up in Baghdad to prevent the Sunni militants from reaching the capital, which is itself divided into Sunni and Shi'ite neighbourhoods, and saw ferocious Sectarian Street fighting in 2006-2007 under US occupation.

But the insurgents did not enter Samarra, the next big city in their path on the Tigris north of Baghdad. The situation inside Samarra was calm and you could not see any presence of the militants and life was normal there.

2.4 KRG'S CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND THE BETRAYAL OF THE YAZIDI

After the events of August 03, 2014, and the sudden withdrawal of Kurdish militia forces "Peshmerga" from Sinjar without any fighting and delivery of Sinjar with its Yezidi people on a golden plate to ISIL. In the view of many Iraqi intellectuals and politicians, the fall of Sinjar at the hands of the ISIL was treason from the Kurdish side. During the occupation of the Sinjar by the ISIL a wide range of atrocities were conducted by the ISIL against the Yezidis, such as kidnapping and raping of women and children. This was reported after the survival of some of the Yezidis from ISIL, they reported, that they were suffering the most severe enduring in Kurdistan that even the PDK circumvented the Yezidis from the rights of demonstration and talking to keep their KRG crimes that did against us. Also, they stated

that “all we are doing is trying protest peacefully, but the Asayish Forces, Kurdish security forces trying to create problems in our peaceful protest here in Northern Iraq and then they change it to fighting against us and always trying to prevent us from going forward.

Also, the Yezidis were facing a bad security situation in all IDP camps in Northern Iraq, they were asking for international protection before it was too late. Also, some Yezidis stated that the KRG Asayish forces had beaten and tortured hundreds of displaced Yezidis including women, and detained hundreds of those innocent displaced Yezidis, and they do not know what their future would be under the mercy of KRG’s organisation of Asayish.

In addition, the KRG prevents any media sources from reaching out to Yezidis to get the right information; when someone takes the truth about our situation then the Asayish take them to prison and even when the foreign TV channels come here to IDP camps, the KRG puts interpreters from their intelligence to do interviews with people who are belonging to PDK and even if they do it with other people try to keep their crimes hidden by interpreting in wrong way. The most striking thing was that the entire Sinjar region was cleansed in less than one day by Islamic State terrorists and the overwhelming majority of the Yezidis were openly stating that; we could not “Trust Kurds” anymore, the KRG betrayed us in many ways, enough is enough!

The Iraqi Kurds, under Masoud Barzani, were complicit in the mid-2014 Islamic State takeover of Mosul and the Sinjar region that was inhabited by Kurdish-speaking Yezidis. The KRG saw the occupation of Mosul and Sinjar by ISIL as an opportunity to take over more oil and declare their independence from Baghdad.

However, after the Islamic State marched towards the Kurdish "capital" Erbil, where US and Israeli intelligence as well as Western oil companies have their regional headquarters, the Kurds started to oppose the Islamic State, then tried to fight against the Islamic State. During the occupation of Mosul and Sinjar and Telafer minorities like the Yezidi, Assyrians, and Turkmens were driven away from their homes by the Islamic State, and they were denied from returning to their areas by Kurdish militias.

2.5 OCCUPATION OF ERBIL

ISIL fighters have overrun the town of Mosul, and then ISIL started attacking the village and sub-district adjacent to the city of Erbil. The Kurdish forces left their front-line position without resistance making ISIL advance further and threatening the city of Erbil. The KRG allowed the terrorist PKK militants to fight against the ISIL in the area.

After the defeat of the Kurdish forces and withdrawal from villages that were attacked by ISIL. The Allied forces at once met up and immediate action was taken to stop the advance of the ISIL and the fall of the city of Erbil, the allied forces began conducting airstrikes on the ISIL position to prevent them from advancing them further. In my opinion without the Allied air attack on the ISIL fighters the city of Erbil would have fallen at the hands of the ISIL within hours but there was tremendous support from the Allied air forces to stop the ISIL from advancing to Erbil and also ensure that the Kurdish Regional Government in Erbil remains in powers, during the advances of the ISIL fighter the Kurdish Peshmerga escaped from the front lines and leaving behind them the PKK terrorist fighters to fights the ISIL terrorists.

2.6 THE BESIEGED OF TURKMEN SUB-DISTRICT OF AMERLI

Amerli is a small district located 20km south of Tuz Khormatu, which is 80 km south of Kirkuk. In July 2007, Amerli was subject to a deadly trailer bomb explosion in the middle of a busy market where 160 civilians were killed, more than a hundred people were wounded, and more than a hundred houses were destroyed.

The attack left behind numerous widows, orphans, disabled children, and adults, and since then young people and professionals have been targets for deliberate killing on their way to work between Amerli, Tikrit, and Kirkuk. [35]

Following the fall of Saddam Hussein's government in 2003 and Kurdish control of Northern, sadly the Kurdish policy toward the Turkmens was no different from that of the Arabization policy that was conducted against the Turkmens during Saddam Hussein's reign. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi Turkmen's situation deteriorated dramatically, and the Turkmen expected to see justice, equality, and human rights but tragically the reverse has happened.

The lands of the Turkmens have been confiscated; many Turkmens have been kidnapped, arrested, and assassinated. The Turkmens have been subjected to tremendous pressure from the Kurdish militias forcing the Turkmen to disregard their Turkmen identity and Turkmens were forced to blend into Kurdish society.

However, during the occupation of Iraq and the appearance of the ISIL terrorist groups, the Turkmens have again been subjected to a most brutal campaign by terrorist Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) militants, thousands of Turkmen were forced to flee the

³⁵ Mr. Zahid Jihad Albayati, Writer, Journalist, and Member of Iraqi Writers Union & Dr. Elham MA Albayati, Writer and Consultant Paediatrician, UK. Albayati, Z. J. & Albayati, E. (February 2015), "Turkomans of Iraq: The Third Ethnic Component of Iraq", Vol. IV, Issue 2, pp.6-28, *Centre for Policy, and Research on Turkey (Research Turkey)*, London, Research Turkey. (<http://researchturkey.org/?p=7873>)

Turkmen district of Telafer, sub-district of Basheer and city of Mosul when ISIL terrorist organisation overran the area.

The Turkmen people in the sub-district of Taza Khormatu and the district of Tuz Khormatu were continuously subjected to the ISIL terrorists' rockets and mortars attacks. Also, the sub-district of Amerli was subjected to ISIL terror attacks. The sub-district of Amerli was held under siege by the ISIL militants for 84 days. The water, electricity, medical, and food supply in America were cut off by ISIL. The people in Amerli lived under harsh inhumane and horrific conditions and more than fifty children, along with ten new-born babies lost their lives in one day as a result of lack of milk, medicine, and nutrition, more than one hundred people were, perished as a result of the siege and daily attacks.

In addition, Turkmen's villages around Amerli were ransacked, and attacked by ISIL, and a substantial number of Turkmen were killed indiscriminately including sick, children, women, and the elderly. The Turkmen in Amerli were killed only for being Shi'a and the Turkmen managed to escape from their villages leaving behind the most vulnerable who abused and killed ISIL and their houses, mosques, lands, and livestock were burnt and destroyed by ISIL militants.

During the seizure of the Amerli by ISIL, initially, the Turkmen in Amerli left on their own although there were massive Kurdish forces present nearby, especially in Tuz KKhormatu. The Kurdish forces stood silently, and they did not engage without skirmishing with ISIL. The Kurdish militia was extremely happy to see Amerli being seized by the ISIL and fully wiped out from the map because this would reduce the Turkmen population in the area and fulfill the Kurdish dream and aspiration of having a Kurdish state with Turkmen issues.



Figure (136) Turkmen women in Amerli were armed with snipers in trenches prepared to face the ISIL terrorist fighters.

Amerli was held under siege by the ISIL militants for 84 days and during this period the Turkish government and ITF ignored the plight of the Iraqi Turkmen, both had failed to fulfill the plight of the Iraqi Turkmen with arms. Nevertheless, the people of Amerli fought with courage using basic military arms and determination. They were able to defeat the ISIL with the help of Iraqi coalitions from various groups. The American help was extraordinarily little, and it came extremely late, which left many doubts in the minds of many Turkmen as to the intentions of America in supporting Turkmen in their struggle.



Figure (137) Turkmen people in Amerli are armed with various machine guns prepared for facing the ISIL terrorist fighters.



Figure (138) Turkmen people in Amerli were armed with various machine guns and prepared to face the ISIL terrorist fighters.

During the seizure of Amerli by the ISIL militants, there was no action taken against the ISIL militants by the Kurdish Peshmerga, US, and British forces. The Kurdish militia and allied forces completely

failed to help and protect the Turkmens from the ISIL attacks but when the Yazidis were forced to flee Sinjar as the ISIL militants overran their area and city of Mosul; this prompted an international aid operation and helped to trigger the US air strikes against the ISIL militants. The Turkmens were also questioning why Germany, France, Canada, and Britain did not show the same solidarity and support toward the Iraqi Turkmens in Amerli. Over 10,000 Turkmens had sought refuge as thousands of Turkmens were executed by the ISIL militants.

Turkmens believed that humanitarian aid should be distributed equally and fairly to all the Iraqi people who were fleeing ISIL militants in Northern Iraq. The Turkmen and Christians were left defenceless when the Iraqi army retreated from Mosul and Kirkuk. However, after the occupation of the city of Mosul by the ISIL militants, the Kurdish armed forces, instead of sending their troops to fight ISIL militants in Mosul, Telafer, and Sinjar but the Kurdish militia used the sectarian chaos in Iraq to expand their autonomous territory by occupying the oil fields in Kirkuk and surrounding areas.

The ISIL had swept across northern Iraq, pushing back Kurdish regional forces, threatening the Kurdish regional capital of Erbil, and driving tens of thousands of Christians and members of the Yazidis religious minority from their homes. Germany, France, US., and Britain had shown great empathy only towards the Kurdish people. They funnelled arms to the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and a few European countries played a tremendous role in changing the dynamics and structure of the region.

In the view of Turkmens, the US and EU's provision of arms support for the Kurds was a good and positive step against the terrorist organisation ISIL. The Turkmens felt this help should not only be given to the Kurdish people, but the Turkmens people should also be given arms and support so that they would be able to defend themselves against ISIL and unfortunately, the support was only provided to the Kurds.

It was an indication that the American, British, and French had other plans and incentives behind the decision to establish a Kurdish state. The US and EU's stance on supporting the Kurds was motivated by plans to divide Iraq into three states consisting of a *Shi'a* region in the

south, a strengthened Kurdish region in the north, and a Sunni region in central Iraq.

This action was rejected by the Turkmen and civil war was imminent if this plan was implemented by the US and EU countries. In the view of many Turkmen, an independent Kurdish state would further destabilize the region and create new tensions, also within the states neighbouring Iraq.

Ignoring the plight of the Turkmen was seen as a part of a plan for creating a special region for Christians and Yazidis on the Nineveh plain. The Turkmen were the biggest losers from the implementation of such a plan. The Turkmen have suffered a lot during and after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime. Iraqi Turkmen, as the third largest ethnic group affected by the violence in Iraq, should also be equally armed by Britain to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. The Turkmen disapproved of sending weapons only to the Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Iraq and YDP in northern Syria as these weapons could later be used by the Kurd Peshmerga, to suppress the other ethnic groups in the region.

The Turkmen, Christians, and Yazidis were betrayed by the Kurdish Peshmerga when they retreated from the Turkmen district of Telafer and sub-districts of Beshir, Kustepa, Biravchi, Makhmur, and Sinjar. The Kurdish Peshmerga left the Turkmen, Christians, and Yazidis under the mercy of the terrorist militants of ISIL.

The Kurdish Peshmerga was fighting to protect their state, not for the Iraqi people as was believed. The Turkmen were worried about the formation of an independent Kurdish state, as this would risk further destabilizing the region. The Turkmen were extremely anxious to see the US and the West act against the terrorist organisation ISIL only in the Kurdish existing area.

However, the US, England, France, Italy, Canada, and Germany did not show the same equality and empathy towards the Turkmen. The Turkmen were asking for arms, help, and support from the Western countries, asking for equal treatment to fight the terrorist organisation ISIL.

During the Amerli blocked by the ISIL, Ayatollah Ali Sistani, *Shi'a* Muslims' most influential scholar, said through his representative, Abd al-Mehdi al-Karbala that "*we appeal to the relevant sides to work*

sincerely in breaking the siege. We also call for saving the brave town's citizens from the dangers of the terrorists." Ayatollah Sistani added, "The speeding up of the air delivery of food to the people of Amerli is a top priority."

During the seizure of Amerli, the sub-district of Amerli circled by the ISIL militants and the only access to Amerli was by Helicopter, this was also a dangerous task because these helicopters were in the range of the ISIL firepower.

The plight of the Turkmen in Amerli was partially fluffed by the Iraqi government which was dropping food, and transferring the children, elderly, and sick people out of Amerli. Finally, the plight of Turkmen in Amerli was fulfilled by Iraqi Militia *Al-Hashed Al-Shaibi*, Turkmen militia from Tuz Khormatu and some Iranian advisers and volunteers also participated in the liberation of the Amerli.

The liberation of Amerli from ISIL militants caused tremendous happiness and enjoyment among the Iraqi Turkmen. The victory against the ISIL increased the morale of the Turkmen in the area, especially in the districts of Tuz Khormatu, Daquq, Kirkuk, and Taza Khormatu. As a consequence, Turkmen believed that the establishment of a Turkmen militia was essential to get their right and freedom, hence a Turkmen militia was established with the help and contribution of the local Turkmen businesses in various Turkmen-inhabited areas and especially Turkmen Shi'aa Controlled areas.

In addition, during the seizure of Amerli, countless Turkmen from the district of Tuz Khormatu were killed and targeted by ISIL and terrorist attacks, from kidnapping, roadside bombs, car bombs, and suicide bombers. Turkmen houses in Tuz Khormatu, Mosques, worship places like Husseiniya, and even nurseries, primary schools, and high schools were targeted and burnt by both Kurds and ISIL militants.

In January 2013, a suicide bomber exploded himself in the middle of a gathering of funeral, killing more than forty-two people, and injuring more than seventy people. In addition, on the 13th of June 2013, another deadly suicide bomber attack conducted by the ISIL militant on a peaceful demonstration in Tuz Khormatu killed Iraqi Turkmen Front Vice President Mr. Ali Hashim Muhtaroglu, and Mr. Ahmed Koja who was the governor of the city of Salahaddin.

The bomb also caused the death of thirteen prominent Turkmen and injured more than thirty people. The attack on the Turkmen in the district of Tuz Khormatu continued, in July 2013, the district of Tuz Khormatu saw a huge car bomb at 5 a.m. while people sleeping in their beds, the bomb caused the death of twelve innocent Turkmen and destroyed more than twenty houses and injuring more than fifty people.

In the district of Tuz Khormatu, more than 1,500 Turkmen were killed, more than 1,000 houses were destroyed, and more than thousands of families were forced to leave their homes and go south of Iraq in general and especially to the cities of Karbala and Baghdad as they were being fearful of their lives.

2.7 THE OCCUPATION OF THE TURKMEN SUB-DISTRICT BASHEER BY ISIL

Basheer (Beşir) is the name of a large Turkmen agricultural sub-district situated 25km southwest of Kirkuk whose name has become famous as a symbol of the Turkmen's sufferings in Iraq after it was mentioned in the preamble of the new Iraqi Constitution in 2005, along with the names of the Arab sub-district Al-Dujail and of the Kurdish sub-district Halabja, whose populations have suffered the most in Iraq under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein.

The ordeals of the Turkmens of Basheer under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein from 1980 up to 2003 have been acknowledged by the legislators and the authors of the new Iraqi constitution as 'crimes of ethnic cleansing, racial oppression and massacres amounting to genocide, committed against the Turkmens of Basheer'.

Basheer is one of the *Shi'a* Turkmen villages, that were destroyed when Saddam forced their habitants to leave, confiscated their lands, killed many youths, and imprisoned others.

After 2003, many orders from the central government were ignored and local Arab tribes who took over Basheer lands refused to leave.

On the 12th and 13th of June 2014, ISIL fighters attacked Basheer civilians, kidnapping, killing, abducting, and raping children, and women. Mosques and worship places were destroyed, and fifty-nine people, including three children and a woman killed. Little girls and young women were raped and then killed, and their corpses hung from the lamp posts and around one thousand families fled from Basheer.

The history of Basheer goes back more than one thousand years, and its first recorded history goes back to 1556, it is mentioned in the Ottoman registers (Dafter Tahrir of Kirkuk N° 111 of the year 1556 AC) dating back to the reign of the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent and kept in the Turkish Archives in Ankara. According to these registers, there were 89 Turkmen families and nine unmarried people living in Basheer in 1556, all of them farmers who had been issued official deeds registered in their names. After WWI, when the new Iraqi state, the Kingdom of Iraq was set up the deeds and property certificates issued during the Ottoman era were renewed in 1936 and

registered as deeds being issued by the Iraqi state. The property ownership situation in Iraq remained unchanged until 14th July 1958 when the Monarchy was overthrown by a coup d'état and the Republic of Iraq was declared.

2.8 FIRST GENOCIDE: LAND CONFISCATION, ETHNIC CLEANSING AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

During the early years of the Republic, the Iraqi Communist Party and their Kurdish leftist allies became predominant, and they influenced the political and social orientation of the regime. The government issued many new laws, amongst them the ‘agrarian law’ which limited land ownership to a maximum of 2.000 dunams (five hundred hectares) per family.

Many hectares of land were taken from Turkmen families in Basheer and distributed to landless Iraqis such as the Arab nomads and poor Kurds, to help them to settle around Basheer. Furthermore in 1968, when the Baath party came to power in Iraq through a military coup, it embarked on a policy of Arabisation of the Turkmen region in Kirkuk Province, they issued new laws limiting property ownership to 200 dunams (50 hectares) per family (law number 117 of 1970) and more agricultural lands belonging to the Turkmen families living in Basheer and in the other Turkmen villages around Kirkuk were confiscated.

[36]

From 1970 to 1980 the Revolutionary Command Council of the Baath regime issued several decisions by which they confiscated lands belonging to Turkmens, supposedly for public interest (protection of oil fields, enlargement of the military installations, new air base, etc.), i.e., Decision Number 369 of 1975, Decision Number 824 of 1976, Decision Number 949 of 1977, Decision 1065 of 1978. This is how 1.300.000 Donums (325.000 hectares) of agricultural land belonging to Turkmens of Kirkuk was confiscated as showed in the letter from the Judicial Adviser of the Ministry of Agriculture in Kirkuk to the Minister of Agriculture Ref 16784 dated 25th November 2010.

All these confiscated Turkmen lands have been registered as ‘lands belonging to the Iraqi state’ in the name of the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Local Administration.

³⁶ The tragedy of the Turkmens of Basheer (Basheer) in Kirkuk province – Iraq, two genocides have been committed against them in the past 28 years, the first one in April 1986 and the second one in June 2014. Dr. Hassan Aydinli, Iraqi Turkmen Front EU Representative, Brussels, 25th March 2015.

In 1982 after the start of the Iraq-Iran war, and despite the enrolment of several hundreds of Turkmens from Basheer in the army to fight against the Iranians, the Iraqi security forces arrested hundreds of intellectuals from Basheer, accusing them of being opponents to the Baath party and affiliated to the forbidden Al-Dawa Party.

In 1984, after summary judgments by a revolutionary court, 93 intellectuals of Basheer were sentenced to capital punishment and were hanged and seventy-one were sentenced to life imprisonment in *Abu Ghraib* prison, amongst them young boys aged sixteen and elderly men over sixty. [37]

In 1986 while the young men of Basheer, were still fighting on the front in the war against Iran, the Baath regime, not satisfied with the above-mentioned unjust punishments of innocent Turkmens of Basheer, ordered the expulsion of their families, giving them 48 hours to pack their personal effects and leave their homes. They were forcibly moved to some communal compounds that had been built in a rush to serve as '*transitional accommodation*' on the road to Tikrit.

Their houses were razed to the ground and their agricultural lands were confiscated and given to Sunni Arabs supporting the Baath regime, in application of a policy designed to Arabize Turkmen towns and villages in Kirkuk province.

Each of these Arab families was given 10.000 Iraqi Dinars in cash (the equivalent of 33.000 US as an incentive to build their house on Turkmen lands, while the unfortunate Turkmen were displaced without any valid reason or any legal justification and without receiving any compensation.

After a year spent in the communal compounds the Turkmen families from Basheer were dispersed to cities throughout Iraq: Nasiriya, Diyala, Diwania, Kut, and Erbil, without being provided with housing and without being compensated for the loss of their livelihoods, houses, and agricultural lands. From being landowners and farmers for centuries in Iraq, the Turkmens of Basheer became refugees in their

³⁷ The tragedy of the Turkmens of Basheer (Basheer) in Kirkuk province – Iraq, two genocides have been committed against them in the past 28 years, the first one in April 1986 and the second one in June 2014. Dr. Hassan Aydinli, Iraqi Turkmen Front EU Representative, Brussels, 25th March 2015.

own country and were left completely destitute. Meanwhile, the Baath regime had Arabized the name of the village calling it “*Al-Bashir*” instead of Basheer. [38]

After the regime change in April 2003, when the US military occupied the north of Iraq, they did not take control of the area around Basheer and the Arabs who had been installed there by the Baath regime remained in the area. The original Turkmen inhabitants of Basheer came with tents and camped near the village, demanding the departure of the Arab settlers, they wanted to recuperate their agricultural lands and be compensated for the loss of their properties and loss of earnings since 1986.

A Turkmen NGO built one hundred houses for the families of the martyrs, which became the nucleus of the new reconstructed sub-district of Basheer, and little by little other Turkmen families returned and built their houses there.

In July 2003 the newly returned Turkmens from Basheer wanted to remove the Arab settlers by force, the US occupation authorities intervened, they led and controlled a “mediation” in September 2003, but this mediation did not resolve the property dispute, it was only a ‘*short-term agreement*’ which allowed the Arabs who had settled in Basheer to stay on the land for the Winter agricultural season on a ‘non-renewable basis’, it granted them the Winter harvest. The requirement was that they would leave Basheer within one year of the signing of the ‘agreement.’ [39]

After this one year, the Turkmens would be allowed to return to their ancestral lands. Unfortunately, the Arab settlers did not respect this ‘agreement’ and they refused to leave Basheer, despite the new Iraqi government’s offer to give them a sum of money to help them return

³⁸The tragedy of the Turkmens of Basheer (Basheer) in Kirkuk province – Iraq, two genocides have been committed against them in the past 28 years, the first one in April 1986 and the second one in June 2014. Dr. Hassan Aydinli, Iraqi Turkmen Front EU Representative, Brussels, 25th March 2015.

³⁹ The tragedy of the Turkmens of Basheer (Basheer) in Kirkuk province – Iraq, two genocides have been committed against them in the past 28 years, the first one in April 1986 and the second one in June 2014. Dr. Hassan Aydinli, Iraqi Turkmen Front EU Representative, Brussels, 25th March 2015.

to the region they came from. To make things worse, they built more houses on Turkmen lands.

On 15th January 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority issued Regulation Number 8, authorizing the Governing Council of Iraq to set up the *Iraqi Property Claims Commission*. Soon after its creation, the Commission created Tribunals to look at the claims presented by the Iraqis who had been unjustly dispossessed.

The Turkmens of Basheer followed the procedures set up by the Commission and in early 2005 they introduced 1.150 claims to the Tribunals set up by the Property Claims Commission in Kirkuk for their confiscated agricultural lands situated in Basheer had been registered in their names in the official old Cadastral Sector of Basheer (Sector numbers 36, 38,45,46,47 and 48). [40] which is registered in their names in the official old Cadastral Sector of Basheer (Sector numbers 36, 38,45,46,47, and 48). [41]

In July 2005 the Tribunals examined these 1.150 claims introduced by the Turkmens of Basheer, they found them receivable and justified and they ordered the return of all the agricultural lands to their original owners. Notwithstanding the decisions of the Tribunals being in favour of the Turkmens of Basheer, only 350 of the 1.150 claims have been completed to date. This shows that the discrimination against the Turkmens continues in Iraq, despite the regime change and despite a special decree (number 59 / 2088) on 3rd October 2005 from the president of the Republic ordering the central and local authorities in Iraq to execute the decisions of the Tribunals of the Property Claims Commission swiftly and without any further delay. [42]

⁴⁰ The tragedy of the Turkmens of Basheer in Kirkuk province – Iraq, two genocides have been committed against them in the past 28 years, the first one in April 1986 and the second one in June 2014. Dr. Hassan Aydinli, Iraqi Turkmen Front EU Representative, Brussels, 25th March 2015.

⁴¹ The tragedy of the Turkmens of Basheer in Kirkuk province – Iraq, two genocides have been committed against them in the past 28 years, the first one in April 1986 and the second one in June 2014. Dr. Hassan Aydinli, Iraqi Turkmen Front EU Representative, Brussels, 25th March 2015.

⁴² The tragedy of the Turkmens of Basheer in Kirkuk province – Iraq, two genocides have been committed against them in the past 28 years, the first one in April 1986 and the second one in June 2014. Dr. Hassan Aydinli, Iraqi Turkmen Front EU Representative, Brussels, 25th March 2015.

Regrettably, the Iraqi Ministers of Finance and Local Administration, under the pressure of the Sunni Arab political parties, have appealed the decisions of the Tribunals for the remaining eight hundred claims, arguing that they need these lands supposedly ‘for the public interest.’ Consequently, the cases are still pending, and the Arab settlers are still living around Basheer and exploiting Turkmen agricultural lands.

In 2006, under the government of Prime Minister Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, the actual Prime Minister, Dr. Haidar Al-Idabi, who was his adviser and was nominated the president of a Committee to investigate the Crimes committed against the people of Basheer under the Baath regime had asked (on 5th February 2006 in a letter ref. MRW/12/2006) the Governor of Kirkuk, Abdurrahman Mustafa, to update him about the progress of the local authorities of Kirkuk in helping the people of Basheer to recuperate their lands and to return to their homes.

He asked the Governor to send him a report about the problems still faced by the people of Basheer. On 30th March 2006, the Iraqi Council of Ministers decided to reconstruct the sub-district of Basheer and it allocated 43 billion Iraqi Dinars (about 32 million USD) for this project and ordered the Finance Ministry (in a letter dated 2nd April 2006 ref. 8/1/5/4423) to allocate 14 billion Iraqi Dinars to the Ministry of Reconstruction and Housing for the year 2006 to start the reconstruction. [43]

After the removal of the Baath regime and nine years after the decision of the Iraqi Council of Ministers to reconstruct Basheer and despite the budget allocated in 2006 for its reconstruction, not a single house has been built by the Iraqi Government for the Turkmens of Basheer, the only realization by the Iraqi Ministry of Reconstruction and Housing and by the Governorate of Kirkuk is a publicity board at the entrance of Taza Khormatu near Basheer announcing the ‘Project for the Reconstruction of Basheer’.

⁴³ The tragedy of the Turkmens of (Basheer) in Kirkuk province – Iraq, two genocides have been committed against them in the past 28 years, the first one in April 1986 and the second one in June 2014. Dr. Hassan Aydinli, Iraqi Turkmen Front EU Representative, Brussels, 25th March 2015.

2.9 SECOND GENOCIDE: MASS KILLINGS, RAPES, ETHNIC CLEANSING, AND LOOTING BY ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT TERRORIST GROUPS

To make things worse for the Turkmens of Basheer, the Arab settlers who remained around Basheer welcomed the ISIL terrorists when these came to the area, and they supported them in the attacks on Basheer which started on 14th June 2014. Basheer inhabitants resisted the ISIL attack for 3 days with their small weapons and only a little ammunition. Unfortunately, because they did not get any help from the Iraqi forces or the Kurdish Peshmerga, they could not stop the invasion and occupation of Basheer by ISIL terrorists.

ISIL occupied Basheer on 17th June 2014 and expelled its entire Turkmen population composed of about 1.500 families, totalizing about 10.000 people. ISIL terrorists looted all the homes and properties. A few days after they had occupied Basheer, they published some videos on their websites, showing the demolition of schools, offices, mosques, religious shrines, and the library. To terrorize and humiliate the Turkmens, ISIL published photos of their unfortunate victims, some had been beheaded and their bodies had been left in the open to be eaten by wild animals, and some others had been tied to lamp posts.

ISIL has committed war crimes and ethnic cleansing in Basheer. During the first three days of their attack, they killed thirty-six unarmed Turkmens. They kidnapped women and children, tortured, raped, and savagely killed some of them.

A few days after the occupation of Basheer, a group of Turkmen volunteers composed of youths from other Turkmen localities in Taza Khormatu, Tessin, Tuz Khormatu and Kirkuk came to help the people of Basheer, together they tried to dislodge ISIL terrorists. Unfortunately, they failed, twenty-one were killed and many of them were injured by ISIL snipers positioned in strategic points in and around Basheer, armed with heavy long-range machine guns. Their task was made difficult because ISIL had already planted explosive

devices on the roads leading to Basheer and booby-trapped buildings and houses in Basheer. [44]

On 18th March 2015, a Turkmen unit of the ‘Popular Mobilisation Units to Fight against ISIL’ (Hashed al-Shaabi) tried again to liberate Basheer, unfortunately, they too failed, because ISIL terrorists had time to reinforce their positions in and around Basheer, positioning many more snipers with long-range machine guns in all the strategic high positions. The Turkmen unit managed to reach the Police Station, but they were forced to withdraw after suffering many casualties, five were killed and nine gravely injured.

The Turkmen unit of the ‘Popular Mobilisation Units to fight against ISIL’ with its present-day ability and weapons cannot liberate Basheer without reinforcement and support from the Iraqi and/or International Coalition air forces. Unfortunately, to date, neither has come to their help.

During the 23rd of March 2015 Meeting of the Iraqi Council of Ministers in Baghdad, it was decided that the people who have suffered from ISIL terrorist attacks in the north of Iraq, i.e., the Christians, the Turkmens, the Yezidis, the Kurds, and the Shabaks, exposing them to mass killings and to internally displacement, are victims of ethnic cleansing, amounting to genocides. Concerning the Turkmens, the Council of Ministers had specified that the Turkmens of Telafer and the Turkmens of Basheer have been victims of genocide by ISIL terrorist groups. Thus, this is the second genocide committed against the Turkmen of Basheer in less than 28 years. As a result of the atrocities committed against the Turkmens in Basheer, Dr. Hassan Aydinli, called upon the Delegation for Relations with Iraq of the EU Parliament, to support the Turkmen case and endorse the Turkmen demands stated in the Common Declaration of the indigenous non-ruling peoples of Iraq, which we presented to the EU Parliament on 19th November 2014 by Dr. Hassan Aydinli and advocate Turkmen

⁴⁴ The tragedy of the Turkmens of (Basheer) in Kirkuk province – Iraq, two genocides have been committed against them in the past 28 years, the first one in April 1986 and the second one in June 2014. Dr. Hassan Aydinli, Iraqi Turkmen Front EU Representative, Brussels, 25th March 2015.

requests with the European Parliament, the EEAS, the European Commission and the EU Council. [45]



Figure (140) photos of Turkmen martyrs who died fighting to liberate sub- district of Basheer from ISIL



Figure (141) photos of Turkmen martyrs who died fighting to liberate the sub-district of Basheer from ISIL these people were killed by ISIL and their bodies were found in Basheer.

⁴⁵ The tragedy of the Turkmen of (Basheer) in Kirkuk province – Iraq, two genocides have been committed against them in the past 28 years, the first one in April 1986 and the second one in June 2014. Dr. Hassan Aydinli, Iraqi Turkmen Front EU Representative, Brussels, 25th March 2015.

2.10 FIGHTING TO LIBERATE BASHEER (BEŞİR) FROM THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT

This small agricultural village of Basheer had witnessed horrors and lost so many times to the extremists. The people of Basheer were driven out by the Baa'th regime but returned to their homes in 2003. They were driven out again by the al-Qaida in 2007 but bravely returned. Once again Basheer faced the same fate, its inhabitants haunted by its death that was struck by the terrorist ISIL in 2014 but later the district Basheer was occupied again by terrorist groups ISIL. The inhabitants's village of Basheer were killed and executed by the ISIL only for their ethnic and religious identity of being Turkmen, their religious places were destroyed and blown up by ISIL, and the males of the sub-district were taken away and executed by the ISIL, the inhabitants of the Basheer were forced to leave, and their property and lands were taken by the Sunni Arabs who worked and supported the terrorist group of ISIL.



Figure (142) Turkmen fighters Al-Hashed Al-Shaabi in the district of Basheer before liberation from ISIL militants



Figure (143) Turkmen fighters Al-Hashed Al-Shaabi in the district of Basheer after liberation from ISIL militants.

All these atrocities happened to the Turkmen of Basheer and the world community kept watched and silent. The Turkmen had no choice but to liberate the sub-district by themselves, so the Turkmen Brigade was established to protect the Turkmen from the terrorist group ISIL and occupied Kurdish forces. The Turkmen Brigades part of the PMU has played a prominent role in the liberation of Basheer. Turkmen Brigade which was a faction of the Popular Mobilisation Units. There were approximately 30,000 fighters that made up brigades and their fundamental areas of operation included the provinces of Kirkuk, Anbar, Nineveh, and Salahaddin.

The Turkmen Brigades with the support of the Iraqi army, and Kurdish Peshmerga, with the aerial support of the international coalition, launched the military operation of liberating Basheer in 2017 from ISIL.

Previously, the Popular Mobilisation Unit conducted several attacks on Basheer trying to free the village from Islamic State control, but the attacks were unsuccessful. During the attack, unfortunately, several soldiers were killed and injured. Also, numerous jihadist bodies were left in the hands of Peshmerga.

Basheer stayed under ISIL control for almost two years but in the view of many Turkmen the liberation of the village was important because ISIL in Basheer often used mortars to shell areas under Iraqi army control, including the Turkmen sub-district of Taza Khormatu in the southern Kirkuk.

However, following the liberation of Basheer, hashed al-Shaabi militia entered the village and retrieved nineteen bodies belonging to their Turkmen militiamen who were killed in their earlier attacks. The Turkmen's bodies were wired with booby bombs by ISIL terrorists and exploded after the militia tried to remove them.



Figure (144) photos of Turkmen fighters (Al-Hashed Al-Shaabi) who fought to liberate the sub-district of Basheer from terrorists ISIL fighters.



Figure (145) photos of Turkmen fighters who fought to liberate the sub-district of Basheer from terrorists ISIL.



Figure (146) retrieved fifteen bodies belonging to Turkmen militiamen who were killed in their earlier attacks trying to liberate Basheer and this photo was taken by Ali Mükerrerem Kasapoğlu



Figure (147) the funeral for the retrieved fifteen bodies of Turkmen militiamen who were killed in their earlier attacks this photo was taken by Ali Mükerrer Kasapoğlu.



Figure (148) the funeral of the Turkmen fighters who were killed by the ISIL during the liberation of Basheer.



Figure (149) The Turkmen MP Niyazi Memaroglu with the Turkmen fighters Al-Hashed Al-Shaabi in the district of Basheer after liberation from ISIL militants



Figure (150) Turkmen fighters (Al-Hashed Al-Shaabi) who fought to liberate the sub-district of Basheer from terrorists ISIL fighters.



Figure (151) Turkmen member of Iraqi Parliament Yilmaz Memaroglu firing a mortar at the ISIL fighter's position.



Figure (152) Turkmen member of Iraqi Parliament Yilmaz Memaroglu firing a mortar at the ISIL fighter's position.

((بسمه تعالى))

أسماء شهداء في عملية محاولة تحرير قرية بشير يوم ٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩

ت	الاسم الثلاثي	تاريخ الاستشهاده	محل الولادة	الملاحظات
١	ميلم مهدي روزنك صمد سمين	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	تسمعين	
٢	قاسم محمد رشيد محمد	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	تسمعين	
٣	حاتم عبدالمهدي قنبر مهدي	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	بشير	
٤	جعفر اسماعيل تقى عباس	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	بشير	
٥	صباح جعفر محمد سعدون	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	بشير	
٦	عبدالله اصغر اكبر	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	بشير	
٧	علي محمود عباس يونس	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	بشير	
٨	مصطفى حسين شاكر مرتضى	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	بشير	
٩	سجاد حسن رضا	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	تازه	
١٠	علي قنبر احمد زانو	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	تازه	
١١	عادل عبدالله حسين عبد	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	تازه	
١٢	ياسين موسى زينل تقى	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	تازه	
١٣	خالد اكرم اسماعيل توفيق	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	تازه	
١٤	محمد زينل اكبر كاظم	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	تازه	
١٥	فلاح عباس هجران زين العابدين	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	طوز	
١٦	عباس فاضل ابراهيم سمين	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	طوز	
١٧	عصام زين العابدين ابواز احمد	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	طوز	
١٨	عبدار خورشيد رشيد غني	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	طوز	
١٩	حيدر احمد رشيد حسن	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	طوز	
٢٠	اشرف ماهر احمد مهدي	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	طوز	
٢١	عباس كريم غفور بلندر	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	طوز	
٢٢	عادلان محمد مهدي قنبر	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	طوز	
٢٣	حمدي ابراهيم قنبر	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	طوز	
٢٤	حيدر اسعد جابرني	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	طوز	
٢٥	محمد اسعد زين العابدين	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	طوز	
٢٦	زكريا يحيى علي حسن	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	طوز	
٢٧	فرات شاكر خياط	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	طوز	
٢٨	مرتضى حسن زين العابدين تقى	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	طوز	
٢٩	بيبراول محمد حسين حيدر	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	طوز	
٣٠	نزار اشرف سمين لطيف	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	طوز	
٣١	عصا حسن احمد	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	طوز	
٣٢	عبدالله احمد محمد باقى	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	طوز	
٣٣	علي قاسم عباس تقى	٢٠١٤/٦/٢٩	طوز	

هو > محمد
يعني > قاسم
هذا الاسم ليس اسمك > قنبر

بشير

Figure (153) is the name of the Turkmen people who were killed during the liberation of the sub-district of Basheer.

((بسمه تعالی))

سماه شهداء يوم الفتحام قرية بشير من قبل الإرهابيين (النواغش) المصادف ٢٠١٤/٦/١٧

ت	الاسم الثلاثي	تاريخ الاستشهاد	محل الولادة	الملاحظات
١	محمد مردان قاسم علي الموسوي	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٢	ذوالفقار علي رفيع محمد	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٣	عون الدين جمعة قاسم	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٤	جواد محمد شوكت زبير	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٥	باسم محمود شوكت زبير	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٦	محمد محمود شوكت زبير	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٧	علي الهادي جواد محمود شوكت	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٨	قنبر قاسم عباس	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٩	رالد صبيح اكبر	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
١٠	حمزة علي حسن عسكر	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
١١	باسم طه ابراهيم حسن	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
١٢	عبداس زيدان خلف	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
١٣	بشير عباس زيدان خلف	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
١٤	معصومة قاسم ابراهيم علي	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
١٥	نرجس قاسم ابراهيم علي	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
١٦	علي قاسم عباس	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
١٧	زهراء الوائليح ابو الخضر	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
١٨	محمد أمين قاسم ابراهيم علي	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
١٩	علي قاسم ابراهيم علي	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٢٠	ميهدي حق ويردي رشه علي	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٢١	عيسى سمير علي جويان	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٢٢	حيدر عيسى سمير علي جويان	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٢٣	قنصل جمال اسماعيل حسن	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٢٤	صباح فلاح ولي خضر	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٢٥	بشرى اسماعيل محمد مهدي	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٢٦	سن كول اسماعيل محمد مهدي	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٢٧	يمان اسماعيل محمد مهدي	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٢٨	حبيب حسين صامت شريف	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٢٩	علي ابراهيم حمزة كره الموسوي	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٣٠	ارجان محمد موسى	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	بشير	
٣١	علي صابر الدين نقي اكبر	٢٠١٤/٦/١٧	تازه	

Figure (154) is the name of the Turkmen people who were killed during the liberation of the sub-district of Basheer.

3. CHAPTER THREE

3.0 KURDISH PROVOCATION AND HARASSMENT OF THE TURKMEN

After the fall of the Saddam Hussein government in 2003, the Turkmen of Iraq expected to see justice, fairness, equality, and caseation of the human rights abuse, but the reserve had happened. The Turkmen were arrested, imprisoned, and kidnapped and their rights were violated by the Kurdish militia, ISIL, and the central government in Baghdad,




Figure (155) Photo of Kirkuk Citadel



Figure (156) Photo of Kirkuk Citadel



Figure (157) photo of Kirkuk Citadel



Figure (158) Photo of Kirkuk Citadel



Figure (159) Photo of Kirkuk Citadel



Figure (160) Photo of Kirkuk Citadel

After the toppling the Saddam Hussein and the occupation of Iraq, the US forces in Iraq gave a lot of power and concessions to both Kurdish parties as rewards for their support and participation in the removal of the Saddam Hussein government.

One of the Kurdish provocations by the Kirkuk governor Najmaddin Omer was, in March 2015, the Kurdish militia raised a huge Kurdish regional flag at the Kirkuk citadel which is considered the symbol for the Turkmen people.

The main objective of the Kurdish militia in raising a Kurdish flag on the Kirkuk citadel aimed to provoke the Turkmen. The Turkmen politicians and Turkmen members of the governing council approached Najmaddin Omer requesting the removal of the Kurdish flag to avoid any clashes that might occur between the Turkmen and the Kurds, but unfortunately, the Kurdish governor took no action and ignored the Turkmen demand. Although the Najmaddin Omer, a few days before had issued no flag shall be raised in Kirkuk except an Iraqi flag, and according to the legislation and Iraqi constitution, the city of Kirkuk is not a part of the KRG therefore the Kurdish regional

flag should not be raised at the first place on the governmental building in Kirkuk.



Figure (161) Kurdish militia put Kurdish flag on the Kirkuk citadel to provoke the Turkmen in March 2015 March 2015-Kirkuk, TURKMENELI



Figure (162) Kurdish militia put the Kurdish flag on the Kirkuk citadel to provoke the Turkmen, March 2015, -Kirkuk, and TURKMENELI



Figure (163) Photo of Kirkuk Qalesi (Kirkuk Citadel) in the last centuries (1900)



Figure (164) Photo of Kirkuk Citadel

The result of placing a KRG flag on the Kirkuk citadel wall caused a counter-response from the Turkmen in Kirkuk by raising a Turkmen flag adjacent to the Kurdish flag. After the first day of raising the Turkmen flag, the Turkmen flag was removed and burnt by the Kurdish militia.

The burning of a Turkmen flag by the Kurdish militia caused outrage among the Iraqi people, especially among the Turkmen. As a consequence, the Kurdish flag was removed to avoid clashes between the Kurds and the Turkmen in Kirkuk. This clearly showed the objective and reality of the Kurdish policy in Kirkuk, their objective to change the demography of the city of Kirkuk and annex it to the KRG. In addition, this incident revealed that the Kurds were not interested in power sharing and living in harmony in Kirkuk but showed they were extremely opportunistic. They were prepared to do everything to annex the city of Kirkuk to the KRG, but the Turkmen people were totally against this and more in favour of living in harmony.



Figure (165) The Turkmen flag was prepared by people to be raised on the Kirkuk Citadel adjacent to the Kurdish flag and confronting the Kurds, in March 2015.



Figure (166) The Turkmen flag was raised by people on the Kirkuk Citadel adjacent to the Kurdish flag and confronting the Kurds, March 2015-Kirkuk, TURKMENELI



A figure (167) Turkmen flag was raised by people on the Kirkuk Citadel adjacent to the Kurdish flag and confronting the Kurds, March 2015-Kirkuk, TURKMEN ELI.

Also, in March 2015 the Kurdish militia went rampage into the streets of Kirkuk, especially in the Turkmen-populated neighbourhood provoking the Turkmen by shouting anti-Turkmen slogans.

The Kurdish militias were armed with automatic machine guns, they were using abusive language and terrorizing the innocent and unarmed Turkmen by waving Kurdish flags and firing randomly with machine guns. This entire Kurdish abuse happened in front of the eyes of the police and security police in Kirkuk who were Kurdish and were supposed to provide protection, stability, and security for the people.



Figure (168) The Turkmen flag was raised by people on the Kirkuk Citadel adjacent to the Kurdish flag and confronting the Kurds, March 2015-Kirkuk, TURKMENELI

The Kurdish objective was to provoke the Turkmens and get some response so that they would have an excuse and pretext for attacking the Turkmens as they did it in 1959 hundreds of the Turkmens were in the hands of the Kurdish militia and Iraqi communist party.



Figure (169) To provoke the Turkmen, in March 2015 the Kurd militia with the help of Kurdish police went rampage in the streets of Kirkuk and in the Turkmen, neighbourhood shouting anti-Turkmen slogans and abusive language while carrying machine - Kirkuk, TURKMENELI.



Figure (170) To provoke the Turkmen, in March 2015 the Kurd militia with the help of Kurdish police went rampage in the streets of Kirkuk and in the Turkmen, neighbourhood shouting anti-Turkmen slogans and abusive language while carrying machine - Kirkuk, TURKMENELI.



Figure (171) In Al_Jumuhriya Street, the main street in Kirkuk, photos show the Kurdish provocation of the Turkmen, in March 2015. The Kurdish militia with the help of Kurdish police went rampage in the street of Kirkuk and in the Turkmen, neighbourhood shouting anti-Turkmen slogans and abusive language while carrying a machine - Kirkuk, TURKMENELI.



Figure (172) Al_Jumuhriya Street in Kirkuk which was the main street in 1968 shows the cleanliness and planning, of the city but after the Kurdish occupation of Kirkuk 2003 the town was fully destroyed by the Kurdish militia Kirkuk, TURKMENELI



Figure (173) Kurdish militia provoking the Turkmen by writing a support slogan for the PKK terrorist on the wall of the Turkmen house – March 2015- Kirkuk, Turkey.



Figure (174) Kurdish militia provoking the Turkmen by writing a support slogan for the PKK terrorist on the wall of the Turkmen house – March 2015- Kirkuk, Turkey.



Figure (175) The Kurdish militia removed the Iraqi flag and replaced it with the Kurdish flag to provoke the Turkmen and Arabs. Although the city of Kirkuk is legally and by the Iraqi constitution it is not bound to the KRG, March 2015- Kirkuk, Turkey.



Figure (177) The Kurdish militia removed the Iraqi flag and replaced it with the Kurdish flag to provoke the Turkmen and Arabs. Although the city of Kirkuk is legally and by the Iraqi constitution it is not bound to the KRG. TURKMEN ELI.



Figure (178) The Kurdish militia removed the Iraqi flag and replaced it with the Kurdish flag to provoke the Turkmen and Arabs. Although the city of Kirkuk is legally and by the Iraqi constitution it is not bound to the KRG, Kirkuk-TURKMENELI.



Figure (179) Kurdish student at Kirkuk University wearing military uniforms and carrying a gun inside the university with the help of the Kurdish Police, March 21st, 2015- Kirkuk- TURKMENELI



Figure (180) On the 21st of March 2015, Kurds carrying machinegun and with the help of Kurdish police went rampage in front of the Iraqi Turkmen Front Head office in Kirkuk shouting an abusive language and anti-Turkmen slogan to provoke the Turkmen-Kirkuk, TURKMENELI.



Figure (181) On the 21st of March 2015, Kurds carrying machinegun and with the help of Kurdish police went rampage in front of the Iraqi Turkmen Front Head office in Kirkuk shouting an abusive language and anti-Turkmen slogan to provoke the Turkmen, - Kirkuk, TURKMENELI

4. CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 TURKMENS REJECT HOISTING OF A KURDISH FLAG IN KIRKUK



Figure (182) Turkmen in Kirkuk rejecting the hosting of the Kurdish regional flag in Kirkuk.

After the fall of Saddam Hussein's government in April 2003, Kurdish parties brought over a half million Kurds from various parts of northern Iraq to be settled in Kirkuk. This was implemented with the help of the Allied forces. The demography of the city of Kirkuk was completely altered by the Kurdish militia and they managed to dominate the city of Kirkuk provincial council with the help of the US administration, especially when the Iraqi provincial election was conducted at a time when the Republic of Iraq was going through an unstable and chaotic period.

During the Najmadin Omer period, the lands and buildings belonging to the Iraqi government and the Turkmen were confiscated and occupied by the Kurdish political parties. The confiscated lands by the

Kurdish party were distributed to the Kurdish political party's members who were living in Erbil, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah.

During the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurdish Peshmerga took the opportunity to seize the city of Kirkuk which prompted an influx of Kurds into the city, when historically the city of Kirkuk had been populated mainly by the Turkmen with a Kurdish minority. [46]

After the occupation of Iraq, the situation of the Turkmen and Arabs in Kirkuk deteriorated and dramatically worsened especially when Dr. Najmadin Omer was appointed as a governor of the city of Kirkuk. The Kurdish governor Najmadin Omer caused rifts and tensions amongst the Turkmen, Kurds, and Arabs in Kirkuk. Najmadin Omer was unpopular amongst the people in Kirkuk in general and especially among the Turkmen and Arabs. During Omer's rule, the Turkmen directors and police in Kirkuk were replaced with unqualified and inexperienced Kurds from outside of Kirkuk. The job opportunities in Kirkuk were overwhelmingly given to the Kurds. All the experienced and highly qualified Turkmen and Arabs working at the Iraqi Petroleum Company in Kirkuk were forced to leave and given early retirement while being replaced with Kurdish people.

Najmadin Omer led the destruction of the Turkmen villages around Kirkuk which led the Turkmen to be forced from their farms and villages. Under the instruction of Najmadin Omer, 90% of the budgets of the Kirkuk governing council were spent on works and services in the Kurdish-populated neighbourhoods whereas Turkmen-populated areas were fully neglected and were being ignored.

The Turkmen employees who had been appointed by the central government in Kirkuk had their application forms deliberately not approved by Najmadin Omer. He refused to use the Turkmen language on the signs of the government building although according to the new

46 Iraqi court overrules Kirkuk council decision to raise KRG flag, ANADOLU AGENCY, BAGHDAD, and Published on August 17, 2017.
<https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2017/08/17/iraqi-court-overrules-kirkuk-council-decision-to-raise-krf-flag>

Iraqi constitution, the Government buildings in Kirkuk must be written in three languages Turkmen, Arabic, and Kurdish.

The majority of the citizens in the city of Kirkuk were overwhelmingly unhappy and dissatisfied with Najmadin Omer's performance with the administration of the city of Kirkuk proving that he was incompetent in fulfilling his job. Politicians and intellectuals requested that the central government in Baghdad remove Najmadin Omer from his position for being incompetent, which caused tension and hatred amongst the ethnic groups in Kirkuk.

Najmadin Omer deliberately caused tension between the ethnic groups in the city of Kirkuk to divert away from his political problems and, to provoke the Turkmen, thus enabling him to keep his position as governor and continue to show himself as a patriot amongst the Kurdish people to maximize support from the Kurdish people and to remain in power.

On 4th April 2017, Najmadin Omer sent a letter, (Document Issue 742) to the head of the Kirkuk Provincial Council requesting to raise only a KRG flag on all state buildings in Kirkuk. This decision was carried out without the approval of the Kirkuk provincial council and central government in Baghdad as shown in the document **[Doc.6]**.

كۆماربەخ حەزرىق پارىزگانىخ كىركوك نووسىنگەخى پارىزگار		جەمھورىيەتى عىراق مەھكىمەتى كىركوك مەكتەبى مەھكىمەتى
٢٠١٧ / ئازار / ١٤	٧٩٢	٧٩٢

الى / رىئاسەتە مەجلىس مەھكىمەتى كىركوك
م / رەفەقەتە مەجلىس كوردستان

بەئىنسىيەتە ئىبادەت نەزەرىيەسى كىركوك مەن مەنەزەق مەنەزەق
 ئىبەق مەشەمۇلە بەلمادە (١٤٠) مەن نەستور عىراق نەزەب مەن مەجلىسەم
 مەسوقر بەقرار و جوب رەفەقەتە مەجلىس كوردستان بەجەنەب مەن جەمھورىيە
 عىراقىيە فى مەبەقە نوانىر مەھكىمەتى / والشىركەتە عەمەتە التەبەقە
 للوزارات وفى مەنەسەبەتە رەسمىيە ... مەن الشىركە .


 الدكتور
 نجم الدين عمر كريم
 محافظ كركوك
 ٢٠١٧/٣/١٤





نسخة منه اليه :
 - مكتب المحافظ

Hazar2017/3/14

Email: kirkukgovernment@gmail.com
www.kirkuk.gov.iq

Document (6)

**Republic of Iraq
Kirkuk Governate
Governor Office
Date 14 March 2017
Document Issue: 742**

**To: the head of the Kirkuk Governing Council
Subject: Hoisting a Kurdistan flag**

Due to the Nowruz Festival Season, Kirkuk has been a part of the disputed area, and it is included in Article 141 of the Iraqi legislation. We request that you hoist the Kurdish flag along with the Iraqi flag on all the governmental buildings including the general establishment that is linked to the ministerial offices.

**Regards
Dr. Najmadin Omer Karim
Kirkuk Governor
14/3/2017**

Document (6)

The aim of the Kirkuk governor Najmadin Omer in hoisting the KRG flag over the state building in Kirkuk was to gain sympathy and increase his popularity amongst the Kurdish people but his action angered many Turkmen and the Arabs.

The Turkmen considered Najmadin Omer's action by hosting a Kurdish flag over the state building was pure provocation. As a consequence, the Turkmen citizens poured into the streets of Kirkuk to show their anger, frustration, and condemnation of the Kirkuk governor's decision.



Figure (183) The Kurdish flag hoisted along the Iraqi flag over the governmental building in Kirkuk.



Figure (184) Kurdish flag hoisted along the Iraqi flag over the state building in Kirkuk.

However, since the creation of the Republic of Iraq, the state buildings in Kirkuk have always flown an Iraqi national flag. Nevertheless, a Kirkuk governor's decision to request a KRG flag on all state buildings was against the Iraqi constitution and his actions created anger and outrage amongst the Arabs and the Turkmens. [47]

The central government in Baghdad immediately released a statement and condemned the Kirkuk governor's action in a letter dated 22nd of March 2017, (number 4/B/423) that was sent to the Kirkuk Governing Council in the city of Kirkuk from the Iraqi Parliament. The letter was sent and signed by Dr. Turhan Muthir al_Mufti who was the head of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and Higher Commission for Coordinating amongst the Provinces (HCCP) as shown in the document [Doc.7].

47 Kurd Flag Raising Ads Tensions in The Iraqi City of Kirkuk, May 12, 2017, Heard on Morning Edition, Jane Arraf.



العدد: ع/ب/ ٤٤٢

التاريخ: ١٤٠٠/٧/١٩

مجلس محافظة كركوك - مكتب رئيس المجلس

الموضوع/ علم العراق

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته...

إشارة الى كتاب محافظة كركوك /مكتب المحافظ ذي العدد ٧٤٢ والمؤرخ في ٢٠١٧/٣/١٤ والمتعلق برفع علم إقليم كردستان بجانب علم العراق نود بصدده ان نبين بأن المادة ١٤٠ من دستور جمهورية العراق لعام ٢٠٠٥ قد رسمت الالية الواجب اتباعها بشأن كركوك والمناطق المتنازع عليها ولم يتم حسم هذا الأمر لحد الان وان محافظتكم الموقرة هي الان ضمن سلطة الحكومة الاتحادية وضمن السلطة اللامركزية الادارية وعليه يجب ان يرفع العلم العراقي حصراً على وفق نظام علم العراق رقم ٦ لسنة ١٩٨٦ وتعديلاته. فضلاً عن ان صلاحية اصدار مجالس المحافظات قرارات وتعليمات محلية وبما لا يتعارض مع الدستور والقوانين الاتحادية وان مسألة العلم ورفعه او وضع علم معه لايندرج من ضمن اختصاصات مجلس المحافظة كون الموضوع اتحادي مركزي.

للتفضل بالاطلاع والعمل بموجبه ... مع وافر التقدير والاحترام

ح. طورهان مظفر المهدي
٤٤
٢

رئيس مفترارية الهيئة العليا للتنسيق بين المحافظات

ممثل الحكومة في مجلس النواب

/آذار/ ٢٠١٧

نسخة منه الى/

- محافظة كركوك/كتابكم المشار اليه في اعلاه/للتفضل بالاطلاع ...مع التقدير.
- الوزارات كافة-مكتب الوزير/للتفضل بالاطلاع واتخاذ مايلزم بتوجيه الدوائر لوزارتكم الموقرة برفع العلم العراقي حصراً...مع التقدير.

**Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Council of Ministers
Higher Commission for Coordinating amongst the provinces.
(HCCP)**

Document 4/B/423

Date: 22/3/2017

**To Kirkuk Governing Committee: The head Committee office
Subject: Iraqi flag**

Regards and peace from the God

Regarding the document issued by the Kirkuk governor, document Number 742 was issued on 23/3/2017 regarding the hoisting of the KRG flag along the Iraqi flag. In this regard we would like to let you know that the article of 140 from the Iraqi Constitution 2005 has drawn a plan to be followed regarding the city of Kirkuk and the distributed area and the issue regarding the distribution has not been completed and is still in process.

The city of Kirkuk is still a part of the central government in Baghdad so only no other than the Iraqi flag shall be hoisted on the governmental building in Kirkuk, and this was clearly stated in the Iraqi Constitution and Legislation, regarding the Iraqi flag, item 6 for year 1986.

Kind regards

Dr. Turhan Muthir Al_Mufti

The president of the Higher Commission for Coordinating amongst the provinces

Government representative in the in the Iraqi Parliament

Document seven

Dr. Turhan Muthir Al-Mufti stated in his letter that he had requested the Kirkuk Governing Council Committee to revoke the Kirkuk governor's decision to raise the Kurdish flag on all state buildings in Kirkuk. In addition, the letter stated article 141 of the Iraqi Constitution regarding the disputed land with emphasis that no decision had yet been taken regarding article 141. Also, he stated that the city of Kirkuk shall be run by the central government and not by the Kurdish Regional Government.

Dr. Turhan also stated that the city of Kirkuk is not a part of KRG, so only the Iraqi flag shall be raised on all state buildings according to article (6) of the Iraqi resolution that was legislated in 1986 with the flying of an Iraqi flag on government buildings. However, the Kurdish governor refused the implementation of the Iraqi parliament's decision and he refused to remove the KRG flags from the state building even though there was condemnation from the Turkmen, Arabs, Central government, Iran, and other countries. [48][49]



Figure (185) Turkmen waving Turkmen flags took to the streets in Kirkuk to protest a vote by the Kirkuk local government to raise the flag of Kurdistan over state buildings on March 29, 2017

48 <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/kirkuks-turkmen-protest-after-kurdish-flag-raised-iraqi-city-890476408>.

49 <http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/2579bafc-3b04-4c7e-a915-9edf1180e203/Kirkuk-Turkmen-demonstrate-against-decision-to-raise-Kurdistan-flag>.

The Kirkuk governor ignored Dr. Turhan Muthir al-Mufti's decision, and the people of Kirkuk reacted by coloring the city of Kirkuk with a Turkmen flag as a reaction to the Kurdish action.

The Turkmen showed their disapproval and rejection of the Kurdish flag flying on all state buildings in Kirkuk. As a consequence of this, Dr. Najmaddin Omer announced that the Turkmen party's action in Kirkuk was an illegitimate decision. The Turkmen demonstrators gathered near the province's administrative building by waving Iraqi and Turkmen flags. The demonstrators handed a protest letter to the governorate office, stating the raising of the Kurdish flag on state buildings was unconstitutional, and against the Iraqi legislation and the willingness of the people of Kirkuk.



Figure (186) Turkmen waving Turkmen flags took to the streets in Kirkuk to protest a vote by the Kirkuk local government to raise the flag of Kurdistan over state buildings on March 29, 2017.

The Turkmen protestors held a Turkmen and Iraqi flag alongside signs with slogans, calling “Kirkuk is Iraqi, not Kurdistan.” “Kirkuk Turktur Turk Kalacak” in the Turkish language means that “Kirkuk is a Turkish city and remains Turkish.” They also raised banners reading “No for unconstitutional decisions” and “Turkmens reject the governor's decision on raising the Kurdish flag on estate buildings.”



Figure (187) Turkmen waving Turkmen flags took to the streets in Kirkuk to protest a vote by the Kirkuk local government to raise the flag of Kurdistan over state buildings on March 29, 2017.

The Turkmen demonstration against the Kurdish authority intensified when one of the Kurdish officials who were working in the Kirkuk governor building drove through a group of peaceful Turkmen demonstrators injuring many Turkmen one of the injured Turkmen was taken to the hospital and was treated for broken legs.

festive “Eid Newroz”. For the Turkmen, the citadel of Kirkuk was considered an important part of their history.

The citadel of Kirkuk was populated by Turkmen until the citadel was demolished by Saddam Hussein’s government under the Arabization policy in the mid-seventies of the last century to displace the Turkmen from Kirkuk and erase their history. Although no Kurds were living in the Kirkuk Citadel, a deliberate decision from Karim to raise a Kurdish Regional Government flag was a pure provocation against the Turkmen. Najmaddin Omer had requested from the Kirkuk Provincial Council Committee who were fully controlled by Kurds to hold an urgent session on raising the Kurdish flag on all state buildings in the province.



Figure (188) Turkmen waving Turkmen flags took to the streets in Kirkuk to protest a vote by the Kirkuk local government to raise the flag of Kurdistan over state buildings on March 29, 2017



Figure (189) A Turkmen waving Turkmen flags took to the streets in Kirkuk to protest a vote by the Kirkuk local government to raise the flag of Kurdistan over state buildings on March 29, 2017



Figure (190) Turkmen waving Turkmen and Iraqi flags took to the streets in Kirkuk to protest a vote by the Kirkuk local government to raise the flag of Kurdistan over state buildings on March 29, 2017.



Figure (191) An injured Turkmen in Kirkuk was run over by a Kurdish member who working in the Kirkuk governor while he was protesting the decision of the Kirkuk Council to raise the Kurdish flag on all state buildings in the Kirkuk Province, on March 29, 2017

Previously, the Kirkuk governor Karim provoked the Turkmen by flying a Kurdish flag on the historic citadel of Kirkuk during Newroz

On Tuesday, March 2017, the Kirkuk Provincial Council Committee held the hearing, and the council members approved the resolution with majority votes while all the Turkmen and Arab members boycotted the meeting.

Following the Kirkuk Council's approval, a Turkmen member of the Iraqi Parliament Hassan Turan labelled the move as unconstitutional and claimed that the Kirkuk Council did not have the authority to make such a decision. In addition, the provocation action by Najmadin Omer caused more tensions between Iraq's central government in Baghdad, and Kurdish regional authorities in northern Iraq.

Again, the Kirkuk issue resurfaced, and by the 28th of March 2017, 25 Kurdish provincial councilors voted to fly the Kurdish regional flag over government buildings. Although the Council session was boycotted by the 19 Turkmen and Arab members, they did raise concerns that the move was unconstitutional and drew regional and international criticism against the Kirkuk governor. Also, the Kirkuk governor's decision was condemned by the Asaied Ahaq and other political parties.

At the same time, on March 28, 2017, the Iraqi Parliament in Baghdad voted against the decision of Kirkuk's provincial council to raise the Kurdistan flag alongside the Iraqi flag in the government buildings. Saad al-Hadithi, the spokesperson for the Iraqi prime minister's office, released a statement "The decision to raise the Kurdish flag violated the Iraqi Constitution.

In addition, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned the Iraqi-Kurdish leadership that Ankara's strong relation with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was at risk over Kirkuk. "I am calling on the Iraqi Kurdish regional administration to turn back from this mistake as soon as possible. We enjoy good relations right now. Do not break them," Erdogan said. "Kirkuk is for the Turkmen, Arabs, and Kurds if they are there. "Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu warned that it would "not be correct to change that region's ethnic composition." Whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran which backed the Shi'a militia umbrella organisation Hashed Shaabi also condemned the Kirkuk governor's decision, and they were against an expansionist Kurdish policy.

The Republic of Türkiye was critical too, viewing itself historically as the protector of the Iraqi's Turkmen population. İbrahim Kalın, the spokesperson for Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, had warned the move would cause further tensions in Kirkuk, while Hüseyin Müftüoğlu, spokesperson for the Turkish foreign ministry, stated that the move would damage stability and reconciliation efforts and could erode the multi-cultural identity of the city.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan warned the Kurdish authority that unless the flag was taken down, the Kurdish administration of the city risked damaging the good ties between Ankara and Erbil.

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), meanwhile, described the decision of the Kurdish governor Dr. Najmaddin Omer as a "unilateral step that might jeopardize harmony and peaceful coexistence amongst many ethnic and religious groups that rightly call Kirkuk their home." In addition, a statement was released from Türkiye's Foreign Ministry in March 2017 which described the move as "contrary to the notion of a constitutional process, adding that such an approach would have "an adverse effect on the country's stability and security". Also, the former Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gul had criticized the KPC's move as "unconstitutional" in a post on Twitter.

The United Nations representative in Iraq had also expressed concerns about the governor's decision to fly the Kurdish regional flag over the citadel in Kirkuk, warning against "unilateral steps" that could inflame tensions. "The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) was concerned by the decision of the governor of Kirkuk to raise the flag of the Kurdistan region of Iraq over Kirkuk citadel," and this was outlined in a statement.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Bahram Qassemi stated on the 3rd of April 2017 "Iran supports Iraq's territorial integrity and national sovereignty, according to Fars News Agency". "Hoisting any flag except Iraq's national flag in Kirkuk was contradictory to the country's constitution and will increase the tension," Bahram Qassemi stated. The spokesperson added that recent measures from certain Iraqi groups could turn the attention of the Iraqi government from the fight against the Islamic State (ISIL) to political issues. Iran was concerned over the raising of the Kurdish flag in Kirkuk which came

after the Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım called on Iran to take an active role in the issue due to its position as a neighbouring country. Also, the Sulaimani, Iran's Foreign Ministry warned that raising flags other than the Iraqi flag in Kirkuk would lead to further tension in the country. Whereas the US Ambassador to Iraq Douglas Silliman stated that the flag row was drawing attention away from the fight against ISIL. A decision to hoist a Kurdish flag alongside the Iraqi flag on the governmental building was condemned by Iraqi Vice President Osama al-Nujaifi, who described it as a 'breach of national unity. Türkiye's foreign minister Mevlet Cavusoglu criticized the "unilateral" move and claimed that Türkiye had been informed by Nechirvan Barzani, the prime minister of the KRG, that it was also opposed to the move. "We don't find correct the vote held by the regional administration," he told Turkish radio and the television station "TRT."

However, the president of the KRG Masoud Barzani contradicted Mevlet Cavusoglu's comments and said that the move to raise the flag in Kirkuk showed the possibility of "coexistence" in the city. "In a complete conflict like that in Iraq, the KRG and Kirkuk governorate have shown a great example of coexistence and keeping their areas from tensions and sectarian fighting,"

In addition, the Turkish MP Devlet Bahçeli the chairperson of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) condemned the decision that was taken by the Kirkuk governor in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye on 22 July 2007. The ITF in Ankara also organised a protest of the hoisting of the Kurdish flag on the governmental building in Kirkuk in March 2017, and Devlet Bahçeli and the chairperson of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) attended the protest and wore a scarf of a Turkmen flag. There continued to be some conflict of interest and argument between the Kurdish and Turkmen MPs in Baghdad when the Iraqi Parliament voted on the 28th of March 2017 against the Kirkuk Provincial Council's decision to raise the Kurdistan flag alongside the Iraqi flag in the government buildings.

The Turkmen Member of the Iraqi Parliament Niyazi Memaroglu was threatened by the Kurdish Member of the Iraqi Parliament. The Kurdish members of the Iraqi Parliament Shakwan Abdullah,

Mohammed Othman, Shiwan Aldawedi, and Ariz Abdullah used abusive language towards the Turkmen MP Niyazi Memaroglu.

The Kurdish MP Shakwan Abdullah screamed and shouted in the face of the Turkmen MP Niyazi Memaroglu, “We will kill you soon like a dog” and “We will kill you as we killed other Turkmen” Also the same MP’s treated the Turkmen MP Hassan Turan, the incident was witnessed by Dr. Turhan Muthir Al_Mufti who was the head of the Presidency of the Council of Minister and Higher Commission for Coordinating amongst the Provinces (HCCP), but unfortunately with the lack of security, instability, and weak central government in Baghdad none of these Kurdish MP’s were arrested or interrogated.



Figure (192) Turkmen hoisted Turkmen flags all over Kirkuk to protest a vote by the Kirkuk local government to raise the Kurdish flag over state buildings.



Figure (193) Turkmen hoisted Turkmen flags all over Kirkuk to protest a vote by the Kirkuk local government to raise the Kurdish flag over state buildings.



Figure (194) Turkmen hoisted Turkmen flags all over Kirkuk to protest a vote by the Kirkuk local government to raise the flag of Kurdistan over state buildings on March 29, 2017.



Figure (195) The Kirkuk governor's decision to hoist a Kurdish flag on the governmental building was condemned by the *Asaied_Ahaq*.



Figure (196) A Turkish foreigner affair in Ankara releases a statement condemning the action of the Kirkuk governor.



Figure (197) Turkish MP. Devlet Bahçeli and the chairperson of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) kissed a Turkish flag during a protest carried out by the Turkmen in Ankara against the hoisting of the Kurdish flag on the governmental building in Kirkuk in March 2017.

في إتصال هاتفني قبل قليل مع مقرر البرلمان العراقي النائب التركماني نيازي معمار اوغلو اكد سيادته عن نفيه الادعاءات التي تحدثت عن تأجيل تنفيذ قرار مجلس النواب العراقي والذي اتخذ بالاعلانية يوم امس حول انزال العلم الكردي من بنايات ومؤسسات الحكومية في كركوك, وقد اكد سيادته بانه لا توجد قوة او سلطة تستطيع تجريد او الغاء القرار. وحول سؤالنا عن تعرضه لتهديد بالقتل من بعض النواب الاكراد تحت قبة البرلمان العراقي فقد صرح سيادته بما يلي. بعد تقديمنا لمشروع القرار نهجم علي اربع نواب اكراد علي بكلمات نابية وبذيئة لا تليق بنواب يمثلون امكون الكردي اطلاقا , وهم كل من

- 1 - شاخوان عبدالله
- 2- محمد عثمان
- 3 - شيوان الداودي
- 4 - اريز عبدالله

حيث بدا شاخوان صارخا بوجهي مستغثا قريبا (كالكلاب) كما قمنا باغتتيال الاخرين , ثم قام بتهديد النائب التركماني (حسن طوران) بنفس الاسلوب العدوانى الغير اللائق. ثم قام الثلاث الاخرين بتهديدي وتصفيتي باللغة العربية وامام انظار البرلمانين وشهادة ممثل رئيس الوزراء في البرلمان الدكتور (طورهان المفتي) وتمتلك التنسجيل الصوتي الكامل لتهديدي وتهديد النائب الاخ حسن توران , موضحا بانه سيقدم غدا الاتيين بتقديم دعوى قضائية في محكمة الكرخ ضدكم بتهمة التهديد بالقتل العلني , محملا اياهم كافة المسؤولية في حالة تعرضنا لاي هجوم مسلح في المستقبل ومستائلا ابهذا الاسلوب المخزي يطالبون بتشكيل دولتهم ؟؟؟

Figure (198) Turkmen Member of the Iraqi Parliament was threatened by the Kurdish Members of the Iraqi Parliament *Shakwan Abdullah, Mohammed Othman, Shiwan Aldawedi, and Ariz Abdullah* using abusive language towards the Turkmen MP *Niyazi Memaroglu,*



Figure (199) Turkmen Member of Iraqi Parliament *Niyazi Memaroglu* who was threatened by the Kurdish Members of Iraqi Parliament *Shakwan Abdullah, Mohammed Othman, Shiwan Aldawedi, and Ariz Abdullah* after showing the corruption of the Kurdish governor *Najmadin Omer.*



Honorable Mr. Investigation Court Judge of Kirkuk
Complainer/ the Lawyer Firas Abbas Alluhaybi/ Karkh Penalty
Complex

Complained against:

- 1- Kirkuk Governor/ as well as his position
- 2- Chairman of the provincial council/ As well as his position.
- 3- Kirkuk Police Chief/As well as his position.

The complaining party.

On 28/3/2017 the complainant did lower the Iraqi flag from all the state offices of Kirkuk Governorate and the fact that this governorate belongs administratively to the center and not to the Kurdistan region. Also, on 1/4/2017 The Iraqi parliament voted by majority to compel the complainant to raise the Iraqi flag over the Iraqi governmental building. However, the complainant refused to implement this decision, which is considered a crime punishable by law.

Therefore, should ask to take the necessary legal measures against them.

Complainer

Lawyer/ Firas Abbas Alluhaybi

4.1 IRAQI COURT OVERRULES KIRKUK COUNCIL DECISION TO RAISE KRG FLAG ON THE GOVERNMENTAL BUILDING IN KIRKUK

On 18th of August 2017, the Iraqi court overruled the Kirkuk council decision to raise the KRG flag on the state building in Kirkuk as per court order number 1008/K2017 and overrode an earlier decision by Kirkuk's provincial council to raise the Kurdish regional flag over public institutions in Kirkuk city.



Figure (two hundred) The advancement of municipal services in Kirkuk began in 1875 during the era of the Ottoman Empire and he was the first municipality president of the late Omer Agha Mohammed Saeed, who was one of the Agha of the Peryadi neighbourhood in Kirkuk.

However, on the 14th of March 2017, Kurdish members of Kirkuk's provincial council voted in favour of raising the Kurdish regional flag alongside Iraq's national flag over the city's public institutions whereas in April 2017, the Iraqi parliament voted to disallow the practice, stating only the Iraqi flag should grace the disputed city's public buildings. But on the 18th of August 2017, an Iraqi administrative

court upheld the parliamentary vote, describing the provincial council's decision as "contrary to the law", according to a statement issued by the court. "The court's decision is binding and must be implemented by the relevant parties," which was revealed by Mr. Tarek Harb, an Iraqi lawyer to the Turkish Anadolu Agency as shown. **[Doc.8] [Doc.9] [Doc.10]**



رقم القرار: ٢٠١٧/٧٩٩
تاريخ القرار: ٢٠١٧/٨/١٦
رقم الدعوى: ٢٠١٧/ق/١٠٠٨

تشكلت محكمة القضاء الإداري بتاريخ ٢٠١٧/٨/١٦ برئاسة نائب رئيس مجلس الدولة المستشار الدكتور كريم خميس خصيبك وعضوية كل من المستشار الدكتور أصلام عثمان لقنه والمستشار الدكتور قيسر يحيى جعفر المألوفين بالقضاء باسم الشعب وأصدرت القرار الآتي:-

المدعون/ ١- علي مهدي صادق ٢- تركان شكر أوبوب ٣- قاسم حمزة أحمد ٤- تصنيح محمد علي
٥- عدنان نور الدين محمد/ وكيلاهم المحامين محمد مجيد رسن وبارق احمد الموسوي.
المدعى عليه / رئيس مجلس محافظة كركوك (إضافة لوظيفته) وكيلاه الموظف الحقوقي كاروان عثمان نجم والمحامي جنان محمد جميل.

جهة الدعوى: ادعى المدعون بواسطة وكيلاهم امام هذه المحكمة بعريضة الدعوى المؤرخة في ٢٠١٧/٥/٢٨ بأنه سبق وان اصدر المدعى عليه إضافة لوظيفته قراره المرقم (٩١٠) في ٢٠١٧/٣/٣٠ بناءً على ما جاء في محضر اجتماعه في الجلسة المرقمة (٣٧٧) في ٢٠١٧/٣/٢٨ والمتضمن في الفقرة (١) منه رفع علم إقليم كردستان بجانب علم جمهورية العراق في جميع دوائر المحافظة والشركات العامة التابعة للوزارات وفي المناسبات الرسمية لحين استجابة الحكومة الاتحادية لتفويض بنود المادة (١٤٠) من الدستور وان هذا القرار قد جاء مخالفاً للقانون لكون المادة (٧٥٣) من قانون إدارة الدولة العراقية للمرحلة الانتقالية لعام ٢٠٠٤ قد تضمنت الاعتراف بحكومة الإقليم للأراضي التي كانت تدار من قبلها في ٢٠٠٣/٣/١٩ الواقعة في محافظات (دهوك، اربيل، سلیمانیه، كركوك، نينوى) وتأجيل التسوية النهائية للأراضي المتنازع عليها وفق المادة (٥٨٨) (ج) منه لحين استكمال اجراءات منها الاحصاء السكاني وان كركوك لها وضع خاص في الدستور والقوانين النافذة لم يراعها المدعى عليه إضافة لوظيفته وان المادة (١٤٣) من الدستور ألغت قانون إدارة الدولة العراقية باستثناء ما ورد في المادة (٧٥٣) و (٥٨) منه بغية عدم المساس بهذا الوضع وانه مخالف لقانون علم العراق رقم (٣٢) لسنة ١٩٨٦ والقانون رقم (٩) لسنة ٢٠٠٨ وانه مخالف لنص المادة (٢٣) خاسماً) من قانون انتخاب مجالس المحافظات والاقضية والنواحي رقم (٣٦) لسنة ٢٠٠٨ التي أقيمت على وضع محافظة كركوك المنصوص عليه دستورياً لحين اجراء انتخابات فيها وان وضعها هو محافظة مستقلة لم ترتبط بالقلم حسب قانون المحافظات غير المنتظمة في إقليم رقم (٢١) لسنة ٢٠٠٨ والذي لم يزد فيه في الوقت نفسه اي اختصاص لمجلس المحافظة برفع علم غير علم جمهورية العراق في الدوائر الموجودة في المحافظة وانه قد خالف قرار الإصلاح السياسي للمرحلة القادمة رقم (٤٤) لسنة ٢٠٠٨ وان هذه المخالفة قد أكد عليها كتاب الأمانة العامة لمجلس الوزراء بالرقم (١٤٧١٦/٤٥٢/ق) في ٢٠١٧/٥/١١ وان مجلس النواب قد لغى القرار المطعون فيه وانه واجب الاتباع تكون مجلس المحافظة يخضع لرقابة مجلس النواب حسب المادة (٢/٢) من قانون المحافظات غير المنتظمة في إقليم النفاذ واليه قد تخلموا من الأمر ولكن دون جدوى لذا يرفعون تظلمهم الى هذه المحكمة ويطلبون دعوة المدعى عليه إضافة لوظيفته والغاء قراره المرقم (٩١٠) في ٢٠١٧/٣/٣٠ بناءً على ما جاء في محضر اجتماعه في الجلسة المرقمة (٣٧٧) في ٢٠١٧/٣/٢٨ والقرارات المتعلقة به وللرابعة الحضورية العتبية ولاطلاع المحكمة على مستندات الدعوى ودفع الطرفين فقد اتفقوا على ختام المرافعة لإصدار القرار الآتي:-



(٣-١)

Document (8) The Iraqi court per court order 1008/K2017 dated on the 18th of August 2017 overrode an earlier decision by Kirkuk's provincial council to raise the Kurdish regional flag over public institutions in Kirkuk city.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

جمهورية العراق

محكمة القضاء الإداري

٢٠١٧/٧٩٩

رقم القرار

٢٠١٧/٨/٦

تاريخ القرار

٢٠١٧/٣/١٠٠٨

رقم الدعوى




القرار الذي التديق والمداولة وجدت المحكمة ان المدعين يطعون وبحسب ما جاء في عريضة الدعوى بالقرار المرقم (٩١٠) في ٢٠١٧/٣/٣٠ بناءً على ما جاء في محضر اجتماعه في الجلسة المرقمة (٣٧٧) في ٢٠١٧/٣/٢٨ والمتضمن في الفقرة (١) منه رفع علم إقليم كردستان بجانب علم جمهورية العراق في جميع دوائر المحافظة والشركات العامة التابعة للوزارات وفي المناسبات الرسمية لحين استجابة الحكومة الاتحادية لتنفيذ بنود المادة (١٤٠) من الدستور وتجد المحكمة بان القرار محل الاعتراض هو قرار إداري صادر من المدعي عليه إضافة لوظيفة وفق قانون المحافظات غير المنتظمة في إقليم رقم (٢١) لسنة ٢٠٠٨ وان المدعون أعضاء في مجلس محافظة كركوك وان الخصومة مع المدعي عليه إضافة لوظيفته رئيس مجلس المحافظة وليس مع الحكومة الاتحادية أو إقليم كردستان كي تكون امام دعوى دستورية تخضع لاختصاص المحكمة الاتحادية العليا وإنما هي دعوى إدارية تخضع لاختصاص هذه المحكمة بما يندرج تحت وكيلي المدعي عليه إضافة لوظيفته بعدم الاختصاص وقد لاحظت المحكمة بان المدعين قد تلبغوا بالقرار المطعون فيه وتظلموا منه في ٢٠١٧/٤/١٠ من دون الرد عليه وحيث أنهم أقاموا الدعوى بتاريخ ٢٠١٧/٥/٢٨ فانهم يكونوا بذلك قد أقاموها ضمن المدة القانونية البالغة (٦٠) ستين يوماً لإقامة الدعوى من تاريخ رفض التظلم حقيقة أو حكماً المنصوص عليها في المادة (٧/سابعاً) من قانون مجلس الدولة رقم (٦٥) لسنة ١٩٧٩ فقرر قبولها شكلاً ولدى عطف النظر على موضوعها لاحظت المحكمة بان المدعي عليه إضافة لوظيفته قد اصدر القرار المطعون فيه والمتضمن ثلاث فقرات كان اولها رفع علم إقليم كردستان بجانب علم جمهورية العراق في جميع دوائر المحافظة والشركات العامة التابعة للوزارات وفي المناسبات الرسمية لحين استجابة الحكومة الاتحادية بتنفيذ بنود المادة (١٤٠) من الدستور وقد اطّلت المحكمة على اختصاصات مجلس المحافظة المنصوص عليها في القوانين النافذة وأهمها قانون المحافظات غير المنتظمة في إقليم رقم النافذ والذي لم يرد فيه إي نص يتضمن اختصاص المجلس برفع علم آخر الى جانب علم جمهورية العراق بآية صورة كانت على آية بناية حكومية أو غير حكومية كما اطّلت المحكمة على البند (خامساً) من المادة (٢٣) من قانون انتخاب مجالس المحافظات والاقضية والنواحي رقم (٣٦) لسنة ٢٠٠٨ ووجدت بأنه ينص على ان "يستمر مجلس محافظة كركوك الحالي في ممارسة مهامه وفقاً للقوانين النافذة قبل نفاذ القانون رقم (٢١) لسنة ٢٠٠٨ المذكور أنفاً ويبقى وضع محافظة كركوك المنصوص عليه دستورياً على ما هو عليه الى حين إجراء انتخابات فيها" ومن ثم فإن محافظة كركوك من المناطق التابعة للحكومة الاتحادية وتخضع لإدارتها وليس لإقليم كردستان وان تنفيذ المادة (١٤٠) من الدستور هو ليس من اختصاص المدعي عليه إضافة لوظيفته وإنما هنالك جهات أخرى تختص بذلك وقد لاحظت المحكمة بان التشريعات النافذة لم تجز لأية جهة ان ترفع علماً آخر الى جانب علم جمهورية العراق ومنها قانون علم العراق رقم (٣٣) لسنة ١٩٨٦ ونظام علم العراق رقم (٦) لسنة ١٩٨٦ كما اطّلت المحكمة على كتاب الأمانة العامة لمجلس الوزراء المرقم (١٤٧١٦) في ٢٠١٧/٥/١١ المرسل الى المدعي عليه إضافة لوظيفته وما تضمنه من أدلة وأسناد معتبرة قانوناً لما تقدم وحيث ان المدعي عليه قد اصدر قراراً غير مختص



(٣-٢)

Document (9) The Iraqi court per court order 1008/K2017 dated on the 18th of August 2017 overrode an earlier decision by Kirkuk's provincial council to raise the Kurdish regional flag over public institutions in Kirkuk city.



Document (10) The Iraqi court per court order 1008/K2017 dated on the 18th of August 2017 overrode an earlier decision by Kirkuk's provincial council to raise the Kurdish regional flag over public institutions in Kirkuk city.

However, the head of the provincial council of Kirkuk who was of Kurdish descent, Rebwar Talabani, and the governor of Kirkuk refused to abide by the Iraqi Parliament's decision on 1st of April 2017. Talabani said Article 115 in the Iraqi Constitution entitles the

Kirkuk Government to “make decisions on things which do not fall within the authority of the federal government.”

The Deputy Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament, Aram Sheikh Mohammed, stated that there was a political message behind the decision to lower the Kurdistan flag in Kirkuk. Later, the Turkmen Member of Parliament Niyazi Memaroglu collected signatures from over 126 members of the Iraqi parliament and brought up the issue of the hoisting of the Kurdish flag on the State building in Kirkuk as well as the corrupt Kirkuk governor Najmaddin Omer and the incompetent administration of the Kirkuk governor.

The question of hoisting the Kurdish Regional Government flag on all Iraqi government buildings in Kirkuk created tension amongst the Arabs, Turkmen, and Kurds. The Turkmen and Arab citizens in Kirkuk asked, why it was now that the Kurdish governor had decided to hoist the Kurdish Regional Government flag on all state buildings in Kirkuk.

It could be argued that the raising of the KRG flag by Dr. Najmaddin Omar was due to a weak central government in Baghdad, combined with the lack of instability and security in Iraq, as well as disunity amongst the Turkmen parties and a lack of international support for the Arabs and Turkmen.

The Kurdish expansion ideology with American support and the occupation of the various towns by ISIL, combined with the drop in oil prices, the crisis in Syria, the coup attempt in Türkiye, the sudden support of the US government to the terrorist groups PYD and YGP with arms and logistical support, were all reasons to encourage the Kurds to hoist the Kurdish flag on all governmental building.

In addition, the lack of unity amongst the Turkmen political parties and the Kurdish aspiration to control the hub of Kirkuk oil inspired the dream to establish the Kurdistan and Israeli plan, for the Kurdish flag to be on all state buildings in Kirkuk. Although the Kurdish authority was encouraged and supported by the Western countries in general and especially the US with an ambition to fulfill the Israeli and American agenda and plan to divide Iraq and control its oil resources.

Therefore, the American and Israeli governments fully supported the Kurdish plan for conducting the referendum by holding various

conferences and media propaganda in various Western countries, especially in the US. The view of many Iraqi political observers was that the Kurdish parties were getting the green light and support from the Americans, French, and British and would not have had such courage to hoist the Kurdish flag on the government building and challenge the central government in Baghdad without this support.

المحكمة الاتحادية العليا/ مكتب رئيس المحكمة
الوزارات كافة / مكتب الوزير
الجهات غير المرتبطة بوزارة
المحافظات كافة / مكتب المحافظ
مجلس المحافظات كافة / مكتب رئيس المجلس
الموضوع/ قرار

تحية طيبة ...
ترافق لكم رهنأ قرار مجلس النواب رقم (٥٢) لسنة ٢٠١٦ المتضمن موافقة المجلس على إقالة محافظ كركوك السيد (نجم الدين عمر كريم) من منصبه استناداً لأحكام المادة (٧) بامناً (٧) من قانون المحافظات غير المنتظمة في إقليم رقم (٢١) لسنة ٢٠٠٨ (المعدل) ، نرجو مراعاة ذلك مع التقدير.

المرافقات :-

- صورة قرار .

د. مهدي حسن العلق
الأمين العام لمجلس الوزراء وكالة
٢٠١٧/١٠/٥

س. ش. دل. ر. ب.
٠٠١٠

صورة عنه الى :

- مجلس النواب/ الدائرة البرلمانية/ إشارة الى كتابكم ذي العدد (ش ل/٩١/١٦٦٨) المؤرخ في ٢٠١٧/٩/١٦
- للتفضل بالعلم ... مع التقدير .
- مكتب رئيس مجلس الوزراء/ إشارة الى كتابكم ذي العدد (م.و.و.٢٦/١٢٩٣٨) المؤرخ في ٢٠١٧/٩/٢٦ /للتفضل بالعلم ... مع التقدير .
- محافظة كركوك/ مكتب المحافظ/ للتفضل بالعلم وإتخاذ ما يلزم ... مع التقدير .
- مجلس محافظة كركوك/ مكتب رئيس المجلس/ للتفضل بالعلم وإتخاذ ما يلزم ... مع التقدير .
- الإمانة العامة لمجلس الوزراء / الدائرة القانونية / قسم الوظيفة / مع الأوليات الأصلية ... مع التقدير .
- البريد الدوار .

Republic of Iraq

General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers

Legislation Office

Issue: K/2/2/27/ 311956

Date 10/2017

The Federal High Court/ The office of the Supreme Court
The organisations that are not linked to the Ministry.
All Governate / Governate Council, Head of the council

Subject: Resolution

Here with attached is the decision of the House of Parliament number 52 for the year 2017 that contains the approval of the House of Parliament for the resignation of the Kirkuk government Najmadin Omer from his position according to the legislation of Governmental, item two-sevenths which is not enforced in the region and modified in the year 2008. Please comply with this

Dr. Mahdi Muhsin Al_Alaq
Secretary General of the Cabinet of Ministers
3/10/2017

Document (11)

Republic of Iraq
House of Representatives

Date: 16/09/2017
Issue: S/L/1/9/1952

Subject: The Council's decision
The house representative
Number 52 for the year 2017

The members of the House of Representatives in its session eighteen held on the date of September 14, 2017, of the legislative term and based on the provisions of Article 59 issued the following resolution dismissing the governor of Kirkuk Najmaddin Omer from his position.

Dr. Salim Abdullah Al_Juburi
Chairman of the House of Representatives
September 2017

Document (12)

جمهورية العراق
الامانة العامة لمجلس الوزراء

REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers

الدائرة القانونية
العدد: ق/٢٧/٢٠١٧
التاريخ: ٢٠١٧/١٠/٠٥

٢١٩٥٦

المحكمة الاتحادية العليا / مكتب رئيس المحكمة
الوزارات كافة / مكتب الوزير
الجهات غير المرتبطة بوزارة
المحافظات كافة / مكتب المحافظ
مجالس المحافظات كافة / مكتب رئيس المجلس
الموضوع/ قيرار

تحية طيبة ...

ارافق لكم رتباً قيرار مجلس النواب رقم (٥٢) لسنة ٢٠١٦ المتضمن موافقة المجلس على اقالة محافظ كركوك السيد (جهم الدين عمر كريم) من منصبه استناداً لاحكام المادة (٧/١٧٢مسا/٢) من قانون المحافظات عبر المنتظمة في إقليم رقم (٢١) لسنة ٢٠٠٨ (المعدل) ، نرجو مراعاة ذلك .

مع التقدير.

تسليم
الموافقات :-
صورة قيرار

السادة
السادة
١٠/٨

صورة عنه الى :

- مجلس النواب/ الدائرة البرلمانية/ إشارة الى كتابكم ذي العدد (١٦٦٨/٩/١٦) المؤرخ في ٢٠١٧/٩/١٦ لتتفضل بالتعلم ... مع التقدير .
- مكتب رئيس مجلس الوزراء/ إشارة الى كتابكم ذي العدد (١٢٩٢٨/٢٦/١٦) المؤرخ في ٢٠١٧/٩/٢٦ لتتفضل بالتعلم ... مع التقدير .
- محافظة كركوك/ مكتب المحافظ/ لتتفضل بالتعلم واتخاذ ما يلزم ... مع التقدير .
- مجلس محافظة كركوك/ مكتب رئيس المجلس/ لتتفضل بالتعلم واتخاذ ما يلزم ... مع التقدير .
- الامانة العامة لمجلس الوزراء / الدائرة القانونية / قسم الوظيفة / مع الاوثان الرسمية ... مع التقدير .
- البريد الديار

د. مهدي حسين العلق
الامين العام لمجلس الوزراء وقاية
٢٠١٧/١٠/٠٥

General Secretariat of Council of Ministers - Legal Department
Phone No. ٧٤٣٢٠٦

٢٠١٧/١٠/٠٥

Document (13) Dismissal of the Kirkuk governor Najmadin Omer

Republic of Iraq
General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers

Legislation Office

Issue: K/2/2/17/ 321956

The Federal High Court/ The office of the Supreme Court

The organisation that are not linked to the Ministry.

All Governate / Governate Council, Head of the council

Subject: Resolution

Regards and greetings...

Here with attached is the decision of the House of Parliament number 52 for the year 2017 that contains the approval of the House of Parliament for the resignation of the Kirkuk government Najmadin Omer from his position according to the legislation of Governmental, item 2/7 which is not enforced in the region and modified in the year 2008. Please comply with this

Dr. Mahdi Muhsin Al_Alaq

Secretary General of the Cabinet of Ministers

3/10/2017

Document (13) Sucking the Kirkuk governor Dr. Najmadin Omer.



((سر. وخص. وتعل. جدا))

إلى / مجلس النواب / مكتب رئيس المجلس

م / إتخاذ إجراءات قانونية

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

إشارة إلى كتاب الأمانة العامة لمجلس النواب / الدائرة البرلمانية ذي العدد (ش.ل/٢٩٢/٩/١) ومرافقه الطلب الموقع من قبل (١٢٤) نائباً بموجب الكتاب المرقم بالعدد (١٠٤٨) في ٢٠١٧/٨/١٨ .
وجه السيد رئيس مجلس الوزراء الطلب من مجلسكم الموقر إقالة محافظ كركوك وذلك لتعرضه بجهة محافظة كركوك إلى التصدع والإخلال بالوحدة الوطنية للمحافظة. وحسب الصلاحيات المخولة لمجلسكم بموجب المادة (٧/٧) تامناً (٧) من قانون المحافظات غير المنظمة في إتياله رقم (٢١) لسنة ٢٠٠٨ المعدل .
تفضلتم بأخذ ما ينسزم لتنفيذ توجيه سيادته على وفق القانون .
وإعلامنا .. مع التقدير.

إياد حميد شيبه
مدير مكتب رئيس الوزراء وكالة

٢٠١٧/٩/ ١١

صورة ضوئية عن:

- الامانة العامة لمجلس الوزراء - مكتب الأمين / للتفضل بالطم .. مع التقدير .
- مكتب رئيس الوزراء - الدائرة القانونية / إشارة إلى ملونم المرقمة (١٤٠٥/١٧/١) في ٢٠١٧/٩/١١ / لاطم .. مع التقدير .
- قسم المتابعة
- إندفارة المكتب الصادرة.

Republic of Iraq
Prime Minister's Office

To the House of Representatives
Office of the Prime Minister
Issue: M.R.W/S/2553
Date: 12/09/2017

To: The House of representative/ the office of President of the Council
Subject: Take legal action to be taken

According to the General Secretariat of the House of Representatives/ the parliament office, number H/L/1/9/292, the request, approval, and signatures of the 124 members of the Iraqi parliament per document number 1048 on 18/8/2017.

The head of the council minister had requested from your council the resignation of the Kirkuk governing province because he is the root cause of the Rift and breach of national unity in the province.

According to the powers vested under the term (7/Eight/2) According to the powers vested under the non-regular period in the region.

We are requesting action to be taken against him.

Ayad Hussein Ubid
Director of the Director's Office of the Prime Minister and his absence
11/09/2017

Document (14) sucking the Kirkuk governor Najmadin Omer

كۆماری عێراق
هه سیناریۆ قشقی هه بجهوه مان ئه زینه مان
ئه ره مانگی به ره مان



جمهوریة العراق
الأمم المتحدة
البرلمان

العدد ٢٦٦١/٩/١
التاريخ ٢٤٢

المتابعة التشريعية

الى / مكتب السيد رئيس مجلس الوزراء

م / قرار

تحية طيبة...
ترافق طيبا القرار الخاص بـ (رفع العلم العراقي فقط على دوائر محافظة كركوك والغاء قرار مجلس محافظة كركوك حول رفع علم القيم كردستان على المباني الحكومية في المحافظة) والذي صوت عليه مجلس النواب بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٤/١ في الجلسة المرقمة (٢٢) من الفصل التشريعي الثاني/ السنة التشريعية الثالثة/ الدورة الانتخابية الثالثة.

مع التقدير...

للموافقة
- نسخة من القرار.

عم الامين العام لمجلس النواب
المهندس صلاح جاسم الحميري
نائب الامين العام للشؤون الادارية
/ رجب / ١٤٣٨ هـ
/ نيسان / ٢٠١٧ م

نسخة عنه اليه
- مكتب السيد رئيس مجلس النواب .. للتعامل بالإطلاع مع التقدير.
- مكتب السيد النائب الأول لرئيس مجلس النواب - د همام حمودي .. للتعامل بالإطلاع مع التقدير.
- مكتب السيد النائب رئيس مجلس النواب - الأستاذ آرام محمد علي.. للتعامل بالإطلاع مع التقدير.
- مكتب السيد الامين العام لمجلس النواب .. للتعامل بالإطلاع مع التقدير.
- مكتب السيد نائب الامين العام للشؤون البرلمانية .. للتعامل بالإطلاع مع التقدير.
- الدائرة البرلمانية/ قسم المتابعة التشريعية .. للحفاظ والمتابعة
- الصادرة المرقمية

Council of Representatives / Iraq
General Secretariat
Baghdad - Convention centre

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جمهورية العراق / مجلس النواب
بغداد / قصر المؤتمرات

محمد زاهر

Republic of Iraq
General Secretariat of the House of Representatives

To the Prime Minister's Office
Subject: Resolution

Herewith enclosed special resolution for the hosting flag on the state building. Only the Iraqi flag shall be hosted on the Kirkuk Governate building. Also, the resolution of the Kirkuk council shall be abolished that stated to hosting the Kurdish regional government flag on the government building which was voted by the House of Representatives in the numbered session twenty-two dated the 1/4/2017.

Assistant Secretary-General of the House of Representatives
Salah Jasim Alhumeyri

Deputy Secretary-General for Administrative Affairs
April 2017

Document (15)

قوانين
مجلس النواب
رقم (٥٩) لسنة ٢٠١٧

قر مجلس النواب بجلسته السابعة عشر والمنعقدة بتاريخ ١٢ / أيلول / ٢٠١٧ من الفصل التشريعي الاول /
السنة التشريعية الرابعة / الدورة الانتخابية الثالثة واستناداً الى احكام المادة (٥٩/ ثانيا) اصدار نص القرار الاتي :

ان مجلس النواب العراقي من السلطات الاتحادية التي تلمها المادة (١٠٩) من الدستور العراقي بالحفاظ على وحدة العراق وسلامته واستقلاله وسيادته والزام اعضاءه بالمادة (٥٠) من الدستور العراقي بالسير على سلامة اراضيه وسيادته وتكون الدستور العراقي قد حدد على سبيل الحصر الحالات التي يستثنى بشأنها الشعب العراقي في المواد (٤) خامساً (١١٩) ثانياً ، (١٢٩) ثانياً وثالثاً ورابعاً ، المادة (١٣١) ، المادة (١٤٢) ، المادة (١٤٤) ، ولم يكن من بينها الاستثناء من اجل الانفصال اذ خلى الدستور من نص ينظم حالة الانفصال وهو يعارض وحدة الدولة الاتحادية الذي اكدت عليه المادة (١) من الدستور ، كما ان احكام بعض المناطق الواقعة خارج اقليم كردستان بالاستفتاء المزمع اجراءه يوم ٢٥/٩/٢٠١٧ يخالف المادة (١٤٢) من الدستور ، وحيث ان العراق حقق النصر على داعش وان اي اجراء من شأنه ان يزعزع الاستقرار الامني والاجتماعي يرفضه البرلمان العراقي في هذه المرحلة واستناداً لاحكام المواد (١) والمادة (٥٩) ثانياً والمادة (١٠٩) والمادة (١٤٢) .

١. رفض الاستفتاء المقرر اجراءه ضمن حدود اقليم كردستان وخارج حدود الاقليم في كل الاراضي المتنازع عليها ويضمتها كركوك والزام السلطات المختصة باتخاذ مايلزم لانفاذه واعتبار الاستفتاء المزمع اجراؤه في اقليم كردستان امراً مخالفاً للدستور ومعنوم الاثر القانوني ومهدداً لوحدة العراق .

Parliamentary Decision
House of Parliament, Number (51) year 2017

The House of Parliament has decided in its session which was held on the 12th of September 2017 from the first legislative term and according to the provisions of Article 59, the following decision is issued.

The House of the Federal Government per Article 109 of the Iraqi Constitution preserves the unity of Iraq, its safety, independence, and sovereignty, and obliges its members to Article 50 of the Iraqi Constitution to ensure the safety of its lands and sovereignty.

However, the Iraqi constitution has specified, exclusively, the cases in which the Iraqi people are satisfied in Articles (4) Fifth, (119) the second (126) Second, second, third and fourth from the article (131) Article (142), and Article (144), and amongst them was the referendum for secession if the constitution vacates a party the regulates the state that was confirmed by article 2 of the constitution.

Also, the holding of some areas outside of the Kurdish Regional Government region a referendum scheduled to be held on twenty-five violates Article 143 of the constitution.

According to article 1 article 59, article 109, and article 143.

1-Reject the referendum scheduled to be held in the Kurdish regional government and the disputed territories including the city of Kirkuk, also the suggested referendum is against the Iraqi constitution and threat to the unity and integration of Iraq.

كربلاء عراقي
مستشارين كسبي نهجهم من تهنه وان
مديانكي بهرمان



جمهورية العراق
الأمم المتحدة
الائتلاف البرلماني

- المصدر:
٢. تتحمل الحكومة العراقية مسؤوليتها في الحفاظ على وحدة العراق واتخاذ كافة
التدابير والقرارات التي تضمن الحفاظ على وحدة العراق.
٣. التزام الحكومة الاتحادية وحكومة الاقليم ببدء حوار جيد لمعالجة المسائل العالقة
بموجب الدستور والشوازين النافذة.

الاسباب الموجبة

نظرا لما يشككه الاستفتاء المزمع اجراؤه في اقليم كردستان من تهديد لوحدة العراق التي
كفلها الدستور العراقي في المادة الاولى منه فضلا عن تهديده للأمن الاقليمي والسلم
الاهلي ولان هذا الاجراء يفتقر الى السند الدستوري ويقع مخالفا للدستور العراقي النافذ
في المواد (٧) و (١٤) و (١٣) صدر هذا القرار.

لنا
د. سليم عبد الله الجبوري
رئيس مجلس النواب
/ ذي الحجة / ١٤٣٨ هـ
/ ايلول / ٢٠١٧ م

Council of Representatives / مجلس النواب
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جمهورية العراق / مجلس النواب
بغداد / قصر المونستراد
مختار آخر

Document (17)

Republic of Iraq
General Secretariat of the House of Representative
Parliament office

Date:

Issue:

2- The Iraqi government shall bear the responsibility for the integration and unity of the Republic of Iraq. Also, all the decisions are action that keeps the unity and integrity of Iraq.

3- Bin both the Kurdish Regional Government and the Federal Government in Baghdad to begin a serious dialogue to resolve and address outstanding issues according to the constitution and laws in force.

The reasons area:

Due to the threat posed by the referendum that was supposed to be conducted by the Kurdish regional government for the unity and disintegration of the Republic of Iraq. This referendum will be a threat to the stability and the unity of Iraq. This referendum is also against the Iraqi constitution, per articles 1, 140, and 143.

Dr. Salim Abdullah Al_Juburi
Speaker of the House of representatives

September 2017

Document (17)

كلمة السيد
مجلس النواب
مكتب السيد
مجلس النواب



مجلس النواب
مكتب السيد
مجلس النواب

العدد ٨٦٧٠ / ١١ / ١٧
التاريخ ١١ / ١٧ / ٢٠١٧

شؤون النجان

الى / مكتب السيد رئيس الجمهورية

م / قسرا

يهدىكم مجلس النواب اطيب التحيات --
مرافق لكم القرار المرقم (٥٢) والذي صوت عليه مجلس النواب بتاريخ ١٤ / ايلول / ٢٠١٧ في جلسته المرقمة (١٨)
من الفصل التشريعي الاول / السنة التشريعية الرابعة / الدورة الانتخابية الثالثة

مع التقدير

الرفقات:

- قرار مجلس النواب المرقم (٥٢) في ٩ / ٩ / ٢٠١٧

صلاح الدين احمد عبيد العزيز
الامين العام لمجلس النواب / وكالة
/ ذي الحجة / ١٤٣٨ هـ
١١ / ايلول / ٢٠١٧ م



- صورة ضوئية منه الى
- مكتب السيد رئيس مجلس النواب - للتفضل بالاطلاع - مع التقدير .
- مكتب السيد النائب الاول لرئيس مجلس النواب - للتفضل بالاطلاع - مع التقدير .
- مكتب السيد الامين العام لمجلس النواب - للتفضل بالاطلاع - مع التقدير .
- مكتب السيد نائب الامين العام لمجلس النواب - للتفضل بالاطلاع - مع التقدير .
- المدير العام لادارة / قسم شؤون النجان - للتفضل بالاطلاع - مع التقدير .
- السفارة العراقية -

Iraq - Baghdad
Conference Palace
Parliament Council

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www.parliament.iq

العراق - بغداد
قصر البرلمان
قسم شؤون النجان

Republic of Iraq
House of Representatives

To /The Prime Minister's Office

Subject: Parliament resolution

Herewith the attached Resolution No. 52, which was voted by the Chamber of Deputies on 14 September 2017 at the session numbered eighteen of the first legislative term.

With regards
Salahaddin Ahmed Abdul-Aziz

Secretary General of the House of Representatives

Document (18)



كوتماري عتيق
تمتداده في كشتي له نجومه من نوره وان
فهرما كهي به لهما ماني

العدد ١٦٩
التاريخ ١٦ / ٩ / ٢٠١٧

قسم الوثائق

السيد رئيس مجلس النواب المحترم

*الاستاذ البرلماني
السيد محمد عيسى الجبوري
مدير عام الدائرة العامة
بغداد*

م/ قرارات وتوصيات الجلسة رقم (١٨٨)
الخميس / ١٤ ايلول / ٢٠١٧

- ١- تم التصويت بالموافقة على طلب السيد رئيس مجلس الوزراء ومدعوماً بتوافق (١٢٨) نائب بأضافة فترة على جدول الاعمال (التصويت على اقالة السيد محافظ كركوك من منصبه).
- ٢- تم التصويت بالموافقة على مشروع قانون تنفيذ تعويضات شهداء الحرب ضد عصابات داعش الارهابية وتسريع اكمال معاملتهم والحماية الفعالة لجرحاهم.
- ٣- تم التصويت بالموافقة على تقديم فترة التصويت على اقالة السيد محافظ كركوك في جدول الاعمال.
- ٤- تم التصويت بالموافقة على اقالة السيد محافظ كركوك من منصبه.
- ٥- تم التصويت بالموافقة على مشروع قانون الرق.

سير الاجراءات الطبيعية:
تمت القراءة الاولى لمشروع قانون تعديل قانون الاحوال الشخصية رقم (١٨٨) لسنة ١٩٥٩ سيتم التصويت من حيث المبدأ في جلسة قادمة.

تمت القراءة الاولى لمشروع قانون انتخاب مجلس النواب سيتم التصويت من حيث المبدأ في جلسة قادمة.

مع التقدير...



محمد حسن
مدير عام الدائرة البرلمانية
١٦ / ايلول / ٢٠١٧

*استاذي ياريتي
أفك مبروك كرها ولكنك
صبر نزل
١١٦
١١٦*

- تمت القراءة الاولى لمشروع قانون تعديل قانون الاحوال الشخصية رقم (١٨٨) لسنة ١٩٥٩ سيتم التصويت من حيث المبدأ في جلسة قادمة.
- تمت القراءة الاولى لمشروع قانون انتخاب مجلس النواب سيتم التصويت من حيث المبدأ في جلسة قادمة.
- مع التقدير...

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دائرة الوثائق / مجلس النواب
بغداد / مبنى المؤتمرات

Document (19)

Republic of Iraq
General Secretariat of the House of Representative
Parliament office

Issue:

169

Date: 16/09/2007

Honorable President of the House of Representative

The recommendation and resolution of session number 18

Thursday 14/ 09/2017

1. The approval was agreed on the voting on the request of the Prime Minister including approval of the 128 members of the Iraqi Parliament of the dismissal of the Kirkuk governor from his post.
2. A vote was approved on the approval of the immortalization of the martyrs who were killed by the ISIL terrorist organisation and accelerated the completion of these transactions and intensive care of their wounded.
3. It was voted by agreeing to submit a vote on the dismissal of the governor from the agenda.
4. The vote was approved with the removal of the governor, Kirkuk, from his position.
5. Voting was approved by the irrigation bill.

General Director of the Parliamentary Department

16th September 2017

Document (19)



مستند رقم ١١٩
السيد رئيس الوزراء
بإذابة سائر المطالبات

((بحق وشخص وعطارد))

إلى / مجلس النواب / مكتب رئيس المجلس

م / اتخاذ إجراءات قانونية

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

إشارة إلى كتاب الأمانة العامة لمجلس النواب / الدائرة البرلمانية ذي العدد (ش ل/ ٢٩٢/٩/١) ومرافقه المطلب المرفوع من قبل (١٢٤) نائباً بموجب الكتاب المرقم بالعدد (١٠٤٨) في ٢٠١٧/٨/١٨ .
ووجه السيد رئيس مجلس الوزراء المطلب من مجلسكم الموقر إقالة محافظ كركوك وذلك لتعرضه وحده محافظة كركوك إلى التصدع والإخلال بالوحدة الوطنية للمحافظة، وحسب الصلاحيات المخولة لمجلسكم بموجب المادة (٧/ ثامناً ٢) من قانون المحافظات غير المنتظمة في إقليم رقم (٢١) لسنة ٢٠٠٨ المعدل .
نفتخلكم بأخذ ما يلزم لتنفيذ توجيه سيادته عنى وفق القانون .

معد فضلكم والآن في طابقتهم
محاولات لطعن في الملتزم
السيد به ضبطت في المحاولات
وأصرت بأوضاعه لهذا الملت في المقدم لربك
بلحى بمب الزبون رقم ٤٠٤٠٤٠٤٠٤

إياد حسين عبيد
مدير مكتب رئيس الوزراء وكالة
٢٠١٧/٩/١١

- نسخة ضوئية عنه إلى
- الأمانة العامة لمجلس الوزراء - مكتب الأمانة / لتتفضل بالتحمل ... مع التقدير .
- مكتب رئيس الوزراء - الدائرة القانونية / إضافة إلى مكتبكم للرقعة (١٤٠٤/١٧/٢٠١٧) في ٢٠١٧/٩/٢١ / للعلم ... مع التقدير .
- قسم المتابعة
- أمانة المكتب التنفيذي

ربطت جملة إقالة محافظ كركوك
ولما سنا مقدما للمعلم عاتق وللصفت لبرك لاني
بأن أجهت في أقرب جلب لجلبى الزبون العراق

Document (20)

Republic of Iraq
Prime Minister's Office
Issue: S/2553
Date: 12/09/2017

Personnel and confidential and urgent
Subject: Conduct the legislation decision

Per the letter of the General Secretariat of the Council of Parliament/ Parliamentary Office Sh/L/1/9/292 and enclosed signed letter from 124 members of Parliament according to the letter numbered and issued 1048 on 18/8/2017.

The directorate of the General Secretariat has requested from your respected committee the resignation of the Kirkuk governor because the unity of the city of Kirkuk has been subjected to the disintegration and damage to the national unity of the province.

According to the power that you have given to your committee per legislation 7/ Eight/2 of the province's legislation that is not regulated in the regional government number 21 that has been modified in the year 2008.

Please take the correct action per the legislation and let us the outcome.

With Regards
Ayad Hussein Ubaid
Deputy of the Prime Minister's Office
11/9/2017

Document (20)

قرر مجلس النواب بجلسته الثالثة والعشرون والمُعقَّدة بتاريخ ٢٧ / ايلول / ٢٠١٧ من الفصل التشريعي الاول السنة التشريعية الرابعة / الدورة الانتخابية الثالثة واستناداً الى احكام المادة (٥٩ / ٥٩) فانياً (من الدستور واستمداً من مجلس النواب بواجبه الوطني والدستوري المتمثل لتعب الشعب العراقي بجميع مكوناته وحرصاً على وحدة العراق وسلامة ارضه ووطنيه ويعوجب السلطنة الممنوحة له وفق الدستور الذي اقره جميع ابناء الشعب العراقي ومنهم الغداة الكرد الساسون للاتصال عن الوطن فانه يؤسِّد على خطورة الاوضاع الحالية وتدابيرها التي تهدد مصير الوطن بسبب اصرار سلطة الفيم كوردستان على اجراء الاستفتاء والقيام بتفويتة في الخامس والعشرين من ايلول الجاري رغم صدور قرار من مجلس النواب العراقي بعدم دستورية وقانونية هذا الاستفتاء في جلسته الانتخابية السابعة عشر في ١٢ / ايلول / ٢٠١٧ وتجاهل سلطة الاقليم للمشايدات من جميع المؤسسات العراقية للرجوع عن اجراء الاستفتاء وكذلك مناشدات الدول الاقليمية والمنظمات الدولية كمنظمة التعاون الاسلامي وجامعة الدول العربية والمجتمع الدولي متمثلاً بالامم المتحدة ومجلس الامن وعدم تنفيذ قرارات القضاة الاتحادي الواردة في الامر الولاوي الصادر من المحكمة الاتحادية على عراض الدعاوي للقائمة بهذا الصدد القاضي بايقاف اجراء الاستفتاء لكل ما تقدم فقد ناقش المجلس في جلسته المشار اليها الفأ تلك الاحداث والتطورات واستمع لآراء السادة النواب من مختلف الكتل .
اصدار القرار الآتي:

- ١- ان اجراء الاستفتاء من قبل سلطة الفيم كوردستان غير دستوري ومخالف لاحكام المادة (١) منة والتي نصت على (ان هذا الدستور ضامن لثوثة العراق) وعليه يعد باطلاً كما تبطل كل الاجراءات المترتبة عليه.
- ٢- الزام القائد العام للقوات المسلحة بانحلا كافة الاجراءات الدستورية والقانونية للحفاظ على وحدة العراق ومحايت مواطنيه لاصدار اوامره للقوات الامنية بالعودة والانتشار في جميع المناطق المتنازع عليها وبضمنها كركوك وفقاً لما كان عليه الحال قبل تاريخ ٢٠١٤/٦/١٠.
- ٣- التاكيد على تنفيذ القرارات المتخذة من قبل المجلس الوزاري للامن الوطني في جلسته الاخيرة لاسمي قراره بالمناجعة القضائية للمسؤولين عن تنفيذ الاستفتاء ومن بينه رئيس سلطة الاقليم للنتهية ولايته وتقديمهم للمحاكمة وفقاً للقوانين العراقية النافذة وكذلك سائر الموظفين الكرد العاملين في مؤسسات الدولة الاتحادية.

Republic of Iraq
House of Parliament

Parliament decision
Parliament Office
Number 55 for the year 2017

1. The referendum that was held by the Kurdish regional government is illegal and unconstitutional and against the Iraqi legislation article 1 which clearly states the constitution guarantees and secures the unity of the Republic of Iraq. Therefore, the independent referendum will be null and void.

2. The commitment and obligation of the commander of the armed forces to take all legal and constitutional measures to preserve the unity of Iraq and protect its citizens, and to issue orders to the security forces to return and spread in all disputed areas, including the city of Kirkuk according to the same as before 10/06/2014.


3. Confirmation of the implementation of decisions taken by the Council of Ministers for National Security in its last session, especially its decision to follow up the quarantine on the implementation of the referendum, including the president of the authority of the Kurdish regional government whose his mandate has ended and bring them to trial in accordance with the executive laws of the Iraqi and including all other Kurdish employees working in the institutions of the federal state.

Document (21)

- ١- غلب المظالم الحدودية التي تقع خارج سيطرة السلطة الانتدابية واعتبار الجندال التي تدخل منها بحملات مهربية ومناشدة دول الجوار العراقي لاتخاذ التدابير اللازمة لمساعدة الحكومة العراقية على تنفيذ هذه القرارات.
- ٥- على الحكومة إعادة الحقوق الشمالية في كركوك وللناطق المتنازع عليها لأشراف وسيطرة وزارة النفط الاتحادية ومنع التدخل لأي من الأحزاب النافذة في تلك المناطق.
- ٦- اتخاذ الاجراءات الكفيلة لتنفيذ قرارات السلطات التنفيذية والتشريعية والقضائية الخاصة بإقليم كوردستان لاسيما قرار الاثارة محافظ كركوك.
- ٧- على الحكومة استتعاء المشراء والمطبخ في الدول التي لديها ممثلات ومكاتب في الاقليم لفرض ابلاتهم بإغلاق تلك الممثلات والقنصليات ونقلها الى محافظات خارج اقليم كوردستان.
- ٨- دعوة فخامة رئيس الجمهورية لاحترام للقيام بواجباته التصويص عليها بالمستور خاصة للفة (١٧) منه باعتبارها رمز وحدة الوطن وللممثل سيادة البلاد و الساهر على ضمان الانزمام بالمستور والحافظ على استقلال العراق وسيادته ووحدة وسلامة اراضي.
- ٩- التأكيد على تنفيذ استراتيجية الصالحة الوطنية على قاعدة تغليب الهوية الوطنية لأبناء الشعب العراقي.
- ١٠- العمل على اعادة التنازحين الى مناطقهم وتهيئة جميع الوسائل لتحقيق هذا الهدف ومن بينها اعادة اعمار المناطق للضرورة.
- ١١- استمرار جميع الموظفين الكرد من مختلف الناصب في عملهم وضمان أمنهم ممن لم يشاركوا في هذا الاستفتاء.
- ١٢- الحفاظ على الروابط الوطنية الاجتماعية مع المواطنين الكرد باعتبارهم مكون اساسي من مكونات الشعب العراقي.
- ١٣- على الحكومة عدم قبول الحوار لشروطه الا بعد الغاء نتائج الاستفتاء.

د. سليم هادي الجبوري
رئيس مجلس النواب
/ محرم / ١٤٣٩ هـ
/ ايلول / ٢٠١٧ م

4. Close the entire border gate that is not under the control of the central government, all the enter commodities via these border gates and it is considered as smuggled commodities, also we are calling the neighbouring counties to assist us in implementing this decision.
5. The Kurdish region shall return all the oil wells in Kirkuk and the disputed area to the central government in Baghdad. This oil field shall be run by and Ministry of Oil in Baghdad and prevent any political parties in the area from interfering in this issue.
6. The Kurdish region shall implement the resolution and the order of the government high commission court order in general especially the implementation of a court order that is related to the resignation of Kirkuk province governor.
7. The Iraqi central government shall call all the ambassadors and foreign government representatives in the Kurdish government to inform them of the closure of these embassies and to be transferred to other Iraqi provinces.
8. The president of Iraq shall be considered the person the person in charge of the unity of the country and he carries his duty as normal per Article 67 of the Iraqi constitution.
9. It is important to emphasize national unity far away from the national identity.
10. The government commitment to return all the displaced people to their region and the government shall provide all the facilities and materials needed to implement this decision including the reconstruction of affected areas.
11. The Kurdish governmental employees shall continue in their current jobs if there is no proof that they had participated in the Kurdish independent referendum.
12. To maintain the national social ties with the Kurdish citizens as a basic component of the Iraqi people.
13. The government should not accept conditional dialogue until after the results of the referendum are cancelled.



Document (23) Dismissal the Kirkuk governor Najmadin Omer signed by the president of Iraqi Foud Masum

Republic of Iraq
President Office

Official Resolution
Number (73)

According to item seventh of the legislation article (73) of the legislation and article (7)/Eight/ of the province's resolution for region number (21) for the year 2008 and modified, according to the decision of the House of Parliament t, implement the following.

The dismissal of Najmadin Omer from the Kirkuk governor position
This resolution is valid from this date and shall be published in the governmental newspaper.

Foud Masum
President of Iraq

Document (23)

4.2 THE REASONS AND ACCUSATIONS FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE KIRKUK GOVERNOR DR. NAJMADIN OMER

The Kirkuk governor Dr. Najmadin Omar violated the provisions of the Constitution and the violation of federal laws and committed many serious violations while he was working as Kirkuk governor. As a result of his abuse of power, a letter was sent to Haider al-Abadi, the Prime Minister of Iraq, calling on him to use the powers as prescribed in Article 7/VIII.2 of the provincial law No. 21 of 2008 that was amended by House of Representatives for the dismissal of the Kirkuk governor Najmadin Omar from his position, for misusing his position for non-functional purposes and caused waste of public funds and mismanagement of his duty.

According to paragraph (VIII.1 of the above article), there was enough evidence to persuade the council and the House of Representatives to vote for the dismissal of the Kirkuk governor for following a violation and for irregularity reasons.

Najmadin Omar received a sum of ten million dollars monthly from the Kurdistan Regional Government and considered the received amount of money as the province share from province's oil exported by the KRG abroad. Najmadin Omar deposited the sum of the money in the KRG Banks in Erbil without depositing it in the federal banks or the Kirkuk banks, and without the sum being subjected to the checks of the Office of Federal Financial Control.

In addition, these irregularities, and the received money from the KRG did not match the volume of exported quantities of oil from Kirkuk and finally exported oil from the fields of the Kirkuk province and did not pass through the gate of Sumo Company as required by the federal budget law for 2017.

Najmadin Omar as chairperson of the security committee in the province of Kirkuk failed to take proper actions and measures that would end the violence and crime that prevailed in the province. He was not even able to stop or eradicate the number of kidnappings, assassinations, and armed robberies in the city of Kirkuk.

Najmadin Omar failed to stop citizens' intimidation and confiscation of their properties by the Kurdish party and militia members. It was the view of many citizens in Kirkuk, that Najmadin Omar dramatically failed to take proper action against the Kurdish perpetrators and Kurdish militia.

He did not take any suitable measures to deter the criminals and perpetrators and he failed to take proper steps to reveal and expose the perpetrators who conducted the assassination of many prominent politicians and intellectual figures who were assassinated in suspicious and ambiguous circumstances.

Najmadin Omar did not pursue the crimes of assassinations of many Turkmen and Arab personalities in the province. The overwhelming majority of these assassinations were conducted for political reasons or administrative or security, and he did not disclose those crimes or the perpetrators who conducted these despicable acts. In other words, he was protecting the criminals who were members of the Kurdish political parties and who were responsible for these crimes.

Najmadin Omar paid the salaries of the employees of the Kirkuk Police Directorate despite orders issued by the Ministry of the Interior that the salaries of the police should not be paid for November 11, 2015, and he forced the employees of the Directorate of the Governorate Treasury to spend them in violation of the law.

He approved various contracts with the Kurdish political parties who were not on the list in the provincial council to spend the budgets that were allocated from petrodollars for the operational budget which was contrary to the rules of exchange approved by the budget law and federal laws related. These contracts were conducted without proper bidding, but it was implemented by direct approaches to the Kurdish contractors and not announced to the other tenders. The implementation of these contracts was contrary to the instructions of the implementation of government contracts and made those referrals limited to specific companies and exclusion of many companies, who were more efficient technically and financially.

Najmadin managed all powers in his office such as.

Approvals for the sale or purchase of real estate within the province.

Approvals for housing settlement in the province.

Approvals for the transfer of employees to and from the province.

Approvals for the transfer of furniture within the governmental building in Kirkuk.

Approvals for the appointment of employees and day laborers.

Approvals for the transfer of ration card which was issued by the previous government of Saddam Hussein.

Najmadin Omar rejected many applications for approval that are linked and related to Turkmen and Arab citizens without providing any suitable reasons and explanations. He kept all official files, administration applications, and an employment application file for the Turkmen and Arabs in his office without having been approved or processed for several months and without providing any suitable explanation for this delay.

Najmadin Omar completely refrained from attending the meetings of the Supreme Commission for Coordination between the provinces, which was chaired by the Prime Minister. He prevented the individual employee who wished to represent the province in those meetings. Najmadin Omar's objective was to cut off all the links between the province of Kirkuk and the federal authorities, even though Kirkuk was not within the frame of the KRG. This was a clear violation of the provision's legislation and Article (45) of the Governorate Law No. 21 of 2008 amendment. .

Najmadin Omar personally requested the provincial council in Kirkuk to take a decision to raise the KRG flag above the estate buildings and the departments of the province in Kirkuk. This decision was a clear violation and contrary to the provision's resolution of the Constitution that clearly stated that only the Iraqi flag shall be hosted above the governmental and Estate building. But instead of Najmadin Omar implementing the administrative court ruling including the abolition of the Council's decision by only raising only Iraqi flag Najmadin Omar completely rejected the decision of the parliament and the judiciary.

He also, refrained from conducting the decision of the House of Representatives to raise only the Iraqi flag on the governmental building and he continued raising the Kurdish Regional government flag on the governmental building.

Najmadin Omar officially requested the Kurd-controlled provincial council, to decide to include the city of Kirkuk within the Kurdish

independent referendum in the province of Kirkuk as it was holding in the other three provinces of the Kurdish Regional Government.

Although the Kurdish referendum in northern Iraq on 25 September 2017 was rejected by the Turkmen and Arabs in Kirkuk, the Kurdish parties decided to hold the referendum in Kirkuk on 25 September 2017.

The city of Kirkuk sits fully outside the boundaries of the territory specified by Article (143) of the Constitution, and it follows the federal government. However, including the province of Kirkuk within the Kurdish independent referendum was an alternation and violation of Article (23/V) of the Elections Law Provincial Councils No.36 of 2008 amended.

Najmadin Omar failed the implementation of many resolutions and decisions that were issued by the federal ministries for political reasons, and without consideration of the public interest whereas he implemented other decisions that benefited the Kurdish ethnic groups in Kirkuk. He was accused of numerous corruption cases. These and other accusations were in the process of investigation by the Integrity Commission.

The corruption cases were associated with the development projects in Kirkuk, council contracts, and the waste of public money that was allocated to the Kirkuk province from the petrodollar program.

Najmadin Omar toured various places in Kirkuk, which was not part of KRG.

He was accompanied by a number of official KRG supporters and he was encouraging hatred and making propaganda for the Kurdish Independent Referendum.

Najmadin Omar continuously acted against the Iraqi constitution and federal laws.

He refrained from implementing the decisions of the Council of Deputies and Judgments. Najmadin Omar's actions became a factor of instability and provocation of the Turkmen and Arabs in the province, and his presence became a major threat to the peaceful coexistence between its people.

Najmadin became the biggest threat to the unity of the country as he continuously aimed to change the constitutional status of the province of Kirkuk.

However, after a long discussion in the Iraqi parliament, a decision was taken by the Iraqi members of Parliament, and a majority decision was made to sack the corrupt and incompetent Kirkuk governor Najmadin Omer. He refused to leave his position and refused to comply with the Iraqi government's decisions per a document [**Doc.8**] and [**Doc.9**].



الصفحة: ١-٤٨
التاريخ: ٢٠١٣/٨/١٨

السيد رئيس مجلس النواب العراقي المحترم

م/فساد ادارى ومالى

في الوقت الذي نثمن جهود هيئة الرئاسة ومجلس النواب والحكومة العراقية في متابعة ملفات الفساد المستشرية في بعض الحكومات المحلية والتي أدت مؤخراً الى اتخاذ إجراءات قانونية بحق المخالفين وتعزيزاً للدور الرقابي لمجلس النواب العراقي الموقر نرفق لكم طياً قوائم بتواقيع (١٢٤) من السادة أعضاء مجلس النواب الذين يطالبون فيه اتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية بخصوص ملفات الفساد المتطفلة بمحافظة كركوك ومتابعة إجراءات هيئة النزاهة والقضاء العراقي بخصوصه حيث نرى تكوّن واضحاً وعدم الجدية في تفعيل العشرات من الدعاوي القضائية المقامة بحقه منذ الأعوام ٢٠١٣ و ٢٠١٤ فضلاً عن تسلمه عشرة ملايين دولار شهرياً من حكومة إقليم كردستان وعدم إيداعها بحساب الحكومة المحلية منذ سنتين وعدم امتثاله لقرارات مجلس النواب وتوصيات وتوجيهات الحكومة الاتحادية وعدم التزامه في تنفيذ قرارات القضاء العراقي وتطالب بمخاطبة السيد رئيس الوزراء لبيان الخطوات الواجب اتخاذها من قبل سيادته حيال هذه المخروقات الخطيرة .

وتقبلو منا قائق الشكر والتقدير .

المرفقات/

- (٨) قوائم لتواقيع السادة النواب تبدأ بالتسلسل ١. نيازى معمار اوغلو وتنتهي بالتسلسل ١٢٤. ساجدة محمد بونس .
- (٥) جداول لمجموع ٦٤ دعوة قضائية .



النائب نيازى ميمار اوغلو
مُستَرَجَعٌ لِمَجْلِسِ النُّوابِ العِراقِيِّ

نسخة منه الى /

- مجلس القضاء الاعلى
- هيئة النزاهة
- ديوان الرقابة المالية
- الاضبارة .

E-Mail: niyazi_56@yahoo.com

Republic of Iraq
House of Parliament
Issue: 1048
Date: 18/08/200

Honorable Speaker of the Iraqi Council of Representatives
Subject: Administrative and financial corruption

While appreciating the efforts of the Presidency, the Council of Representatives and the Iraqi government in following up on corruption files that are rampant in some local governments, which have recently led to legal measures being taken against violators and to enhance the oversight role of the esteemed Iraqi Council of Representatives, we enclose for you herewith lists of signatures of (124) members of the Council of Representatives who They demand that legal measures be taken regarding corruption files related to the governor of Kirkuk and to follow up the action of the Iraqi Integrity and Judiciary Commission regarding him, as we see that it is clear that there is no seriousness in activating dozens of lawsuits filed against him since the years 2013 and 2014, in addition to receiving ten million dollars a month from the Kurdistan Regional Government and not Its creation at the expense of the local government two years ago, its non-compliance with the decisions of the House of Representatives, the recommendations and directives of the federal government, and its lack of commitment in implementing the decisions of the Iraqi judiciary.

Member of the Iraqi Parliament
Niyazi Mimaroglu

Please accept our thanks and appreciation.

Attachments

(8) The lists of signatures, gentlemen of the House of Representatives, starting with sequence 1 Niazzi Mimar Oghul, with sequence 124 Sajida Muhammad Yunus. (5) Tables for a total of 64 lawsuits.
copy to /

Document (24)



العدد: ١٠٤٨
التاريخ: ٢٠١٧/٨/٢٠

السيد رئيس مجلس النواب العراقي المحترم

م/فساد ادارى ومالى

في الوقت الذي نشتم جهود هيئة الرئاسة ومجلس النواب والحكومة العراقية في متابعة ملفات الفساد المستشرية في بعض الحكومات المحلية والتي أدت مؤخراً الى اتخاذ إجراءات قانونية بحق المخالفين وتعزيزاً للدور الرقابي لمجلس النواب العراقي الموقر نرفق لكم طياً قوائم بتواقيع (١٢٤) من السادة أعضاء مجلس النواب الذين يطالبون فيه اتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية بخصوص ملفات الفساد المتعقدة بمحافظة كركوك ومتابعة إجراءات هيئة النزاهة والقضاء العراقي بخصوصه حيث نرى لتلك واضحة وعدم الجدية في تفعيل العشرات من الدعاوي القضائية المقامة بحقه منذ الأعوام ٢٠١٣ و ٢٠١٤ فضلاً عن تسلمه عشرة ملايين دولار شهرياً من حكومة إقليم كردستان وعدم إيداعها بحساب الحكومة المحلية منذ سنتين وعدم امتثاله لقرارات مجلس النواب وتوصيات وتوجيهات الحكومة الاتحادية وعدم التزامه في تنفيذ قرارات القضاء العراقي وتطالب بمخاطبة السيد رئيس الوزراء لبيان الخطوات الواجب اتخاذها من قبل سيادته حيال هذه المخروقات الخطيرة .

وتقبلو منا قائق الشكر والتقدير .

المرفقات/

- (٨) قوائم لتواقيع السادة النواب تبدأ بالتسلسل ١. نيازى ميمار اوغلو وتنتهي بالتسلسل ١٢٤. ساجدة محمد بونس .
- (٥) جداول لمجموع ٦٤ دعوة قضائية .



السيد نيازى ميمار اوغلو
مقرر مجلس النواب العراقي

نسخة منه الى /

- مجلس القضاء الاعلى
 - هيئة النزاهة
 - ديوان الرقابة المالية
 - الاضبارة .
- مع التقدير .

E-Mail: niazi_56@yahoo.com

Ministry of Foreigner Affairs
Embassy of the Republic of Iraq / Beirut
Issue: 9/1/ return- Beirut-1129
Date: 27/05/2019

Subject: Enlightening ethnic Najm Al-Din Mar Karir Al-Tawarghi

You fully agree with the recovery file of the Iraqi suspect Al-Najm Al-Din Omar Karim Al-Lagray (reported by Al-Banna with the letter from the Judicial Council / Presidency of the Public Prosecution numbered 92/10203/2018 on 5/27/2019, an arrest warrant was issued against him by the Kirkuk Investigation Court for embezzling five cars Various types owned by the Kirkuk Governorate Office.

Given that the film fulfills the conditions and controls stipulated in Articles (1 and 7) of the Convention on the Extradition of Criminals between Iraq and Lebanon for the year 1929 AD, we hope that a file for extradition should be created with the competent Lebanese judicial authorities to consider the matter of its extradition to Iraq pending the case requested by the provisions of Article (316) of The Iraqi Punishment Law, knowing that the file is in the hands of the positions of the Integrity Commission and the Recovery Department (Haider Sadoun Abdul Hussein, legal advisor, Amin Nasser

Kindly review and confirm receipt and inform us.

Rajeh Mousawi
Head of the legal department 5/27/2019

Document (27)

There are several court cases complain against the Kirkuk governor Najmadin Omer Karim that were submitted to the Kirkuk High Court and waiting to be investigated.

No	Number Issued	Subject
1	رقم 119/13 ك3/2013	صنع حراري
2	رقم 175/13 ك/2013	النسب المحوري
3	رقم 165/13 1/2013	اجازات استثمار ممنوحة من قبل الاستثمار
4	رقم 152/13 1/2013	منظومة كاميرات المراقبة
5	رقم 179/13 1/2013	احتياجات محطة كركوك
6	رقم 166/13 2/2013	مشروع تطوير مدخل بغداد - كركوك، المعهد التقني، تقاطع دويمير
7	رقم 183/13 1/2013	مشروع تجهيل وفحص انابيب لكتول، وبغداد
8	رقم 190/13 1/2013	شركة بلان، فلتو 33 كلف وانشاء محطة 11/33 كلف ونصب المعدات قرب شركة طارق
9	رقم 169/13 2/2013	التفاهد على عهد من المشاريع دون استكمال موافقة او مسابقة الترخيص
10	رقم 181/13 11/2013	مشروع تخطيط شوارع حي الواسطي
11	رقم 321/13 1/2013	ادراج المتعاقدين المتكثفين في تنفيذ التز امالهم لكتول
12	رقم 222/13 8/2013	بناء قدرات العاملين و ادارة المشاريع
13	رقم 177/13 /2013	شركة خالدان/ تخطيط شوارع حي الموسلي والاحياء المجاورة

No	Number Issued	Subject
1	MT 119/13 K3/2013	Thermal paint
2	MT 175/13 K/2013	Nasab Almuazi
3	MT 165/13 1/2013	Investment certificate issued by the investment company
4	MT 152/13 1/2013	Surveillance camera system
5	MT 179/13 1/2013	The requirement of the Kirkuk power station
6	MT 166/13 2/2013	The project of development of the entrance to Kirkuk and Baghdad city, Technical Institute, Damuz crossover
7	MT 183/13 1/2013	Pile supply and check project
8	MT 190/13 1/2013	Bulan Company Kv and the establishment of 11/3Kv power station and installation machinery near the Tariq plant
9	MT 169/13 2/2013	Having contact with various projects without having the approval of the Kirkuk municipally
10	MT 181/13 11/2013	The paving Waseti Neighbourhood streets
11	MT 321/13 1/2013	The list of contractors
12	MT 222/13 8/2013	Training the labour and conducting project
13	MT 177/13 /2013	Khaldan company for paving the Musela. neighbourhood and adjacent neighbourhood

14	مت ١٣/٢٧١ ق/٢٠١٣	اىصال التيار الكهربائى الى قرية طيبة وقرية الشرفية
15	مت ١٣/١٧٢ ق/٢٠١٣	تخطيط شوارع واحد حزينان/ شارع عبدالرحمن خلف ابراهيم خليل
16	مت ١٣/١٧٤ ق/٢٠١٣	شركة ثقة للمقاولات العامة/ انشاء بنائة الجنسية والاحوال المدنية
17	مت ١٣/١٧١ ق ١٣/٢٠١٣	قضية تخطيط منطقة واحد حزينان/ خلف اسواق انور
18	مت ١٣/١٩٣٤	شراء سيارات تويوتا دون مصادقة المجلس
19	مت ١٣/١٠ ق/٢٠١٤/١	قرية جمعاة فرثن وحصو وخايط للشارع
20	مت ١٣/١١ ق/٢٠١٤/١	طريق علو محمود
21	مت ١٣/١٣ ق/٢٠١٤/١	بناية التسجيل العقاري في نيس
22	مت ١٣/٧٩ ق ٢٠١٤/٤	انارة سوق مركز قضاء الديرس
23	مت ١٣/٣٨ ق ٢٠١٤/٢	مشروع انشاء بناية مديرية توزيع كهرباء كركوك
24	مت ١٣/١٥٥ ق ٢٠١٣	اراج 33 كي في الرشد
25	مت ١٣/١٨٤ ق ٢٠١٣/١	مشروع انشاء جزء من الطريق الحوالىمدينة كركوك
26	مت ١٣/١٩٥ ق ٢٠١٣/٢	الكلية التقنية/ مشروع الخطوط الناقلة لمياه الامطار في الحي العسكري
27	مت ١٣/١٩٦ ق ٢٠١٣/١	مشروع تخطيط حي للصناعي/ بناة مدرسة 12 صف في حي الخضراء
28	مت ١٣/١٧٣	انشاء جسر يربط بين طريق بغداد والداخل

29	MT86/13 K 22/2014	The Taakhi project on the land registered M51KT
30	MT189/13 K4/2014	Paving a road of Tulki - Dermanaw
31	MT 13/175 K2014	Municipality asphalt plant

No	Number Issued	Subject
14	MT 271/13 K 2013	Installation of the electricity to Tiba and Sharifa village
15	MT 172/13 K 2013	Paving Wahid Huzayran and Abdul Rahman Khalef Ibrahim Khalil streets
16	MT 174/13 K 2013	The Thika and construction general company, the establishment of the national ID and certificate
17	MT 171/13 K 2013	The One Huzayran paving / behind Nur market
18	MT 1932	Purchasing Toyota cars without the approval of the Committee
19	MT 10/13 K/1/2014	The Chamchaga village, stone, and paved road
20	MT 11/13 K/1/2014	Alu Mahmood road
21	MT 13/13 K/1/2014	The Property Registration office in Dubis
22	MT 79/13 K/1/2014	The lighting of the sub_district of Dubis
23	MT 38/13 K/2/2014	The project of building the Electricity office
24	MT 155/13 K 2014	Tower of 33 K in Rashad
25	MT184/13 K/1/2013	Project of paving a part road around Kirkuk
26	MT195/13 K/1/2013	Institute of Technology, the project of transferring the rainwater in the Hay Alaskeri neighbourhood
27	MT196/13 K/1/2013	Paving the Hay Al_Sinaie project and building a school with twelve classrooms in Hay Al_Khathraie
28	MT173 K 2013	Building a bridge that links Baghdad Road to the city of Kirkuk
32	MT13/59 K/2014	The establishment of three hundred housing units
33	MT13/77/K/2014	Paving a road between Sheikh Ibrahim village and Taq-Taq

ت	رقم الكتاب	الموضوع
34	1507 في 2014/10/21	تقرير رابرة بخصوص بنائتي للمجلس والمحافطة
35	802 في 2012/5/21	مشروع تجهيز البيات/ مكتب عبدالرسول للتجارة
36	1375 في 2012/8/6	تجاوز واعتداء على وجهاء قرية كوردة مبر على السيد صلاح محمد حسيب مهندس مديرية التخطيط
37	2067 في 2012/11/7	اوليات طريق مطيح الكبير المرابط للناصرية
38	122 في 2013/1/23	جسر حي للمسكري
39	130 في 2013/1/27	اعلام/ بخصوص المشاريع المحاللة لى ناحية الزاب
40	95 في 2013 /1 /21	تحقيق في نفق الشورجة
41	376 في 2013/2/29	تقرير رابرة لجنة الاقتصاد والمالية لمشروع تطوير مدخل اربيل- ساحة الطيران
42	435 في 2013/2/28	نلكز شركة خالدان في كافة الاعمال المحاللة اليها في معظم مناطق كركوك
43	360-523 18/2/2013	تحقيق اداري / شكوى السيد محمد خضر

No	Number Issued	Subject
34	1507 21/4/2014	A report on the establishment of the governate and committee
35	802 21/5/2012	A project of supplying machinery and equipment for Abdul Rassul trade company
36	1375 6/8/2012	The attack on the members of the Kurda Mir village
37	2067 7/11/2012	The provisional Sataih Al_Kabir Road that links to the Nasiriyah city
38	122 23/1/2013	Hay Al_askeri bridge
39	130 27/1/2013	The project's implementation is given to the district of Zab.
40	95 21/1/2013	Investigation into the Shorja tunnel
41	376 29/2/2013	A report of the visiting committee for economics and finance for development of the entrance city of Erbil and Sahat Altayaran
42	435 28/2/1013	Khalden company for work given in all Kirkuk
43	360-523 18/2/2013	Administration investigation/A complaint by Mr. Mohammed Khather

	7/3/2013	
44	2013/2/5 في 218	تحقيق اداري
45	2013/2/5 في 219	شكوى اهالي منطقة حي الواسطي خلف جامع شيخ ابراهيم
46	641 18-3-2013	شكوى منطقة حي الاسرى والمفقودين
47	1071 21-5-2013	شكوى السيد جبار كريم محمد/ تنفيذ مشروع مدينة لعاب كركوك الاستثماري
48	1445 16-7-2013	شكوى اهالي منطقة سلطان ساقى/ سوء التثبيت
49	1093 26-5-2013	مصادقة/ مدينة لعاب اطفال اجازة استثمارية
50	1103 26-5-2013	شكوى ايصال الكهرباء الي قرية ابو علي
51	1330 24-6-2013	اعلام/ هدم سياح متنزّه العباسي
52	1194 5-6-2013	شكوى المواطنة وفاء خالد

No	Number Issued	Subject
44	218 5/2/2013	Administration inquiry
45	219 5/2/2013	The complaint of the Hay Al_Wasiti neighbourhood behind the Sheikh Mosque
46	641 18/3/2013	The complaints of the Hay_Alasra and Mafqudin neighbourhood
47	1071 21/7/2013	A complaint by Mr. Jabar Karim Mohammed for the implementation. of Game City project
48	1445 16/7/2013	A complaint by the Sultan Saqi neighbourhood for bad paving
49	1093 26/5/2013	Approval of the children playground permission investment
50	1103 26/5/2013	Transmitting electricity to Abu Ali village
51	1330 24/6/2013	Media/ The destruction of the Al_abasi park
51	1194 5/6/2013	A complaint by the citizen Wafaie Khalid

53	1374 2-7-2013	اوليات مشروع زون ه شركة زوزك وصقر المنار
54	1327 12-6-2013	فتح عطاء
55	1107-126 26-5-2013	تزايد/ شكوى ناحية الملتقى حول قلة التخصيص السنوي للمشاريع
56	1833 24-9-2013	اوليات/ انشاء حدائق بدون مصادقة المجلس تشجير وتنظيف مدينة كركوك
57	2038 3-11-2013	الشركات المتلكنة

No	Number Issued	Subject
53	1374 2/7/2013	The priority of the Zon project and Zozuk and Saqer Al-Manar company
54	1327 12/06/2013	Quotation
55	1107-126 26/05/2013	A complaint was made by Al_Multaqa about the lack of annual share for the projects
56	1833b24/09/2013	Establishment of parks and planting trees in Kirkuk
57	2030 3/11/2013	Various companies

58	1977 23-10-2013	دعوة مباشرة / خط ناقل لمعالجة شحة المياه رحيم اوه بنجه عطي
59	2462 29-12-2013	انشاء مجمع سكني قرب حويلية المصطفى دوميز
60	722 7-4-2014	مشروع التجهيزات الرياضية
61	1089 3-6-2014	نتائج تدقيق اجراءات التعاقد للعقد المرقم 7 في 2014-10-11 مشروع تجهيز ترامت بونك
62	1204-1316 18-6-2014 24-7-2014	الغرامات التأخيرية والامانات المحجوزة
63	1483 2-10-2014	مشروع تخطيط شارع قرية عمشة وقرية مرعي
64	1507 21-10-2014	انشاء شبكة وبنر وخزان لقرية لقرية الشيخ ابراهيم في قضاء الدبس

5

ابراهيم وعنه اطمن لنتيجة DKK لقرية مرعي من مكرها واحرف
تكونت منسوبة والتزم بقرية دوسية وهذه المنظمة حوله على ارجح
الاداءة كالمأوك على لعملة
النتيجة وحصوله يكون
تضامنه بحره كفاية كركوك
خمس الدين عمر كريم
القاضي
القاضي معالي اولاد

58	1977 23/10/2013	The transportation of water in Rahim Awa and Penja Ali
59	2462 29/12/2013	Establishment of a housing estate near Husseinia AL Mustafa in Dumez
60	722 07/04/2014	Project of sports supplies
61	1089 03/06/2014	Project of supplying Trust Bring
62	1204-1316 18/6/2014 24/7/2014	Accumulated penalties and reserved material
63	1483 2/10/2014	Project of paving roads in Amsha village and Murie village
64	1507 21/10/2014	Installation of water e Reservoir for Sheikh Ibrahim village in the district of Dubis

5. CHAPTER FIVE

5.1 KURDISH INDEPENDENT REFERENDUM

Historically most of the population in Kirkuk were Turkmen, but during the dictatorship of the ousted Saddam Hussein, many Arab families were brought into Kirkuk under the Saddam Hussein regime and both the Turkmen and Kurdish families were forced out to change the area's ethnography, under a policy termed "Arabization". As a result of that policy, the Arab population increased dramatically in Kirkuk whereas the Turkmen population reduced.



Figure (201) Percentage of ethnic groups in Kirkuk in 1957

After the fall of the Saddam Hussein government in 2003, the Kurds began returning to Kirkuk with the help of the Kurdish militia. The Kurdish parties began bringing Kurdish families from Syria, Iran, Türkiye, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Dohuk and resettling them in Kirkuk. The aim was to change the area's ethnography of the city of Kirkuk, under a new policy termed "Kurdification" in the event of an eventual referendum on whether the city should be part of a future Kurdistan or remain as a part of the Republic of Iraq.

As a result of a weak central government in Baghdad, the lack of security and stability in the region persisted. This led to the thriving of

both the PKK and the ISIL terrorist groups in northern Iraq. Consequently, in 2014 the ISIL terrorists attacked the city of Mosul, causing the fleeing of Iraqi forces from the city. ISIL fighters attempted to secure more territories in northern Iraq shortly after taking over the city of Mosul and establishing their so-called “Islamic caliphate state” across the northwest of Iraq.

The occupation of the city of Mosul by ISIL terrorists resulted in a fleeing of Iraqi troops that were stationed in Kirkuk, and this caused a power vacuum. Consequently, the KRG took advantage of the power vacuum and sent troops to the city of Kirkuk, claiming that the city of Kirkuk is a part of the KRG, instead of dispatching their troops to the city of Mosul to fight the ISIL terrorists from advancing on to the city of Mosul. The Kurdish militia was more interested in controlling Kirkuk oil fields rather than fighting the ISIL terrorist group.

In the view of many Iraqi observers, the city of Kirkuk is an important town for the KRG because a quarter of the Iraqi oil reserves are found around this area. It has one of the biggest oil fields in the country with more than 6% of the world's oil coming from this area with Iraq having the world's second largest proven oil reserves. After controlling the city of Kirkuk and its oil fields the KDP militia, the KRG began exploring and exporting about 550,000 barrels of oil a day, including oil from fields near Kirkuk, earning about \$8 billion annually.

The earned profits from the export of oil were taken by the KRG and none of these profits were spent on the city of Kirkuk. Due to the US administration's interest in the oil in northern Iraq, it encouraged the US administration to support the Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani's administration to remain in power to control northern Iraq.

The smuggled oil from Kirkuk province by the Kurdish administration was exported through Turkish pipelines and sold mostly to Israel and other Western countries at a lower price. The families of the Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani, some prominent Kurdish politicians, and the ISIL terrorist organisation were intimately involved in this business. Despite billions of incomes from the illegal sale of oil, funds were going into the pockets of the Masoud Barzani family while the ordinary Kurdish citizens were not benefitting at all from oil profits.

The continuation of a weak central government in Baghdad had encouraged the Kurdish Regional Government to conduct a referendum in three Iraqi cities Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Duhok which is controlled by the KRG. With the presence and support of the Kurdish military forces in Kirkuk, the KRG was able to include the city of Kirkuk in the Kurdish independent referendum, even though the city of Kirkuk is not within the KRG administrative border.




Figure (202) the crude oil exported by the KRG per day.

The KRG decision to include the city of Kirkuk within the Kurdish independent referendum was completely opposed by the Turkmen, Arabs, central government in Baghdad, Türkiye, Iran, and all countries in the world except Israel. The Kurdish independent referendum in Kirkuk was boycotted by the Turkmen and Arabs. Both rejected the participation in the Kurdish independent referendum. The Turkmen and Arabs in Kirkuk considered the Kurdish independent referendum unconstitutional and against the will of the people in Kirkuk. The Kurdish independent referendum in northern Iraq alarmed many Arabs and Turkmen, but both groups were conflicted as they preferred to live under Iraq's central government rather than under the control of the Kurdish regional government. All Arab countries including the Republic of Türkiye and the Islamic Republic of Iran opposed the Kurdish independent referendum.

However, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who was serving as a member of the Knesset and Chairman of the Likud party openly supported the Kurdish independent referendum, and he considered it as a legitimate right for the Kurds.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that “*The Kurds have been and will continue to be reliable and long-term allies of Israel since they are, like us, a minority group in the region.*” He added that the Kurdish referendum is “*the legitimate efforts of the Kurdish people to attain a state of its own.*” In addition, the late Israeli president Shimon Peres pledged support to the Iraqi Kurds and their quest for statehood, with hundreds in the Kurdistan region paying their respects to the former Israeli president when he died in 2016.

Beyond economic cooperation between the state of Israel and the KRG, Israel's ongoing policy of support for Iraqi Kurdish separatism continued, including in the areas of intelligence, and technology.

The KRG always denied a link with Israel, but the first official acknowledgment that Israel had provided aid to the Iraqi Kurds was after the toppling of the Saddam Hussein government in 2003. Israel's acknowledgment that they had provided aid to the Iraqi Kurds extends as far back as 1980 when Prime Minister Menachem Begin revealed that Israel had supported the Kurdish rebels during their uprising against the Iraqis between 1965 and 1975.

Israel had sent arms and ammunition to the Kurdish rebels during their uprising against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq between 1965 and 1975 with the aim of destabilizing Iraq. Also, Israel supported the Kurdish rebels with propaganda campaigns in Europe, provided a training course for Kurdish medics, created schoolbooks in Kurdish languages, and opened a mobile hospital in northern Iraq.



Figure (203) This photo was taken two months prior to the Kurdish independence referendum, and shows Masoud Barzani, the Jewish lobby, and advisers who were helping him to annex northern Iraq. The photo includes Jared Corey Kushner who was senior advisor to the US president, Cohen, the French man Henry Bernard, John Kenneth Galbraith the American Ambassador for Croatia, the deputy of Paul Bremer who was administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq, Fakhri Karim, who is the director of the daily Arabic newspaper Al_Mada.

While Israeli military aid was placed on the back burner between 1975 and the nineties of the last century, Kurdish officials continuously denied that they had links with the Israeli government. However, according to a report published in the New Yorker magazine in 2004, the Israeli military and intelligence operatives were active in Kurdish areas in Iraq providing training for commando units. Israel used the North of Iraq as a base to obtain intelligence on Iraq, and Iran especially when the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. The Kurdish rebel leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the father of KRG president Masoud Barzani continuously gained the support of Mossad, Israel's intelligence agency during his numerous independence struggles against the central government in Baghdad.



Figure (204) This is a piece of Saddam Hussein's giant artillery; the length of the artillery is 150 meters and its shell reaches 600 miles this piece was confiscated by a British museum and currently is kept at Southampton Museum in the U.K. The engineer who designed this artillery was assassinated by the Israeli sect service Mossad.



Figure (205) Kurds flying an Israeli flag and Kurdish flags during an event to urge people to vote in the upcoming independence referendum.



Figure (206) Kurds flying an Israeli flag and Kurdish flags during an event to urge people to vote in the upcoming independence referendum.



Figure (207) Kurds flying an Israeli flag and Kurdish flags during an event to urge people to vote in the upcoming independence referendum.



Figure (208) photo of caricature commenting on the Kurdish independent referendum.

During the Kurdish referendum carried out by the KRG, the American administration in Washington came up with an alternative proposal to

the Kurds for the referendum, but Masoud Barzani rejected the American proposal, which suggested canceling the referendum and entering into negotiations with the central government in Baghdad to decide the future the city of Kirkuk with facilitation by the United States.

The Kurds rejected the American proposal, and they tried to annex more land from Iraq while Iraq was under occupation. In the view of many observers in Iraq, after the occupation of Iraq by the USA in 2003, the Iraqi Kurds were too confident that they would be able to annex the city of Kirkuk to the Kurdish Regional Government region. Also, the United States Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated on the 24th of September that *“it will not recognise the Kurdish referendum that was carried out on the 25th of September 2017 in Iraqi Kurdistan. “The vote and the results lack legitimacy, and we continue to support a united, federal, democratic, and prosperous Iraq,”* Tillerson said in a statement.



Figure (214) The American released a statement showing that does not support the Kurdish independent referendum in Iraq.

The Kurdish referendum for independence was a nonbinding referendum and was fully opposed by all the countries in the region except for the state of Israel. But the officials from Baghdad, Iran, Türkiye, the UN, and the US led a coalition and lobbied hard to exclude Kirkuk from the referendum or to postpone the Kurdish referendum for independence in all areas.



Figure (209) The American released a statement showing that does not support the Kurdish independent referendum in Iraq.

The KRG's refusal to agree to these terms influenced the Iraqi army to plan for redeployment in the city of Kirkuk.

However, on the 25th of September 2017, a Kurdish independence referendum was held by the Kurds in areas that were under their control, including the city of Kirkuk, which prompted Baghdad to change its policy towards the KRG. Regardless of this, after the referendum, the Kurdish authorities stated that the Kurdish referendum had been successful with 93 percent of the Kurdish people voting for “Yes” for independence.

After t conducting the Kurdish referendum, there was jubilation amongst the Kurds. The Kurds celebrated by hosting and carrying a Kurdish and Israeli flag, and this action angered a lot of people in the region. The hosting of an Israeli flag by the Kurds after the Kurdish referendum was passed, inflamed many Iraqis who considered them as traitors. In the view of many observers, the Kurdish behaviour demonstrated that the Iraqi Kurds had no loyalty towards Iraq, and this was evident throughout the history of Iraq.



Figure (210) Kurdish people openly voted several times and there was a widespread of forgery.

Following the Kurdish referendum, the Iraqi parliament held an emergency meeting and voted in favour of the dismissal of all public sector Kurdish employees who had participated in illegal voting in the Kurdish referendum. The Iraqi court ordered the arrest of those instrumental in forming an independent commission that led to the referendum.

The implementation of the Kurdish referendum by the Kurdish Regional Government angered the Republic of Turkey, the Republic

of Iraq, and the Islamic Republic of Iran and as a result of this referendum, an urgent meeting was held between these three countries to discuss measures required to be taken towards the Kurdish Regional Government in response.

In the meantime, the Prime Minister of Iraq, Haider al-Abadi had warned the Kurdish leaders that the Kurdish independence referendum was a threat to the Iraqi territory integrity, and he threatened to act against the KRG unless the Kurds annulled, also he stated that the result of the referendum was determined as illegal and unconstitutional.

The Kurdish referendum was completely opposed and rejected by both Turkmen and Arabs, whereas the Kurds in northern Iraq were overwhelmingly in favour of Kurdish independence. Nevertheless, the central government in Baghdad heaped pressure on the KRG and demanded that they cancel the Kurdish independent referendum. Also, the Iraqi parliament urged the Iraqi central government to send troops to take control of vital oil fields held by Kurdish forces.

At this time Iraq and Turkish armies started joint exercises near the KRG border. The Turkish and Iraqi military drills on the KRG border put additional pressure on the KRG to cancel their overwhelming support for independence.

Because of the pressure applied by the Iraqi and Turkish governments on the KRG, a foreign airline began suspending flights to Kurdish airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. The Iraqi Civil Aviation Authority banned international flights to Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. However, although there was pressure to cancel the Kurdish Independent Referendum by the Turkish and Iraqi authorities, the Kurdish authorities rejected Baghdad's demands that they should annul the referendum as a condition for dialogue.

After a few days of meetings and negotiations between KRG and Iraq, Türkiye, Iran, which led to a deadlock, the consequences of which forced the Iraqi, Turkish, and Iranian governments to take several actions against the KRG.

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi stated that a proviso to hold any dialogue with the KRG would require that Kurdish leaders hand over all the oil fields in Kirkuk and other disputed areas that fell under Kurdish control.

The Iraqi central government demanded that the Kurdish Regional Government hand the border control gate on the Turkish border to central government control, but the KRG rejected the Iraqi central government's demands.

Then, an urgent meeting was held in the Dukan district in northern Iraq between the leadership of both Kurdish parties KDP and PUK, and the Iraqi president Fuad Masum also attended the meeting, who is also a PUK member. The meeting ended in the district of Dukan with a Kurdish affirmation of national unity in the face of all pressure. The Kurdish authority in northern Iraq refused to cancel the referendum result published in a press statement released by Hemin Hawrami, a senior assistant to Kurdistan president Masoud Barzani.

However, the Kirkuk governor Dr. Najmaddin Omer Karim released a statement encouraging the Kurdish people to carry arms and to block the roads in Kirkuk, revolting against the Iraqi army and PMU. However, some armed civilian Kurds took to the streets of the city of Kirkuk, carrying arms and vowing to defend their land.

At this time, serious negotiations were conducted between Iraqi officials and the Kurdish Regional Government but again, both the KDP and PUK rejected any demands to nullify the referendum results and they refused to accept any preconditions imposed on them before any talks with the central government in Baghdad.

The situation was tense between the KRG and the central government while negotiations were ongoing in Baghdad. The Kurdish KDP party in Kirkuk facilitated hundreds of PKK terrorists from the districts of Daquq, Makhmur, and Zap area to descend on Kirkuk to participate in the fighting against the Iraqi army and hashed al-Shaabi "PMU". This action by the KDP party angered the Iraqi government, the Turkmen, the Arabs, and the Turkish Republic. But Dr. Najmaddin Omer Karim, a Kurdish governor of Kirkuk province, responded to this accusation of the presence of the PKK terrorists in Kirkuk with a statement denying the presence of the PKK terrorists in Kirkuk.




Figure (211) PKK terrorists in Kirkuk who are being brought by the KDP party and KRG.

Najmadin Omer stated that it was just “a handful of Iraqi Kurds who were sympathizers of the P.K.K.’s goals who had arrived in Kirkuk that weekend and that they were not P.K.K. members and they were not armed.

The statement released by Dr. Najmadin Omer was not true. The PKK terrorists have been listed in most of Europe, the USA, and Turkish as terrorist groups. **[Doc.25]**

The Kurdish regional Government's main aim in bringing the PKK terrorists to Kirkuk and the surrounding region was to change the demography of the city of Kirkuk and to terrorize the Turkmens and Arabs

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

كۆماری عێراقی فیدرال ئەنجومەتی پارێزگای كەرکوك ئەنجومەتی قەزای داڤوق ژمارە / ٤٧٧ بەروار / ١٦ / ٢٠١٥		جەمھوریە العێراقی الفدرالی مجلس محافظة كركوك مجلس قضاء داڤوق العدد / ٤٧٧ التاريخ / ١٦ / ٢٠١٥
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(نقاتل فلوق داعش بيشمركة وجيشا وحشدا شعبيا)

إلى / مركز شرطة داڤوق
 م / عدم معانعة

لامانع لدينا من فتح مقر لقوات PKK في مركز قضاء داڤوق وبالتنسيق مع شرطة داڤوق
 والاجهزة الأمنية خدمة للحفاظ على سلامة وأمن المواطنين في القضاء .

.... مع التقدير....

د. أمير خندا كرم محمد
 رئيس مجلس قضاء داڤوق
 ٢٠١٥ / ٥ / ١٦

E-mail, drAmirMir1972@yahoo-com
 Mobile-07701586075 Face book
 dr amir khuda karam

Document (25) Shows the KDP councilor of the sub-district of Daquq forwarding a confidential letter to the chief Kurdish police requesting to open a headquarters for the PKK terrorists in Daquq.

Republic of Iraq
Kirkuk Govern ring Committee.
District of Daquq Committee

Issue: 267
Date: 6/5/2015

To: The Daquq Police Station
Subject: No objection

There is no objection from outside to opening a headquarters for the PKK in the district of Daquq in conjunction with Daquq police and security department to service the security of the citizens in Daquq.

With regards

Dr. Amir Kheda Keram Mohammed
Head of the Daquq Council Committee

6/5/2015

Figure (25) Document shows the KDP councilor of the sub-district of Daquq forwarding a confidential letter to the chief Kurdish police requesting to open a headquarters for the PKK terrorists in Daquq.

Before moving the Iraqi troops to the city of Kirkuk, the tensions between the KRG militia and Popular Mobilisation Units near Kirkuk were extremely tense and volatile. By the afternoon of Saturday 14th October 2017, news broke in the city of Kirkuk that the Iraqi forces had issued a statement stating that 2.00 pm was the final deadline for the Kurdish forces to withdraw from Kirkuk but Iraqi officials in Kirkuk called the reports false. On the evening of the 14th of October, the Iraqi army used helicopters to drop leaflets on the population in Kirkuk stating that the Iraqi army was continuing to liberate the city of Kirkuk.

On the 15th Sunday of October 2017, a deadline was given by the Iraqi central government to the Kurdish forces to withdraw from contested areas (Kirkuk) or face unspecified consequences, but by the time the deadline lapsed, the Kurdish militias remained in their positions in Kirkuk. The Kurdish militia ignored the Iraqi central government's demands and the Kurds firmly continued to refuse to comply with the request from the Iraqi government.




Figure (212) leaflets were thrown to the citizens in Kirkuk by the Iraqi army arguing the people to support the Iraqi army and the Iraqi army continues to liberate the occupied cities and towns.

Prior to the liberation of the city of Kirkuk, the Iraqi government surrounded the city of Kirkuk and shut down overseas flights in the Kurdish international airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, as a result of this, many foreigners stationed in the city of Kirkuk left the city and headed to the city of Erbil.

By late Sunday 15th October 2017, Iraq's foreign ministry announced that Iran closed its borders with Iraq near the Kurdish region as requested by the Iraqi government. The situation on the ground in the city of Kirkuk was unclear and chaos ensued resulting in people living in fear, worry, and uncertainty. The Kurdish police and security service were dismayed and were scattered over the city of Kirkuk.

The Turkmen parties in Kirkuk and the Turkish government were continuously monitoring the situation in the city of Kirkuk to ensure the Turkmen in Kirkuk would not be subjected to harm and result in a massacre as was the case in 1959, where hundreds of Turkmen were killed by the Kurdish communist militia.

On the same day, Dr. Najmaddin Omer the Kurdish governor of Kirkuk released a statement and called upon the public in the city of Kirkuk to fight the Iraqi army and stated that "the city of Kirkuk will be a graveyard for the Iraqi army". Ironically, he was one of the first people who escaped from the city of Kirkuk and took the money of the Kirkuk governorate treasure which was estimated to be a million dollars. [50] whereas Kamal Karikokly, the Kurdish commander for the district of Dibis area, before the liberation of Kirkuk, Kamal Karikokly reported to the Kurdish media and TV station that he expected an attack by government forces at any time and that if they tried to attack, the result would be "bad for them (Iraqi army) and for us, and the whole region."

Before the Iraqi armed forces and PMUs attack on the city of Kirkuk, Kamal Karikokly and Dr. Najmaddin Kareem Omer were two of the first people to run away from the city of Kirkuk to Erbil without putting up any military resistance against the Iraqi armed forces and popular mobilization unit's "PMU" (Hashed al-Shaabi).

However, late on Sunday 15th of October 2017, the president of the KRG Masoud Barzani, released a statement and offered negotiation with the central government in Baghdad on Kirkuk and other issues, without conditions. In response to this, the Iraqi Prime Minister Mr. Abadi had said "*he will not negotiate unless the Kurds annul the referendum results*" carried out on the 25th of September 2017.

⁵⁰Former Kirkuk governor Najmaddin Karim accused of corruption, <https://ekurd.net/kirkuk-najmaldin-karim-corruption-2018-02-21>

On the night of Sunday 15th of October 2017, Iraqi Prime Minister Mr. Abadi released a statement and accused the Kurdish leader of bringing fighters from the Kurdistan Workers' Party in Türkiye into Kirkuk, calling it "a declaration of war against the rest of Iraq and its federal forces". He also stated that the PKK terrorists have been listed in the terror list of the United States and European Union. The Iraqi central government demanded from the KRG the following requests via the Kurdish leadership of the PUK in the city of Sulaymaniyah.



Figure (213) Kamal Karikokly and Najmadin Omer, who first fled from Kirkuk ahead of the Iraqi army & PMU arrival, all have been wanted by the government for theft and misusing local funds.

To surrender the Kirkuk airbase to the Iraqi central government in Baghdad.

To surrender the K1 Military camp in Kirkuk to the Iraqi central government.

To surrender all the oil wells in Kirkuk to the Iraqi central government in Baghdad.

To surrender all the ISIL terrorists who were captive at the KRG to be handed over to the central government in Baghdad.

To return all the areas that were under Kurdish control, and which were controlled by the Iraqi army before being occupied by ISIL, back to the central government in Baghdad.

The Kurdish parties should comply with all central government decisions regarding the resignation of the Kirkuk governor Najmaddin Omer



جمهورية العراق
 REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
 General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers

الدائرة القانونية
 العدد: ٢٢٥٤٨ / ٢٧/٢٠١٧
 التاريخ: ٢٠١٧/١٠/

المحكمة الاتحادية العليا / مكتب رئيس المحكمة
 مجلس القضاة الأعلى / مكتب رئيس المجلس
 الوزارات كافة / مكتب الوزير
 الجهات غير المرتبطة بوزارة
 المحافظات كافة / مكتب المحافظ
 مجالس المحافظات كافة / مكتب رئيس المجلس
 الموضوع: **القرار**

تحية طيبة ...

بالنظر لمشاركة بعض الموظفين أو المكلّنين بخدمة عامة بتنفيذ إجراءات استقالة الإقليم خالفاً لقرار المحكمة الاتحادية العليا رقم (٩٤) (تدنية/٢٠١٧) الصرح في ٢٠١٧/٩/١٨ وحيث أن قرارات المحكمة الاتحادية العليا باتت وملزمة استناداً إلى أحكام المادة (٩٤) من الدستور وأحرص لتكثيف الاعاء العام من القيام بواجباته قانوناً ، نرجو تزويد الاعاء العام بأسماء المشمولين بالوصف المذكور لتتولى ملاحقة المذكورين أصولياً .

للتفضل بالعلم وأخذ ما يلزم ... مع التقدير .

هـ . مهدي حسين الخليل
 الأمين العام لمجلس الوزراء وقناة
 ٢٠١٧/١٠/

صعداً على:

- رئاسة الجمهورية / القنون
- مجلس النواب / مكتب رئيس المجلس
- مكتب رئيس مجلس الوزراء
- الأمانة العامة لمجلس الوزراء / مكتب الأمين العام
- الأمانة العامة لمجلس الوزراء / مكتب معاون الأمين العام
- الأمانة العامة لمجلس الوزراء / دفتر الأمانة العامة كافة
- الأمانة العامة لمجلس الوزراء / الدائرة القانونية / قسم التصريح / مع الأوقات الأصلية ... مع التقدير .
- البريد الإلكتروني

Republic of Iraq

Legal Department
Issue/2/227/ 32548
Date 09/20/2017

Supreme Electoral Court/ Office of the Chief Justice
Supreme Judicial Council/Chairman's office
All ministerial offices/ Ministry office
The parties are not affiliated with the ministry.
All provinces/ Governor Office
All governorate council/Chairman's office

Subject: Resolution
Greeting

Given the participation of some employees or those charged with a public service in implementing the regional referendum procedures contrary to the decision of the Federal Supreme Court No. 24 \ Federal \ 2017 dated 09/18/017, the occurrence of decisions of the Federal Supreme Court that it is binding based on the provisions of Article 94 of the Constitution and to enable the Public Prosecution to carry out its duties legally.

We would like to provide the Public Prosecution with the names of those included in the description so that he can pursue the persons in the court.

Dr. Mahdi Muhsin Al-Alaq
Secretary General of the Council of Ministers in his Absence
08/10/2017

6. CHAPTER SIX

6.1 THE KURDISH DEFEAT IN KIRKUK AND THE LIBERATION OF THE DISTRICT OF ALTUN KÖPRÜ

On Sunday 15th October 2017, the government in Baghdad decided to curtail the territorial ambitions of the Kurds to annex the city of Kirkuk to KRG territory. During the Kurdish military presence in Kirkuk, the situation for the Turkmens and Arabs had deteriorated, the Turkmens and Arabs completely opposed the Kurdish militia and Kurdish security Asayish presence in Kirkuk. The situation on the ground in Kirkuk was a very volatile, and extremely unstable place for both Arabs and Turkmen, creating an unbearable situation for them. The Turkmens were kidnapped, arrested, oppressed, discriminated against, abused, and assassinated by the Kurdish militia who were fully supported by the American military and the Israeli secret service agents.

During the Kurdish rule in Kirkuk, the land of the Turkmens well as the land belong lands belonging to the earlier Saddam Hussein regime was confiscated by the Kurds. These lands were confiscated unlawfully and were redistributed to the Kurdish militia members resident in the city of Erbil as a reward for being a member of the Kurdish party. Some Kurds who had been given the land had never into Kirkuk in their entire life.

The main aim of the Kurdish militia to redistribute free land to Kurds from outside of the city of Kirkuk was to: Change the demography of Kirkuk; Increase the Kurdish population; Reduce the Turkmen population and finally reduce the influence of the Turkmen population in the city of Kirkuk.

During Dr. Najmaddin Omer's rule, the demography of Kirkuk was completely changed and altered by the Kurdish parties. The number of Kurds brought and settled in the city of Kirkuk increased dramatically, especially when thousands of Kurds were brought from Syria, Türkiye, Erbil, Duhok, Iran, and Sulaymaniyah.

The Turkmen and Arabs were frightened, oppressed, kidnapped, arrested, and scared to demand their legitimate rights because they feared being arrested and potentially assassinated by the Kurdish militia who were running the town with an iron fist.

The Turkmen employees were forced out for early retirement, and they were prevented from being employed in government offices. The Turkmen directors for the hospitals, universities, and police were replaced by the Kurds so that the Kurds could have more influence in running and decision-making in these departments.

The demographic changes in Kirkuk didn't stop there but continued to bring thousands of Kurds from various Kurdish regions to be employed in Kirkuk. Kurdish pregnant women were brought from Erbil and Sulaymaniyah to have a birth in Kirkuk so that the parents could obtain a Kirkuk birth certificate. The Kurd plans to implement a long-term strategy especially if the UN has decided to conduct a referendum on the future of the city of Kirkuk. Then, the Kurds will be able to use their birth certificates as documentary evidence that they represent the overwhelming majority in Kirkuk.

The discrimination against the Turkmen and Arabs in the government offices and all aspects of life in Kirkuk reached its highest level. The illegitimate Kurdish discrimination, oppression, and unfairness that had been conducted against both the Turkmen and Arabs increased dramatically. The demographic changes carried out by the Kurdish militia and Najmadin Omer created huge hatred by Turkmen, and Arabs in Kirkuk towards the Kurdish citizens in general and especially toward the Kurdish parties.

Also, the rapid demographic changes in Kirkuk created a huge rift and anger amongst the Turkmen and Arabs towards the Kurds. The Turkmen and Arabs' anger towards the Kurd's monopoly reached its boiling point during the Najmadin Omer administration. The tension was increasing amongst the citizens in the city of Kirkuk who were expecting to see a civil war as an outcome of this.

There were several complaints and demands from Turkmen and Arab citizens against the Kurdish administration in Kirkuk. The Turkmen and Arab MPs openly were requesting for urgent government intervention to prevent a civil war in Kirkuk, and to halt the Kurdish assimilation policy, and abuse of power in Kirkuk.

Continuous complaints were submitted by the Turkmen MP Niyazi Memaroglu to the Iraqi government, which played an important and active role in championing the Kirkuk issue to the Iraqi Parliament agenda and exposing the Kirkuk governor's assimilation policy.

As a result of these complaints, this forced the Iraqi parliament to take several resolutions against him but all the agreed actions by the Iraqi parliament were ignored and Najmadin Karim refused the implementation of the Iraqi Parliament resolution.

In the view of many observers, his refusal increased and added more tension amongst the Turkmen, Arabs, and Kurds in Kirkuk. This was considered one of the main reasons that forced the government in Baghdad to take direct action against the Kirkuk governor by sending the Iraqi army to Kirkuk.

Before the liberation of Kirkuk from the Kurdish occupation, the central government in Baghdad took several measures against Najmadin Omer and the Kurdish Regional Government in Kirkuk. The Iraqi government openly warned the KRG and especially the Kirkuk governor Najmadin Omer to stop his discrimination policy in Kirkuk. The Iraqi government openly accused the KRG of creating tension among the ethnic groups through its continuous and direct KRG intervention in Kirkuk.

After the Iraqi parliament decided against the Kirkuk governor, the situation in Kirkuk deteriorated because Najmadin Omer ignored and refused the implementation of the Iraqi Parliament resolution and he continued his discrimination policy.

On Sunday 15th October 2017, the central government in Baghdad released an extraordinarily strong statement warning the Kurdish factions stationed in Kirkuk of consequences if the Kurdish militia did not pull out from the city of Kirkuk within a specified time given by the Iraqi government. However, this government warning was ignored by the Kurdish militia.

In the meantime, Najmadin Omer released a statement encouraging the public in general, and especially the Kurds to take to the streets and carry arms against the Iraqi central government. But his request was ignored by Arabs and Turkmen. However, a handful of the Kurdish members who belonged to the KDP Kurdish party and PKK terrorists carried out his demands.

On Monday 16th of October 2017, Iraqi state television released a statement, stating, that the Iraqi forces had begun an operation to liberate the city of Kirkuk from the Kurdish militia. By the afternoon of the 16th of October 2017, the Iraqi army accompanied by the “Al_Hashed Al_Shaibi” Popular Mobilization Units “PMU” moved to liberate the city of Kirkuk.

In the meantime, a brief statement was released by the state-run Iraqi network in Baghdad stating that the Iraqi troops have begun their military operation in the city of Kirkuk. The statement included, that Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, ordered Iraqi troops to impose security in the area and to cooperate with the people of Kirkuk.

During the Iraqi army operation in Kirkuk, there was total dismay, mayhem, chaos, uncertainty, and fear among the Kurds who were living in Kirkuk.

After a few hours of the military operation and the Iraqi army entering the city of Kirkuk, the Kurdish militia and the PKK terrorist group disappeared from the city of Kirkuk. This was shocking news for the Iraqi people seeing the Kurdish forces withdraw from the city of Kirkuk without retaliating with military resistance towards the Iraqi troops.

The Kurds who did not manage to escape from Kirkuk feared the reprisals of the Turkmen and Arabs for the atrocities and crimes that had been committed. However, within a few hours of the arrival of the Iraqi troops in Kirkuk, a large number of Kurds escaped from the town. When the Iraqi troops arrived, they took full control of several oil fields, including the key point Baba Gurgur oil field, and gas field around Kirkuk, the K1 military base without any resistance from the Kurdish troops who were previously stationed there.

By the evening of the 16th of October 2017, the Iraqi security forces had taken full control of the city, driving out hundreds of Kurdish Peshmerga and PKK terrorists that were stationed in Kirkuk. The Kurdish militia easily and unexpectedly abandoned their positions in Taza Khormatu, Terkalan, Yaychi, Basheer, Terkalan, Bulawa, Daquq, Altin Kopru, and Taza Khormatu without putting up any military resistance against the Iraqi army. Although the Kurdish troops that were linked to the KRG were well trained and armed with military equipment by the US armed forces.

On the same day, the Iraqi forces set up checkpoints around the city of Kirkuk perimeter, and they removed all the Kurdish flags from the government buildings, streets, and from the top of the Kirkuk governor's headquarters and they were replaced with replaced solely with Iraqi flags.

Also, the Kurdish militia leaders and KDP party members who were responsible for terrorizing the citizens of Kirkuk quickly escaped from Kirkuk toward Erbil without putting any military resistance.

After the Iraqi troops entered Kirkuk, the situation in the city of Kirkuk was very tense, and there was uncertainty among the people. The uncertainty and tension were extremely noticeable on the outskirts of the city of Kirkuk where the chaos and disbelief of the Kurdish paramilitary and Kurdish families escaping from Kirkuk. Thousands of cars and vehicles belonging to the Kurdish citizens were queuing towards the outskirts of the city of Kirkuk and loaded with their families and belongings as they were running away.

The Kurdish escapees from the city of Kirkuk were forcibly stopped by the Kurdish militia who were carrying light machine guns. The Kurdish escapees were insulted and abused, and their cars were kicked by their Kurdish militia because they did not want to stay to fight.

The Kurdish militia stood on the main roads towards the city of Erbil and made their own checkpoint and took the law into their hands. They tried to prevent the Kurdish vehicles and cars from leaving the city of Kirkuk but without any success. There was anger and fear amongst the Kurdish civilians who were trying to escape the advance of the Iraqi troops.

As an observer, it was ironic to see the Kurdish militia standing on the main road on the outskirts of Kirkuk attacking their people instead of fighting the Iraqi troops and PMU. The Kurdish militia abuse did not stop there; they also, attacked the Kurdish families with stones, kicking their cars with the butt of the machine guns that they were carrying and accusing them of being a coward and a traitor for not putting up a fight against the Iraqi central government.

Nevertheless, within a few hours of the fighting between the Kurdish militia and the Iraqi army, the Iraqi forces took full control of the city of Kirkuk and the Kurdish military forces without hardly a shot being fired by the Kurdish militia. The Kurdish police who previously

controlled the city of Kirkuk and who had been harassing the Turkmens and Arabs, pulled out of the city in a rush without putting up any resistance. Some of the police escaped from Kirkuk wearing civilian clothes to avoid being found and arrested for the crimes and atrocities that had been committed against the Turkmen and Arabs.

During the liberation, according to the information that was released by the Iraqi government, there was disorganised resistance from the Kurdish militia toward the Iraqi army. The Iraqi government stated twenty-two Kurdish militia were killed in the sporadic fighting and the majority of those killed were from the PKK terrorists who were brought to Kirkuk by the KDP party, while seven Iraqi soldiers also lost their lives.

The liberation of Kirkuk was a remarkable setback for the Kurdish Regional Government who just a few weeks prior had liberated the city of Kirkuk and had conducted an independence referendum trying to annex the city of Kirkuk to KRG.

During the independence referendum, although the KRG had the support from the US, Israeli and some Western countries to conduct independence referendum, the central government in Baghdad was able to liberate Kirkuk, without hardly any resistance put up by the Kurdish forces which came as a profound surprise to international observers.

Yet, the Iraqi Kurdish defeat did not stop in Kirkuk, and by the evening of Tuesday 17th of October 2017. The KRG had lost other vast territories, some of which the KRG had controlled since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

During the operation of the liberation of Kirkuk, the US administration in Washington released a statement, and the Pentagon urged all involved people in the region to focus on battling Islamic State militants and to avoid provoking disputes amongst the Iraqi people.

The US statement in Washington was a clear sign of keeping its distance from supporting the KRG. Whereas the president of the KRG Masoud Barzani assumed, that American support would shield him from Iraqi retaliation from the time when he had called the referendum.

However, the Americans did not take any action against the Iraqi army when the central government sent their troops to Kirkuk. Also, the central government in Baghdad ignored the plight of the president of the KRG Masoud Barzani from entering the city of Kirkuk. However, the American, Trump-led administration merely muttered some weasel words about not liking to see friends fight.

This is the second time in a brief history of Iraq that the Kurdish political parties were not learning a lesson from their history. For example, when the king of Iran Mohamed Rida Shah Pahlavi ceased to support the Kurdish rebellion against the Iraqi government in 1973. But by the morning of the 18th of October 2017, the city of Kirkuk and the surrounding district were under the control of the Iraqi army and the area that had been controlled previously by the KRG had shrunk dramatically by almost half. The Iraqi army liberated the lands back to its original boundary.

This was a clear sign that Kirkuk would never be a part of KRG, and if the Kurds somehow managed to annex the city of Kirkuk to the Kurdish Regional Government, then both the Turkish Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran would intervene to prevent that.

After the expulsion of the Kurdish forces from Kirkuk, the Iraqi armed and security forces stormed the headquarters of the Kurdish parties and Kurdish security offices in various neighbourhoods in Kirkuk. These premises were used to imprison the ISIL terrorists and Turkmens Kirkuk citizens who opposed the Kurdish administration policy.

These prisoners were taken to Erbil by the Kurdish security forces. The Iraqi armed and security forces found the corpses of many Iraqi citizens killed and their bodies were dumped into the sewage by the Kurdish secret services police. Also, Iraqi armed and security forces obtained a lot of documents showing interrogation of the prisoners and they found tools and devices used for the torturing of prisoners.



Figure (214) the advance by the central government security forces on Kirkuk took place quicker than expected.



Figure (215) the advance by the central government's Iraqi security forces on Kirkuk



Figure (216) Iraqi federal police advance toward the disputed city of Kirkuk.



Figure (217) Iraqi forces advancing towards Kirkuk.



Figure (218) Locals' wave to Iraqi forces as they arrive in southern Kirkuk.



Figure (220) people greeted the troops rolling through the streets with cheers.



Figure (219) Ayatollah Hussein Sistani's office the religious leader of the Shi'aa in Iraq released a statement stating that “who stands against the Iraqi central government and the Republic of Iraq and should be fought against them.



Figure (221) The Turkmen sub-district of Bulawa was liberated from Kurdish-occupied forces by the PMU.



Figure (222) the KRG was removed, and the Iraqi flag was hosted above the Kirkuk provincial government.



Figure (223) Iraq forces in the office of the departed Kirkuk provincial Government Najmadin Omer



Figure (224) Turkmen member of Iraqi parliament Niyazi Memaroglu sitting at the office of the departed Kirkuk provincial government Najmadin Omer after the liberation of Kirkuk by the Iraqi army and PMUs on 17/10/2017 Kirkuk-TURKMENELI



Figure (225) Turkmen member of Iraqi parliament Niyazi Memaroglu sitting at the office of the departed Kirkuk provincial government Najmadin Omer after the liberation of Kirkuk by the Iraqi army and PMUs on 17/10/2017 Kirkuk-TURKMENELI



Figure (226) On the 17th of October the Turkmen member of the Iraqi Parliament Mr. Niyazi Memaroglu on the Kirkuk Qalesi (Kirkuk Castel) prior to giving his speech about the removal of the fugitive Kurdish governor of Kirkuk and liberation of Kirkuk from the Kurdish occupation Kirkuk- TURKMENELI



Figure (227) On the 17th of October the Turkmen member of the Iraqi Parliament Mr. Niyazi Memaroglu on the street of Kirkuk after the removal of the fugitive Kurdish governor of Kirkuk and liberation of Kirkuk from the Kurdish occupation Kirkuk- TURKMENELI



Figure (228) Iraqi kids pulling a Kurdish flag in the street after the Kurdish militia fled Kirkuk, Kirkuk- TURKMENELI



Figure (229) Barriers with defaced Kurdish flags are seen outside of an evacuated checkpoint in the village of Basheer south of Kirkuk Iraq Friday, Oct. 13, 2017, Kirkuk- TURKMENELI

In the meantime, the Kirkuk governor Najmadin Omer and many Kurdish police had fled from Kirkuk before the city of Kirkuk was liberated by the Iraqi army. The Kurdish militia left the city of Kirkuk in a rush and left behind their ammunitions that were provided by the US and some European countries that were used to kill the Iraqi people after the occupation of Iraq in 2003.

The Kurdish army's defeat in Kirkuk was a big shock for the Iraqi people. The Iraqi army was flabbergasted to see highly trained and well-equipped Kurdish troops by the UK, US, and Germany fleeing the city of Kirkuk without putting up any military resistance.

As a Turkmen observer, one of the main reasons for the Kurdish defeat in Kirkuk was: A Kurdish racist mentality and expansion aptitude to occupy the lands of other people: The greed of the Kurdish leadership and their expansion policy.

It is extremely important to remember, that after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, the Kurdish militia took the opportunity for the lack of stability and security in Iraq. The Kurdish parties had full control of the city of Kirkuk militarily with the help of the US forces. The Kurdish militia took more share than had been expected.

The Kurds immediately began conducting their expansion policy which is known as the Kurdification policy.

The Kurdification policy conducted by the Kurds in Kirkuk after 2003 was more vicious and aggressive than the Arabization policy that was conducted by the Saddam Hussein government.

The oppression, kidnapping, human rights abuse, and confiscation of Turkmen lands, the Kurdish aspiration to establish greater Kurdistan made the Turkmen and Arabs stand firmly against the Kurdish agenda.

As a matter of fact, before the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, there was a lot of sympathy and support for the Kurdish fighters from the Turkmen. There were a lot of Turkmen siding along the side of the Kurdish rebels fighting the Saddam Hussein regime. However, after the occupation of Iraq in 2003, the Turkmen's support for the Kurdish cause dropped to its lowest level. As a Turkmen observer, the Kurdish militia desertion from the city of Kirkuk can be summarized as follows:

The Kurdish defeat in Kirkuk was caused by a lack of a proper military plan against the incoming Iraqi troops to Kirkuk. The distrust and a wide division between the two Kurdish parties PUK and KDP were some of the factors that contributed to their defeat.

In the view of many Iraqi observers and a military analyst the Kurdish defeat in Kirkuk was caused by low morale amongst the Kurdish

fighters and desertion of the Kurdish force's leadership from Kirkuk before the arrival of the Iraqi army.

The Iraqi army and PMU were more highly motivated than the Kurdish forces and they had a full initiative than the Kurdish forces. The Kurdish forces that were stationed in Kirkuk were considered by the local people in the city of Kirkuk as mercenaries and occupiers.

The most crucial factor for the Kurdish defeat in Kirkuk was a lack of courage and motivation among the Kurd fighters because Kirkuk was not a part of the KRG.

The overwhelming majority of the Kurds brought by came to Kirkuk via a Kurdish parties was for economic reasons, and to increase the Kurdish population and these Kurdish economic migrants were not prepared to fight against the Iraqi government troops.

During the liberation of the city of Kirkuk, both Turkmen and Arabs sided with and supported the Iraqi central government troops. The damage and mistrust that was caused by the Kurdish governor Najmadin Omer against the Turkmen and Arabs played tremendous roles in defeating the Kurdish troops in Kirkuk since both ethnic groups supported the Iraqi army and PMU.

Finally, most of the Kurdish fighters that settled in Kirkuk were not originally from there, but they were attached to the PKK terrorist group which came from northern Syria and the southern republic of Türkiye.

After the Iraqi army victory, the Kurdish fighters who belonged to the KDP party blamed their defeat and failure on their rival Kurdish PUK party. They accused the PUK party of betrayal by siding with the Iraqi central government.

In reality, this was not the case since the security of Kirkuk was completely under the control of the KDP militia. During the liberation of Kirkuk, the Turkmen and Arabs welcomed the Iraqi army and the PMU. Most of the PMU unit members that participated with the Iraqi army in the liberation of Kirkuk were from the Turkmen Shi'a who originated from the districts of Telfer and Tuz Khormatu.

The rapid fall of Kirkuk on the hand of the Iraqi troops gave impetus to the capitulation across northern Iraq. The Iraqi army and PMU forces swept the Kurdish-controlled area unopposed into areas that military leaders thought they would have to fight for. After a day from

the stunning collapse and defeat of the Kurdish forces in Kirkuk. The Peshmerga units loyal to the defacto Kurdish president Masoud Barzani were forced to pull out of the towns of Bashiqa, Khanaqin, and Sinjar. Finally, on the 17th of October 2017, the Iraqi army fully liberated the city of Kirkuk.



Figure (230) The Popular Mobilization Unit which was formed by the Turkmen Shi'a from the district of Telfer before liberating Kirkuk in 2017, Kirkuk- TURKMENELI

The liberation of the city of Kirkuk shattered the ambitions, dreams, and aspirations of the Kurds from annexing the city of Kirkuk to the Kurdish Regional Government. After the Iraqi army entered the city of Kirkuk, they found empty streets, shuttered shops, and primitive roadblocks created by the Kurdish fighters, which were quickly cleared, before the relaxed arrivals accepted their new positions.

The liberation of Kirkuk from the Kurdish occupation was an important and significant day for the Turkmen and Arabs. Both ethnic groups welcomed the PMU and the Iraqi army and there was jubilation and celebration in all Kirkuk. The people in Kirkuk ran into the street showing their support, jubilation, and welcoming the Iraqi army, people offered food, flowers, and water to the incoming Iraqi soldiers and PMU members and they were received as heroes.

There was celebration everywhere in Kirkuk, and the people were firing bullets into the sky using automatic machine guns AK-47 expressing their joy, happiness, and jubilation. There was no sorrow and sympathy for the Kurdish forces' defeats.



Figure (231) Kurds crossing a Kurdish checkpoint in Altin Kopru set up by Kurdish Peshmerga, Kirkuk- TURKMENELI



Figure (232) A Peshmerga rests on the side of the Erbil-Kirkuk Road after his unit fled Kirkuk, following a military operation by the Iraqi PMU to retake the city of Kirkuk, Kirkuk- TURKMENELI



Figure (233) Kurdish Peshmerga Commander crying after they had been defeated by the Iraqi army and the PMU in Kirkuk.



Figure (234) PKK fighters on the streets of Kirkuk putting resistance against the Iraqi army and popular Mobilization Units and the PKK terrorists listed in the US, UK, Türkiye, and most European terrorist lists, Kirkuk- TURKMENELI



Figure (235) PKK fighters on the streets of Kirkuk putting resistance against the Iraqi army and popular Mobilization Units and the PKK terrorists listed in the US, UK, Türkiye, and most European terrorist lists, Kirkuk- TURKMENELI



Figure (236) An Iraqi soldier removes a Kurdish flag from Altin Kopru on the outskirts of Erbil, Kirkuk- TURKMENELI



Figure (237) US supplied equipment to Kurds including tanks, being used to bulldoze images of Iraqi Kurdistan president Masoud Barzani. Kirkuk- TURKMENELI



Figure (238) Turkmen fighters putting a pair of slippers on the mouth of the PKK terrorist leader Abdullah Ocalan in Kirkuk, Kirkuk- TURKMENELI

An official statement was released by the KDP party, which stated, that the Kurdish defeats in Kirkuk were caused by a secret deal that was reached between a Patriotic Union of Kurdistan “PUK” leader

Mr. Bafel Talabani, the eldest son of former president Jalal Talabani, and Hadi al-Ameri the head of the Popular Mobilization Units “PMU.”

The KDP party spokesperson also stated the central government in Baghdad and the PUK will be establishing a new authority area for the Kurds in Halabja-Sulaymaniyah-Kirkuk. The KDP party also stated the federal government in Baghdad would manage the oil wells of Kirkuk and other strategic locations in the city while also overseeing the public sector payroll.



Figure (239) Kurds were fleeing Kirkuk prior liberation of Kirkuk by the Iraqi army and PMUs, Kirkuk- TURKMENELI

The Kurdish defeat in Kirkuk brought disappointment and frustration amongst the Kurdish militia. As a consequence, the Kurdish militia began discriminately firing artillery shells and mortar bombs using long-range artillery on the innocent Turkmen who were living in the sub-district of Altin Kopru.

The Kurdish bombardment of the Turkmen sub-district of Altin Kopru caused tremendous damage to the civilian houses and caused panic and fear among the people in the district.

The aim of the Kurdish militia shelling the Turkmen-populated district was to force the Turkmen to leave the area. However, the Iraqi army

quickly took the correct measures, and they succeeded in stopping the Kurdish shelling.

After the Kurdish defeat in Kirkuk, an overwhelming majority of the Iraqi population demanded that the Iraqi army should continue pushing the Kurdish militia out of the city of Erbil. However, the applied pressure on the Iraqi government from France, the US, and the UK made the Iraqi army cease its military operation against the Kurdish forces at the border of the sub-district of Alton Kopru.



Figure (240) Shells fired by the Kurdish militia on the Turkmen houses in Altin Kopru, Kirkuk- TURKMENELI



Figure (241) Damages caused by artillery and mortar shells fired by the Kurdish militia on the Turkmen houses in Altin Kopru, Kirkuk- TURKMENELI



Figure (242) Damages caused by artillery and mortar shells fired by the Kurdish militia on the Turkmen houses in Altin Kopru, Kirkuk- TURKMENELI



Figure (243) Damages caused by artillery and mortar shells fired by the Kurdish militia on the Turkmen houses in Altin Kopru, Kirkuk- TURKMENELI



Figure (244) Damages caused by artillery and mortar shells fired by the Kurdish militia on the Turkmen houses in Altin, Kirkuk- TURKMENELI

After the Kurdish defeats in Kirkuk, immediately the Turkmens in the city of Kirkuk demanded to return of their lands which were forcibly confiscated by the Kurd parties. Unfortunately, some of these

confiscated Turkmen lands were built on shopping centers, workshops, offices, private farms, petrol stations, and private houses. It was exceedingly difficult for the Turkmen citizen to get their lands back because of fear of the Kurdish reprisal, the corrupt judicial system in Iraq, and the Kurdish control judicial system in Kirkuk. During the occupation of the city of Kirkuk, the Kurdish party distributed confiscated Turkmen and governmental lands to the Kurds under gunpoint, but after the Kurdish defeat in Kirkuk, most of the Kurdish squatters escaped from the city of Kirkuk and this enabled some Turkmen to return their confiscated lands.



Figure (245) After the Kurdish defeat in Kirkuk, written in graffiti, the lands have been returned to their original and legitimate owners, Kirkuk- TURKMENELI.



Figure (246) After the Kurdish defeat in Kirkuk, written in graffiti, “Rujaeat” which means in Arabic “Returned” to their original and legitimate owners, Kirkuk-TURKMENELI



(247) the statue of the fugitive of the Kirkuk provincial governor Najmadin Omer left behind after the liberation of Kirkuk from Kurdish-occupied forces, Kirkuk-

During the Kurdish rule in Kerkuk, the Asayish (Kurdish secret police) in Kirkuk were responsible for the terrorizing, arresting, imprisonment, assassination, and kidnapping of innocent people. But

these Asayish escaped from Kirkuk in a rush leaving behind them important documents and offices. The Iraqi forces had for the first time to access some of these offices that were used by the Asayish. The Iraqi Special Anti-Terror Force was accompanied by various Iraqi TV stations and journalists. They discovered unbelievable torturing materials that were left by the Kurdish forces. The Iraqi special anti-terror force stated the Kurdish Asayish were using these premises for execution, torturing, and eliminating innocent people who opposed the idea of the annexation of the city of Kirkuk to the KRG. The Iraqi official TV station showed their office images of hundreds of mortar shells, bombs, and explosive materials that were ready to be used. Also, the Iraqi special anti-terror forces found torturing instruments, bomb-making material, and a number of corpses while checking the water sewage in their premises these bodies were badly decomposed there were signs of torture, and the bodies were unrecognition.



Figure (248) An employee from the water and sewage department in Kirkuk opening the sewage channel at the Asayish premises in Kirkuk, - TURKMENELI



Figure (249) The corpses of an innocent Turkmen killed by Asayish removed from the water sewage, Kirkuk- TURKMENELI



Figure (250) The corpses of an innocent Turkmen killed by Asayish and dumped into the water sewage, Kirkuk- TURKMENELI

In addition, the Iraqi special anti-terror forces found no traces of the prisoners that were in their possession. These prisoners were transferred to Erbil to cover up the undisputable atrocities and crimes that were committed against the innocent Turkmen and Arabs. The

Asayish who committed these despicable crimes are still at large, and none of these Asayish have been arrested to face justice.

After the liberation of Kirkuk, a tense negotiation was carried out between the Kurdish Regional Government and the Iraqi central government in general, especially regarding the future of the city of Kirkuk and the presence of the Kurdish troops in Kirkuk. The Turkmen and Arab parties' delegation openly requested the Iraqi central government to reject and refuse the demand of the Kurdish Regional Government demand from the return of the Asayish to the city of Kirkuk.

As the result of the despicable acts and crimes that are being conducted by the Asayish in Kirkuk. The Iraqi Parliament issued a resolution on 1/11/2017 per item 1 and article 59 of the Iraqi legislation preventing the Kurds from establishing and opening the Kurdish security headquarters in Kirkuk province except opening the headquarters for the Iraqi Federal Government Forces as shown in the document number. [26]

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مجلس النواب العراقي
البرلمان العراقي
البرلمان العراقي

العدد، ش. ل. / ١١ / ٢٠١٧
التاريخ، ١ / ١١ / ٢٠١٧

شؤون اللجان

(دستورنا خيمتنا .. والضمامن لوجدتنا الوطنية)

قرار نيابي
مجلس النواب
رقم (٢٨) لسنة ٢٠١٧

قرر مجلس النواب بجلسته التاسعة والعشرين والمنعقدة بتاريخ ٣١ / تشرين الاول / ٢٠١٧ من الفصل التشريعي الاول السنة التشريعية الرابعة / الدورة الانتخابية الثالثة واستناداً الى احكام المادة (٥٩ / ثانياً) من الدستور اصدار القرار الآتي:

عدم السماح بفتح اي مقر امنى او تواجد قوات غير اتحادية في كركوك والمناطق المتنازع عليها واقتصار حفظ الامن في هذه المناطق بالسلطة الاتحادية حصراً .

د. سليم عبد الله الجبوري
رئيس مجلس النواب
/ صفر / ١٤٣٩ هـ
/ تشرين الثاني / ٢٠١٧ م

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العراق - بغداد
قصر المؤتمرات
مجلس النواب

Document 26

Document 26 states that no permission shall be given in the establishment of any security offices and presence of any military forces to be established in Kirkuk province and distributed territory except and only the Iraqi Federal Government forces to restore security.

Republic of Iraq
House of Representatives

Date: 1/11/2017
Issue: S/L/1/9/1961

Subject: The Council's decision
The house representative
Number 68 for the year 2017

The members of the House of Representatives in its session 298 held on the 1st of November 2017, of the legislative term and based on the provisions of Article 59 issued the following resolution.

No permission shall be given for the establishment of any security offices and presence of any military forces to be established in Kirkuk province and distributed territory accept and only the Iraqi Federal Government forces to restore security.

Dr. Salim Abdullah Al_Juburi

Chairman of the House of Representatives

Document 26

The hatred and the atrocities that were committed by the Kurdish militia towards the Turkmen did not stop there but continued. On Saturday, December 9, 2017, the Kurdish militia attacked the district of Tuz Khormatu with mortars and fired Katyusha rockets at the civilians. The attack caused tremendous damage to the properties and led to the death of several children and injuring a dozen children. The Kurdish militia aimed to intimidate the Turkmen population to bring instability and fear amongst the Turkmen and force them to leave the area.



Figure (251) the damages on the Turkmen property caused by Kurdish militia firing Mortars shells in Tuz Khormatu



Figure (252) The Mortars shells fired by the Kurdish militia on the Turkmen population in Tuz Khormatu



Figure (253) the damages on the Turkmen property caused by Kurdish militia firing Mortars shells in Tuz Khormatu



Figure (254) the damages caused by firing Mortars shells by the Kurdish militia on the Turkmen population in Tuz Khormatu



Figure (255) the damages caused by firing Mortars shells by the Kurdish militia on the Turkmen population in Tuz Khormatu



Figure (256) Turkmen babies injured by Kurdish militia firing mortar shells on the district of Tuz Khormatu



Figure (257) Turkmen children were killed by Kurdish militia firing mortar shells on the district of Tuz Khormatu



Figure (258) Turkmen babies injured by Kurdish militia firing mortar shells on the district of Tuz Khormatu



Figure (259) Turkmen babies injured by Kurdish militia firing mortar shells on the district of Tuz Khormatu

It was extremely difficult for the Kurdish militia to accept their defeat in the city of Kirkuk. The Kurdish militia continued to attack the Turkmen targets in the area. On Saturday 16th of December 2017, the headquarters of the Turkmen Front in the Musalla branch in Kirkuk was attacked by Kurdish militia with rocket-propelled grenade RPG7 as revenge for their defeat in in Kirkuk. The attack on the ITF office in Masala caused tremendous damage to the building but there were no death casualties. Then, the Iraqi Turkmen Front “ITF” leader and a member of the Iraqi parliament Mr. Ershad Salhi attended to the site of the attack, and *“said in a television statement that there were groups that want to provoke sedition and security in Kirkuk.”* In addition, the headquarters of the Turkmen craftsmen in Kirkuk was attacked but later the Iraqi anti-terrorist forces confiscated a car with Erbil registration that was used by four Kurdish attackers. Also, Iraqi anti-terrorist forces searched the confiscated car and they found large amounts of ammunition, automatic machine guns, and several RGP7, and the four Kurdish suspected were arrested.

7. CHAPTER SEVEN

7.1 THE ARREST OF THE OUSTED GOVERNOR OF THE IRAQI PROVINCE OF KIRKUK NAJMADIN OMER

The governor of Kirkuk, Dr. Najmadin Karim, was born in Mosul and joined the Kurdish forces known as Peshmerga in 1972. He left Iraq in 1975 and completed his neurosurgical training at George Washington University in the USA.

Dr. Karim became an American citizen and lived in the United States until 2009, returned to Iraq. He ran for the Kurdistan Alliance in the parliamentary elections, and he was elected a member of Parliament for Kirkuk. He was rewarded a position of Kirkuk Governor by the Kurdish-controlled Kirkuk Governorate Council on 29 March 2011.

Dr. Najmadin Karim was one of the members of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's Kirkuk list in the 2014 general elections. He drew enormous votes from the Kurdish voters with the support of the Kurdish parties who were controlling every aspect of the city of Kirkuk in general and especially the voting system.

After the toppling the Saddam Hussein in 2003, the responsibility for the security and the police in Kirkuk was given to the Kurds by the US forces. In addition, the control checkpoint for entering and exiting from Kirkuk was controlled by the Kurdish military. This helped the Kurdish parties tremendously during the election. During the election in 2011, the Kurdish parties brought thousands of Syrian and Turkish Kurds who settled in Erbil to vote in the local election for the Kurdish candidates in Kirkuk without being questioned at the check-entry checkpoints.

During the election, there was alleged cheating and manipulation of the voting system by the Kurdish voters. The equipment used for counting the votes in the election was manipulated by the Kurds in favour of the Kurdish party candidates.

The manipulation of the vote counting system was discovered in the district of Hawija which is mainly populated by the Arabs. During the vote counts 70% of the voters appeared to be in favour of the Kurdish

parties, although no Kurds are living in the area. The Arab observers at the vote-counting station noticed there were discrepancies and inconsistencies in the vote-counting system. The Arab observers in the voting center immediately complained to the election committee about the discrepancies in the vote-counting system, and they released a statement emphasizing there had been manipulations by the Kurds in the vote-counting system. The news of the manipulation in the vote counting system quickly spread in Kirkuk, and immediately demonstrations by both Arabs and Turkmens started against this.

The election committee who was responsible for the election process immediately departed the city of Kirkuk to Baghdad fearing for their lives from a reprisal of the public. The election committee was selected by the Kurdish parties. They were heavily involved in the manipulation of the voting system.

In Kirkuk, the public demanded the election committee investigate the manipulation of the vote-counting system. Within a few days, an investigation was conducted by the vote election committee.

A report from the investigation showed the Kurds had manipulated the voting registry machine not only in the district of Hawija but also in various sub-districts in Kirkuk.

Subsequently, all the voting ballot boxes were collected and kept in warehouses in Kirkuk for checking and recounting, however, the recounting process never happened since Kirkuk was fully controlled by the Kurdish police, Kurdish army, Kurdish militia, and Asayish.

As a result of this manipulation of the voting registry system a demonstration was organised by the Turkmens in front of the Election Committee Office and within a few days the subject was closed, and all the voting election manipulations were ignored.

Consequently, this led to the Kurdish domination in Kirkuk and the Kurds were dominating all the aspects of life in the city of Kirkuk with the help of the American forces after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Kurdish governor Dr. Najmadin Karim Abdullah was a divisive leader during his governing of the city of Kirkuk and this led to ethnic tension between the Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens.

Dr. Najmadin Karim was extremely nationalist with a racist and superior ideology, especially in allocation of jobs and changing the demography of Kirkuk. He only employed the Kurds and dismissed

many Turkmen who were replaced by the Kurds. He transferred many teachers and police from KRG to Kirkuk to increase the Kurdish population.

Najmadin Karim was focused on acting as a Kurdish party member and implementing the Kurdish party policy and agenda by changing the demography of the city of Kirkuk. During his rule, Turkmen and Arab villages were bulldozed by the Kurdish militia under the pretext these villages had been used by the terrorists and ISIL. Because of his discriminatory policies, Najmadin Karim was not seen as an appropriate governor by the Turkmen and Arabs, and the number of crimes, thefts, car bombs, kidnaping, and assassination of the Turkmen, dramatically increased at this time.

The atrocities committed by the Kurdish police and militia did not stop there but continued, for example in the Turkmen district of Tuz Khormatu, hundreds of Turkmen houses, shops, and religious places were burnt by the Kurds, and car bombs and assassination of the Turkmen were seen on a daily basis.

It appeared to be the objective of the Kurds in Kirkuk to bring fear to the Turkmen and force them to leave the area. The Kirkuk governor and associated members of him were extremely corrupt, with millions of dollars disappearing from the treasury using imaginary projects, theft, corruption, and embezzlement were everywhere in the governing office in general and especially were stolen from municipal buildings in Kirkuk.

Employment and governmental appointments in the city of Kirkuk were fully controlled by the Kurds. It was extremely unusual for the Turkmen and Arab citizens to get a job. There was an overwhelming majority of the appointed people in the governmental offices in Kirkuk were Kurds.

Employment in the government offices was extremely difficult for the Turkmen and Arabs in some instances. It required approval and recommendation from the Kurdish parties. By paying a bribe to the Kurdish official of thousands of dollars was a normal procedure to get a job.

As a result of this, theft, corruption, and embezzlement were common occurrences in the government administration in the city of Kirkuk. There were hundreds of complaints and court cases against Dr. Karim

Najmaddin that were related to theft, embezzlement, corruption, power abuse, and misuse of government funds.

Consequences of this resulted in a warrant of arrest being issued by several high courts against Najmaddin Karim, but the arrest warrant was not successful in detaining him because the city of Kirkuk was completely under the control of the Kurdish militia and police.

Najmaddin Karim publicly was running the show of annexing the city of Kirkuk to the KRG region, although there was strong opposition and rejection from both the Turkmen and Arabs.

Najmaddin Karim created ethnic tension between the Kurds and Turkmen especially when he ordered the Kurdish militia to raise a huge Kurdish flag on the Kirkuk castle. In the view of many Turkmen citizens, this was interpreted as an act of provocation towards the Turkmen. With the knowledge of Dr. Najmaddin Karim, the Kurdish chief police in the city of Kirkuk granted the PKK terrorist organisation to open an office in the district of Daquq, although this PKK terrorist organisation is listed in the European and US terrorist list.

Also, he refused several instructions and orders that were issued by the central government in Baghdad. Najmaddin Karim's abuse of power did not stop there; he removed all the Iraqi national flags from the government buildings in Kirkuk and they were replaced with a Kurdish flag. This action was totally against the Iraqi constitution and legislation. In addition, Najmaddin Karim changed the names on the signs of government buildings to the Kurdish language, but he rejected adding the Turkmen language to the signs, although the Iraqi constitution clearly states that the Turkmen language should be used on all government buildings in Kirkuk.

Najmaddin Karim was also heavily involved in smuggling the oil from the Kirkuk oil field in cooperation with the KRG. As a result of this corruption some Kurds within the PUK party stood against Najmaddin Karim, and the corruption issue caused a rift between the two Kurdish parties. The PUK party demanded his resignation but instead of submitting his resignation, he switched from the PUK to the KDP party.

During his rule, the demography of the city of Kirkuk was changed, and the land of the Turkmen and Arabs was forcibly confiscated and

given to the Kurds and the Kurdish migrants from Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Dohuk.

All the directorates of the government offices were replaced with Kurds, and he appointed thousands of Kurds who were brought from outside of the city and who settled in Kirkuk. The government buildings and properties belonging to the previous Ba'ath regime were confiscated by the Kurdish parties.

All the projects, contracts, and investments in Kirkuk were given to the Kurds; the demography of the city of Kirkuk was fully changed. There was a lack of security and stability, and car bombings, kidnaping, and assassinations were common occurrences in Kirkuk.

During the whole of the rule of Najmaddin Karim, the provocation against the Turkmen, with its discrimination policies reached its peak. Due to his autocratic style, he refused to implement central government decisions, and bribery and corruption in the government departments were common.

Since his refusal to raise the Iraqi flag in Kirkuk, and his participation and propaganda policy to annex the city of Kirkuk to the KRG. This made the Federal Central Government in Baghdad issue a court order for his dismissal from his position for being incompetent. All of this made him unpopular amongst the Turkmen and Arabs.

However, Najmaddin Karim refused the implementation of the order that was made by the Federal Central Government to leave his office. He heavily relied on the Kurdish forces in Kirkuk. During the Kurdish referendum in Kirkuk, he clearly said that he would not follow the dismissal order that was issued by the Iraqi parliament and that he would stay in office.

During the Najmaddin Karim, the provincial council in Kirkuk was controlled mainly by the Kurds, they condemned the decision of the Iraqi parliament with council head Ribwar al-Talabani claiming only the council had the power to remove him.

In the meantime, there were many complaints, and court cases submitted to the high court against Najmaddin Karim, and they were mostly related to theft and corruption. Also, there was an arrest warrant against him issued by the high court in both Kirkuk and Baghdad.

In May 2017, the Kirkuk Court of Appeal issued a warrant for his arrest and an order to seize his assets. Najmadin Karim was accused of corruption in connection with Project "Kirkuk Eagle", which aimed to wirelessly monitor vehicle movements in and out of the province to prevent theft and prevent a terrorist attack which the court claimed was fraud.

In October 2017, Najmadin Karim escaped from the city of Kirkuk when the Popular Unit Army "PUA" and the Iraqi federal army entered the city of Kirkuk. The Federal Central Government also ordered a warrant for the arrest of Najmadin Karim in connection with the referendum.

During the liberation of the city of Kirkuk, Najmadin Karim was one of the first people who escaped from Kirkuk, 30 million dollars were missing from the Kirkuk Municipality and hundreds of the government's vehicles, heavy machinery equipment, diggers, and armed cars were taken by him and his supporters to Erbil.

But Najmadin Karim was detained by General Security in Lebanon after arriving at Beirut's airport; Karim was detained based on an Interpol arrest warrant. There was jubilation in Iraq in general and especially in Kirkuk for the arrest of the fugitive Najmadin Karim in Lebanon. He was referred to the public prosecution, which took the necessary action against him. He was also wanted by Iraqi authorities on charges of embezzlement, corruption, and abuse of power. One day after his arrest in Lebanon, the public prosecution finished its interrogation of Najmadin Karim and released him until further questioning, and he was banned from leaving Lebanon.

The Lebanese government instructed that Najmadin Karim stays in Lebanon until the Iraqi authorities send his judicial file to Lebanon to take the necessary action.

In the meantime, the Iraqi government issued an arrest warrant via the Iraqi Embassy in Lebanon, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Legal Department, Issue: 9/1/ Deport-Beirut 4/1129, Date: 27/05/2019.

The Iraqi government requested from the Lebanon, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to transfer Najmadin Omer Karim to Iraq and to face judiciary and to receive his fair punishment but unfortunately, this did not happen.

However, the Iraqi MP for the State of Law Coalition Mansour al-Baiji urged the Iraqi government to arrest Najmadin Karim, the former Kirkuk governor.

After he arrived in Erbil from Lebanon, Mansour al-Baiji stated that the federal government must have a serious and clear position towards the return of the former governor of Kirkuk to the Kurdistan region. The Anti-Corruption Council urged Prime Minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi to perform its responsibility and called on the government to introduce Karim to the judiciary to receive his fair punishment.

He left Erbil and departed for the USA, while he was in the USA, he was diagnosed with Pancreatic Cancer in 2019 and, Karim died on the 31st of October 2020 in hospital in the United States at the age of seventy-one.



الصفحة: ١-٢٨
التاريخ: ٢٠١٧/٨/١٨

السيد رئيس مجلس النواب العراقي المحترم

م/ فساد ادارى ومالى

في الوقت الذي نتمن جهود هيئة الرئاسة ومجلس النواب والحكومة العراقية في متابعة ملفات الفساد المستشرية في بعض الحكومات المحلية والتي أدت مؤخراً الى اتخاذ إجراءات قانونية بحق المخالفين وتعزيزاً للدور الرقابي لمجلس النواب العراقي الموفر ترفق لكم طياً قوائم بتواقيع (١٢٤) من السادة أعضاء مجلس النواب الذين يطالبون فيه اتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية بخصوص ملفات الفساد المتتفة بمحافظ كركوك ومتابعة إجراءات هيئة النزاهة والقضاء العراقي بخصوصه حيث نرى تلكواً واضحاً وعدم الجدية في تفعيل العشرات من الدعاوي القضائية المقامة بحقه منذ الاعوام ٢٠١٣ و٢٠١٤ فضلاً عن تسلمه عشرة ملايين دولار شهرياً من حكومة إقليم كردستان وعدم ايداعها بحساب الحكومة المحلية منذ سنتين وعدم امتثاله لقرارات مجلس النواب وتوصيات وتوجيهات الحكومة الاتحادية وعدم التزامه في تنفيذ قرارات القضاء العراقي وتطالب بمخاطبة السيد رئيس الوزراء لبيان الخطوات الواجب اتخاذها من قبل سيادته حيال هذه الخروقات الخطيرة .

وتقبلو منا فائق الشكر والتقدير .

المرفقات

- (٨) قوائم لتواقيع السادة النواب تبدأ بالتسلسل ١. نيازى معمار اوغلو وتنتهي بالتسلسل ١٢٤. ساجدة محمد يونس .
- (٥) جداول لمجموع ٦٤ دعوة قضائية .

السيد نيازى معمار اوغلو
مُتَرَجِّمٌ لِمَجْلِسِ النُّوَّابِ الْعِرَاقِيِّ
المُذَوَّبُ بِالتَّسْوِيقِ
مجلس النواب العراقي
المذوب بالتسويق

نسخة منه الى

مجلس القضاء الاعلى
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الاضبارة .
للتفضل بالاطلاع ... مع التقدير .

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Republic of Iraq
Council Representative
Presidency Cadre/ Decision office

Issue: 1048
18/08/2017

To the Head of the Iraqi parliament
Subject: Administrative and financial corruption

Please find enclosed the signatures of 124 members of the Iraqi parliament who are requesting to investigate the files of the embezzlement and corruption that is linked to the Kirkuk governor. We are seeing the lack of willingness and action toward the corruption court cases against the Kirkuk government for the period of 2013 to 2014.

Although still receiving monthly 10 million dollars from the Kurdish Regional Government and not lodging the money into a governmental bank for the last two years, also not implementing the orders that have been issued by the Federal Government in Baghdad and refusing the order orders that have been issued against him, so we request from the prime minister to immediate action against him.

Niyazi Memaroglu
The decision of the first parliament

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Republic of Iraq
Council Representative
Presidency Cadre/ Decision office

Issue: 1048
18/08/2017

To the Head of the Iraqi parliament

Greeting:

Due to the crisis in the city of Kirkuk, and the refusal of government authority in Kirkuk for implementation, the decision has been taken by the Iraqi House of Parliament that only the Iraqi national shall be raised in the governmental offices building in Kirkuk.

In addition, also due to the accumulation of administrative and financial corruption cases against the Kirkuk governor the national reconciliation and partnership process has been torpedoed by the governor Kirkuk.

We, the undersigned deputies, demand a proposal to remove the governor of Kirkuk from the House of Representatives

Member of Parliament
Niyazi Memaroglu
The decision of the first parliament

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العدد
التاريخ

- ٢٠١٦ / ١١ / ١٠
- ٤٨ - عريشان هادي
٤٠ - تامله السامري
٤١ - د. محمد بشير
٤٢ - ابي الحسين
٤٣ - محمد ناجي
٤٤ - د. هنان اوتاروي
٤٥ - علي صبحي كامل
٤٦ - خالد احمد
٤٧ - هادي هادي
٤٨ - محمدان ابراهيم
٤٩ - امل السامري
٥٠ - اكيلا الميرزا
٥١ - هادي جبار الله الميرزا
٥٢ - رهام الصويرة
٥٣ - زينب حارث الهادي
٥٤ - صادق صالح ابيان
٥٥ - احمد الطهري
٥٦ - محمد نوري ابيان

النيازي ميمار اوجلو
مركز الرئاسة / مكتب القرارات

E-Mail: niazi_56@yahoo.com

Document (34)



العدد: ٢٠١ / / التاريخ:

السيد رئيس مجلس النواب المحترم
حنية طيبة

بالنظر لبقاء اسم البصر في كرسيك وعدم امتثال الحكومة
المحلقة في كرسيك لقرار مجلس النواب بإيقاف تعليم العراقيين فقط
في دوائر محافظة كربلاء وبما تم ملتصاقه لفسادك وراي
وكذلك ونسب عملية التواضع والسرقة البوطينية
منه قبل ساقط كرسيك، فخير لكونه لم يرفعهم اوراق
لظان عرض اقالة محافظ كربلاء في مجلس النواب
المعراقة مع وزير التعليم

- ١- نيازي حمار أوفلو
- ٢- اريته جصامي
- ٣- من توران
- ٤- جاسم محمد جعفر
- ٥- محمد تقي الملاك
- ٦- هادي محمد حسين الاديب
- ٧- هاشم عبد الجبار
- ٨- د. خلف عبد الهادي خلف
- ٩- كاسر السيد

النائب نيازي حمار أوفلو
مقرر مجلس النواب العراقي

E-Mail: niazi_56@yahoo.com

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السيد رئيس مجلس النواب اجتمع
 في يومه

للاطلاع عرض ومناقشة ازمة نيويورك بحضور
 قرار مجلس محافظة نينوى بوضع علم اعلام كردستان
 على احياء المدينة في نينوى اقليم كردستان
 بصحبة اعمال هيئة ملك نينوى العراقية يوم ١٠/١٢/٢٠١٠
 مع دائرة التقدير

١- الضائب يثاني صا - ارفان
 ٢- جاسم محمد جعفر
 ٣- حسن توران
 ٤- ابراهيم اصيلي
 ٥- مستيق نصر اولاد
 ٦- عبد ساري
 ٧- نزهة كهابي
 ٨- احسان اندي
 ٩- احسان احمد
 ١٠- كاطال اندي
 ١١- احمد انانيل
 ١٢- صفور البعبي
 ١٣- د. هادي الجبوري
 ١٤- صالح اسدي

مضمون الطلب
 تم التقدير

مستو

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٢١ - كتاب التاريخ
 ٢٢ - كتاب التاريخ
 ٢٣ - كتاب التاريخ
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 ٤٩ - كتاب التاريخ
 ٥٠ - كتاب التاريخ

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- العدد: ٢٠١ / ١ / ١ التاريخ: ١٤٣١ / ١١ / ١٤
- ٤٧ - ~~محمد الجبوري~~
 - ٤٨ - ~~شبه سوه ابني~~
 - ٤٩ - ~~متوه الماكي~~
 - ٥٠ - خالد المزعني
 - ٥١ - المر الجبرا
 - ٥٢ - الشيخ منتقلان الكوبي
 - ٥٣ - استاذ الصلوات
 - ٥٤ - جمال عبد الزهراء
 - ٥٥ - د. قيس الجبوري
 - ٥٦ - فهد الجبوري
 - ٥٧ - د. هادي جبور
 - ٥٨ - عال مفايق
 - ٥٩ - حبي كندر
 - ٦٠ - زاهر محيبي
 - ٦١ - د. اقبال عبد الرزاق
 - ٦٢ - عبد الوهاب بن نيك
 - ٦٣ - متي الصوري

النائب نيازى ميمار اوجلان
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العدد
التاريخ ٢٠١ / /

- ٦٤ - همام العنابي
- ٦٥ - عبد الكريم بطان
- ٦٦ - سفيان مطر
- ٦٧ - محمد راجح
- ٦٨ - منة بقر
- ٦٩ - طاهر المردوي
- ٧٠ - هلال بسدر
- ٧١ - منة و عمار
- ٧٢ - هادي هادي
- ٧٣ - عادل بسدر
- ٧٤ - هادي هادي
- ٧٥ - علي المرتبة
- ٧٦ - محمد الحسيني الزبيدي
- ٧٧ - هادي محمد
- ٧٨ - عبد الهادي موصلي بسدر
- ٧٩ - عمار الحبيسي
- ٨٠ - محمد كون هادي

الرائد نيازى منصور اوجلو
مقرر مجلس النواب العراقي

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العدد
 التاريخ

- ٨١ - صياغة المحنة
- ٨٢ - تفويض اللجنة
- ٨٣ - سيرة الكوسون
- ٨٤ - بدر الحد
- ٨٥ - د. كامل الزبيدي
- ٨٦ - عماد السبيعي
- ٨٧ - لجنة البعثة
- ٨٨ - حمدى سجاد
- ٨٩ - غازية القعود
- ٩٠ - محمد البرجوني
- ٩١ - عز الدين الدعبل
- ٩٢ - هولة الزبادي
- ٩٣ - عائشة المساري
- ٩٤ - حول رائف الوائلي
- ٩٥ - هامة لطلح
- ٩٦ - محمد عبد الرحمن
- ٩٧ - فائق الشيخ علي
- ٩٨ - فهد
- ٩٩ - عامر الغفاني
- ١٠٠ -

النائب نيازي ميمار أوجلو
 مقرر مجلس النواب العراقي

م. البرجوني
 م. الوائلي
 م. السبيعي
 م. الزبيدي
 م. الكوسون

E-Mail: niazi_56@yahoo.com

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العدد: / / التاريخ: ٢٠١١

- ١٠١ - ميثاق الحامدي مع مسدده
- ١٠٢ - ثورة البجاريك
- ١٠٣ - حسن خباركي
- ١٠٤ - ظافر العلي
- ١٠٥ - ناهدة لرايسا
- ١٠٦ - > عادة لسمري
- ١٠٧ - عليه نوري
- ١٠٨ - فاطمة الزكي
- ١٠٩ - كواطف بقر
- ١١٠ - رعد فارس
- ١١١ - رشيد الوائلي
- ١١٢ - امة السليم
- ١١٣ - د. محمد علي بقر
- ١١٤ - طه الدقاسي
- ١١٥ - محمد روثان
- ١١٦ - د. فهدون ايعادي
- ١١٧ - عبد الرحيم لسمري
- ١١٨ - حياة سير لسمري
- ١١٩ - ميمار اوغلو
- ١٢٠ - شروق مؤمنوك

الثامن نيازي ميمار اوغلو
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الحمد،
 التاريخ: ٢٠١ / /

- ١٤١ - جمهورية العراق
- ١٤٤ - ١.٢ جوانه بيورك
- ١٤٢ - هفتاي المبيعات
- ١٤٩ - محمد
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- ٢٠٠

النائب نيازى ميمار اوجلان
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Document (42)



العدد: ٧٧٤
التاريخ: ١٤ / ٩ / ٢٠١٧

الى / الامانة العامة لمجلس الوزراء - مكتب السيد الامين العام المحترم

الموضوع / استفتاء المزمع اجراءه في ٢٥ / ٩ / ٢٠١٧

تحية طيبة ...

راجين التفضل بالايعاز عن طريق مجلس الوزراء الموقر الى المفوضية العليا المستقلة للانتخابات والوزارات العراقية كافة بعدم تقديم دوائرها الموجودة في محافظة كركوك اي شكل من اشكال الدعم لعملية الاستفتاء المزمع اجراءه في ٢٥ / ٩ / ٢٠١٧ ولكون محافظة كركوك هي خارج حدود الاقليم بموجب المادة (١٤٣) من الدستور العراقي وان اشترك اية دائرة حكومية بعملية الاستفتاء او تقديم الدعم اللوجستي لها يقع تحت طائلة مخالفة الدستور والقوانين الاتحادية واتخاذ مايلزم من اجراءات قانونية ضد اي مدير دائرة يقدم اي نوع من انواع الدعم لعملية الاستفتاء .

مع فائق التقدير ...

عن الكتلة التركمانية
مجلس النواب العراقي



٢٥ / ٩ / ٢٠١٧
مقره تجاب لنواب
نظامي صدره

Republic of Iraq
Council Representation
Turkmen Block

Issue: 727
Date: 12/09/2017

The General Secretariat for the Council of Ministers/ Honorable
Secretary General's Office

Subject: The subject referendum to be implemented/ 25/09/2017

We would like the Council of Ministers to inform the Independent High Commission for the Iraqi Election and Ministries that their governmental offices do not submit any support for the planned referendum process that was suggested to be conducted on 25/09/2017.

Since the city of Kirkuk is out of the Kurdish Regional Government boundary and under article 143 of the Iraqi constitution.

We are requesting from Council of Ministers to inform the Independent High Commission in Kirkuk, to stop any participation or providing any logistical support from any governmental offices to the referendum process and doing so will be against the constitutions and federal laws.

The Council of Ministers to inform the Independent High Commission shall take all the necessary legal measures against any department director who provides any kind of support to the referendum process.

Regards
Turkmen Bock
In the Iraqi Council of Representatives

Document (43)



قرار
مجلس النواب
رقم (٥٥) لسنة ٢٠١٧

قرر مجلس النواب بجلسته الثانية والعشرون بتاريخ ٢٠١٧/٤/١ من الفصل التشريعي الثاني السنة التشريعية الثالثة الدورة الانتخابية الثالثة واستنادا الى احكام المادة (١٤٣) من الدستور العراقي وقانون ٣٦ لسنة ٢٠٠٨ للمادة ٢٣ / البند خامسا ماياتي :

اولا- الابقاء على رفع العلم العراقي فقط على دوائر محافظة كركوك والغاء قرار مجلس محافظة كركوك حول رفع علم اقليم كردستان على المباني الحكومية في المحافظة.

ثانيا- استنادا الى دستور جمهورية العراق المادة (١١١) و (١١٢) بأن النفط هو ملك الشعب العراقي وان حقوق كركوك تخضع لادارة الحكومة الاتحادية ولا يحق للاقليم او محافظ كركوك التصرف وتصدير النفط دون علم و موافقة الحكومة الاتحادية.

د. سليم عبدالله الجبوري
رئيس مجلس النواب
/ رجب / ١٤٣٨ هـ
/ نيسان / ٢٠١٧ م

السيد شيرازي انقل
مضمون القرار الى السيد شيرازي
من قمتي ووطنكم لبعالة
١٠/٤/١٧
د. سليم عبدالله الجبوري
١٤٣٨ هـ

Republic of Iraq
House of Representatives
Parliament Office

Issue:
Date:

Resolution
House of Parliament
Number (35) year 2017

The House of Representatives decided in its 22nd session of the legislative term and according to article 143 from the Iraqi legislation and per article 36 dated 2008, article 33 item 5, the following.

Firstly, only the Iraqi flag to be raised on the governmental building in Kirkuk, ignoring the decision of the Kirkuk Governing Council to raise the Kurdish Regional Government on the governmental building in Kirkuk.

Secondly: according to the Republic of Iraqi legislation, articles 111 and 112, the oil in Iraq is the property of the public and the Kirkuk oil field belongs to the Federal central government in Baghdad. The Kurdish Regional Government and the governor of Kirkuk have no right to act and export of the oil without the permission and knowledge of the central government in Baghdad.

Dr. Salim Abdullah Al_Juburi
Speaker of the House of Representatives

Document (44)



كوتناى عيزراق

بەسپارەتی گشتی ئەجومەنی نوێنەرانی
ئێـرەـق

المسند ٢٦٦٤/٩/١
التاريخ ٢٤٢

التابعة التشريعية

إلى / مكتب السيد رئيس الجمهورية

م / قرار

تحية طيبة ...
ذرافق طبا القرار الخاص بـ (رفع العلم العراقي فقط على دوائر محافظة
كركوك والغاء قرار مجلس محافظة كركوك حول رفع علم اقليم
كردستان على المباني الحكومية في المحافظة) والذي صوت عليه مجلس النواب
بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٤/١ في الجلسة المرقمة (٢٢) من الفصل التشريعي الثاني/ السنة
التشريعية الثالثة/ الدورة الانتخابية الثالثة.
مع التقدير...

(Signature)

عـ الامين العام لمجلس النواب
المهندس صلاح جاسم الحميري
نائب الامين العام للشؤون الادارية
/ رجب / ١٤٣٨هـ
/ نيسان / ٢٠١٧م

(Signature)

للإفقات
- نسخة من القرار.

نسخة مقدم لطلب
السيد رئيس مجلس النواب
مقره مجلس النواب

نسخة عنه الى:

- مكتب السيد رئيس مجلس النواب ... للتفضل بالإطلاع مع التقدير.
- مكتب السيد النائب الأول لرئيس مجلس النواب - د همام حمودي ... للتفضل بالإطلاع مع التقدير.
- مكتب السيد نائب رئيس مجلس النواب - الاستاذ اراء محمد علي ... للتفضل بالإطلاع مع التقدير.
- مكتب السيد الامين العام لمجلس النواب ... للتفضل بالإطلاع مع التقدير.
- مكتب السيد نائب الامين العام للشؤون البرلمانية ... للتفضل بالإطلاع مع التقدير.
- المديرية البرلمانية/ قسم التابعة التشريعية ... للحفاظ والتابعة.
- الصادرة المركزية.

House of Representatives - Iraq
General Secretariat
Baghdad - Convention centre

E-mail: parliament@parliament.gov.iq
website: www.parliament.iq
fax: 00964(0)1 5382929

جمهوریە عێـراق
بەغداد / قەسەر نوێنەرانی

محمد زاهر

General Secretariats of House Representative

Issue: 1/9/3662

Date; 3/4/2017

To: Office of the President of the Republic

Ref: Resolution

We enclosed herewith your decision to raise the Iraqi flag only on the governmental building in Kirkuk and cancel the decision of the Kirkuk Provincial Council to raise the flag of the Kurdish Regional Government flag on the governmental building which was voted by the House of Representatives on the date 1/4/2016 in the session numbered 22 of chapter legislation two/the third-year legislation/the third electoral cycle.

To: The Secretary General of the House of Representatives

The Engineer

Salah Jasim Al_Humeyri

Deputy Secretary General for Administration Affairs

April 2017

Document (45)

Republic of Iraq
House of Parliament
Work schedule.
Session Number 22
Saturday, April 2017

First: reading verses from the Holy Quran.

Second: Voting on the project of legislation to seize and confiscate movable and immovable funds transferred to that belonging to the previous regime according to the Reconciliation, and Status, the Financial Committee, the Legal Committee) Article-9.

Third: Voting on the legislation for official holidays (The Committee of Awqaf and Religious Affairs Committee, Culture Committee, and Legislation Committee. (Article 6)

Fourth: Voting on the proposed law of Basra, the economic capital of Iraq, the Economic and Investment Committee, and the Legal Committee Article 6.

Fifth: Voting in terms of principle on the draft law for renting agricultural lands Committee on Agriculture, Water and Marshes (Finance Commission).

Six: a general topic for discussion regarding raising the flag of the Kurdistan region over the department's institutions and governmental establishment in the province of

Seventh: The nations were either interrogated by the Minister of Health. (Template: Awad Al-Awadi).

Eighth: A general topic for discussion on the security situation in Sinjar district and a report by the Security and Defence committees, and security committee and irregular provinces, and governance in the regional government.

Ninth: A general topic for discussion regarding the management of state institutions and their bodies by proxy. (Representative Ahlam Al-Husseini).

Tenth: A general topic for discussion regarding the difficulty of coordinating and following up the committees of their ministries during the performance of their oversight duties in accordance with the Constitution (**The MP** Ahmed Taha Al-Sheikh).

Eleven: states the first reading of the proposed First Amendment Arts Law, Martyrs Foundation No. (1) Of 2016. (Committee of Martyrs for the End of Time, Victims and Political Prisoners, Finance Committee, Legal Committee) (Item 6).

Twelve: Report and discussion of two legal drafts of the Republic of Iraq's accession to the Maritime Labor Convention for the year 2006 and the accession of the Republic of Iraq to the Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention No. 185 of 2003. Foreign Relations Committee, Labour, and Social Affairs Committee) Article 2.

Thirteen: A report and discussion of the proposed law for the second amendment to the Law of the Independent High Electoral Commission No. (11) For the year 2007. (Legal Committee).

Document (46)

المجلس محافظه كركوك بقراريه من ١٤ عضو مجلس ٢٦ منهم
 كرد و ٩ تركمانه و ٥ عرب و مسيحي واحد .
 صبه فاؤنر سلطه الاستقلال و منذ عام ٢٠٠٥ و لكامل السيطره
 لهم تجرى انتخابات في كركوك و صبه فاؤنر المحافظ رقم ٢١ لسنة ٢٠٠٨
 في السنوات الاخره اصبحت كركوك في مجلس المحافظه ليسوا بجانبه
 الى التركمان و العرب لانهم اكثر من نصف العدد و ما كان منهم عقد
 جلسات المجلس و من العوده الى التوافق مع قلوبنا في كركوك
 من التركمان و العرب و المجرم نجم الدين محافظ كركوك استغل
 نقل كركوك في المجلس و اصبحت مصيماً على المجلس و خصوصاً
 المحافظ هو بوغز بقصد جلسات مجلس المحافظه و محض
 حيله المحافظه و لا يعطي مجالاً لرئيس المجلس و المضار كركوك
 نظام بوغز و يأمر المجلس بالتخاف أي قرار في المحافظه .
 و نصف التوافق السياسي المعمول استناداً الى المادة
 ٤٣ من قرأه البرلمان العراقي بضرورة التوافق و توازن و كركوك
 في اللجان تنفيذه (١٤) و طغى الكراوات و استولى
 على كل مفاصل العراق في المحافظه / النفط / التربية / الصحة /
 الشرطة و حوى الحكم لبلدنا / و البلدية / و الاستفتاء / و النفوس
 فضلاً عن مافيائه و عضايته التي تسرق في لمديه ٤٤ ساعة
 في القتل و الخطف و التسلب و التهديد و الترهيب و الاستغلال على
 اساسي الجوارح و ليوالاته اكبر منظمة ارهابية كروية يعود لفرز
 الصالح كركوك و PKK و تواصله مع شبكات اسرائيليه
 و اتاح لهم وضع العراق و PKK و العلم الاسرائيلي و وضع قبضته
 على كركوك استغله في كركوك الاصل كركوك و فتح حساب في اقلبي
 المجلس العراقي لترصيد المبالغ و هو مخالفه قديماً
 كـ يتبعوا

ومنع التمسك بالعرف من مقتضى الطبيعة في هوية الله والبناء
 والتعليل في هدد بطرد التمسك بكل واحد واضح في
 احدى طبقات حجب المحافظة الى خارج كقولك وبشراً
 قنائة توكلمه المين كيف يستعمل بالتمسك بالعرف واحتفل
 الراضين التي تعود للتمسك بحجة اننا زلالية الى مستعملين
 كرد بالاجماع، وأما كل الماربع الى شركة كردية
 والنرها ونسبه . ودخلت في عهد المحافظ الامن مليارين
 دولار وبن في لواتر سوي في ١٨٠٠ سنة هذو
 المبالغ . الى انه وصل به لطفام والكتاورية لكن
 يكون بطلاً قومياً بين اللرد أو عن في حبل حبل محافظ كركول
 برزح العلم اللردى على الجانب اللومفة في كركول بتاريخ ١٨٠١ ٣١ ١٧٦١
 لغرض كسب محافظ لصب اللردى للامداد نوروز في ١٧٦١ ٣١
 حيث كنت حاضرًا من جهة اليازة طرانة للتمسك في الانفاضة طباهرية
 - حواء في مقبرة السليدي في ناحية ان تون توكرك التمسك وسعفت
 لفر حبل محافظ كركول برزح العلم اللردى وصرحت للبيداس
 فزها فظاً فادح حبل البرجيري عنه والى مستقوم بالتحاف
 الاجراءات القاتونية بحجم حبل محافظ كركول ، وفي نصري
 هددت المحافظ حبل المحافظ اعلم ما ارتبوعه من خطا جسيم
 وما هي الابد يومين تفاهميت ما حوسم محافظ كركول على
 شخصي بأشرف غير اليتي انه التوله نائبا لاشرف سبهم وان
 توقفت فاخوتنا على اوضفه وانا بعني وجود
 وما نفسى لوسم وعل قنائة السرفية اوضعت له منه هو
 وكجهم فادة وجر لوك واللمنة له أيام الأيام وبيننا وسوف
 أسبت له منه هو نيات من صا او علوف

ك
 شيخ

بالاضافة قام محافظ كركوك بتسلم تنظيمات الاتحاد
 الوطني الكردستاني في مناطق كركوك واربعة ومانده
 والقوة كوربي وديس وبيدات واعلنت قبضته
 الكلتورية على هذه المناطق
 فعندها دقت الجرسى الزماني لي فاجب عليه
 ان اعمل على الاعادة لزيارة اهالي كركوك وهذه
 المناطق اثر لثباته لاجل

واشرت بالجران لسياسي ولتعيد لوضع
 لصل بقائه والحمد لله تحت في ذلك
 نجاحاً بالهراً و دخلت مع لوصول لاجل اتحادية الى
 كركوك يوم ١٦ و ١٧ و ١٨ و ١٩ و ٢٠ و ٢١ الى كركوك
 و دخلت ديوان المحافظة و جلست على كرسى
 المحافظ لاجل لثباته و لثباته لثباته
 السيد لثباته لثباته و عدت الجاهري و فعلت فعلتي
 مهم بعدها تحولت في احياء دار جولة كركوك
 سناً و مشتقاً بالثباتي لثباتي
 مهم بعدها جعلت لوضع المضار عمل لثباتي و تحت لثباتي
 في اتحاد قرأ - بعدم عودة قوات البيشمركة لاجل لثباتي
 الى كركوك و طرد لثباتي و لثباتي لثباتي بالاطليم و لثباتي لثباتي
 لثباتي و بعدم كركوك و دولتي

٢٠١٨
 ١٤

بشاني صهر و لثباتي

(سري وخصي)
الى / مكتب السيد رئيس مجلس الوزراء

م / اتخاذ اجراءات قانونية

نهديكم اطيب التحيات ...
ربطنا الطلب المقدم من قبل السيد النائب نيازي معمار اغلو والموقع من قبل (١٢٤) نائباً
بموجب الكتاب ذي العدد (١٠٤٨) في ٢٠١٧/٨/١٨ .

راجين الاطلاع وتوجيه الجهات ذات العلاقة باتخاذ مايلزم واعلامنا ... مع التقدير

المرققات:

- طلب السيد النائب نيازي معمار اوغلو بموجب الكتاب ذي العدد (١٠٤٨) في ٢٠١٧/٨/١٨ .

صلاح الدين احمد عبد العزيز
الامين العام لمجلس النواب / وكالة
/ ذي القعدة / ١٤٣٨ هـ
١٩ / اب / ٢٠١٧ م

- صورة ضوئية فئة السيد
- مكتب السيد رئيس مجلس النواب.. للتفضل بالاطلاع... مع التقدير.
- مكتب السيد النائب الاول لرئيس مجلس النواب... للتفضل بالاطلاع... مع التقدير.
- مكتب السيد نائب رئيس مجلس النواب.. للتفضل بالاطلاع... مع التقدير.
- مكتب السيد النائب نيازي معمار اغلو .. اشارة الى كتابكم ذي العدد (١٠٤٨) في ٢٠١٧/٨/١٨ .. للتفضل بالاطلاع... مع التقدير.
- مكتب السيد الامين العام لمجلس النواب.. للتفضل بالاطلاع... مع التقدير .
- مكتب السيد نائب الامين العام لشؤون البرلمانية .. للتفضل بالاطلاع... مع التقدير .
- الدائرة البرلمانية/ شؤون اللجان.
- الصادرة المركزية .

كوميوناري
ترويج و ترويجات
ترويج و ترويجات
ترويج و ترويجات



مجلس النواب
البرلمان العراقي
البرلمان العراقي
البرلمان العراقي

شؤون النجان

العدد: ش. ل. / ٩ / ١ / ٥٥
التاريخ: ٢٠١٧ / ٩ / ٢٧

- ٤- خلق المنافذ الحدودية التي تقع تحت سيطرة السلطة الاتحادية واصتبار البضائع التي تدخل منها بضائع مهربة ومناشدة دول الجوار العراقي لاتخاذ التدابير اللازمة لمساعدة الحكومة العراقية على تنفيذ هذا القرار.
- ٥- على الحكومة إعادة الحقوق الشمالية في كركوك والمناطق المتنازع عليها لأشراف وسيطرة وزارة النفط الاتحادية ومنع التدخل لأي من الأحزاب النافذة في تلك المناطق.
- ٦- اتخاذ الاجراءات الكفيلة لتنفيذ قرارات السلطات التنفيذية والتشريعية والقضائية الخاصة بإقليم كوردستان لاسيما قرار اقالته محافظ كركوك.
- ٧- على الحكومة استدعاء السفراء والممثلين في الدول التي لديها ممثلات ومكاتب في الاقليم لغرض ابلاغهم بمغلق تلك الممثلات والقنصليات ونقلها الى محافظات خارج اقليم كوردستان.
- ٨- دعوة فخامة رئيس الجمهورية المحتوم للقيام بواجباته المتصوص عليها بال دستور خاصة المادة (٦٧) منه باعتباره رمز وحدة الوطن والممثل لسيادة البلاد و الساهر على ضمان الالتزام بالدستور والحفاظ على استقلال العراق وسيادته ووحدة وسلامة اراضيه.
- ٩- التأكيد على تنفيذ استراتيجية المصالحة الوطنية على قاعدة تغليب الهوية الوطنية لأبناء الشعب العراقي.
- ١٠- العمل على اعادة النازحين الى مناطقهم وتهيئة جميع الوسائل لتحقيق هذا الهدف ومن بينها اعادة اعمار المناطق المتضررة.
- ١١- استمرار جميع الموظفين الكرد من مختلف المناصب في عملهم وضمن امنهم ممن لم يشاركوا في هذا الاستفتاء.
- ١٢- المحافظة على الروابط الوطنية الاجتماعية مع المواطنين الكرد باعتبارهم مكون اساسي من مكونات الشعب العراقي.
- ١٣- على الحكومة عدم قبول الحوار المشروط الا بعد الغاء نتائج الاستفتاء.

المستشار القانوني
للشؤون الوطنية
السيد شاذلي ابراهيم
انت بمرادك وهما شاذلي ابراهيم
السيد شاذلي ابراهيم
رئيس مجلس النواب
محرم / ١٤٣٩ هـ
ايلول / ٢٠١٧ م

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السيد شاذلي ابراهيم
رئيس مجلس النواب
مجلس النواب

العدد : مكتب / ق . م / س / ٢٤٥ / ٣٤
التاريخ : ٢٠١٧ / ٩ / ٢٠

برس الاشارة الى الجهة و رقم الكتاب
بشكل كامل عند الاجابة

(سري وشخصي)

الى / مكتب السيد رئيس الوزراء المحترم

م / اجراءات

تهديكم هذه الهيئة اطيب التحيات ...

اشارة الى كتاب مكتبكم الموقر بالعدد (٢٠١٧/٨/٢٠) و (٢٤٢٤/٢٨) في ٢٠١٧/٨/٢٨، ترفيق
لكم رفقاً جدولاً يتضمن الاجراءات المتخذة والنتائج بصدد القضايا الجزائية الخاصة بموضوع بحث
كتابكم المستكور انفاً المتعلقة بالقائمة المراقبة طي كتاب مجلس النواب العراقي / مكتب النائب (تيازي معمار اوغلو)
بالعدد (١٠٤٨) في ٢٠١٧/٨/١٨، للتعامل بالتسليم.

تعرب لكم هذه الهيئة عن فائق تقديرها واحترامها .

المرفقات :-

- الجدول اعلاه.

هينه الزراهه



الدكتور

حسن الجابري

رئيس هيئة النزاهة / وكالة

٢٠١٧ / ٩ / ٢٠

المرفق
تتمتع طلت محافظه لادخلها لعدد طومر
مرفقاً بقائمة
٢٠١٧ / ٩ / ٢٠

سخة منه الي :-

مكتب رئيس الهيئة / للفضل بالاطلاع مع التقدير .

مجلس النواب العراقي / مكتب السيد النائب (تيازي معمار اوغلو) المحترم / اشارة الى كتابكم بالعدد (١٠٤٨) في ٢٠١٧/٨/١٨ / للفضل
بالاطلاع مع التقدير .

دائرة التحقيقات / قسم المعلومات والمتابعة / اشارة الى كتابكم بالعدد (٢١٥٢) في ٢٠١٧/٩/١٢ / للفضل بالاطلاع واعلامنا اخر
الاجراءات والنتائج التي يتم التوصل اليها بصدد القضايا الجزائية التي مازالت قيد التحقيق حال تحققها مع التقدير .

قسم المتابعة / المتابعة (٢٠١٧ / ٩ / ٢٠) مع الاوليات كافة للمتابعة لفقاً

سهي ٩ / ١٩



((بيان))

التاريخ / / ٢٠٠٧

صرح محافظ كركوك نجم الدين كريم قبل أيام وخلال مؤتمر صحفي بمقولات خطيرة واتهمني باتهامات باطلة ولا أساس لها من الصحة ولا ترقى إلا أن تكون افتراءات تفتقر الى أبسط معايير المصداقية فأبتداءً ادعى محافظ كركوك بأنني لست تركمانياً وهذا محض افتراء فالقاصي والداني يعلم بأنني من عائلة عراقية تركمانية عاشت أباً عن جد وعن أجداد في منطقة طوزخورماتو التركمانية مدنية الشهداء ولي إخوة التحقوا بصفوف المعارضة لمقارعة النظام البعثي البائد وكانوا مقاتلين أشداء في فيلق بدر وذبح أخي عدنان معمار اوغلو من الوريد الى الوريد في العملية الاستشهادية لتحرير بشير من دنس عصابات داعش الإجرامية .

كما واتهمني محافظ كركوك بوجود تحقيق إداري عندما كنت موظفاً في مصرف الرشيد فرع عرفة بكر كوك وبأسلوب لا يليق لمقام كادر متقدم في الحزب وهو لا يعلم إن التحقيق الإداري قد أغلق دون التوصل الى أية شائبة قانونية حول عملي المصرفي بل بالعكس تم تكريمي من قبل مراجعي آنذاك وفي عام ٢٠٠٧ وتم اختياري كأكفأ موظف في المنطقة الشمالية .

إن ردت الفعل الغاضبة والغير المبررة من محافظ كركوك جاءت بعد تصريحه للإعلام عن نيتي بالقيام على جمع توافيق للمطالبة بإقالته وفق الأطر الدستورية والقانونية وهذا من صميم عملي كنانب عن الشعب العراقي وكان حرياً به أن يرد بالأصول القانونية على إجراءاتي وليس بالأكاذيب والافتراءات التي لا تتطابق مع الوقائع .

٢٠١٧
النائب
نياز ميمير اوغول
مقرر مجلس النواب الأول

تابع
↓



((بيان))

ردي على محافظ كركوك نجم الدين كريم بعد اطلاق التهم بحقنا جرافاً و بطلاناً .
ابتداءً قولي :-

كنيتي عراقي تركماني وقومي للنخاع وناضلت وساناضل في الدفاع عن وطني العزيز العراق وشعبي التركماني وابن تركماني وحفيد تركماني وأسمي نيازي محمد مهدي قنبر كونوش ابراهيم امين دميرداغ من أصل آذري ومن احفاد اوغوز خان تواجدا وعشنا في عراقنا العزيز منذ الالاف السنين وبامكان محافظ كركوك أن يتأثر من أصالة حسبي ونسبي وعشيرتي معمار اوغلو والتي سميت نسبة الى محصنة أجدادي المعاريين وتمتعتها لحد هذا اليوم ونحن من أوائل من عشنا في مدينة طوزخورماتو ومقابرنا تشهد وخير دليل على ذلك الى يومنا هذا ومن عائلة مناضلة ومعارضة للنظام البائد والتحق أشقائي بالمعارضة المسلحة في فيلق بدر منذ نهاية السبعينات ولغاية سقوط النظام الدكتاتوري ولم اترك العراق للحظة ونتفاجئ بمحافظ كركوك في تشبيهنا بالمجرم طه ياسين رمضان وبأمثاله الذين خانوا وقاتلوا الكرد .

٢٥١ / /
١٠
٢
النائب

نيازي امجداز اوغلو
مقرر مجلس النواب الاول

٢٥١
↓



الرجوع
التاريخ

2

وخدمنا في مصارف الدولة العراقية لأكثر من ثلاثون عاماً برتبة رأس وتميزنا في الأداء والعبء ولم يحكم علينا بأي قرار قضائي مطلقاً سوى تحقيق إداري وغلق لعدم توفر أي ثبوتات قانونية وبتاريخ ٢٠٠٧/٣/٢٢ جرى دور استلام وتسليم لنا في المصرف وبإشراف مكتب المراقبة وتم تسليم ما بذمتنا وبشكل مصادق عليه ويعدّها خضناً انتخابات مجلس محافظة صلاح الدين وأصبحنا عضواً ولغاية ٢٠١٣/٦/١٩ ومن بعدها خضنا الانتخابات العامة وأصبحنا عضو لمجلس النواب العراقي أي بمعنى خضنا ثلاث انتخابات في الدولة العراقية وفق المعايير والسياسات المعمولة .

ويظهر لنا محافظ كركوك وبتهمنا بالاختلاس معتقداً بأننا كنا نعمل في كازينو أو علوة مخضر مع العلم وفق التقارير الرسمية حصلنا على لقب أكفأ موظف مصرفي في المنطقة الشمالية .

وردة فعل محافظ كركوك الغاضبة بحقي جاءت اثر جمع توقيع السادة النواب لاتخاذ قرار رفض قرار مجلس محافظة كركوك بخصوص رفع علم إقليم كردستان في دوائر كركوك ونجحت فيها فضلاً عن جمعي توقيع أخرى لغرض إقالته من منصبه لفشله الذريع فحنن نقوم بدورنا النيابي الوطني المشروع .

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النائب
نيازي ميمار أوغلو
مقرر مجلس النواب الأول

٢٠١٧
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3

الرجوع
التاريخ

فكان الاولى لمحافظ كركوك :

١. أن يمثل لقرار الشعب العراقي في إبقاء العلم العراقي فقط في دوائر محافظة كركوك .
٢. أن يجيب القضاء في ملفات الفساد الخاصة بكركوك وهي بالعشرات والمترامية في أروقة القضاء العراقي في كركوك وبغداد .
٣. أن يكشف حتى لو على جاني واحد من بين منات الجناة الذين يسرحون ويمرحون في شوارع كركوك وأمام الملا يقتلون ويخطفون ويسرقون .
٤. أن يوقف التجاوزات الهائلة والخطيرة على الأراضي التركمان وإيقاف عملية هدم دورهم ومنعهم من البناء على ارض أجدادهم .
٥. أن يلتزم بالتوافق السياسي وإعادة حقوق التركمان المسلوبية من المناصب قسراً .
٦. أن لا يمنع دخول القوات المركزية الى مناطق كركوك لغرض فرض القانون والنظام .
٧. إيقاف الفتنة التي أشعلها لوحده .
٨. أن لا يتباهى بأهل المصالح والجنباء من التركمان والعرب .
٩. أن يترك أسلوب التسلط والتزعم والهيمنة والتفرد والدكتاتورية ان أراد كركوك مستقراً .

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النائب

نيازى امجد اوزغلو
مقرر مجلس النواب الاول



٢٠٠٦/٧/٢٤
٢٠٠٦/٧/٢٤

((سري وشخصي))

مكتب فخامة رئيس الوزراء

العدد: ق/١٠٦/١٠٠٠/٤٥٥
التاريخ: ٢٠٠٦/٦/٢٨

م/تشكيل اقليم كركوك

إشارة لكتابكم المرقم م. ر.ن/٣٠/ والمؤرخ ٢٠٠٦/٦/٤ ومرفقه نسخة من طلب مجموعة من اعضاء مجلس محافظة كركوك الذي يطلبون فيه اجراء استفتاء لتشكيل اقليم كركوك .

- نسود ان تبدي لفخامة رئيس الوزراء عدم امكانية الاستجابة لهذا الطلب للأسباب التالية .
١. ان المادة ١١٨ من دستور جمهورية العراق اوجبت على مجلس النواب ان (يسن) في مدة لا تتجاوز ستة أشهر من تساريخ أول جلسة له قانوناً يحدد الاجراءات التنفيذية الخاصة بتكوين الاقاليم . وحيث ان المجلس عقد اول جلسة له بتاريخ ٢٠٠٦/٣/١٦ فأن الصدة المحددة (لسن) ذلك القانون لم تنته بعد إذ سيكون يوم ٢٠٠٦/٩/١٥ نهاية لها . ولعدم سن ذلك القانون فلا يمكن لأية محافظة او مجموعة محافظات (بما فيها محافظة كركوك) ان تطالب بتكوين اقليم في الوقت الحاضر .
 ٢. ان المادة (١٤٠) من دستور جمهورية العراق قررت ان تتولى السلطة التنفيذية اتخاذ الخطوات اللازمة لاستكمال تنفيذ متطلبات المادة (٥٨) من قانون ادارة الدولة العراقية للمرحلة الانتقالية على ان تنجز تلك المتطلبات المتمثلة بالتطبيع والاحصاء والاستفتاء في كركوك والمناطق الاخرى المتنازع عليها لتحديد ارادة مواطنيها في مدة أقصاها الحادي والثلاثين من شهر كانون الاول سنة الفين وسبعة (٢٠٠٧/١٢/٣١) .
- للتفضل بالاطلاع ونقترح تبليغ مقدمي الطلب بتلك الاحكام الدستورية .

مع التقدير .

د.فرهاد نعمة الله حسين

الامين العام لمجلس الوزراء وكالة

٢٠٠٦/٦/

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