Tag: zero-problems foreign policy

  • Turkey’s unsustainable politics in Middle East

    Turkey’s unsustainable politics in Middle East

    Ramzy Baroud

    Confused may be an appropriate term to describe Turkey’s current foreign policy in the Middle East and Israel in particular. The source of that confusion — aside from the appalling violence in Syria and earlier in Libya — is Turkey’s own range of mistakes.

     

    The Turkish government’s inconsistency regarding Israel highlights earlier discrepancy in other political contexts. There was a time when Turkey’s top foreign policy priority included reaching out diplomatically to Arab and Muslim countries. Then, we spoke of a paradigm shift, whereby Istanbul was repositioning its political center, reflecting perhaps economic necessity, but also cultural shifts within its own society. It seemed that the East versus West debate was skillfully being resolved by politicians of the Justice and Development Party (AKP).

    The ‘Zero Problems’ policy

    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, along with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, appeared to have obtained a magical non-confrontational approach to Turkey’s historic political alignment. “The Zero Problems” policy allowed Turkey to brand itself as a bridge between two worlds. The country’s economic growth and strategic import to various geopolitical spheres allowed it to escape whatever price was meted out by Washington and its European allies as a reprimand for its bold political moves — including Erdogan’s unprecedented challenge of Israel.
    Indeed, there was a link between the growing influence of Turkey among Arab and Islamic countries and Turkey’s challenge to Israel’s violent behavior in Palestine and Lebanon, and its rants against Syria and Iran. Turkey’s return to its political roots was unmistakable, yet interestingly, it was not met by too strong an American response. Washington couldn’t simply isolate Istanbul and the latter shrewdly advanced its own power and influence with that knowledge in mind. Even the bizarre anti-Turkish statements by Israeli officials sounded more like incoherent rants than actual foreign policy.

    Israel’s clout in the region

    Political arrogance and U.S.-financed military strength are two pillars by which Israel maintains its clout in the region. The first was childishly applied when the then Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister, Danny Ayalon, publicly snubbed Turkey’s Ambassador, Ahmet Oguz Celikkol, in January 2010 by placing him on a lower sofa. He then asked Israeli journalists to take note of the insult. The second came in May 2010 when Israeli commandos descended on the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara, carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza, and killed nine Turkish citizens in cold blood.

    “Idiocracy” is how Israeli columnist Uri Avnery described Israel’s behavior toward Turkey, which was once one of Israel’s most vital allies. But idiocy has little to do with it and Turkey knew that well. Israel wished to send strong messages to the Turks, that its strategic and political maneuvering was of no use here and that Israel would continue to reign supreme in the face of Erdogan’s ambitious policies. The real idiocy was Israel’s miscalculations, which failed to take into account that such behavior could only speed up Turkey’s political transformation. The fact that the U.S. was losing its once unchallenged grip over the fate of the Middle East had also contributed to Turkey’s sudden rise as a country with far-reaching ties and long-term political vision.

    Turkey’s new political priorities

    Erdogan quickly rose to prominence. His responses to Israel’s provocations, and to what was essentially a declaration of war, came in the form of strong words and measured actions. He conditioned any rapprochement with Israel on a clear apology over its transgressions, compensations to the victims and the families of the dead, and ending the siege on Gaza. The last condition further highlighted Turkey’s new political priorities.

    As far as Turkey’s regional ascendency was concerned, it mattered little whether Israel apologized. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was losing favor, even with his own allies in Washington. And unlike Washington, under the thumb of the pro-Israeli lobby, Istanbul was a country with independent foreign policy.

    The Turkish government’s inconsistency regarding Israel highlights earlier discrepancy in other political contexts. There was a time when Turkey’s top foreign policy priority included reaching out diplomatically to Arab and Muslim countries

     

    Ramzy Baroud

     

    When AKP triumphed in Turkey’s elections in June 2011, the so-called Arab Spring was still in its early stages. Then, much hope was placed on the rise of popular movements in countries that have been disfigured by Arab dictators and their Western benefactors. Not only did the ruling party disregard the fact that Turkey had taken part in the old political structure in the Middle East, it also escaped them that Turkey was an important member of NATO which unleashed a terrible war on Libya on March 19, deliberately misinterpreting U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973. Yes, Turkey had resisted the war option at first, but it was quick to forgive and forget and eventually recognized and supported its political outcome. Thanks to the war, Libya is now in a permanent state of bedlam.

    Victory Speech

    Erdogan’s victory speech in June 2011 attempted to paint a new picture of reality regarding future prospects and Turkey’s proposed role in all of this. “I greet with affection the peoples of Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Cairo, Tunis, Sarajevo, Skopje, Baku, Nicosia and all other friends and brother peoples who are following the news out of Turkey with great excitement,” Erdogan said. “Today, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans have won as much as Turkey.”

    But that “win” was short-lived. The euphoria of change created many blind spots, one of which is that conflicts of sectarian and ethnic nature — as in Syria — don’t get resolved overnight; that foreign military intervention, direct or by proxy, can only espouse protracted conflict. Indeed, it was in Syria that Turkey’s vision truly fumbled. It was obvious that many were salivating over the outcome of a Syrian war between a brutal regime and a self-serving, divided opposition, each faction espousing one foreign agenda or another. Suddenly, Turkey’s regional and global ambitions of justice and morality grew ever more provisional because of fear of chaos spilling over into its border areas, the tragic rise of the number of Syrian refugees at Turkey’s borders and the fear of a strong Kurdish presence innorthern Syria.

    Erdogan: ‘Israel a terrorist state’

    Not even capable Turkish politicians could hide the confusion in which they found themselves. Responding to Israel’s bombing of Gaza last November, which killed and wounded hundreds of Palestinians, Erdogan described Israel as a “terrorist state.” “Those who turn a blind eye to discrimination toward Muslims in their own countries, are also closing their eyes to the savage massacre of innocent children in Gaza. … Therefore, I say Israel is a terrorist state.”

    But even then, discussions were under way regarding the text of an Israeli apology to Turkey over the Mavi Marmara attack. That apology had finally arrived as an undeserved gift to U.S. President Barack Obama, who visited Israel in March with a message of total support for Israel.

    “In light of Israel’s investigation into the incident which pointed to a number of operational mistakes, the prime minister expressed Israel’s apology to the Turkish people for any mistakes that might have led to the loss of life or injury and agreed to conclude an agreement on compensation/non-liability,” Netanyahu’s apology read. No commitment regarding Gaza was made. Erdogan’s office responded: “Erdogan told Benjamin Netanyahu that he valued the centuries-long strong friendship and cooperation between the Turkish and Jewish nations.” According to Netanyahu, the apology over the “operational mistakes” had everything to do with the need to share intelligence over Syria between both of the countries’ militaries. To balance out Turkey’s hurried retreat to its old political foreign policy, Erdogan is reportedly planning to visit Gaza in April.

    “We will take on a more effective role. We will call, as we have, for rights in our region, for justice, for the rule of law, for freedom and democracy,” were the resounding words of Erdogan following his party’s elections victory last year.
    It is likely that Istanbul will try to maintain a balanced position, but, as Erdogan himself knows, in issues of morality and justice, middle stances are simply untenable.

     

    _____________

    Palestinian-American journalist, author, editor, Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) taught Mass Communication at Australia’s Curtin University of Technology, and is Editor-in-Chief of the Palestine Chronicle. Baroud’s work has been published in hundreds of newspapers and journals worldwide and his books “His books “Searching Jenin: Eyewitness Accounts of the Israeli Invasion” and “The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People’s Struggle” have received international recognition. Baroud’s third book, “My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story” narrates the story of the life of his family, used as a representation of millions of Palestinians in Diaspora, starting in the early 1940’s until the present time.

  • The problem with Islamist Turkey’s ‘zero problems’ policy

    The problem with Islamist Turkey’s ‘zero problems’ policy

    The problem with Islamist Turkey’s ‘zero problems’ policy

    Special to WorldTribune.com

    By Gerald Robbins

    The culprit in last week’s suicide bombing at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara was not, as expected, an Islamic terror group bent on attacking American interests. Rather, a Marxist organization known as the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party Front claimed responsibility.

    The group’s communiqué explained the assault as a response to “imperialist ventures” in Egypt, Libya and Syria. The growing consensus is the bombing was a warning to Turkey’s Middle East ambitions.

    Turkish police secure the area after an explosion at the security entrance at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara on Feb. 1. /EPA/BGNES

    Nowadays it’s popular to see Turkey as a necessary regional overseer, a strategically important nation bridging Christian and Muslim environments. Its location, Islamic legacy and decades of Western political adaptation seemingly make it a natural interlocutor that can correctly discern how to deal with the Arab Spring. Yet what has transpired indicates otherwise.

    Ankara’s once solidly pro-Western orientation is now offset by its growing involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. This is primarily due to the Islamist ideology of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP). Economic overtures towards the Gulf region and neighboring Arab states, coupled with a belief in Muslim solidarity (a retort to the European Union’s lukewarm reaction to Turkish membership) underscore what has transpired.

    Turkey’s shift isn’t an ad hoc retort to the EU’s recalcitrance nor the post-Cold War’s geopolitical vacuum however. Since the AKP came to power nearly a decade ago, Turkish foreign policy has followed what’s been called a “zero problems” doctrine.

    Conceived by Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, “zero problems” essentially establishes friendly, non-confrontational relations with surrounding neighbors while overlooking their objectionable aspects. Ankara’s rationale assumes that acting as an understanding, non-judgmental fellow Muslim can eventually enlighten wayward regimes. It’s an endeavor which theoretically provides Turkey with a sense of regional prominence. It also complements the Obama administration’s “lead from behind” philosophy, signifying Ankara is better tasked for promoting democratic values in the Muslim world than Washington.

    However Turkey’s outreach towards its Arab neighbors has been disappointing. Ankara believed there was a critical gap in the Arab Spring’s regional ferment that it could capably fill. Initially pro-Turkish sentiment was on display. Arab demonstrators were televised holding placards of Turkey’s fiery Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whom commentators compared to a latter day version of Gamal Abdel Nasser.

    Impromptu polls throughout the Muslim world commonly found Turkey to be the most admired if not inspiring society. The idea that a Turkish-led “neo-Ottoman” commonwealth would result from these revolutions was advocated throughout academic and think tank institutions.

    The events afflicting Syria noticeably altered matters.

    The Syrian Spring reflects how the region’s once hopeful promise quickly devolved into disappointment and uncertainty. Almost two years of civil war have killed over 60,000 people.

    Considering that Turkey’s longest border is with Syria, the ongoing struggle to unseat the Assad regime unnerves Ankara. An estimated 200,000 Syrians fleeing the bloodshed currently reside in Turkish refugee camps, straining resources and goodwill. The fighting has occasionally spilled over to Turkey’s side of the border, inflicting sometimes fatal casualties. Coping with these hardships is part of Ankara’s dilemma, since it’s uncertain who exactly controls the Syria’s frontier.

    Damascus relinquished its border presence several months ago to concentrate its forces around the capital and major cities. A medley of anti-Assad factions with varying agendas and ideologies have filled the void. The Syrian border land is also primarily inhabited by the Kurds.

    In light of the fact that Turkey’s quarter century insurrection with its own Kurdish population has cost over 35,000 lives, Ankara’s neo-Ottoman expectations have been chastened by next-door anxieties.

    Syria is the cornerstone of Turkey’s Eastwards outreach. Prior to the Arab Spring, civilizing Bashar Assad’s errant ways was the marketing tool the Erdogan government used to convince Western officialdom of its vital role as a sociopolitical go-between. Defanging Damascus would also greatly benefit Turkey’s campaign to become a full member of the European Union.

    Instead of Washington-led belligerence, Ankara endeavored to gently goad Syria with trade and treaties. Prime Minister Erdogan lauded his “brotherly” relations with President Assad, noting a shared Ottoman legacy as the key to success.

    Evoking this common history is a flawed concept. Several centuries of Ottoman rule over Syria and other Arab domains was far from nostalgic. Governance was essentially harsh if not inefficient and rife with corruption. Save for a shared religion, noticeable variances appear. There is a colonizer versus colonized perspective to consider. The Ottomans were foreign rulers within the Arab homelands, a history that has more in common with British, French and Dutch annals than fellow Muslims. Even the idea of religious solidarity is suspect. Turkey’s early Twentieth Century decision to cast its lot with Western secularism gave it a suspect reputation among Muslim brethren. Arab protestors admire Erdogan’s character, but it’s a different system and historical legacy from which he hails.

    As Syria continues bleeding, the perception of being a regional savior decreases. Détente with Damascus has become a diplomatic embarrassment for the Turks, blemishing credibility.

    “Zero problems” has metastasized into multiple problems, ranging from diplomatic overreach to festering crossborder tensions that can quickly turn viral. Unfortunately the U.S. Embassy bombing in Ankara might be a harbinger of things to come.

  • ‘Wrong foreign policy has endangered Turkey political stability’

    ‘Wrong foreign policy has endangered Turkey political stability’

    A leading Turkish politician says the Turkish government’s wrong policies towards its neighboring states have put the political stability of the country in jeopardy, a report says.

    ostovar20130108093448637

    In an interview with Turkish Ortadogu (Middle East) daily on Saturday, Deputy of Turkey’s Nationalist Movement Party, Ahmet Kenan Tanrikulu said the chaotic political situation inside and outside Turkey has harmed Turkey’s political stability and put the country’s economy on the verge of fragmentation.

    Tanrikulu said the setbacks over drafting the new constitution and the increase of terror inside the country and the government’s wrong and provocative policies towards Turkey’s neighbors have placed the country in serious jeopardy.

    “Turkey’s political stability has been seriously harmed and the government of [Turkish Prime Minister] Recep Tayyip Erdogan is not reliable whatsoever,” the Turkish official maintained.

    Tanrikulu further highlighted the high costs of living and heavy taxes as well as people’s dissatisfaction with the country’s wrong economic policies.

    “The unprecedented increase of prices has decreased people’s financial power and the unemployment is gradually on the rise,” he went on to say.

    He cast doubt on the statistics of Turkey’s economic growth, saying that Erdogan’s government managed to win the votes of the nation through demagogy.

    The economic stability requires political stability and Ankara is currently entangled in a difficult political situation in the region, he concluded.

    AO/HN

    via PressTV – ‘Wrong foreign policy has endangered Turkey political stability’.

  • Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Zero Problems with Neighbors Revisited

    Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Zero Problems with Neighbors Revisited

    by Richard Falk

    Davutoglu JFK forum Harvard

    Foreign Affairs Minister of Turkey Ahmet Davutoğlu

    Pundits in Europe and North America in recent months have delighted in citing with a literary smirk ‘zero problems with neighbors,’ which has been the centerpiece of Ahmet Davutoglu’s foreign policy agenda since he became Foreign Minister on May 1, 2009. Mr. Davutoglu had previously served as Chief Advisor to both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister ever since the AKP came to power in 2002, and was known in those years as the ‘architect’ behind the scenes. Critics of the zero problems approach point to the heightened Turkish tensions with Syria and Iraq, the persisting inability of Ankara to overcome the hostile fallout from Mavi Marmara incident with Israel, and even the revived salience of the long unresolved dispute with the Armenian diaspora sparked by a new French law that makes the denial of genocide associated with the 1915 massacres a crime and has led to a dramatic worsening of Turkish-French relations.

    Troubles to be sure, but should these be interpreted as ‘failures,’ and more precisely as ‘Turkish failures’? Perhaps Davutoglu was insufficiently cautious, or, alternatively, too optimistic, when he articulated the zero problems diplomacy, but was it not at the time an accurate way of signaling a new dawn for Turkey’s approach to neighbors, especially its Arab neighbors, and actually, to the world as a whole? And Davutoglu implemented his lofty vision with a dizzying series of initiatives that opened long-locked doors. He also made it clear that the neighborhood was not to be understood in a narrow geographical sense, but rather in as broad a sense as disclosed by cultural and historical affinities and mutual strategic interests. Davutoglu was eager not only to banish lingering bad memories associated with centuries of Ottoman rule over much of the Arab world, but also to renew connections with countries that shared Turkic and Muslim identities.

    It should be recalled that Turkish foreign policy began charting this new course years before Davutoglu became Foreign Minister, and thus was a shift in worldview that was shared with Recip Tayyip Erdogan and Abudllah Gul, the two dominant political leaders during the past decade.  Indeed, both men deserve some of the credit, and a share of the responsibility, for steering the Turkish ship of state into such mainly uncharted waters of diplomatic initiative.

    In an important sense, the turning point came in 2003 when the Turkish government, after sending some mixed signals to Washington, finally refused to allow the United States to use its territory to stage an invasion of Iraq. At the time the anti-AKP domestic opposition challenged this unprecedented act of geopolitical insubordination by Ankara as the biggest mistake in the whole of Turkish republican history. In retrospect, this opting out of the invasion of Iraq constituted a transformational moment for Turkey that demonstrated to its neighbors and the world, and even to itself, that Turkey could and would think and act for itself when it comes to foreign policy, that the hierarchical alliances of the Cold War period were over, and that Washington should no longer take Ankara’s collaboration for granted. And yet this move did not mean, as some critics in both Turkey and the United States wrongly claimed, a turn toward Islam and away from the West or its continuing involvement in Western security arrangements. Even during the Iraq War Turkey allowed the Incirlik Air Base to be used by American combat aircraft, including for bombing missions. As recently shown, Turkey still values its NATO ties even to the extent of allowing radar stations to be deployed on its territory that is linked to a missile defense system that seems mainly intended to protect Europe, Israel, and the Gulf from Iran in the immediate future and possibly Russia in the long-term.

    By now it is almost forgotten that it was Turkey that encouraged peace talks between Syria and Israel to resolve their conflict that seemed to be headed for success until their abrupt breakdown, a development attributed at the time to the Israeli attacks on Gaza at the end of 2008, but in retrospect better understood as the unwillingness of Israel to give up its 1967 conquest and subsequent occupation of the Golan Heights. Turkey also sought to be a peacemaker further afield in the Balkans and Caucasus, doing the seemingly impossible, bringing Bosnia and Serbia together in a manner that moved these two antagonistic governments on a path leading to normalization and at least a cold peace. Even more ambitiously, in collaboration with Brazil, Turkey used its new stature as an independent regional player in May 2010 to persuade Tehran to accept an arrangement for the storage of a large portion of Iran’s enriched uranium in Turkey, thereby demonstrating the plausibility of a peaceful alternative to the United States/Israel posture of sanctions and warmongering.

    To be sure, the earlier sensible effort to have friendly relations with Syria has now badly backfired, but not until the regime in Damascus started the massive shooting of its citizens and refused to meet the demands of its people for far reaching reforms.  Arguably, the same reversal of outlook in Ankara occurred in relation to Libya after Qaddafi threatened to massacre his opposition, leading eventually to extending some Turkish humanitarian support for the U.N.-backed NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 that shaped the outcome of an ongoing internal struggle for control of the Libyan political future. Also, there is no doubt that the refusal of the European Union to shift its one-sided stance on Cyprus that is punitive toward Turkey has had some serious consequences. It has soured relations with Greece, producing a temporary deterioration that has taken place despite the Turkish show of reasonableness and exhibiting a spirit of compromise in relation to Cyprus. And, together with the recent Islamophobic surge in Europe, this perceived unfairness to Turkey with respect to Cyprus has reinforced the weakening of an earlier Turkish commitment to qualify for membership in the E.U.

    Even with Israel, despite the strong sympathies of the Turkish public with the struggle of the Palestinians, the AKP leadership has done its best to restore normalcy to the relationship between the two countries. After all, the May 31, 2010 attack by Israel’s navy in international waters on the Mavi Marmara carrying humanitarian activists and assistance to Gaza and challenging the Israeli blockade was not only a flagrant breach of international law but resulted in the death of nine Turkish passengers. Turkey has demanded an official apology and compensation for the families of the victims, a reasonable set of expectations that was apparently on the verge of acceptance by Tel Aviv, but collapsed at the last hour when challenged by the internal political opposition to Netanyahu led by the super-hawk foreign minister, Avigdor Liebermann, now under government investigation for fraud.

    What this brief overview argues is that Turkey has consistently tried to avert recourse to intervention and war in the Middle East and to promote diplomatic approaches that rely to the extent possible on soft power. It has, to be sure, experienced several geopolitical rebuffs, as in relation to its efforts to end the confrontation with Iran, impressively refusing to stay in line behind the bellicose leadership of the United States and Israel. Davutoglu has correctly affirmed Turkey’s resolve to act on the principled basis of its values and convictions, as well as strategic calculations of its interests, in the post-Cold War politics of the region, and not blindly follow directives from Washington. Iran is a striking case where the Turkish approach, although seemingly incapable of stemming the drift toward war being mounted by the West, is both wiser and more likely to achieve the goal of reassuring the world that Tehran means what it says when it insists that it does not intend to acquire nuclear weapons. As in every other foreign policy setting, Davutoglu is exhibiting his belief that in the 21st century persuasion works better than coercion when it comes to achieving political goals without even considering the costs of death, devastation, and displacement.

    In sum, the zero problems with neighbors as a touchstone to Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and the world needs to be understood as an aspiration and strong preference rather than as an invariable and inflexible guide to practice. There are too many contradictions embedded in the political realities of the contemporary world to be slavishly tied to a rigid foreign policy doctrine that is incapable of taking account of context and shifting perceptions and interests. For instance, in Syria and Libya the Turkish government was forced to choose between siding with a regime slaughtering its own people and backing a disorganized opposition in its heroic if clouded efforts to democratize and humanize the governing process.  Of course, there are suspicions that Turkey’s support for the anti-Assad insurgency also reflects a disguised preference for a Sunni opposition that is anchored, if at all, in the Muslim Brotherhood as compared to the secular authoritarianism of the Damascus regime. As well, there are speculations that in the ongoing regional struggle for ascendancy Turkey would rather in the end side with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, reinforced by the United States, than Iran and a newly engaged Russia.

    Zero problems needs to be understood as a preferred framework for addressing the relations between countries, not just governments, and in situations of strife choices must be made. Arguably Turkey went too far when it backed NATO in Libya and the U.N. Security Council with respect to Syria or not far enough when it failed to show support for the Green Revolution in Iran after the stolen elections of June 2009 [Editor’s note:  the claim that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stole the 2009 presidential election has no basis in fact]. These are difficult interpretative choices upon which reasonable persons of good faith can disagree. Whatever the policies pursued in specific situations, they do not necessarily invalidate the principled positions articulated by Davutoglu since he became Foreign Minister. Davutoglu has repeatedly affirmed these principles as being as important for him as are realist calculations in shaping foreign policy in complex situations. Possibly, if the Green Revolution had shown more persistence and promise or the Iranian regime had engaged in more widespread killing of its people Turkey would have made a ‘Syrian choice.’

    Davutoglu on more than one occasion has expressed enthusiastic support for the upheavals grouped together under the banner of ‘the Arab Spring.’ He calls these upheavals great historical transformations that are irreversible, and expressions of a thirst by young people in their respective countries for lives of dignity and democratic freedoms. There is nothing that Turkey has done to thwart these high ideals.

    In this respect, I think it is possible to reach an assessment of Turkish foreign policy as of early 2012. It has charted a course of action based to the extent feasible on soft power diplomacy, taking numerous initiatives to resolve its conflicts with neighbors but also to offer its good offices to mediate and unfreeze conflicts between states to which it is not a party. Its credibility has become so great that Istanbul has replaced European capitals as the preferred venue for conflict resolution whether in relation to Afghanistan or even Iran, and despite its much publicized diplomatic differences with Washington. It is notable that despite Western annoyance with Ankara regarding Iran or resulting from the simmering dispute with Israel, the U.S. Government seems to favor Istanbul as the most propitious site for any prospective negotiations with Iran concerning its nuclear program.

    At the same time, as the policy reversals with respect to Syria and Libya illustrate, it is not always possible to avoid taking sides in response to internal struggles, although Turkey has delayed doing so to give governments in power the opportunity to establish internal peace. In a globalizing world, boundaries are not absolute, and sovereignty must give way if severe violations of human rights are being committed by the regime. Even in such extreme circumstances armed intervention should always be a last resort, and one only undertaken in extreme instances on behalf of known opposition forces and in a manner that has a reasonable prospect of cumulative benefits at acceptable costs for the targeted society. Such conditions almost never exist, and so intervention under present world conditions is rarely if ever, in my judgment, justified, although bloodshed, oppression, and crimes against humanity may generate strong public and governmental support for interventionary diplomacy.

    We can only hope that Turkey stays the Davutoglu course, pursuing every opening that enables positive mutual relations among countries and using its diplomatic stature to encourage peaceful conflict resolution wherever possible. Rather than viewing ‘zero problems’ as a failure, it should be a time to reaffirm the creativity of Turkish foreign policy in the course of the last decade that has shown the world the benefits of soft power diplomacy, and a pattern that other governments might learn from while adapting to their own realities. This diplomacy, as supplemented by Turkey’s economic success and political stability, helps us appreciate the deserved popularity of and respect for the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, throughout the region and the world.

    Richard Falk is an international law and international relations scholar who taught at Princeton University for forty years. Since 2002 he has lived in Santa Barbara, California, and taught at the local campus of the University of California in Global and International Studies and since 2005 chaired the Board of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. Read more articles by Richard Falk.
    https://richardfalk.org/

  • Turkey’s Balancing Act

    Turkey’s Balancing Act

    EAST LANSING, MICHIGAN – Turkey has over the past few weeks become the spearhead of a joint Western-Arab-Turkish policy aimed at forcing President Bashar al-Assad to cede power in Syria. This is quite a turnaround in Turkish policy, because over the past two years the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had gone out of its way to cultivate good relations with neighboring Syria, with whom it shares a long land border.

    ms5347 thumb3This change of course on Syria has also cost Turkey a great deal in terms of its relations with Iran, the principal supporter of Assad’s regime, which Turkey had also cultivated as part of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy.

    Given these new strains, it is worth recalling that a only few months ago many American leaders were livid at what they perceived to be Turkey’s betrayal. In their view, Turkey had re-oriented its foreign policy toward the Muslim Middle East and away from the West – a shift supposedly reflected in the country’s deteriorating relations with Israel and improving ties with Iran and Syria.

    Many American policymakers and publicists, unable or unwilling to distinguish Turkish-Israeli relations from Turkish-American relations, interpreted Erdoğan’s condemnation of Israel’s blockade of Gaza as a bid to cozy up to his Arab neighbors at the expense of Turkey’s relations with not only Israel but with the West in general. Turkey’s attempt to mediate between the major Western powers and Iran concerning the Islamic Republic’s uranium stockpile went unappreciated in the West; indeed, the United States scuttled the effort just as it seemed to be bearing fruit. And Turkey’s subsequent vote in the United Nations Security Council against imposing additional sanctions on Iran seemed to offer further proof that Turkey had adopted an “Islamic” foreign policy.

    America’s anxiety assumed that it is a contradiction for Turkey to seek good relations with both the West and the Muslim Middle East, and that Ankara’s decision to improve its relations with its Muslim neighbors was motivated primarily by religious and ideological concerns considered important by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Turkey’s recent tense relations with Iran demonstrate this assumption’s basic fallacy, and point to a non-ideological foreign policy that caters to Turkish national interests as defined by the country’s political elite – including the post-Islamists in power today.

    Disagreement between Turkey and Iran initially centered on their conflicting approaches to the internal rebellion against Assad’s dictatorship. Iran has been heavily invested in the Assad regime, its lone Arab ally and the main conduit for delivering material support to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Turkey, on the other hand, after some initial hesitation, has thrown its weight fully behind Assad’s opponents, including by providing refuge to them, as well as to defectors from Syria’s army. Indeed, Turkey has gone further by helping the divided Syrian opposition to come together on its territory to establish a joint front against the Assad regime and provide a credible alternative to it.

    Turkey abruptly shifted its stance on Syria, and aligned its position with that of the major Western powers, for two reasons. First, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) could not afford to be seen as opposing democracy in Syria, given that its own legitimacy rests heavily on its democratic credentials. Second, once Erdoğan’s government concluded that Assad’s regime was bound to fall, it sought to secure its future interests in Syria, which is of strategic importance to Turkey – even at the cost of jeopardizing relations with Iran.

    Iran’s displeasure at Turkey’s “betrayal” of Assad was compounded by the Erdoğan government’s recent decision to install a NATO anti-missile early-warning facility – aimed at tracking Iranian missile activity – in Malatya in eastern Turkey. According to Iranian authorities, NATO’s system is designed to neutralize Iran’s deterrent capacity vis-à-vis Israel, thereby increasing the likelihood of an Israeli or US strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. Iranian officials went so far as to warn Turkey that it would make the Malatya facility its first target in retaliation for a Western strike on Iran.

    In reality, Israel can track Iranian missile activity from several sites other than Malatya. Iran’s threat, therefore, is an expression more of discontent with Turkey than of genuine concern that the Malatya facility will adversely affect its deterrent capacity.

    Iranian-Turkish tensions reflect three larger realities. First, the Arab Spring, and especially the Syrian uprising, exposed the two sides’ underlying rivalry for influence in the Middle East and the Arab world. Second, Turkey’s turn toward the east is not ideologically or religiously inspired, but instead is based on solid strategic and economic calculations; as the fluid situation in the Middle East continues to develop, Turkey will adapt its policies accordingly. Finally, Turkey has invested far too much in its strategic relations with NATO, and with the US in particular, to fritter them away in exchange for uncertain gains in relations with Iran.

    This does not mean that Turkey will return to its traditional strategic dependence on the US and its allies, an approach that defined Turkish foreign policy throughout the Cold War and the decade following it. The AKP government is committed to the country’s strategic autonomy and to greater activism in the Middle East. But it is also aware that such policies must not cost Turkey its relationship with NATO and the US.

    Turkey is engaged in an intricate effort to preserve its old relationship with the West while building new ties with its Muslim neighbors. Turkey’s leaders understand that the country can best preserve and enhance its leverage with both sides by maintaining good relations with each.

    Mohammed Ayoob is Professor of International Relations, Michigan State University, and Adjunct Scholar, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding.

    Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2012.
    www.project-syndicate.org

  • Turkey’s businessmen rue government stance on Syria

    Turkey’s businessmen rue government stance on Syria

    By Jonathan Head BBC News, Gaziantep

    57450143 sankoparkmall
    The Sanko Park Mall is quiet on Fridays, the day Syrians used to come
    Continue reading the main story

    Syria Crisis

    • Arab mission test
    • Idlib ‘massacres’
    • Russia’s support
    • Civil war fears

    There is a joke going around business circles in the south-eastern Turkish city of Gaziantep these days. “We no longer have zero problems with our neighbours,” it goes, “we now have zero neighbours without problems.”

    It is an ironic reference to the new foreign policy championed by the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), which was given the title “Zero Problems With Neighbours” by its architect, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu.

    This aimed to eliminate the historic tensions which had kept Turkey in a state of hostility with all its neighbours, and rebuild relations based on trade.

    It was a roaring success. Trade with the Middle Eastern region expanded quickly, especially with Iraq and Syria, the two Arab countries on Turkey’s south-eastern border.

    Closer political ties followed. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan established a close personal rapport with President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, the two countries abolished visas, and a flood of tourists came both ways across the border.

    ‘Nobody comes’

    The events this year have turned that policy on its head.

    After initially trying to persuade President Assad to embrace reform, the Turkish government is now leading those countries calling for him to go. The free trade agreement has been torn up. Tourism has all but stopped.

    Gaziantep Gaziantep, sixth largest city in Turkey, has been one of the biggest losers from the Arab uprisings

    Gaziantep was one of the biggest beneficiaries of the new foreign policy, and it is now one of the biggest losers from the Arab uprisings.

    It is now the sixth largest city in Turkey, with important textile, construction material and food processing industries that have thrived on access to Middle East markets. New housing is being built all over the city.

    Its hotel and retail businesses did just as well out of Syrian visitors.

    The two-year-old Sanko Park Mall, the most luxurious in the region, was built largely to cater for Syrian shoppers. It is strikingly quiet on Fridays, the day the Syrians used to come.

    Continue reading the main story

    “Start Quote

    If you have a problem with your neighbour, you try to fix it”

    Mehmet Ali Mutsfoglu Gaziantep businessman

    “Before the Arab Spring the city was full of Syrian people here for the weekend, staying in the hotels a couple of days, shopping, spending money,” says Mehmet Ali Mutafoglu, whose family runs Akteks, one of the city’s big textile firms.

    “But now, since the critical situation between the two governments, nobody is coming over to Turkey.”

    Akteks owns two factories in Aleppo, in northern Syria, and has seen its business contract by 30-40%.

    Exports stalled

    It is not just the collapse of trade with Syria which has hit Gaziantep’s manufacturers.

    Many of the city’s exports to other Middle Eastern countries go through Syria, which has a border with Turkey stretching more than 800km (500 miles).

    That route has become more dangerous and expensive. New fees are being imposed on Turkish trucks, and they have occasionally been shot at by Syrian troops.

    Turkey's border with Syria near Gaziantep Turkey shares an 800km-long border with Syria

    “Almost 80% of our business with Syria has stopped,” says Adnan Altunkaya, whose family owns a big food and drinks producer.

    “It’s because of the border. There’s no security, and you often don’t get paid at all.”

    “Sometimes they close the customs gates, and your trucks are stuck there – then you have to pay, and that increases the cost of transport.”

    At the Besler group, one of Turkey’s biggest food processors, they have started exploring alternative routes for their products.

    Kemal Cakmak, one of the five brothers who founded the company, now runs their giant pasta factory, using the high-quality durum wheat that grows in this part of Turkey.

    He says some trucks are now going to the Middle East via Iraq, although this is a much longer and more expensive route.

    Mr Cakmak is also going to try sending a consignment of pasta to Lebanon on ships that the government has promised to help exporters.

    ‘No dialogue’

    These entrepreneurs are all natural supporters of the AKP. It is the most business-friendly party in modern Turkish history, and its economic record is the key to its electoral success.

    Turkey's Economy Minister, Zafer Caglayan (right), visits Gaziantep Turkish officials have explained that they had no choice but to back the Syrian opposition

    So its decision to turn its back on President Assad has left some Gaziantep businessmen bewildered.

    “If you have a problem with your neighbour, you try to fix it,” says Mr Mutsfoglu.

    “You don’t cut all the connections with your neighbour. But now there’s no dialogue between Turkey and Syria. It’s not good for the countries, it’s not good for business, it’s not good for the people living in the cities.”

    Turkey’s Economy Minister, Zafer Caglayan, who came to open a new office for the regional exporters’ association, brushed these concerns away.

    Most trade with Syria was continuing, Mr Caglayan said, and the government was looking for alternative routes for exports. He trusted the people of Gaziantep to be patient, he added.

    But the alternatives – going by ship or through Iraq – were dismissed by most of the manufacturers I met as too slow and too expensive. They would make their products uncompetitive, they said.

    In the main food market, traders were feeling the loss of Syrian business, but here there was more sympathy for the government’s position.

    Besler Pasta Factory in Gaziantep Gaziantep’s factories are exploring alternative export routes and markets for their products

    Many of them agreed that Turkey must take a stand in support of the protesters in Syria.

    With a decisive third election victory under its belt last June, the AKP can probably afford to take risks with its entrepreneurial supporters.

    Turkish officials have explained that they had no choice but to back the Syrian opposition.

    They believe President Assad’s days are numbered, and that the events of 2011 have taught Turkey that it must put itself on the right side of history.

    But this does mean the “Zero Problems” foreign policy, which has shaped Turkey’s relations with its neighbours for a decade, has been shelved for now, and it is not clear yet what will take its place.