Tag: Wikileaks

  • US diplomats suggest Turkey’s Erdogan is ill informed – Monsters and Critics

    US diplomats suggest Turkey’s Erdogan is ill informed – Monsters and Critics

    Berlin – US diplomats believe Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is ill-informed and advised by a foreign minister with little appreciation of politics outside Ankara, leaked cables claimed Sunday.

    In a summary of despatches dealing with Turkey, the German news magazine Der Spiegel said the Americans believed many leading figures in Erdogan’s ruling AKP party were members of a Muslim brotherhood.

    They reported that Erdogan mainly read the news from newspapers sympathetic to the Islamist movement and was surrounded by an iron ring of flattering but stuck-up advisers.’

    Other cables charged that Erdogan had promoted Islamic bankers into prominent positions and said Turkey’s leadership was feuding, according to the Spiegel summary.

    Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, the key contact for the US embassy in Ankara, was also criticized in the despatches, with diplomats saying he had a ‘neo-Ottoman’ vision and little awareness of what went on outside Ankara, according to Der Spiegel.

    It quoted a senior Turkish official who told a US diplomat in a chat that Davutoglu exercised Islamist influence on Erdogan and added about Davutoglu, ‘He’s dangerous.’

    The London newspaper The Guardian quoted cables that quoted Davutoglu giving a ‘spirited’ answer in November 2009 to visiting US Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon, who visited Ankara to ask Turkey not to meddle in diplomacy over Iran’s nuclear programme.

    The despatch said the US official warned of the danger to Turkey if Iran obtained a nuclear weapon.

    ‘Davutoglu gave a spirited reply, that ‘of course’ Turkey was aware of this risk. This is precisely why Turkey is working so hard with the Iranians,’ the cable said. ‘Only Turkey can speak bluntly and critically to the Iranians, Davutoglu contended.’

    However at talks in Paris, Gordon chided the French for blocking Turkish efforts to join the European Union.

    ‘Gordon said that Turkey was caught in a vicious cycle and it is not completing necessary reforms because the Turks do not believe that their EU candidacy will be allowed to progress,’ the cable said.

    via US diplomats suggest Turkey’s Erdogan is ill informed – Monsters and Critics.

  • Wikileaks releases US diplomatic cables

    Wikileaks releases US diplomatic cables

    28 November 2010, Sunday / REUTERS, 0 2 0 0

    Whistleblower website WikiLeaks released a cache of classified US State Department documents on Sunday that provide candid views of foreign leaders and sensitive information on terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

    WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN ROBERT GIBBS

    “These cables could compromise private discussions with foreign governments and opposition leaders, and when the substance of private conversations is printed on the front pages of newspapers across the world, it can deeply impact not only US foreign policy interests, but those of our allies and friends around the world.”

    “Such disclosures put at risk our diplomats, intelligence professionals, and people around the world who come to the United States for assistance in promoting democracy and open government.

    ROGER CRESSEY, PARTNER AT GOODHARBOR CONSULTING, FORMER US CYBER SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM OFFICIAL

    “This is pretty devastating. The essence of our foreign policy is our ability to talk straight and honest with our foreign counterparts and to keep those conversations out of the public domain. This massive leak puts that most basic of diplomatic requirements at risk in the future. …”

    “Think of relations with Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Afghanistan, governments who we need to work with us in defeating al Qaeda. Their performance has been uneven in the past, for a variety of reasons, but this kind of leak will seriously hinder our ability to persuade these governments to support our counterterrorism priorities in the future.”

    “Whoever was behind this leak should be shot and I would volunteer to pull the trigger.”

    US REPRESENTATIVE PETER T. KING, NEW YORK REPUBLICAN

    Urged US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to designate WikiLeaks a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

    “WikiLeaks presents a clear and present danger to the national security of the United States. I strongly urge you to work within the Administration to use every offensive capability of the US government to prevent further damaging releases by WikiLeaks.”

    SIR CHRISTOPHER MEYER, FORMER BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

    “This won’t restrain dips’ (diplomats) candour. But people will be looking at the security of electronic communication and archives. Paper would have been impossible to steal in these quantities.”

    EMILE HOKAYEM, SENIOR FELLOW, MIDDLE EAST, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

    “I’m not surprised by the fact that the Gulf is portrayed as a major source of funding extremist groups. It’s clear money goes to extremist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But is there such a thing as an al Qaeda bank account? Probably a decent number of people are still doing it because they think it is a charity.”

    PROFESSOR MICHAEL COX, ASSOCIATE FELLOW, CHATHAM HOUSE THINK TANK

    “It’s a great treasure trove for historians and students of international relations. It is a sign that in the information age, it is very difficult to keep anything secret. But as to whether it’s going to cause the kind of seismic collapse of international relations that governments have been talking about, I somehow doubt.

    Diplomats have always said rude things about each other in private, and everyone has always known that. Governments have a tendency to try to keep as much information as possible secret or classified, whether it really needs to be or not. The really secret information, I would suggest, is still pretty safe and probably won’t end up on WikiLeaks.

  • US embassy cables: US steps up pressure on Turkey over Iran

    US embassy cables: US steps up pressure on Turkey over Iran

    Thursday, 25 February 2010, 11:05
    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 000302
    SIPDIS
    DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE
    EO 12958 DECL: 02/21/2020
    TAGS PRELPARMMNUCMASSIRTU
    SUBJECT: U/S BURNS’ FEBRUARY 18 MEETINGS WITH U/S
    SINIRLIOGLU
    REF: ANKARA 263
    Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

    1. (C) Summary: During February 18 “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue” meetings in Ankara, Turkish MFA Undersecretary Sinirlioglu:

    — Appealed for “simultaneity” between Armenian Protocols ratification and the Minsk Process; — Registered increasing GoT dissatisfaction with Iraqi PM Malaki; — Expressed hope USF-I CG Odierno’s engagement would elicit substantive cooperation from the KRG against the terrorist PKK; — Urged higher profile USG involvment in the Cyprus reunification talks, and; — Confirmed GoT interest in further dialogue on missile defense.

    End Summary.

    IRAN

    —-

    2. (C) Burns strongly urged Sinirlioglu to support action to convince the Iranian government it is on the wrong course. Sinirliolgu reaffirmed the GoT’s opposition to a nuclear Iran; however, he registered fear about the collateral impact military action might have on Turkeyand contended sanctions would unite Iranians behind the regime and harm the opposition. Burns acknowledged Turkey’s exposure to the economic effects of sanctions as a neighbor to Iran, but reminded Sinirlioglu Turkish interests would suffer if Israel were to act militarily to forestall Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons or if Egypt and Saudi Arabia were to seek nuclear arsenals of their own. He said the international community’s patience with Iran had been met with the Iranian refusal, since October, to work with the P5-plus-1, the clandestine enrichment facility near Qom and Tehran’s recent decison to enrich its low-enriched uranium to 20%. The IAEA’s creative proposal to fabricate new fuel assemblies for the Tehran Research Reactor had stumbled on a technically unfeasible Iranian counter-offer for a simultaneous exchange in Iran of Iranian fuel for fuel assemblies. Carefully constructed sanctions, Burns argued, targeting the increasingly pervasive economic power of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, would convey the international community’s unity and determination. “We’ll keep the door open to engagement,” he stressed. A visibly disheartened Sinirlioglu conceded a unified message is important. He acknowledged the countries of the region perceive Iran as a growing threat: “Alarm bells are ringing even in Damascus.”

    ARMENIA

    ——-

    3. (C) Sinirlioglu appealed for “simultaneity” between Armenian Protocols ratification and the Minsk Process. He emphasized “a strong reaction” against the protocols among ruling party MPs had to be overcome before the government would hazard a ratification effort. He warned Congressional passage of an Armenian genocide resolution would “complicate” his government’s domestic political calculations regarding ratification. He said if something acceptable to Azerbaijani President Aliyev can found, then “we can move” the protocols forward. Sinirlioglu suggested Azerbaijan and Armenia’s announcement of an agreed framework for Minsk Group progress would provide the GoT with the necessary political cover. Burns inquired about the prospect for progress on a natural gas deal between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Sinirlioglu implied

    ANKARA 00000302 002 OF 005

    Aliyev is holding an agreement hostage to Turkey’s handling of the protocols: “He doesn’t trust us.”

    IRAQ

    —-

    4. (C) Sinirlioglu registered the GoT’s increasing dissatisfaction with PM Malaki and fear that he is tending “to get out of control.” “He is preoccupied with his political survival;” nevertheless, Sinirlioglu continued, the GoT is in frequent contact with him. The MFA hosted Maliki advisors Sadiq al Rikabi and Tariq al Najmi to meetings 10 days prior. Sinirlioglu lamented Iran’s efforts to influence the election. He noted Saudi Arabia is also “throwing around money” among the political parties in Iraq because it is unwilling to accept the inevitability of Shia dominance there. “We want a free, transparent and fair election,” he said, “we need to forestall a deepening of the sectarian divide.”

    5. (C) After the March 7 elections, Sinirlioglu said, Turkey would initiate an effort to connect Iraqi gas fields to the Turkish grid via a 300 kilometer pipeline, costing USD 500 million. He asserted the pipeline could begin pumping within two years. He alleged Iranian opposition to the pipeline because most of Iraq’s gas fields are in Kurdish and Sunni areas. Sinirlioglu advocated a second pipeline that would give Iraqi oil an alternative to the Gulf as a route to Europe once the country is able to meet its OPEC quota. He asserted the piplines’ construction would pull the several Iraqi communities together into a common project. The creation of new “common assets,” he said, could be more important for its politically unifying effect than its economic impact.

    6. (C) Sinirlioglu registered his appreciation for USF-I Commanding General Odierno’s recent visit. He hoped for the early drafting of an action plan that would elicit more cooperation from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leadership harboring in northern Iraq: “We want the KRG to understand that working with us is important.”

    ISRAEL

    ——

    7. (C) Burns focused on Turkey’s strained relationship with Israel. Sinirlioglu argued “the problem is not bilateral, but general.” He attributed increasing regional country frustration with Israel to the stalled Peace Process, especially on the Palestinian track. He blamed the lack of progress on Israeli intransigence, which caused regional stake-holders to question Netanyahu’s goals. He contended the “humanitarian situation in Gaza,” which is not a punishment of Hamas, but of the Gazan people, fed Turkish popular anger against Israel. Even so, bilateral cooperation with Israel is continuing. Turkey is acquiring Israeli military equipment, notably Heron UAVs. Direct flights between the two countries are routine. Two-way trade is healthy, he said, tourism has dropped recently, but “will recover.” Sinirlioglu described Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s mid-January visit as “very good.” He noted the MFA is exploring the possibility of arranging a meeting between the two prime ministers on the margins of an international gathering. Returning to a GoT obsession, he recalled the Turkey-brokered Syria-Israel proximity talks, “which were shattered by Cast Lead,” Israel’s December 2008 military operation in Gaza. Burns noted Syria places high value on Turkey’s role as a mediator and repeated Senator Mitchell’s statement that Turkey-brokered proximity talks can make an important contribution to the Peace Process.

    ANKARA 00000302 003 OF 005

    SYRIA

    —–

    8. (C) Sinirlioglu contended Turkey’s diplomatic efforts are beginning to pull Syria out of Iran’s orbit. He said a shared hatred for Saddam had been the original impetus for their unlikely alliance. “Now, their interests are diverging.” Once again pitching Israel-Syria proximity talks, Sinirlioglu contended Israel’s acceptance of Turkey as a mediator could break Syria free of Tehran’s influence and further isolate Iran.

    EU, CYPRUS and GREECE

    ———————

    9. (C) Sinirlioglu said Turkey’s EU accession is being obstructed by the politically motivated objections of several member states, notably France, Austria and Cyprus. He reserved special criticism for President Sarkozy. He accused France of changing the rules mid-game. He contended French opposition to Turkey’s membership is “deepening the cultural divide” between Christian Europe and the Muslim world: “A wider audience is watching this.”

    10. (C) He regretted perceived Greek Cypriot complacency regarding the island’s reunification talks: EU “membership makes them invulnerable.” Greek Cypriots, he said, want the world to forget the progress achieved by the Annan Plan in 2004. They pretend relations between the island’s two communities are an internal affair, even though, by treaty, it’s been an international issue for 50 years. Talat’s cross-voting proposal, Sinirlioglu continued, should have been a breakthrough, but the Greek Cypriots failed to react. Downer is frustrated, Sinirlioglu alleged, and so are the Turkish Cypriots. He implied the island’s Turkish community would register its frustration by voting out Talat as TRNC “president” in April. He renewed Turkey’s appeal for higher profile direct USG involvement in the negotiations.

    11. (C) Sinirlioglu welcomed Greek PM Papandeou’s belated response to Erdogan’s October 30 letter seeking a frank new discussion of the two neighbors’ several long-running disputes. He conceded Papandreou’s delay is understandable in light of his likely preoccupation with Greece’s acute financial crisis. Based on Papandreou’s response, Sinirlioglu said, Turkey expects to begin new talks with Greece soon.

    AFGHANISTANPAKISTAN and INDIA

    ——————————-

    12. (C) Burns opened the discussion on Afghanistan with praise for Turkey’s military, training and development contributions there. Sinirlioglu said Turkey had chosen to focus on three Afghan challenges: “the marriage of Wahhabism and Pashtun nationalism”; the chronic antagonism between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and; the country’s security forces deficit. He said Turkey plans to address the first by ramping up its education programs in Afghanistan; the second by pursuing its trilateral Ankara Process, which sponsors meetings of senior Afghan and Pakistani ministerial and intelligence counterparts, and; the third by establishing a police training center in Kabul that aims for a throughput of 5160 trainees per year. Keying off the last point, AMB Tacan Ildem, who recently concluded an assignment as Turkey’s NATO PERMREP, declared the EUPOL police training effort in Afghanistan a failure. He said the EU’s criticism of Turkey’s unwillingness to work directly with EUPOL is unjustified. He argued, since Turkey does not have a security agreement with the EU and is excluded from the

    ANKARA 00000302 004 OF 005

    European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the GoT lacks a legal basis on which to cooperate with EUPOL. “We would like the EU to involve us not as a third country, but, in view of our accumulated rights,” as a candidate for membership. He urged the USG not to coordinate bilateral agreements to support EU operations but, instead, to route all cooperation with the EU on security issues through NATO.

    13. (C) Deputy Undersecretary for South Asian Affairs Engin Soysal led the discussion on Pakistan. He described the Ankara Process and the recent Turkey-sponsored Afghanistan Neighbors Summit as Turkish efforts to assert regional responsibility for South Asia’s inter-linked problems. He said Turkey had not invited India to the neighbors summit in deference to Pakistani sensitivities; however, he claimed, Pakistan understands attempting to exclude India from the nascent South Asian regional structures would be a mistake. He reported Indian Prime Minister Singh had requested President Gul’s assistance with Pakistan during the latter’s visit to New Delhi the previous week. Acting on that request, Gul had phoned Pakistani President Zardari, who was skeptical of Indian intentions. Gul is planning to visit Pakistan later this year. Soysal said Iran is proposing a quadrilateal summit, which would include Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan, but that proposal had yet to generate enthusiasm.

    14. (C) Soysal, Turkey’s former ambassador to Pakistan, said the Pakistani military, though displeased with Zardari, remains unwilling to intervene; nevertheless, senior officers’ patience may not be infinite. Zardari needs to increase the democratic legitimacy of parliament. Soysal offered. Nawaz Sharif has become a much more constructive player.

    15. (C) Soysal urged a NATO training role in Pakistan. Picking up from Soysal, Tacan Ildem suggested NATO invite Pakistani military officers to courses at Oberammergau.

    BOSNIA

    ——

    16. (C) Sinirlioglu registered the GoT’s determination to resist perceived EU efforts to exclude Turkey from the Balkans, particularly Bosnia. He identified effecting rapprochement between Bosnia and Serbia as Turkey’s immediate diplomatic goal for the region. Towards that end, Sinirlioglu said, we convinced Haris Siladjdzic, who had been in Ankara the day before, to cease references to Serbian “genocide.” The United States and Turkey have “agreed to disagree” on the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Bosnia; nevertheless, “we value your involvement in the Balkans.”

    BILATERAL EUROPEAN RELATIONS, NATO

    ———————————-

    17. (C) Burns inquired about Turkey’s bilateral relations with Europe. Sinirlioglu briefly recapped Turkey’s unhappiness with Sarkozy. He described his country’s relationship with Austria as infected by the latter’s ethnic prejudice. He complained Belgium and Denmark are reluctant to suppress terrorist PKK-affiliated organizations active in their countries. Tacan Ildem added that, as part of the 2009 POTUS-brokered deal that had overcome Turkish objections to the appointment of Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO Secretary General, Denmark had promised to clarify its legal requirements prerequiste to acceding to Turkey’s request for the closure of Roj TV, a PKK mouthpiece. This still needed to be done, Ildem said.

    18. (C) Picking up from Ildem, Sinirlioglu recalled the

    ANKARA 00000302 005 OF 005

    POTUS-brokered deal had included an understanding that a qualified Turk would be considered for Assistant Secretary General. Instead, he said, a German of uncompelling merit was selected. “We suspect a deal between Rasmussen and Merkel.” Ildem complained high-level positions should be part of NATO reform: “We missed an opportunity with the selection of the Assistant Secretary General.” Sinirlioglu added: “We let Rasmussen have Secretary General, because we trusted you.”

    MISSILE DEFENSE

    —————

    19. (C) Sinirlioglu inquired about Russia’s reaction on missile defense. Burns said the Russians are much more relaxed towards the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) and we hope to have more conversations on missile defense bilaterally and, eventually, within the NATO-Russia Council. Sinirlioglu recalled PM Erdogan’s request in his recent meeting with SECDEF Gates that the Iranian threat not be highlighted to justify PAA.

    20. (U) Participants:

    Turkey

    Undersecretary Feridun Sinirliolgu Deputy Undersecretary Engin Soysal Ambassador Reha Keskintepe, Director General for the Americas Ambassador Tacan Ildem, Director General for International Security Affairs Ambassador Aydin Sezgin, Director General for Intelligence and Security Affairs Ebru Barat Gokdenizler, Deputy Director General for the Americas Serhat Aksen, Department Head, Americas

    United States

    Undersecretary William Burns Ambassador James Jeffrey Deputy Assistant Secretary Tina Kaidanow Bridget Brink, NSC Daniel O’Grady, Political Counselor Tamir Waser, P Staff Jeremiah Howard, Deputy Political Counselor – Notetaker

    21. (U) Undersecretary Burns has cleared this cable.

    Jeffrey

    “Visit Ankara’s Classified Web Site at gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey”

  • U/S BURNS’ FEBRUARY 18 MEETINGS WITH U/S  SINIRLIOGLU

    U/S BURNS’ FEBRUARY 18 MEETINGS WITH U/S SINIRLIOGLU

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 000302 
    
    SIPDIS 
    
    DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
    
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2020 
    TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC MASS IR TU
    SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' FEBRUARY 18 MEETINGS WITH U/S 
    SINIRLIOGLU 
    
    REF: ANKARA 263 
    
    Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
    
    1. (C) Summary:  During February 18 "Shared Vision and 
    Structured Dialogue" meetings in Ankara,   Turkish MFA 
    Undersecretary Sinirlioglu: 
    
    -- Appealed for "simultaneity" between Armenian Protocols 
    ratification and the Minsk Process; 
    -- Registered increasing GoT dissatisfaction with Iraqi PM 
    Malaki; 
    -- Expressed hope USF-I CG Odierno's engagement would elicit 
    substantive cooperation from the KRG against the terrorist 
    PKK; 
    -- Urged higher profile USG involvment in the Cyprus 
    reunification talks, and; 
    -- Confirmed GoT interest in further dialogue on missile 
    defense. 
    
    End Summary. 
    
    IRAN 
    ---- 
    
    2. (C) Burns strongly urged Sinirlioglu to support action to 
    convince the Iranian government it is on the wrong course. 
    Sinirliolgu reaffirmed the GoT's opposition to a nuclear 
    Iran; however, he registered fear about the collateral impact 
    military action might have on Turkey and contended sanctions 
    would unite Iranians behind the regime and harm the 
    opposition.  Burns acknowledged Turkey's exposure to the 
    economic effects of sanctions as a neighbor to Iran, but 
    reminded Sinirlioglu Turkish interests would suffer if Israel 
    were to act militarily to forestall Iran's acquisition of 
    nuclear weapons or if Egypt and Saudi Arabia were to seek 
    nuclear arsenals of their own.  He said the international 
    community's patience with Iran had been met with the Iranian 
    refusal, since October, to work with the P5-plus-1, the 
    clandestine enrichment facility near Qom and Tehran's recent 
    decison to enrich its low-enriched uranium to 20%.  The 
    IAEA's creative proposal to fabricate new fuel assemblies for 
    the Tehran Research Reactor had stumbled on a technically 
    unfeasible Iranian counter-offer for a simultaneous exchange 
    in Iran of Iranian fuel for fuel assemblies.  Carefully 
    constructed sanctions, Burns argued, targeting the 
    increasingly pervasive economic power of the Iranian 
    Revolutionary Guard Corps, would convey the international 
    community's unity and determination.  "We'll keep the door 
    open to engagement," he stressed.  A visibly disheartened 
    Sinirlioglu conceded a unified message is important.  He 
    acknowledged the countries of the region perceive Iran as a 
    growing threat:  "Alarm bells are ringing even in Damascus." 
    
    ARMENIA 
    ------- 
    
    3. (C) Sinirlioglu appealed for "simultaneity" between 
    Armenian Protocols ratification and the Minsk Process.  He 
    emphasized "a strong reaction" against the protocols among 
    ruling party MPs had to be overcome before the government 
    would hazard a ratification effort.  He warned Congressional 
    passage of an Armenian genocide resolution would "complicate" 
    his government's domestic political calculations regarding 
    ratification.  He said if something acceptable to Azerbaijani 
    President Aliyev can found, then "we can move" the protocols 
    forward.  Sinirlioglu suggested Azerbaijan and Armenia's 
    announcement of an agreed framework for Minsk Group progress 
    would provide the GoT with the necessary political cover. 
    Burns inquired about the prospect for progress on a natural 
    gas deal between Turkey and Azerbaijan.  Sinirlioglu implied 
    
    ANKARA 00000302  002 OF 005 
    
    Aliyev is holding an agreement hostage to Turkey's handling 
    of the protocols:  "He doesn't trust us." 
    
    IRAQ 
    ---- 
    
    4. (C) Sinirlioglu registered the GoT's increasing 
    dissatisfaction with PM Malaki and fear that he is tending 
    "to get out of control."  "He is preoccupied with his 
    political survival;" nevertheless, Sinirlioglu continued, 
    the GoT is in frequent contact with him.  The MFA hosted 
    Maliki advisors Sadiq al Rikabi and Tariq al Najmi to 
    meetings 10 days prior.  Sinirlioglu lamented Iran's efforts 
    to influence the election.  He noted Saudi Arabia is also 
    "throwing around money" among the political parties in Iraq 
    because it is unwilling to accept the inevitability of Shia 
    dominance there.  "We want a free, transparent and fair 
    election," he said, "we need to forestall a deepening of the 
    sectarian divide." 
    
    5. (C) After the March 7 elections, Sinirlioglu said, Turkey 
    would initiate an effort to connect Iraqi gas fields to the 
    Turkish grid via a 300 kilometer pipeline, costing USD 500 
    million.  He asserted the pipeline could begin pumping within 
    two years.  He alleged Iranian opposition to the pipeline 
    because most of Iraq's gas fields are in Kurdish and Sunni 
    areas.  Sinirlioglu advocated a second pipeline that would 
    give Iraqi oil an alternative to the Gulf as a route to 
    Europe once the country is able to meet its OPEC quota.  He 
    asserted the piplines' construction would pull the several 
    Iraqi communities together into a common project.  The 
    creation of new "common assets," he said, could be more 
    important for its politically unifying effect than its 
    economic impact. 
    
    6. (C) Sinirlioglu registered his appreciation for USF-I 
    Commanding General Odierno's recent visit.  He hoped for the 
    early drafting of an action plan that would elicit more 
    cooperation from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) 
    against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) 
    leadership harboring in northern Iraq:  "We want the KRG to 
    understand that working with us is important." 
    
    ISRAEL 
    ------ 
    
    7. (C) Burns focused on Turkey's strained relationship with 
    Israel.  Sinirlioglu argued "the problem is not bilateral, 
    but general."  He attributed increasing regional country 
    frustration with Israel to the stalled Peace Process, 
    especially on the Palestinian track.  He blamed the lack of 
    progress on Israeli intransigence, which caused regional 
    stake-holders to question Netanyahu's goals.  He contended 
    the "humanitarian situation in Gaza," which is not a 
    punishment of Hamas, but of the Gazan people, fed Turkish 
    popular anger against Israel.  Even so, bilateral cooperation 
    with Israel is continuing.  Turkey is acquiring Israeli 
    military equipment, notably Heron UAVs.  Direct flights 
    between the two countries are routine.  Two-way trade is 
    healthy, he said, tourism has dropped recently, but "will 
    recover."  Sinirlioglu described Israeli Defense Minister 
    Ehud Barak's mid-January visit as "very good."  He noted the 
    MFA is exploring the possibility of arranging a meeting 
    between the two prime ministers on the margins of an 
    international gathering.  Returning to a GoT obsession, he 
    recalled the Turkey-brokered Syria-Israel proximity talks, 
    "which were shattered by Cast Lead," Israel's December 2008 
    military operation in Gaza.  Burns noted Syria places high 
    value on Turkey's role as a mediator and repeated Senator 
    Mitchell's statement that Turkey-brokered proximity talks can 
    make an important contribution to the Peace Process. 
    
    ANKARA 00000302  003 OF 005 
    
    SYRIA 
    ----- 
    
    8. (C) Sinirlioglu contended Turkey's diplomatic efforts are 
    beginning to pull Syria out of Iran's orbit.  He said a 
    shared hatred for Saddam had been the original impetus for 
    their unlikely alliance.  "Now, their interests are 
    diverging."  Once again pitching Israel-Syria proximity 
    talks, Sinirlioglu contended Israel's acceptance of Turkey as 
    a mediator could break Syria free of Tehran's influence and 
    further isolate Iran. 
    
    EU, CYPRUS and GREECE 
    --------------------- 
    
    9. (C) Sinirlioglu said Turkey's EU accession is being 
    obstructed by the politically motivated objections of several 
    member states, notably France, Austria and Cyprus.  He 
    reserved special criticism for President Sarkozy.  He accused 
    France of changing the rules mid-game.  He contended French 
    opposition to Turkey's membership is "deepening the cultural 
    divide" between Christian Europe and the Muslim world:  "A 
    wider audience is watching this." 
    
    10. (C) He regretted perceived Greek Cypriot complacency 
    regarding the island's reunification talks:  EU "membership 
    makes them invulnerable."  Greek Cypriots, he said, want the 
    world to forget the progress achieved by the Annan Plan in 
    2004.  They pretend relations between the island's two 
    communities are an internal affair, even though, by treaty, 
    it's been an international issue for 50 years.  Talat's 
    cross-voting proposal, Sinirlioglu continued, should have 
    been a breakthrough, but the Greek Cypriots failed to react. 
    Downer is frustrated, Sinirlioglu alleged, and so are the 
    Turkish Cypriots.  He implied the island's Turkish community 
    would register its frustration by voting out Talat as TRNC 
    "president" in April.  He renewed Turkey's appeal for higher 
    profile direct USG involvement in the negotiations. 
    
    11. (C) Sinirlioglu welcomed Greek PM Papandeou's belated 
    response to Erdogan's October 30 letter seeking a frank new 
    discussion of the two neighbors' several long-running 
    disputes.  He conceded Papandreou's delay is understandable 
    in light of his likely preoccupation with Greece's acute 
    financial crisis.  Based on Papandreou's response, 
    Sinirlioglu said, Turkey expects to begin new talks with 
    Greece soon. 
    
    AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN and INDIA 
    ------------------------------- 
    
    12. (C) Burns opened the discussion on Afghanistan with 
    praise for Turkey's military, training and development 
    contributions there.  Sinirlioglu said Turkey had chosen to 
    focus on three Afghan challenges:  "the marriage of Wahhabism 
    and Pashtun nationalism"; the chronic antagonism between 
    Afghanistan and Pakistan, and; the country's security forces 
    deficit.  He said Turkey plans to address the first by 
    ramping up its education programs in Afghanistan; the second 
    by pursuing its trilateral Ankara Process, which sponsors 
    meetings of senior Afghan and Pakistani ministerial and 
    intelligence counterparts, and; the third by establishing a 
    police training center in Kabul that aims for a throughput of 
    5160 trainees per year.  Keying off the last point, AMB Tacan 
    Ildem, who recently concluded an assignment as Turkey's NATO 
    PERMREP, declared the EUPOL police training effort in 
    Afghanistan a failure.  He said the EU's  criticism of 
    Turkey's unwillingness to work directly with EUPOL is 
    unjustified.  He argued, since Turkey does not have a 
    security agreement with the EU and is excluded from the 
    
    ANKARA 00000302  004 OF 005 
    
    European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the GoT lacks a 
    legal basis on which to cooperate with EUPOL.  "We would like 
    the EU to involve us not as a third country, but, in view of 
    our accumulated rights," as a candidate for membership.  He 
    urged the USG not to coordinate bilateral agreements to 
    support EU operations but, instead, to route all cooperation 
    with the EU on security issues through NATO. 
    
    13. (C) Deputy Undersecretary for South Asian Affairs Engin 
    Soysal led the discussion on Pakistan.  He described the 
    Ankara Process and the recent Turkey-sponsored Afghanistan 
    Neighbors Summit as Turkish efforts to assert regional 
    responsibility for South Asia's inter-linked problems.  He 
    said Turkey had not invited India to the neighbors summit in 
    deference to Pakistani sensitivities; however, he claimed, 
    Pakistan understands attempting to exclude India from the 
    nascent South Asian regional structures would be a mistake. 
    He reported Indian Prime Minister Singh had requested 
    President Gul's assistance with Pakistan during the latter's 
    visit to New Delhi the previous week.  Acting on that 
    request, Gul had phoned Pakistani President Zardari, who was 
    skeptical of Indian intentions.  Gul is planning to visit 
    Pakistan later this year.  Soysal said Iran is proposing a 
    quadrilateal summit, which would include Turkey, Afghanistan 
    and Pakistan, but that proposal had yet to generate 
    enthusiasm. 
    
    14. (C) Soysal, Turkey's former ambassador to Pakistan, said 
    the Pakistani military, though displeased with Zardari, 
    remains unwilling to intervene; nevertheless, senior 
    officers' patience may not be infinite.  Zardari needs to 
    increase the democratic legitimacy of parliament.  Soysal 
    offered.  Nawaz Sharif has become a much more constructive 
    player. 
    
    15. (C) Soysal urged a NATO training role in Pakistan. 
    Picking up from Soysal, Tacan Ildem suggested NATO invite 
    Pakistani military officers to courses at Oberammergau. 
    
    BOSNIA 
    ------ 
    
    16. (C) Sinirlioglu registered the GoT's determination to 
    resist perceived EU efforts to exclude Turkey from the 
    Balkans, particularly Bosnia.  He identified effecting 
    rapprochement between Bosnia and Serbia as Turkey's immediate 
    diplomatic goal for the region.  Towards that end, 
    Sinirlioglu said, we convinced Haris Siladjdzic, who had been 
    in Ankara the day before, to cease references to Serbian 
    "genocide."    The United States and Turkey have "agreed to 
    disagree" on the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Bosnia; 
    nevertheless, "we value your involvement in the Balkans." 
    
    BILATERAL EUROPEAN RELATIONS, NATO 
    ---------------------------------- 
    
    17. (C) Burns inquired about Turkey's bilateral relations 
    with Europe.  Sinirlioglu briefly recapped Turkey's 
    unhappiness with Sarkozy.  He described his country's 
    relationship with Austria as infected by the latter's ethnic 
    prejudice.  He complained Belgium and Denmark are reluctant 
    to suppress terrorist PKK-affiliated organizations active in 
    their countries.  Tacan Ildem added that, as part of the 2009 
    POTUS-brokered deal that had overcome Turkish objections to 
    the appointment of Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO Secretary 
    General, Denmark had promised to clarify its legal 
    requirements prerequiste to acceding to Turkey's request for 
    the closure of Roj TV, a PKK mouthpiece.  This still needed 
    to be done, Ildem said. 
    
    18. (C) Picking up from Ildem, Sinirlioglu recalled the 
    
    ANKARA 00000302  005 OF 005 
    
    POTUS-brokered deal had included an understanding that a 
    qualified Turk would be considered for Assistant Secretary 
    General.  Instead, he said, a German of uncompelling merit 
    was selected.  "We suspect a deal between Rasmussen and 
    Merkel."  Ildem complained high-level positions should be 
    part of NATO reform:  "We missed an opportunity with the 
    selection of the Assistant Secretary General."  Sinirlioglu 
    added:  "We let Rasmussen have Secretary General, because we 
    trusted you." 
    
    MISSILE DEFENSE 
    --------------- 
    
    19. (C) Sinirlioglu inquired about Russia's reaction on 
    missile defense.  Burns said the Russians are much more 
    relaxed towards the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) and we 
    hope to have more conversations on missile defense 
    bilaterally and, eventually, within the NATO-Russia Council. 
    Sinirlioglu recalled PM Erdogan's request in his recent 
    meeting with SECDEF Gates that the Iranian threat not be 
    highlighted to justify PAA. 
    
    20. (U) Participants: 
    
    Turkey 
    
    Undersecretary Feridun Sinirliolgu 
    Deputy Undersecretary Engin Soysal 
    Ambassador Reha Keskintepe, Director General for the Americas 
    Ambassador Tacan Ildem, Director General for International 
    Security Affairs 
    Ambassador Aydin Sezgin, Director General for Intelligence 
    and Security Affairs 
    Ebru Barat Gokdenizler, Deputy Director General for the 
    Americas 
    Serhat Aksen, Department Head, Americas 
    
    United States 
    
    Undersecretary William Burns 
    Ambassador James Jeffrey 
    Deputy Assistant Secretary Tina Kaidanow 
    Bridget Brink, NSC 
    Daniel O'Grady, Political Counselor 
    Tamir Waser, P Staff 
    Jeremiah Howard, Deputy Political Counselor - Notetaker 
    
    21. (U) Undersecretary Burns has cleared this cable. 
    
    Jeffrey 
    
               "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at  
    gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"
  • S E C R E T:ERDOGAN AND AK PARTY AFTER TWO YEARS IN POWER

    S E C R E T:ERDOGAN AND AK PARTY AFTER TWO YEARS IN POWER

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 007211
     Wiki
    
    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

    SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2029 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON TU

    SUBJECT: ERDOGAN AND AK PARTY AFTER TWO YEARS IN POWER:

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 007211 
    
    SIPDIS 
    
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2029
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON TU
    SUBJECT: ERDOGAN AND AK PARTY AFTER TWO YEARS IN POWER:
    TRYING TO GET A GRIP ON THEMSELVES, ON TURKEY, ON EUROPE 
    
    (U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O.
    12958 1.4 (a,b,c,d). 
    
    1. (C) Summary: PM Erdogan and his ruling AK Party seem to
    have a firm grip on power -- if for no other reasons that
    there is currently no viable alternative and inertia weighs
    heavily in politics.  Nevertheless, Erdogan and his party
    face enormous challenges if they are successfully to embrace
    core principles of open society, carry out EU harmonization,
    and develop and implement foreign policies in harmony with
    core U.S. interests.  End summary. 
    
    2. (C) As PM Erdogan strode through the EU corridors of power
    Dec. 16-17 with his semi-pro soccer player's swagger and
    phalanx of sycophantic advisors, he may have seemed a strong
    candidate for European leader of the year.  A regional leader
    to be reckoned with for a decade to come.  The man who won
    Turkey the beginning of accession negotiations with the EU.
    Who broke loose three decades of frozen Turkish policy on
    Cyprus.  Who drove major human rights reforms through
    parliament and through constitutional amendments.  Whose
    rhetorical skill, while etched with populist victimhood, is
    redolent with traditional and religious allusions that
    resonate deeply in the heartland, deeply in the anonymous
    exurban sprawls.  Who remains the highly popular tribune of
    the people, without a viable or discernible political
    rival...outside his own ruling AKP. 
    
    3. (C) In short, Erdogan looks unbeatable.  But is he?  And
    is he willing to give relations with the U.S. the leadership
    and momentum they need from the Turkish side? 
    
    4. (C) Erdogan has a two-thirds majority in parliament.  Main
    opposition left-of-center CHP amounts to no more than a bunch
    of elitist ankle-biters.  There is currently no serious,
    broad-based political alternative, owing to Erdogan's
    rhetorical dominance and control of the debate on social
    questions close to the hearts of the center-right majority in
    Turkey; other party leaders' political bankruptcy; and the
    stultifying effect of current party and election laws on
    entry for younger, untainted political aspirants.  AKP argues
    that the economy, at least from the perspective of macro
    indicators and continued willingness of emerging-market
    portfolio investors to buy the expectations and sell the
    facts, appears to have stabilized.  Moreover, the authority
    of AKP's nationwide party machine is blurring with the
    Turkish State's executive power at the provincial and
    district level and with municipal functions to an extent not
    seen since the days of the one-party state.  These factors
    seem set to continue for the foreseeable future. 
    
    5. (C) Yet Erdogan and AKP face politically fateful
    challenges in three areas: foreign policy (EU, Iraq, Cyprus);
    quality and sustainability of leadership and governance; and
    resolution of questions fundamental to creation of an open,
    prosperous society integrated with the broader world (place
    of religion; identity and history; rule of law). 
    
    EU
    -- 
    
    6. (U) Erdogan indexed his political survival to getting a
    negotiation date from the EU.  He achieved that goal.  The
    Wall Street Journal and other Western and Turkish media have
    opined that the EU owes Turkey a fair negotiating process
    leading to accession, with the Journal even putting the onus
    on the EU by asserting that while Turkey is ready the
    question is whether Europeans are ready for Turkey. 
    
    7. (C) But there's always a Monday morning and the debate on
    the ground here is not so neat.  With euphoria at getting a
    date having faded in 48 hours, Erdogan's political survival
    and the difficulty of the tasks before him have become
    substantially clearer.  Nationalists on right and left have
    resumed accusations that Erdogan sold out Turkish national
    interests (Cyprus) and Turkish traditions.  Core institutions
    of the Turkish state, which remain at best wary of AKP, have
    once again begun to probe for weaknesses and to feed
    insinuations into the press in parallel with the
    nationalists' assertions.  In the face of this Euro-aversion,
    neither Erdogan nor his government has taken even minimal
    steps to prepare the bureaucracy or public opinion to begin
    tackling the fundamental -- some Turks would say insidious --
    legal, social, intellectual and spiritual changes that must
    occur to turn harmonization on paper into true reform.  The
    road ahead will surely be hard. 
    
    8. (U) High-profile naysayers like main opposition CHP
    chairman Baykal, former Ambassador Gunduz Aktan, and
    political scientist Hasan Unal continue to castigate Erdogan.
     But theirs is a routine whine.  More significant for us is
    that many of our contacts cloak their lack of self-confidence
    at Turkey's ability to join in expressions of skepticism that
    the EU will let Turkey in.  And there is parallel widespread
    skepticism that the EU will be around in attractive form in
    ten years. 
    
    9. (C) The mood in AKP is no brighter, with one of FonMin
    Gul's MFA advisors having described to UK polcounselor how
    bruised Turkey feels at the EU's inconsistency during the
    final negotiations leading to Dec. 17 (EU diplomats in Ankara
    have given us the other side of the story).  Gul was
    noticeably harder-line than Erdogan in public comments in the
    lead-up to the Summit, and was harder-line in pre-Summit
    negotiations in Brussels, according to UK polcounselor.
    There was noticeable tension between Erdogan and Gul in
    Brussels according to "Aksam" Ankara bureau chief Nuray
    Basaran.  She also noted to us that when negotiations seemed
    to have frozen up on Dec. 17, Erdogan's advisors got phone
    calls from Putin advisors urging Turkey to walk.  Basaran
    says that at least some of Erdogan's advisors urged him to do
    so. 
    
    10. (C) AKP's lack of cohesion as a party and lack of
    openness as a government is reflected in the range of murky,
    muddled motives for wanting to join the EU we have
    encountered among those AKPers who say they favor pursuing
    membership...or at least the process.  Some see the process
    as the way to marginalize the Turkish military and what
    remains of the arid "secularism" of Kemalism.  We have also
    run into the rarely openly-spoken, but widespread belief
    among adherents of the Turk-Islam synthesis that Turkey's
    role is to spread Islam in Europe, "to take back Andalusia
    and avenge the defeat at the siege of Vienna in 1683" as one
    participant in a recent meeting at AKP's main think tank put
    it.  This thinking parallels the logic behind the approach of
    FonMin Gul ally and chief foreign policy advisor in the Prime
    Ministry Ahmet Davutoglu, whose muddy opinion piece in the
    Dec. 13 International Herald Tribune is in essence a call for
    one-way multi-cultural tolerance, i.e., on the part of the EU. 
    
    11. (C) Those from the more overtly religious side of AKP
    whinge that the EU is a Christian club.  While some assert
    that it is only through Turkish membership and spread of
    Turkish values that the world can avoid the clash of
    civilizations they allege the West is fomenting, others
    express concern that harmonization and membership will water
    down Islam and associated traditions in Turkey.  Indeed, as
    AKP whip Sadullah Ergin confided to us recently, "If the EU
    says yes, everything will look rosy for a short while.  Then
    the real difficulties will start for AKP.  If the EU says no,
    it will be initially difficult, but much easier over the long
    run." 
    
    12. (C) AKP also faces the nuts-and-bolts issue of how to
    prepare for harmonization.  In choosing a chief negotiator
    Erdogan will need to decide whether the risks that the man he
    taps will successfully steal his political limelight outweigh
    the political challenge his choice will face since it will be
    the Turkish chief negotiator's responsibility to sell the EU
    position to a recalcitrant Turkish cabinet.  It is because
    the chief negotiator is likely to be ground down between EU
    demands and a prickly domestic environment that some
    observers speculate Erdogan might give the job to his chief
    internal rival Gul. 
    
    13. (C) At the same time the government must reportedly hire
    a couple thousand people skilled in English or other major EU
    languages and up to the bureaucratic demands of interfacing
    with the Eurocrats who descend on ministries as harmonization
    starts.  If the government continues to hire on the basis of
    "one of us", i.e., from the Sunni brotherhood and lodge
    milieu that has been serving as the pool for AKP's civil
    service hiring, lack of competence will be a problem.  If the
    government hires on the base of competence, its new hires
    will be frustrated by the incompetence of AKP's previous
    hires at all levels. 
    
    Questions About AKP Leadership and Governance
    --------------------------------------------- 
    
    14. (C) Several factors will continue to degrade Erdogan's
    and AKP's ability to effect fair and lasting reforms or to
    take timely, positive decisions on issues of importance to
    the U.S. 
    
    15. (C) First is Erdogan's character. 
    
    16. (C) In our contacts in Anatolia we have not yet detected
    that Erdogan's hunger for absolute power and for the material
    benefits of power have begun to erode his grassroots
    popularity.  Others disagree.  Pollster and political analyst
    Ismail Yildiz has asserted in three lengthy expositions to us
    late in Dec. that the erosion has started.  We note that (1)
    Yildiz expressed frustration to us that the AKP leadership
    did not respond to his offer to provide political strategy
    services; (2) he is currently connected to mainstream
    opposition figures; and (3) he also runs a conspiracy-theory
    web site.  So we treat his view cautiously.  However, judging
    by his references and past experience in the Turkish State,
    he appears to have maintained conncetions with the State
    apparatus and to have a network of observers and data
    collectors in all 81 provinces. 
    
    17. (C) Inside the party, Erdogan's hunger for power reveals
    itself in a sharp authoritarian style and deep distrust of
    others: as a former spiritual advisor to Erdogan and his wife
    Emine put it, "Tayyip Bey believes in God...but doesn't trust
    him."  In surrounding himself with an iron ring of
    sycophantic (but contemptuous) advisors, Erdogan has isolated
    himself from a flow of reliable information, which partially
    explains his failure to understand the context -- or real
    facts -- of the U.S. operations in Tel Afar, Fallujah, and
    elsewhere and his susceptibility to Islamist theories.  With
    regard to Islamist influences on Erdogan, DefMin Gonul, who
    is a conservative but worldly Muslim, recently described Gul
    associate Davutoglu to us as "exceptionally dangerous."
    Erdogan's other foreign policy advisors (Cuneyd Zapsu, Egemen
    Bagis, Omer Celik, along with Mucahit Arslan and chef de
    cabinet Hikmet Bulduk) are despised as inadequate, out of
    touch and corrupt by all our AKP contacts from ministers to
    MPs and party intellectuals. 
    
    18. (C) Erdogan's pragmatism serves him well but he lacks
    vision.  He and his principal AKP advisors, as well as FonMin
    Gul and other ranking AKP officials, also lack analytic
    depth.  He relies on poor-quality intel and on media
    disinformation.  With the narrow world-view and wariness that
    lingers from his Sunni brotherhood and lodge background, he
    ducks his public relations responsibilities.  He (and those
    around him, including FonMin Gul) indulge in pronounced
    pro-Sunni prejudices and in emotional reactions that prevent
    the development of coherent, practical domestic or foreign
    policies. 
    
    19. (C) Erdogan has compounded his isolation by constantly
    traveling abroad -- reportedly 75 foreign trips in the past
    two years -- with a new series of trips planned for 2005 to
    Russia, "Eurasia", the Middle East and Africa.  Indeed, his
    staff says 2005 is the "year of Africa", but they provide no
    coherent reason why.  This grueling cycle of travel has
    exhausted him and his staff and disrupted his ability to keep
    his hand on the tiller of party, parliamentary group, and
    government.  He has alienated many in the AKP parliamentary
    group by his habit of harshly chewing out MPs.  Moreover, we
    understand that MUSIAD, an Anatolia-wide group of businessmen
    influential in Islamist circles who gave Erdogan key
    financial support as AKP campaigned prior to the 2002
    elections, is disaffected by Erdogan's unapproachability.
    Judging by comments to us of insiders in the influential
    Islamist lodge of Fethullah Gulen such as publicist
    Abdurrahman Celik, the lodge, which has made some inroads
    into AKP (Minister of Justice Cicek, Minister of Culture and
    Tourism Mumcu; perhaps 60-80 of 368 MPs; some appointments to
    the bureaucracy), has resumed the ambivalent attitude it
    initially had toward Erdogan and AKP. 
    
    20. (C) Second is the coalition nature of AKP, the limited
    number of ministers whom Erdogan trusts, and the efforts of
    some -- principally FonMin Gul but from time to time Cicek --
    to undermine Erdogan.  No one else in AKP comes close to
    Erdogan in grassroots popularity.  However, Gul's readiness
    to deprecate Erdogan within AKP and even to foreign visitors
    (e.g., Israeli deputy PM Olmert) and his efforts to reduce
    Erdogan's maneuvering room with hard-line criticisms of U.S.
    policy in Iraq or EU policy on Cyprus have forced Erdogan
    constantly to look over his shoulder and in turn to prove his
    credentials by making statements inimical to good
    U.S.-Turkish relations.  We expect Erdogan to carry out a
    partial cabinet reshuffle early in 2005, but he will be
    unable to remove the influence of Gul. 
    
    21. (S) Third is corruption.  AKP swept to power by promising
    to root out corruption.  However, in increasing numbers
    AKPers from ministers on down, and people close to the party,
    are telling us of conflicts of interest or serious corruption
    in the party at the national, provincial and local level and
    among close family members of ministers.  We have heard from
    two contacts that Erdogan has eight accounts in Swiss banks;
    his explanations that his wealth comes from the wedding
    presents guests gave his son and that a Turkish businessman
    is paying the educational expenses of all four Erdogan
    children in the U.S. purely altruistically are lame. 
    
    22. (S) Among the many figures mentioned to us as prominently
    involved in corruption are Minister of Interior Aksu,
    Minister of Foreign Trade Tuzmen, and AKP Istanbul provincial
    chairman Muezzinoglu.  As we understand it from a contact in
    the intel directorate of Turkish National Police, a
    continuing investigation into Muezzinoglu's extortion racket
    and other activities has already produced evidence
    incriminating Erdogan.  In our contacts across Anatolia we
    have detected no willingness yet at the grassroots level to
    look closely at Erdogan or the party in this regard, but the
    trend is a time bomb. 
    
    23. (S) Fourth is the poor quality of Erdogan's and AKP's
    appointments to the Turkish bureaucracy, at party
    headquarters, and as party mayoral candidates.  A broad range
    of senior career civil servants, including DefMin Gonul,
    former Undersecretary of Customs Nevzat Saygilioglu, former
    Forestry DirGen Abdurrahman Sagkaya, and many others, has
    expressed shock and dismay to us at the incompetence,
    prejudices and ignorance of appointees such as Omer Dincer,
    an Islamist academic whom Erdogan appointed Undersecretary of
    the Prime Ministry, THE key position in the government/state
    bureaucracy.  Dincer is despised by the TGS.  Many
    interlocutors also point to the weakness of Erdogan's deputy
    party chairmen.  The result is that, unlike former leaders
    such as Turgut Ozal or Suleyman Demirel, both of whom
    appointed skilled figures who could speak authoritatively for
    their bosses as their party general secretary and as
    Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry, Erdogan has left
    himself without people who can relieve him of the burden of
    day-to-day management or who can ensure effective, productive
    channels to the heart of the party and the heart of the
    Turkish state. 
    
    Two Big Questions
    ----------------- 
    
    24. (C) Turkey's EU bid has brought forth reams of
    pronouncements and articles -- Mustafa Akyol's
    Gulenist-tinged "Thanksgiving for Turkey" in Dec. 27 Weekly
    Standard is one of the latest -- attempting to portray Islam
    in Turkey as distinctively moderate and tolerant with a
    strong mystical (Sufi) underpinning.  Certainly, one can see
    in Turkey's theology faculties some attempts to wrestle with
    the problems of critical thinking, free will, and precedent
    (ictihad), attempts which, compared to what goes on in
    theology faculties in the Arab world, may appear relatively
    progressive. 
    
    25. (C) However, the broad, rubber-meets-the-road reality is
    that Islam in Turkey is caught in a vise of (1) 100 years of
    "secular" pressure to hide itself from public view, (2)
    pressure and competition from brotherhoods and lodges to
    follow their narrow, occult "true way", and (3) the faction-
    and positivism-ridden aridity of the Religious Affairs
    Directorate (Diyanet).  As a result, Islam as it is lived in
    Turkey is stultified, riddled with hypocrisy, ignorant and
    intolerant of other religions' presence in Turkey, and unable
    to eject those who would politicize it in a radical,
    anti-Western way.  Imams are for the most part poorly
    educated and all too ready to insinuate anti-Western,
    anti-Christian or anti-Jewish sentiments into their sermons.
    Exceptionally few Muslims in Turkey have the courage to
    challenge conventional Sunni thinking about jihad or, e.g.,
    verses in the Repentance shura of the Koran which have for so
    long been used to justify violence against "infidels". 
    
    26. (C) The problem is compounded by the willingness of
    politicians such as Gul to play elusively with politicized
    Islam.  Until Turkey ensures that the humanist strain in
    Islam prevails here, Islam in Turkey will remain a troubled,
    defensive force, hypocritical to an extreme degree and
    unwilling to adapt to the challenges of open society. 
    
    27. (C) A second question is the relation of Turkey and its
    citizens to history -- the history of this land and citizens'
    individual history.  Subject to rigid taboos, denial, fears,
    and mandatory gross distortions, the study of history and
    practice of historiography in the Republic of Turkey remind
    one of an old Soviet academic joke: the faculty party chief
    assembles his party cadres and, warning against various
    ideological threats, proclaims, "The future is certain.  It's
    only that damned past that keeps changing." 
    
    28. (C) Until Turkey can reconcile itself to its past,
    including the troubling aspects of its Ottoman past, in free
    and open debate, how will Turkey reconcile itself to the
    concept and practice of reconciliation in the EU?  How will
    it have the self confidence to take decisions and formulate
    policies responsive to U.S. interests?  Some in AKP are
    joining what is still only a handful of others to take
    tentative, but nonetheless inspiring, steps in this regard.
    However, the road ahead will require a massive overhaul of
    education, the introduction and acceptance of rule of law,
    and a fundamental redefinition of the relation between
    citizen and state.  In the words of the great (Alevi)
    Anatolian bard Asik Veysel, this is a "long and delicate
    road." 
    
    29. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
    EDELMAN
  • Der Spiegel/Wikileaks info on Turkey

    Der Spiegel/Wikileaks info on Turkey

    The US Diplomatic Leaks

    A Superpower’s View of the World

    By SPIEGEL Staff

    Getty Images

    US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and US President Barack Obama: Never before in history has a superpower lost control of such vast amounts of such sensitive information.

    251,000 State Department documents, many of them secret embassy reports from around the world, show how the US seeks to safeguard its influence around the world. It is nothing short of a political meltdown for US foreign policy.

    What does the United States really think of German Chancellor Angela Merkel? Is she a reliable ally? Did she really make an effort to patch up relations with Washington that had been so damaged by her predecessor? At most, it was a half-hearted one.

    The tone of trans-Atlantic relations may have improved, former US Ambassador to Germany William Timken wrote in a cable to the State Department at the end of 2006, but the chancellor “has not taken bold steps yet to improve the substantive content of the relationship.” That is not exactly high praise.

    And the verdict on German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle? His thoughts “were short on substance,” wrote the current US ambassador in Berlin, Philip Murphy, in a cable. The reason, Murphy suggested, was that “Westerwelle’s command of complex foreign and security policy issues still requires deepening.”

    Such comments are hardly friendly. But in the eyes of the American diplomatic corps, every actor is quickly categorized as a friend or foe. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia? A friend: Abdullah can’t stand his neighbors in Iran and, expressing his disdain for the mullah regime, said, “there is no doubt something unstable about them.” And his ally, Sheikh bin Zayed of Abu Dhabi? Also a friend. He believes “a near term conventional war with Iran is clearly preferable to the long term consequences of a nuclear armed Iran.”

    Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s emissaries also learn of a special “Iran observer” in the Azerbaijan capital of Baku who reports on a dispute that played out during a meeting of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. An enraged Revolutionary Guard Chief of Staff Mohammed Ali Jafari allegedly got into a heated argument with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and slapped him in the face because the generally conservative president had, surprisingly, advocated freedom of the press.

    A Political Meltdown

    Such surprises from the annals of US diplomacy will dominate the headlines in the coming days when the New York Times, London’s Guardian, Paris’ Le Monde, Madrid’s El Pais and SPIEGEL begin shedding light on the treasure trove of secret documents from the State Department. Included are 243,270 diplomatic cables filed by US embassies to the State Department and 8,017 directives that the State Department sent to its diplomatic outposts around the world. In the coming days, the participating media will show in a series of investigative stories how America seeks to steer the world. The development is no less than a political meltdown for American foreign policy.

    Never before in history has a superpower lost control of such vast amounts of such sensitive information — data that can help paint a picture of the foundation upon which US foreign policy is built. Never before has the trust America’s partners have in the country been as badly shaken. Now, their own personal views and policy recommendations have been made public — as have America’s true views of them.

    AN INTERACTIVE ATLAS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CABLES

    A time lapse of 251,287 documents: The world map shows where the majority of the cables originated from, and where they had the highest level of classification. View the atlas …

    For example, one can learn that German Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, the Germany’s most beloved politician according to public opinion polls, openly criticizes fellow cabinet member Guido Westerwelle in conversations with US diplomats, and even snitches on him. Or that Secretary of State Clinton wants her ambassadors in Moscow and Rome to inform her whether there is anything to the rumors that Italian President Silvio Berlusconi and Vladimir Putin have private business ties in addition to their close friendship — whispers that both have vehemently denied.

    America’s ambassadors can be merciless in their assessments of the countries in which they are stationed. That’s their job. Kenya? A swamp of flourishing corruption extending across the country. Fifteen high-ranking Kenyan officials are already banned from traveling to the United States, and almost every single sentence in the embassy reports speaks with disdain of the government of President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga.

    Weighing Public Interest against Confidentiality

    Turkey hardly comes away any less scathed in the cables. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the cables allege, governs with the help of a cabal of incompetent advisors. Ankara Embassy officials depict a country on a path to an Islamist future — a future that likely won’t include European Union membership.

    As with the close to 92,000 documents on the war in Afghanistan at the end of July and the almost 400,000 documents on the Iraq war recently released, the State Department cables have also been leaked to the WikiLeaks whistleblower platform — and they presumably came from the same source. As before, WikiLeaks has provided the material to media partners to review and analyze them.

    With a team of more than 50 reporters and researchers, SPIEGEL has viewed, analyzed and vetted the mass of documents. In most cases, the magazine has sought to protect the identities of the Americans’ informants, unless the person who served as the informant was senior enough to be politically relevant. In some cases, the US government expressed security concerns and SPIEGEL accepted a number of such objections. In other cases, however, SPIEGEL felt the public interest in reporting the news was greater than the threat to security. Throughout our research, SPIEGEL reporters and editors weighed the public interest against the justified interest of countries in security and confidentiality.

    In a statement, a spokesperson for the White House condemned the impending publication of the documents by WikiLeaks as “reckless and dangerous.” The cables, which contain “candid and often incomplete information,” are not an expression of policy and do not always shape final policy decisions, the statement reads. “Such disclosures put at risk our diplomats, intelligence professionals, and people around the world,” the spokesperson said. The fact that “private conversations” are now being made public “can deeply impact not only US foreign policy interests, but those of our allies and friends around the world.”

    REACTION FROM THE US GOVERNMENT

    In a statement, the White House has condemned the publication of “private diplomatic discussions” with foreign governments by SPIEGEL and four other international media on Sunday. Click on the link below to read the statement in full.

    White House Statement

    It is now possible to view many political developments around the world through the lens of those who participated in those events. As such, our understanding of those events is deeply enriched. That alone is often enough to place transparency ahead of national regulations regarding confidentiality.

    Following the leaks of military secrets from Afghanistan and Iraq, these leaks now put US diplomats on the hot seat. It is the third coup for WikiLeaks within six months, and it is one that is likely to leave Washington feeling more than a bit exposed. Around half of the cables that have been obtained aren’t classified and slightly less, 40.5 percent, as classified as “confidential.” Six percent of the reports, or 16,652 cables, are labelled as “secret;” and of those, 4,330 are so explosive that they are labelled “NOFORN,” meaning access should not be made available to non-US nationals. Taken together, the cables provide enough raw text to fill 66 years worth of weekly SPIEGEL magazines.

    Gossip and the Unvarnished Truth

    Much in the material was noted and sent because those compiling the reports or their dialogue partners believed, with some certainty, that their transcripts would not be made public for the next 25 years. That may also explain why the ambassadors and emissaries from Washington were so willing to report gossip and hearsay back to State Department headquarters. One cable from the Moscow Embassy on Russian first lady Svetlana Medvedev, for example, states that she is “generating tensions between the camps and remains the subject of avid gossip.” It then goes on to report that President Medvedev’s wife had already drawn up a list of officials who should be made to “suffer” in their careers because they had been disloyal to Medvedev. Another reports that the wife of Azerbaijan leader Ilham Aliyev has had so much plastic surgery that it is possible to confuse her for one of her daughters from a distance, but that she can barely still move her face.

    What makes the documents particularly appealing, though, is that many politicians speak the unvarnished truth, confident as they are that their musings will never be made public.

    What, though, do the thousands of documents prove? Do they really show a US which has the world on a leash? Are Washington’s embassies still self-contained power centers in their host countries?

    In sum, probably not. In the major crisis regions, an image emerges of a superpower that can no longer truly be certain of its allies — like in Pakistan, where the Americans are consumed by fear that the unstable nuclear power could become precisely the place where terrorists obtain dangerous nuclear material.

    There are similar fears in Yemen, where the US, against its better judgement, allows itself to be instrumentalized by an unscrupulous leader. With American military aid that was intended for the fight against al-Qaida, Ali Abdullah Saleh is now able to wage his battle against enemy tribes in the northern part of the country.

    Insult to Injury

    Even after the fall of Saddam Hussein, it still remained a challenge for the victorious power to assert its will on Iraq. In Baghdad, which has seen a series of powerful US ambassadors — men the international press often like to refer to as American viceroys — it is now up to Vice President Joe Biden to make repeated visits to allied Iraqi politicians in an effort to get them to finally establish a respectable democracy. But the embassy cables make it very clear that Obama’s deputy has made little headway.

    Instead, the Americans are forced to endure the endless tirades of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarek, who claims to have always known that the Iraq war was the “biggest mistake ever committed” and who advised the Americans to “forget about democracy in Iraq.” Once the US forces depart, Mubarak said, the best way to ensure a peaceful transition is for there to be a military coup. They are statements that add insult to injury.

    On the whole, the cables from the Middle East expose the superpower’s weaknesses. Washington has always viewed it as vital to its survival to secure its share of energy reserves, but the world power is often quickly reduced to becoming a plaything of diverse interests. And it is drawn into the animosities between Arabs and Israelis, Shiites and Sunnis, between Islamists and secularists, between despots and kings. Often enough, the lesson of the documents that have now been obtained, is that the Arab leaders use their friends in Washington to expand their own positions of power.

    Editor’s note: DER SPIEGEL’s full reporting on the WikiLeaks US diplomatic cables will be published first in the German-language edition of the magazine, which will be available on Monday to subscribers and at newsstands in Germany and Europe. SPIEGEL ONLINE International will publish extended excerpts of SPIEGEL’s reporting in English in a series that will launch on Monday.