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  • Ankara’s Facilitator Role Reflects Turkey’s Broader Objectives in Iraq

    Ankara’s Facilitator Role Reflects Turkey’s Broader Objectives in Iraq

    Ankara’s Facilitator Role Reflects Turkey’s Broader Objectives in Iraq

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 143
    July 27, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Commenting on the recent controversial contacts between American diplomats and Iraqi Sunni insurgents in Turkey, Turkish government sources have confirmed that Ankara facilitated high-level talks, and maintains that the government in Baghdad was kept informed of these developments (Taraf, July 26). This highlights the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government’s earlier efforts to act as a peace broker between the conflicting parties to promote a comprehensive peace, and use its leverage in the region as an asset in its relations with the United States.

    A representative from the political council for the Iraqi resistance told al-Jazeera that they held talks with American officials in Istanbul in March and May and signed a protocol on future talks. Although the spokesperson noted that these talks did not produce any practical results, he claimed that this document showed the acknowledgement of their legitimacy by the United States. The Iraqi government issued a written statement, describing the protocol as interference in Iraq’s internal affairs, and asking for a clear explanation from Washington and Ankara (New York Times, July 23). The State Department spokesperson acknowledged the meetings were part of American efforts to bolster political reconciliation, yet added that they took place with the knowledge of Iraqi officials. CNN also quoted an anonymous administration official who recognized the signing of “a protocol document with the group about logistics for the third round of talks” (www.cnn.com, July 24).

    Although Iraqi government sources recognized such talks between American officials and Iraqi insurgents in the past, they were apparently troubled by the reported signing of a protocol. During Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s visit to the United States, this development occupied a major part of his agenda. Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari expressed his disappointment over this development. “How do you expect allies and friends of the government and the political process to meet and negotiate with parties that are accused of terrorism?” he asked. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that she was informed about the talks only recently and argued that the State Department did not authorize the signing of a protocol. She gave assurances that Baghdad would be informed of such meetings in the future. In return, Maliki expressed his satisfaction with these guarantees (www.aljazeera.net, July 25).

    As it later transpired, there was indeed a protocol, which was leaked to Iraqi Shiite newspapers (www.worldbulletin.net, July 24; Vatan, July 25). The protocol was signed anonymously by representatives from the American delegation, Iraqi resistance, and the Turkish delegation. Both sides recognized Turkey’s mediation efforts in future rounds of talks in the form of facilitating communication between the American delegation and the insurgents.

    Speaking anonymously to the press, Turkish foreign ministry officials confirmed the talks had occurred, but emphasized that Turkey was playing a facilitator role and the initiative was undertaken by the American side. They expressed their surprise at the Iraqi government’s claim that they were not informed about the talks, noting that Maliki was aware of these developments before his trip to Washington (Taraf, July 26).

    Indeed, Ankara has actively worked to integrate different Iraqi factions into the legitimate political processes in order to create a viable national system. As part of this policy, Turkey has had long-running relations with the Iraqi Sunni groups. Through its diplomatic initiatives, Turkey was instrumental in convincing the Sunni groups to participate in the December 2005 legislative elections in Iraq (Bugun, December 6, 2005). Likewise, Turkey is believed to have played a key role in convincing the Sunni groups not affiliated with al-Qaeda and former Baathist elements to resolve their differences and oppose al-Qaeda’s terrorist activities (ANKA, July 19, 2007).

    Turkey’s connections with Sunni Arabs reportedly created anxiety among Shiite and Kurdish groups (Hurriyet, December 24, 2006). In the past two years, following a redefinition of Turkey’s Iraq policy, Ankara developed comprehensive ties with all Iraqi groups and formations in order to promote Turkey’s economic, energy and strategic interests in the country. The declarations issued following the meetings in February and April 2008 of the Turkish National Security Council laid the foundations of this new policy. Subsequently, Ankara first resumed dialogue with the Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq in an attempt to resolve its own problems with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (Terrorism Monitor, December 8, 2008). Moreover, Turkey also intensified its efforts to open dialogue with Shiite groups. Turkish diplomats and government officials met with Iraqi Shiite leaders and politicians, which culminated in the visit of the Iraqi radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr to Istanbul in May of this year (EDM, May 5).

    Turkey’s facilitation of these talks builds on the AKP government’s efforts to maintain dialogue with all Iraqi groups and encourage them to resolve their differences, as well as insisting on the need for the United States to communicate with all groups in Iraq. In that sense, this policy complements Ankara’s earlier initiatives to facilitate dialogue between Syria and the United States and Israel and its Arab neighbors.

    Such efforts reflect Ankara’s perceptions of Iraq, which it views as a future partner, and a gateway to the Middle East. Therefore, Turkey has developed deeper commercial and strategic ties with Iraq, as reflected in its desire to bring Baghdad into the Nabucco project. However, Ankara fears that if political reconciliation cannot be accomplished, especially in the wake of the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq, the country might descend into chaos and instability, with potentially serious consequences for its own security. Therefore, Ankara wants to ensure a stable transformation of the country through a comprehensive dialogue among the various groups. As the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has expressed on numerous occasions, the key to stability in Iraq depends on strengthening the capacity of its national institutions. In Davutoglu’s view, national institutions such as the army cannot be based on factions, but need to be built on a national identity, which requires a comprehensive national reconciliation (www.dunyabulteni.net, September 22, 2008).

    https://jamestown.org/program/ankaras-facilitator-role-reflects-turkeys-broader-objectives-in-iraq/

  • Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    Turkey, U.S.: Strengthening Ties as Ankara Rises
    March 19, 2009 | 1837 GMT ADEM ALTAN/AFP/Getty ImagesTurkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoganSummary
    U.S. President Barack Obama will visit Turkey on April 6-7 and meet with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The United States and Turkey have many areas of mutual interest, including Iraq, Middle Eastern diplomatic efforts, Iran and Central Asia. Obama’s visit indicates that his administration recognizes Turkey’s growing prominence, and it gives the United States a chance to coordinate policy with a rising power.

    Analysis
    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan confirmed late March 18 that U.S. President Barack Obama will be visiting Turkey on April 6-7. In an interview with Turkish news channel Kanal 7, Erdogan said he had invited Obama to attend a meeting of the Alliance of Civilizations initiative in Istanbul on April 7, but “did not expect” Obama to arrive a day early for an official state visit to Ankara. “Combining the two occasions is very meaningful for us,” he added. Obama’s trip to Turkey will follow a visit to London for the G-20 summit on the global financial crisis, a NATO summit in Strasbourg, France, and a trip to Prague to meet with EU leaders.

    Obama’s decision to visit Turkey this early in the game highlights his administration’s recognition of Turkey’s growing prominence in the region. The Turks have woken up after 90 years of post-Ottoman hibernation and are in the process of rediscovering a sphere of influence extending far beyond the Anatolian Peninsula. The Americans, on the other hand, are in the process of drawing down their presence in the Middle East in order to free up U.S. military capabilities to address pressing needs in Afghanistan. With the Turks stepping forward and the Americans stepping back, there are a number of issues of common interest that Obama and Erdogan will need to discuss.

    The first order of business is Iraq. The United States is putting its exit strategy into motion and is looking to Turkey to serve as an exit route for U.S. troops and equipment from Iraq. The Turks would not have a problem with granting the United States such access, but they also want to make sure that U.S. withdrawal plans will not interfere with Turkey’s intentions of keeping Iraqi Kurdistan in check. With key Kurdish leader and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani retiring soon and Kurdish demands over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk intensifying, the Turks want to make clear to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq that Ankara promptly will shut down any attempts to expand Kurdish autonomy. Turkey will not hesitate to use the issue of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters hiding out in northern Ir aq as a pretext for future military incursions should the need arise to pressure the KRG in a more forceful way, but such tactics could run into complications if the United States intends to withdraw the bulk of its forces through northern Iraq. Therefore, the decision on where to base U.S. troops during the withdrawal process will be a political one, and one that will have to address Turkish concerns over the Kurds. Washington likely will see this as a reasonable price to pay, as it has other problems to handle.

    Related Special Topic Page
    Turkey’s Re-Emergence
    Beyond Iraq, the United States is looking to Turkey as the Muslim regional heavyweight to take the lead in handling some of the knottier issues in the Middle East. The Israeli-Syrian peace talks that went public in 2008 were a Turkish initiative. These negotiations are now in limbo, with the Israelis still working to form a new government, but the Turks are looking to revive them in the near future. Turkey, Israel, the United States and the Arab states all share an interest in bringing Syria into a Western alliance structure, with the aim of depriving Iran of its leverage in the Levant. However, the Syrians are setting an equally high price for their cooperation: Syrian domination over Lebanon. These negotiations are packed with potential deal breakers, but Turkey intends to take on the challenge in the interest of securing its southern flank.

    Iran is another critical area where the United States and Turkey see eye to eye. The fall of Saddam Hussein and the rise of the Shia in Iraq have given Iran a platform for projecting influence in the Arab world. But the Turks far outpace the Iranians in a geopolitical contest and will be instrumental in keeping Iranian expansionist goals in check. Erdogan’s outburst over Israel’s Gaza offensive was just one of many ways Turkey has been working to assert its regional leadership, build up its credibility among Sunnis in the Arab world and override Iranian attempts to reach beyond its borders. At the same time, the Turks carry weight with the Iranians, who view Turkey as a fellow great empire of the past and non-Arab partner in the Middle East. Washington may not necessarily need the Turks to mediate in its rocky negotiations with Iran, but it will rely heavily on Turkish clout in the region to help put the Iranians in their place.

    Some problems may arise, however, when U.S.-Turkish talks venture beyond the Middle East and enter areas where the Turkish and Russian spheres of influence overlap. Turkey’s influence extends into Central Asia and deep into the Caucasus, where the Turks have a strong foothold in Azerbaijan and ties to Georgia, and are in the process of patching things up with the Armenians. As the land bridge between Europe and Asia, Turkey is also the key non-Russian energy transit hub for the European market, and through its control of the Bosporus, it is the gatekeeper to the Black Sea. In each of these areas, the Turks bump into the Russians, another resurgent power that is on a tight timetable for extracting key concessions from the United States on a range of issues that revolve around Russia’s core imperative of protecting its former Soviet periphery from Western meddling.

    The U.S. administration and the Kremlin have been involved in intense negotiations over these demands. Washington is still sorting out which concessions it can make in return for Russian cooperation in allowing the United States access to Central Asia for supply routes to Afghanistan, and in applying pressure on Iran. As part of these negotiations, Obama will be meeting with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev at the G-20 summit and later in the summer in Moscow. Though it is still unclear just how much the United States is willing to give the Russians at this juncture — and how flexible the Turks will be in challenging Russia — Washington wants to make sure its allies, like Turkey, are on the same page.

    But as STRATFOR has discussed in depth, Russia and Turkey now have more reason to cooperate than collide, and recent diplomatic traffic between Moscow and Ankara certainly reflects this reality. In areas where the United States will want to apply pressure on Russia, such as on energy security for the Europeans, the Turks likely will resist rocking the boat with Moscow. The last thing Turkey wants at this point is to give Russia a reason to politicize its trade relationship with Ankara, cause trouble for the Turks in the Caucasus or meddle in Turkey’s Middle Eastern backyard. In short, there are real limits to what the United States can expect from Turkey in its strategy against Russia.

    Obama and Erdogan evidently will have plenty to talk about when they meet in Ankara. Though the United States and Turkey have much to sort out regarding Iraq, Syria, Iran and Russia, this visit will give Obama the stage to formally recognize Turkey’s regional prowess and demonstrate a U.S. understanding of Turkey’s growing independence. Washington can see that the Turks are already brimming with confidence in conducting their regional affairs, and can expect some bumps down the road when interests collide. But the sooner the Americans can start coordinating policy with a resurgent power like Turkey, the better equipped Washington will be for conducting negotiations in other parts of the globe.

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  • Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    Geopolitical Diary: The Turkish and Iranian Balance of Power
    February 27, 2009Turkish President Abdullah Gul announced on Thursday that he will make a one-day trip to Iran on March 10 to attend the Economic Cooperation Organization summit. While the summit aims to improve economic and commercial relations among the member states, the leaders will also discuss bilateral relations and regional issues. Of the two items on Gul’s agenda, his bilateral meetings with the Iranians hold far more interest for STRATFOR than anything that the summit will generate.

    Both Turkey and Iran are on the rise. Until relatively recent times, both have been contained by various forces, most notably Iraq and the Soviet Union. Between the end of the Cold War and American defeat of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, however, many restrictions on the power of both states evaporated. Both Turkey and Iran are looking for wider roles in their region. Both have grand imperial pasts. Both have ambitions. And both are somewhat oddballs in the world of geopolitics.

    Most nations are oriented around a piece of flat, core territory where the nationality was not just born, but has entrenched itself. For France, Germany and Poland, that core is their respective portions of the Northern European Plain. The core territory of the United States is the coastal Atlantic strip east of the Appalachians. Argentina is centered on the bountiful flatlands around Buenos Aires. The defining territory of China comprises the fertile regions between the Yellow and Yangtze rivers.

    Such flatness is critical to the development of a nation because the lack of internal geographic barriers allows the dominant culture to assimilate or eliminate groups that would dilute or challenge its power. Additionally, plains regions tend to boast river systems that allow thriving agricultural, transportation and trade opportunities that mountainous regions lack. Very few states count mountains as their core simply because mountains are difficult to pacify. It is very easy for dissident or minority groups to root themselves in such regions, and the writ of the state is often weak. Consequently, most mountainous states are defined not by success but by failure. Lebanon, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Laos come to mind.

    Turkey and Iran are different. Their core lands are mountainous regions — the Anatolian Peninsula for Asia Minor and the Zagros Mountains of Persia. Even though the Turks are not original descendants of their their Anatolian power base, they were able to secure their central lands when they swept in as conquerors a millennium ago and have since destroyed or assimilated most of the natives. The Persians ruled through a dizzyingly complex system of interconnected elites that succeeded in instilling a common Persian culture that extended somewhat beyond mere ethnicity, all while keeping the base of power in the Persians’ hands.

    But that is where the similarities end. As these two states both return to prominence, it is almost inevitable that Turkey that will fare better than Iran, simply because the Turks enjoy the advantage of geography. Anatolia is a plateau surrounded by water on three sides and enjoys the blessing of the Golden Horn, which transforms the well-positioned city of Istanbul into one of the world’s best — and certainly most strategically located — ports. Turkey straddles Europe and Asia, the Balkans and the Islamic world, the former Soviet Union and the Mediterranean Basin. The result is a culture not only incredibly aware of international events, but one steeped in trade whether via its land connections or —by virtue of being a peninsula — maritime trade. Unsurprisingly, for a good chunk of the past 2,000 years, Anatolia — whether under the Greeks, the Romans, the Byzantines or most recently under the Turks themselves — has been at or nea r the center of human development.

    By comparison, Iran got shortchanged. Although Iran has water on two sides, it has a minimal maritime tradition. Its plateau is a salt desert. The Caspian Sea is landlocked and boasts no major population centers aside from Baku — the capital of another country with a hostile ethnic group. The Persian Gulf coast of Iran is not only lightly populated, but it is easy for powers on the gulf’s southern coast to block Iranian water access to the wider world. While Anatolia has a number of regions that are well watered — even though it does not have many rivers — Persia is predominately an arid region.

    The Turks also enjoy demographic advantages. Only one-fifth of Turkey’s population is non-Turkish, while roughly half of Iran is non-Persian. Iran requires a large army simply to maintain rule at home, while Turkey has the relative freedom to expend resources on power projection tools such as an air force and navy. The difference shines through in their respective economies as well. Despite having nearly identical populations in terms of size, Iran’s economy is only two-fifths the size of Turkey’s. Even in the battle of ideologies, Turkey retains the advantage. The Arab majority in the region prefer Turkey — a fellow Sunni power — to take the lead in managing regional affairs, whereas Shiite Persian Iran is the historical rival of the Arab world.

    Iran may be junior to Turkey in a geopolitical contest, but Iran is still a power that Turkey has to take into consideration. In a major historical reversal, the Iranians have regained influence over Iraq with the rise of a Shia-dominated government that they had lost to the Turks in the mid-1550s, bringing the two powers closer into contact. When two expansionary powers interact closely — as Turkey and Iran are now — they can be either driven to conflict or come to an understanding regarding their respective spheres of influence. In the present day, there are probably more causes for cooperation than conflict between Ankara and Tehran. Iran’s westward expansion gives Turkey and Iran good reasons to cooperate in order to contain Iraq’s Kurdish population in the north. Moreover, Turkey’s bid to become a major energy transit state would improve significantly through a better relationship with Iran.

    Given this dynamic, Gul’s upcoming trip to Iran is likely to be the first of many. The Turks and the Persians have much to sort out on the bilateral level as each seeks to expand their geopolitical influence.

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  • Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    United States: Treasury Calls Anti-Iranian Kurdish Group A Terrorist Organization
    February 4, 2009The U.S. Treasury has labeled the anti-Iranian Kurdish group Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) a terrorist organization and will freeze any assets the PJAK has under U.S. jurisdiction, Reuters reported Feb. 4. PJAK is a front for the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has been fighting against Turkey’s government for 25 years. PJAK members fight