Tag: UAV

  • Meet China’s Killer Drones

    Meet China’s Killer Drones

    From Iraq to Nigeria, countries looking for cheap, armed drones are increasingly turning to China — and leaving the United States behind.

      • By Adam Rawnsley

    Iraqi officials revealed last weekend that one of their armed drones carried out an airstrike which mistakenly killed nine members of a Shiite militia near Tikrit in a friendly fire incident. The news came as a surprise, mostly because many people didn’t know Iraq had armed drones.

    Iraq, for the record, very much does. And so do a number of countries, especially in the Middle East, thanks to the rise of China as a prolific developer and no-questions-asked exporter of armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Chinese exports are now helping to loosen the door policy of the once-exclusive club of countries with drones capable of destroying targets on the ground. Unmanned Chinese aircraft like the armed Caihong, or “Rainbow,” series of drones are fast becoming the Kalashnikovs of the drone world — entry-level alternatives for countries eager to achieve a basic unmanned strike capability quickly and cheaply.

    Turns out there are a lot of eager buyers. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt have bought armed Chinese drones, as have Pakistan, Nigeria, and Iraq. Actually using the robotic aircraft hasn’t always gone smoothly: Nigeria’s armed CH-3, short for “Caihong-3,” drones first became public when one of them surfaced in photos of a crash in the northeastern part of the country, though it’s unclear whether the aircraft went down due to technical problems or ground fire. Two CH-4 drones also reportedly crashed in Algeria while undergoing testing by the Algerian military, which has been weighing a purchase.

    Those countries are turning to Chinese drones because they’re easier to buy — and much cheaper — than their American counterparts.

    Washington has strict limits on which countries can buy U.S.-made armed drones. China is willing to sell them to anyone with cash to spend.

    Washington has strict limits on which countries can buy U.S.-made armed drones. China is willing to sell them to anyone with cash to spend.

    China’s drone marketing revolves around a three-pronged strategy of “price, privacy, and product,” according to Ian Easton, a research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, an Arlington, Virginia, think tank focused on Asian security issues.

    On the product side, armed drones had been the almost exclusive and rarely exported preserve of Western countries like the United States and Israel. But China has spent years working to develop its own UAV industry to catch up with the United States, in part to ensure it could keep pace with American military technology in the event of a future conflict between the two superpowers.

    “This is a sector they’ve been investing in heavily since just after 2000. There are anywhere between 75 [and] 100 UAV-related companies, both private and state-owned, building things out to meet demand,” says Richard Fisher Jr., a senior fellow on Asian military affairs at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, a think tank in Alexandria, Virginia, focused on international security issues. “The Chinese government gives them all lunch money, and they just work building new things. Sometimes the government will buy them. Sometimes they’ll let these companies export them.”

    That investment has helped the Chinese drone industry market cheaper, albeit somewhat less capable, versions of the iconic American Predator and Reaper drones to a wide international market — all without forcing buyers to jump through the political and regulatory hurdles that exist in the United States. In addition to U.S. national arms export regulations, the United States abides by the voluntary international Missile Technology Control Regime, which asks members to apply a “strong presumption of denial” to exports of drones that can carry a 1,100-pound payload more than 185 miles.

    Chinese drone companies also spare buyers some of the controversy associated with armed drones by making the actual transactions as opaque as possible. Easton says Chinese drone makers are protective of their clients’ privacy, revealing little about buyers or prices.

    Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have reportedly bought the armed GJ-1 variant of the Wing Loong drone, developed by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group.

    Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have reportedly bought the armed GJ-1 variant of the Wing Loong drone, developed by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group. But it’s the CH-3 and CH-4B armed drones, made by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. (CASC) and marketed by Aerospace Long-March International Trade (ALIT), that appear to be the most popular models so far.

    A number of countries began adding those drones to their fleets in 2015. The Nigerian Air Force showed off its own CH-3 during a visit from its chief of air staff in July. Pakistan’s Burraq drone, reportedly based on the CH-3, carried out its first strike in September. Iraq revealed itself as a CH-4B customer in October, and in December IHS Jane’s published an analysis of satellite imagery which appeared to point to a CH-4B on the runway at Saudi Arabia’s Jizan Regional Airport.

    Iraq’s CH-4B rollout ceremony in October:

    Thus far, though, Pakistan and Iraq are the only two countries with confirmed airstrikes carried out by Caihong drones, with Iraq launching its first reported CH-4B strike in December.

    A December CH-4B strike in Iraq: 

    Kelvin Wong, an Asia-Pacific analyst for IHS Jane’s, has seen both CH-3 and CH-4B drones up close at international airshows, where CASC and ALIT company officials have been happy to talk up their products, often to curious delegations from Middle Eastern countries.

    The CH-3 debuted in 2008, followed by the CH-4B later in 2012, and Wong says that in the years since, CASC “has continued to improve [its] features as well as develop new and compatible sensor and weapon payloads since those were publicly introduced.”

    The CH-3A, an updated variant, is a smaller, tactical drone. Its official specifications list an ability to carry just over 130 pounds of missiles and bombs on the two hardpoints under its wings. However, Wong has seen the drone displayed with two of China’s roughly 100-pound AR-1 missiles, a sign that the actual payload capacity might hold a heavier load of weapons than the specifications suggest. The small size of the CH-3A comes at the cost of a shorter endurance, however, with the ability to loiter in the air for just around six hours.

    By contrast, the CH-4B is a larger drone that closely resembles the bulb-nosed, V-tail, American MQ-9 Reaper. The CH-4B’s larger size gives it the ability to carry more missiles and bombs and stay in the air over targets for up to 40 hours. In addition to making it available for export, China has also integrated the CH-4B into its own People’s Liberation Army Air Force.

    It’s the added loitering time and armaments capability that make the CH-4B an attractive purchase; the drone can carry both AR-­1 laser-guided missiles and FT-9 guided bombs. The AR-1 is “the Chinese equivalent of the ubiquitous [American] Hellfire air-to-ground missile” seen on the Predator and Reaper drones, Wong said.

    The weapon can pierce through about 40 inches of armor, making it an effective weapon when used on certain structures or lightly armored vehicles. The 110-pound FT-9 is a small precision bomb that can find targets either through satellite navigation systems like GPS or be guided to them by a laser and clocks in at a little heavier than the 99-pound AR-1 missile.

    In November, CASC also teased the debut of another armed Caihong drone, the CH-5, with a small model at a defense industry conference in Shenzhen, China. The CH-5 is reportedly designed to carry a larger payload of weapons and will reportedly be available for export alongside its predecessors.

    Model of a CH-5 (photo credit to China Daily):

    Specific pricing information for China’s armed drones is hard to come by, but experts believe the aircraft are much cheaper than their Western counterparts. The Wing Loong, an apparent copy of the U.S. Predator drone, reportedly costs as little as $1 million per UAV, whereas an actual Predator has a $4 million unit cost. CASC literature advertises its armed drones as “affordable for small to medium countries” and available for just the price of “a modern main battle tank.”

    There are some hints that the relatively cheap price for China’s armed drones comes at the cost of less capability or even perhaps quality. Jeremy Binnie, an IHS Jane’s analyst focused on the Middle East, notes that while pictures of Iraq’s CH-4B sitting in a hangar first leaked in mid-March 2015, Iraqi officials didn’t officially announce the purchase until October. “It seems a bit surprising to me that the Iraqis took so long to get their [drone] operational,” says Binnie. “That suggests to me that there are some teething problems.”

    Leaked photo of Iraq’s CH-4B (photo credit to Iraqimilitary.org): 

    Other incidents could point to reliability issues with the Caihong drones. Nigeria’s armed CH-3 first became public when one of them surfaced in photos of a crash in the country’s northeast. Two CH-4 drones also reportedly crashed in Algeria during tests by the Algerian military, though the incidents may not have dampened the country’s enthusiasm for a purchase. Algeria is also rumored to have expressed interest in purchasing an armed CH-4 to help in its war against domestic al Qaeda-linked militants.

    Wong also points to China’s historic struggles with self-sufficiency in engine technology as a sign that it may not have yet reached complete parity with the United States. “I was told that the current turboprop engine installed in the CH­-4 is a ‘mature and reliable’ indigenous design, but I have my doubts about this claim.”

    China’s drones may be cheap, capable, and discrete, but they still owe much of their market share to the tight restrictions that the United States, an early developer and prolific user of armed drones, has placed on exporting UAVs. While the United States has sold armed Reaper drones to countries like Britain, even close NATO allies like Italy have found that adding an armed capability to their unarmed Reaper drones can entail a lengthy and difficult approval process. In the process, the United States has been mostly left out of the global armed drone market, which represents a slice of the international military drone market expected to be worth up to $10 billion by 2024.

    In a recognition of mounting frustration among American allies and defense contractors, the State Department announced last February that it would relax some export restrictions on U.S. drone sales. But in November, outgoing Air Force acquisition chief William LaPlante noted that American allies at the Dubai Airshow were still grumbling that Chinese weapons, including drones, were a preferable option because of the difficulty in getting American sales approved.

    The U.S.-based Textron Systems has been working on an armed version of the Shadow UAV, which may pique the interest of international buyers and offer a less sensitive export option than American Reaper or Predator drones. In a statement to Foreign Policy, Textron’s senior vice president and general manager of unmanned systems, Bill Irby, writes that the company has “tested the Shadow® Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (both M2 and V2 variants) with Textron Systems Weapon & Sensor Systems Fury lightweight precision-guided weapon successfully,” noting that any exports of weapons, data link, and sensor technology would be subject to government approval.

    Aside from the United States and China, not many other countries have jumped headlong into the armed drone export market. South Africa’s Denel has floated the prospect of selling an armed Seeker 400 drone for export. And Israel, a world-class drone producer, has offered its Heron TP drone, which can carry arms, to India and Germany. Nonetheless, Israel’s frosty relations with Arab countries make it an unlikely producer to meet the growing Middle Eastern UAV demand.

    “The popularity of the CH-4 system demonstrates that UAVs are less likely to be a flash in the pan than a relevant part of national military capabilities around the world moving forward,” said Michael Horowitz, a political scientist at the University of Pennsylvania who studies U.S. drone export policy.

    And that means more and more countries like Iraq are likely to be shopping around in the global UAV marketplace — and finding Chinese drones to fit their needs instead of American ones.

    Top photo credit: Screengrab from YouTube

  • Turkey to co-produce pilotless Navy copters

    Turkey to co-produce pilotless Navy copters

    ÜMİT ENGİNSOY

    ANKARA- Hürriyet Daily News

    taiA new program for the co-production of unmanned helicopters worth hundreds of millions of dollars has been launched by military and procurement authorities to boost Turkey’s naval intelligence capabilities, a procurement official said on the weekend.

    The Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), Turkey’s procurement agency, will formally start the program soon. Requests for proposal will likely be released before the end of the year, the official said on condition of anonymity. “The competition will be open to foreign bidders, but they will have to agree to work with a Turkish prime contractor,” the official said.

    The local prime contractor will most likely be Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) based near Ankara, industry sources said. Last December TAI successfully performed test flights for the Sivrisinek (Mosquito), its first small unmanned helicopter prototype, which is equipped with the Cirit (Javelin), a rocket developed by Turkish missile maker Roketsan.

    The co-production program will involve an initial batch of up to 30 unmanned helicopters, all to be acquired by the Navy. Initial specification for the planned unmanned platform is a range of 180 kilometers and a flight time of up to 10 hours, procurement officials said. In its first test flight, the Sivrisinek was airborne for 90 minutes. According to planned contract specifications, the unmanned helicopters must perform vertical take-off and landing since they will be operated from naval platforms. The unmanned helicopters will initially be deployed on a landing platform dock (LPD) Turkey plans to acquire, but in later stages of the program, they will operate using Turkish corvettes and frigates as bases.

    UAVs either self-directed or remote controlled

    An unmanned or pilotless aircraft (UAV) can function either by remote control by a navigator or pilot, or autonomously as a self-directing entity. In the military most types are used for surveillance purposes, while the U.S. General Atomics’ MQ-9 Reaper is an armed version.

    Most Army and Air Force drones are pilotless aircraft with large wings as they utilize long runways for take-off and landing. But since naval platforms usually lack runways, UAVs used by the Navy are pilotless helicopters. As there is no risk of loss of personnel, UAVs can be used for risky missions. Turkey’s UAV efforts mainly are related to the country’s fight against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militants. In the 1990s, Turkey utilized 10 platforms bought from the U.S. General Atomics. In recent years, such platforms were obtained from Israel. Turkey presently has in its inventory nine IAI Heron UAVs for anti-terrorism surveillance but plans to buy a small number of MQ-1 Predator drones from the United States. Meanwhile, its own program to produce the Anka drone has faced technical problems.

    via Turkey to co-produce pilotless Navy copters – Hurriyet Daily News.

  • Turkey Meets Over Half Its Defense Requirements Domestically

    Turkey Meets Over Half Its Defense Requirements Domestically

    Turkey Meets Over Half Its Defense Requirements Domestically

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 100

    May 24, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    The 10th International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF), held in Istanbul on May 10 – 13, was an important venue to demonstrate the transformation of the Turkish defense industry in recent years. Organized biannually since the 1990s, the event featured over 600 companies or company representatives from 49 countries, including Turkey, while delegations from over 70 countries visited (www.idef11.com). Delivering an address at the inauguration, President Abdullah Gul reiterated the importance Turkey attaches to the defense industry. He referred to Turkey’s efforts to increase local input in defense procurement through greater utilization of various joint production programs and boosting domestically designed production (Star, May 11).

    Despite some international representation, the fair largely served to exhibit products of Turkish producers, as well as to publicize the achievements of Turkey’s flagship defense projects in recent years. Leading defense companies such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing and EADS were also present, but Western defense observers reportedly maintained that “in nature, the fair remains mostly a Turkish, regional and Middle Eastern event.” In a development reflecting the regional nature of the event, the largest deal struck at IDEF 2011 was reportedly an agreement for Turkey’s export defense equipment to Qatar, including small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), worth $120 million (Hurriyet Daily News, May 13).

    Armored vehicles, Turkey’s major export items, which find buyers in the Middle East and South Asia, were on display at the event. Moreover, a great deal of publicity was devoted to Turkey’s main battle tank project, which was developed in partnership with South Korea’s Hyundai Rotem, supplying the technological know-how (EDM, August 7, 2008). Turkish military vehicle producer, Otokar, introduced the first prototype of the tank at the fair, named Altay. Otokar expects the tanks to be ready for sale by 2016.

    Similarly, the results of Turkey’s national warship projects were also publicized at the fair. A Turkish corvette designed and produced in Turkey’s shipbuilding yards was on display. In recent years, Turkey has placed greater emphasis on developing its national capacity to build warships of different classes to meet the Navy’s needs. Murad Bayar, the head of the Under Secretariat for the Defense Industry (SSM), the organization in charge of procurement programs, argued recently that Turkey is capable of producing aircraft carriers domestically (Star, May 8).

    Another high publicity weapons system on display was various UAV projects. The Turkish armed forces use several small-sized UAVs produced in Turkey and SSM has recently signed a contract with another defense manufacturing firm to produce tactical UAVs (Anadolu Ajansi, January 4). Turkey has also been working to develop a national medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAV system to reduce its dependence on the United States and Israel for strategic intelligence gathering. ASELSAN, contractor for Turkey’s MALE UAV project, announced recently that its UAV, named ANKA, successfully passed test flights and could become operational in one year’s time. Defense industry analysts expect the UAV market to record rapid growth in the coming years. They argue that with its recent investments in the UAV sector, Turkey is poised to emerge as a leading supplier in its region (Haberturk, May 9).

    Turkey is also working on a national attack helicopter project, ATAK, in partnership with Italy. Meanwhile, to meet the Turkish army’s needs for general attack helicopters, Turkey has been evaluating various offers for some time (EDM, July 7, 2009). Turkey finally made a decision on a long-awaited tender and awarded the deal to U.S. Sikorsky. Turkish Defense Minister, Vecdi Gonul, described the $3.5 billion deal as a milestone, as it would involve joint helicopter production (Anadolu Ajansi, April 21).

    Although foreign participation remained limited, the expanding product line on display at IDEF underscored the transformation of the Turkish defense industry and its expanding potential to meet the needs of the armed forces. In that regard, the recent figures released by the Defense Industry Manufacturers’ Association also represented a bright picture for the sector (Anadolu Ajansi, April 26). In 2010, 52 percent of Turkish armed forces weapons systems needs were supplied by domestic producers. This development was seen as a success story, as the SSM had set the target of meeting 50 percent of the TAF’s needs domestically. In 2003, the ratio of domestic production in the military procurement total was only 25 percent.

    At the same time, the total volume of Turkish arms exports reached $634.2 million in 2010, five percent less than the previous year, reflecting the impact of the global financial crisis. Nonetheless, considering that in 2004 Turkey’s exports were only $196 million, there is a visible improvement in its overall export potential. Representatives of the sector aim to reach an annual export volume of $1 billion this year and $2 billion by 2016. According to other statistics, total revenues for Turkish defense firms reached $2.7 billion in 2010, again a significant leap from $848 million ten years earlier. Reflecting this growing economic potential, Turkey invested over $500 million in research and development activities in 2010.

    Determined to maintain this momentum, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan argued during a recent meeting with businessmen that the Turkish defense industry’s annual revenues will exceed $8 billion in five years (Hurriyet, May 19). Indeed, it has been part of Erdogan’s goals to achieve self-sufficiency in military procurement since his party came to power in 2002. In 2004, Turkey overhauled its military modernization programs and rules on military procurement, seeking to increase the domestically manufactured share. The recent advances in that direction have pleased Erdogan, as he constantly refers to the transformation of the Turkish defense industry in his state of the union addresses (Anadolu Ajansi, October 30, 2010).

    While Turkey was largely dependent on defense sector imports during the 1990s, the military modernization programs during that decade were focused on joint production with foreign manufacturers to supply the Turkish army. These facilitated the emergence of a domestic arms industry. In the last decade, the Turkish defense industry has increasingly shifted in the direction of national design and production, based on the accumulated experience and technology transfers achieved through international partnerships. This growth, which is geared toward meeting the Turkish army’s needs, has been achieved largely thanks to support and protection provided by the Turkish government. Yet, the Turkish defense industry seems to be moving to a new phase of mass production for international markets, where it is likely to face fiercer competition.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-meets-over-half-its-defense-requirements-domestically/