Tag: Türkiye – Rusya

  • The Russians are Coming: Still Seeing Red

    The Russians are Coming: Still Seeing Red

    kanal istanbul savunma hatti

    Probable Enemy Avenues of Approach

    30 years later, of course, Turkish-Russian relations were even worse. These maps, from the Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey reflect early cold war American expectations about how the communists would attack Turkey. Though a good deal of strange conspiracy theories have arisen from the mistaken assumption that whatever the military makes plans for reflects its official policy, these maps at the very least are a reminder that at the time, an invasion like this and the world war it would trigger were considered real possibilities.

    rusya turkiye savas savunma hatti kanal istanbul

    A direct attack on the straights accompanied by an invasion from Bulgaria

    The Turkish defense of Istanbul at this time was centered around the Catalca line, running across Thrace on the raised ground north of Buyukcekmece, the same point where the Ottoman army held off Bulgarian forces in 1913. A more controversial subject, between American military planners and their Turkish colleagues, was where America would mount its defense. One plan, understandably unpopular with Turkish leaders, involved writing off most of Anatolia and trying to stop the Russian advance into the Middle East at the Taurus mountains north of Adana.

    adana savunma hatti

    Finally, though not suitable for an amphibious landing, Midye, now called Kiyikoy, is a delightful place for a weekend trip from Istanbul.

    Source: midafternoonmap.com/2013/01/the-russians-are-coming-or-still-seeing.html

  • Russian bombers destroyed 23 Turkish tanks, 18 MLRS installations and about 50 armored personnel carriers

    Russian bombers destroyed 23 Turkish tanks, 18 MLRS installations and about 50 armored personnel carriers

    Russian bombers destroyed 23 Turkish tanks, 18 MLRS installations and about 50 armored personnel carriers

    Russian aviation destroys Turkish armored vehicles and weapons.

    Erdogan’s violation of the agreements with Moscow resulted in huge losses for Turkey in Syria. Since the beginning of last week, Turkish troops and pro-Turkish terrorists have lost almost a hundred units of armored vehicles illegally transported to Syria, and it is not Syria, but Russian military aviation that is crushing the enemy.

    According to the arguments of local and foreign news agencies, today Turkey has lost at least 23 tanks in Syria (including 4 Leopard tanks – approx. Ed.), About 50 armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles, 18 MLRS installations, more than 20 military trucks and 2 warehouses with weapons and ammunition. Attacks of Russian military aircraft were carried out mainly on the largest accumulations of equipment, and, often, armored vehicles were destroyed immediately when crossing the Turkish-Syrian border.

    The losses among the militants who have already received Turkish tanks and armored personnel carriers are by no means less impressive – about 300 terrorists died only when they attacked the convoys and locations of enemy forces.

    According to the arguments of a number of sources, Russia is actively maintaining contacts with the Turkish side, and as soon as Ankara declares that it knows nothing about the illegal crossing of the Syrian border, attacks are carried out on columns and convoys.

    Türkçe:
    IDLIB Türk-Rus savasinin esiginde 20022020

     

  • TURKEY AND RUSSIA

    TURKEY AND RUSSIA

    Highlights

    • Turkey has moved closer to Russia while its relationships with the United States and the European Union have suffered.
    • A Turkish realignment toward Russia is not likely to materialize given their vastly different strategic priorities and visions.
    • For practical reasons, Turkey will take additional steps over the coming months to rekindle its alliance with the United States and its partnership with the European Union.

    Turkey’s relationship with Russia is historically fraught with suspicion and friction. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the two countries have established an important economic relationship, and they have set a bold, perhaps unreachable target of $100 billion in bilateral trade. Even so, this economic aspiration is counterbalanced by differing prerogatives in the strategic and geopolitical realm. Turkey, representing NATO’s eastern flank, has partnered for decades with the United States and the European Union to contain Russian influence in Eastern and Central Europe, as well as the Caucasus. Recent developments in the Syrian civil war have resulted in a strange congruence of interests and seeming cooperation between Ankara and Moscow, but it would be a stretch to argue that this cooperation will deepen into an enduring strategic relationship.

    Frayed Relations With the U.S.

    Since 2012, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been at odds with the United States, under Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, for actively supporting Kurdish rebels in Syria to defeat the Islamic State. Turkey considers the Kurdish rebels in Syria an offshoot of the insurgent Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which the Turkish government, as well as the United States, NATO and the European Union, lists as a terrorist organization. In turn, Russia has, with the help of Iran, established a process not only of defeating the Islamic State in Syria but also of defeating all rebel groups fighting the pro-Russian government of Syrian President Bashar al Assad. The situation in Syria has left policy analysts wondering whether Turkey is actively distancing itself from its American and European partners to adopt a closer strategic relationship with Russia.

    To be sure, there are many issues that have resulted in a deep schism between Turkey and the United States. U.S. backing of Kurdish rebels can be seen as merely the tip of the iceberg. In return, Turkey has concluded the purchase (if not the actual deployment) of a Russian S-400 missile system to bolster its air defenses in clear preference to the U.S.-made Patriot missile system. U.S. authorities have threatened their Turkish counterparts that if they deploy the Russian missiles the United States will not transfer more than 100 F-35 fighters to Turkey, mainly because the Russian crews who would operate the S-400 batteries would be in a prime position to gain information regarding the F-35’s strengths and weaknesses. Further, Erdogan’s government has arbitrarily detained U.S. citizens as bargaining chips to compel Washington to accede to Turkish policy demands, specifically regarding Syria. In return, the United States, in addition to sanctioning Turkish Cabinet ministers, has threatened further punitive measures against Turkey — measures that could seriously damage its already debt-ridden and fragile economy.

    Instead of mending fences with the United States and requesting emergency financial assistance from the U.S.-dominated International Monetary Fund and/or World Bank, could it be that Erdogan is more interested in turning to new “allies” such as Russia and China to achieve his regional and wider foreign policy agenda? The purchasing of sovereign debt by China is just one avenue by which Beijing is advancing its global ambition of unseating the United States as the sole economic and military hegemon, and it would be quite attractive to Erdogan’s government precisely because monetary loans from China are likely to carry fewer conditions than those obtained from the IMF and World Bank. Other than a historical security apparatus rooted in the Cold War, and limited trade relations, there is not much that binds Turkey and the United States together.

    Other than a historical security apparatus rooted in the Cold War, and limited trade relations, there is not much that binds Turkey and the United States together.

    On the other hand, Russia and Turkey have a significant economic partnership that not only spans a number of critical sectors but also makes Turkey increasingly dependent on Russia. Turkey derives 55 percent of its natural gas needs (natural gas produces 60 percent of its electricity) from Russia, for example. Both countries have also signed an agreement to build at least one Russian nuclear power plant in Turkey. Because of Turkey’s potential as a transit hub for Russian natural gas to Europe — one that bypasses Ukraine — Moscow and Ankara are building the TurkStream pipeline, which could begin carrying Russian natural gas through Turkey to the European Union via Bulgaria as early as late 2019. The Russian domestic market is a vital destination for Turkish exports, including but not limited to cars, agricultural produce and textiles.

    Further, the influx of 4 million to 5 million Russian tourists to Turkey in 2017 represents 12 percent of the country’s total number of tourists and a significant source of revenue. To crown these vital areas of economic synergy, one must bear in mind that Turkey and Russia’s bilateral relationship does not depend on shared values such as human rights and democratic governance, a factor that has further embittered Turkey’s relationship with the United States and the European Union.

    Signs of Improvement

    Despite the economic ties, Turkey’s supposed realignment toward Russia and China — a clear preference that would put it in the Eurasia camp and possibly out of NATO — is not likely to materialize. Turkey and Russia have vastly different strategic priorities and visions. In the immediate future, Turkey is ambivalent about a Russian- and Iranian-backed military assault on the last rebel-held town of Idlib in Syria. Erdogan has so far succeeded in preventing the operation from taking place. This may not last for much longer. Russia has a clear interest in ending the Syrian civil war and seeing al Assad’s government fully in control of the country once again. This concern presents a number of problems for Turkey. The battle for Idlib would result in new waves of refugees destined for Turkey, which already hosts more than 3.5 million Syrians and isn’t in a position to cope with more. In addition, it is highly likely that the extremist elements making up the remnants of the Syrian resistance that Turkey has actively supported (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and other Islamic State or former al Qaeda elements) would flee to Turkey and pose an internal security threat.

    In the long term, Turkey has little to gain with a re-empowered al Assad government, which is likely to present a resentful posture against Erdogan, precisely because he tried to topple al Assad’s government and replace it with a Sunni alternative. Strategically speaking, Turkey also remains largely isolated in the region, and in the event it does not patch up its relationship with its partners, it is likely to face increased security and economic challenges, which its NATO, U.S. and EU anchors so far have largely shielded Ankara from. Consider that Turkey has no real alternative to renewing and maintaining its military capacity independent of U.S.-made products — namely the F-35 fighter. It is for such reasons that Erdogan has recently initiated several overtures to begin rebuilding relationships with allies he has seriously strained. The freeing of U.S. cleric Andrew Brunson in mid-October was a clear attempt to de-escalate tensions with the United States and prevent further sanctions being levied against Turkey. More recently, the apparent murder of The Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul has resulted in Erdogan attempting to marginalize Saudi Arabia in the eyes of the United States and the European Union and to raise Turkey’s profile as a more credible partner, by divulging precise intelligence in Khashoggi’s death.

    Turkey remains more distant toward its once stalwart alliance with the United States and partnership with the European Union than at any other point in recent history. However, in the coming months we are likely to witness more overt measures to rekindle and reaffirm these embittered ties, if only for pragmatic reasons.

    globe color

  • A Deal Between Turkey and Russia Won’t Stop the Crisis in Idlib

    A Deal Between Turkey and Russia Won’t Stop the Crisis in Idlib

    Sep 19, 2018 | 09:00 GMT

    This photo, taken on Sept. 9, 2018, shows destruction in the town of al-Habit on the edges of rebel-held Idlib province.
    (OMAR HAJ KADOUR/AFP/Getty Images)
    Highlights
    • A deal over Syria’s Idlib province will prevent Russian-backed loyalist forces from launching an offensive there and will defuse the growing crisis between Turkey and Russia.
    • The Syrian government, Iran and the jihadist factions among the rebels will try to undermine the agreement.
    • As a result, Idlib will remain unstable and the threat of military operations around the province will continue.

    Russia and Turkey have come to an agreement over Syria’s last rebel stronghold, Idlib. Following their latest round of talks in Sochi, Russia, on Sept. 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced their deal to set up a 15- to 20-kilometer (9.3- to 12.4-mile) jointly patrolled demilitarized zone around the province by mid-October. The agreement, which will prevent Russian-backed loyalist forces from launching a major offensive to reclaim Idlib from the rebels, stands to ease tensions between Russia and Turkey. Nevertheless, the standoff over Idlib is far from resolved, and numerous obstacles remain that could undermine the deal.

    The Big Picture

    The fate of Idlib, the last rebel stronghold in the Syrian civil war, will help determine the future of the conflict. Not only could Idlib make or break Turkey’s relationship with Russia, but it could also draw in external powers and drag the war beyond Syria’s borders.

    Reaching a Compromise

    Russia agreed to the deal out of a desire to preserve its relationship with Turkey. The Turkish government opposed the Russian-backed operation on Idlib, which would have deprived it of a buffer zone in northern Syria while also driving millions of Syrian refugees into its territory. To try to avert the operation, Ankara reinforced its 12 observation posts in and around Idlib and promised its rebel allies in the region more supplies and support. Russia still could have maintained its backing for the Syrian military attacks on the province, striving to avoid a direct confrontation with Turkish forces by steering clear of their observation posts. But given the high risk of accidental strikes on Turkish troops — and the damage they would cause relations with Turkey — Moscow instead opted for a compromise with Ankara. By avoiding significant offensive operations in Idlib, moreover, Russia reduced the chances that the Syrian government would carry out another chemical attack on Idlib’s rebel forces, thereby warding off dangerous strikes from the United States and its allies.

    Though the agreement accomplished Ankara’s goal of deterring a major assault on Idlib, it is not without its costs for Turkey. Turkey, for instance, has openly promised to work to drive out rebel forces from the demilitarized zone around Idlib as part of the deal. In addition, it has probably assured Moscow privately that it would do more to crack down on the extremist groups still operating in the province, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria. These groups and their regional affiliates not only include many Chechen and Uighur militants among their ranks — a source of concern for Russia and China, respectively — but they also have spearheaded attacks against Russian forces in Syria. In several strikes, for example, they used drones to drop rudimentary explosives onto the Russian air base at Latakia.

    Complications

    The extremist groups’ reaction to the deal will pose the most immediate obstacle to its success. Having maintained their ties with Turkey, jihadist organizations like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Turkistan Islamic Party will face considerable pressure from Ankara to withdraw from Idlib. Their cooperation is hardly guaranteed, however. The groups have long been wary of Turkey’s intentions and are aware of its efforts to set up a rebel coalition, the National Front for Liberation, to balance and eventually replace them in the fight. Furthermore, giving up front-line positions and quietly withdrawing from the demilitarized zone would contradict their hard-line ideological stance in the fight against the Syrian government. By compromising their beliefs in this way, the groups could risk further splintering and lose recruits to al Qaeda affiliate Hurras al-Deen or to lingering Islamic State cells in the region.

    On the other side of the zone, Russia’s allies Iran and the Syrian government will also challenge the deal. Tehran and Damascus have been keen to get Russia’s backing for a full-scale offensive on Idlib and will not be pleased with the agreement, though they may publicly endorse it. Motivated to destroy the deal and weaken Russia’s relationship with Turkey, the Syrian government could, with Iran’s help, start skirmishes with rebel forces or even launch its own attacks in the region under the pretense of responding to strikes by the extremist groups there. All these constraints mean that violence and instability will continue to grip the region, even without the prospect of a major offensive on Idlib.