Tag: Turkish Armed Forces

  • The once all-powerful Turkish armed forces are cowed, if not quite impotent

    The once all-powerful Turkish armed forces are cowed, if not quite impotent

    Erdogan and his generals

    The once all-powerful Turkish armed forces are cowed, if not quite impotent

    20130202_EUP001_0

    IMAGINE a country with NATO’s second-largest army that counts Iraq, Iran and Syria as neighbours and is encircled by the Aegean, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean—but has nobody to command its navy. Just such a situation looms in Turkey after this week’s resignation of Admiral Nusret Guner, the number two in the navy who was expected to take over when its incumbent head steps down in August. There are no other qualified candidates, not least because more than half of Turkey’s admirals are in jail, along with hundreds of generals and other officers (both serving and retired), all on charges of plotting to oust Turkey’s mildly Islamist Justice and Development (AK) government.

    Admiral Guner’s resignation came after prosecutors claimed that 75 naval officers being tried for allegedly running a sex-for-secrets ring had planted a spy camera in his teenaged daughter’s bedroom. In an emotional speech the admiral said he believed in his colleagues’ innocence.

    The series of cases known as Ergenekon has left Turkey’s once omnipotent armed forces weak and divided. At last count one in five Turkish generals, including Ilker Basbug, a former chief of the general staff, was behind bars. This ought to be a triumph for Turkish democracy. But the trials are dogged by claims of spiced-up evidence and other discrepancies.

    The families of over 250 defendants given long prison terms in September 2012 in another alleged coup plot, Sledgehammer, are taking their case to the UN Human Rights Council. They insist the evidence was doctored. Independent forensic experts back their claims. Jared Genser, a lawyer based in Washington, DC, who has worked for such luminaries as Vaclav Havel and Desmond Tutu, says he agreed to act for the Sledgehammer defendants because he “firmly believes” in their innocence and because the evidence against them “was demonstrably forged”.

    Some point fingers at a powerful Muslim group led by Fethullah Gulen, a moderate Turkish cleric living in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania. The generals hounded the Gulenists after they ejected Turkey’s first Islamist prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, in 1997. The Gulenists have made a comeback under AK and are said to have infiltrated the police and judiciary.

    Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, shares some doubts, even though he has cut down the generals’ influence during his decade in power. “These operations against the army are affecting morale. There are 400 serving and retired officers in jail. At this rate we will have no officers left to appoint to command positions,” he complained in a recent interview. As clashes with the Kurdish separatist PKK continue despite new peace talks and the conflict in Syria threatens to spill over the border, Mr Erdogan is right to be worried.

    Yet even as the prime minister seeks to distance himself from the Ergenekon case, some claim that he has struck a cosy alliance with the army. The chief of the general staff, Necdet Ozel, who owes his rise to the resignation in 2011 of his predecessor in protest at Ergenekon, is fiercely loyal. Mr Erdogan rushed to his defence in December 2011 after the Turkish air force had rained bombs on Kurdish civilians who were apparently mistaken for PKK rebels as they slipped into Turkey from Iraq. Some 34 Kurds, mostly teenagers, died. A parliamentary commission investigating the affair has run into claims of a cover-up. Not a single head has rolled.

    It may be that the still-popular Mr Erdogan feels that the army is fully under his control. The National Security Council through which the generals used to bark orders to nominally civilian governments has been reduced to a symbolic role. After constitutional reforms were approved in a 2010 referendum, soldiers began to be tried in civilian courts. “Erdogan sees the army as his boys,” comments Henri Barkey, a professor of international relations at Lehigh University in Pennsylvania.

    Yet for all their recent setbacks the generals still retain considerable sway. The defence budget remains largely immune to civilian oversight. The chief of the general staff is not subordinate to the minister of defence. And an internal service law that allows the army to intervene in politics remains in place.

    Indeed, the idea that some officers may have been conspiring to topple the AK government is not far-fetched. In 2007 the army tried unsuccessfully to stop Abdullah Gul, a former foreign minister, from becoming Turkey’s president because his wife wears the Islamic headscarf. In 2008 the generals egged on the constitutional court to ban AK on flimsily documented charges that it was seeking to impose sharia law. In the event the case was dismissed by a single vote. As for Ergenekon, “even in the absence of tampered evidence, there is sufficient proof of coup plotting to send scores of generals to jail,” argues Orhan Kemal Cengiz, a human-rights lawyer who has studied the case.

    Turkey’s army has overthrown no fewer than four governments since 1960. The bloodiest coup came in 1980, when 50 people were executed, 500,000 were arrested and many hundreds died in jail. Yet millions of Turks, who have long revered the armed forces as custodians of Ataturk’s secular legacy, cheered the coup. Its leaders are now at last facing trial; opinions are belatedly shifting amid gruesome revelations of the army’s misdeeds. A recent poll suggests that, for the first time, the presidency has supplanted the army as the country’s most popular institution. And a report by the Platform for Soldiers’ Rights, an advocacy group, detailing abuse of conscripts, has dealt a further blow. Some 934 soldiers are said to have committed suicide over the past decade, surpassing the number killed while fighting the PKK. Were the conscripts killed by their superiors? Their parents want to know.

    From the print edition: Europe

  • Free world allies fought for South Korea during war

    Free world allies fought for South Korea during war

    Free World Allies
    Turkish troops arrive in the southeastern port city of Busan in 1950 to join the Korean War. Some 21 countries took part in the conflict. / Korea Times file

    UNC waged crusade against communism

    By Andrew Salmon

    On 29 August, 1950, a bright summer day, a startlingly alien sound blasted across Busan docks: A series of flatulent drones followed by a piercing wail.

    The sound was emanating from a group of young men pacing the gun turrets of an approaching heavy cruiser. Their appearance was even more bizarre: They were clad in skirts and chequered, tasseled headgear. The cacophonous lilt emanated from sack-like objects the men were plying.

    The objects were bagpipes; the men were Scottish troops of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, the lead battalion of 27th British Brigade. At an urgent American request, and in response to the deteriorating military situation, this unit had been dispatched. post-haste, from Hong Kong with such speed that they dubbed themselves the “For-God’s-sake-send-something Brigade.”

    27th Brigade were just the first of the non-American contingents to arrive in Busan to help stem Kim Il-sung’s invasion. On the embattled peninsula, a new concept in world affairs was being born: A United Nations military intervention force, or, to give it its formal title in Korea, the United Nations Command, or UNC.

    This was the force enabled by UN Security Council resolutions of 25th and 27th June and 7th July 1950 calling for the “restoration of international peace and security in the area” following Pyonyang’s 25th June invasion. Several contingents, however, would not land until 1951, by which time the South had been saved, the North defeated and counter-invaded – and then the entire situation reversed by the Chinese intervention at the end of 1950.

    Under the U.N. banner, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Columbia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, India (Field Ambulance), Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, Thailand and Turkey supplied ground combat troops, while South Africa deployed its “Flying Cheetah” fighter squadron. Denmark, Italy, Norway and Sweden provided non-combatant medical units.

    The United States commanded this polyglot force, and, after South Korea, provided its main muscle, contributing seven infantry division and a marine division, as well as logistical support, and the largest naval and air units. In July 1953, a survey showed that South Korea had 590,911 troops in the UNC; the US, 302,482; and other U.N. contingents totaled only 39,145.

    Most of the non-American UNC contingents were small. Once the war entered its static stage in late 1951, the Australian, British, Canadian, Indian and New Zealand units fought together, but the Commonwealth Division was the only unit in the UNC that was operationally independent. Turkey provided a brigade, but all other contingents ― except for little Luxembourg’s, which was a platoon fighting within the Belgian battalion ― were battalion-sized and were absorbed into American parent formations.

    The cosmopolitan expansion of the coalition defending South Korea provided the U.S.-run logistics chain with a range of problems. While the U.S. Army was dry, the Dutch wanted gin, the French wine, and the Australians, Belgians and British, beer to fight on. On the rationing front, the Turks would not eat pork and like the Dutch, demanded fresh bread. The Greeks wanted figs, raisins and olive oil.

    Yet, while these UNC units might cause cultural, linguistic and logistical headaches for U.S. commanders, and while they did not compare in size with the Americans, many of them proved to be exceptionally high quality fighting units. This was particularly so in the first six months of the war when, by comparison, the U.S. Army was suffering significant morale and leadership problems.

    The Turks forged a legend in their first action. Sent to hold the flank of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division, disintegrating under Chinese onslaught at the end of November 1950, the ferocity with which they employed their bayonets earned them global fame. At the same time, they took massive casualties, partly due to linguistic problems and poor liaison with American forces.

    The French battalion proved a lynchpin at Chipyong-ni, a battle of encirclement in February 1951 that was widely considered the first UNC tactical victory against the onrushing Chinese.

    At the heart of the greatest enemy offensive of the war in April 1951, stood the British 29th Brigade, which earned global attention for its tragic stand on the Imjin River. On the opposite end of the front, the Australian and Canadian battalions of 27th Commonwealth Brigade won plaudits for their masterly defensive battle at Kapyong during the same Chinese offensive.

    The fighting quality of the Commonwealth Division would be evident in the key ground they were assigned to once the war entered its static stage: Flanking the U.S. Marine division, generally considered the best of the U.S. ground units, along the Samichon Valley, at the northern end of the so-called “Uijongbu Corridor” the traditional invasion route to Seoul.

    The Belgians were noted for their enthusiastic professionalism, and the Greeks for their excellence in mountain warfare.

    What compelled such a disparate group of nations to fight for a country that very few of their citizens had even heard of before 25 June 1950?

    Although the ostensible causus belli was the defense of South Korea, Rhee Syngman’s government – a regime of questionable democratic credentials, and one which operated, in the view of many UNC men, with comparable brutality to Kim Il-sung’s – hardly made a compelling case for intervention.

    There were, instead, three main reasons. National desires to win the goodwill of Washington; national suspicions of militant communism; and a more general desire to support the efforts of the then-fledgling, but promising, U.N.

    For the U.K., which fielded the second-largest contingent, it was a fight to stem global communism, but the country was also under pressure to maintain its “special relationship” with the U.S. France, heavily engaged in Indochina, needed to earn American goodwill for aid in that struggle. It is fair to say that all the northern European contingents felt a debt of honor toward the U.S. after World War II, and the Greeks had even more recent reasons to thank the U.S. for its assistance in winning the Greek Civil War.

    Two units that UNC officers were careful not to deploy alongside one another were the traditional enemies of southern Europe, the Greeks and the Turks. Ankara was keen to cement ties with Washington, in order to gain membership in NATO; ironically, Athens shared the same motive.

    After the armistice was signed in July 1953, this international legion, a force as polyglot as any since the Crusades, dispersed. Australian and British veterans headed for a less intense anti-communist struggle in the jungles of Malaya, but for one contingent, the end of the Korean War spelled disaster. The French battalion was assigned to Indochina, where Paris’ position was deteriorating. The much-admired battalion was wiped out by Viet Minh forces in 1954.

    Some who fought under the U.N. banner in Korea were disappointed at the organization’s less effectual role thereafter. The original U.N. resolutions that had underwritten the UNC’s existence had been made possible by the absence of the USSR’s envoy to the body, Josef Malik, who was boycotting the body in summer of 1950 (due to the U.N.’s refusal to grant a seat to communist China).

    Once Moscow rejoined the world body and Cold War politics began affecting its operation, it became difficult to employ U.N. forces on anything other than “peacekeeping” missions — many of questionable effectiveness. It would not be until the end of the Cold War, and the U.N. intervention in the Gulf War of 1991, that the U.N. would again field a military force with real teeth.

    Sixty years later, the leading nation in the UNC, the United States, is still South Korea’s most important political ally, but it is fair to say that the trade and commercial links forged between Seoul and other UNC capitals have fallen in importance since the end of the Cold War. Then-enemy China, for example, has replaced the United States as Korea’s top trade partner.

    Still, emotional ties endure: South Korea and Turkey, for example, displayed a mutual affection during their World Cup semifinal match in 2002 that was born in the war years and after, when Turkish troops founded the “Ankara” orphanage.

    The peninsula had seen international contingents fighting on its soil before. Kublai Khan’s multi-ethnic legions used Korea as a staging area for their doomed invasions of Japan in the 13th century, and Japanese, Manchu, White Russian, Chinese and Soviet troops would all leave blood on Korean soil in succeeding centuries.

    But the UNC troops of 1950 made up of the most cosmopolitan army the peninsula had ever hosted; their ethnic and national diversity would not be witnessed again in Korea until the 1988 Summer Olympics. For modern Korea, the internationalization of its fight for survival in late 1950 was the first, if unacknowledged, step in a process that few South Koreans would start talking about until the early 1990s: Globalization.

    andrewcsalmon@yahoo.co.uk

    http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/09/117_73312.html, 19/09/2010

  • Chief of the Turkish Army Redefining the Political Role of the Military

    Chief of the Turkish Army Redefining the Political Role of the Military

    Chief of the Turkish Army Redefining the Political Role of the Military

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 72
    April 15, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey’s Chief of the General Staff, General Ilker Basbug, delivered a speech at the War Academies Command in Istanbul on April 14 addressing several issues including civil-military relations, national identity, the role of religion, and the fight against terrorism. In a two-hour speech broadcast live on nine TV stations, Basbug tried to erase the image of the military being opposed to religion. He underlined the need to recognize sub-national cultural identities, reiterated his support for the secular and democratic regime in Turkey, drew a distinction between terrorists and innocent civilians and called for a more healthy civil-military relationship (www.tsk.mil.tr, April 14).

    Many of the phrases used by Basbug, such as “the people of Turkey” or “terrorists are human beings too,” were considered as “firsts” for the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), and interpreted as a marked shift in the military’s position on social and political problems. In a symbolic gesture, the TAF opened a press briefing to journalists known for their fierce criticism of the military’s interference in politics, signaling its willingness to reach out to broader sections of Turkish society (Turkish daily, April 15).

    For some Turkish analysts, this represents the military’s attempt to adjust to the recent drastic changes within Turkish politics and society. Its new leadership realizes that although elements within the Turkish military interfered in the presidential election through the April 27, 2007 memorandum, it was unable to prevent the election of Abdullah Gul. The AKP’s victory in the July 2007 general elections demonstrated that the Turkish society opposed such military interference in the political process. Moreover, the alleged involvement of a growing number of serving and retired military officers in the ongoing Ergenekon investigation has undermined the popularity of the military, further tilting the balance in favor of civilians, which increased the pressure on the TAF to redefine its position on civil-military relations (Hurriyet, April 14).

    Nonetheless, Basbug is known as an outspoken commander whose leadership style does not restrict him to the military, and has strong opinions on the key challenges facing the country (EDM, August 15, 2008). Basbug regularly holds consultation meetings with journalists, academics and intellectuals, which is consistent with his approach and visionary outlook. He regards tackling broader social problems as a self-declared duty.

    In this context, Basbug set the tone at the outset of his speech: “I will address the issues of civil-military relations, the fight against terrorism, democracy and secularism from an academic perspective.” He quoted international philosophers and writers as well as the works of Turkish scholars, and referred to scientific studies to support his arguments. Rather than offering an exclusively military-security perspective, he presented a sociological analysis of these issues. On terrorism, for instance, Basbug called for studying its root causes and understanding why militants join terrorist organizations.

    Although the moderation of the military leadership is welcomed by civilians and is viewed as a sign of the normalization of Turkish democracy, it has allegedly weakened Basbug’s image and authority amongst the officer corps. The arrests of several military personnel, in addition to retired high ranking military commanders, in the previous wave of the Ergenekon investigation caused disquiet inside the Turkish military. Military officers expected Basbug to state publicly his stance on Ergenekon and the overall role of the Turkish military (Hurriyet, April 14).

    Despite his extensive coverage of civil-military relations during his address, Basbug made no direct comment on the Ergenekon investigation. He indicated that he might hold a separate press conference to present his opinions on current issues (www.cnnturk.com, April 14). Basbug’s speech received a mixed reaction from Turkish analysts, partly reflecting his cautious approach based on his awareness of often contradictory expectations. For some, the speech heralded a new era. They found Basbug liberal and supportive of a pluralist democracy. Similarly, some argued that his remarks signaled the TAF might be preparing to support an amnesty for the PKK terrorists. Critics alleged Basbug’s speech was only a compilation of previous statements on these issues and contained nothing new. However, they conceded that there was a shift in the way the military communicates with the public. Basbug adopted moderate language and avoided any hint of confrontation with the political authorities (www.kanaldhaber.com.tr, April 14; Milliyet, Radikal, Hurriyet, Taraf, April 15).

    Basbug’s speech revealed the limits on further civil-military reform. He was keen to reassert the interests of the TAF and protect its privileged position. Despite recognizing the constitutional restrictions on the military and acknowledging the supremacy of the government, he called on politicians to consult the military and respect its autonomy. He expressed support for democracy and sought to reach out to the conservative sections of society, while claiming that two smear campaigns were underway against the TAF. One led by those criticizing the TAF using the pretext of promoting democracy, and a second from those seeking to mobilize religious opposition against the military. In particular, Basbug reiterated his ardent opposition to “religious communities” (cemaat), and their growing social, economic and political power. Finally, despite his recognition of Turkey’s cultural diversity, he insisted on protecting the nation-state from globalization. Basbug claims to approach controversial issues from a sociological perspective, while some of his uncompromising views contradict trends within Turkish society.

    https://jamestown.org/program/chief-of-the-turkish-army-redefining-the-political-role-of-the-military/