In a column a few weeks ago regarding the Insight Turkey Annual Conference, I gave a synopsis of the debate among the participants of a panel on Turkish-U.S. relations. Responding to a question on the panel about the possible “spoiler” of Turkish -US relations in 2016, there was a consensus among the panelists on the possible negative impact on bilateral ties by the Democratic Union Party’s (PYD) armed People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria. This issue has been negatively affecting the relationship between Turkey and Syria, especially over the last two years. Other than the immediate impact stemming from the publicity this disagreement involves, there is also the long-term problem that this tension is generating for mutual trust between the two countries. This is not the first time PKK-related issues have caused problems in bilateral relations. In the immediate aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Ankara and Washington experienced tensions in bilateral relations because of the lack of satisfactory U.S. action against PKK targets. Increasing PKK activity and disagreement between Turkey and the U.S. during this period generated significant tension, while the difference between the two countries regarding the PYD and YPG started to create a more serious disagreement, deteriorating relations especially during the siege of Kobani. The fact that some U.S. officials publicly criticized Ankara for not doing enough in Kobani, and the fact that the U.S., despite opposition from Ankara, airdropped weapons to the YPG added to this crisis. For Ankara, the operational cooperation and membership overlap between the YPG and PKK make the two organizations one and the same. This overlap and cooperation could generate a major security risk for Turkey by increasing the capabilities of the PKK on the ground. There was already some concern within the Turkish security establishment about the PKK’s unwillingness to pull its forces out of Turkey during the cease-fire period. The U.S. assistance to the YPG in this period both legitimized and emboldened the organization in the region. After the sudden termination of the cease-fire agreement, the PKK demonstrated that some of Turkey’s concerns regarding the increasing sophistication of PKK operations were well-founded. Since then, the U.S. has stepped up its support for the YPG and Ankara has continued to express its concern meaning the discord between two countries continues to test their bilateral ties. In the meantime, Turkey faced a series of PKK attacks in southeastern cities and challenges to public order from its affiliated organizations. Since then, Turkey launched a major offensive against PKK targets. Operations against DAESH also intensified during this period. At this critical juncture, Ankara is facing two separate terrorist threats from two different organizations. While pursuing and intensifying the crackdown on these groups in Turkey, Ankara is also taking precautions to stop any form of infiltration by the members of these groups from Syria and Iraq into the country. On this point at least, there is not much difference of opinion between Turkey and US on how to fight DAESH with operational cooperation and coordination in border security arrangements between the two countries. Nevertheless, Ankara insists that the main problem is the state of affairs that Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime has generated and that a solution in Syria is necessary to resolve the widening regional crisis. What is more, the distinction that Washington claims to exist between the PKK and YPG is a problem to Turkish-U.S. relations. Washington seemed to recognize the concerns Ankara has conveyed about the YPG sufficiently enough to avoid them becoming a threat to Turkey, but there are serious concerns regarding operational cooperation, exchange of knowhow and membership overlap between the PKK and YPG. It will take stronger precautions to convince Ankara on the safety of American policy, and in the absence of such measures the issue will continue to be a spoiler for the two countries’ relations. It can be expected that debates about the airfield in northern Syria will also be part of discussions in the coming weeks. [Daily Sabah, January 25, 2016] |
Tag: TURKISH AMERICAN RELATIONS
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AMERICA FILES : Turkish-American Relations Revisited
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George Mitchell Visits Ankara
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 40March 2, 2009By: Saban Kardas -
Will it Strengthen U.S.-Turkish Relations?
Will the Closure of Manas Airbase Strengthen U.S.-Turkish Relations?
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 35February 23, 2009Saban KardasThe Kyrgyz parliament’s vote to close down Manas Airbase puts at risk supply routes for international forces operating in Afghanistan shortly after the U.S. decision to bolster the American military presence in Afghanistan (EDM, February 20). The attempts to find alternative routes in the wake of this controversial decision highlight the strategic cooperation between Turkey and the United States and the role Turkey could play in maintaining a supply route for U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
Referring to some Russian and American experts, the Turkish press has speculated that the United States may try to find another base in Central Asia to compensate for the loss of Manas. Given the growing Russian influence in the region and the declining credibility of the United States following the Russo-Georgian war in the summer of 2008, however, they claim that the United States would have a hard time securing a new base agreement. If the Americans fail to convince Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to accept U.S. requests, according to the Turkish press, the United States then would request a military base in Turkey’s Black Sea town of Trabzon (Hurriyet, February 19; Evrensel, February 20; Yeni Safak, February 20).
As the speculation mounted, the question of whether the United States had indeed knocked on Turkey’s door was raised to Metin Gurak, the spokesman of the Turkish military, during his weekly press briefing on Friday, February 20. Gurak stressed that as of the briefing Turkey had received no such request (Ihlas Haber Ajansi, February 20).
The same day, U.S. military sources announced that they had been able to secure the cooperation of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to allow transportation of non-lethal supplies to Afghanistan through their territories (AFP, Friday 20). In a development that apparently lends support to the Turkish press reports, Retired Air Force General and chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers, told 6 News, a private Turkish news station, that although the decision of the Kyrgyz parliament would not disrupt U.S. operations, it would make maintaining the supply routes more inconvenient and possibly more expensive. Noting that Manas was used mainly for refueling purposes, he emphasized that other bases in the Middle East, including in Turkey, could also host refueling tankers but with more operational costs involved. Myers said that the United States was seeking its NATO allies’ support and emphasized his belief that Turkey and the United States would maintain their constructive cooperation in Afghanistan (Star, February 20).
Indeed, since the beginning of military operations in Afghanistan following September 11 and the subsequent launch of international stability operations, Turkey has provided military assistance to the U.S.-led coalition, in both the context of the transatlantic alliance and Turkish-American strategic ties. During the initial operations leading to the fall of the Taliban regime, the United States used Turkish airspace and Incirlik Airbase for the campaign, although Turkey did not deploy combat troops. Turkey has also actively participated in the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) and commanded this NATO mission for two terms.
Can Turkey offer Trabzon? Analysts maintain that Trabzon offers many advantages in terms of its key location, which allows access to Middle Eastern, Central Asian, and Caucasus theaters; and therefore it is reportedly of interest to U.S. military planners. However, Turkey has previously declined American requests for setting up a base in Trabzon. Following the fall of Manas, the U.S. may press with a renewed proposal, but it is unlikely that the Turkish government would make such a politically risky decision. Also, Trabzon is one of the Anatolian cities where nationalist feelings and anti-Americanism run high; and, short of drastic U.S. actions to restore the deteriorating American image in Turkey, stationing U.S. personnel in the area might be a politically bad decision.
Therefore, claims about possible requests concerning an airbase in Trabzon might be exaggerated. Nonetheless, it is the case that as Afghanistan emerges as a major issue on the agendas of NATO and the Obama administration, Turkey is coming under pressure about its role in Afghanistan. Diplomatic sources believe that during his conversations with the Turkish prime minister and president, President Obama might have requested his counterparts to commit more Turkish troops or other forms of military contributions to U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (EDM, February 19).
Subsequent developments support such a conjecture. NATO defense ministers met in Poland in an informal meeting on February 19 and 20 to discuss the agenda for the next summit in April. They welcomed the U.S. decision to raise troop levels but underscored the need for civilian contributions to be boosted as well (www.nato.int, February 20). Upon his return to Turkey from the meeting, Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul told reporters that he had had a chance to discuss Turkey’s contributions with its alliance partners. Noting that Turkey’s direct aid to Afghanistan amounted to $200 million, he said that Turkey assisted in the training of the Afghan military and police. Gonul also said that he had met separately with the Afghan and American defense ministers and discussed ways in which Turkey’s contributions might be increased (www.trt.net.tr, February 21).
In addition to Turkey’s possibly increased role in Afghanistan, Turkey is one of the major exit routes for U.S. planes withdrawing troops from Iraq (Hurriyet Daily News, February 23). These developments have an element of irony. The Turkish Parliament’s refusal to allow American forces to use Turkish territory to launch the northern front against the Iraqi Army in 2003 led many to claim that the Turkish-American relationship would go south. Soon after the fall of Baghdad and in a mood of triumph, some even speculated that the United States might punish Turkey by closing down the Incirlik base as part of its plans to relocate military bases worldwide. Only a few years after the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns began, the United States had to abandon many of its positions in its new-found allies and might be requesting the use of Turkish territory.
The Kyrgyz parliament’s decision highlights both the importance of having a long-term and reliable ally in an area of strategic importance to U.S. interests and the mutual dependence between Turkey and the United States.
https://jamestown.org/program/will-the-closure-of-manas-airbase-strengthen-u-s-turkish-relations/
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Turkey’s New Regional Role
Two Calls, Many Scenarios: How Will Washington Readjust to Turkey’s New Regional Role?
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 33February 19, 2009President Barack Obama telephoned President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip separately on Monday. In his first official contact with the Turkish leaders since his inauguration, Obama discussed cooperation between the two countries over a wide spectrum of issues of common concern. Earlier this month, Vice President Joe Biden met Foreign Minister Ali Babacan at the security conference in Munich. Obama might have a face-to-face meeting with Gul during the NATO summit in April, celebrating the Atlantic alliance’s 60th anniversary.
The statement released by the White House said “President Obama had warm and productive phone conversations with Turkish President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan… The President emphasized the importance of the United States’ alliance with Turkey and said he looks forward to working with both President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan on a broad agenda of mutual strategic interest.” Obama stressed the need to strengthen the U.S.-Turkish relationship and work together toward meeting the challenges of the 21st century (www.whitehouse.gov, February 16).
The Turkish President’s office also issued a statement saying that “President Obama emphasized the importance he attaches to Turkish-U.S. relations and expressed his appreciation for [Turkey’s] leadership role in regional issues.” It was noted that the two sides had reiterated their determination to work together (www.tcbb.gov.tr, February 16).
In its report, the Turkish Prime Minister’s office highlighted President Obama’s positive remarks about the Turkish-American strategic partnership and Turkey’s role for regional peace. The statement said that Erdogan had “expressed [to Obama] Turkey’s sensitivities in Armenia and the Middle East and emphasized the importance of a fair and impartial American attitude in order not to hurt bilateral relations [between Turkey and the United States].” The statement also quoted Obama as saying, “I would like to affirm the vital role played by your leadership in the Middle East peace process. America has always appreciated Turkey’s sensitivities” (www.bbm.gov.tr, January 16).
Figuring out the reasons behind the timing of Obama’s calls has been a guessing game. Most observers focus on the issues raised during the talks as a key to understanding the content of the conversations and how Turkish-American relations may evolve in the days to come. According to official statements and various news stories, the issues discussed during both conversations included cooperation in NATO, U.S. support for Turkish-Iraqi rapprochement, the need for collaboration in Middle-East peace efforts, developments in Turkish-Armenian relations, Turkish-EU relations, and the United States’ policies toward Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Statements from the Turkish leaders preferred to highlight Obama’s praise of Turkey’s strategic role, especially its policies in the Middle East. Following Turkey’s vocal criticism of Israel during the Gaza invasion, concerns had arisen about the future of Turkish-American relations. Pro-AKP media outlets maintained that Obama’s expression of U.S. readiness to cooperate with Turkey was a positive sign that tension between Turkey and Israel would not undermine Turkey’s place in the United States’ Middle East policies. They go so far as to claim that despite the urging by some pro-Israel lobbyists for Washington to punish Ankara for the Davos incident, the warm phone conversations show that Ankara has successfully managed to keep its relations with Tel Aviv and Washington in separate baskets (Yeni Safak, February 18).
Other reports claimed that Obama solicited Turkey’s contributions for his administration’s plans for a new peace initiative in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Turkish side was reportedly assured by Obama that legislation recognizing the Armenian claims of genocide would not be brought before Congress (Radikal, February 17; Ihlas Haber Ajansi, February 17). According to a Turkish expert evaluating the phone conversations, it is unlikely that Obama will use the word “genocide” in his Armenian Remembrance Day statement on April 24 (Zaman, February 18). Erdogan said that he had had a detailed conversation with Obama about the Armenian claims, but he declined to give any details (Milliyet, February 19).
Turkish media outlets critical of the government, however, noted that the White House statement had departed from the issues highlighted by Ankara, instead putting emphasis on Turkey’s NATO membership and changes in the U.S. policies toward Pakistan and Afghanistan. They also pointed out that Obama’s office did not even mention the Armenian issue in the list of topics being discussed. According to these sources, some Washington-based analysts maintain that the reference to NATO was meant to remind Turkey of its responsibilities under the Atlantic alliance and warn Ankara about its “independent initiatives” (www.cnnturk.com, February 17; Cumhuriyet, February 17).
Indeed, Turkey has opted to develop special missions for itself outside the alliance framework—its role as peace broker in the Middle East, for example—and has occasionally deviated from the transatlantic community on issues such as how to deal with Russia, Sudan, and Iran. In Ankara’s view, this new activism could be complementary to Western efforts to promote peace and stability in troubled regions; but according to critics of the government, Turkey’s attempts to carve an autonomous international profile might strain Turkish-American relations.
Many Turkish analysts also agree that the mention of Afghanistan by the White House was significant in light of Washington’s recently announced plans to bolster U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan. About 800 Turkish troops are currently serving in Afghanistan under the NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), and Turkey has held the ISAF command for two terms in the past. Given the difficulties NATO has encountered in carrying out its mission in Afghanistan and the Obama administration’s determination to refocus its attention there, Ankara, along with other NATO allies, might be coming under pressure to increase its contributions to the ISAF and remove the obstacles it sets to EU-NATO coordination (Today’s Zaman, February 18, Hurriyet Daily News, February 18; EDM, February 9). When this issue was brought up in the past, Turkey declined to commit additional troops, but it remains to be seen how Ankara will respond to such requests in the run-up to the NATO Summit in April.
Discussions following Obama’s two telephone calls show that Turkish-American relations in the Obama administration are still in uncharted waters. By calling Gul and Erdogan separately, Obama showed that he was aware of who wielded power in Ankara; but how Washington will readjust itself to Ankara’s more assertive role in regional politics is a question that still begs for an answer. Developments ahead of the NATO summit and Obama’s handling of the Armenian claims will give more concrete indications of whether and how the parties will find common ground beyond rhetoric.
https://jamestown.org/program/two-calls-many-scenarios-how-will-washington-readjust-to-turkeys-new-regional-role/
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Turkish-American relations under a new U.S. president
Committed to Change, or Changing Commitments?
by Soli Ozel*
Those who rejoiced in the presidential victory of Barack Obama expect him to hold Turkey to higher standards on human rights, democracy, and rule of law.”
ISTANBUL — Two weeks prior to the U.S. presidential election, the October survey of Metropoll found that nearly 39 percent of Turks wanted Barack Obama to be the next U.S. president and only 14.1 percent wanted John McCain. Of those surveyed, 45 percent were either not interested or thought it did not matter who was elected the next U.S. president.
On the eve of election night, as talk shows on the U.S. elections proliferated across television channels in Turkey, it transpired that many members of the punditry had a high discomfort level with an Obama presidency. Particularly, former diplomatic corps representatives openly displayed their displeasure with such a choice in fear that such a move could jeopardize bilateral relations.
As Amberin Zaman explained in “Turkey and the United States Under Barack Obama: Yes They Can,” indeed the only reason for such animosity was the president-elect’s open support for a genocide resolution. U.S. Senator and now Vice President-Elect Joe Biden’s record on Cyprus and the Armenian genocide resolution, as well as hisKurdophile views (his partiality for a highly autonomous if not independent Kurdistan in Iraq) was also duly noted.
Such a degree of insularity or self-centeredness cannot be very healthy for a country that wishes to play and will be asked to play an important role in regional affairs during the Obama presidency. On the one hand, Turkey and Turks from all walks of life desire to be taken seriously, take pride in their country’s recent performance as a mediator in regional conflicts, and support a more activist foreign policy. On the other hand, there is very little tolerance for acts or policies on the part of Turkey’s allies and friends that may not entirely satisfy Turks’ expectations. This intolerance is particularly accentuated on the issue of the Armenian genocide resolution and the fight against the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) when it comes to the United States.
Many Turks shared the world’s enthusiasm for the election results but this did not stop others from questioning either the authenticity of the president-elect’s image and views, or to doubt that he would make a difference. Some welcomed the change that the Obama administration promised to bring in both the domestic and foreign policies of the United States. They welcomed the possibility of a more cooperative approach to world politics on the part of the new U.S. administration. They also believed that the symbolism of the election for American democracy would help re-kindle the drive for democracy throughout the world that had been discredited under the Bush administration. In short, their logic was that a development that would be good for the world could not be bad for Turkey.
Those who rejoiced in the presidential victory of Barack Obama expect him to hold Turkey to higher standards on human rights, democracy, and rule of law. Precisely for this same reason, others are uncomfortable and would have preferred a Republican administration that would just pay lip service to such issues and shape its relations with Turkey on the basis of strategic and security concerns. Such a U.S. administration would have little to say about the ongoing hardening of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government’s policy vis-a-vis the Kurds, and its blatant disregard for freedom of expression and of the press. It would not raise the flag on rising police brutality and torture, and would not put undue pressure on the government to revitalize the moribund EU accession process.
No matter which way the Obama administration goes, there is no doubt that a new page will be turned in Turkish-American relations. These relations went through a turbulent period under U.S. President George W. Bush and have only begun to recuperate following the November 5, 2007 meeting between President Bush and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The U.S. president’s decision to provide the Turkish Armed Forces with actionable intelligence about the PKK went a long way in both improving the American image in the country and in re-establishing trust between institutions.
I argued in an earlier analysis piece that both the government and the armed forces were ready and willing to improve relations. On the American side there is recognition that Turkey’s cooperation will be necessary for almost all the thorny issues that the new U.S. administration will tackle, from Iraq to Afghanistan to the Caucasus. The two sides have a clear common interest in coordinating efforts for energy security and for stabilizing the Caucasus.
With such a loaded agenda, the United States and Turkey will need to understand one another’s motives, concerns, and perspectives clearly. Redefining the common interests of Turkey and the United States—a task that was due immediately after the end of the Cold War but was not undertaken—is a necessary step. In the wake of the Iraq war and the many failures of the Bush administration in its policies toward the Middle East, Turkey cannot be expected to put America’s global interests over its own regional interests.
Over the course of the past decade, Turkey’s policy toward the region has taken a new direction in reflecting political imagination for the region. Favoring diplomatic engagement, egalitarian relations, and regional initiatives, this latest political approach began to take shape at the end of the 1990s but found its full manifestation under the AKP government.
Turkey’s much-appreciated mediation between Syria and Israel, the opening to Armenia, and the desire to play a constructive role between Iran and the United States all stem from this approach.
Based on the president-elect’s preferences for diplomacy over confrontation, there should be plenty of room for the two allies to cooperate. Indeed, in Iraq when troop withdrawal begins, Turkey will be asked to be of assistance.In Afghanistan, if a negotiated truce is reached that will include the Taliban, Turkey’s historical ties with that country and with Pakistan for that matter might come in handy for the arduous process of nation-building that is the only guarantor of peace and stability in the long-run.
However, it is also imperative that in this new period the mechanics of the relationship change as well. Rather than asking Turkey to cooperate with the United States on policies singularly decided upon in Washington, an effort should be made to devise policies in a more collaborative fashion. Turkey’s myriad connections in Russia and Iran ought to be taken into consideration before Ankara is asked to participate in policies that might harm its vital interests.
Turkish officials and the public in general will look for American support for fair resolution of the Cyprus conflict and for more committed American assistance in fighting the PKK in northern Iraq. Begrudgingly but steadily, Turkey has taken steps to recognize the political reality of the Kurdistan regional government. The chances are high that relations between Ankara and Erbil, the Kurdish regional capital, will not have to go through Baghdad in the near future. However, there are two preconditions for such a development. The first is the isolation, weakening, and elimination of the PKK in northern Iraq. The second is the continuation of the special status of Kirkuk, keeping that city out of sole Kurdish control.
Geopolitical realities seem to have once more elevated Turkey’s importance in American foreign policy decisions. In the past, Turkey’s strategic importance and America’s reliance on it had an inverse relation to the deepening of Turkish democracy. In other words, during the Cold War Turkey’s democratic deficits were not of much concern for Washington. Today, the stability of Turkey necessitates that the country maintain its democratic orientation and that all its political actors (the military, the judiciary, and all its political parties) commit themselves to this goal. One of the major tests of the Obama administration in its relations with Turkey may very well be whether it will treat Turkish democracy as a fundamental good or an expendable one.
If Washington continues to rigorously support Turkey’s EU accession process and insists forcefully that Ankara show the same enthusiasm as it did between 2002 and 2004, it will have passed the test.
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Soli Ozel, Lecturer, Bilgi University; Columnist, Sabah Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of International Relations and Political Science. He is a columnist for the national daily Sabah and is senior advisor to the chairman of the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association. Additionally, he is the editor of TUSIAD’s magazine Private View.
The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).
About GMF The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between North America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes, and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany, on the 25th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.