Tag: Turkey’s Axis

  • Turkey: East, West Or Erdogan? – OpEd

    Turkey: East, West Or Erdogan? – OpEd

    The complex dynamics of Turkey’s geographical position and cultural uniqueness have always defied easy explanation. But in the decade since Tayip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) were first elected, change within Turkey and between Turkey and the world has erupted in a number of different directions. Consequently, the word “enigmatic” is perhaps the best way to describe Turkey’s foreign policy over the past ten years.

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    By Dr. Anthony Rusonik

    Turkish society has shown conflicting signs of drift towards East and West under Ergodan’s rule. On one hand, we witness continued restrictions on press freedoms, trumped-up charges against rivals in the secular defense establishment, and a slow but deliberate injection of political Islam into the primary educational system. On the other, there is the 2010 Constitutional package that elevated an independent judiciary, encouraged freedom of association, and was designed to promote Turkey’s EU bid, albeit without success. One day Erdogan makes a personal apology to the Kurds for historic wrongs, the next day the Turkish army increases operations against the PKK in Northern Iraq, and Erdogan bristles at French and American recognition of the Armenian genocide.

    Given these apparent contradictions, two common themes emerge in a survey of the literature that attempts to explain Turkish behaviour, as evidenced in a December 2010 episode of TV Ontario’s “The Agenda”. One school, led by scholars such as Daniel Pipes, considers that Turkey has gone “rogue”, shifted to Iran and is now bent on the destruction of the secular republic founded in 1923 by Kamal Ataturk. Pipes argues that Turkey can no longer be trusted by NATO and should be expelled from the alliance. The other school of thought represented by Janice Stein of U of T, maintains that Turkey’s “swings” are natural and manageable bumps on the road of a journey towards modernization, democratization, and constitutionalism. New forces unleashed vie for influence in a spirited pluralism.

    A third school of thought – less credible in traditional Realist frameworks of analysis but nonetheless evident in observation of Erdogan and the pendulum that is now Turkish foreign policy – is that Turkey is more and more Mr. Erdogan’s country. Its fluctuations reflect the Prime Minister’s ego and mercurial temperament more than is allowed in “serious” analytical frameworks. In particular, Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman ambitions are merged with personal character traits where pride and honour sometimes overcome traditional state interests. In short, Mr. Erdogan bristles when he feels slighted, basks in the glory of praise, and this seems to affect his policy decisions.

    Since neither Stein nor Pipes’ approaches can explain past behavior nor predict current outcomes with confidence, a framework based on leadership psychology deserves closer examination.

    The Economist first offered this explanation in its assessment of Turkish-Syrian relations. Puzzled as to why Ankara demonstrated such patience for Bashar Assad’s crackdown and the resultant destabilization of Turkey’s southern border, The Economist concluded that the irreparable break between Erdogan and Assad didn’t occur until the former had the belated revelation that the latter chose not to heed his advice. It wasn’t Assad’s repression per se that produced a fit of pique in Erdogan and his barb that “Assad would end up like Qaddafi.” No, it was Assad’s apparent refusal to heed Erdogan’s personal advice to reform that led to Erdogan’s contempt for his former friend. Still, most in Syrian opposition see more bluster than action in Erdogan. Apart from support for Syrian refugees, Turkey has not acted against the Assad regime. Erdogan’s “zero problems” policy is in tatters and the moment for Turkey to assume leadership of the Arab Spring seems lost.

    The same kind of personal reaction is evident in Turkey’s drift towards Iran after Ankara’s political liberalization and economic reforms failed to impress Germany and France. Former French President Sarkozy dismissed Turkey’s EU bid in no uncertain terms with “I do not think that Turkey has a place in Europe.” In a bid to spite the Europeans, Erdogan turned East despite Tehran’s support for Assad, despite competition with Iran for influence in the Arab world, and despite discomfort with Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Unless and until, Erdogan declared, Western sanctions against Iran win UN endorsement and Israel’s nuclear program is also investigated, Turkey will continue to import Iranian oil. It appears a snubbed Erdogan has overplayed his hand, such that the Iranians tested his patience and forced him to prevent Iranian aircraft loaded with arms for Assad to overfly Turkish territory. It seems that Erdogan might have traded his last chance at EU membership for an alliance with Iran that may risk key Turkish interests.

    The role of insult or perceived insult also deserves full investigation in the demise of Turkish-Israeli relations. Here, neither Pipes nor Stein can explain the Ankara-Jerusalem whirlwind without some of the puzzle pieces force-fit to their theories. Pipes maintains Erdogan’s break with Israel was an orchestrated and calculated policy that needed a pretext –The 2009 Gaza Flotilla– to launch a neo-Ottoman bid for Turkish resurgence in the Arab World. Pipes casts Erdogan in the provocative and reckless tradition of Gamal Nasser and Saddam Hussein, where the aspiring Muslim leader taunts Israel to win the Arab street, grows bolder with apparent success, then pays the price. If there is some truth to this assertion, it is still at odds with the image of Erdogan calling Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu with an offer –insistence—to send Turkish water bombers to help the Israelis fight forest fires, or the acceptance of Israeli humanitarian aid for Turkish earthquake victims.

    On the other hand, Stein’s view of the tattered relationship as a natural re-balancing after a decade of close defense ties that have elevated Turkey’s military too high in domestic politics and rendered Turkey’s prestige too low in the Arab world doesn’t quite capture the dynamic of demise either. It fails to explain why Erdogan cannot muster more than rhetoric against Assad now because he cannot – or will not – reach out to Jerusalem to ensure its intentions and support – quiet or otherwise – should Turkey act against Damascus. His rhetorical threats to send another Flotilla with Turkish naval escort, or to challenge Israel and Cyprus over their massive natural gas finds in the Mediterranean, seem muted and frustrated. A diplomatic channel with Jerusalem, Erdogan must know, would allow him to negotiate Turkey’s economic claims to the undersea riches.

    If Erdogan’s break with Israel is only partly explained by his half-hearted Nasserite ambitions and as a measure to curb Turkey’s military, then the lion’s share of the answer is indeed the fact that Erdogan considers that Israel is too proud, too stubborn, and has slighted Tayip Erdogan once too often.

    Well before the Flotilla incident and Erdogan’s steadfast determination to extract an apology from Israel as a condition to restore a degree of warmth to the relationship, Erdogan perceived a series of insults from Israel.

    The first fissures in the relationship formed in January 2009 at Davos, where Erdogan assailed Israeli President Shimon Peres over the Gaza War. The tone of Erdogan’s attack at first appears to support Pipes’ position that Turkey calculated the break and used the Gaza war to launch a neo-Ottoman drive. The undercurrents, however, are of greater interest. First, the “last straw” from Erdogan in the debate wasn’t Peres per se, but the fact that the moderators allowed him less time to speak than Peres had. That’s what enraged Erdogan. Second, although he could not say it at the time, Erdogan was furious that the Gaza operation was planned and occurred while he had invested his personal energies and reputation in secret Israeli-Syrian negotiations The fact that had such diplomacy succeeded Erdogan would look a fool in hindsight now as Assad’s crackdown is unabated is both ironic and irrelevant. What counts is that Erdogan felt burned, and he never forgot it.

    The sense of humiliation reached a new level a year later as the Israel summoned the Turkish ambassador over an anti-Israeli television broadcast in Turkey. To emphasize their displeasure, the Israelis declined to shake hands or display the Turkish flag, and they arranged to seat the Turkish ambassador in a lower position.

    Erdogan bristled. Ankara called for Israel “to abide by diplomatic courtesy and respect.” The statement was less critical of the Israeli policy per se than in the way Turkey perceived Israel handled the differences.

    In hindsight, then, it seems little wonder Erdogan attempted to restore Turkish pride and protest Israeli policy with his refusal of Israeli requests to curb the Gaza Flotilla in 2010. Erdogan maintained that the Flotilla was a popular expression of support for the Palestinians, and that the state would not interfere with that. In yet another irony, and regardless of where one casts blame in the incident, Erdogan’s immediate demand beyond an end to the blockade was for an apology and compensation – from the state of Israel to the Turkish state. This was no longer a private matter for Erdogan, but a national interest and a personal mission.

    Lost in the aftermath of the incident was the fact that Turkey was a quiet advocate for the release of GIlad Shalit and secret Hamas-Israel talks, such that Turkey’ prestige as a power-broker was restored. The fact that the Israelis remained distrustful and preferred the now-deposed Mubarak regime in Egypt to mediate is immaterial.

    No, the relationship did not hit rock bottom until the UN Palmer report concluded that Israel’s blockade was legal and, further, that Israeli commandos had a right to defend themselves when they encountered resistance on the Ravi Mamara. Stunned and enraged that he was contradicted by the UN, Erdogan denounced the report that he had insisted upon and awaited with uncharacteristic patience. Defiant, Erdogan reiterated his insistence on an Israeli apology and cancelled all residual military deals with Israel.

    Israel has offered regret and humanitarian compensation, but refuses a formal diplomatic apology for legal reasons. The standoff continues, at considerable cost to both Ankara and Jerusalem. Israel is again excluded from NATO exercises at Erdogan’s insistence. Erdogan’s pride may be intact as a result, but his Syrian and Cypriot headaches would ease if he could swallow a bitter bill. Israel has made it national policy not to engage in a rhetorical war with Turkey or to prod at Erdogan’s wounds, but the American recognition of Armenian genocide- even as Israel withheld its own recognition- is a reminder that Jerusalem‘s isolation does not render it without means.

    Warranted or not, and irrespective of one’s own biases, one must conclude that an Israeli apology could have far more impact on relations with Turkey than conventional analysis considers possible.

    Turkey under Erdogan is neither a rogue in Eastern drift towards Iran nor a model for Westernized democratic Islam. Rather. Turkey under Erdogan is, well, Turkey under Erdogan.

    Dr. Anthony Rusonik is a contributor to Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

  • A decision for Turkey

    A decision for Turkey

    By Boston Herald Editorial Staff

    The turmoil that continues to roil the Middle East could eventually determine whether Turkey falls to extreme Islamist rule.

    The government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been described as moderate Islamist, but friends of Israel are not so sure. From the former era of cooperation, Turkey-Israel relations have sunk to ice-cold in the wake of Turkey’s support for the misbegotten Gaza aid flotilla of 2010 and Turkey’s current cooperation with the terrorist organization Hamas in building a hospital in Gaza. Turkey has admitted providing some funds to Hamas.

    Yet Erdogan reportedly has good telephone relations with President Barack Obama, and Turkey, a member of NATO, has lent important support to the anti-government rebels in Syria.

    Syria, listed by the U.S. State Department as a supporter of terrorism since 1979, has housed the headquarters of Hamas for years.

    But Hamas leader Khaled Meshaai now has decided to move himself out of Damascus.

    Hamas has even stopped denying that it’s looking for a new headquarters. Meshaai recently visited King Abdullah of Jordan; both said a move to Jordan was not contemplated.

    The question came up in Turkey. Turkish President Abdulla Gul issued one of those “neither confirm nor deny” statements, which means the question is open.

    If Hamas gave up terrorism, the headquarters location wouldn’t matter. Otherwise, a move to Turkey — which over the years has lost nearly 40,000 citizens to terrorism — would, according to Yusuf Tayyip, a writer for the Hurriyet Daily News, put Turkey “in far deeper difficulties than we could ever imagine.”

    Exactly right.

    It would be hard for Turkey to stay in NATO.

    At a minimum, it would mean the end of all anti-terrorism assistance from the United States and other countries. And it would confirm Turkey’s course toward extremism.

    via A decision for Turkey – BostonHerald.com.

  • Op-chart: Turkey’s changing world

    Op-chart: Turkey’s changing world

    Op-chart: Turkey’s changing world

    Editor’s Note: Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Hale Arifagaoglu is a research assistant at the Institute. Bilge Menekse is a former research intern at the Institute.

    By Soner Cagaptay, Hale Arifagaoglu and Bilge Menekse – Special to CNN

    turkey tradeOver the course of the 20th Century, Turkey’s world became increasingly Eurocentric. The country joined European and broader Western institutions, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), while also moving to become a member to the European Union (EU).

    Today, however, the country’s single-minded European trajectory appears to be a thing of the past. Turkey, which has experienced phenomenal economic growth in the past decade, no longer feels content to subsume itself under Europe.

    Since 2002, the Turkish economy has more than doubled in size, reaching a magnitude of $1.1 trillion. Gone is the Turkey of yesteryear, a poor country begging to get into the EU.

    Enter the new Turkey: A country that feels confident, booming as the world around it suffers from economic meltdown. In the third quarter of 2011, the Turkish economy grew by a record 8.2%, outpacing not only the county’s neighbors, but also all of Europe.

    Europe’s economic doldrums coupled with Turkey’s new trans-European vision under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government means that the country’s traditional commercial bonds with Europe are eroding while its trade links with the non-European world flourish. Accordingly, the Turks are increasingly trading with the non-OECD world (see the chart above).

    Paralleling this trend, Ankara has pursued a foreign policy that transcends Turkey’s old European focus.

    The AKP’s vision of reaching beyond Europe politically is now Turkey’s vision as well. The following graph shows the number of new diplomatic missions Turkey has opened up since the AKP came to power in 2002:

    turkey diplomatic

    Source: Turkish Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs official website ). OIC stands for Organization of Islamic Conference.

    If Turkey is no longer trying to fit into Europe, then what is it doing? The best way to describe the new Turkey is as a “Eurasian China” – a country that is aggressively trading with the entire world while building connections to distant destinations. The next graph compares direct destinations served from Istanbul by the country’s flagship carrier, Turkish Airlines, in 1999 and 2010:

    turkey airlines

    Source: Turkish Airlines official website ). MENA stands for the Middle East and North Africa. CIS stands for the Commonwealth of Independent States, including Russia and former Soviet states.

    Is the “Eurasian China” model sustainable? This requires the Turkish economy to keep humming along and the country’s politics to remain relatively stable.

    There is a foreign policy angle at work here: Turkey is relatively stable at a time when the region is in upheaval. This, in turn, attracts investment from less-stable neighbors like Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Investors are looking for a stable economy. Ultimately, political stability and regional clout are Turkey’s hard cash. Its economic growth and ability to rise as a “Eurasian China” will depend on both.

    The views expressed in this article are solely those of Soner Cagaptay, Hale Arifagaoglu and Bilge Menekse.

    via Op-chart: Turkey’s changing world – Global Public Square – CNN.com Blogs.

  • Opera, genre loved by Ataturk, grows in popularity

    Opera, genre loved by Ataturk, grows in popularity

    Turkey: Opera, genre loved by Ataturk, grows in popularity

    Country a big fan of musical genre despite shift towards Islam

    17 January, 15:46

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    Ali Baba and the 40 Thieves, on stage in Turkey Ali Baba and the 40 Thieves, on stage in Turkey

    (ANSA) – ANKARA – A Western style of music is having success in the capital of Turkey, which has an Islamic majority and is moving away from the foundations that were laid by Ataturk: opera. Opera theatres are often sold out and ticket sales have increased. This trend was revealed by the Ankara State Opera and Ballet (ADOB), which underlines that the occupancy of theatres increased by 6% in the first half of this season (2011/12), when 36 thousand people saw a total of 68 highly appreciated performances. The season was opened by the ballet ”The Hunchback of Notre dame” and continued with the Turkish opera ”Ali Baba and the 40 thieves,” said ADOB chairman Erdogan Davran. Davran added that a ”Tosca” premiere was also on the programme (directed by Alessandro Cedrone and lighting by Stefano Pirandello).

    Opera in Turkey owes its success to the impulse it received from the founder of the modern country, Kemal Ataturk. Ataturk in fact loved this genre, despite the fact that he had opened the country to all Western arts in the fields of painting, sculpture, literature, music, ballet and theatre. He wanted to use culture to tie relations to the Western countries that had used Turkey as eastern bulwark against the Soviet Union for decades. After the fall of the Wall in 1989 and the start of the era of the moderate Islamic Premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2003, Turkey started to reposition itself: from NATO guardian to a regional power that wants to become a model for the entire Middle East and North African area. Turkey’s shift towards the Islamic world under the umbrella of a secular political constitution does not appear to have corroded the success of opera, at least according to the figures on this season in Ankara. ”All our shows are sold out,” Davran told the Turkish Anadolu agency. Usually there are fewer visitors in October due to the opening of the schools, but this year was different: even that month all performances were sold out. The theatre schedule included 23 performances every 30 days, without counting touring shows. Despite this summer’s restoration works that made 100 seats unavailable, we have received 4,500 more spectators in the first part of the season and tickets for the 600 available seats are sold out ”on the same day sales are opened on the internet,” the ADOB director underlined. The theatre, which includes soloists, a chorus, an orchestra, a ballet and modern dance ensemble, also increased the number of performances, now at its maximum due to logistical and organisational limits. With an eye on the future, more shows for children will be scheduled: the first will start in the second half of the season, added Davran, stressing that premieres of opera, ballet and modern dance performances are on the programme. (ANSAmed).

  • Turkey turns away from Europe

    Turkey turns away from Europe

    By Philip Terzian

    Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses his party members at the parliament in Ankara, Turkey, Tuesday, Nov. 22, 2011. (Anonymous)

    (The Weekly Standard)

    One way to gauge the present state of European unity is to know that Turkey, which has energetically sought membership in the European Union for the past decade, is now having second thoughts about the enterprise. According to the German Marshall Fund, in 2004, three-quarters of Turks thought EU membership was a good idea; last year, that percentage had dropped to little more than a third. A recent story in the New York Times featured a pointed question from a prominent supporter of the Erdogan government in Ankara: “The EU has absolutely no influence over Turkey, and most Turks are asking themselves, ‘Why should we be part of such a mess?’ ” The reasons this has come to pass tell us as much about Europe, and its faltering quest for economic and political unity, as about Turkey.

     

    It is not difficult to comprehend why and how the notion of Turkish membership was ever seriously contemplated. The EU itself is the culmination of several decades’ worth of wishful thinking: that the experience of two devastating wars had persuaded Europeans to set aside national differences in a common, transnational cause; and that the cause had persuaded postwar Europeans to surrender their currencies (and, to some degree, national sovereignty) in favor of a common monetary zone and limited authority in Brussels.

    Now we know how that turned out. As long ago as 1914 socialists were surprised to discover that working-class Europeans tended to think of themselves as Frenchmen and Germans and Italians, not Europeans, when hostilities broke out. And while Europeans, for differing reasons, might have welcomed the creation of the eurozone–Germans as a means of ratifying economic dominance, Greeks for the opportunity to hitch their wagon to the stars–they have since learned the familiar lesson that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Public opinion in Germany is becoming impatient with the idea of bailing out the EU’s less provident members, and public opinion in Greece is similarly impatient with austerity dictated from Berlin.

    Turkish membership in the EU depends, to a large degree, on a comparable suspension of disbelief. Turkey is a huge country located predominantly in Asia minor, populated overwhelmingly by Muslims, and ruled by a broadly successful Islamist government. It is difficult to guess how much the average Irishman or Belgian feels in common with a nation that borders on Iraq, but it is not so difficult to gauge public sentiment in Cork or Antwerp about open borders and employment for tens of millions of workers who face Mecca to pray.

    The problem, of course, is that public opinion–or put another way, democracy–has never been critical to the European enterprise. The political leadership of Europe welcomed the prospect of Turkish membership in the EU for the same reason past Turkish governments sought admission. The military alliance between Turkey and the West–NATO–gave something to both sides: It kept Turkey, caught historically between East and West, in the Western camp during the Cold War; and it offered Turkey’s growing economy and Westernized elites increasing access to European markets.

    Now all that is turned on its head. The strategic rationale for Turkish membership in NATO hasn’t existed since the fall of the Soviet Union, and between the Arab Spring and the growth of Islamist sentiment in the Muslim world, the Erdogan government sees its opportunities to wield influence in the East, not the West. Nor is there much evidence that Turkey has felt obliged to commit to the sort of comprehensive internal reforms required for EU membership. Although Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has succeeded in clipping the wings of the higher command, Turkey remains a democracy at the sufferance of its army. And while some improvements have been made in the realm of human rights, neither the Kurdish minority nor the 64 journalists currently imprisoned for insulting Turkishness would argue that it has been enough.

    Then there is the Republic of Cyprus, a European Union member situated off Turkey’s southern coast. The northern third of the island has been under Turkish military occupation since 1974, and Turkey remains not only hostile to the prospect of withdrawal and reunification–its puppet state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, is recognized by no other country–but increasingly, even violently, hostile to Cyprus itself. Turkey has threatened military action against Israeli and Cypriot proposals to drill for oil in the eastern Mediterranean, far from Turkey’s territorial waters, and plans to boycott discussions with the EU next year when Cyprus assumes its rotating presidency.

    Suffice it to say that the EU constitution does not permit membership for a state whose army (illegally) occupies a large chunk of territory in a member-state.

    In one sense, it would seem that Turkey’s estrangement from the EU was inevitable: The European Union is in the midst of an existential, as well as financial, crisis, and there is no telling how it will end. The fractured alliance is not likely ever to resemble the Europe that Turkey applied to join in 1987. The Turks can hardly be blamed for expressing reservations. In a larger sense, however, this is more bad news about a crossroads power that has, in the past, been useful to American interests. Turkey’s gathering sense of itself as the supreme Muslim power in the region appeals to the “reset” mentality in the White House–Erdogan says things about Israel in public that President Obama must think privately–and reduces European influence in the Middle East.

    Neither of these developments can be welcome. Turkey’s tiny Christian neighbor Armenia, for example, which harbors unhappy memories of Ottoman misrule, and is subject to economic and diplomatic blockade, has lost the prospect of European Union membership as a moderating influence on Ankara. And any Turkish government that turns resolutely away from Europe, and plays to the Islamist gallery, is by any measure bad news for Washington and the long-term objectives of American policy.

  • Lessons from Turkey’s new ‘soft power’

    Lessons from Turkey’s new ‘soft power’

    While Nato was bombing its way to the Libyan oilfields, Turkey has been using “soft power” to assert its new-found foreign policy. Denied full membership of the European Union, largely by Germany and France, on flimsy grounds of “culture and identity”, Ankara’s foreign policy is increasingly drifting away from a Western orientation towards being Eastern-orientated, moving from the Global North to the Global South.

    300Although Turkey’s economic and political culture is deeply integrated into Europe, it has aggressively carved a diplomatic niche in the Iranian nuclear-enrichment crisis, Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and recently the Arab Spring. The global financial crisis has affected Turkish traditional markets in Europe and the United States, so it seeks to explore untapped markets in the Middle East and Africa.

    In Turkey’s calculations, South Africa is viewed as a strategic partner, particularly at this critical juncture in its attempt to develop an Africa agenda. It is within this context that the unusual state visit to South Africa by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan earlier this month, must be understood.

    The two countries share similar global outlooks on many matters affecting global governance. South Africa’s eyes are rightly fixed on the Brics, yet cultivating strong ties with countries such as Turkey should be a foreign-policy priority.

    Turkey appears to be aware of its strategic objective in pursuing relations with South Africa. Does Pretoria have a strategy on Turkey? Can South Africa gain or lose in foreign-policy calculus by being closer to Ankara?

    In the diplomatic arena, Pretoria’s stance on the urgent need to transform the economic and political institutions of global governance is largely shared by Ankara. Thus, the United Nations Security Council, the World Bank and International Montary Fund (IMF) should be democratic and truly representative of all regions of the world. South Africa and Turkey are both members of the G20, and have been working closely to reshape the global economic order into one that is more representative of emerging markets and the developing world.

    As it stands, Turkey’s chances of being the next Brics member are very good. In 2003, Pretoria and Ankara both vehemently opposed the unlawful American invasion of Iraq. Turkey sacrificed its strategic relations with Washington by refusing the use of its territory as a launchpad in the US’s disastrous war against Iraq under Saddam Hussein.

    Support for Palestine
    South Africa and Turkey support the Palestinian yearning for statehood and have repeatedly condemned the use of violence by both sides. Addressing the Arab League, Erdogan noted that recognition of a Palestinian state is “not an option but an obligation”. On many occasions Erdogan has offered a vocal critique of Israeli actions: in Gaza, on the Mavi Marmara incident, and elsewhere.

    Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said: “Israel is out of touch with the region and unable to perceive the changes taking place, which makes it impossible for the country to have healthy relations with its neighbors.”

    Both South Africa and Turkey are opposed to nuclear proliferation but support the right of countries to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. The two countries’ view of Iran’s dispute with Western countries, led by the US, over the enrichment of uranium, is a good example. They both seek a peaceful resolution to the Iranian nuclear-enrichment crisis. Given its geographical proximity to the Middle East, Turkey plays a greater leadership role in this than South Africa.

    Yet tight diplomatic relations between Pretoria and Ankara will strengthen South Africa’s Middle East policy. South Africa is seen as a champion in peaceful negotiation, the mediation of political conflicts and peacekeeping, as well as post-conflict reconstruction and development. Turkey might want to learn from South Africa how to resolve conflicts in its neighborhood (it has a territorial dispute with Cyprus).

    The Arab Spring has, unexpectedly, benefited Ankara more than Nato. Egypt’s future leadership in the Middle East region has been weakened by uncertainty about its political stability. On his recent state visit to post-Mubarak Egypt, Erdogan sold the Turkish model of democracy, saying: “Do not be wary of secularism. I hope there will be a secular state in Egypt.”

    The major point he made was that “secularism is compatible with Islam”. This view appears to be welcome in Libya. The head of the Transitional National Council (TNC), Mustafa Abdel Jailil, said: “We will not accept any extremist ideology, on the right or the left. We are a Muslim people, for a moderate Islam.”

    South Africa could use Erdogan’s growing influence to reach out to the new players in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt to achieve peace and security, in line with its African agenda. More importantly, Turkey’s expanding economy requires Africa’s energy and markets.

    Development and finance
    The country is renowned in the spheres of infrastructure development and development finance. It should not only be the South African government that is thinking seriously about Turkey, but business, labour and civil society as well.

    Like Turkey, South Africa must balance its diplomatic relations with both developed and developing countries. Universities in South Africa and Turkey can share and exchange knowledge in numerous academic fields. While Turkey can teach the world how to balance secularism and Islam on the doorstep of Europe, South Africa remains a beacon of hope as it strives to be multi-religious and multiracial.

    Although South Africa is battling to close the widening inequality gaps between racial, gender and other groups, it has made huge strides in just two decades on deep structural and historical divisions.

    Turkey’s experience has lessons for South Africa and the region in a number of development areas, but South Africa’s experience in advancing a non-sectarian democratic order and in accommodating minorities, both non-African and African, may offer Turkey some lessons too.

    David Monyae is an independent international-relations expert

    Lessons from Turkey’s new ‘soft power’