Tag: Turkey – EU

Egemen Bagis: Turkey and the EU Have a Common Future
Adelina Marini, Sofia

It is probably different when you have a friend in the EU institutions. Of course, it is important what that friendship is based upon and also whether there are expectations this friendship to deliver something specific. This is what I was thinking while I listened to the brief press conference of the Turkish chief EU negotiator, Egemen Bagis, and the new president of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz. I relied on that news conference very much, because there were only photos and video footage from the other meetings of Bagis in Brussels. After all, Turkey is a strategically important partner of the EU, the oldest candidate for a full membership and at the moment a very influential player in the Middle East.

A little context

While I was waiting for that press conference to start, I had a few questions wandering in my mind. Without enlisting them in order of significance, the first that came across was related to an announcement I saw on Twitter yesterday (Feb 7), that against the backdrop of the expectations the Greek coalition government to finalise the text of an agreement with its creditors and the troika, Turkey had stopped the gas deliveries for Greece. The news is especially stressful because it is a signal that maybe Greece is no longer capable of paying even for its gas deliveries, which means that it is practically bankrupt. Besides, stopping the deliveries is happening at a time of one of the severest winters in Europe in general for decades. So, this question was important to be addressed – what were the reasons for halting deliveries, could the EU do something, etc. According to reports in the Turkish NTV, there were technical problems that caused the stop of gas deliveries from Azerbaijan to Turkey and Iran.

The second question, of course, was related to Turkey’s accession process, which has been practically stalled since 2010 when during the Spanish Presidency of the Council was the last time when a chapter in the negotiations was opened. Since then, the meetings with Turkish representatives have been growing more and more uncomfortable for the EU and reveal the growing self-confidence of Turkey as a self-reliant regional power, which no longer needs the EU but which the Union needs more and more.

Naturally, the third issue was the Syria situation, against the backdrop of the Russian and then Chinese veto on a resolution in the UN Security Council, that caused a wave of disappointment and even bewilderment.

Syria

The news conference started with pointing out the friendly relations between Egemen Bagis and Martin Schulz, the purpose of which remained unclear. The European Parliament chief outlined as an especially important topic of his discussions with Bagis precisely Syria. “We, as Europeans, have to be very grateful to the position Turkey chose regarding Syria”, he said, having in mind the support Turkey stated for the pro-democratic protests in the country, violently crushed by Bashar Assad’s regime. And Mr Bagis for his part underlined that this was the right position, because innocent people were killed. It is time the international community to work to convince the Syrian leadership to implement the necessary reforms so that all in Syria live in prosperity and freedom, he added.

The international community is at the moment with tied hands. The US has closed its embassy in Damascus, followed by several European countries. The only connection with Bashar al-Assad’s government is being maintained by Russia. On February 7th, Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, visited the country. A fact, which is obviously not to Turkey’s liking. On Saturday, Turkish Foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu said at the annual security conference in Munich that there was a great danger nuclei of confrontation to be created in the region. “We do not want the Cold War logic in our system”, he said and called the Cold War structures in the region to be transformed.

The role Turkey is playing in the region was an occasion Martin Schulz to say that, because of Syria, Turkey had again proven how important it was as a strategic partner of the EU “today and in the future”.

Armenia

What caused my perplexity was Schulz’s reaction to a question of a journalist, regarding an ongoing preliminary investigation in Switzerland, related to a remark Egemen Bagis made regarding the events of 1915, which Turkey denies were a genocide against the Armenian people. For unclear reasons this question evoked laughter with the European Parliament chief, who in the same time refused to comment on preliminary investigations. While Egemen Bagis was answering that question however, Martin Schulz continued to laugh, finding it hard to repress.

The Turkish minister recalled that his country was ready to confront its history and to create a committee of international experts on the Armenian question and reminded about the letter of Premier Erdogan to the government of Armenia in 2005, in which he says that he is ready to confront his history and asks whether Armenia is ready to do the same. In fact, Mr Schulz did not leave the topic without a comment, saying that he wanted to make a recommendation in his capacity of a German and especially of a German president of a multinational European institution, who has to confront his country’s past everyday. “The demons of our past haunt us even today and every day I face my country’s past. Our generation is not guilty for crimes committed in the past but it is responsible to ensure that they do not repeat”.

Turkey and the EU

Was it for the friendly relations with Egemen Bagis or for his personal convictions, but Martin Schulz called on the European Union to stick to its promises for Turkey and its membership to the EU. He recognised that this was a long and difficult way but that was a promise the EU made for Turkey. Schulz explained that both discussed the term “European perspective” which, in his words, was often used for candidate countries. In fact this term is used especially frequently for countries the membership of which seems too distant, like for example the Western Balkan nations. According to Schulz, the European Perspective is a geographic game. This term means to stick to the commitments Turkey to become a member of the EU. For his part Egemen Bagis explained that the European perspective meant that it was time “together to look into the problems, not only because we have common past and heritage but a common future”.

Cyprus

With his words the Turkish minister for European affairs confirmed Turkey’s pledge to ignore the EU Council Presidency of Cyprus, which starts on July 1, unless a solution is found by then to the Cyprus question. He announced that he and the president of the European Parliament had committed to assist the presidents of the two communities – the Turkish and the Greek – to shake hands in agreement before July, “so that this does not turn into an issue but into a solution and an opportunity for the EU-Turkey relations”.

For now it is not clear how Bagis’s meeting with EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fule went by but the video footage reveals very warm relations. As euinside wrote many times, for long it has been high time a brand new conversation between the EU and Turkey to take place on what the relations between them should be, especially against the background of the really impressing role the country is playing in the Middle East in a moment when Europe has its throat squeezed by severe fiscal and economic troubles. To which, by the way, Turkey also proposes a solution, articulated again by Egemen Bagis – remove the visas and thus you will boost your economy. Turkey is the only EU candidate country which is still under a visa regime with the EU.
- Egemen Bagis: Turkey and the EU Have a Common Future
February 9, 2012
Meeting the Geopolitical Challenges of the Arab Spring: A Call for a joint EU-Turkish Agenda

Meeting the Geopolitical Challenges of the Arab Spring: A Call for a joint EU-Turkish Agenda

by Günter Verheugen

This policy brief discusses the potential for cooperation between Turkey and the EU in the countries that are going through political transformation in the Middle East and North Africa. Since both sides have a vested interest in seeing stability, peace and strong economic development in this shared neighbourhood, they must work together and develop a common strategy by which to combine their strengths and advantages while offsetting their weaknesses. The brief highlights how the relationships between Turkey, the EU, and the Arab world are all fraught with difﬁ culties and tensions that prevent coordinated action between the ﬁ rst two parties. Despite these limitations, if the European Union and Turkey managed to cooperate on such a geopolitically important project, it would have an enormous additional beneﬁt: revitalizing the stalled relationship between the EU and Turkey and lending it a sense of urgency and importance.

To read the full report both in English and in French, visit:

February 3, 2012
Should Turkey join the EU? | FreshCyprus

Question by Brett E: Should Turkey join the EU?

EU foreign ministers are considering what sanctions to impose on Turkey over its failure to open its ports to trade with the Greek Cypriot government of Cyprus.

Turkey wants an embargo lifted on the breakaway Turkish Cypriot state but the European Commission has proposed freezing elements of Turkey’s membership talks.

The 25 EU member states are deeply divided over Turkish membership. Supporters say it’s strategically important to welcome this moderate Muslim nation. Opponents fear Turkey’s size, relative poverty, historical and cultural differences.

Would you like to see Turkey join the EU?

Best answer:

Answer by Hove Andrew

No

via Should Turkey join the EU? | FreshCyprus.

January 5, 2012
Turkey and the European: rethinking a multifaceted relationship

Call for Papers: Interdisciplinary Workshop “Turkey and the European: rethinking a multifaceted relationship” by Tilburg University

December 15, 2011 by Changing Turkey

Interdisciplinary Workshop

Turkey and the European: rethinking a multifaceted relationship

21 September 2012, Tilburg Law School, Tilburg University, the Netherlands

Contact and abstract submission: [email protected]

Important dates

Deadline for submission of abstracts: 5 March 2012

List of participants finalised: April 2012

Extended abstract submission: June 2012

Paper submission: August 2012

Convenors

Firat Cengiz, Tilburg University, [email protected]

Lars Hoffmann, Maastricht University, [email protected]
Background

It has been almost 50 years since the European Economic Community and Turkey signed the Ankara Association Agreement that was supposed to pave the way to full Turkish membership to today’s EU. Yet, Turkey’s candidate status for membership was approved finally in 1999 and accession negotiations started only in 2005. Moreover, soon after the negotiations faced a stalemate due to Turkey’s refusal to extend the Turkish-EU customs union to the Republic of Cyprus and the EU’s resulting refusal to negotiate accession chapters with regard to internal market. Recent policy developments imply that if Turkish accession is taken seriously, the EU needs to find new strategies to re-energise the accession talks.

Turkey’s role as a Muslim ‘leader of democracy’ renders her a natural partner to western forces to speak to the increasingly western-sceptic peoples of the Middle East, particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring. Likewise, due to its geopolitical position Turkey is seen an indispensible partner for European energy security. The EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Štefan Fühle, speaking on Turkish-EU relations, pointed out that ‘the EU has…repeatedly underlined the importance of progress in the normalisation of relations between Turkey and all European Union Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus’.

Nevertheless, there are significant reasons to doubt whether it is realistic to expect a revitalisation in Turkish-EU relations in the near future. The AKP government in Turkey is going through a confidence boost due to Turkey’s impressive economic performance as the world 17th economy and the party’s recent third consecutive election victory. Consequently, the Turkish government perceives its relationship with the EU more and more as one between equals. This perception does not sit comfortably with the regular dynamics of accession. Likewise, although the EU has been ‘a vocal and often successful advocate for democratization’ in candidate countries (Kubicek 2011), it seem to have lost its leverage over the Turkish political system as illustrated in the 2010 constitutional reform experience. Finally, a number of EU Member States, most notably Austria, France and Germany, remain sceptical of Turkish EU membership due to sociopolitical reasons and campaign for an alternative privileged association framework.

In the midst of these centripetal and centrifugal forces in Turkish-EU relations, we aim to take stock of the Turkish enlargement process and shine such-needed light on different aspects of Turkish accession. In previous accession negotiations the EU has been both ‘the main catalyst and constraining factor’ in regional integration (Bechev 2006). On this basis we aim to disentangle the Turkish-EU relations to detect what both sides can gain from accession and what reform steps have to be taken – both in Ankara and Brussels – to revitalise the Turkish accession talks.

Specific Topics and Questions (non-exclusive)

* Turkey’s regional role: is Turkey’s emerging regional leadership complementary or alternative to its half a century old objective of EU membership? Given this position, what kind of extra incentives can be offered to secure continuing Turkish commitment to EU membership?

* Benefits for the EU Member States: why should Turkish membership matter to the EU and its Member States? Given socio-political cost-benefit structures of both sides how can the sceptical EU Member States be convinced to commit to Turkish membership?

*Cyprus: the Cypriot conflict constitutes the ‘official’ reason for the stalemate in accession negotiations. Given the wide gap between the official position of Turkey in this matter vis-à-vis that of the EU, what kind of short- and medium-term strategies can be offered for the resolution of the current stalemate? Can progress be made in accession talks without the resolution of the Cypriot conflict?

*Democratic conditionality: given the current movement towards authoritarian government and governance in Turkey and despite the stalemate in accession talks, does the EU still enjoy credible leverage with regards the Turkish constitutional reform process? What kind of ‘anchor’ role – if any – can the EU perform concerning issues such as minority protection, electoral fairness, and freedom of expression?

*The Kurdish issue: after the 2011 elections disturbing events took place that increasingly threatened the resolution of the Kurdish issue through democratic methods. What kind of role – if any – can the EU institutions play in securing a return to political talks with the aim to achieve a peaceful and sustainable solution to the Kurdish conflict?

*The role of civil society: EU institutions do not directly engage with civil society in accession countries, apart from operating financial support programs, such as PHARE. Likewise, the Europeanisation literature largely rules out the effectiveness of ‘socialisation’ as a method of integration. However, in the Turkish case, where the process suffers from a lack of commitment from both sides, can civil society constitute a viable partner for the EU to achieve a sustained commitment to Turkish membership? If so, what kind of strategies can the EU institutions adopt for building such a partnership?

Workshop format

The workshop will take place on 21 September 2012. It will be a one-day

workshop with a keynote speech and three panels. We anticipate three papers per panel, as well as a chair and a discussant. We aim to foster debate among the different paper-givers throughout the day, though the workshop will be open to the public.

Output

We aim to publish papers as an edited volume and/or a special journal issue. We contacted international publishing houses and received positive initial responses. After full-length papers are submitted a definitive decision will be taken with regard to the outlet of publication.

Reimbursement policy

Funding for economy travel and accommodation costs (up to two nights in

Tilburg) of speakers may be available.

December 16, 2011
“New” Europe Meets “New” Turkey: A British Future for Ankara?

The emergence of a “new” European Union, in the wake of a sleepless and tumultuous summit held 20 years after the treaty that led to the creation of the political union and the euro currency, was met with ambivalence in Turkey. The irony of Europe’s perennial “sick man” being the most dynamic actor and economy has been widely noted at the same time as Turkey’s own aspirations for membership have waned in recent years. While analysts argue over a common framework for the phenomena sweeping the Mediterranean, commentators across the board have acknowledged that Turkey has been the unambiguous winner of the “Arab Spring” and the “European Fall.”

Since the beginning of the eurozone crisis, Turkey has offered itself as an antidote to an ailing Europe trying to gain strategic leverage to little avail. Echoing a recent refrain, “Hold on, Europe, Turkey is on its way,” Turkish leaders have had little sympathy for Europe’s problems. On the final day of the European Summit, the Turkish president, Abdullah Gül, speaking at the World Policy Conference in Vienna, said that “negligence” is to blame for the financial crisis roiling the European continent, contrasting the EU’s malaise with Turkey’s economic and political dynamism. Seen from Ankara, there is a deficit of political leadership in Europe that has resulted from the bad governance that permeates all aspects of the present crisis. Perhaps if Turkey was on the inside of the EU, it might not have such a harsh view, but its own relations with Brussels have always been complicated.

Turkey, with its combination of economic pragmatism and soft-power appeal as a Muslim-majority secular democracy, has fared much better than a depressed and divided Europe in global affairs, particularly in its own neighborhood. Shedding its former policies of disengagement in its region, Ankara has become the most active European participant over the last decade and, given its close geographic proximities to the “hotspots” of 2011, has become Europe’s most valuable partner in the region.

At a moment in which European leadership is being questioned, Turkey’s newfound swagger and emergence as an international leader should be welcomed as signs of the effectiveness of Europe’s soft-power appeal in institutionalizing and encouraging a more responsible partner in regional stability and long-term democratization. Double standards and contradictions, motivated by domestic, economic, or geopolitical interests nonetheless remain in the foreign policies of Turkey and other European countries. To the extent that Europe is defined as a set of principles and value, the very challenge with Turkey is applying these standards consistently and universally in constructing a viable partnership that is consequential, flexible, and mutually beneficial.

Now that Europe has come closer together, the question of what to do about Turkey’s eternal quest for membership will gain further traction and the example of Britain might offer an interesting opportunity for another strategically important yet Euroskeptic regional power in Ankara. Rather than seeing Turkey’s growing international role as a challenge or mere hubris, it should be taken as an opportunity to reinforce Turkey’s European credentials, which makes it a unique and flexible potential new member.

via Joshua W. Walker: “New” Europe Meets “New” Turkey: A British Future for Ankara?.

December 13, 2011
For Turkey, lure of EU is fast fading

Dan Bilefsky, NYT:

Turkey’s economy is projected to grow at a 7.5 per cent annual rate while Europe’s are sputtering.

As economic contagion tarnishes the European Union, a newly assertive Turkey is increasingly looking east instead of west, and asking a vexing question: Should Turkey reject Europe before Europe rejects Turkey? When Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the charismatic prime minister, first swept to power in 2002, he made Turkey’s entry into the EU his overriding goal. Determined to anchor the country to the West, Erdogan’s Muslim-inspired Justice and Development Party tackled thorny issues like improving minority rights and easing restrictions on free speech to move Turkey closer to Western norms.

But Turkey’s bid got anything but a warm reception from many members of the union, not least because of Turkey’s large, almost entirely Muslim population. The negotiations dragged on endlessly without ever yielding a clear pathway to membership.

Weilding nee clout

Now it is Turkey that has soured on the idea, analysts here say. With Europe roiled by a spiraling credit crisis and the tumult of the Arab Spring creating opportunities for Turkey to wield new clout as a regional power, people here are weighing a step that would have been unthinkable only a few years ago: walking away from the EU altogether.

“Prime Minister Erdogan wanted to be the first conservative Muslim leader who would bring Turkey to the West, but after Europe betrayed him, he abandoned those ambitions,” said Erol Yarar, the founder of a religiously conservative business group of 20,000 companies that is close to the prime minister. “Today, the EU has absolutely no influence over Turkey, and most Turks are asking themselves, ‘Why should we be part of such a mess?”’

Turkey’s increasingly muscular foreign policy in the Middle East was in evidence last week when it imposed tough sanctions on Syria and made preparations for possible military intervention. And Turkey has become a powerful voice of regional outrage over Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, especially since it froze its ties with Israel over a deadly commando raid on a flotilla of vessels that tried to reach Gaza from Turkey.

Meanwhile, Turkish officials say relations with the EU have reached a state of hopeless disrepair, made worse by the prospect of Cyprus taking over the rotating presidency of the union next year.

Turkey has been locked in an intractable political fight with Cyprus since 1974, when it invaded the island to prevent a proposed union with Greece and set up a rival government in the ethnic Turkish part of Cyprus that only it recognizes. In London last month, President Abdullah Gul disparaged Cyprus as “half a country” that would lead a “miserable union,” Milliyet, a Turkish newspaper, reported. Then, when France took the unusual step last week of proposing that Turkey be invited to take part in a meeting of the union’s foreign ministers to discuss Syria, Cyprus vetoed the idea.

A century ago when the Ottoman Empire was crumbling, Turkey acquired the unwelcome nickname “the sick man of Europe.” Now many Turks cannot help but gloat that Turkey’s economy is projected to grow at a 7.5 per cent annual growth rate this year while Europe’s are sputtering.

Public opinion in Turkey has already turned away. According to surveys by the German Marshall Fund, 73 percent of Turks saw membership as a good thing in 2004, but only 38 percent felt that way by 2010.

The country’s minister for EU affairs, Egemen Bagis, said in an interview that Turkey remained committed to joining. With its young and dynamic work force, large domestic market and growing regional role, he said, Turkey would be a bigger asset than ever to the teetering union.

Cooler relations with Turkey are costing Europe influence in the Arab world, where Turkey, a NATO member bordered by Iran, Iraq and Syria, is fast becoming an important interlocutor for the West. For the first time in decades, analysts say, Europe needs Turkey more than Turkey needs Europe.

To the protesters in the streets of Cairo or Tripoli or Homs, Erdogan, a pious Muslim leading a prosperous country of 78 million, is a powerful symbol of the compatibility of democracy and Islam, while Europe’s perceived hostility to its Muslim residents undercuts its influence in the region.

Senior Turkish officials say Erdogan himself has turned away from Europe and embraced Washington instead, a development signaled by Turkey’s announcement of sanctions against Syria. While Erdogan coordinated closely on the issue with President Barack Obama, the officials said, Europe played only a supporting role.

via For Turkey, lure of EU is fast fading.

December 9, 2011