Tag: Turkey – EU

EU Urges Turkey to Forge Cyprus Ties to Revive Membership Talks

By Emre Peker

Oct. 12 (Bloomberg) — The European Union urged Turkey to normalize relations with Cyprus, amid concerns about rising tension between the two countries, to jump-start membership talks that stalled more than a year ago.

Turkey has made progress over the past year in its push to join the 27-nation bloc, the EU said today in an annual progress report. The European Commission, the EU executive arm that also oversees expansion, said Turkey needs to improve fundamental rights, particularly freedom of expression, to advance.

The pace of Turkey’s membership application depends on full implementation of a customs-union agreement that includes Cyprus, the EU said in Brussels. Turkey, which doesn’t recognize the Greek Cypriot government, has sent warships alongside a Turkish vessel that is exploring for natural gas off the divided Mediterranean island. It also threatened to freeze its EU ties if Cyprus takes on the bloc’s rotating presidency without a solution to the four-decade split.

“The accession negotiations with Turkey have regrettably not moved into any new areas for over a year,” the EU said in the report. “The pace of accession negotiations would gain new momentum if Turkey proceeded to the full implementation of its customs-union obligations with the EU, and made progress towards normalization of relations with Cyprus.”

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu have repeatedly said Turkey would cease to have relations with the EU if Cyprus assumes the presidency in the second half of 2012 without a solution to reunify the island.

Rising Tensions

Since mid-September, tensions in the eastern Mediterranean have been rising, with Turkey responding in kind to Greek Cypriot drilling off the island’s southern coast. Noble Energy Inc., the U.S. firm that started drilling Sept. 18, found gas reserves, the Greek Cypriot Phileleftheros newspaper reported yesterday.

Cyprus split in 1974, when Turkey invaded in response to a coup by supporters of a union with Greece. Turkey is the only country to recognize a Turkish Cypriot administration in the island’s north, where it keeps thousands of troops. Greek Cypriots rejected a 2004 UN plan submitted to a popular vote on both sides of the island by three to one. Turkish Cypriots voted two to one in favor.

The EU said trials of writers and journalists, as well as limitations to Internet access, cause “serious concerns” about freedom of expression in Turkey.

Trade Accord

The bloc started talks in 13 of 33 policy areas as part of the membership negotiations. Discussions on one of the issues have been provisionally closed and talks on eight others can’t be opened until Turkey meets certain obligations, the EU said. That includes the so-called Ankara Protocol that would extend a trade accord with the EU to Cyprus. The bloc demands that Turkey open its ports and airports to traffic from Cyprus under the July 2005 protocol.

Turkey can overcome the “competitive pressure and market forces” in the EU and should speed up implementation of structural reforms to its economy, according to the report by Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fule’s group. The country’s 8.9 percent economic growth last year was driven by domestic demand and its expansion has continued in 2011 as Turkey “strengthened its presence in new markets” and continued its integration with the EU, the group said.

“Turkey has become one of the fastest-growing economies in the world,” Egemen Bagis, a lawmaker heading Turkey’s newly created EU Affairs Ministry, said Sept. 30 in Strasbourg, France, where he was meeting with counterparts from the bloc. “There are still those who try to treat us as if we were the Turkey of the 1960s. We can give them the response they deserve with self-confidence because Turkey is quickly advancing on the path to become a global power.”

–With assistance from James Neuger in Brussels. Editors: Heather Langan, Eddie Buckle

To contact the reporter on this story: Emre Peker in Ankara at [email protected].

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Andrew J. Barden in Dubai at [email protected].

via EU Urges Turkey to Forge Cyprus Ties to Revive Membership Talks – Businessweek.

October 13, 2011
For Europe, a Bridge Too Far to Turkey

By JOHN VINOCUR

It meant, in their eyes, Europe literally extending its frontiers to the borders of Iran, Syria and Iraq, and the E.U. adding to its membership a predominantly Muslim country whose population would soon give it the biggest number of seats in the European Parliament. As for Turkey’s government, its uncertain relationship with democracy was exemplified by 57 journalists in jail — more, at last count by international watchdogs, than either China or Iran.

Now, at an increasing pace over the last six months, Turkey is portraying itself as a regional power in the Middle East, threatening to send its ships to challenge Cypriot or Israeli gas exploration rights in the Mediterranean, talking up “an axis” with Egypt, and warning of a “real crisis” with the E.U. if it allows the Republic of Cyprus to hold, as scheduled, its six-month rotating presidency next year. To its backers in Europe, this Turkey can no longer look much like an idealized bridge to a world beyond clashes of civilizations.

In the opposite direction, surveying a weakened and divisive Europe, whose resolve and forthrightness are in question as it stumbles from nonsolution to nonsolution of its economic and financial crises, the Turkish president, Abdullah Gul, insists his country has accumulated as much political influence internationally as the entire E.U. combined.

So? In the very short term, Turkey’s new stance gives Europe (with Germany and France opposing full Turkish membership) a respectable alibi and respite from an issue it cannot easily solve. But in the process, the door closes on the goal of integrating Turkey into a European-led geopolitical and economic order.

“The majority of Europe welcomes the moment, thinking, ‘Great, the Turkey thing is off the table,”’ said a Brussels official whose country backs Turkish entry. He added, “We think Turkey is worth it, and that they’re a real risk if they sail off into the distance.”

All the same, a new distance has unspoken pluses.

The apocalyptic notion of Europe being overrun by Turkish Muslims, brandished by right-wing populists like Geert Wilders of the Netherlands — Turkey’s rapidly growing population is approaching 80 million — is deflated as a hysteria-making political argument.

Reality also says the European Union couldn’t handle two existential issues at one time. The magnitude of the problems represented by Turkish entry into full-fledged membership (Germany talks instead of a “privileged partnership”) appears incompatible with the E.U.’s unresolved issues of debt and deficit, an economy nearing standstill by the end of the year, and an intensifying discussion of the need for greater economic governance.

The Obama administration, so far, can praise Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s “great leadership,” be happy that Turkey will be part of a U.S. antimissile defense system, and disregard Mr. Erdogan’s Putin-style remark that there are only “presumptions” about Iranian nuclear weapons intentions.

Yet the question of Turkey’s new engagement in the Arab world, its falling out with Israel, and general bluster is a more intimate one for Europe. Some Europeans would like to minimize the problem.

The Brussels official who found a majority of E.U. members liking the idea that Turkey’s entry seems shelved for now — I spoke to a cabinet minister from another E.U. core country who agreed — described Turkish assertiveness as “tactics, not strategy,” and part of an expression of Turkey’s irritation with Europe’s resistance to it.

The Finnish foreign minister, Erkki Tuomioja, has pointed in the same direction and asserts, “Turkey doesn’t have the means for its policy.”

But if you take Turkey’s Middle East power ambitions as serious — and not blowhard fantasizing — then it is the Turks who are forcing the E.U. to turn away from its candidacy. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has said, “A Turkey that wants to become a regional power must build up its political and economic influence on the waterways from the Agean to the Adriatic and from the Suez Canal to the Persian Gulf.”

The leading German research organization for international politics and security affairs, SWP, takes the point. It published a paper two weeks ago, titled “Turkey on a Course of Confrontation,” whose introduction reads, “Ankara is looking to pick a fight in the Mediterranean not only with Israel and the Republic of Cyprus, but also with the European Union.”

The same week, Mr. Gul, while rejecting anything short of full E.U. membership during a visit to Germany, sounded provocative about his hosts’ approach to Turkish immigration. He described as a violation of “human rights” a German regulation requiring spouses of Turks living in Germany to pass German-language competency tests before taking up residence.

Earlier in the year, Mr. Erdogan, as a guest of Angela Merkel, had an imperative-type message for Turkish immigrants: “Integrate yourselves into German society, but don’t assimilate.”

Finding an overall response to the new circumstances is not easy.

Last week, NATO’s secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, both chose to praise Turkey’s “stabilizing role in the region” and dodge the issue of its charter member’s warning that it might send its navy toward non-NATO Cyprus to block its exploration for gas. He said the alliance “as an organization is not going to interfere in these disputes.”

On this matter, at least — if it sees a measure of immediate comfort in Turkey talking itself out of closer association anytime soon — the E.U. can ignore an active Turkish challenge to a tiny member’s sovereignty only at the expense of its self-respect.

October 4, 2011
Is Turkey’s EU dream coming to the end of the road?

AMANDA PAUL

[email protected]

Is Turkey’s EU dream coming to the end of the road?

In a couple of weeks the European Commission will publish its annual Progress Report on Turkey’s progress towards becoming a member of the EU.

One could say it represents something of a scorecard for Turkey’s efforts in meeting EU demanded reforms in both economic and political terms, including underlining areas where Turkey needs to make much greater efforts.

While on the one hand, one may say that this year’s report, more than any other so far, has become irrelevant because the chances of Turkey ever joining the EU seem to be reducing by the day, but on the other it is still serves as a useful tool for monitoring the political and economic situation in the country and how Turkey is progressing on issues such as minority rights, fundamental freedoms, human rights, the Kurdish issue, etc.

Turkey’s EU journey began over half a century ago in 1959 when Turkey was given associate membership status. In 1964, the Association Agreement between the then- “European Economic Community” (EEC) and Turkey provided to establish far-reaching economic cooperation, from a customs union to free movement of labor with a preamble containing a reference to eventual membership. And again at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, when Turkey was finally granted candidate country status, the communiqué of the summit read “Turkey is a candidate country destined to join the EU on the basis of the same criteria applied to all other candidates.” Nice words, but unfortunately the EU has not applied the same approach to Turkey as it did with the other candidates.

In 2005, Turkey’s membership talks kicked off, together with Croatia. Some six years later, Croatia has finalized its negotiations and is on the verge of becoming the 28th member of the EU. For Turkey, it has been a different story. The membership talks are frozen with some 18 negotiating chapters blocked. While leaders from both sides continue to smile and pretend that there is still a commitment, behind closed doors the air is filled with mutual recrimination. Confidence and trust have evaporated. Turkey has been left frustrated by the unrelenting positions of France and Germany (among others), which continue to violate the EU’s commitment to full membership by talking about “alternatives,” while the EU’s reluctance to offer Turkey visa liberalization (something which all other candidate have) has added salt to the wound. Turkey has also played its part. Turkey is a proud nation which has been a crucial ally of the West, including through its membership of NATO for decades. The idea that countries which Turkey considered “friends” could so blatantly reject them and label them as unsuitable for EU membership has been a difficult to deal with. Today, Turkey’s reform process has slowed down, while Ankara continues refuse to meet its commitments vis-à-vis the Ankara Protocol. Cyprus continues to be at the epicenter of the problem. The EU’s decision to allow a divided island into the EU has had serious repercussions and has only served to make a difficult problem even more intractable. Confident in their EU seat, the Greek Cypriots have felt more able to take on tougher positions in peace talks for reunification.

Furthermore, tensions about Cyprus have reached a new climax following the discovery of off-shore natural gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean, particularly in the economic zones of Israel, Lebanon and Cyprus. Cyprus has infuriated Turkey by concluding an agreement with Israel on the delimitation of their respective economic zones. The anger culminated earlier this month with the government of Greek Cyprus deciding to start drilling for gas southeast of the island and the Turkish government threatening that it would not accept this and going on to conclude an agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf with the “government” of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (KKTC), which since its creation in 1983 has not been recognized by any other country other than Turkey.

This has been compounded by Turkey announcing that it will suspend relations with the EU in July 2012 when the Greek Cypriots take up the rotating EU presidency, unless negotiations on the reunification of the island will have been successfully concluded by then, which is highly unlikely. All in all — combined with Turkey’s deteriorating relations with Israel — the eastern Mediterranean has become a very hot spot, although anything beyond aggressive words would seem unlikely.

Meanwhile, the EU continues to have little interest in its once grand enlargement project being burdened with visionless leaders and an economic nightmare. Turkey, with its booming economy and increasingly important regional role, is growing surer of itself and eager to be the major political and economic player in the Middle East region.

Today, Turkish membership of the EU appears more distant than ever. With its 78 million dynamic people, Turkey feels strong enough to stand alone. As one of the major economic powers on Earth, a member of the OECD and G20, emulated as an example by Arab neighbors, it may consider EU membership no longer necessary for its economic development and politically more of burden than of benefit.

via Is Turkey’s EU dream coming to the end of the road?.

October 2, 2011
Turkey’s EU minister says rate of Turkish people against membership reach 35-40 percent

Turkey’s European Union (EU) minister and chief negotiator said on Saturday that the rate of Turkish people opposing to Turkey’s EU membership had reached 35-40 percent, AA reported.

Egemen Bagis said this rate was raising concerns, and Europe should solve its own problems.

“EU is today extending more support to Turkey’s membership, however there are still some unsolved problems,” Bagis said during the Eighth Meeting of Yalta European Strategy in Ukraine.

Bagis said if Turkish citizens had to wait to get a visa from EU member states, they naturally felt themselves less European.

The minister pointed to Turkey’s growing economy, and said Turkish people used to be afraid of saying that they were Kurds.

“However, there is a TV channel broadcasting in Kurdish, and a person who was imprisoned for reading a poem in 1996 is the prime minister now and he spoke about secularist democracy to the Egyptians two days ago,” he said.

Bagis also said the real thing was integration to the EU, and Turkey had done its bests to abide by recommendations.

Egemen Bagis had a meeting with Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Hryshchenko on the sidelines of the meeting.

After the meeting, Bagis told reporters that they discussed the situation of Crimean Tatars, ways to lift visa between the two countries, and inauguration of new consulates.

“Inauguration of a new Turkish consulate general in Simferopol will boost our relations, and I told him that they may think of opening a consulate general in Antalya (southern Turkey),” he said.

Bagis said Turkey was ready to lift visa procedure with visa, and Turkey had ended visa procedures with 65 countries so far.

Moreover, Bagis interviewed with Crimean news agency QHA and said whether or not to become an EU member was not important, what was important was to develop Turkey.

Bagis said the world was changing so rapidly that the EU might seek ways to admit Turkey as a member in a short time.

“A Europe without Turkey, which is the most rapidly growing economy in Europe, Europe’s sixth biggest economy with the youngest and most dynamic population and the strongest army, does not have any chance in security policies,” he said.

Bagis said 70 percent of energy resources were within Turkey’s territories, and the EU did not have any chance to access those resources without Turkey’s contribution.

“I believe that days when Europe will see Turkey’s potential is very close,” Bagis also said.

Turkey became an EU candidate country in December 1999. The union launched accession talks with Turkey on October 3, 2005. The EU has so far opened 13 of the 35 chapter headings to negotiations with Turkey.

via Turkey’s EU minister says rate of Turkish people against membership reach 35-40 percent | Turkey | Trend.

September 19, 2011
Turkey to freeze EU ties if Cyprus gets EU presidency

Comments strongest yet by Ankara over its opposition to Cyprus presidency and could mark start of a new low point in ties between European Union and Turkey

Reuters

Published: 09.18.11, 12:46 / Israel News

EU-candidate Turkey will freeze relations with the European Union if Cyprus is given the EU presidency in 2012, Deputy Prime Minister Besir Atalay was quoted as saying by state-run news agency Anatolian late on Saturday.

The comments were the strongest yet by Ankara over its opposition to the Cyprus presidency and could mark the start of a new low point in ties between the European Union and Turkey which began accession talks to the bloc in 2005.

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Turkish PM Erdogan during Cairo address (Photo: EPA)

The comments also come at a time of heightened tension in the eastern Mediterranean where Turkey is locked in a row with Cyprus over potential offshore gas deposits. Turkey’s relations with one-time ally Israel are also at a low.

“If the peace negotiations there (Cyprus) are not conclusive, and the EU gives its rotating presidency to southern Cyprus, the real crisis will be between Turkey and the EU,” Anatolian quoted Atalay as telling Turkish Cypriot Bayrak Radio and TV at the end of a trip to northern Cyprus.

“Because we will then freeze our relations with the EU. We have made this announcement, as a government we have made this decision. Our relations with the EU will come to a sudden halt.”

The internationally-recognized Greek Cypriot government is due to take on the six-month rotating EU presidency in July 2012.

Cyprus has been divided since a Turkish invasion in 1974 triggered by a brief Greek-inspired coup. UN-sponsored peace talks between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots have stumbled since they were relaunched in 2008.

In July, Turkey’s European Union minister said freezing ties with the Greek Cypriot EU presidency was “an option” but Atalay’s comments were the first time Ankara has said it would definitely halt relations.

Greek Cypriots represent the island internationally and in the European Union, while Turkey is the only country to recognise the Turkish Cypriot state. Greek Cypriots say Turkey cannot join the bloc until the Cyprus conflict is resolved.

The rotating presidency has lost some importance since the EU’s Lisbon treaty, which established a permanent head of the European Council that groups national governments, and a new foreign and security policy chief. But a determined country can still shape the agenda.

Of the 35 “chapters” — policy areas of EU law — Turkey has completed one, and 18 have been frozen because of opposition by EU member states including Cyprus and France.

via Turkey to freeze EU ties if Cyprus gets EU presidency – Israel News, Ynetnews.

September 19, 2011
Turkey would be better neighbor for Armenia in straitjacket of EU – interview

September 05, 2011 | 16:15

By Aram Gareginyan

Talks of Turkey and the EU over membership are still pending – but for Armenia it might as well be better otherwise. EU admission, long sought by Turkey, may impose certain guidelines in political behavior – particularly treating the Genocide issue. In an interview to Armenian News – NEWS.am, political analyst, head of the Center for Regional Studies, Richard Giragosyan, gives another possible scenario of Genocide recognition process – involvement of the Israeli lobby in Congress, in response to the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador to Ankara.

Do you think that the recent agreement between Turkey and the US on stationing NATO’s missile defense radar in the country could have repercussions on the relations between Turkey and Iran?

It could, but more interesting are the repercussions on the relations between Turkey and Russia. They have been moving closer together over energy, diplomacy, geopolitics for several years. Even on the Protocols Russia was generally supportive. This is the first time Turkey is doing something that Russia does not like. And for me it’s most interesting and significant because it is the first real test to see how deep and how strong the relationship between Russia and Turkey is. And we’re not sure what Russia will do. Because this is, in fact, the same missile defense plan involving Poland and Czech Republic, that Russia was so strongly against. From the Turkish perspective it’s interesting too, because despite the negative reaction from Russia, Turkey has decided to go further with this in order to bolster its own role in the region. Over the past two years Turkey was not acting in the interest of the United States – on Iran, in a deal with Brazil. Even with Armenia on the Protocols in was not an American plan. They didn’t brief the Americans, and the Americans were upset. Now this is the second time Turkey is moving in the direction of being an American ally again. The first one was Syria: Hilary Clinton went to Turkey, the Turkish foreign minister went to Syria. The interesting thing from the Turkish perspective is what price the Americans had to pay to get Turkey to agree. That we don’t know. It could be American cooperation, or abstaining from criticizing Turkey’s military attacks against Kurdish villages and positions in Northern Iraq.

So Iran is merely a pretext, and the move is directed against Russia?

Not in military terms, but politically – yes. Or it may be Turkey’s attempt to show Russia that Turkey is strong and important and may deserve more from Russia. That could be Turkey’s style of gamble. Regarding Iran, whether or not these defensive systems are in Turkey is less important, because Iran has no alternative but to try to use Turkey as a mediator or a broker, having limited options. What’s interesting from the Armenian perspective is there’s no statement or reaction. What Armenia should do is go to the European Union and say – we have good relations with Iran: let us help and advise you on European policy toward Iran or to be a neutral platform. In other words, Armenian foreign policy in this case shows more missed opportunities, because there’s no energy and no creativity in the Foreign Ministry.

Do you think the EU could heed to Armenian recommendations?

Definitely. In terms of either the Eastern partnership, or the EU foreign ministerial initiative. Armenia is the only country in the bigger region, in the whole Black sea region, that can play a constructive role. It’s the only country in the region that has good relations with Iran and the West. Turkey, for its own purposes, is playing a role. But Armenia, unlike Azerbaijan and Georgia, is the only neighbor of Iran that can be a messenger, or mediator.

Do you think that Russia possesses enough leverage to influence the political behavior of Turkey?

I think not too much of leverage. In many ways the relationship between Turkey and Russia in my opinion is a bad marriage; it’s not bound to last very long. They are historical and regional rivals. And there will come a point when Turkey and Russia begin to clash. The other thing that’s interesting is Turkey trying to promote itself as a bigger regional power, which also directly threatens Russian interests and power in the South Caucasus. In Armenian perspective this is probably a positive development, because the more problems between Russia and Turkey, the better for Armenia, in this context.

Do you regard the current signs of Islamisation of Turkish policy as a lasting trend?

Lasting as far as the AKP government is in power. Yes, it is an Islamist oriented government, but this is not just about Islam. This is about who wants to be stronger in the Middle East. The reason that Turkish-Israeli relations have declined so much, is that Turkey doesn’t see a need for Israel any more. And Turkey wants to win over the Arab masses, especially after the change of governments in Tunisia/Egypt, now possibly Libya/Syria. Now Turkey wants to emerge as the leader. Which is ironic, because, even under the Ottoman Empire, most of the Arabs in the region hated the Turks. They remember the Ottoman Empire, and the Genocide. But what’s interesting, is by being anti-Israeli, Turkey is being very populist in the Middle East. The other interesting thing is that Turkish government is using its problems with Israel as a way to weaken the Turkish military by cutting off military ties between the Turkish military and one of its key supporter, the Israelis. So it’s also about internal Turkish politics as well. From the Armenian perspective this greatly strengthens the Genocide issue. For many years the Israelis, because of the relationship with Turkey, have helped to sabotage or damage Genocide recognition efforts. Now the Israeli lobby in the United States and in Europe may actually turn around and support the Genocide issue to get revenge against Turkey. So in terms of Genocide recognition, this is a big change and a much more powerful development against Turkey and for Genocide recognition.

Do you think that the Genocide bill will finally get underway in Knesset?

It could, but my point is not just the Knesset, but the Congress. You will see the Genocide bill being seen no longer just an Armenian issue, but a convenient way for many of the Jewish lobby to use it as a stick to beat up Turkey. It’s not exactly a good reason for us pursuing Genocide recognition, but it will strengthen the campaign.

Do you view the Islamisation of Turkey just as an imitational move, or the government does plan to make the society more Islam-oriented?

It’s worth consideration. We don’t know yet whether it’s the AKP government, Islamist at its core, that is leading the Islamisation of Turkey, or it’s the population becoming more Islamic, and therefore the government is playing on that in terms of getting more power. In other words, the trend of Islamisation in Turkey could be from the bottom up, not necessarily top down. But it also changes the meaning of Islamic government. The trend of Turkey is not like the trend of Iran. This isn’t about establishing an Islamic state. This is about finding a way to be less secular and more democratic. But we’re not sure if Turkey will succeed. The other thing from an interesting Armenian perspective, since Turkey is on the border: the military, the secular reaction, the Ataturk camp against the Islamic government of Turkey. They haven’t lost yet. They may still be a powerful counter-reaction or even counterrevolution against the Turkish trend of Islamic politics. And Armenia should actually consider the different scenarios, and plan for the outcome of the battle for the future of Turkey. And I don’t think this has been thought of enough.

Do you think that moving off its secular policy may freeze talks of Turkey with EU over membership?

Perhaps I’m wrong, but over the past year and a half, even after meeting with Turkish officials in Turkey, my opinion is that the Turkish strategy has changed. It’s no longer begging to join the European Union. It’s much more now about making Turkey stronger, so that the European Union will need Turkey more than Turkey needs the European Union. That’s the danger, and that’s a new strategy. From the Armenian perspective, in the future, I would personally like to see Turkey in the European Union. Mainly because Turkey would be better as a neighbor and less dangerous within the straight jacket of the European Union. Because after joining the EU, Turkey would be much more accountable in treating Armenian issues, addressing the Genocide, historical legacies, property restitution. But most importantly, Turkey would also have to reduce is military, no longer be as aggressive or threatening either to Armenia or the Kurds, would have to play a different game with Azerbaijan. This would leave Turkey less room to maneuver to be a hostile neighbor. For that reason, Turkey within the European Union, and within a bigger European Union, may be a better neighbor to Armenia. This would also bring the EU borders to the Armenian border.

Military cooperation of US and Turkey has been uneven over the last decade. Why do you think the US still seek partnership?

What we see is for years or decades it was always the Pentagon, the US military that defended Turkey even when they shouldn’t have to, regarding the Genocide or relations with Armenia. And it was the State department who was pushing Turkey. Now it’s the opposite, it’s actually the Pentagon that is still upset with Turkey, and still no longer sees the need for Turkey. Now that the Americans are in Afghanistan, in Iraq, have a different role in the Middle East, they need Turkish military assistance much less than before. And even Turkey as a NATO member is a different Turkey. It sees the Black Sea not within the angle of NATO or cooperation with the US, but much more a Turkish sea, or in cooperation with Russia. So I think the military relation has changed dynamically, probably will never recover to what it was. And I think this is probably good for the region. Because for too long Turkey has been seen as a loyal NATO ally. But it wasn’t really loyal, and it wasn’t much of an ally, if we really analyze it.

What could you say of Turkey’ efforts to get a foothold at Balkans, manifested in recent statements of support to Bosnia by Davutoglu on his Balkan tour?

In fact, in general Turkish foreign policy, especially with Davutoglu, has prioritized the Balkans and the Turks rom the Balkans. But what’s interesting is the problem it demonstrates. In my opinion, the weakness of Turkish foreign policy is it’s over-extended. It doesn’t prioritize. It wants to be active in Syria, Libya, Iraq, Bosnia, Cyprus, Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Russia, Brazil and Iran, Sudan, North Korea – do all these things at once. And it’s much over-confident and over-extended. And this will be the downfall. If Turkey is trying all these initiatives in foreign policy, if it doesn’t give a 100 percent, it will fail in many attempts, rather than succeeding in fewer ones. This may actually bring Turkey back to the Armenian issue, because, according to many Turkish foreign ministry officials, they may return to the Armenian-Turkish border opening and diplomatic relations, the essence of the Protocols, because they are failing in other areas of foreign policy. And this one is maybe smaller and easier for them to accomplish, according to their thinking.

Do you think that the Protocols would be raised again in Turkish Parliament?

No. According to what I’m seeing as an analyst, the Protocols are dead, and will never come back. Not in Turkey, not in Armenia. What’s going on now in my opinion, is diplomacy of a much more limited nature to try to reach an agreement on the terms of the Protocols – border opening, diplomatic relations. But not on the Protocols themselves. Because Turkey realizes it made a strategic mistake with the Protocols in underestimating the Azerbaijan’s reaction. So I don’t think it will go back to them. From the Armenian side, it doesn’t make sense trying to resurrect the Protocols. Regarding the historical sub-commission issue, what’s good about the current situation, is it’s only about border opening and diplomatic relations first. There’s no more talk from the Turkish side, if you notice, about any sub-commission on the historical issues. So there’s less of danger of weakening or selling out Armenia’s defense of the Genocide issue.

September 6, 2011