Tag: Turkey as the role-model

  • Turkey’s popularity dives in MENA region poll

    Turkey’s popularity dives in MENA region poll

    Turkey’s popularity dives in MENA region poll

    Country’s approval in the region decreases significantly, especially in Egypt and Syria, Turkish think-tank study shows.

    Umut Uras Last updated: 04 Dec 2013 19:28

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    Turkish government has been critical of the military rule in Egypt and the Syrian regime [AP]

    Turkey’s popularity in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has shrunk over last three years, with particular sharp drops among the Syrian and Egyptian public, a field study conducted by a Turkish think-tank says.While 78 percent of respondents in the 16 countries subject to the study had a positive view on Turkey in 2011, the percentage declined to 69 percent in 2012 and 59 percent in 2013.

    Conducting the research for the fifth time, the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) made phone interviews with 2,800 people in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Tunisia, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Yemen and Libya. Respondents were asked questions on their views on Turkey as well as issues related to the MENA region in general.

    In Egypt, Turkey’s approval rate was registered as 38 percent in 2013, whereas the same data was 84 percent in 2012 and 86 percent in 2011. Syrians’ support for Turkey was 22 percent in 2013, dropping from an already low rate of 28 percent in 2012 and 44 percent in 2011.

    Following the July coup that overthrew Mohamed Morsi, the former Egyptian president, Turkey’s conservative Justice and Development Party government has been an outspoken critic of the new regime, frequently bashing its crackdowns in public statements and expressing support for Muslim Brotherhood-backed Morsi. The countries recently expelled each other’s ambassadors.

    Similarly, Ankara has stood against the regime in Damascus in the Syrian crisis, expressing support for the opposition, harbouring thousands of Syrian refugees and letting armed rebels using its territory in various ways.
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    Syrians think Turkey is ‘unfriendly’

    Eighty-eight percent of those surveyed in Syria think that the Turkish government has been “unfriendly” towards their country, while the same rate is 68 percent in Egypt. In Iraq, 58 percent of the people polled gave answers in the same direction.

    Iraq’s Shia dominated government and Ankara have had a thorny relationship for the last couple of years as a result of sectarian tensions and Ankara’s close ties with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq. Baghdad and the KRG have been in dispute over sharing of oil wealth, land and other issues.

    The decline recorded [in Turkey’s popularity] in the last three years is due to the turmoil in the region and Turkey’s related policiesDr. Sabiha Senyucel, TESEV director and writer of the report

     

    Meanwhile, among the interviewees, 90 percent in Libya, 88 percent in Tunisia, 87 percent in Palestine, 80 percent in Gulf Cooperation Council countries (excluding Saudi Arabia), 79 percent in Saudi Arabia and 78 percent in Iran believe the Turkish government is “very friendly” to their country.

    “The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East Survey has been conducted for the last five years. Popularity of Turkey was very high in 2009. The decline recorded in the last three years is due to the turmoil in the region and Turkey’s related policies,” Dr. Sabiha Senyucel, the director of the TESEV’s foreign policy programme and one of the writers of the report, told Al Jazeera.

    While 64 percent of those polled think that Turkey’s influence on MENA politics is growing day after day, a decreasing number of people believe Ankara should play a larger role in the region – decreased from 71 percent in 2011 to 60 percent in 2011. Fewer believe Turkey can be a model for the region compared to the previous two years, the rate dropping from 61 in 2011 percent to 51 percent in 2013. The rate is particularly low in Syria, Egypt and Iran, with a significant drop in Egypt’s approval rating.

    Respondents increasingly think that Turkey is pursuing sectarian policies, with data increasing compared to 2012 in all of the subject countries. Thirty-eight percent said Turkey had been following sectarian policies, an increase of 9 percent from last year. The rate is 54 percent in Syria and 45 percent in Egypt, both increasing significantly.

    In comparison, 65 percent said Iraq, 62 percent said Syria and 61 percent said Iran had been involved in sectarian policies.

    “Respondents generally think that regional politics have become increasingly sectarian. Turkey’s policies are also seen as more sectarian than last year. Although I personally do not think this is the case [Ankara pursuing more sectarian policies], Turkey being perceived this way does not help its image in terms of neutrality,” Senyucel said.
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    Graph for Turkey story [Al Jazeera]

     

    Middle East issues

    Across the MENA region, the UAE is rated first in terms of positive perceptions, followed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey. In 2011 and 2012, Turkey topped the ranking.

    Among the respondents in 16 countries, 43 percent said the coup was good for Egypt, whereas 46 percent said it was a bad development for the country.

    Meanwhile, positive views on the Arab Spring have decreased. Only 37 percent said that the process had been good for their country – the ratio was 52 percent in 2011 and 44 percent in 2012.

    In 2012, economic problems had topped the list of the most important regional issues in all 16 countries except Iraq, while in 2013 political issues and security/terrorism issues were frontrunners in various countries such as Egypt, Lebanon and Tunisia. In Iraq and Libya, the Western presence or threat is seen as the number one issue of importance.

    When respondents were asked about the most pressing issue in their home country – instead of the whole region – economic issues still far topped the list with 39 percent followed by security/terrorism issues at 16 percent.

    Economic issues remained the far highest national concern for Iranians at 86 percent while 54 percent in Libya and 30 percent in Syria think security issues or terrorism is the most pressing national problem.

    Regarding powers outside the region, positive perceptions on Russia and China have increased. The percentage of people thinking these country’s governments are friendly to their country stand at 80 and 71 percent respectively.
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    Source:
    Al Jazeera
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  • The Independent: How Turkey blew its chance to lead this troubled region

    The Independent: How Turkey blew its chance to lead this troubled region

    The country could have enhanced its influence and saved a lot of lives. It did the exact opposite

    Whatever happened to the idea that Turkey was the coming power in the Middle East, with its surging economy and stable democracy under a mildly Islamic government which might be the model for Arab states as they ended decades of police state rule in 2011? Turkey seemed perfectly positioned to lead the way, with no serious enemies in the region and with good relations with the US and the EU. Oversimplified headlines comparing modern Turkey with the Ottoman empire in the days before it became a great power in the 16th century did not seem wholly exaggerated.

    Two years later, none of these good things has come to pass for Turkey, and it is very short of friends in the Middle East. It has managed simultaneously to make enemies of the four powers to its south and east: Iran, Iraq, Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon – as well as the monarchies of the Gulf with the exception of Qatar. Turkish pilots are kidnapped in Beirut and Turkish truck drivers arrested in Egypt. Turkish support for the former president of Egypt Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood has infuriated the military regime, which has even intervened to stop the showing of Turkish soap operas on Egyptian television.

    Most serious of all, Turkey’s entanglement in support of what may well be the losing side in the Syrian crisis is bringing nothing but disaster. It did not have to be like this: at the start of the Syrian crisis Ankara was well placed to play a moderating role in the crisis, since it was on good terms with President Bashar al-Assad but able to put pressure on the insurgents who depend on keeping open the 560-mile Turkish-Syrian frontier. But the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, overplayed his hand, assumed that Assad would go down as quickly as Muammar Gaddafi in Libya and gave full support for the armed groups Many other governments made the same mistake, but the consequences of the failure of the armed groups to win a decisive victory is most serious for Turkey.

    via Syrian TV – The Independent: How Turkey blew its chance to lead this troubled region.

  • A warning from Erdogan’s Turkey

    A warning from Erdogan’s Turkey

    Often cited as a model for Arab Spring countries, Turkey is marked by a massive divide between rich and poor as well as heavy state repression of labour unionists, journalists, students and Kurdish nationalists
     Alp Altınörs

    In the Arab world, especially in Tunisia and Egypt, the so-called “Turkish model” has become one of the main propaganda slogans of reactionary forces.

    The Nahda government in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt seem to believe that the success of Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey can give them the hope of success and the popularity that they themselves are losing.

    The economic realities hidden behind this glossy image of Turkey give a different image, however. It is true that the Turkish economy experienced a certain economic growth under the government of Erdogan—GDP grew between 2002 to 2012 by annual average of 4.9 percent (with the exception of 2009, in which GDP fell by 4.8 percent). In 2012, however, the growth rate dropped to 2.2 percent.

    Plunder of imperialist finance capital

    The main force behind this growth has been foreign capital. According to the figures of the Central Bank of Turkey, Turkish imports that amounted to $36 billion in the period 1984-2001 leaped sevenfold to $281.4 billion in the period 2002-2012.

    Net capital inflow to Turkey grew at the same rate, from $65 billion in the period 1980-2002 to $484 billion in the period 2002-2012.

    These figures show the level to which the Turkish economy has been integrated into the capitalist world economy during the Erdogan governments.

    Foreign capital came to Turkey basically for two reasons: firstly because of “hot money”, the money-capital invested in state bonds, credit, and stock market shares; and secondly because of direct capital investment, which came to buy privatised state enterprises and assets. All in all, direct capital investment accounted for less than 20 percent of total capital inflows during that period.

    Central Bank data shows that between 2002 and 2012 —that is, during the Erdogan period—total revenue transfers from Turkey to foreign countries amounted to $120 billion, 78 percent of which represented interest transfers.

    That is to say, during the past 10 years, imperialist finance capital has effectively plundered the country, taking away $120 billion from the total surplus value created by the labouring masses of Turkey—$93 billion in debt service alone, although economists don’t focus on this acute form of robbery.

    Dictatorship of the top 0.5 percent

    An analysis of income distribution draws an even bleaker picture of the socio-economic situation in Turkey. Data from the recent survey of the Ministry of Family and Social Rights showed that close to 40 percent of Turkish society lives at, or below, minimum wage, set at 773 Turkish Lira per month ($1 equals approx.. TL1.79).

    In addition, 6.4 percent of Turkish families live on less than TL 430 a month, a level that brings hunger and malnutrition. On top of these two segments, 23.1 percent of Turkish families live with a monthly income in the range of TL 815-1,200, or just above minimum wage.

    Together these three segments make up to 61.6 percent Turkish society, a bit less than two thirds of the country.

    ‘Middle class’ families represent the bulk of the remaining 38.4 percent of the population. These are classified as families that earn an income that lies between TL 1,200 and 5,500. To be exact, this segment comprises about 37.3 percent of the population.

    That leaves a tiny segment of society, which represents roughly 1.2 percent of the total population of Turkish families. This segment comprises high-income families earning more than TL 5,500 per month.

    The majority of the families in this top category could be classified as “upper middle class” families, although a monthly income of TL 5,500 is much lower than the level need to classify its owner as bourgeois in Turkey. The real bourgeois in Turkey represent only a fraction of this already tiny segment.

    Data released by the Banking Regulation and Control Council (BDDK) suggests that the bourgeois class in Turkey represents a mere 0.5 percent of the population. According to BDDK data, the largest 0.5 percent of the bank accounts held in Turkish banks own 63 percent of total money deposited in all accounts.

    At the same time, 97.5 percent of all accounts have less than TL 50,000 deposited in them. Bank deposits are better measures of accumulated wealth than income, and thus we can safely say that 0.5 percent of Turkish society monopolises two thirds of the country’s wealth now.

    AKP not only increased social inequality in Turkey, it opened the doors for rich Islamists to enter this top 0.5 percent club, or the bourgeoisie of Turkey.

    Prior to AKP’s ascendance to power, the ruling generals used to deny Islamists entry into this club of super-millionaires. Now Islamist businessmen enter this stratum with ease, and obviously their entry has not changed the character of this club.

    As for the poor, the government seems now to make do with redistributing a tiny portion of the national resources among them—mind you, not as a right, but as a de facto bribe that one receives when he or she votes for AKP.

    Unemployment

    In 2001, the official unemployment rate hovered around 10.3 percent. This was the year of the big economic crisis in Turkey. Since then—that is, during the 12 years of AKP rule—unemployment never fell below 9.5 percent, a level that it now maintains.

    Official unemployment rates are notoriously unreliable, however. Labour unions, for example, estimate unemployment at 15 percent, while youth unemployment is estimated at 23 percent, as it is growing at much higher rate than average unemployment in society.

    The point to emphasise here is that while Turkey managed to maintain an economic growth rate of roughly 5 percent a year during the past decade, this failed to push unemployment down in any reasonable way. Regardless of which unemployment statistics you take, Turkey is still hovering around the unemployment rate of the crisis year of 2001.

    Growth has, in other words, been coupled with little social benefit, and the reason behind this goes back to its immensely exploitative nature, as a worker needs to do the work of three to keep his or her job.

    The deterioration in labour rights in Turkey helped defend this exploitation. Factory workers are forced to stay away from labour unions, paving the way for “subcontracting” to become the dominant form of work relations.

    In a workforce of about 10 million workers, only 0.7 million are members of a labour union. The size of the workers’ segment that has the right to make collective contracts is even smaller. During AKP’s rule, the subcontracted part of the workforce (called ‘taşeron’ workers in Turkish) grew in fact from 387,000 to 1.6 million workers.

    Erdogan’s government supported this transformation and tried to boost it more than once. It amended, for example, the labour law to legalise many forms of “lean” and “flexible” work. Taşeron workers are practically prohibited from unionising, and this situation erodes the very basis of social opposition.

    Turkish farmers are faring even worse; their production costs reach nearly the same level as their income and many of them have quit farming, leaving the villages to join the vast unemployed population of the cities.

    The repression behind the growth

    AKP government utilises harsh repression to maintain this high level of inequity and exploitation.

    Turkish prisons contain nearly 10,000 political prisoners. They come from different backgrounds—socialist, Kurdish, Islamist, and ultra-nationalist. Many of them were sentenced to prison under anti-terror laws.

    The very diversity of these prisoners exposes the political role of these laws and the repression that they seek to deploy. One third of the people imprisoned worldwide on the basis of “anti-terror laws” are in Turkey, showing how relatively easy it is to convict people for terrorism under AKP rule.

    Freedom of speech has also suffered from AKP’s repression. According to the Platform for Solidarity with Imprisoned Journalists, 70 journalists are imprisoned in Turkey today. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) thus declared Turkey a “world leader” in imprisoning journalists. The government, on the other hand, refuses to admit that these journalists were imprisoned for their oppositional journalism, and insists on classify them according to the laws that were used to convict them, as “terrorists.”

    Most of the convicted journalists belong to either the left or the Kurdish national press. Mainstream media columnists and TV broadcasters managed to avoid this fate, at least until now. Nevertheless, they are not immune to government intimidation. They lose their jobs whenever they cross the line in criticising the government.

    Ece Temelkuran’s case is one of the most notorious examples of this policy of media intimidation. Judging that Temelkuran crossed the line, Erdogan pressured “Milliyet,” one of Turkey’s main newspapers, to fire Temelkuran despite her fame and presence in the international press.

    Temelkuran’s fate does not represent an isolated case. Many big media writers who oppose AKP’s government lost their jobs, as the party continues to “clean” the public sphere from any progressive criticism of the government.

    AKP also repressed the right to strike and unionise, as mentioned before. In the past ten years, the government banned numerous labour strikes and waged a systematic war against many organised labour sectors.

    Last year, for example, the government tried to pass a law prohibiting strikes in the air transport sector. Although the resistance of the air transport workers succeeded in impeding their general plan, Turkish Airlines still managed to get the government support necessary to fire 300 of its workers.

    The air transport sector is but one of the many sectors that came under AKP attack. Public employees, including schools and hospitals’ workers, are denied the right to strike, for example. The police also raided the offices of the unions of public employees many times. Today there are 125 members of the Confederation of Public Sector Employees (KESK) in prison on charges of, again, “terrorism.” It is not hard to see how Turkey managed to score one of the highest rates of convicted “terrorists” in the world.

    Naturally, a government that goes that far doesn’t spare student activism from its repression. About 850 student activists are currently in prison for protesting in favour of free education or against fascist repression and the oppression of the Kurdish people.

    Many of them have been condemned to heavy prison sentences, ranging from six years to life sentences. In indicting them, the state put forward “evidence” of them committing “criminal activities” like participating in demos, shouting slogans, or even reading the Communist Manifesto.

    The AKP government has been the prime oppressor of the Kurdish people too. Although AKP has recently signaled their intention to change their policies towards the Kurdish people—as they pushed for dialogue with Abdullah Öcalan, who is held prisoner on Imrali Island—that doesn’t mean that they have left aside their Kurdish oppression policy.

    Education in Kurdish language is still prohibited; among political prisoners, 8,000 belong to the Kurdish movement; 1,500 young people from both sides died during the fierce war between the Kurdish popular guerilla and the army (a war that was directed by the AKP government).

    The massacre of Uludere-Roboski village in 2011 was one of the worst atrocities of this bloody process. F-16 warplanes bombed a group of civilian Kurdish peasants who were engaging in border trade. This bombing left 34 peasants dead, mostly young people. Naturally, this triggered huge protests throughout the country. But while the government was clearly responsible, as it ordered the bombing, no one has been held accountable for this crime to so far.

    The Sultanate transformation

    Atrocious as it is, this level of repression and authoritarianism doesn’t seem to suffice AKP’s desire to monopolise power in the country. Erdogan has recently put forward a proposal meant to tighten his grip on all forms of state power, by proposing to change the constitution to transform the Turkish political system into a presidential system.

    His proposal transfers most state powers to the president, rendering him nearly a sultan. It also gives the president the right to dissolve the parliament, elect half of the Supreme Court members, and veto laws approved by the parliament—in addition to government powers, of course.

    His proposal is, in short, but an attempt to institutionalise a fascist police state, to be led by the AKP government. It is timely, coming as the balance of power in the country tips away during AKP’s rule from the military into the hands of the police. AKP has gradually come to rely more and more on its control over the police.

    It’s been a long way since the AKP government struggled against the semi-military rule over the state machine. During their early beginnings, the AKP used to uphold the slogan “civilian supremacy.” They got the support of many liberal sectors who opposed military rule with this slogan.

    But as soon as they managed to get a hold on state power, they used this power not to democratise the state, but to install a repressive regime of their own. The semi-military fascist regime that was led by the secular generals was eventually transformed into a civilian fascist regime led by the “moderate” Islamists.

    Our people’s struggle for freedom and democracy thus continues, and the more the AKP-led, imperialist, economic exploitation proceeds, the more repression it requires, the more the people of Turkey resist their rule. Our determined resistance will pave the way to a popular rejection of their rule, one day.

  • Why Turkey isn’t a model for the Arab Spring

    Why Turkey isn’t a model for the Arab Spring

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    Turkey needs a new and robustly democratic constitution – only then can we talk about a regional democratisation model.

    Larbi Sadiki

    Dr Larbi Sadiki is a Senior Lecturer in Middle East Politics at the University of Exeter, and author of Arab Democratization: Elections without Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2009) and The Search for Arab Democracy: Discourses and Counter-Discourses (Columbia University Press, 2004).

    Nothing is more fallacious than projecting Turkey as a model for the fledgling Arab Spring democracies. Not for lack of good practices on the Turkish side. Rather, the problems rest with the Arab side, in my view. The software (Turkish know-how), as it were, does not suit the existing hardware (Arab Spring republics). How and why? A few areas call for attention.Arab and Turkish Islamism

     

    The eruption of Arab revolutions has done wonders to Turkey. It is all of a sudden catapulted into the limelight as the most relevant transitional example. That is, one on which new Arab transitional candidates may potentially be modelled. It is not just democracy that advocates have in mind. It is precisely “Islamic” or AKP-type democratisation that draws the advocates’ attention. Even here, the argument could not be more flawed.

     

    The brand of AKP democracy invokes “Muslim politics” – the use is intended to take precedence over “Political Islam” and “Islamism”.

     

    The difference is often missed until Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori put the question to bed. The two scholars launched the career of the concept in the 1990s. In its gist it refers to how Islam’s ideals are wedded to reality, by recycling, reviving, selecting, re-thinking and reinterpreting the wide range of symbols and intellectual resources cumulatively added to the religious canons over a period of 1,400 years. The upshot are contests and counter-contests over meaning, fragmentation of sacred authority, and unprecedented access of arguably more educated Muslim masses to the interpretive vocation, once the exclusive bastion of the learned.

     

    Islamism seeks civic re-branding of Islam. It is generally driven by a top-down movement in which the symbols of Islam are re-arranged to suit political ends: systematic Islamisation of state, society and culture. This movement has had its ups and downs, including periods of attrition (confrontation with the national-secular state) and disputations amongst various Brotherhood schools (Sudan, Jordan, Palestine, Gulf and Maghreb countries’ reinterpretations fine-tuning those of the “mother-organisation” in Egypt). The difference between Turkish and Arab Islamism is as follows: Arab Islamists have privileged theory over practice; Turkish Islamists have almost done the opposite.

     

    Not directly tied to Turkish Islamists, but Fethullah Gulen’s eclecticism (open to market economics), pragmatism (gradual renaissance, less emphasis on dogma, stress on education) and spirituality (with a Sufi content), and nationalism (Turkish, local knowledge derived from Nuri Said’s teachings) are difficult to match with Arab seminal ideologues, which count amongst their ranks brilliant thinkers such as the late Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali of Egypt (open to democracy, equal gender relations, universal citizenship and rule of law).

     

    The lineage of both brands of Islamism and the “workshops” where they are forged are different.

     

    Muslim politics more or less facilitates participation by the previously excluded multitude. The gates of speech, too, are flung wide-open. This is where the AKP comes in handy: building resourcefulness in politics to crystallise and prove the utility or relevance of Islamic symbols. There are no clerical oligarchs who pontificate – AKP has no analogue to Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al-Turabi or Rachid Ghannouchi. However, they have amongst their ranks thousands of successful industrialists, businessmen, entrepreneurs, artisans, professionals and civil servants.

     

    Building ‘Islam-city’

     

    As if the AKP builds “Islam-city” bottom-up, acquiring the savoir-faire of both politics and Islam by engaging with the horizontal dimensions of life: how to build modern infrastructure, alleviate poverty, transfer factories from Europe to Turkey and construct a robust work ethic. For Arab Islamists, “Islam-city” remains largely discursive: that is of course until the election of Islamists into power such as in Egypt and Tunisia in the context of the Arab Spring.

     

     

     

     

    That is, it is a figment of re-imagining community, a process threaded to Quranic injunctions and hadiths , and only meekly tied to the travails of how to build a modern economy, a country that works and states that master the art of the game of nations: competitively safeguarding sovereignty and being ahead in the learning curve of the global economy.

     

    To recap, there are three major criteria for drawing parallels and recording differences between the two types of how to be Muslim and active in politics:

     

    In terms of ontology, the AKP and Arab Islamisms agree: in essence, Muslim identity cannot exist de-coupled from Islam.

    When it comes to epistemology: for the AKP, verifiability of Islam-city (civic Islam) finds validation in empiricalsavoir-faire and the attendant tests of Western modernity. For Arab Islamists, dogma, teleology and eschatology are inextricably linked to the search for some notion of “Islam-city” through which the alternative to modernity delivers contests.

    Methodologically, the AKP pragmatically enacts the symbols of Islam quantitatively, privileging hands-on approaches to seek quality, whereas Arab Islamists are qualitative seekers of truth, with quantity being secondary: material success has no meaning if it overlooks eudemonia (happiness) in the hereafter.

    Arab and Turkish secularisms: The route to democracy

     

    There is a Turkish distinction without Arab equivalence. Since the time of Kemal Ataturk, secularism in Turkey has opened up continuous workshops in which polarities forged the dynamics of diversity within unity, and opposites who pluralised the system and eventually set it on a democratising track.

     

    Arab secularisms have been incoherent, rigidly rejecting all opposition. When socialism was state policy, defenders of the market or and liberal politics were constructed as state enemies. When times changed and an open-door policy evolved as the state’s political mantra, discourses, moralities and ideologies on the left of the political spectrum became the new marginal. By and large, the vagaries of the “left” and the “right” proscribed religious voices and forces.

     

    East-West divides have been turned into grounds for creating a workable synthesis, on Turkish terms, through which the excesses of Ataturk’s quest for Europeanisation are blended with Turko-Islamic yearnings. Turkey has transcended the “Western complex”. Arabs, generally, and Islamists more specifically, have turned the “West” as a constant antithesis, a kind of “Orientalism in reverse”, countering Western theses of “exceptionalism” about Arabs and Muslims.

     

    Moreover, Turkish “Muslim politics”, by under-stating dogma and verifying the symbols of Islam in engaging with modernity in a vast territory in which the bar was raised for the country’s industrialists, entrepreneurs, human rights and democracy advocates, and even EU advocates, has gradually learnt how to reconcile the imperatives of secularism and Islamism.

     

    Arab Islamists are, in varying degrees, too dogmatic to raise the level of the discursive and the sophistication that derives from an appreciation of “Smithean logic” (metaphorically) in making wealth for their nations, building countries that work and in competing or developing a vigorous work ethic. Only in these workshops the complex of secularism may be tested, adjusted, and, perhaps, superseded. Declarations of the much-vaunted “Islamic state” thus far lack the practical engagement with modernity’s complexities, innovations and scientific, medical and technological revolutions.

     

    That Turkey is today on course to economic greatness and democratic consolidation must be understood within Turkish specificity: “democratising dialectics” that locked polity and society into a reformist logic of no return. It is through this that structural achievements over a 60-year period, since multi-partyism was launched, that the building blocks of political and economic development have been laid. En route to the current context, Ataturk and Erdogan represent, on the surface, opposites. In practice, combined, respectively, as thesis-antithesis, have created the synthesis that is today Turkey.

     

    Democratic dialectics

     

    Thus each of the political figures in the leadership phalanx in Turkey represents a necessity to mother the invention of the systemic processes of Ataturkist nationalism, military-bureaucratic centralism, followed by multi-partyism, including religious parties, through to democratisation.

     

    Ataturk preserved the Anatolian motherland, and dismantled the Ottoman imperial regime, founding a brand of centralised republicanism. By introducing multi-partyism , “Neo-Ataturkist” Ismet Inonu rebelled against Ataturk’s single-party and patrimonial polity, and reaching to the periphery. He ended the dominance of Ataturk’s Republican People’s Party (RPP), and along with RPP rebels, they had the Democrat Party (DP) as a contender for power by the 1946 general election. Four years later, multi-partyism was in full swing, with the DP winning the 1950 election and leading the government for close to 10 years.

     

    Suleyman Demirel broke with tradition when he revolutionised economic strategy, favouring export-based orientation, the onset of fully-fledged capitalism. It marked the onset of new democratic dialectics in which workers and the forces of the left sharpened their political skills and opposition.

     

    The 1960s, which was marked by a coup against Prime Minister Adnan Menderes’ government, created sufficient democratic dialectics the upshot of which was a momentum pitting civil society against the military and bureaucracy. This was a prime example of how opposites created the transformative dynamics of internal sparring between the forces of paternalistic political patronage and democratic pluralism.

     

     

     

    Even throughout the 1960s and 1970s, under military tutelage and façade democratic competition, from Suleyman Demirel’s Justice Party politics through to Bulent Ecevit of the RPP, Turkey’s polity was acquiring the structural conditions of democratic transitions and society was enabling itself by consolidation of the agency to organise politically.

     

    By the 1980s, the military under General Kenan Evren waseager to steer politics from the sidelines, aided by constitutional guardianship, as new dialectics began with the birth of Kemalism’s most vigorous antithesis: the National Salvation Party and its leader Necmettin Erbakan. Just as qualitative as the rise of Muslim politics in Turkey, which shook the military, the defenders of the Kemalist republic, was Turgut Ozal and the Motherland Party who helped modernise and transform Turkey in the 1980s and early 1990s.

     

    This was an historical moment that marked the severing of the umbilical cord with the generals, unlike under the Demirel and Bulent Ulusu’s governments, which pandered to the top brass. The 1983 election fought under a proportional system, and won by Ozal , asserted society’s thirst for autonomy from the army, setting in motion the process of civilianisation of polity. Erdogan closed the circle: deepening Ozal’s quest for civilianisation of polity (hence the systematic dismantling of the deep state), economic development and globalisation, and closer ties with the European Union. There would have been neither Ozal nor Erdogan without Ataturk, Evran, Demirel, or Erbakan.

     

    Ozal has no Arab analogue in any of the republics ousted by three revolutions in 2011, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. Arab politics were drenched in deep singularity, literally with ruling mass-mobilisation parties occupying the state, eventually privatising politics. The difference could not be starker: Turkey’s state-building began with a narrow ideational and leadership base, which continuously widened, creating openings generated by democratic dialectics, through which thesis and antithesis yield synergy. Arab state-building started with a wide power base, which had been tattered gradually under the juggernaut of eliminating all opposition in the name of national unity and uniformity.

     

    Turkish model versus Turkish good practices

     

    All the Turkish leaders mentioned, however, worked within the parameters demarcated by the republic’s architect Ataturk who remains first amongst equals amongst the inheritors of the ship of government in Turkey: commitment to Turkish nationalism, under the watchful eyes of the military, and the quest for modernity, economic development and democratisation.

     

    However, piece by piece, the early Kemalist tutelage is turned into a dispersed project of collective ownership guided by the objectives of modernisation of economy and society, and de-centralisation, de-bureaucratisation, de-militarisation and democratisation of polity. The new vision is guided by deeper pluralisation so that citizenship includes the sizeable Kurdish minority. This is where the Justice and Development Party or AKP may succeed where its predecessors have failed. Only time will tell how this workshop of refashioning citizenship proceeds.

     

    Turkish democratisation is still unfurling and has imperfections, which Turkish critics, including from within the government know of: deeper and wider universalisation of citizenship rights, and improved human rights. This is the next learning curve for Turkish democrats, including within the AKP. Plus, Turkey needs a new and robustly democratic constitution! May be only then we can talk about a regional democratisation “model”.

     

    In the Arab case, revolution had to arrive. It was logical explosion in the face of a reality in which power-holders monopolised all stakes in politics. Whether the revolutionary route delivers the structural, ideational and moral mechanisms for democratisation remains to be seen. Regardless, the Turkish experience or “model” – with many a good practice of relevance to Arab Spring democracies – cannot be replicated with Ozals and Erdogans.

     

    Dr Larbi Sadiki is a Senior Lecturer in Middle East Politics at the University of Exeter, and author of Arab Democratization: Elections without Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2009) and The Search for Arab Democracy: Discourses and Counter-Discourses (Columbia University Press, 2004).

     

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.

     

     

    Source:

    Al Jazeera

  • Can Turkey become a major economic, political and financial player again?-Analysis

    Can Turkey become a major economic, political and financial player again?-Analysis

    Turkey’s strategic geographical position, at the crossroads of eastern and western cultures, historically guaranteed its political importance on the Old World stage. Now, with its stable economical growth and a young, well-educated and highly skilled workforce, Turkey is once again rising up to become a major economic, political and financial force in the new global economy.

    Turkey has been investing heavily in the development of its infrastructure, with several large projects currently underway. These include the $11bn construction of the Istanbul-Izmir motorway, the $25bn investment in the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant by Russia’s Rosatom and the $15bn investment in the new Istanbul Airport, which will be the world’s largest airport with an annual capacity of 150m passengers. Other major construction projects that have commenced include a high-speed rail link for Istanbul to Anmkara and a third bridge over the Bosphorus, all of which will coincide with Turkey’s bid for the 2020 Olympics.

    While numerous US and European banks collapsed following the global financial and Eurozone crises, Turkey’s banking sector has been performing relatively robustly on the international stage. Turkish central bank data has revealed that portfolio inflows last year rose 60% to $35bn, with commentators describing Turkey as one of the most interesting emerging markets in the region with a diversified range of investment products. Last November, Fitch Ratings gave Turkey its first investment grade credit rating in almost 20 years, which endorses the country’s economic transformation and has been one of the main catalysts for the significant rise in demand for Turkish assets this year.

    Outside interest

    With its deepening capital markets and robust growth, Turkey has caught the interest of the international investment community, particularly from the Gulf region, with investors being drawn to Turkey’s widening range of investment products, from a debut sovereign Sukuk bond issue last September to foreign currency-denominated Eurobonds from both banks and corporates.

    Inward and outward foreign direct investments of all sizes are flooding the market. At the larger end of the scale, the larger investments typically come from new or emerging jurisdictions. Russia is becoming one of the largest trading partners in Turkey, and good and improved relations between the two countries has resulted in Turkey becoming the largest foreign investor in Russia. While Russia’s Rosatom is building the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, Sberbank has acquired both the domestic Turkish Denizbank for over $4bn and the consumer banking division of Citibank in Turkey.

    Outside the financial services sector, a significant proportion of the Turkish pharmaceutical manufacturing industry has been acquired by global drugmakers. These companies, mainly Swiss, German, Japanese and US based, continue to compete for larger shares of Turkey’s fast growing pharmaceutical market, which expanded from $3bn in 2003 to $13bn in 2012.

    There have been similar trends in many other sectors, including insurance and healthcare, as the economy expands and a fast growing population increases purchasing power, consuming both domestic and imported production.

    Turkey’s exports are on a continuous increase, with the government taking critical steps to control the economic growth and current account deficit. The government has committed to increase its exports, currently at $150bn, to over $500bn by Turkey’s centennial celebrations in 2023. Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan recently said that it would be possible to reach a GDP per capita of $25,000, provided that both judicial and educational reforms are carried out to liberalise the economy.

    As part of its stated ambition to establish Istanbul as a major international financial centre appropriate to the country’s standing in the region, the government has set out its plans and construction for the premises of an international financial centre (IFC) have already commenced. The intention is for the IFC to improve the Turkish economy by attracting funds, allowing Turkish businesses to obtain easier finance and for the domestic insurance sector to become closer to international financial markets.

    As part of its commitment to legislative reform and to improve the climate in which to do business in Turkey, the cabinet has sent legislation to parliament on the formation of the Istanbul Arbitration Center (IAC). Turkey is aiming for the IAC to become a major dispute resolution centre for investors particularly in the IFC and a prime centre for the resolution of commercial disputes in the region. At a conference on the proposed IAC, convened in November 2012, the various requirements for the development of a successful arbitration centre were discussed by a record number of 380 delegates.

    As the organisers of the conference, Mehmet Gn & Partners believe that establishing the IAC alone is not enough – it must be supported by the creation of special courts and appeal chambers equipped with the state-of-the-art disclosure processes, so that the complex disputes that IFC participants may encounter can be swiftly and efficiently resolved. We will continue to work to facilitate the establishment and international recognition of the IAC, of specialised IFC courts and the adoption of full and frank disclosure in Turkish civil procedures.

    The deputy prime minister believes that Istanbul can fill the gap between the financial centres of London, Frankfurt and Dubai, and become a regional powerhouse. There is no doubt that following the Arab Spring, Istanbul benefited from its position as a strong stable economy outside the EU and its “safe haven” status for investors in the East Mediterranean, North African and Central Asian region. In Egypt, Cairo has already lost its importance to Istanbul as was shown when the Nikkei Index of Japan relocated its Middle East offices to Istanbul. With an almost bankrupt Greece and Cyprus, and an unstable Egypt, Turkey is paving the way to become the region’s major financial and commercial centre.

    bne/Mehmet Gn of Mehmet Gn & Partners

  • Turkey Is the Model for Arab Spring Nations

    Turkey Is the Model for Arab Spring Nations

    Aki Peritz is the senior policy adviser for national security at Third Way and author of Find, Fix, Finish: Inside the Counterterrorism Campaigns that Killed bin Laden and Devastated Al Qaeda.

    The political advances Islamist parties have been making across the Middle East have caused a lot of uneasiness in Washington. From Egypt to Tunisia, religiously conservative Islamist politicians are leading major countries, complicating an already complex narrative for U.S. policymakers. But is this worry justified?

    Time will tell, but at least we have one decent example of an Islamist party taking power and not crashing the government or the economy: Turkey.

    The “Turkey Model”—how moderate Islamist parties could govern Western-oriented, Muslim-majority countries—was on everyone’s lips during the Arab Spring as the new Middle Eastern paradigm. But the Turkish model will only succeed if these countries can build secular states with strong governmental institutions, and only if the U.S. backs these efforts, as it has strongly supported Turkey over the past 70 years.

    [See a collection of political cartoons on the Middle East.]

    From the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has been the beneficiary of almost a century of secular rule. Generations of Turks have lived in a modern secular state, so much so that women in headscarves even today cannot enter government buildings. The Turkish military is the primary enforcer of secularism, forcing out one government in 1997 the generals deemed too religious. While ugly, it cemented the notion that there are limits to how far religion can advance in the public marketplace.

    As a secular-oriented nation, Turkey is bound to the West in many ways. The shopworn phrase that Turkey sits at the crossroads of Europe and Asia is not just a throwaway line for the country’s tourism industry. As a NATO member since 1952, Turkey is integral to the American-European military alliance, even if the European Union continues to give Ankara the cold shoulder. And NATO needs Turkey, for the country has the second largest military in the alliance.

    Here at home, U.S. policymakers since World War II have seen Turkish stability as a core national security imperative. After all, the 1947 Truman Doctrine was founded specifically to assist Turkey against communist aggression. President Truman provided aid to the “freedom-loving” people of Turkey, for it was “necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity.”

    [See a collection of political cartoons on defense spending.]

    Even now, Turkey is critical, and the US is deeply invested in the country. Turkey hosts U.S. troops at Incirlik Air Base and Izmir Air Station. 400 U.S. troops man Patriot missile batteries in the south, and the nation hosts an X-band radar system at Kürecik Air Base that keeps an eye on its irascible neighbor, Iran. Turkey is also critical to solving – or at least containing – the civil war in Syria.

    Despite some rocky stretches, such as when the Turkish parliament denied the U.S. an invasion route in the run-up to the Iraq War, the U.S. assiduously cultivates Turkey because it remains in Washington’s best interests to do so. As Kim Ghattas noted in “The Secretary,” Secretary of State Clinton saw her Turkish counterpart as “one of her more consequential counterparts even if she didn’t always agree with him. Developing a relationship with [Foreign Minister] Davutoglu was also a way of keeping Turkey close, in the orbit of the West.”

    And this rapport continues to pay dividends: During his latest trip to the region, President Obama brokered a rapprochement between Turkey and Israel renewing the two countries’ strategic partnership.

    This is all accomplished with religious conservatives dominating parliament. Despite some misgivings, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) have been in power for a decade, and so far they’ve been successful in guiding the economy, growing it at almost 6 percent a year.

    [See a collection of political cartoons on the European debt crisis.]

    Still, all is not all rosy in Anatolia. In 2010, Turkey voted against UN sanctions against Iran. A recent scandal named Ergenekon has placed numerous top military men behind bars. Turkey remains on edge with its Kurdish population. And simmering historic tensions with Greece threaten to erupt over Cyprus.

    From a larger perspective, Turkey shows that religious parties and democratic rule are not inherently incompatible. However, a country requires a foundation of stable, credible civilian institutions and a history of citizen-state interactions for this to work—combined with a close and continuing interest from the world’s remaining superpower. This successful recipe could be replicated, over time, across the Middle East.

    When the master Ottoman architect Mimar Sinan designed the magnificent Süleymaniye Mosque in the 1550s, he let the structure’s foundations settle for three years in the earthquake-prone city before beginning the mosque’s actual construction. If the nations of the Middle East had time and patience to let their political foundations become strong and independent enough to withstand periodic shakeups, they too can be like Turkey.

    It remains to be seen whether the leaders guiding the new Middle East have this perseverance—and whether America has the attention span to follow through on our side of the bargain.

    via Turkey Is the Model for Arab Spring Nations – World Report (usnews.com).