Tag: Turkey-Russia

GMIS-2019: global industry and economy leaders meet in the industrial heart of Russia
The Global Manufacturing and Industrialization Summit (GMIS-2019) was held in Yekaterinburg from July, 9 through July, 11. GMIS-2019 business program included more than 40 events, business breakfasts, panels sessions on global business priorities, dialogues with global industry leaders, seminars and presentations. GMIS-2019 discussions focused on topics such as digital transformation and green technologies, smart cities, the development of low-carbon production, safety in industrial automation, robotics, and artificial intelligence.

The GMIS opening ceremony started with the welcome speech of Badr Al–Olama, Head of the Organising Committee for GMIS who said: “Nature should continue inspiring us on our path of technological innovation and transformation in the advent of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. This will allow for clean air, water, food, and quality of life to be sustained for generations to come. We are proud to announce our second global initiative that is inspired by the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and his vision of using sustainable and eco-friendly solutions that are inspired by nature. We look forward to the realisation of this global vision in partnership with academia, the start-up community, and the manufacturing sector.”

Dmitry Kozak, Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, said: “Synchronization of GMIS with the main industrial exhibition INNOPROM makes the 2 events an effective platform for strengthening international industrial cooperation, a unique discussion platform for the joint identification of actual problems of industrialization.”

“Russia’s desire to develop a modern manufacturing sector using 4IR technologies makes it an ideal venue for GMIS in 2019,” said Suhail Mohammed Faraj Al Mazroui , Minister of Energy and Industry of the United Arab Emirates.According to the Director General of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) Lee Yong, “the 4th Industrial revolution will affect all of us, and expert discussions on these issues at GMIS can ensure a course for sustainable development”.

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin said: “I am convinced that ensuring clean air, water, food, and quality of life and life expectancy for billions of people requires drastically new technologies and technical devices, which are less resource-intensive but much more eco-friendly. Such uber efficient scientific engineering, manufacturing solutions will allow us to strike a proper balance between bio and techno spheres. This includes the so-called nature-inspired technologies. They imitate natural processes and systems. They follow the laws of nature. I believe that in our era of tectonic changes and uncertainty, the priority for us are the intrinsic values, the creation of better opportunities for life and development of people. This great responsibility lies with us for the future of our planet and we need to work together.”
The summit was held at the newly-built Congress Centre. The modern design and the infrastructure of the 42,000m2 Congress Centre was mentioned by the UNIDO head Li Yong as well as other high-profile guests. The Congress Centre accommodates conference halls, a media centre, art gallery, exhibition space, seminar rooms and lounges. It will become a major venue, presenting the widest diversity of exhibitions and events that will support the economic, industrial and cultural vitality of the city and region of Ekaterinburg.
July 28, 2019
Cyprus Crisis And Russia Turkey Tensions

Moscow and Cyprus are still negotiating terms of a potential bailout.

Most will hail the crisis’s receding if a deal is reached.

But for Turkey, seeing Cyprus and Russia growing even closer together could revive age-old hostilities between Moscow and Istanbul.

Depending on how far back you want to go, the love between the two was first lost upon Mehmed II’s sacking of Constantinople — capital of Christian Orthodoxy — in 1453.

Then came the Crimean war in the 1850s, which pitted Russia against the Ottoman Empire (as well as France and Britain) over the rights of Christians in the Middle East.

And during the Cold War, Turkey became a staunch ally of the U.S.

Relations have improved more recently, especially under President Medvedev.

Google MapsBut the conflict that engulfed Cyprus in the ’70s — which saw Turkey invade the island to prevent it from coming under Orthodox Greece’s influence — has never actually ended.

To this day, a small enclave calls itself “The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” and is recognized by Turkey (though they’re the only ones who do so). As recently as 2001, Turkey was threatening to annex the north if Cyprus joined the EU.

We already know Russians do a lot of business on the island, so any more intimate relations between the two countries — like a naval base — shouldn’t really come as a surprise.

But that kind of move will not likely sit well in Istabul.

via Cyprus Crisis And Russia Turkey Tensions – Business Insider.

March 21, 2013
Turkey-Russia relations and missile defence

The ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) pursuit of a more muscular and independent foreign policy has helped change the perception of Ankara in Moscow over the past ten years from being in step with NATO aims to a more independent foreign policy actor.

Turkish President Abdullah Gul (left) greets Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Turkey-Russia economic relations are a key component of bilateral ties. Reuters
“There have been some remarkable milestones that affected Turkish-Russian relations and paved the way for further co-operation,” Habibe Ozdal, a researcher at the International Strategic Research Organisation, specialising in Russia and Black Sea Studies, tells SETimes.

One of these significant milestones was the Turkish parliament’s refusal to allow the United States to invade northern Iraq from Turkish territory in 2003.

After this decision, “Ankara started to be evaluated as an independent actor in the region. From this standpoint, Moscow began to evaluate Ankara as an important actor that can stand for its national interests, even against a longtime ally,” according to Ozdal.

On the local level, growing bilateral trade and tourism has contributed to the thawing of relations. However, close relations with Moscow are still new, and the two sides are working to build trust at the upper echelons of government.

“It [Turkey] has been a member of NATO since 1952, that together with the EU integration process, has built up a certain level of trust [with the West] … between Turkish policy spheres, state agencies, security, military and business elites,” European Geopolitical Forum founder Marat Terterov tells SETimes.

“They don’t have the equivalent of that in the Turkish-Russian relationship. They are in the process of building it.”

One potential point of contention is Russia’s stringent opposition to the NATO decision to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system, which includes the forward based radar on Turkish territory.

“While [most] Russians generally accept the US and NATO concern about countries with missile capability, such as Iran, they do not see that capability emerging in the near future,” Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-proliferation senior fellow Nikolai Sokov told SETimes.

“According to Russian assessments, Iran is still pretty far from long-range missile capability. Hence they suspect that the real reason for missile defence is not the reason that is publicly declared.”

The recently concluded agreements for the launch of the newer Phased Adaptive approach with Turkey, Romania, Poland and Spain has been met with sharp criticism in Moscow.

“This is not about the radar itself — it clearly does not have capability vis-a-vis Russia. It was rather seen as further evidence that NATO proceeded with implementing missile defence plans without co-ordinating with Moscow,” Sokov said.

“People are making the argument that the missile defence would undermine the Russian strategic potential,” Pavel Podvig, director and principal investigator of the Russian Nuclear Forces Project, tells SETimes.

“There is no way the system can be a threat to anyone,” according to Podvig, but “the military and defence agencies [in NATO member states] are using it as a pretext for new programmes and for more money.”

This content was commissioned for SETimes.com.

October 21, 2011
Turkey Pursues Mixed Aims Over Supply Contract Cancellation With Russia

Turkey Pursues Mixed Aims Over Supply Contract Cancellation With Russia

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 182

October 4, 2011

By: Saban Kardas

After the failure of Turkey’s apparently last-ditch effort to renegotiate the price for Russian gas, Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz announced Turkey would not renew the supply contract through the “Western pipeline,” scheduled to expire at the end of the year. The contract was originally signed in 1986, which was a major turning point for Turkish-Russian relations, as Turkey went ahead with this deal in Cold War conditions. Since then, Turkey’s energy ties with Russia have flourished, in parallel with the overall improvement of bilateral relations.

Under the contract, Turkey imports 6 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas through the Balkans, which is distributed in Istanbul and the surrounding areas. Turkey also has other supply agreements with Gazprom through the same pipeline and the Blue Stream pipeline, and additional supply agreements with Azerbaijan and Iran, as well as importing LNG from Algeria and Nigeria. Granted, Turkey’s imports from Russia account for almost two-thirds of its total gas consumption.

In addition to its concerns over the strategic liability generated by this overdependence, Turkey has raised several demands vis-à-vis Gazprom for some time. Ankara has confronted the problem of over-contracting, which emerged as a major issue following the contraction of its energy consumption in the wake of the global financial crisis. As Turkey had to incur penalties resulting from take-or-pay provisions, it has been demanding an easing of the supply terms. Moreover, given the calculation indexes linking gas and oil prices, Turkey, along with other importers, has been complaining about the hike in its energy bills. Again, Turkey’s demand for price revision has largely fallen on deaf ears, which became an issue during Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s trip to Moscow earlier this year. His Russian counterparts only deferred the issue for further discussion (EDM, March 18).

The parties were expected to notify their decision for the cancellation of the 1986 agreement six months prior to the expiration date, or it would be renewed automatically. Gazprom responded positively to Ankara’s request for the postponement of the date for notification to the end of September. Gazprom’s concession to Italy’s ENI in a similar plea partly encouraged BOTAS to expect a similar outcome (Sabah, July 25). Yet, Gazprom, instead, raised the price in its quarterly revision (Radikal, August 10).

While an agreement was not forthcoming in the lingering talks and the deadline was approaching, Yildiz threatened not to renew the contract, citing a 39 percent increase in prices over the last 29 months. In a swift reaction, Gazprom officials downplayed the minister’s remarks, arguing that they received no confirmation to that effect from BOTAS, which was their partner in Turkey (Hurriyet, September 29; EDM, September 30). However, Gazprom officials apparently undervalued some nuances: after all BOTAS was a public corporation and the Turkish government was very sensitive to energy issues, not to mention the fact that Turkey’s concerns were long on the agenda.

With the Russian side’s failure to meet the expectation for discounts, Yildiz announced that BOTAS conveyed to its partners the decision to end the contract (Anadolu Ajansi, October 1). While the decision seems to halt about 15 percent of Turkey’s supplies, Yildiz sought to allay concern that it might lead to gas shortages, citing the ongoing supply contracts with Russia and other countries, as well as the import contracts signed by the private sector. Alexander Medvedev, the Director-General of Gazprom Export, also confirmed this development, noting that Gazprom will continue to supply the same volume to Turkish end-users through existing and new customers, including those from the private sector (www.cnnturk.com, October 3).

This development was possibly sparked by various interrelated considerations, which is hidden in Yildiz’s remarks. First, there seems to be strategic reasoning. Through this move, Turkey wants to send a signal that it is determined to break its over-reliance on natural gas (especially for electricity generation) on the one hand and Russian gas on the other. It is instructive that Yildiz explained in detail how Russia was unresponsive to Turkey’s demands for price revision for a long time, and added that with this move Turkey demonstrated that it was not devoid of options for supply diversification. Granted, for Turkey, Gazprom has been a reliable supplier and will likely remain a major supplier in the years to come. Given that Yildiz also acknowledged that point and added that the private sector would likely sign new contracts with Russia, it seems that this move largely seeks to enhance Turkey’s bargaining position in the future.

A second and related point suggests that this development is driven by Turkey’s ongoing project of liberalizing its energy markets. In particular, the Turkish government has been criticized for its slow pace in decoupling BOTAS’s transportation grid and its monopoly on imports. Private companies have already secured supply contracts in some instances, and it was reported that Gazprom did not concede to the transfer of contracts to private importers. With this decision, the government hopes private companies will take over the contracts with Gazprom, hopefully on more favorable terms, while simultaneously reducing BOTAS’s market share, which is also a requirement the EU has put before Turkey. It remains to be seen, however, if this move will enhance Turkey’s bargaining leverage vis-à-vis Russia and other suppliers. There is reason to doubt whether private companies bidding for smaller volumes of gas will be able to gain a better bargaining power than what BOTAS has accomplished so far vis-à-vis Gazprom.

Third, the decision seeks to contain BOTAS’s losses, which has been selling gas to domestic consumers below its actual costs. On the same day that Yildiz announced the termination of the contract, BOTAS issued new prices for residential and industrial consumers, which implied price hikes of over 10 percent. While BOTAS cited the declining value of the Turkish Lira and increases in gas prices in international markets, this major price adjustment came as a shock to consumers. Instead of paying for unused gas, BOTAS had kept the prices constant in order not to curb consumption. The latest price hike, accompanied by efforts to reduce BOTAS’s market share and its take-or-pay obligations, seeks to improve the company’s financial standing, which has been running huge losses due to such practices in gas sales. But Turkish consumers – who became accustomed to this indirect subsidy – are unlikely to welcome the development.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-pursues-mixed-aims-over-supply-contract-cancellation-with-russia/

October 4, 2011
Turkey and Russia Defy America’s Imperial Design in the Middle East and Central Asia

by Eric Walberg

Global Research, October 1, 2010

Al-Ahram Weekly

The new Ottomans and the new Byzantines are poised for an intercept as the US stumbles in the current Great Game.

The neocon plan to transform the Middle East and Central Asia into a pliant client of the US empire and its only-democracy-in-the-Middle-East is now facing a very different playing field. Not only are the wars against the Palestinians, Afghans and Iraqis floundering, but they have set in motion unforeseen moves by all the regional players.

The empire faces a resurgent Turkey, heir to the Ottomans, who governed a largely peaceful Middle East for half a millennium. As part of a dynamic diplomatic outreach under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey re-established the Caliphate visa-free tradition with Albania, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya and Syria last year. In February Turkish Culture and Tourism Minister Ertugrul Gunay offered to do likewise with Egypt. There is “a great new plan of creating a Middle East Union as a regional equivalent of the European Union” with Turkey, fresh from a resounding constitutional referendum win by the AKP, writes Israel Shamir.

Turkey also established a strategic partnership with Russia during the past two years, with a visa-free regime and ambitious trade and investment plans (denominated in rubles and lira), including the construction of new pipelines and nuclear energy facilities.

Just as Turkey is heir to the Ottomans, Russia is heir to the Byzantines, who ruled a largely peaceful Middle East for close to a millennium before the Turks. Together, Russia and Turkey have far more justification as Middle Eastern “hegemons” than the British-American 20th century usurpers, and they are doing something about it.

In a delicious irony, invasions by the US and Israel in the Middle East and Eurasia have not cowed the countries affected, but emboldened them to work together, creating the basis for a new alignment of forces, including Russia, Turkey, Syria and Iran.

Syria, Turkey and Iran are united not only by tradition, faith, resistance to US-Israeli plans, but by their common need to fight Kurdish separatists, who have been supported by both the US and Israel. Their economic cooperation is growing by leaps and bounds. Adding Russia to the mix constitutes a like-minded, strong regional force encompassing the full socio-political spectrum, from Sunni and Shia Muslim, Christian, even Jewish, to secular traditions.

This is the natural regional geopolitical logic, not the artificial one imposed over the past 150 years by the British and now US empires. Just as the Crusaders came to wreak havoc a millennium ago, forcing locals to unite to expel the invaders, so today’s Crusaders have set in motion the forces of their own demise.

Turkey’s bold move with Brazil to defuse the West’s stand-off with Iran caught the world’s imagination in May. Its defiance of Israel after the Israeli attack on the Peace Flotilla trying to break the siege of Gaza in June made it the darling of the Arab world.

Russia has its own, less spectacular contributions to these, the most burning issues in the Middle East today. There are problems for Russia. Its crippled economy and weakened military give it pause in anything that might provoke the world superpower. Its elites are divided on how far to pursuit accommodation with the US. The tragedies of Afghanistan and Chechnya and fears arising from the impasse in most of the “stans” continue to plague Russia’s relations with the Muslim Middle East.

Since the departure of Soviet forces from Egypt in 1972, Russia has not officially had a strong presence in the Middle East. Since the mid- 1980s, it saw a million-odd Russians emigrate to Israel, who like immigrants anywhere, are anxious to prove their devotion and are on the whole unwilling to give up land in any two-state solution for Palestine. As Anatol Sharansky quipped to Bill Clinton after he emigrated, “I come from one of the biggest countries in the world to one of the smallest. You want me to cut it in half. No, thank you.” Russia now has its very own well-funded Israel Lobby; many Russians are dual Israeli citizens, enjoying a visa-free regime with Israel.

Then there is Russia’s equivocal stance on the stand-off between the West and Iran. Russia cooperates with Iran on nuclear energy, but has concerns about Iran’s nuclear intentions, supporting Security Council sanctions and cancelling the S-300 missile deal it signed with Iran in 2005. It is also increasing its support for US efforts in Afghanistan. Many commentators conclude that these are signs that the Russian leadership under President Dmitri Medvedev is caving in to Washington, backtracking on the more anti-imperial policy of Putin. “They showed that they are not reliable,” criticised Iranian Defence Minister Ahmad Vahidi.

Russia is fence-sitting on this tricky dilemma. It is also siding, so far, with the US and the EU in refusing to include Turkey and Brazil in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme. “The Non-Aligned countries in general, and Iran in particular, have interpreted the Russian vote as the will on the part of a great power to prevent emerging powers from attaining the energy independence they need for their economic development. And it will be difficult to make them forget this Russian faux pas,” argues Thierry Meyssan at voltairenet.org.

Whatever the truth is there, the cooperation with Iran and now Turkey, Syria and Egypt on developing peaceful nuclear power, and the recent agreement to sell Syria advanced P-800 cruise missiles show Russia is hardly the plaything of the US and Israel in Middle East issues. Israel is furious over the missile sale to Syria, and last week threatened to sell “strategic, tie-breaking weapons” to “areas of strategic importance” to Russia in revenge. On both Iran and Syria, Russia’s moves suggest it is trying to calm volatile situations that could explode.

There are other reasons to see Russia as a possible Middle East powerbroker. The millions of Russian Jews who moved to Israel are not necessarily a Lieberman-like Achilles Heel for Russia. A third of them are scornfully dismissed as not sufficiently kosher and could be a serious problem for a state that is founded solely on racial purity. Many have returned to Russia or managed to move on to greener pastures. Already, such prominent rightwing politicians as Moshe Arens, political patron of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, are considering a one-state solution. Perhaps these Russian immigrants will produce a Frederik de Klerk to re-enact the dismantling of South African apartheid.

Russia holds another intriguing key to peace in the Middle East. Zionism from the start was a secular socialist movement, with religious conservative Jews strongly opposed, a situation that continues even today, despite the defection of many under blandishments from the likes of Ben Gurion and Netanyahu. Like the Palestinians, True Torah Jews don’t recognise the “Jewish state”.

But wait! There is a legitimate Jewish state, a secular one set up in 1928 in Birobidjan Russia, in accordance with Soviet secular nationalities policies. There is nothing stopping Israeli Jews, orthodox and secular alike, from moving to this Jewish homeland, blessed with abundant raw materials, Golda Meir’s “a land without a people for a people without a land”. It has taken on a new lease on life since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev made an unprecedented visit this summer, the first ever of a Russian (or Soviet) leader and pointed out the strong Russian state support it has as a Jewish homeland where Yiddish, the secular language of European Jews (not sacred Hebrew), is the state language.

There has been no magic hand guiding Turkey and Russia as they form the axis of a new political formation. Rather it is the resilience of Islam in the face of Western onslaught, plus — surprisingly — a page from the history of Soviet secular national self-determination. Turkey, once the “sick man of Europe”, is now “the only healthy man of Europe”, Turkish President Abdullah Gul was told at the UN Millennium Goals Summit last week, positioning it along with the Russian, and friends Iranian and Syrian to clean up the mess created by the British empire and its “democratic” offspring, the US and Israel.

While US and Israeli strategists continue to pore over mad schemes to invade Iran, Russian and Turkish leaders plan to increase trade and development in the Middle East, including nuclear power. From a Middle Eastern point of view, Russia’s eagerness to build power stations in Iran, Turkey, Syria and Egypt shows a desire to help accelerate the economic development that Westerners have long denied the Middle East — other than Israel — for so long. This includes Lebanon where Stroitransgaz and Gazprom will transit Syrian gas until Beirut can overcome Israeli-imposed obstacles to the exploitation of its large reserves offshore.

Russia in its own way, like its ally Turkey, has placed itself as a go-between in the most urgent problems facing the Middle East — Palestine and Iran. “Peace in the Middle East holds the key to a peaceful and stable future in the world,” Gul told the UN Millennium Goals Summit — in English. The world now watches to see if their efforts will bear fruit.

Eric Walberg writes for Al-Ahram Weekly http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/ You can reach him at http://ericwalberg.com

https://www.globalresearch.ca/turkey-and-russia-defy-america-s-imperial-design-in-the-middle-east-and-central-asia/21273

October 3, 2010
Russia no longer ‘security threat’ to Turkey

ANKARA, August 23 (RIA Novosti)-Turkey will strike four countries, including Russia, from its list of external security threats in a bid to revise the country’s national security strategy, national media reported on Monday.

The new national security strategy, the draft of which is to be considered at a National Security Council meeting in October, excludes Russia, Greece, Iran and Iraq from the so-called Red Book – a national security policy document – as “principal external threats,” the Milliyet daily said.

Turkey regards international terrorism and fundamentalism as its main external threats.

Ankara has been closely cooperating with the four former “security threats” in recent years and now regards them as its new partners.

Turkey’s relations with Russia have greatly improved since Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Party of Justice and Development came to power in 2002.

The draft strategy highlights close bilateral economic cooperation with Russia, good potential in trade and energy, and “a shared vision of stability in the Caucasus.”

August 23, 2010