Turkish Forum

Tag: Taner Yildiz

  • Turkey Seeks Closer Energy Partnership and LNG Contract with Qatar

    Turkey Seeks Closer Energy Partnership and LNG Contract with Qatar

    Turkey Seeks Closer Energy Partnership and LNG Contract with Qatar

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 158
    August 18, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    The Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, paid a two day visit to Turkey on August 17-18, as the guest of Turkish President Abdullah Gul. They both signed several agreements aimed at improving bilateral relations, including promoting closer cooperation on energy issues.

    On August 17, Gul and al-Thani met in Istanbul. The Turkish and Qatari delegations held working meetings during the day, discussing regional issues as well as bilateral cooperation. The first bilateral agreement signed involved a protocol concerning regulating labor issues between the two countries. The second agreement was inked between Turkish Radio and Television Corporation and Qatar’s State Television to enhance broadcasting cooperation. The parties also signed a memorandum of understanding on waiving visa requirements for their citizens (Cihan, August 17).

    During the press briefing, Gul emphasized that the high-level delegation accompanying al-Thani indicated the importance that Qatar attaches to Turkey. He noted that economic cooperation was the most important aspect of bilateral ties and highlighted Qatar’s help in facilitating Turkey’s relations with other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Gul also referred to Qatar’s constructive role in regional affairs and praised his counterpart’s efforts to mediate over regional problems. He reiterated that Turkey and Qatar held similar positions on many issues, and that they had worked together to promote regional peace. Al-Thani also highlighted their growing bilateral ties and expressed his determination to further develop this relationship. Moreover, he acknowledged Turkey’s role in regional policies, and his gratitude toward Ankara for its position on the Palestinian issue (www.tcbb.gov.tr, August 17).

    The annual trade volume between both countries remains low at $1.5 billion. However, Qatar is an important destination for Turkish contractors and its companies have undertaken multi-billion dollar projects there. Realizing the great potential created by Qatar’s infrastructure investments and its expanding economy, the Turkish private sector wants to further penetrate this market. The Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (ITO) recently announced that as part of their “Gulf Expansion” project, they will hold a major Turkish export fair in Qatar in September (Hurriyet Daily News, July 26). Turkey is also eager to attract investments from Qatar to boost its own economic development, as part of its broader attempt to turn the country into a major destination for Persian Gulf capital (EDM, February 5).

    Reflecting these interests, on the second day of his trip Gul and al-Thani attended a working breakfast of the Turkish-Qatar Business Council, hosted by Turkey’s Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) and the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK). Gul and the AKP government have proven instrumental in developing closer ties with Qatar and have promoted the flow of Qatari capital in Turkey, thanks partly to their personal ties. However, some of these business transactions were the subject of domestic political discussions. The joint-ventures between Qatari firms and businessmen close to the Turkish government continue to be a major source of criticism (Milliyet, May 1, 2008).

    The parties announced that they will set up a Turkey-Qatar Joint Energy Working Group. Gul said that they discussed the feasibility of gas pipelines, storage facilities and refineries, as well as meeting Turkey’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) needs. Gul invited Qatar to invest in the storage facilities in Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, which is the terminus of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the planned Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline. Ankara has actively promoted Ceyhan as a global energy terminal, and al-Thani responded to this offer with great enthusiasm (Vatan, August 18).

    Al-Thani also added that he hopes to see a “pipeline” running from Qatar to Turkey, and that the feasibility work on that project will continue. It was unclear, however, whether it would be a natural gas or crude pipeline, and what route it would follow.

    Prior to the visit, Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yildiz had publicized the “natural gas” dimension of the bilateral meeting. Yildiz said that talks were underway with Qatar concerning importing LNG. Yildiz noted that his contacts with Qatar are part of a broader Turkish effort to diversify its energy suppliers and supply routes. He said that if the parties could reach a consensus, Turkey might import around 4 billion cubic meters (bcm) of LNG annually from Qatar (Anadolu Ajansi, August 16). He also added that he hoped to sign a declaration on LNG imports during the visit of the Qatari delegation, yet following the meetings no official announcement was made to that effect.

    Qatar is believed to possess the third largest gas reserves in the world, behind Russia and Iran. It is also a leading supplier of LNG and Turkey wants to develop cooperation with Qatar in natural gas projects. In July Qatar was represented during the signing ceremony of the E.U.-backed Nabucco pipeline and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan maintained that Nabucco might tap into Qatar’s gas in the future (EDM, July 14).

    Ankara has attempted to import Qatari LNG for its domestic needs for some time. During Gul’s February 2008 and Erdogan’s April 2008 visits to Qatar, energy was an important item on their agendas. They raised the issue of LNG imports, and the negotiations on this have continued since (Hurriyet, February 5, 2008; ANKA, April 15, 2008).

    As a country heavily dependent on importing natural gas, Turkey meets its needs primarily through pipelines from Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan. It also has contracts with Algeria and Nigeria to import 4 bcm and 1.2 bcm of LNG annually, respectively. However, during the heavier winters, or when there are supply disruptions caused by the problems mainly encountered with Iran, Turkey is forced to buy LNG on spot markets. Since it lacks major natural gas storage facilities, such seasonal fluctuations result in the payment of higher sums for energy bills (Radikal, August 17). Therefore, Ankara is considering expanding the country’s storage capacity and importing larger amounts of LNG through long-term contracts, which might help it avoid such problems in the future.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-seeks-closer-energy-partnership-and-lng-contract-with-qatar/
  • Progress in Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices and Transit

    Progress in Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices and Transit

    Progress in Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices and Transit

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 153
    August 10, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Following the signing of energy cooperation agreements between Turkey and Russia, Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz continued his “energy diplomacy,” by visiting Azerbaijan. Prior to departing for the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, the Azerbaijani enclave between Turkey and Armenia, on August 8 Yildiz stressed that his trip followed the agreements Turkey recently signed on both the Nabucco project and South Stream. He also added that as part of intensive energy diplomacy, he will travel to Syria this week to sign an agreement for the construction of a pipeline that will connect the Arab gas pipeline with the Turkish grid (Anadolu Ajansi, August 8).

    In Nakhchivan, Yildiz met with the President of Nakhchivan Vasif Talibov and the head of the Azerbaijani oil company SOCAR, Rovnag Abdullayev. Turkey and Nakhchivan signed a memorandum of understanding on laying a pipeline from the East Anatolian city of Igdir to Nakhchivan, which will carry half a billion cubic meters (bcm) of Azeri gas annually to Nakhchivan (Cihan, August 8).

    Another major part of Yildiz’s agenda were talks between Turkey and Azerbaijan concerning the gas trade and transportation. Although the negotiations have been under way for some time, Ankara and Baku have been unable to reach an agreement on three inter-related issues: re-pricing the gas Turkey imports from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz I reserves, setting the price and volume for Turkey’s imports from the Shah Deniz II, and developing a regime for the transit of the gas through the Turkish territory (www.cnnturk.com, August 8).

    These issues have implications beyond bilateral relations between Ankara and Baku. In the context of the discussions concerning the construction of alternative pipelines carrying Caspian basin gas to European markets, there is growing interest in tapping into Azerbaijan’s resources, particularly the Shah Deniz II field, which is expected to be operational by 2016. Whereas the European companies are interested in purchasing Azeri gas to feed Nabucco, Russia has been trying to lock in the same resources through a long-term contract to supply its alternative South Stream project and to pre-empt Nabucco. Baku is looking to secure the best deal from this competition, and diversify its export routes as much as possible, which led it to export a symbolic volume of gas to Russia through a non-binding agreement in June, which seems to have paid some tactical dividends (EDM, July 17).

    Azerbaijan’s decision is considered as a “flexible tactical move” on Baku’s part (EDM, July 2). The agreement demonstrated to Ankara and its Nabucco partners that Azerbaijan was not short of options for the sale and transport of its gas. Indeed, the urgency induced by the agreement served as a wake-up call for Turkey and other European countries, which helped convince Ankara to end its stalling and open the way to sign the Nabucco inter-governmental agreement (EDM, July 6).

    Nonetheless, a second tactical goal of the Azeri-Russian agreement has yet to bear concrete results: “the $350 price offer [which Russia will pay for the Azeri gas] has set a benchmark that other importers of Azerbaijani gas may have to bid against” (EDM, July 2). Indeed, Baku’s sudden move surprised many in Ankara at the time, leading to speculation that Turkey might have to pay higher prices. Nonetheless, when asked about the impact of the Azeri-Russian deal on the Turkish-Azeri talks on re-pricing, Yildiz preferred to decouple the two processes from each other. “How much does the [Azeri-Russian agreement] affect the price? This question should be directed to Abdullayev. We had submitted our offer before the agreement with Russia, and we are still at the same position. Because, [we believe] our price offer takes into account both sides’ interests, and ensures that the project remains feasible” (www.haberturk.com, July 10).

    Ankara claimed that it offered a “fair” price to Baku, and it expected this to be accepted (EDM, June 4). Apparently Turkey proved unable to satisfy the expectations of the Azeri side, and Yildiz and Abdullayev have held several meetings to discuss this issue. Ankara’s reluctance to revise the price for Azeri gas raises suspicions that, using its geographic position as leverage, Ankara is resorting to “tactics of extortion” to maximize its benefits at Azerbaijan’s expense, which might eventually undermine the prospects for Nabucco (EDM, July 2).

    Nonetheless, Azerbaijan’s ongoing talks with Turkey demonstrate its willingness to export its gas to European markets independent of Russian-controlled pipelines and its treatment of Nabucco as an overriding national interest. However, the conditions that Ankara will attach to the use of its territory for exports, including transit fees and re-export rights, are a major factor influencing Baku’s decision, which raises a larger question about the Turkish government’s position on pipeline diplomacy.

    After signing agreements on both Nabucco and South Stream, Ankara maintains that the two projects are not necessarily exclusive. Moreover, in response to charges that Turkey’s agreement with Russia, which granted South Stream the right to conduct seismic feasibility studies in the Turkish zone of the Black Sea, was a serious blow to Nabucco, Turkish officials maintain that “Turkey is not a partner in the South Stream project and only allowed the use of its territorial waters in the Black Sea, while the country is a partner state in Nabucco.” They also added that Turkey still considers Nabucco as a strategic priority (Hurriyet Daily News, August 7).

    If Turkey indeed treats Nabucco as a priority project, one area where it could tilt the balance in favor of Nabucco is to facilitate the westward flow of Azeri gas. In this way, it could cement its ties to Baku and reassure its Western partners of its commitment to Nabucco. No agreement was signed during Yildiz’s meeting, but the statements by Azeri officials signaled a promising future. Abdullayev said that, “we came close to concluding Turkey-Azerbaijan gas agreements. We can soon finalize the issue of transit prices. Gas from Shah Deniz will also come to Turkey, and will flow to Europe through Turkey. This will support the two sister nations” (www.ntvturk.com, August 8).

    https://jamestown.org/program/progress-in-turkish-azeri-talks-on-gas-prices-and-transit/
  • Ankara Approves Nabucco Following High Level Visit to Moscow

    Ankara Approves Nabucco Following High Level Visit to Moscow

    Ankara Approves Nabucco Following High Level Visit to Moscow

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 128
    July 6, 2009 12:48 PM Age: 4 hrs
    Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Turkey, Energy, Foreign Policy, Economics, Featured
    By: Saban Kardas
    Ankara has reportedly finally given the green light to the Nabucco project, and the intergovernmental agreement might be signed on July 13. When the news broke on the Russian deal with Azerbaijan (EDM, July 2), the Turkish media initially suggested it represented a lethal blow to Nabucco. Partly as a result of the Russian media’s manipulation, it was interpreted as a negative development to undermine the viability of Nabucco (www.nethaber.com, June 30).

    On July 1-2, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu visited Moscow to meet his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. Before his departure, Davutoglu said that Turkey was unconcerned about the gas deal between Moscow and Baku, and supported enhanced cooperation between its neighbors. Davutoglu maintained that growing regional cooperation, especially in energy, will benefit everyone in the region, (Anadolu Ajansi, July 1).

    Energy Minister Taner Yildiz made a similar point, arguing that the different projects are not alternatives and choosing one does not necessarily mean foregoing another. Yildiz added that the Russian-Azeri agreement would not affect Turkish-Azeri talks on the re-negotiation of the price for Turkey’s gas imports from Shah Deniz-I, and the country’s future imports from Shah Deniz-II (www.iha.com.tr, July 1).

    In Moscow, Davutoglu held talks on bilateral relations as well as regional security issues. During their joint press briefing, Davutoglu emphasized that Turkey and Russia have developed close economic, commercial, cultural and political ties, while both countries could solve their differences through dialogue. Davutoglu told reporters that, though the date was not set, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin would visit Turkey in the near future. Lavrov also underlined that the approaches of the two countries toward regional and global problems overlap.

    Asked about the possibility of Turkey’s cooperation with Russia in the South Stream project, Davutoglu said: “There are no limitations and barriers on Russian-Turkish cooperation. We decided to consider all projects, including alternative energy projects. Therefore, I want to express our readiness to collaborate with Russia on South Stream or other projects in a transparent manner.” Responding to the same question, Lavrov said that if Turkey decided to join the project, the Russian side would prepare the necessary groundwork. He added that the Turkish energy minister will discuss the details with the Russian officials (Anadolu Ajansi, July 2).

    Indeed, Yildiz also visited Moscow at the same time, at the invitation of the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin. As the co-chairs of the joint Turkish-Russian economic council, Yildiz and Sechin discussed bilateral economic relations. Yildiz raised issues relating to Turkish investors operating in Russia, particularly the “customs crisis.” Cooperation in energy issues occupied a large part of Yildiz’s itinerary. Energy related topics included the Russian offer to build Blue Stream II beneath the Black Sea, the current status of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant tender which was awarded to a Russian consortium, preliminary negotiations for additional gas purchases from Russia, and the South Stream project (Milliyet, July 1).

    Sechin told Yildiz that Moscow has studied the feasibility of various possible projects to diversify energy supplies to Europe. He claimed that South Stream outperforms Nabucco in terms of its efficiency and economic feasibility, and invited Turkey to join the project. In particular, he claimed that Russia has enough proven gas reserves to feed South Stream. Nonetheless, the Russian delegation did not elaborate any specific role envisaged for Turkey in South Stream, which in its current form would not cross Turkish territory.

    Yildiz repeated Ankara’s frequent argument that Nabucco and South Stream are not necessarily competitors: “This is a strategic package. It includes important projects that concern the two countries, our regions and our neighbors.” The Turkish government will evaluate all offers on the table, and choose the project that satisfies both countries’ interests, Yildiz added (Cihan, July 2).

    These developments led to speculation that Nabucco was in crisis (www.cnnturk.com, July 2). On his return to Turkey, Yildiz dismissed Russian media reports that Moscow asked Ankara to withdraw from Nabucco. Moreover, Yildiz said that the negotiations on Nabucco were well advanced and the parties were close to signing a deal, though avoiding specifying a date. He added that the talks were being carried out by the foreign ministry and prime minister’s office (Hurriyet, July 3).

    On the same day, European Commission officials announced that Turkey extended an invitation to its Nabucco partners to attend a ceremony in Ankara to sign the long-delayed intergovernmental agreement on July 13 (Anadolu Ajansi, July 3). The commission spokesman and Nabucco officials provided no further details as to whether Turkish demands were met to ensure its supply security, especially the controversial 15 percent clause, which had been stalling the negotiations (www.euobserver.com, July 3).

    Davutoglu flew from Moscow to Bucharest at the invitation of his Romanian counterpart Cristian Diaconescu, where he met the Romanian president and other officials. He discussed bilateral partnerships and regional cooperation in the Black Sea. After emphasizing the flourishing ties between the two countries, Davutoglu praised their cooperation in the context of the Nabucco project. Though he noted that Nabucco and South Stream were not mutually exclusive, Davutoglu maintained “Nabucco is a strategic project for us. This will continue to remain our main priority” (Cihan, July 3).

    Both Davutoglu and Yildiz declined to set a date but affirmed that the intergovernmental agreement will be signed soon. Sources close to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s office, however, reportedly confirmed that the government plans to hold a ceremony on July 13. If the schedule of the heads of state from the other Nabucco partners, Bulgaria, Romania, Austria and Hungary permits, then the agreement will be signed in Ankara (Hurriyet, July 4).

    What led to this turnaround in Turkey’s position and whether it secured concessions from its partners will be clarified if Ankara hosts the intergovernmental agreement next week. However, last week’s heavy diplomatic traffic, combined with Erdogan’s earlier contacts in Brussels, shows the extent to which Turkey wants to maximize its political and commercial gains by pitting the rival pipeline projects against each other.

    https://jamestown.org/program/ankara-approves-nabucco-following-high-level-visit-to-moscow/
  • Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices Continue through “Soccer Diplomacy”

    Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices Continue through “Soccer Diplomacy”

    Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices Continue through “Soccer Diplomacy”

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 107
    June 4, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yildiz discussed energy issues with Azeri officials on the sidelines of a recent soccer game. Following his talks, Yildiz commented on the status of the Turkish-Azeri talks on pricing gas imports and Turkey’s position on the Nabucco project. The incident echoes what was referred to as the “soccer diplomacy” conducted last year between Turkey and Armenia.

    The Turkish and Azeri national soccer teams played a friendly game in Turkey’s central Anatolian city of Kayseri on June 2. There was huge public interest and over 30,000 spectators decorated the stadium with the Turkish and Azeri flags. They carried placards and chanted slogans reflecting the sense of solidarity between the two nations: “We are all Azeris,” “Karabakh belongs to Turks,” “We cannot be divided” (www.nethaber.com, www.tumspor.com, June 2).

    The sporting fixture also provided an additional venue to discuss contentious bilateral issues. The president of the Azerbaijani state petroleum company (SOCAR) Rovnag Abdullayev (also the head of the Azeri soccer federation), was in the audience. He watched the game alongside the head of the Turkish soccer federation and Yildiz. On the periphery of this event, Yildiz and Abdullayev continued their talks on pricing Turkey’s gas imports from Azerbaijan. Abdullayev flew back to Baku together with the Turkish ambassador to Azerbaijan in the same private jet (Hurriyet, June 3).

    Yildiz told reporters that both sides shared their views as well as new proposals on pricing. He added that the Azeri side will respond after further evaluating the Turkish proposals. Although Yildiz found Azerbaijan’s request for further deliberation quite natural as part of the negotiation process, he also stressed his hope that it might be accelerated. “It will be in both countries’ interest to reach a solution as soon as possible. Over the next week, technical delegations will continue their work on the [mutual] proposals. My opinion is that without losing further time, an agreement on Shahdeniz-I and Shahdeniz-II should be reached. Our Azeri brothers said they would help us on this issue” (Anadolu Ajansi, June 3).

    Abdullayev offered reassurance that no difficult issues existed between the two countries, but he said that there was no reason to rush into the project. He added “a thirty-year agreement and other issues cannot be resolved in one or two days. The game provided an opportunity to discuss these, but commercial matters cannot be concluded in haste… We received Turkey’s proposals on oil and gas and we will study them” (Milliyet, June 4).

    Currently there are two major elements on the agenda of the Turkish-Azeri gas talks. Azerbaijan expects Turkey to revise gas import prices. Moreover, anxious to transport its gas to European markets, Baku wants Ankara to adopt a more cooperative position on the Nabucco project.

    Under the terms of an agreement in 2001, Turkey annually imports 6 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas from Azerbaijan’s Shahdeniz-I site at a price of $120 per thousand cubic meters, which is far below current global energy prices. Turkey also plans to purchase 8 bcm of gas from the Shahdeniz-II for its domestic consumption. Since the 2001 agreement ended in April 2008, Turkey has continued to import Azeri gas at the old price. In recent months, Baku has demanded the revision of the price to reflect the current market value, although Ankara has reportedly been unenthusiastic (EDM, May 1).

    During his trip to Azerbaijan in May, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan promised that a new and “fair” price will be found (EDM, May 14). Yildiz, who accompanied Erdogan to Baku, later said that “the price [offered] was as fair as possible… I cannot give a figure. But it is not as high as [the price for] the Russian gas. We are trying to agree on a price that is not completely disconnected from world markets and one that will satisfy both us and our Azeri brothers” (Hurriyet, May 16). However, the fact that a final decision has not been reached, shows that Turkey’s price offer did not necessarily satisfy the Azeri side, and they preferred to continue the talks until a “fair” price is agreed.

    During his contacts in Kayseri earlier the same day, Yildiz commented on the future of the Nabucco project. Turkey has been viewed as the main obstacle to the conclusion of the intergovernmental transit agreement for the Nabucco pipeline, yet recent remarks emerging from Ankara has raised hopes for ending the stalemate (EDM, May 15, June 1). Yildiz reiterated Erdogan’s earlier optimism for signing the intergovernmental agreement in June, but added that the continuation of the negotiations indicated that a consensus on the exact date had not been reached (www.ntvmsnbc.com, June 3).

    Yildiz was asked about the Nabucco Managing Director Reinhard Mitschek’s earlier comments that Turkey’s demand for “the 15 percent out-take is not on the table” (Reuters, May 29). In response, Yildiz insisted that Turkey’s demand was still under consideration. After noting that lively bargaining was occurring, he maintained that the Europeans appreciated Turkish concerns. “They are not completely indifferent to 15 percent. The real problem is about its modality… It might be possible to exclude it from the intergovernmental agreement, and then regulate it under another agreement” (Cihan Haber Ajansi, June 3).

    This is not the first time that European and Turkish officials have issued contradictory statements on the Turkish position on the 15 percent issue (EDM, April 20). Ankara appears determined to get the best deal out of the Nabucco negotiations, even at the risk of further stalling the project and perhaps undermining Azerbaijan’s interests. For its own part, Baku also shows that it does not want the “brotherhood” to eclipse the country’s commercial interests, and will continue negotiations until a “fair” deal is finally secured.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-azeri-talks-on-gas-prices-continue-through-soccer-diplomacy/
  • Turkey Adopts a More Cooperative Position on Nabucco

    Turkey Adopts a More Cooperative Position on Nabucco

    Turkey Adopts a More Cooperative Position on Nabucco

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 94
    May 15, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    According to a senior EU official a new deal has been struck between Turkey and the EU paving the way to sign the intergovernmental agreement for the Nabucco project in Ankara on June 25. The breakthrough was reportedly made possible by Turkey dropping its uncompromising negotiating position and offering an unconditional acceptance of the EU’s terms. In particular, Turkey relinquished its demand to purchase 15 percent of the gas transit at discounted prices (The Guardian, May 11). Although positive statements emerged from the EU summit in Prague last week, lending credibility to this report, the Turkish side has rebuffed claims that a concrete deal has been reached.

    In response to questions about the story in the U.K. newspaper the Guardian, the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yildiz, ruled out such a deal: “We should not interpret this [story] as yes or no… Negotiations are still under way.” Yildiz added that President Abdullah Gul was in charge of conducting the negotiations for the intergovernmental agreement, and he was not aware of any date being set on signing the agreement (Referans, May 12).

    One Turkish daily cited an unnamed BOTAS official who refuted the claim that Turkey had abandoned its demand for 15 percent. The same source claimed that Turkey’s demand does not directly relate to the consortium building the Nabucco pipeline, and the negotiations on Nabucco would continue in May (Yeni Safak, May 13). Before departing for Baku, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reacted to these reports, and added that the process remains ongoing (www.aktifhaber.com, May 13).

    Although it remains unclear whether a finalized deal on the negotiations is imminent, it is certain that positive developments in the Nabucco project have occurred. Senior Turkish officials familiar with the negotiations, speaking on the condition of anonymity, confirmed that groundbreaking progress had been achieved -though denying reports that all the conditions or a date had been agreed. In particular, Turkey wants a clause inserted into the intergovernmental agreement to allay its concerns and protect its energy security. “The Turkish side is hopeful that the issue will be solved at the end of the two rounds of discussions before the end of May, leaving enough time for preparations for the signing ceremony” (Hurriyet Daily News, May 13).

    Technical developments appear to be equally positive. Following the Prague summit, the Nabucco consortium announced that engineering teams from the partner countries have launched detailed engineering work on the pipeline route (Milliyet, May 13). A more promising sign is the recent change in the management of Turkey’s energy policies, following the Cabinet reshuffle earlier this month. This has raised expectations that stronger political leadership will ensure avoiding earlier mistakes. Turkey’s hard bargaining position and its misguided policies were considered to be an effort to stall or delay the conclusion of the Nabucco project (EDM, April 24, 27). Inside Turkey, this problematic policy is now increasingly attributed to Turkey’s former energy minister Hilmi Guler, whose insistence on making Turkey an energy hub created a stalemate in the negotiations with the Nabucco partners (Sabah, May 14).

    In addition to the appointment of a new energy minister, Taner Yildiz, who is considered more competent on energy policy, recent developments indicate that President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan are paying closer attention to Turkey’s energy policies. Moreover, it is argued that since the foreign ministry has increasingly become part of the negotiations, a more realistic stance has been adopted in Turkey’s energy policies (Hurriyet Daily News, May 13). Erdogan and Gul’s political leadership and their high profile involvement might boost Turkey’s credibility and facilitate the conclusion of the Nabucco process.

    Gul represented Turkey at the EU energy summit in Prague last week, which followed his attendance at an earlier summit in Sofia in April. In Prague, he tried to reassure the Nabucco partners of Turkey’s reliability by emphasizing how much Ankara was aware of its responsibilities in the transportation of Caspian and Middle Eastern hydrocarbon resources to Europe. Noting that Turkey acted responsibly in the management of other pipelines on its territory Gul added, “we will demonstrate the same sense of responsibility, even more, in the case of the Southern Gas Corridor and Nabucco, which are of higher strategic importance. Turkey has the highest level of determination and political will to realize the Nabucco project.” Gul noted that Turkey’s energy policy is based on harmonizing its own search for diversifying its suppliers and transportation routes with the EU’s attempts to ensure energy security (Hurriyet, May 9).

    Erdogan is actively complementing the perspective outlined by Gul. Energy related issues constituted a major part of Erdogan’s portfolio during his recent trip to Baku (EDM, May 14). Yildiz said that Ankara and Baku will continue their negotiations on prices for Azeri gas flowing through Turkey (Milliyet, May 15). Erdogan then visited Poland where he delivered an important message on Turkey’s position over energy transportation. He said that “Turkey is a transit and consumer country… As a transit country, we will always be ready to render our help available to Nabucco: there is no doubt on that. The route and diversification of supplies are very important. Turkey is pursuing a cooperative approach on all of these issues” (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 14).

    Gul and Erdogan’s recent statements suggest that Turkey might be revising its policy of asserting itself as an energy hub at the expense of producer countries and end users. Instead, it is using its position as a transit country as leverage to request additional concessions. Thus, the Turkish leadership is sending signals that it has adopted a more realistic role in Nabucco, which might provide a solid basis to achieve a common position between Turkey and the EU in energy cooperation. Though they continue to emphasize Turkey’s search for security as part of its new energy policy, they are being more careful not to exaggerate their demands.
    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-adopts-a-more-cooperative-position-on-nabucco/