Tag: Taner Yildiz

  • Bulgaria: Turkey Not to Build NPP on Bulgarian Border

    Bulgaria: Turkey Not to Build NPP on Bulgarian Border

    Bulgaria: Turkey Not to Build NPP on Bulgarian Border – Report

    photo verybig 1448061

    The construction site of what could become a Turkish NPP is said to be visible from the Bulgarian Black Sea village of Rezovo. Map from bivol.bg

    Turkey does not intend to construct a nuclear power plant several kilometers away from its border with Bulgaria, a Bulgarian official has stated, denying earlier reports.

    Konstantin Grebenarov, district governor of Bulgaria’s Burgas, has assured that Turkey only plans to build a thermal power plant

    “Currently there are only private investment intentions for the construction of a thermal power plant there,” Grebenarov told reporters on Monday.

    However, the Bulgaria Greens have expressed concerns over the potential power plant near the Bulgarian border. Even a thermal power plant may pose serious environmental risks, Greens party representative Petko Kovachev has told the Bulgarian National Radio.

    “Our reaction should be very strong if Turkey is building a nuclear power plant near our border without notifying Bulgaria and the European Commission,” Kovachev declared.

    Last week, it emerged that the municipality of the small Black Sea Turkish town of Igneada has received a letter from the central government in Ankara announcing the upcoming construction of a nuclear power plant and thermal power plant on the spot.

    Igneada is a town of some 2 000 inhabitants, located 5 km south of the Rezovska (Rezovo) River, which marks the Bulgarian-Turkish border. The first reports that Turkey was planning to build a nuclear power plant there emerged in 2011.

    Back in April 2011, the Turkish Consul in Burgas Sibel Arkan told Burgas Mayor Dimitar Nikolov that Igneada is only the project with the third highest possibility to become Turkey’s third NPP and the Turkish government is yet to take a decision on its construction.

    In May 2010, Turkey reached an agreement with Russia for the construction of what will become Turkey’s first nuclear power plant in Mersin’s Akkuyu district. Turkey’s second NPP is to be located in Sinop on the Black Sea.

    Locals in both Bulgaria and Turkey are said to be alarmed by the reports that a NPP may be built in Igneada.

    Tags: Sinop NPP, Igneada NPP, EDF, GDF Suez, Areva, Ankara, Tekirdag, France, Sinop, Akkuyu NPP, Nuclear Power Plant, NPP, Taner Yildiz, Black Sea coast, Black Sea, Igneada, Bulgaria Greens

    via Bulgaria: Turkey Not to Build NPP on Bulgarian Border – Report – Novinite.com – Sofia News Agency.

  • Turkish gas drill in Cyprus hikes tensions

    Turkish gas drill in Cyprus hikes tensions

    Turkish gas drill in Cyprus hikes tensions

    Turkey has begun drilling for natural gas in northern Cyprus, increasing tension across the east Mediterranean over control of offshore gas fields.

    NICOSIA, Cyprus, April 27 (UPI) — Turkey has begun drilling for natural gas in northern Cyprus ratcheting up growing tension across the east Mediterranean over control of offshore gas fields that could transform the economies of a region long barren of energy resources.

    The Turks control the northern one-third of Cyprus, where they’ve stationed 30,000 troops since 1974 when they invaded the island, which is dominated by Greek Cypriots.

    Ankara calls its zone the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus but it’s recognized only by Turkey. The Greek Cypriot government in Nicosia is internationally considered the sovereign authority.

    Technically, that means the Turks are drilling illegally.

    That exacerbates a spider’s web of territorial and maritime disputes in the east Mediterranean that intersect with long-running and potentially explosive conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbors and the ancient rivalry between Turkey and Greece.

    Israel made the first discoveries off its northern coast in 2009-10 with the Noble Energy Corp. of Houston striking major reserves.

    The Tamar field contains an estimated 9 trillion cubic feet of gas but the nearby Leviathan field has 17 tcf, the biggest strike made so far in the region. Four subsequent finds have boosted estimated Israeli reserves in the Levant Basin to 35 tcf, worth in excess of $130 billion and enough to turn the once energy-poor Jewish state into an exporter.

    The Turks launched their drilling in the TRNC Thursday, sharpening the swelling dispute over who has rights to the island’s potential energy riches and setting back hopes of reconciliation between the two communities and the states that support them.

    Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz declared the onshore well operated by the state-run Turkish Petroleum Corp. has “strategic significance and we attribute great importance to it.”

    Cyprus could be sitting on enough natural gas to last it 200 years.

    When the Greek Cypriots, defying Turkish warnings, began exploration of the southernmost of their 12 maritime blocks in 2011, Turkey sent a seismic vessel escorted by a warship into Greek Cypriot waters and warned it would “retaliate even more strongly” to any further drilling.

    Israel and Cyprus, where Noble Energy made a strike of 5 tcf-8 tcf recently, are collaborating on plans to jointly export their gas to Europe via an underwater pipeline to Greece.

    Another option is building a liquefied natural gas plant, possibly offshore which would make it the world’s first floating LNG terminal — and a juicy target. China’s interested in building it.

    The economic cooperation between Israel and Cyprus, 300 miles to the north, is also forging a new military alliance between the Jewish state and Greece.

    This is rapidly replacing the strategic alliance between Israel and Turkey that was formalized in 1996, but broke apart in May 2010, in large part because of growing antagonism by Turkey’s Islamist-led government.

    So a major realignment in the eastern Mediterranean appears to be under way as the region’s energy resources are uncovered.

    The U.S. Geological Survey reported in 2010 that the Levant Basin, embracing Syria, Israel, the Gaza Strip and Cyprus, contains an estimated 122 tcf of gas and some 4 billion barrels of oil.

    In February, Israel, a major regional military power, signed a military cooperation pact with the Greek Cypriots, whose military forces are miniscule. This allows Israeli ships and aircraft to use Cypriot territorial waters and airspace.

    That will probably open the way for Israel to deploy F-16s on the island if the Turks get pushy there. Turkey has a squadron of its own F-16s in the TRNC.

    Meantime, the Israelis are making elaborate plans to defend their offshore fields against terrorist or missile attacks.

    For now at least, the main danger is seen to be Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed movement in Lebanon. Beirut claims that Leviathan, as designated by Israel, overlaps into 330 square miles of Lebanese waters.

    The Lebanese are preparing to launch their own exploration in waters likely to hold major gas fields, adding to the complex energy mosaic.

    Hezbollah, which has fought Israel since 1982, says it won’t allow the Jewish state to “plunder” Lebanese resources.

    Israel took part in naval exercises in the region with U.S. and Greek warships March 25-April 5 that included protecting offshore gas platforms. Turkey was excluded.

    The Israeli air force has held several joint maneuvers with the Greeks, where once they trained with the Turks.

    via Turkish gas drill in Cyprus hikes tensions – UPI.com.

  • Turkey rejects West’s anti-Iran energy sanctions

    Turkey rejects West’s anti-Iran energy sanctions

    Turkey’s Energy Minister Taner Yildiz says Ankara will not abide by the Western sanctions imposed against Tehran’s energy sector, stressing that Ankara will maintain its strong energy ties with Tehran.

    taner yildiz“Turkey is not a member of the European Union (EU). Therefore, its decisions are not binding for us. Likewise, the decisions made by the US will not be binding,” Yildiz said at a Thursday news conference with South African Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies in the Turkish capital city of Ankara.

    Davies, for his part, voiced South Africa’s concern about the impact of the sanctions on the global oil prices and the global oil supply.

    On the New Year’s Eve, the United States imposed new sanctions against Iran, aimed at preventing other countries from importing Iran’s oil and doing transactions with its central bank.

    EU foreign ministers also approved sanctions against Iran on January 23, including a ban on Iranian oil imports, a freeze on the assets of the country’s Central Bank within EU states and a ban on selling diamonds, gold, and other precious metals to Tehran.

    The United States, Israel and some of their allies accuse Tehran of pursuing military objectives in its nuclear program and have used this pretext to push for four rounds of UN sanctions and a series of unilateral sanctions against the Islamic Republic.

    Iran has refuted the allegations, arguing that as a committed signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, it has the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful use.

    via Turkey rejects West’s anti-Iran energy sanctions – Tehran Times.

  • Turkey Has to Develop Large Firms in Order to Become an Active Player in Energy Sector

    Turkey Has to Develop Large Firms in Order to Become an Active Player in Energy Sector

    Turkey Has to Develop Large Firms in Order to Become an Active Player in Energy Sector

    Tuesday, 24 January 2012

    Journal of Turkish Weekly (JTW) conducted an exclusive interview with Saban Kardas. Saban Kardas is assistant professor at TOBB University of Economics and Tecnology in Ankara. He is also assistant editor of Insight Turkey, a quarterly journal in circulation since 1999, which is published by SETA Foundation. 

    Q: Would Turkey not be successful if it pursued its energy policy through TPAO, equipped with specific power and well-designed by the state, rather than extending state aid? In this context, is the Azerbaijan SOCAR (State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic) a successful model? Is it possible for Turkey’s energy policy to be changed substantially?

    A: To start with, Turkey and Azerbaijan’s energy policies are different, and will be misleading to start analysis of Turkey’s energy policies with a comparison between them. While as an energy rich producing country Azerbaijan envisions a different set of priorities in its energy policies, Turkey’s energy policy is driven by first and foremost a concern to meet its own needs. Beyond that, Turkey works to assume a role in energy policies as a transit country. The shaping of energy policies in the countries of origin on the one hand and transit countries, i.e., countries that host the transportation routes, on the other, as well as specific institutional structures they devise take place in different settings.

    Going back to the core issue raised in your question: whether Turkey should develop its energy policies by moving to a private-sector driven model or a model based on some form of state control or intervention in the market. Alongside TPAO, BOTAS needs to be mentioned in the context of transit projects. There are market pressures on BOTAS to reduce its market share. There is also a similar expectation from external players, especially the EU. Turkey is responding to these expectations and reducing state involvement but it is difficult to say that it has progressed to an extent that it can satisfy the demands coming from outside. There are different arguments made in support of the opposing models, referring back to your question. As it is sometimes underlined in the ongoing discussions in Turkey, it makes sense to reduce the element of state intervention to the extent possible. From a liberal logic, one can make the argument that a more effective and efficient system can be developed by this approach.

    However, as a counter line of thought argues, in markets regulating strategic commodities, energy being one of them, there are some reasons to adopt some degree of state-control. The key concern in Turkey is that if such a strategic commodity is left to market forces alone, it is hard to develop competitive national players. Such concerns on Turkey’s part have been underlined in the debate taking place in the energy markets. It is widely believed that as it seeks to assert its importance in energy geopolitics, Turkey has to develop large firms in order to become an active player in this field. Firms with big capital need to emerge for global competition. It is not unlikely to occur in free market conditions, but it will be difficult. The best way to do so would be to develop an energy giant with state support. For this reason, Turkey, as in the case of BOTAS, was for some time resisting the pressures to move to a free market-oriented model and retain it as a major player, despite the pressures coming from outside. Recently, as it has been brought to the public’s attention in the context of gas purchase contracts from Russia, Turkey in fact has started to reduce the monopoly over natural gas imports. Similarly, the domestic distribution grid has been privatized to a large extent. Granted, overall, Turkey is heading to a more market-oriented model. Yet, as stated by Energy Minister Taner Yıldız on several occasions, despite a market-oriented model, Turkey wants to retain a decisive capacity for the state to make critical interventions in the operation of market. This appears to be the official prognosis for the future of the state in energy market.

    Going back to the question on the SOCAR (State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic) model, it is early to answer this question, in the sense that the process of SOCAR’s consolidation in the market has yet to be finalized. In this context, what SOCAR is trying to do is in essence to replicate GAZPROM model of Russia, i.e., using its position as a major producer to develop projects aiming to penetrate into downstream markets and gain control over transportation and distribution networks, so that it can maximize profits. The Trans-Anatolia agreement is the most obvious example for SOCAR’s quest to play such a prominent role. Seen from that perspective, this model is not applicable to Turkey, given that Turkey does not stand a chance to become a player in the chain running from the source or producing nations to the distribution networks. So, it is hard to compare Turkey’s energy sector to SOCAR model, given the structural differences.

    Since the SOCAR model is still in the making, one has to wait and see how it will come into full fruition and whether it will accomplish its objectives. It is early to make a realistic assessment. But so far, Azerbaijan is exporting oil and gas and in addition to that it has undertaken major investments in Turkey’s energy sector. So, one can safely say that it has accomplished some progress in downstream markets as well. To sum up, in Azerbaijan, one might expect the emergence of a structure similar to the one in Russia and it has recorded some progress in that regards.

    At this point, one has to note some problems with the GAZPROM model, assuming that SOCAR also pursues a similar approach. In this model, there are debates as to the fusion of the state and business interests; i.e., political authorities shaping the economic decisions or economics dominating political decisions, all the while GAZPROM and other energy giants being at the center of these intermingling relations. If SOCAR follows a similar route to the Russian model, in the mid- to long-term, how the relationship between politics and economics will be forged and whether interest groups formed around energy industry may eventually hinder democratization and good governance are issues that beg closer inspection. If Azerbaijan might be opting for this model, such questions also need to be discussed more candidly.

    Finally, Turkey will unlikely to follow these models. As underlined, while moving toward a market-oriented model, Turkey will develop a structure that enables effective state interventions into the market, through the control of a critical share by the state.

    Q: The signing of the agreement regarding the Trans-Anatolian pipeline, which included Azerbaijan and Turkey, can be considered a blow to Nabucco on the one hand, and giving permission to South Stream might make Europe more dependent on Russia on the other. Was it a reaction against France because of the political air in recent months?

    A: Personally, I do not think the recent developments regarding pipeline projects are directly related to the Armenian allegations. For instance, France has not been particularly supportive of Nabucco. On the contrary, the French are somehow involved in South Stream, having overtaken some of the shares in the project. So, it is difficult to argue that Turkey wanted to hurt France by thwarting Nabucco. There is no such direct connection, and Turkey’s decision(s) are not intended to convey a message to Europe. Both the Trans-Anatolian and the South Stream pipelines should be assessed based on their particular conditions, as well as from Turkey’s own perspective, and how Turkey sees them in line with its priorities in energy policies.

    I don’t think Trans-Anatolia is a blow to Nabucco. Turkey is a country that has always supported the Nabucco as a strategic project and clearly has expressed its commitment. Nabucco continues to play a key role in Turkey’s objectives to become an energy hub. But there are certain structural problems in the Nabucco project itself, and unfortunately, they have not been clearly resolved so far. As is well known, uncertainty over dedicated supplies, lack of financing and lack of unequivocal purchase commitments are other major hurdles. Previously, there used to be uncertainty over the transit regime which occasionally led to crises between Turkey and the EU. Through an understanding Turkey reached with the Europeans earlier, it eliminated those problems.

    One of the drivers of the Trans-Anatolian pipeline is Azerbaijan’s quest for an independent role in energy markets, which I underlined earlier. Turkey has taken a step in support of Azerbaijan’s role. But while providing this support, Turkey also reiterated the fundamental rationale of the Nabucco, i.e., giving approval to a direct corridor from the Caspian basin to European markets traversing Turkey. Turkey hereby sent a signal and reiterated its earlier position that it will not be an obstacle to the so-called Southern corridor. There were some uncertainties regarding the future of the Nabucco project as originally envisaged, which obviously delayed its realization. There had been concerns that the original design might be overambitious and aim at unrealistically high capacity. The joint Azerbaijani-Turkish initiative now enables a reconfiguration of Nabucco in more manageable scales. It is difficult to say that this route is altogether dead, as the rationale underpinning it also is at the core of the Trans-Anatolia.

    Turkey’s support for South Stream is a separate debate, because there is a direct competition with Nabucco there. Turkey has taken similar complementary steps in the past as well. After supporting Nabucco, Turkey demonstrated that it would not be the country that prevents South Stream. In that regards, we can say Turkey has not adopted a new position. The recent moves towards Trans-Anatolia and South Stream is a continuation of the previous position in the recent context.

    Q: The energy agreement signed by Turkey in recent weeks further brought Azerbaijan and Turkey together. In the coming years, will Ankara develop an Azerbaijan-oriented policy despite Yerevan, or create its own policy regarding energy?

    A: Based on the previous discussions, it is worth emphasizing a few points. Firstly, it is difficult for Turkey to develop independent energy policies under the current conditions. If we are talking about supply security in this context, it has different implications. If we are discussing this question in the context of Turkey’s goal of becoming an energy transit corridor, it needs to be handled differently.

    If we try to answer your question in this second dimension, i.e., energy transportation, it is difficult for Turkey to develop energy policies independent of Azerbaijan in the short to medium term. For Turkey to emerge a transit corridor and develop major transit routes, the producers of oil and gas have to give their approval. Azerbaijan is the first and only viable option at this point. In this sense, the Trans-Anatolian agreement signed with Azerbaijan, and the earlier agreements signed at the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council summit between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Ilham Aliyev, finalized Turkey’s first real transit agreement in natural gas markets. Although we have been proud of becoming a hub country, so far it remained at the rhetorical level and has yet to be realized. The compromise reached subsequent to the treaty signed with Azerbaijan allows Turkey to become a natural gas transit route for the first time. In this context, it is difficult for Turkey to develop a policy completely independent of Azerbaijan.

    Apart from this, which alternative players are there? Exporting natural gas reserves in northern Iraq through Turkey has been on the agenda of the northern Iraqi leaders. However, there are problems between Baghdad and provinces as to how to use the natural resources of Iraq. The other option is obviously Iran. Tehran’s strained relations with America, among other factors, limit the ability of Iran to emerge as a major alternative for Turkey’s ambitious to become a transit hub. On the other hand, Russia does not want to market its natural gas through Turkey.

    However, it can be said that Turkey has a growing role at present regarding the oil transportation. The Yumurtalik–Kirkuk pipeline, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipelines or tankers through the sea lanes play an important role in the transportation corridors controlled by Turkey. Beyond these developments, Turkey also has achieved limited progress in terms of reaching its ambitions. Especially, concerning the transport of Kazakh and Russian oil through Turkey, major issues remain. In short, as of now, talking about a role independent of Azerbaijan is difficult.

    Going back to the other issues raised in the question, yes, there has been a rapprochement between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Particularly, the current government’s policy is in favor of close relations with Azerbaijan and we might expect the continuation of this policy. There is no reason for Turkey to give up its Azerbaijan-oriented policy in the upcoming years, especially if the economic partnership continues to deepen between them, as is the case currently. These ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan, in a sense, create disincentives for a possible rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey. For Turkey to be drawn into normalization process, the Armenian side, in its approach towards Turkey, has to understand that there is not only an emotional dimension in the Turkish-Azerbaijani relationship, or a strategic dimension, but there is also a very strong economic dimension. It would be advisable for Armenia to consider its position on Turkey by taking into account these various angles.

    Tuesday, 24 January 2012

    Journal of Turkish Weekly

  • Turkey, north Cyprus sign new energy deal

    Turkey, north Cyprus sign new energy deal

    NICOSIA – Anatolia News Agency

    Northern Cyprus Economy Minister Sunat Atun meets with Turkish Energy Minister Yıldız in Nicosia ahead of signing a deal on energy research. AA photo
    Northern Cyprus Economy Minister Sunat Atun meets with Turkish Energy Minister Yıldız in Nicosia ahead of signing a deal on energy research. AA photo

    The Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) signed an oil field services and production agreement with the Turkish Cypriot Economy and Energy Ministry in Nicosia yesterday.

    Delivering a speech at the ceremony, Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yıldız said northern Cyprus and TPAO signed a transparent agreement complying with international law. The agreement gives permission to the TPAO to conduct exploration, drill oil wells and run a drilling platform on northern Cypriot soil.

    Turkish Ambassador to Nicosia Halil İbrahim Akça also attended the deal ceremony.

    Yıldız yesterday met Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister İrsen Küçük in Nicosia as part of talks in northern Cyprus. Yıldız said it was essential that any resources of oil or natural gas should be shared fairly if such resources were ever found around Cyprus.

    Meanwhile, a Turkish seismic research vessel concluded seismic research in the eastern Mediterranean yesterday. The Piri Reis arrived at Famagusta port and collected data to be evaluated later.

    The ship set sail from İzmir’s Urla Port on Sep. 23 for the eastern Mediterranean to conduct geophysical research and collect seismic data on behalf of Turkish Cyprus.

    via Turkey, north Cyprus sign new energy deal – Hurriyet Daily News.

  • Turkey plans to take action against Armenian plant

    Turkey plans to take action against Armenian plant

    Ali Kayalar

    Energy Minister Taner Yıldız says Turkey’s debut nuclear plant will be the strongest building in the country. AA photo.
    Energy Minister Taner Yıldız says Turkey’s debut nuclear plant will be the strongest building in the country. AA photo.

    Turkey’s Energy Minister Taner Yıldız has said he ordered the country’s nuclear authority to measure radioactivity in the east after the deadly earthquake in Van province for fear of leaks from a nuclear plant in Armenia.

    “I asked the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority to immediately conduct tests,” Yıldız told a group of journalists in Ankara while speaking at a reception to mark the 50th anniversary of the Hürriyet Daily News.

    Turkey is preparing to take legal action against all superannuated nuclear power plants across the world, including Metzamor in Armenia, the minister said.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will receive from Turkey complaints about dozens of nuclear plants across the world that have already exceed an age of 40, Yıldız said.

    “Some countries are announcing that they are putting an end to nuclear power and closing superannuated plants, but they are continuing to build new ones,” he said. “This is not right.”

    However, the minister declined to specify any country by name.

    Siemens, Germany’s biggest nuclear energy company, was turning the page on nuclear energy, the group’s chief executive told the Der Spiegel weekly in September.

    The government in Germany had earlier announced it will withdraw from nuclear energy after the Fukushima nuclear plant disaster in Japan caused by an earthquake and tsunami on March 11 that took more than 20,000 lives.

    Turkey’s to-be-built nuclear plant near the town of Akkuyu in the southern province of Akkuyu would be “the strongest building in the country,” Yıldız said. As risk grows, security measures grow too, he said.

    “We will invest some $20 billion there. It will become an important part of the overall energy system and we will still bear risks. Sorry, but neither the state nor the private sector would take such a risk. One should be crazy, otherwise. We will not let it happen. No need to worry about it.”

    Russian state-owned nuclear power company ROSATOM is the contractor for the project.

    The country plans two more power plants, one in the northern province of Sinop and another in the Thracian region but talks with contractors for these projects were interrupted by the Fukushima accident.

    via Turkey plans to take action against Armenian plant – Hurriyet Daily News.