Turkish Forum

Tag: Syria

  • US Army transported 50 tons of gold from Syria, report says

    US Army transported 50 tons of gold from Syria, report says

    us army transported 50 tons of gold from syria report says 1551183742625

    US Army transported 50 tons of gold from Syria, report says
    DAILY SABAH
    ISTANBUL
    AFP File Photo

    The U.S. Army is transferring tons of gold from Daesh-held areas in Syria to the U.S., multiple reports said.

    According to a source who spoke to Kurdish Bas News Agency, the U.S. forces transferred about 50 tons of gold from areas seized from Daesh terrorists in eastern Syria’s Deir el-Zour region and gave a portion of the remaining gold to the PKK’s Syrian offshoot People’s Protection Units (YPG).

    The gold was reportedly transported from the U.S. military base in Kobani.

    Meanwhile, 40 tons of gold bullions stolen by Daesh terrorists from Iraq’s Mosul province was also taken by the U.S. forces.

    Local sources who spoke to regime-run SANA news agency claimed that the troops relocated large boxes containing Daesh’s gold treasure from al-Dashisheh region in southern Hasakah.

    Daesh terrorist leaders nabbed by U.S. troops reportedly provided information on the whereabouts of the gold, the report said.

    The claim coincides with a report by the U.K.-based Syrian Observatory of Human Rights, which said that the U.S.-backed YPG was after 40 tons of gold left behind by Daesh terrorists in Deir el-Zour.

    “The U.S.-led coalition forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) deliberately do not target the areas under the control of the ISIL terrorists and commanders in Eastern Euphrates in Deir el-Zour as they are trying to locate this treasure by forcing the ISIL militants to speak about its location after surrendering,” the SOHR said, referring to Daesh using another acronym.

    Though Daesh lost many strongholds in Iraq and Syria, a controversial deal between Daesh militants and Syrian groups linked to the PKK, a major terrorist group that carries out attacks in Turkey, helped their safe evacuation from Raqqa, Syria.

    The U.S. still has about 2,000 troops in Syria, many of whom are working in close cooperation with SDF.

    Almost all the territory in the east of the Euphrates River comprising some one-third of the territory of Syria, except for the Assad regime-controlled area near Deir el-Zour and the Daesh-held area near the Iraqi border, is controlled by the SDF. The SDF also controls the districts of Manbij and Tabqah on the right bank of the river.

  • Why Turkey is invading Syria

    Why Turkey is invading Syria

    Türkiye neden Suriye’yi işgal ediyor

    … and how it’s getting what it wanted.

    On Oct. 9, 2019, Turkey launched an attack in northeastern Syria. Turkey made the move shortly after the US announced it would remove some of its troops from the region.

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had his eyes on the region for years. Turkey, he argued, needed a “safe zone” to serve as a buffer against the Syrian War happening just across the border. Yet back home in Turkey, there were other factors at play that accelerated his calls for an invasion that involved Erdoğan’s own political survival.

    The move has recalibrated alliances in the Syrian War and added new uncertainty on the future of the region.

    To learn more, check out these additional resources:

    Vox’s previous reporting on the conflict:
    https://www.vox.com/world/2019/10/16/20908262/turkey-syria-kurds-trump-invasion-questions
    https://www.vox.com/world/2019/10/23/20928769/trymp-syria-turkey-doctrine

    The Institute for the Study of War’s reports on the US withdrawal from Syria:

    Vox Atlas demonstrates where conflicts occur on a map and the ways in which foreign policy shapes a region. Watch all the episodes here:

    Vox.com is a news website that helps you cut through the noise and understand what’s really driving the events in the headlines. Check out .

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  • Turkey May Have Stepped Into Its Own ‘Endless War’ in Syria

    Turkey May Have Stepped Into Its Own ‘Endless War’ in Syria

    Charles Glass
    Board of Contributors
    oct 25, 2019 | 10:00 GMT
    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is pictured here during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi, Russia, on Oct. 22, 2019.

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to deploy joint Russian-Turkish patrols in the so-called security zone Erdogan has ordered Syrian Kurds to evacuate.

    (SEFA KARACAN/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
    Highlights
    • Since its emergence as a republic after World War I, Turkey has largely considered it futile to intervene in the former lands of the Ottoman Empire. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s involvement in Syria reverses that outlook.
    • Erdogan’s decision to expand Turkey’s military occupation in Syria has prompted international outrage, but the action is widely popular in Turkey.
    • Turkey has much to gain if its incursion into Syria succeeds, but it also has much to lose. Turkish history provides a warning: Offensives that start well can end badly.

    “The Turks have always pursued an unhappy policy in regard to native populations,” wrote German Gen. Erich Ludendorff of his World War I Ottoman allies. “They have gone on the principle of taking everything and giving nothing. Now they had to reckon with these people (Kurds, Armenians and Arab tribes) as their enemies.” The Turkish army, driven out of Syria after four centuries in 1918 by the British and “native populations,” is back. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s involvement in Syria reverses the policy of the republic’s first president, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, that kept Turkey out of the Arab world. Ataturk looked westward and saw the futility of returning to lands that had rejected Turkish rule.

    That arrangement worked for Turkey until 2011, when the uprising in Syria opened the way to foreign interference. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were backing assorted militias in their effort to depose Syrian President Bashar al Assad. Erdogan would not be left out. His border with Syria offered the most extensive terrain for infiltrating fighters and war materiel. Moreover, his Justice and Development Party had a long friendship with Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood, whose attempt to depose al Assad’s father, Hafez al Assad, in 1982 ended with the infamous massacre in Hama. Erdogan looked to the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots to play a leading role in the resistance to the younger al Assad. In 2012, a Syrian former Cabinet minister told me that Erdogan had asked al Assad to put Muslim Brothers into his Cabinet. When al Assad refused, the former minister said, Erdogan made clear that he would back all efforts to remove the president and replace him with Islamists.

    Step by Step Into Syria

    One of the stated reasons for excluding the Muslim Brothers, in addition to their history of violent opposition to the regime, was that Syria had not legalized religiously based political parties. The divisive effects of sectarian parties had played out badly in Lebanon after 1975 and had done little to benefit Iraq after the U.S. invasion in 2003.

    Al Assad countered Erdogan’s support for his opponents by allowing Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to threaten Erdogan from Syria. The PKK was instrumental in the formation of the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) that fought with the United States against the Islamic State without joining the U.S.-backed opposition to al Assad.

    Erdogan went step by step into Syria, opening the border to jihadists, facilitating weapons deliveries and, when needed, backing the rebels with firepower — as when Turkish artillery shelled the Armenian Syrian village of Kassab before the Islamists conquered it in March 2014. Barely one year later, Erdogan sent Turkish troops over the border on an innocuous mission, code-named Operation Shah Euphrates, to rescue the remains of Suleyman Shah, an ancestor of the first Ottoman sultan. Erdogan’s next venture into Syria was an all-out invasion, Operation Euphrates Shield, ostensibly to combat Islamic State militants but effectively to force the YPG to retreat from the border zone in the northwest.

    George Orwell would have appreciated Turkey’s operational code names in Syria.

    Then came Operation Olive Branch from January to March 2018 in the largely Kurdish province around Afrin. In that onslaught into a hitherto peaceful corner of northwestern Syria, Turkey relied on about 25,000 Free Syrian Army and other rebel fighters to occupy towns and villages. “Instead of protecting vulnerable civilians’ rights, these fighters are perpetuating a cycle of abuse,” Human Rights Watch declared. The United States refrained from assisting its Kurdish allies, a precedent for its behavior when, following his now-famous telephone conversation with President Donald Trump, Erdogan ordered his army and its allied Islamist militia to advance into northeastern Syria on Oct. 9. Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring followed the Operation Olive Branch game plan (George Orwell would have appreciated these operational names) that expels Kurds, civilians and fighters, from the northeast, executes Kurdish politicians and gives Turkey control of a 20-mile-wide belt from the Mediterranean to the Iraqi border.

    Despite international outrage and sanctions, Erdogan’s decision to expand his military occupation of northwest Syria to the northeast and destroy the YPG is popular among all factions in Turkey. The new mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu, who won office on promises to resist Erdogan’s Islamist and anti-Kurdish policies in Turkey’s most cosmopolitan city, backs the military operation. On Twitter, he called the YPG a “treacherous terror group,” betraying the Kurds who helped elect him. A leading opposition daily, Sozcu, headlined its front page, “Americans, Europeans, Chinese, Arabs — all united against Turkey. Bring it on.” The pro-war fever infecting Turkey replicates the parades, flag-waving and oaths of allegiance that accompanied the country’s entry into World War I in 1914. When the Ottoman fleet attacked Russia’s forts along the Black Sea, Turkish political parties and media outdid each other to demonstrate support for an offensive that started well and ended badly. Turkey lost its empire, and the European Allies occupied Istanbul.

    Much to Gain, Lots to Lose

    Turkey has much to gain if its Syria gamble succeeds — control of a large area it abandoned in 1918, removal of thousands of Syrian refugees from Turkey to parts of Syria they do not know, containment of the YPG and PKK to areas south of its so-called safe zone and a voice in Syria’s future. It also has much to lose — the lives of its soldiers, perpetual warfare along its border and the undying animosity of Kurds in both Syria and Turkey.

    Erdogan’s new collaboration with Russian President Vladimir Putin — with whom he agreed at Sochi, Russia, on Oct. 22 to deploy joint Russian-Turkish patrols in the 20-mile security zone that he has ordered the Kurds to evacuate — dilutes his control in northeastern Syria. It also permits al Assad’s Syrian army to return to an area where Syria has a greater claim to sovereignty than has Turkey. The obstacle to ending the eight-year Syrian civil war remains Turkey’s sole control of the northwestern Syrian provinces of Idlib and Aleppo and the estimated 60,000 rebels, most of them jihadists, it controls there and has used as its mercenaries against the Kurds. The politician most likely to decide the fate of that area is, as with the Kurdish northeast, neither Trump nor Erdogan, but Putin. Watch that space.

    The politician most likely to decide the fate of northwestern Syria is, as with the Kurdish northeast, neither Trump nor Erdogan, but Putin.

    Trump permitted the Turkish invasion, then decided it was not such a good idea and, while not sending the Turkish army back into Turkey, imposed selective economic sanctions, which he lifted Oct. 23. Many Americans support Trump’s stated desire to end the “endless wars” in the belief that taxpayers’ money is better spent on education, health and infrastructure at home than on military operations abroad. Trump, however, has not brought troops home. About 200 American soldiers are to remain at al-Tanf military base, part of a 55-square-kilometer (21-square-mile) area of oil-rich desert where the borders of Syria, Iraq and Jordan meet. He redeployed 1,000 special operations forces from Syria to western Iraq. He is sending 1,800 soldiers to Saudi Arabia. He is threatening Iran with war following his abrogation of the 2015 nuclear deal. He supplies weapons, intelligence and logistical support to Saudi Arabia’s relentless war in Yemen.

    Ending the endless wars is not unlike decolonization, which Europeans undertook following the bankruptcy of their economies during World War II. Most of the colonial withdrawals were as disastrous for the countries involved as the colonial conquests had been. Think of the massacres that followed the partition of India in 1947, the war in Palestine when the British withdrew in 1948, the French wars in Algeria and Vietnam, and Belgium’s criminal actions in the Congo. Among the most irresponsible colonial retreats was Portugal’s from lands it had occupied for four centuries: Angola, Mozambique and East Timor. The first two suffered protracted civil wars, while Indonesian troops invaded East Timor in December 1975 with American approval and massacred a third of its population by the time they were forced to leave in 1999. Now the United States, after arming and earning the trust of Syria’s Kurds, is leaving them to face the Turkish onslaught.

    When President Barack Obama considered the covert operation to train and equip Syrian rebels in 2013, code-named Operation Timber Sycamore, he said to his aides, “Tell me how this ends.” As Turkey is discovering, it doesn’t.

    • Turkey Fights a Losing PR Battle Over Syria Oct 16, 2019 | 09:10 GMT
    • The Syrian Civil War Grinds On, Largely Forgotten Jul 25, 2019 | 09:07 GMT
    • An Impatient Turkey Gets Ready to Enter Northeastern Syria Oct 09, 2019 | 14:10 GMT
  • Putin, Erdogan nail down Syria deal

    Putin, Erdogan nail down Syria deal

    Maxim A. Suchkov October 22, 2019
    Article Summary
    The Russian and Turkish presidents met for more than six hours to come up with an agreement on Syria, one that might survive.

    MOSCOW — Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan at his summer residence of Bocharov Ruchey in the Black Sea resort of Sochi on Oct. 22. This is their eighth meeting this year. Erdogan visited Russia four times this year: working visits on Jan. 23 and April 8; during the Astana trio summit Feb. 14;  and to attend the MARKS air show Aug. 27. Putin visited Turkey only once in 2019. On Sept. 16 Putin took part in another Astana group summit. The two also met at the G-20 summit in Osaka June 29, as well as a meeting in Dushanbe, Tajikstan June 15.

    In 2018, the two presidents also had seven meetings. Yet Putin visited Turkey three times, and Erdogan was in Russia once. The other three meetings took place on the margins of the BRICS summit in Johannesburg, at the Astana group meeting in Tehran and on the sidelines of the G-20 in Buenos Aires.

    Putin and Erdogan skipped the formalities and, after a brief introductory exchange, got down to what Putin would describe as a “business-like and honest conversation.” The two leaders negotiated one-on-one via a single interpreter. On a few occasions they called some members of the delegation into the room for short consultations.

    When it comes to Turkey, Russia’s trademark policy is to tie any initiative in Syria to a broader bilateral development to enforce its negotiation position. The last time Putin was in Ankara, Russia expedited the S-400 delivery, which was originally scheduled for the spring of 2020. Yet most recently, while focusing on Syria, Putin and Erdogan discussed prospects for increased cooperation in the military-technical area; boosting bilateral trade; and switching to payments in national currencies. Turkey also agreed to embrace Russia’s payment system, or Mir — an alternative to credit cards — to boost the flow of Russian tourists to the country.

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    More than six hours of talks resulted in an agreement that Erdogan hailed as “a new stage” in the Syrian conflict, a stage designed to bring peace. The 10-point joint memorandum covers the sensitive issues that both the Russians and the Turks have channeled to the other since the Turkish incursion.

    Specifically, Russia secured Turkey’s respect for “Syria’s territorial integrity” and for the “political unity” of the country. Turkey also recognized the Syrian Constitutional Committee as a key mechanism for the political process in the country. The committee is set to be formally launched next week in Geneva.

    Erdogan said he briefed Putin “in detail” about the Turkish operation — the Kremlin would also add that about the Turkish-American agreements — and was eloquent enough to convince Putin that Operation Peace Spring doesn’t seek a long-term occupation of Syria. Most importantly for Putin, however, was the basic recognition of the “importance” of the Adana agreement and Russia’s primacy in facilitating the process, as enshrined in point four of the deal. This may not yet be a recognition that the Adana agreement should be the basis for the Syrian-Turkish rapprochement, but it is a vital step toward it, just as Moscow wanted.

    Turkey, in turn, secured Russia’s recognition of the operation as a “legitimate security concern” of Ankara’s regarding the People’s Protection Units (YPG). Moscow didn’t challenge Turkey’s gains in the operation, and it also agreed to preserve the status quo created by the operation on the ground. This was meant to be an important sign of respect, both for Turkey’s interests and for Erdogan’s personal investment in the offensive. Russia thus ensured — for the time being — that Turkey doesn’t advance farther into Syria and uses the agreement with Moscow — rather than its long-term military presence — as a guideline to settle the conflict.

    Point five reads that, starting Oct. 23, Russian military police and the Syrian border guard will deploy to the Syrian side of the Turkey-Syria border, beyond the Operation Peace Spring zone, to facilitate the withdrawal of YPG forces and heavy armaments, up to 30 kilometers deep into Syria. Then joint Russian-Turkish units will patrol the 10-kilometer area to the west and east of the operation zone, except for Qamishli, which is under the control of the Syrian army. All YPG forces are to withdraw from Manbij and Tell Rifaat.

    Those principles, though, are largely in line with the spirit if not the letter of the Adana agreement. Moscow deems this situation favorable, at least for now.

    Russia’s deployment of the military police has been a trademark of its conflict management solution in Syria. “In any awkward situation, deploy the military police,” one could joke, if it were not such an effective tool for Moscow, be it in dealings between Israel and Iran, Iranian militias, Sunni opposition groups and now with the YPG and the Turks.

    The key question here is whether the deal over the withdrawal of the Kurdish forces was pre-negotiated between Russia and Damascus, on the one hand, and the Kurdish forces, on the other. The three have been spending a lot of time lately at the Khmeimim air base, for some reason.

    Russia avoided labeling the YPG as terrorists to allow for flexibility in engagement with the Kurdish forces. In this sense, point two is meant to vaguely address the mutual commitment of Russia and Turkey to “fighting terrorism in all of its forms and manifestations” and “confronting separatist intentions on Syrian territory.” The latter is in line with Moscow’s own “territorial integrity for Syria” red line, which Damascus supports. The point allows Ankara and Moscow to interpret accordingly, should a threat emerge.

    Similarly, point seven notes the Russian and Turkish commitment to “preventing any infiltration of terrorist elements.” This is something each party can interpret through its own political and security lens, although it was likely Turkey’s intent to single out Kurdish forces. Remarkably, in its own version of the statement, Russia used the acronym KOS, which, in Russian, stands for “Kurdish Self-Defense Units.”

    “We share the concern of the Turkish side over the rise of the threat of terrorism and the increase in ethnic tensions in this area. We believe these contradictions and separatist moods have been fueled from the outside,” Putin remarked, subtly poking the United States.

    Interestingly, the parties could have reached a deal on Idlib, but it went unmentioned in the joint statement, though Erdogan mentioned Idlib during the press conference as an agenda item. If such a deal was reached, it can be discerned from Moscow and Ankara’s actions in the next few days.

    “Thanks to this agreement, we won’t allow for any separatist organizations to emerge on Syrian territories,” Erdogan said. “Turkey and Russia will not allow it. Starting tomorrow, we will be implementing our project.”

    Found in: Russia in Syria

    Maxim A. Suchkov, is editor of Al-Monitor’s Russia / Mideast coverage. He is a non-resident expert at the Russian International Affairs Council and at the Valdai International Discussion Club. He was a Fulbright visiting fellow at Georgetown University (2010-11) and New York University (2015). On Twitter: @MSuchkov_ALM Email: msuchkov@al-monitor.com

  • Weakened US sanctions threat lingers in wake of Turkish deal with Russia

    Weakened US sanctions threat lingers in wake of Turkish deal with Russia

    Diego Cupolo
    Article Summary
    Possible US sanctions on Turkey are looming as fighting subsides in northeast Syria and Kurdish forces draw back following an agreement between Ankara and Moscow.

    Two weeks after Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring in northeast Syria to expel Kurdish militants from its southern border and establish a so-called safe zone, fighting has largely ended as result of an agreement reached by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday.

    Meeting in Sochi, the two leaders agreed to deploy their forces across most of the northeastern Syrian border and conduct joint patrols along a corridor 10 kilometers (6 miles) deep, while Kurdish-led forces supported by the United States have withdrawn from an area 30 kilometers (19 miles) deep. Meanwhile, the Operation Peace Spring area between the Syrian towns of Tell Abyad and Ras al-Ain will remain under the control of the Turkish military and Turkish-backed Syrian forces.

    The Syrian regime stated Wednesday it would establish 15 observation posts in the region. Turkish officials will seek to reestablish terms set by the 1998 Adana agreement between Ankara and Damascus in which Turkish forces would be able to carry out security operations within a 5-kilometer (3-mile) band along the Syrian border.

    “Adana more or less gives Turkey what it wants … [which is] to break the US-SDF agreement,” said Aaron Stein, director of the Middle East program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, using the acronym for the US-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, which Ankara considers a security threat.

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    “But the political cost of doing that was to de facto recognize [President] Bashar al-Assad,” Stein continued. “Now Turkey has been resisting this, albeit while engaging with the regime’s two principal allies, Russia and Iran. This just brings Turkey more squarely into the camp that the regime is the arbiter of security along its border.”

    The developments come after US President Donald Trump removed about 1,000 US troops stationed in the region, greenlighting the Turkish operation with aims to disentangle Washington from the Syrian conflict, where American forces have coordinated operations to eradicate Islamic State militants since 2014. Prior to Erdogan’s agreement with Putin, US officials had secured a five-day cease-fire in northeast Syria during an Oct. 17 visit to Ankara.

    Speaking on Wednesday morning, Trump said Turkish officials had informed him the cease-fire would be “permanent” and that he would lift economic sanctions in response.

    “This was an outcome created by us,” Trump told reporters in a press conference.

    Yet as Russian and Syrian regime forces take control of border areas not held by Turkish forces, the imposition of previously threatened US sanctions on Turkey looms large in Washington, where officials continue to debate a response to fast-developing dynamics in northeast Syria.

    On Oct. 9, Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham introduced a sanctions bill in an effort to stop Turkey’s cross-border incursion, but support for the legislation has wavered as lawmakers recover from whiplash induced by a number of power plays in northeast Syria. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has since cautioned lawmakers to “think extremely carefully” before sanctioning Turkey and pushing Ankara “into the arms of the Russians.”

    “I’m aware there is some appetite on both sides of the aisle to quickly reach for the toolbox of sanctions,” McConnell said on the Senate floor this Tuesday. “I’m open to the Senate considering them,” he said, but added that caution would be needed moving forward.

    Though Trump said he would repeal sanctions imposed on Oct. 14 by executive order, Ankara can still be subjected to penalties stemming from the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) for the nation’s acquisition of the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system earlier this year.

    While some Washington lawmakers support employing CAATSA sanctions against Turkey, their imposition has been stalled by Trump, who continues to negotiate with Turkish officials in effort to secure the purchase of US-made Patriot missiles to replace the S-400 system, which has been said to pose security risks to NATO military equipment. Still, additional Turkey sanctions bills may arise in Washington as the fallout continues due to numerous human rights abuses, including the alleged use of white phosphorus during Operation Peace Spring.

    “If there was one sanctions bill in addition to CAATSA, it could move towards joining the EU arms embargo, but circumscribing it to weapons that could be used for offensive operations in Syria,” Stein told Al-Monitor, referring to the suspension of arms exports to Turkey by European nations in response to the Syrian incursion. “If there are no offensive operations in Syria, then there may not be the impetus for the sanctions.”

    In the economic sphere, the Turkish lira gained on the dollar following the Erdogan-Putin meeting and rallied further after Trump’s press conference. The lira opened on Wednesday at 5.80 to the dollar and reached 5.72 at the time of reporting. Wolf Piccoli, co-president and political risk analyst at Teneo Intelligence, said the Russia-Turkey agreement would likely have little impact on Turkey’s economic outlook, but “the main risk in the short term remains possible US sanctions.”

    “It will be interesting to monitor the reaction of Congress to the Ankara-Moscow agreement,” Piccoli told Al-Monitor. “However, the risk of sanctions is unlikely to change due to this deal.” He added, “The main driver for the lira remains overall market sentiment, especially towards emerging markets.”

    For the time being, the Kurdish-led SDF forces linked with the People’s Protection Units (YPG) have reportedly been adhering to the agreement reached in Sochi and withdrawing from the Turkish border area in northeast Syria. Following the pullout of US forces, Ankara will oversee its border security with the Syrian regime and Russian intermediaries.

    Stein said the implementation of the Adana agreement was “politically symbolic” as it means Ankara must now recognize the Syrian regime in order to put pressure, via Damascus, on YPG forces that had enjoyed US support under the SDF coalition.

    “It goes to show that when they had to choose, the US was offering more or less the same deal, but the US was offering the same deal with accommodation to the SDF,” Stein told Al-Monitor. “Russia’s deal offered accommodation with the regime and Turkey chose that because their priority was to break the SDF structure.”

    Found in: Turkish-Kurdish conflict, Syria Conflict, Sanctions

    Diego Cupolo is a freelance journalist and photographer based in Ankara, Turkey. His work has appeared in The Atlantic, The Financial Times, Foreign Policy and The New Statesman, among other publications

     

  • Sen. Rand Paul: Syria, Turkey, the Kurds and the right role for the US – A roadmap for peace

    Sen. Rand Paul: Syria, Turkey, the Kurds and the right role for the US – A roadmap for peace

    Betula Nelson (betneluk@yahoo.co.uk)
    Sen. Rand Paul

    By Sen. Rand Paul | Fox News

    President Trump did the wise thing by moving 50 soldiers out of the way of tens of thousands of invading Turks. There can be no doubt that the situation in Northern Syria involving Turkey, the Kurds, and Syria is messy, complicated, and potentially costly. The only questions are for whom, as well as what is the role of the United States.
    Regarding the problem with the Turks and the Kurds, we have to realize a certain reality: the Turks and Kurds were fighting before we arrived in Syria … or even Iraq.  They were fighting while we were there. And they will be fighting after we leave. The only question is what day we leave.
    If that is true, why would we stay one day longer than we need to? Whose son or daughter should risk their life? Whose taxpayer funds should go to policing this area?
    I say not mine.  And not yours, either.

    We are in our current position because our well-intentioned policies have turned out to be just plain bad decisions.  Our military interventions in the Middle East have led to more chaos, not less, and more terrorism, not less.  The foreign policy swamp — Republicans and Democrats — have over-militarized our foreign policy; they have an inexplicable need to see an existential threat to our country behind every rock.

    But there is a way we could all possibly look at this in a new way, together. I offer that we take a collective deep breath and rationally try to find a way forward. A way out of these quagmires. A way to secure our interests. A way to return to true leadership in the world. A way to lead by example through influence and not bayonets. A way to concentrate more on diplomacy and less on deployments.

    We went into Syria, sideways, on the pretext of going after ISIS, but the war caucus, led by Lindsey Graham, saw an opportunity to expand our mission into nation-building. President Trump, though, was clear from the beginning. His intention was to defeat ISIS. While the president’s mission was clear, he did, however, keep U.S. troops in Syria without the congressional authorization the Constitution requires.

    South Carolina Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham and the neocons, however, have always had more ulterior motives. The neocons want Assad gone and a U.S.-guarded homeland for the Syrian Kurds.  They opine that ISIS will return if we don’t stay forever (their same argument for eternal occupation of every place on the planet that harbors radical Islamists).

    We are at a place where our strategic objectives have been confused. We are no longer aligning our ends, ways, and means to reach a desired end state. If we are completely honest, we don’t really have an achievable end state.

    The neocons also claim the Kurds will release the ISIS prisoners.  (This claim is absurd, as the brutality of ISIS would immediately fall on the people of Syria).  The Kurds would be insane to release the ISIS prisoners, as they would be the first victims.  In fact, no country in this five-sided war wants to deal with ISIS again.

    We are at a place where our strategic objectives have been confused. We are no longer aligning our ends, ways, and means to reach a desired end state. If we are completely honest, we don’t really have an achievable end state.

    This is a growing problem in our military adventures around the world because we have gone beyond the typical defined mission for our armed forces: winning a war, then leaving.

    Even the military will tell you there is no achievable military goal in Syria. Yet, we are still there. The neocons are quick to say we have a vital national security interest in Syria. Really? If so, state it. If so, debate it on the Senate floor. Our Founding Fathers defined a path for our nation to go to war, and that path must include a constitutional debate and a declaration of war.

    The neocons are partnered now with the liberal Clinton establishment in bashing the president and loudly saying we should stay in Syria. But if these loudmouths came to Congress as the Constitution requires, who would they declare war on? Syria? Turkey? Russia? Iran? Our previous ally, the Free Syrian Army?

    Ousting Assad and establishing a Jeffersonian democracy (or even a Californian democracy) in Syria is clearly beyond what we as a nation should be willing to do.  Thucydides said nations go to war for “Fear, Honor, and Interest.” Unfortunately, we have clouded interest, are irrational about fear, and dwell too heavily on honor.  We need to realign our attitude to return to the more traditional American foreign policy of strength through restraint.

    I will not attempt to justify Turkey’s perceived, real, or politically motivated security concerns that have led them to conduct their current operations.  If asked by their government, I would urge them to stop immediately and use diplomacy, with our assistance.

    At the very least, I would insist they show restraint in their actions and make sure they were operating well inside the law of armed conflict.  I would also argue for the Kurds to show similar restraint in any form of reprisals against the Turks.  I don’t advocate for the needless use of military force by any country, including my own.  But this current battle is a symptom of a bigger problem that I hope our country can find a way to solve.

    How do we reach an end state that meets our security needs as well as finds an end to the on-going tragedy? Unemotionally, I offer the following broad outline of a strategy that will hopefully get us to that end state.

    • U.S. forces in the region must be repositioned outside of the battle zone.  Our few forces near the border are at risk and serve no realistic deterrent.  They aren’t enough to stop the Turks, nor should we ask them to do that, and they won’t be able to temper the Kurds.
    • We must urge all sides to have a real, lasting, immediate tactical ceasefire.  This will require dialogue between Turkey’s Erdogan and Syria’s Assad.
    • Instead of stoking war by arming all sides of every Middle Eastern conflict, we should withhold arms as leverage to encourage diplomacy.  We must use whatever diplomatic leverage and limited influence we have left in the area to call for regional talks to find solutions to the more strategic problems.

    Ironically, less U.S. involvement has already led to fertile negotiations between the Syrian Kurds and Assad.  Realistically, any chance for a Kurdish semi-autonomous zone (similar to the one in Iraq) will only happen if the Kurds can make peace first with Assad, and then Assad must give assurances to Erdogan that he will keep the Syrian Kurds in Syria and at peace with the Turks.

    We must be prepared to compromise as a way of seeking this “grand bargain.”  We can’t let our ego, or our pursuit of honor, make us think we can make it all look exactly as we want through the sheer force of our will.  We will have to find the courage in ourselves to accept the art of the possible or maybe even practical.

    Republican Rand Paul represents Kentucky in the United States Senate. He is the author of “The Case Against Socialism” (Broadside Books, October 15, 2019).