Will an Economic Reckoning Follow Turkey’s Local Elections?
By Sinan Ciddi
Board of Contributors
Sinan Ciddi
Board of Contributors
(ADEM ALTAN/AFP/Getty Images)
Contributor Perspectives offer insight, analysis and commentary from Stratfor’s Board of Contributors and guest contributors who are distinguished leaders in their fields of expertise.
Highlights
Consumer prices, a deteriorating economy and relations with the United States, Russia and Iran are key developments to watch as Turkey prepares to hold local elections next month.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan insists his country will never ask for another bailout from the International Monetary Fund, but Turkey is fast running out of economic options.
Russia essentially has put Turkey on notice in Syria, while Erdogan’s behavior toward the United States risks serious consequences.
As Turkey’s March 31 local elections draw closer, three key developments bear watching. All three are likely to significantly affect Turkey’s political and economic trajectory as well as its international standing.
Consumer Discontent
Local elections don’t usually attract the same level of domestic and international attention that Turkey’s elections have received this year. But the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) has branded the March 31 vote as one that will determine Turkey’s fate and well-being. In addition, deteriorating economic conditions, including a depreciating currency and inflation, have heightened tensions in the country. Prices for some food items have increased by more than 300-400 percent, prompting President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government to mandate that state wholesalers in Ankara and Istanbul sell produce directly to consumers. Long lines of residents buying food at heavily discounted prices is reminiscent of the late 1970s, when Turks had to line up to buy staples such as butter, sugar and cooking oil. The government says the state will continue to sell produce wholesale until the local elections are held.
To further combat Turkey’s inflationary headwind, Erdogan has ordered state authorities to track prices and punish retailers who allegedly arbitrarily increase prices. To say that these issues have tarnished the reputation of the AKP and Erdogan would be an understatement. The AKP has consistently campaigned on the premise that it is the party of capable governance. The question remains as to whether food prices can be controlled, or even lowered, so that wider public discontent does not translate into votes for the opposition. The loss of large metropolitan municipalities such as Istanbul and Ankara would irreparably harm Erdogan’s image and weaken his power base.
Is a Bailout on the Horizon?
Turkey’s macroeconomic indicators are the second significant development to watch. The lira’s depreciation has placed an undue burden on the country’s private sector industries, many of which rely on imports to run their business. By July 2019, roughly $180 billion worth of foreign debt will come due, which equates to about one-quarter of Turkey’s entire economic output. Not only has this resulted in record numbers of Turkish companies filing for insolvency protection, it has required the government to take unprecedented measures to ensure liquidity and assure investors that Turkey can honor its debts. The prevailing economic opinion in Washington and European investment capitals is that these aims can no longer be met without direct international intervention.
If the IMF is asked to bail out Turkey, what government accountability, transparency, anti-corruption and belt-tightening measures will it demand in return?
Though Erdogan insists at public rallies that Turkey will never ask for another bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), his tune is likely to change after the March elections, when Turkey may have to reach a standby agreement of about $150 billion just to keep the lights on. If this were to happen, the IMF would loan Turkey nearly double what it gave Argentina to shore up its economy. It is in the material interests of European banks and the United States to provide Turkey with the necessary funding to allay concerns of a recessionary contagion, as Turkey’s creditors have loaned generously and will have to satisfy their investor’s concerns that existing debts will be honored. There is also the question of conditionality. If the IMF is asked to bail out Turkey, what government accountability, transparency, anti-corruption and belt-tightening measures will it demand in return? It is hard to envision Erdogan satisfying some or any such conditions given the opaque, unaccountable and corruption-ridden government he perpetuates.
Relations With the U.S., Russia and Iran
Finally, Turkey’s interaction with the United States, Russia and Iran isn’t independent of its domestic economic concerns. Ever since the United States announced it would leave Syria, Erdogan has been keen to convince Russia and Iran of the need to establish a safe zone in Syria — one designed to undermine and prevent a Syrian-Kurdish entity that Turkey will have to reckon with. In Sochi, Russia, last week where he, Erdogan and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani met to talk about Syria, Russian President Vladimir Putin essentially put Turkey on notice that any Turkish demand for a safe zone in Syria would require the approval of the Syrian government. At this point, Russia and Iran are mainly concerned with eliminating challenges to the Syrian government’s ability to impose its sovereignty throughout the country. There is little reason to believe that Turkey will be granted any latitude to pursue Kurdish elements in Syria. If Erdogan is to participate in the reconstruction of Syria and be able to conduct border trade, he will soon have to resolve his differences with Syrian President Bashar al Assad.
Erdogan continues to tread on thin ice when it comes to the United States, and the Trump administration could impose significant measures that could compound Turkey’s economic degradation. Erdogan’s support of the ailing government of President Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela is demonstrated by the large volume of Venezuelan gold Turkey is purchasing. Turkey watchers are concerned that this gold could once again be used to buy Iranian oil and breach U.S. sanctions. Were this to occur, there is good reason to believe the United States could make life very difficult for Erdogan by withholding IMF funding or imposing crippling sanctions, among other possible measures. Turkey is fast running out of options as the March 31 elections approach, despite appearances otherwise in Erdogan’s public speeches. Even in a limited and transactional manner, it is incumbent upon the Erdogan government to collaborate with the United States on a number of issues: to renounce its S-400 missile defense deal with Russia; put a visible distance between itself and the Maduro government; and release Americans it currently detains. Each of these issues will have to be confronted eventually. It makes sense for Turkey to resolve them now before they are dangled in front of Erdogan as conditions that must be met before Turkey can secure an international bailout.
In response to any Turkish attack on the Syrian Kurds, the United States has the power to indirectly sway investor confidence in Turkey largely because of the lira’s inherent volatility and the structural weaknesses of its economy.
Turkey can’t do as much economic damage to the United States, but it can create problems for Washington in the Middle East.
Ultimately, the United States will limit the economic and diplomatic damage it can inflict on Turkey, in part because both wish to maintain the security and economic benefits their relationship provides.
U.S.-Turkey relations have rarely been anything but combustible. In the middle of January, however, U.S. President Donald Trump poured fuel on the fire when he took to Twitter to vow that his country would “devastate Turkey economically” if it attacked the Syrian Kurds after the United States withdraws from northern Syria. Trump’s threat prompted harsh but measured responses from Ankara; President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed sadness at the comment. The next day his sentiment switched to encouragement after a phone call between the leaders. The back-and-forth was nothing new, reflecting instead the two countries’ volatile but multilayered relationship. The pair might frequently frustrate each other, yet both value and need the other to pursue their respective goals at home and in the wider Middle East.
The Big Picture
Turkey endured a difficult year economically in 2018, as the lira fell precipitously against the U.S. dollar — in part because of the White House’s tariffs against Ankara. Washington’s actions demonstrated that it could hurt Turkey economically merely by influencing investor and consumer sentiment in the country. And it might consider doing it again if Ankara follows through on its threats to attack the Syrian Kurds after the United States withdraws from northern Syria.
At the heart of the current tug of war between the United States and Turkey is their conflicting, long-term plans to stabilize Syria and counter militancy in the country. As Washington’s withdrawal from Syria increasingly becomes a question of when and not if, the White House has pressed for a safe zone for its major ally on the ground, the Syrian Kurds. On a larger level, however, the United States wants its regional allies to shoulder more of the burden in stabilizing the Middle East’s conflict zones, and Turkey is a necessary ally in northern Syria — especially when Russia (a major U.S. competitor) and Iran (an outright U.S. enemy) are the other external powers lurking in the neighborhood.
Of course, the long-standing hurdle between Turkey and the United States in Syria is Washington’s choice of local affiliate in the battle against the Islamic State: the mostly Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) — a group that Turkey claims is the same as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) — within the larger Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Indeed, throughout Syria’s war, Ankara has made no secret of its desire to crush the YPG presence on its southern border — something the United States will be powerless to prevent militarily after its withdrawal. Nevertheless, the United States could still inflict serious economic damage on Turkey if it chose to. The question is, how much?
Lessons From a Plummeting Lira
The United States is in a position to hurt Turkey’s economy in part because of the latter’s economic fragility. Turkish corporations are saddled with a high amount of debt, totaling about $200 billion that they must pay back in 2019. What’s more, most of this debt is denominated in dollars and euros, meaning companies will struggle to pay it back if the lira remains weak. But debt isn’t the only specter haunting Turkey: The country is also suffering from high inflation, decreased consumption and a lack of investor confidence stemming in part from perceptions that the country lacks the rule of law.
It was these factors that came to a head last summer during the last diplomatic downturn between the United States and Turkey, in which Trump criticized the Turkish government and imposed limited tariffs and sanctions over its detention of American pastor Andrew Brunson, thereby accelerating the swift depreciation of the lira. In the end, the episode demonstrated that the United States’ ultimate economic weapon against Turkey is sentiment. Such a tool may be indirect, but Trump proved that caustic rhetoric and the imposition of even limited sanctions can depreciate the lira, rapidly damaging investor confidence and inciting consumer panic that the currency would tumble again, thereby compounding the existing consumption slowdown. Indeed, when the lira plunged last summer, Turks began to lose confidence in the economy, causing them to spend less and convert their liras into dollars or other currencies — in spite of official calls to the contrary — causing the lira to plummet even further.
The damage to the lira hurts Turkey’s efforts to bolster its financial sector during a critical time for the economy. Ratings institutions downgraded some of its major banks after the summer 2018 crisis, with Moody’s alone slashing its outlook for 18 lenders. Few Turkish banks operate branches in the United States, but most of the country’s lenders do facilitate dollar transactions, which would expose them to possible action in the unlikely event that the United States moved to sanction them. Moreover, Ankara is determined to protect the financial sector, which contributes significantly to the economy and has a value that totals 87 percent of the gross domestic product. In his efforts to protect the sector and reduce the country’s exposure to precipitous slides in the lira’s value against the U.S. dollar, Erdogan has repeatedly exhorted businesses to increase non-dollar transactions in Turkey. Turkey has indeed made some progress to this end, establishing currency swaps with the likes of Iran over the last year.
Turkey’s Weak Points
But Washington possesses other economic weapons that it could deploy against Ankara — albeit ones that could have negative repercussions for the United States as well. These tools include economic (including more punishing trade tariffs) and strategic measures (including pressure on Turkey over its ties with countries such as Russia, Venezuela, Iran and China).
The United States is Turkey’s fourth largest source of imports and fifth largest destination for exports. Turkey, however, does not even crack the top 20 in terms of U.S. import or export partners, highlighting just how unequal their economic relationship is. Turkish construction companies provide a major source of income for Turkey, but few are active in the United States, meaning Washington cannot use them as a tool against Ankara. But it’s a different story for airlines; the United States could cost Turkish Airlines 10.6 percent of its annual revenue if it barred the major carrier from flying to U.S. destinations.
In terms of trade barriers, the United States has proved its willingness to impose restrictions on Turkey, slapping steel and aluminum tariffs on Ankara in retaliation for the continued detention of Brunson. Although the United States did not damage Turkey economically with the tariffs (and indeed lifted them after Brunson’s release), the uncertainty hurt the lira’s value.
Rather than steel or aluminum, Turkey’s main defensive trade interest is agriculture, which accounts for only 6 percent of the country’s GDP but remains strategically important, because it employs 20 percent of its citizens. More than that, many of the main agricultural regions also happen to be the heartland for Erdogan’s party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Of particular concern for Turkey is its labor-intensive tobacco industry, which accounts for 8 percent of U.S. tobacco imports. On the flipside is cotton. Although Turkey is a major producer, it imports 25 percent of its requirements from the United States. Given this dependence, Trump could hurt Ankara by halting shipments, especially since he has previously demonstrated his willingness to hurt the U.S. agricultural sector in pursuit of other goals. Indeed, stanching a major source of Turkey’s cotton imports would hinder the country’s ability to produce manufactured textiles — one of Ankara’s biggest exports not just to Europe (its main export market) but also to the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Agriculture, accordingly, could come into play if the United States and Turkey’s relations deteriorated to the degree that Washington would consider any and all tools to alter Ankara’s behavior.
The ultimate U.S. economic weapon against Turkey is sentiment. Such a tool may be indirect, but Trump has proved that caustic rhetoric and the imposition of even limited sanctions can depreciate the lira.
A Fight Over Politics
And then there is the political dimension. Turkey is already skirting the boundaries on U.S. sanctions on Iran, and it risks running afoul of future sanctions related to Russia or Venezuela due to the depth of its economic and strategic ties to those countries. Nevertheless, any U.S. push on this front could backfire, because the move could simply convince Ankara to shift its orientation away from the West in favor of China and, especially, Russia.
The United States also doesn’t want Turkey to stir up issues in Washington’s other important Middle Eastern relationships, such as its close ties with Saudi Arabia, which remains a point of contention because Turkey holds leverage over Riyadh after its killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the country’s Istanbul consulate.
At the same time, the United States recognizes the importance of Turkey’s economy to the region, emerging markets, Europe and others, meaning it has little interest in stoking an economic conflagration that would also burn other U.S. allies. Furthermore, Turkey is a major purchaser of U.S. arms, acquiring 28 percent of its foreign weaponry from the United States.
The threat of sanctions will be ever present during Washington and Ankara’s talks on northern Syria, although the United States will be keenly aware of the consequences of acting too forcefully against its longtime ally.
Beyond the current debate over Syria, the United States and Turkey cooperate on any number of issues, including military, intelligence and security coordination. At the same time, however, their difference of opinion on some of the Middle East’s most pertinent issues will ensure their relationship is always mercurial. Be that as it may, a complete rupture is never a likely possibility: Both countries simply need each other too much.
Israeli and Palestinian factions, long trapped in conflict, have routinely fallen into patterns of violence. A stalemated peace process, a fragmented Palestinian political system and an Israeli government often rewarded by voters for hard-edge approaches have kept these cycles going. But since 2014, Israel and its primary Palestinian antagonist, Hamas, have had a tentative understanding over Gaza. That understanding’s shelf life, however, may be expiring.
See Israel’s Survival Strategy
What Happened
Political developments within both Israel and the Palestinian Authority are exacerbating instability in the region and increasing the risk of violence between Israel and Hamas. In late December, a new party led by a former chief of the Israel Defense Forces joined the political fray in Israel, forcing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to find new ways to shore up his national security credentials and to defuse criticism calling his Gaza policy weak. And on Jan. 29, Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah of the Palestinian Authority resigned, marking the formal collapse of the long-moribund Hamas-Fatah unity government. The disintegration untethers Hamas from the Palestinian national government and formalizes Gaza’s de facto long-standing isolation.
Why It Matters
Two sets of forces are in play here. In Israel, various parties are jockeying for position ahead of elections in April. A new party led by retired Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz and called Israel Resilience is the most serious challenge to Netanyahu. Gantz had been sanguine about his policy positions until Jan. 29. In his first political address on that day, he revealed that his attacks on Netanyahu would focus on accusations of corruption and would allude to weaknesses on national security. Political attacks on these two topics are particularly significant because Israel faces exceptionally tense security situations in the north and the south.
In Gaza, the environment is moving increasingly away from compromise and conciliation, even though its Hamas rulers well understand how disastrous another war with Israel would be. The collapse of the Hamas-Fatah 2014 unity agreement came about largely because Hamas wasn’t willing to surrender control of key aspects of Gaza, especially security, to its Fatah rival — despite months of intense mediation by Egypt to bring about an accord. But the collapse also became fait accompli because the economic rewards of the unity deal never came through. Hamas has had to rely on trickles of aid from Qatar via Israel to maintain public services, and the U.S. aid cutoff has worsened the economy. The end of the unity agreement also blocks any future economic support from the Palestinian Authority, leaving Gazans with just the meager flow of Qatari aid. Ordinary Gazans are growing angrier at the situation, creating a boiling social cauldron pushing for more action to restore aid. But Hamas has few tools besides rockets and missiles to influence Israel and its allies — and as the streets in Gaza roil with anger, it will be increasingly disposed to use them.
Hamas has few tools besides rockets and missiles to influence Israel and its allies — and as the streets in Gaza roil with anger, it will be increasingly disposed to use them.
Further Background
Netanyahu’s ostensible right-wing allies dislike his approach to Gaza. A cease-fire in November quite nearly brought down his government after the nationalist Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman bolted from Netanyahu’s coalition in protest. That move forced the prime minister to pump up his national security credentials to stem a potentially fatal leakage of security-minded voters from the Likud Party and his allies. He has publicized military strikes in Syria and may do the same with Gaza. But those strikes may not be enough. Netanyahu may be tempted to hit high-profile targets, and that action could kick off a cycle of retaliation and violence between Israel and Syria or Gaza. Or he could take the risk of going farther afield and striking the Iraqi militias that Iran is arming with ballistic missiles.
Moreover, an escalation by Hamas ahead of Israel’s elections could play into Netanyahu’s hands. The prime minister might be pushed toward a wide-ranging operation in Gaza to stave off criticism from his right-wing allies and from Gantz’s supporters. In addition, if facing imminent indictment for corruption, Netanyahu could find political value in such a distraction ahead of polling.
Since many of Turkey’s woes are driven by external factors, the government will struggle to manage the country’s economic fragility in 2019.
Because of the economic headwinds, Turkey will seek to minimize some tensions with Western governments such as the United States and the European Union, but it won’t abandon its national security goals, including military activities in Iraq and Syria.
Because of the effect that the flagging economy could have in the lead-up to elections in March 2019, the ruling party will likely pursue more flexibility in its political alliances.
Editor’s Note: This assessment is part of a series of analyses supporting Stratfor’s upcoming 2019 Annual Forecast. These assessments are designed to provide more context and in-depth analysis on key developments in the coming year.
Turkey has endured more than its fair share of economic hardships in 2018, but its annus horribilis might portend even greater trials and tribulations in the year to come. Inflation reached record levels, going as high as 25 percent in September, a month after the value of its currency dropped to the unprecedented level of almost 7 liras to the dollar, striking investors with fear. Watching on wearily, consumers could only express their despair as the prices for staples soared. And far from shoring up confidence in the economy, the government and its plans to tackle the crisis simply invited derision.
The Big Picture
Turkey has one of the Middle East’s largest and most dynamic economies — which gives it considerable clout in terms of regional influence. But its growth in recent years has been built on debt, a sizable chunk of which is coming due in 2019. The fragility of the economy in the coming year could mean stagnation and recession, which will challenge the government’s ability to maintain its dominance at the local polls in the spring.
See Turkey’s Resurgence
But thanks to a raft of price and currency controls, as well as some judicious interest rate hikes from the central bank, Turkey emerged from its summer of crisis without suffering a total economic meltdown. The problem for its economy, however, is that all the ingredients that led to the summer of volatility are still present, meaning they could again combine — and grow much worse — in 2019. Mindful of everything that could go poorly in the economy, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is considering how he might broaden his campaign strategy to maximize the gains of his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the March local elections and again come out on top.
The External Drivers Shaping Turkey’s Economy
Just as in 2018, the prospects for growth in 2019 appear poor due to a combination of problems, including a high level of corporate debt, a weak currency, a dearth of foreign investment, a widening current account deficit, sky-high inflation, a struggling export sector and diminishing consumer confidence. In fact, Fitch Ratings and Moody’s Corp. quickly downgraded their growth forecasts for Turkey after its summer of pain. Fitch had originally forecast a growth rate of 4.1 percent for 2019 but revised its expectations to 3.6 percent after the lira took a tumble. Analysts at Bloomberg, however, are even more pessimistic, predicting that growth will drop from 3.5 percent this year to 0.8 percent next year.
The AKP government has succeeded in taming government debt since it came to power in 2002, but Turkey’s corporate sector has acquired a remarkable amount of debt over the past 15 years. And all these debts are coming to a head; the country’s corporations will have to pay a bill estimated at $200 billion, or a quarter of Turkey’s gross domestic product, next year. Most of the bill is denominated in dollars, making it more and more difficult for companies to continue paying back their debt the more the lira drops. And although Turkey boasted a GDP growth rate of 7 percent as recently as 2017, debt propped up much of that expansion.
Some of the power to manage its stagnant economy, however, is out of the government’s hands, because external factors are behind many of the problems with debt, inflation and currency value. One external factor — which the government has had a hand in making — that has harmed the country in recent years is the precipitous drop in foreign direct investment (FDI). Some investors have steered clear of the country since the 2016 coup attempt, which led to the imposition of a harsh state of emergency. For example, FDI levels dropped from $18.7 billion in 2015 to $10.8 billion in 2017. Portfolio inflows (the amount of capital flowing into Turkey’s financial markets) might have improved in its financial markets in recent years, but that’s largely because the country epitomizes an emerging market, offering high risks and a weak currency — two things that make it a bargain.
Turkey’s current account deficit, which totals $46 billion, is also a major issue reflecting the vulnerability of the economy to currency fluctuations. In September, the lira depreciated so steeply that Turkey briefly enjoyed a current account surplus for the month, but only because imports temporarily became so expensive that Ankara couldn’t import what it needed.
But it is inflation — which has been spurred by the lira’s drop, as well as external factors that have sapped interest in emerging market currencies — that will be the biggest task on Ankara’s economic to-do list for 2019. Erdogan, however, has made no secret of his aversion to hiking interest rates and has frequently brought his weight to bear on economic officials, thereby casting doubt on the central bank’s independence. But the government will also have difficulty in pursuing other typical inflation management strategies, such as lowering fiscal spending and spurring competition, when negative consumer sentiment is clouding Turkish markets. Ultimately, the inflation rate, and its impact on purchasing power, will be foremost in consumers’ minds as they head to the polls in March 2019 to vote in municipal elections.
Another major external factor is the country’s exports to Western countries, which have frequently sparred with Turkey over human rights, creeping authoritarianism and its close ties with Russia in spite of Ankara’s membership in NATO, as well as its actions in the Middle East. Turkey and Western entities like the United States and the European Union have papered over the worst of their disagreements for now, but there is little guarantee that the rift won’t re-emerge in the near future, thereby complicating Ankara’s efforts to export to Europe and, more important in the near term, to court investment and better trade links. Likewise, the United States could one day reimpose some of the sanctions and tariffs that helped spur panic over the lira during the summer.
Political Tinkering
No matter how intense the economic headwinds become, Turkey’s government will refuse to budge on certain issues, which will detract from its ability to deftly manage the fragile economy. With Erdogan now wielding enormous control over all aspects of governance — including issues such as the economy that are not necessarily his area of expertise — the country’s economic management strategy has failed to inspire much confidence in external investors. Ankara has outlined a three-year, medium-term economic plan to trim spending, tackle inflation and shore up the lira and consumer sentiment, but its economic team has yet to delve into the onerous task of implementing the promised structural changes. What’s more, pledges to cut down on spending contradict Erdogan’s preferred strategy of spending to spur growth, to say nothing of the challenge the central bank faces in trying to combat inflation given his past interference. And the economic team is led by Erdogan’s son-in-law, the finance and economy minister, underlining the close and opaque ties that bind the president to his financial management squad.
But regardless of how fragile its economy becomes, Ankara will continue to pursue certain political aims. In pursuing its primary national security goal — namely, to prevent the development of a Kurdish state in the broader Middle East, since Turkey believes that would fuel demands for Kurdish autonomy at home and threaten the country’s territorial integrity — Turkey will retain its forces in northern Iraq and northwestern Syria, even if that is likely to tax the country’s coffers or irk its regional and Western allies.
Regardless of how fragile Turkey’s economy becomes, Ankara will continue to pursue certain political aims.
But because of its economic challenges, the Turkish government could make some shifts in the political sector ahead of the local elections, which will determine who wins the mayoral posts in 30 metropolitan areas, as well as thousands of other local positions. Although local polls don’t have the same effect on the country’s direction as general and presidential elections, they do offer a reliable gauge of popular sentiment toward political parties at the local level.
In recent elections, Erdogan has allied with the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), landing him a victory in a 2017 constitutional referendum that greatly enhanced his powers, as well as a win in this year’s general elections. Erdogan championed national security in his campaigns — a topic that appeals greatly to AKP and MHP voters alike — while effectively channeling anxiety over the country’s future into support for his message.
But one group — apart from the country’s Kurds — was not so convinced: urban Turks. A majority of voters in the country’s largest cities, Istanbul and Ankara, actually rejected the constitutional referendum in 2017, while the AKP margin of victory in major centers in 2018 was not as comfortable as in past elections. According to recent polls conducted by Mediar, 18 percent of AKP voters from previous elections have said they will not vote for the party in the upcoming local elections. On top of that, 78 percent of Turks believe the country is experiencing an economic crisis, and 58 percent believe the government is to blame for mismanaging the economy. For the AKP and Erdogan, who has previously painted himself as the man who led Turkey out of an economic crisis in the early 2000s, the polling results suggest that he could be losing some of his grip on national sentiment.
Ever the pragmatic politician, Erdogan is likely to follow a political strategy that goes beyond his usual political coalitions. The president could choose to reduce tensions with Kurds after three years of warfare, reorient himself somewhat toward the political center after years of courting the ultranationalist vote or go in another direction altogether. Without question, however, the AKP will again prove its historic nimbleness. Facing another alliance between the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Good Party, Erdogan no doubt knows he must be deft and flexible in managing whichever political current can provide him the support he needs. But even with more economic woes looming and opponents aligning in an effort to bring him down, few would bet against Erdogan’s winning once again.
The Great Power Competition Intensifies. The United States will escalate its strategic offensive against China with tariffs, sanctions, regulatory buffers around emerging technologies, stronger backing for Taiwan and a more assertive posture in the South China Sea. At the same time, failing arms control pacts will accelerate an arms race among the United States, Russia and China. The edgier geopolitical climate will create strategic opportunities for more vulnerable borderland powers, such as Poland and Taiwan, but will also create massive headaches for middle powers trying to find neutral ground, such as Turkey, India and Vietnam.
Increased Geopolitical Risk for Business. Citing national security threats, the United States will lean heavily on Europe, Japan, Australia, Canada, South Korea and Taiwan to erect stronger barriers to Chinese investment. This will affect research and trade in strategic areas, from artificial intelligence to 5G network rollouts beginning in 2019. China’s imperative to catch up in critical areas like aerospace and high-end semiconductor development will only increase cyberthreats to corporations and compel an overall more offensive U.S. policy in cyberspace. In addition, corporations will have to contend with supply chain disruptions and heavier fines and lawsuits for data breaches.
Measuring Trade Volatility in the Global Economy. A U.S. showdown with the World Trade Organization could paralyze the body’s dispute settlement process, forcing countries into a less predictable bilateral track to resolve their trade differences. Canada, Mexico, Japan and South Korea have a better chance of negotiating quotas to mitigate the threat of U.S. auto tariffs, but the European Union’s trade talks with the United States are doomed to fail. And while additional U.S. tariffs on China will add to trade uncertainty, the overall effect on the global economy from White House trade policy in 2019 will be relatively muted.
Hair-Raising Scenarios for Italy and Brexit. A defiantly populist Italian government will pose the biggest threat to the eurozone in 2019 as concerns grow over the country’s rising debt levels and fragile banking sector. Financial markets and dangerously wide spreads in bond yields — rather than threats from Brussels — will prove to be Rome’s biggest disciplinarians. Brussels will simultaneously work to avert a no-deal Brexit scenario with the United Kingdom, but a British parliamentary veto remains the single biggest obstacle to its orderly exit from the European Union.
The Next Steps in the Anti-Iran Campaign. With far-reaching secondary sanctions in place, the United States will forge ahead with its campaign to isolate Iran regionally and weaken the country from within. This will increase friction between Washington and Tehran and diminish the already scant likelihood of a constructive negotiation. A common agenda opposing Iran will help insulate strategic, high-level ties between the United States and Saudi Arabia despite rumblings within the royal family and foreign governments over Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s leadership.
An Eye on Growing Supply in Global Energy Markets. Saudi Arabia and Russia will carefully manage oil output to prevent a price plunge as they monitor the effects of residual Iranian exports on the market. There is also the potential for production growth out of Iraq and Libya and a significant easing of export capacity constraints on the United States later in the year. Global liquified natural gas markets will be shaken up when the United States assumes its place among the top three LNG exporters in the world in 2019.
Disruptive Forces at Work in the Americas. Hard-line and U.S.-aligned governments in Brazil and Colombia could drive an atypically proactive regional effort to contain spillover from Venezuela’s ongoing crisis. Brazil’s efforts to shake up and reform the Mercosur trading bloc will come up against a politically hamstrung Argentina. The power of the referendum will meanwhile be put to the test in Mexico, where an aggressive populist agenda will raise investor risk.
Ethiopia Drives Big Change in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s ambitious agenda is generating economic interest and attracting outside powers to the Horn of Africa. But internal challenges to the current leadership and ethnic strife risk slowing Addis Ababa’s momentum.
Nov 19, 2018 | 20:19 GMT 16 mins read
Global Trends
In today’s world, nations are becoming increasingly interconnected by air, land, sea and cyberspace. As globalization has knitted countries and continents closer together, the borders of the map and the barriers of geography have been rendered, in some ways, obsolete. Now events in one region can more easily have consequences in another, at times even rippling across the globe. We explore those with the greatest impact on international decision-making during the forecast period below.
section Highlights
A great power rivalry among the United States, China and Russia will accelerate a high-stakes arms race and increase competition in cyberspace. Global governance around these building threats will prove elusive as divisions deepen in the international system.
Even as the United States escalates a strategic offensive against China with additional tariffs and regulatory blocks, sanctions, increased backing for Taiwan, and maritime challenges in the South China Sea, Beijing will rely on its heavy economic leverage to chip away at U.S. alliances.
A White House showdown with the World Trade Organization could grind the body’s dispute settlement process to a halt, forcing countries back to a less predictable bilateral track to sort out their trade frictions.
As Iranian oil exports diminish under sanctions, U.S. production is set to increase, and as the global economy experiences more sluggish growth in 2019, Saudi Arabia and Russia will remain highly reactive to global oil markets to prevent a steep price plunge. Global liquefied natural gas markets, meanwhile, will grow more competitive as the United States earns its place among the world’s top LNG exporters in 2019.
A New and Uncomfortable Global Reality
More than a year ago, Stratfor noted that the intensifying competition among the United States, China and Russia would emerge as the defining feature of the international system, creating a conundrum for the middle powers caught in the throes of great power rivalry. It didn’t take long for trade wars, cyberattacks, shifting defense strategies and arms races to convince the world that this is the new and uncomfortable global reality.
Great power competition is set to only intensify in 2019. The White House will double down on its attempts to short-circuit China’s advances across a number of strategic fields. Beijing will take some blows along the way, but China still has the means and more motivation than ever to accelerate its timetable and efforts toward reaching parity with the United States. And while there is no love lost between China and Russia, the potential for a tighter alignment in 2019 is likely to overcome the friction points in their uneasy partnership.
This new global dynamic creates a massive headache for middle powers and globally exposed businesses attempting to navigate an increasingly complex landscape.
The year will expose the limits the United States faces in trying to isolate China both from within tightly interwoven supply chains and from even the most dependable U.S. allies, caught between maintaining a tight security relationship with the United States and a growing need to expand their economic ties with China. This global dynamic will create a massive headache for middle powers and globally exposed businesses trying to navigate this complex landscape. Even as major European powers try to assert EU sovereignty on the global scale to avoid becoming collateral damage, they will remain largely reactive to the broader competition. And for those powers lying along the borderlands, from Poland to Turkey to Taiwan, a tenser geopolitical climate will translate in some cases into strategic opportunities as they try to work quickly to shore up security alliances and extract special economic benefits from powerful suitors.
Disruptive technologies and fractured treaties will reshape military arsenals in the years ahead.
The rapid development of disruptive weapons technology combined with the steady deterioration of arms control pacts will accelerate the high-stakes arms race among the United States, Russia and China. Washington’s likely imminent withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and a shakier negotiation over the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty will deepen divisions in Europe as Western powers try to avoid getting caught in an arms buildup while states on the front lines with Russia, like Poland, the Baltic states and potentially Romania, volunteer to host U.S. military assets. At the same time, the United States will be freeing itself to build up a formidable arsenal to challenge China, all while Beijing strategically avoids entering such arms pacts and continues apace with its own buildup in the Western Pacific.
The ideological dimension to the great power competition will play out more subtly. The United States is rising to the challenge of competing with a China-Russia axis, but it is relying on unorthodox tactics and a broadly unilateral course that will risk alienating many of the middle-power allies it needs on its side. With the Western front divided and the United States no longer actively defending — and in some cases actively battling — the postwar rules-based system of managing the global order, China will find plenty of inroads among middle powers to blunt the U.S. offensive. Moreover, the technology-driven form of digital authoritarianism that China is harnessing to manage affairs at home and export abroad will offer a compelling alternative to powers with autocratic leanings that have grown wary of the liberal political conditions that traditionally come with partnering with the West.
U.S. and China, Ready to Rumble Into 2019
The U.S.-China competition will escalate on practically all fronts in 2019. Not only will China face heightened economic pressure from tariffs and regulatory blocks against Chinese firms, but the United States will also use sanctions to tighten the screws on Beijing over potential issues including cyberattacks and human rights. (Beijing’s treatment of the Uighurs and other minority groups, for example, will present a prime target for U.S. sanctions policy.)
On the security front, the United States will more assertively challenge China directly in the South China Sea and over Taiwan, possibly leading to more standoffs and close calls between U.S. and Chinese forces in maritime hot spots. U.S. economic efforts to directly counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative, in contrast, will face much greater limitations, as Beijing leverages joint economic access and partnership deals with powers big and small to dilute U.S. alliances.
Despite imposing tariffs on around $250 billion in Chinese imports, the White House can still hit China with another round of tariffs if concessions from Beijing don’t materialize.
On trade, temporary truces between Washington and Beijing will be possible as the two sides negotiate some economic reprieve, but the key word is “temporary”: The gulf between U.S. demands for deep structural reform in China’s economy and the reality of what Beijing is willing to offer without compromising its critical industrial technology strategy and stability at home is simply too wide to allow for a more comprehensive and enduring deal to emerge between them. The United States has already imposed tariffs on roughly $250 billion in Chinese imports. Frustrated by the limited concessions it will be able to extract from Beijing, the White House can still blast China with another round of tariffs targeting a remaining $267 billion in imports.
Potential export controls on “dual-use” targets will prove highly disruptive to many corporations.
U.S. economic pressure against China will also extend well beyond tariffs. U.S. tech firms will face more regulatory oversight as the United States tries to restrict Chinese access to dual-use technologies and scrutinizes the U.S.-China supply chain for national security vulnerabilities. Potential export controls on “dual-use” targets, from high-performance chips to general artificial intelligence research, will be highly disruptive to many corporations. The United States has already been erecting barriers to Chinese investment and research in strategic sectors, but it will also be heavily lobbying other countries — particularly Japan, Canada, European nations, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan — to downgrade their ties with major Chinese tech companies, like Huawei and ZTE, that will be branded as a critical national security risk to their countries.
Timing is key: 2019 marks the rollout of revolutionary fifth-generation telecommunications technology in the developed world.
The next two years will bring a game-changing level of speed and connectivity to underpin transformative technologies, like the “internet of things,” virtual and augmented reality, artificial intelligence processing, autonomous vehicles, and telemedicine — which are already areas of intense U.S.-Chinese competition. And since Huawei and ZTE are two among a small handful of technology companies that have developed the technological infrastructure and standards around 5G, the U.S. government will do whatever it can to prevent its biggest strategic competitor from embedding itself deep inside the economic nervous systems of itself and its allies. That growing imperative will naturally add fuel to an already building fire between the state and the corporation in several advanced economies as multinational tech firms with deeply layered supply chains try to resist a rise in regulatory handicaps to business models that rely on open trade and cross-border data flows.
Any kind of global consensus on the priorities and methods needed to govern cyberspace will remain elusive in 2019.
Intensifying great power competition in cyberspace will only aggravate state-corporate friction over policy. As the biggest target of cyberattacks, the United States is moving down a more offensive path, with China and Russia squarely in its sights. (The lead-up to the 2020 U.S. presidential race will draw additional attention to the cyberthreat posed by China, in particular.) A growing trend can be seen in Western countries where governments will rely on heavy fines and the buildup of consumer lawsuits to hold corporations accountable for large-scale data breaches. Calls among major powers to develop global norms for cyberspace will grow more urgent, but consensus and enforcement for any such agenda will remain elusive given widely divergent positions among the United States, Europe, Russia and China over the priorities and methods needed to govern cyberspace.
The Global Headwinds of U.S. Trade Policy
Outside of the tight U.S. economic focus on China, the looming threat of U.S. auto tariffs and a showdown between the United States and other major powers at the World Trade Organization (WTO) will reverberate throughout the global economy. The White House’s economic policy, while prone to the machinations of rival ideological camps, remains largely driven by an interest in reducing trade deficits through bilateral negotiations. The U.S. administration is also not afraid to use heavy-hitting tactics as leverage. Even as the White House threatens tariffs on auto imports — a major driver of the U.S. trade deficit — in the name of national security, it will not settle on trade deals that fail to include significant concessions in markets like agriculture, where U.S. exporters are more competitive. The United States will also use bilateral trade agreements to discourage U.S. trading partners from signing free trade agreements with China (Canada’s pursuit of such a deal will test the credibility of that tactic).
The finalization of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which already includes greater protections for U.S. auto manufacturers and quota provisions, will largely insulate Mexico and Canada from the threat of U.S. auto tariffs. A diminished economic threat to North American trade will reduce urgency from the U.S. Congress to impose legislative checks on White House trade policy.
Germany has the most to lose from a trade battle with the United States over autos but won’t be able to force the European Union — and France in particular — into making concessions on agriculture to satisfy the White House.
Japan runs a good chance of mitigating the threat of U.S. auto tariffs through a limited trade deal with the United States given the agricultural concessions it made in its free trade agreement with Canada and in the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2018. South Korea will also likely agree to quotas to fend off auto tariffs. In contrast, the prospects for a comprehensive U.S.-EU trade resolution in 2019 look outright dismal. Germany has the most to lose from a trade battle with the United States over autos but will not be able to force the European Union as a bloc, and France in particular, into making concessions on agriculture to satisfy the White House. Depending on which administration trade hawks and pragmatists have the president’s ear at the time, the White House will likely choose between reneging on a truce, imposing auto tariffs anyway and doubling down on Europe in hopes that it will eventually drive Brussels to a deal; or tempering its ambitions and focusing instead on ongoing negotiations over regulations and standards that fall short of formal free trade talks.
Parallel to these troubled trade negotiations is a growing confrontation between major economic powers and the WTO.
The World Trade Organization is currently arbitrating a number of national security-related cases, including one regarding the U.S. justification for imposing tariffs on steel and aluminum in early 2018. The White House will make an example of these cases to argue that the multinational body has no right to arbitrate matters of national security in the first case. Should the White House win this argument, it could make it easier for other states to erect protectionist barriers in the name of national security.
Should the White House lose, the decision will only add to its building crusade against the WTO’s credibility. To be clear, Congress has the authority to prevent an outright U.S. withdrawal from the WTO, which would upend the global economy. But the United States does have the means to paralyze the organization’s dispute resolution process. Because of the United States’ continued block on new appointments, by December 2019 the appellate body risks falling below the minimum three members required to rule on cases.
This form of protest by the United States, which preceded the presidency of Donald Trump, is designed to spur support from the European Union, Japan, Canada and other major trading partners for WTO reforms that would speed its rulings and clarify jurisdictional boundaries as the United States tries to prevent the body from stepping into sovereign trade territory. It’s also intended to get the WTO to hold China and other developing nations more accountable for trade abuses including state subsidization and intellectual property theft. Relatedly, a WTO panel on a case brought against the European Union by China, which is seeking recognition as a market economy, will wrap up in 2019. If the European Union loses this case, it will add momentum to the U.S. argument that the WTO is unfit to regulate China on trade.
An increasing number of influential countries are pushing for WTO reforms to speed up the organization’s rulings and clarify jurisdictional boundaries to limit forays into sovereign trade territory.
But U.S. demands for reform will be a lot to ask from the slow-moving and fractious multinational organization that’s ruled by consensus. There’s a real threat that the United States will grind the dispute settlement process to a halt, a scenario that would drive economic powers back into bilateral negotiations to sort out their differences as they did under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the pre-WTO system that governed global trade in a geopolitical climate oozing with uncertainty.
The Global Energy Outlook
A collapse in oil markets is unlikely in the first half of 2019 as sanctions diminish Iranian oil exports and pipeline constraints limit U.S. production growth. But that supply picture will shift significantly in the second half of the year when U.S. pipeline capacity expands. Saudi Arabia and Russia will remain highly reactive to any signs of oversupply that could send oil prices into a tailspin. Iran still will be able to export about 1 million barrels per day for around the next five months under limited sanctions waivers, and there’s potential for Libya and Iraq to sort out internal political differences long enough to notably affect the market. At the same time, the potential of an internal meltdown decreasing production in Venezuela and discord in the Persian Gulf impeding tanker traffic in the Strait of Hormuz will be closely watched for more acute supply disruptions.
The United States, meanwhile, is preparing to shake up global liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets. By the end of 2019, the United States will join Qatar and Australia as one of the world’s largest LNG exporters. The broader geopolitical effects will take several years to play out as a more competitive LNG market drives short-term contracts and gas-on-gas pricing, particularly in Asian markets with rapidly growing demand. U.S. trading partners under siege by the White House will try to leverage increased purchases of U.S. LNG to temper trade frictions, while Eastern European powers will use U.S. LNG purchases to better insulate themselves from Russia.
Slow and Steady as She Goes for the Global Economy
When we step back and look at all the factors likely to drive instability in the global economy in 2019, there is cause for concern, but not necessarily panic. Growing levels of corporate and sovereign debt, slow growth in workers’ incomes, demographic stresses and building political constraints to structural reform make a troubling backdrop to the longer-term economic outlook. Nonetheless, the biggest threat to the U.S. economy from White House trade policy — the collapse of NAFTA — has been mitigated. The potential for more U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports and on U.S. auto imports from outside North America will create localized, sectoral pains but will have a limited impact on the U.S. economy and global economy at large. The White House will point to stable U.S. economic growth to justify an aggressive approach on trade, though the stimulant effects of U.S. tax cuts and fiscal spending will wane in the next few months and keep U.S. monetary tightening on a relatively moderate course.
As long as U.S. economic growth remains relatively stable, U.S. importers struggle to find cheap alternatives to Chinese products and American consumers continue to tolerate slightly higher prices on Chinese goods, China will be able to weather the economic blows from its enduring competition with the United States while relying more heavily on fiscal adjustments at home to maintain stability.
In Europe, a no-deal Brexit scenario can still be averted, even if narrowly. Even as the Italian government and European Commission will avoid escalating their confrontation into a systemic crisis, the fragility of Italy’s banking sector will remain the biggest risk to eurozone stability. The European Central Bank will implement its shift toward monetary tightening slowly and cautiously as the Italian risk hangs over the eurozone and as economic expansion in Europe slows overall.
Emerging markets will remain under strain from a strong dollar, weak currencies, high inflation, heavy import bills and domestic political constraints on economic reform.
An International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout agreement is preventing the Argentine economy from collapse, but is also raising the potential for a more fiscally lax Peronista comeback in October elections. Turkey will have a bit more political room to pursue light reforms in 2019 while trying to prevent the more controversial aspects of its foreign policy from aggravating economic stability at home. Pakistan is cobbling together IMF and foreign assistance to avoid a balance-of-payments crisis, while the Indian government will prepare for spring elections by avoiding big trade concessions and pressuring the central bank to keep monetary policy loose. Mexico’s new government was spared a NAFTA nightmare but will drive up political risk for investors with an aggressive populist agenda. And while smaller Asia-Pacific economies, including Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia and Taiwan, will be caught in the crosshairs of the U.S.-China trade battle, they are also among the first places that U.S.-based companies in China looking to diversify supply chains will consider as the competition between the economic giants endures.
Related Forecasts These Stratfor analyses provide additional insights for the year ahead
Amid a high-stakes race for technological supremacy, global powers will grapple with the challenge of establishing artificial intelligence governance and ethical norms.
The United States, China and Russia will accelerate efforts to militarize space in the absence of international standards to regulate space conduct.
Even as the great power rivalry with China and Russia pushes the United States to downgrade its military commitments in Africa and the Middle East, a U.S. campaign against Iran along with persistent terrorism and proliferation concerns will fight for U.S. attention and resources.
Anti-corruption is an increasingly popular and potent political weapon that can be harnessed by Western governments and strongmen alike to shape policy at home and abroad.
Great powers will compete over lucrative arms contracts around the world.
A divided and less accommodating Congress will have mixed results for U.S. foreign policy.
A longer-term global energy transition toward renewables will continue in 2019, with corporations assuming more leadership in this shift.
Key Dates to Watch
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Nov 19, 2018 | 20:48 GMT 8 mins read
Middle East and North Africa
The Middle East and North Africa is the world’s crossroads. It encompasses the Arabian Peninsula, the mountains of Iran, the plains of Turkey, the deserts of the Levant, the lands north of the Sahara and all coasts in between. The story of the region, as is so often the case of places stuck between foreign players, is the story of trade, exchange and conflict. The traditional powers of the region are Turkey and Iran — Saudi Arabia and Egypt are the current Arab powers — and their competition for influence over the region’s weaker states makes the Middle East and North Africa an arena of violence and instability.
Key Trends for 2019
The U.S.-Iran Collision Course
The U.S.-led sanctions campaign will hurt Iran, but it won’t lead to the collapse of the Iranian government even as the country’s economy struggles. By increasing sanctions, the United States hopes to coerce Iran to return to the negotiating table. This will not work; while Iran is known for its political feuding, its parties will prioritize regime stability over their usual politicking. Moreover, sanctions have intensified popular unrest, which strengthens the political capital of conservatives and hard-liners against the administration of moderate President Hassan Rouhani. Furthermore, Iran’s assertive intelligence and security apparatus will be empowered by the need to deepen Iran’s defensive strategy in the face of the intensifying pressure.
Iran will do what it can to retaliate against its aggressors, stopping just short of provoking a conventional military response — for now.
Tehran will be tempted to retaliate by harassing U.S. and allied vessels in the Persian Gulf, conducting ballistic missile tests or resuming its nuclear activities, but it will only do so when absolutely necessary. Instead, Tehran will more readily employ cyberwarfare, conduct covert operations, or use its key regional proxies to strike back at the United States, Israel and the Gulf states. Iran wants to avoid provoking a conventional military strike against itself, but as political support from the European Union weakens over 2019 and economic guarantees are replaced by political rhetoric, Tehran will be more willing to engage in sharper retaliatory measures. Learn more about Iran’s strengths and vulnerabilities.
The United States Bolsters Regional Allies
In carrying out its regional strategy, which hinges on containing Iran, the United States will lean on two sets of allies with similarly aligned objectives. The first set includes allies most concerned about Iran and willing to embrace hard-hitting anti-Iranian policies: Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These countries are rapidly overcoming decades of mistrust and conflict to better coordinate against Tehran in cyberspace, in enforcing sanctions, and even militarily.
The United States will rely on its allies in the Persian Gulf to assist with Washington’s Iran containment strategy.
The second set of allies, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar, is more loosely aligned and less willing to take a tough position on Iran. These countries can provide strategic, diplomatic and economic value to the United States in certain regional conflicts and crises. An improved alignment between them could reduce the intensity of the Qatar blockade, but the underlying conflict among members of the Gulf Cooperation Council will endure. Learn more about how these countries will attempt to demonstrate their strategic utility to the United States.
Spotlight on Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia will have to manage growing concerns over Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman throughout 2019. In the wake of exiled Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s murder, the crown prince’s actions will come under increasing international scrutiny. Although he remains well entrenched within the Saudi monarchy, Crown Prince Mohammed’s dominant position still depends on support from his father, King Salman, and quiet resistance will continue to build within the royal family. Some of Riyadh’s key allies will limit military support and foreign direct investment to Saudi Arabia, but crucial relationships are unlikely to shift.
The stain of the Khashoggi affair will linger on the House of Saud into 2019.
Riyadh will continue to advance its Vision 2030 goals over the coming year, easing austerity measures in response to positive economic signs — higher oil prices in 2018, the opportunity to make up for decreased Iranian oil exports, and a relatively successful non-oil revenue generation strategy. This means the kingdom can avoid making hard structural changes to the Saudi economy, especially the labor markets. Complaints over housing, salaries and quality of life will compel the state to use its fuller royal purse to douse grievances with cash. Read more about the troubles facing Saudi Arabia in the wake of the Khashoggi affair.
The Syrian Cauldron Could Spill Over
In the closing stages of the Syrian civil war, five key powers — Turkey, Russia, Iran, the United States and Israel — are competing for influence and control. Moscow and Tehran firmly back Syrian President Bashar al Assad but differ not only in the levels of support they provide but also in their overall objectives. Russia has used the Syrian conflict to expand its footprint in the Middle East and will be protective of its gains and materiel, though Moscow has little desire for open conflict with Turkey, the United States or Israel. Iran, on the other hand, will be more aggressive in its support for Damascus, especially in opposition to Ankara and Washington. Tehran will also continue to build up its forces inside Syria as a deterrent to Israel and as a means to supply Hezbollah, its powerful ally in nearby Lebanon. Israel will attempt to foil Iran’s plans but is intrinsically wary of sparking an unintended conflict with Russia.
Turkey and the United States remain opposed to Assad’s rule, but despite being NATO allies, they will pursue their own agendas in Syria. The United States is focused on eradicating remnants of the Islamic State in the country, though Washington more broadly seeks to remove Iranian influence from Syria as part of its anti-Iran strategy. Challenging Iran in Syria creates tension between the United States and Russia — Moscow cannot and will not force out Iran. Despite efforts to deconflict, the possibility of a military incident involving U.S. and Russian assets is not beyond the realm of possibility.
The possibility of a breakout conflict involving the major powers overseeing the Syrian conflict is conceivable in 2019.
Turkey, for its part, will maintain its focus on containing Kurdish forces in Syria. This is problematic for the United States, which uses the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), a group Ankara sees as a terrorist organization, as an ally against the Islamic State and as a proxy against Iran. In Syria’s northwest, Turkey’s pledge to protect Idlib province could stretch Ankara’s credibility as a local partner, especially given Damascus’ stated goal of total reconquest. Idlib could well become a flashpoint among Turkey, Iran, Syrian loyalist forces and, more remotely, Russia. Given the opposing interests in Syria, the potential for accidental escalation or even a state-to-state confrontation in 2019 is higher than ever, though every power will take steps to avoid this. Learn more about the possibilities for state-to-state confrontation and what 2019 will hold for the Syrian conflict.
Handling Turkey’s Fragile Economy
The biggest challenge facing Turkey in 2019 will be its distressed economy. As well as managing record inflation, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will have to contend with a privately held corporate debt bill roughly equal to a quarter of the country’s gross domestic product — all while avoiding another lira crisis. Erdogan will be politically compelled to broaden his support base ahead of local elections in the spring, courting financially concerned Turks from across the electoral spectrum, some of whom have been turned off by the president’s nationalist policies. Turkey’s brittle economy also weakens Ankara’s position when it comes to dealing with key partners in the West. The U.S. relationship with Turkey is increasingly fractious thanks in part to Ankara’s growing ties with Russia and Washington’s support for the YPG in Syria.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will have his work cut out in 2019 to stabilize the Turkish economy.
Because of its vulnerability to U.S. economic pressure, Turkey will attempt to shore up foreign investment and maintain stable economic relations with Europe. However, Turkey’s historically complex relationship with the European Union will complicate that effort. Beyond stabilizing its economic situation, Ankara will continue to pursue other core imperatives in 2019, including the containment of autonomous Kurdish movements in Turkey’s former Ottoman domains. Ankara will exert whatever influence it can in northern Syria and continue military strikes against Kurdistan Workers’ Party positions in northern Iraq. Learn more about Turkey’s precarious economic position going into 2019.
Related Forecasts These Stratfor analyses provide additional insights for the year ahead
Saudi Arabia will continue efforts to build up its own defense sector so it won’t have to rely on foreign arms suppliers.
Algeria’s government will batten down the hatches in 2019 in advance of a presidential election that risks destabilizing the country’s fragile plan for succession.
Israel will continue to seek investment for its infrastructure development projects, but taking Chinese money will have U.S. consequences.
The Khashoggi Affair could lead the United States to rethink its contribution to the Saudi-led war in Yemen, with consequences that could influence its course.
An unpopular tax bill contributed to Jordan’s recent economic protests, but there is no shortage of issues that could trigger the next political crisis in the Hashemite Kingdom.
Iran’s missile arsenal poses a key threat to Israeli security — especially given Tehran’s proclivities for supplying arms to regional proxies — and Israel will take whatever action it can to mitigate the risk.
The new Iraqi government will struggle to strike a balance between competing external influences, including Iran’s.
Competition between France and Italy complicates Libya’s already formidable struggle to unite its rival factions.
Key Dates to Watch
January: The inaugural meeting of the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) — dubbed the “Arab NATO” — could take place.
January: The heads of state of the African Union will hold a summit in Egypt.
Feb. 17-22: Financial Action Task Force (FATF) plenary meeting in Paris at which Iran’s status will be discussed.
March: Local elections will be held in Turkey.
April: The presidential election in Algeria will be held.
August: Annual Iranian naval drills take place in the Strait of Hormuz.
November: Israeli parliamentary elections must be held by the end of the month.
Unknown Date: 2020 Iranian parliamentary elections will be announced.
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Nov 27, 2018 | 13:49 GMT 8 mins read
Asia-Pacific
The Asia-Pacific is home to more people than any other region. Centered on the western rim of the Pacific Ocean, this region includes the easternmost countries of continental Asia as well as the archipelagos that punctuate the coast. Several of these countries, most notably China, experienced rapid economic growth in the second half of the 20th century, giving the region a new sense of global economic relevance that continues today. That relevance, however, depends largely on China, a power in transition whose rise is testing the network of U.S. alliances that have long dominated the region. How effectively Beijing manages its transition will shape the regional balance of power in the decades to come.
Key Trends for 2019
China Weathers the Trade Storm
Beijing will try to keep its lines of communication with Washington open on trade by offering to buy more U.S. goods and selectively lower barriers to investment, but its concessions won’t meet U.S. demands for structural economic reform. Still, China will only respond in kind to U.S. measures targeting Chinese firms and entities and not take any blanket punitive action against U.S. businesses. Beijing will also deepen public-sector reforms by soliciting foreign investment for its financial, auto and energy sectors. Furthermore, it will ease restrictions in sectors that align with China’s prime interests, such as medical services and education.
China’s refusal to concede to U.S. demands will prolong the ongoing trade dispute.
The United States will maintain its demand that China ease state support for its tech sector, but that will only compel Beijing to accelerate its efforts to ease China’s dependence on foreign technology and diversify its supply chain — thereby necessitating increased state support for the sector. Needless to say, China’s refusal to bow to U.S. pressure on tech will prolong their trade dispute. At the same time, China will strive to acquire technology and cooperate on sector-specific activities with advanced tech powers like Japan, Israel, Taiwan and the European Union, but such activities will face increased scrutiny over concerns about Chinese investment and industrial espionage. Read more on China’s efforts to reform its state sector.
Beijing Battens Down the Hatches
Because the extended trade war threatens the economy in China’s coastal regions (and, thus, social stability), Beijing will ease its tight regulations designed to contain debt and protect the environment while upgrading infrastructure, generating credit and offering direct subsidies to boost growth. China will also carefully manage the yuan’s value to mitigate the damage to exports, allowing it to cope with reduced growth. But an accumulation of debt and the fragility of the housing market will limit Beijing’s ability to use massive credit flows and sharp currency devaluations as a means of economic stimulus.
China will have to rely more on fiscal stimulus — including reducing taxes — to encourage consumption and private sector activity.
It will also encourage the increased use of the yuan in currency swaps and in trade with countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative to mitigate currency volatility. And to keep hedging against U.S. trade pressure, Beijing will pursue bilateral and regional free trade agreements, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in the Indo-Pacific region and trilateral negotiations with Japan and South Korea, all while forging ties with new export markets along the Belt and Road and in Africa. Southeast Asia’s emerging economies, meanwhile, will be ready to lure any factories that relocate from China amid the trade war. Threats to the overall regional supply chain and external financial volatility could also present challenges to countries with higher debt or current account deficits, such as Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. Learn more about why state-owned enterprises are so important to China.
Great Power Competition in the Asia-Pacific
As it tries to chip away at the U.S. regional alliance structure, China will continue its conciliatory outreach to Japan, India and the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by privileging dispute resolution efforts and economic partnerships while also making overtures to Australia, whose April elections could foster some rapprochement. At the same time, Washington will bolster its naval presence in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait and further challenge the One China principle by elevating Taipei’s status at international associations and regularizing arms sales, naval patrols and high-level visits.
The U.S. Navy will be more prevalent in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, which will provoke China to adopt a more robust military posture.
In response, China will adopt tougher naval and aerial postures to assert its territorial claims, increasing the chances of accidents involving the U.S. military. The United States is considering making a naval port call in Taiwan — an event that would trigger a more direct Chinese military response. Japan, India and Australia will increase security cooperation with Washington, but they will refrain from joining U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea or patrols in the Taiwan Strait. Elsewhere in the region, U.S.-ASEAN military exercises and U.S.-Vietnamese defense cooperation will complicate Chinese efforts to limit the further regional expansion of U.S. influence. Find out more about Taiwan’s role in U.S.-China competition.
A Fraying Consensus on North Korea
The United States is intent on extracting tangible concessions from North Korea in 2019. But this is also the year that Pyongyang hopes to squeeze the most out of the Trump presidency before the United States becomes distracted by its election cycle. Given the obviously high stakes of open warfare, neither will deliberately scuttle the dialogue. North Korea will carefully offer tangible pledges but will also expect concrete progress on sanctions relief or toward a peace deal; throughout the process, it will obfuscate and delay where it can. Pyongyang will also insist on assurances that any bilateral deal will have staying power beyond the current administration.
The United States will hesitate to extend an economic lifeline to North Korea by lifting sanctions, but time is on Pyongyang’s side as the international consensus on maintaining sanctions unravels.
For the moment, Washington’s veto power on the U.N. Security Council will allow it to block any effort to repeal the multilateral measures, even as China and Russia push for the international community to reward North Korea for its cooperation. At the same time, the United States will pressure others to fall into line on sanctions by shaming transgressors and threatening secondary sanctions against those who deal with Pyongyang. Complicating matters, inter-Korean detente is reaching the point where it cannot proceed much further without sanctions exceptions — something the United States will only approve after careful consideration. The growing discrepancy between the pace of the inter-Korean dialogue and the pace of the U.S.-North Korean discussions will leave room for China to extend its influence on the Korean Peninsula. Overall, while swings towards breakthroughs and breakdowns will occur throughout the year, North Korea will still maintain possession of many elements of its hard-won nuclear program at the end of 2019.
Moving the Belt and Road Forward
With its access to U.S. markets under strain, Beijing will redouble its efforts to find new export markets and partners through the Belt and Road Initiative. Washington will work principally with Japan and Australia to offer alternative infrastructure investments to counter China’s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, but Beijing will temper potential partners’ concerns regarding financial sustainability, political influence and national security threats by attracting third-party investors. It will also work to undermine Washington’s regional initiatives by pursuing joint projects with middle powers, including Japan, the European Union and India. Take a more in-depth look at the resistance to the Belt and Road Initiative.
A Japanese Awakening
Secure in his position through 2021, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will aim to pass constitutional reforms before the end of 2019 while offsetting the economic impacts of a consumption tax hike through public works spending, incentives for private sector investment and tax exemptions for certain products. And though Russia and Japan will continue to negotiate over the disputed Kuril Islands, a larger standoff between Moscow and the West will scuttle any hopes of a deal.
When it comes to trade, the United States and Japan have an arrangement for now, but much will depend on how far Washington pushes Tokyo.
Meanwhile, Tokyo will grant concessions that will partly placate U.S. trade concerns — so long as the U.S. push for agricultural access does not exceed the limits outlined in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and EU-Japan trade deals. If Washington pushes further, Tokyo will experience a backlash from its powerful farming lobby — although it will weigh whether to sacrifice its agricultural sector to avoid U.S. tariffs on its critical auto sector. Beyond that, Tokyo will also resist U.S. attempts to limit any future Japanese trade deal with China. Read more on Japan’s calculations on automotive and agricultural trade in the face of U.S. pressure.
Related Forecasts These Stratfor analyses provide additional insights for the year ahead
The U.S.-China trade war could benefit Vietnam economically but will complicate Hanoi’s delicate balance between the two.
China’s large debt accumulation will hamper Beijing’s efforts to stimulate the economy.
China’s tech sector will become an increasing concern for the United States, particularly as the two battle over artificial intelligence.
Key Dates to Watch
Early 2019: Release of a World Trade Organization panel report on China’s challenge of the European Union’s refusal to grant China market economy status.
Early 2019: Next Trump-Kim summit may occur.
Jan. 1: Date that the United States could possibly raise the tariff rate on $200 billion worth of Chinese imports to 25 percent.
Jan. 14: First day the United States can hold formal trade deal talks with Japan.
January: First round of CPTPP’s tariff cuts will take effect.
March: Joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises Foal Eagle, Double Dragon and Key Resolve normally held.
May 18: Australia’s Senate elections must be held before this date, with House of Representative elections due by November.
June 28-29: A G-20 summit is scheduled to be held in Osaka, Japan.
August: U.S.-South Korean Ulchi Freedom Guardian military exercise normally held.
Nov 27, 2018 | 20:43 GMT 8 mins read
Europe
To the west of Eurasia lays Europe, a region predisposed to division. It is surrounded on nearly all sides by islands and peninsulas that make it difficult for Europe to cohere. The northern half of the continent, moreover, sits on a plain whose short, meandering rivers tend to empower countries without forcing them to work with others. The southern half is situated on more mountainous terrain that has historically impeded the creation of strong, unified economies. As a result, Europe is a continent riven by pockets of distinct cultures whose differences are all too often irreconcilable.
Key Trends for 2019
Risk in the Eurozone
Italy will remain the main source of financial risk within the eurozone. Rome could make cosmetic changes to its fiscal policies to delay sanctions from the European Commission over its 2019 budget, but the real threat to the country’s financial stability will come not from Brussels but from the financial markets. Rome’s fiscal policies will create uncertainty among investors about the sustainability of its debt.
If Italy’s political and financial turbulence continues, Southern European countries could suffer increased borrowing costs.
The billions of euros in Italian debt held by its banks leaves them vulnerable. Should those banks require assistance, Rome may have no choice but to negotiate a rescue program with the European Union. At the same time, disputes within Italy’s coalition government could prompt early elections, adding to political uncertainty. Italy’s political and financial turbulence will increase the chances of higher borrowing costs and of banking uncertainty in other Southern European countries. Read more about what’s motivating the Italian government’s policies.
The Year of Brexit
While there is no shortage of disruptors around the Brexit process, London and Brussels will work to minimize the economic effects of the United Kingdom’s exit from the bloc. London’s first choice will be to leave with a comprehensive exit agreement, but it may take more than one vote to persuade the British Parliament to approve it. If lawmakers ratify the deal, the United Kingdom will remain in the EU single market in 2019. But even if Parliament rejects it, London and Brussels will still reach temporary agreements, or in some cases act alone, to contain economic disruptions as much as possible. Such measures could include extending the negotiation period under Article 50, to delay Britain’s exit. Still, a British parliamentary veto would throw the logistics of the bilateral relationship (from trade to commercial flights to migration) into flux.
To make Brexit even more interesting, the sitting British government could fall at any point in the negotiations and a new election could be scheduled.
No matter how Brexit happens, the United Kingdom and the European Union will discuss a permanent post-withdrawal trade arrangement, and London will hold free trade talks with other countries, including the United States. Considering their complexity, those negotiations will likely extend beyond 2019. Read about why fragmentation in Europe’s financial system will grow after Brexit.
Trade in Focus
The European Union will not sign a comprehensive free trade agreement with the United States in 2019, but it will be willing to discuss a more modest agreement that covers industrial goods. Brussels will also be open to talking about the elimination of some nontariff barriers to trade. With these gestures, the bloc will try to dissuade the United States from introducing higher tariffs on vehicles produced in the European Union. Should the White House raise the tariffs, the union would retaliate with its own countermeasures. At the same time, it will try to keep the United States engaged in multilateral forums such as the World Trade Organization, and it will side with the White House when it pressures China on issues such as state subsidies and foreign investment limitations.
The EU will continue to seek opportunities with countries such as Australia and New Zealand, South America’s Mercosur trading bloc, and even look to open new export markets in South and East Asia.
Brussels will also see Beijing as a counterbalance to the United States when it comes to defending multilateralism. But large economies such as Germany and France will resist China’s penetration into Europe — especially in sensitive areas such as technology and infrastructure — while smaller states will welcome Chinese investment as an opportunity to boost their economies. In other trade issues, the European Union will hold talks with Australia and New Zealand, seek to complete negotiations with South America’s Mercosur bloc, and look to open new export markets in Asia. Issues such as agriculture and geographic descriptors for food products will prove difficult to solve, but the union will try to make as much progress as possible in its trade talks. Read more on EU-U.S. trade disputes.
The Battle for the EU Leadership
Elections for the European Parliament in May will produce a fragmented legislature; pro-EU parties will retain control, but nationalist and Euroskeptic forces will have a strong following. These divisions will, in turn, make it harder to pass legislation. The selection of the new European Commission president will follow and lead to ideological disputes within the bloc. A conservative commission would probably focus on such issues as trade agreements and reducing immigration from outside the bloc, while a progressive one would more likely focus on ensuring greater economic cohesion within the bloc.
Regional disagreements will slow the pace of policymaking and reduce the possibility of major reforms.
Southern Europe will push for a commission that promotes higher spending and deeper risk-sharing across the bloc, while Northern Europe will push for a body that promotes fiscal discipline and risk reduction. EU governments will also select a new European Central Bank president. The south will push to continue the bank’s expansionary monetary policies, and the north will push to reverse some of them. The regional disagreements will slow the pace of policymaking, reducing the chances of significant reforms. Read more about the competition for EU institutions.
Trouble in Germany and France
As Germany’s governing parties seek to set themselves apart, the country’s politics will be stretched further to the left and right, hollowing out the center. Conflict within the government will reduce its efficacy and could lead to early elections. A new vote would again produce a fragmented parliament and lead to complex coalition talks, further reducing Berlin’s EU leadership role. In France, the government’s push for institutional and economic reform, including a drive to overhaul the pension system, will lead to protests, some of which will disrupt the economy. Paris will succeed in implementing most of its plans, but citizens will be increasingly vocal in rejecting their government’s policies. Domestic issues and France’s dependence on others to get things done in the bloc will limit Paris’ influence on Continental affairs. Read more about the implications of political uncertainty in Germany.
The East-West Divide
Countries in Central and Eastern Europe will take advantage of the global environment to preserve, and potentially deepen, their political and military ties to the United States. The White House will look to Poland and Romania to help increase its presence or even to serve as hosts for American missile systems as the arms race with Russia intensifies. At the same time, Poland, Hungary and Romania will selectively challenge EU institutions and rules, while also making sure not to do anything that puts their memberships in the bloc in jeopardy. These countries will also look to deepen cooperation with their neighbors on issues that vary from energy diversification to infrastructure, and they will get together to resist cuts in EU agricultural and development funds. Read more on Poland’s geopolitical strategy.
The Push for Autonomy
EU countries will tighten cooperation on defense, through initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defense Fund. France will lead the push to enhance Europe’s military capabilities, but disagreements between member states could slow progress. To streamline decision-making, the bloc will try to switch its voting system so changing foreign and taxation policies would require majority approval instead of unanimity. But that will probably fail, because changing the voting mechanism requires unanimous approval, and several countries will want to preserve their veto power.
The European Union’s ambitions will be hampered, in classic fashion, by convoluted leadership and the curse of consensus.
The bloc will also discuss ambitious plans to create international payment channels independent of the United States, replace the dollar with the euro as the world’s reserve currency and increase capital market integration among member states. But a leadership vacuum at the Continental level and the complexity of their implementation will prevent the bloc from realizing them in 2019. Read more on Europe’s push for strategic autonomy.
Related Forecasts These Stratfor analyses provide additional insights for the year ahead
The European Union will continue to take the lead on protecting individual privacy.
Plans in southern Europe to introduce structural reforms will lead to economic and political disruptions.
European governments will keep pushing initiatives to encourage innovation in artificial intelligence and robotics, but companies will struggle to keep up with their Chinese and U.S. counterparts.
The Baltic countries will seek to keep close ties with NATO and the United States to prevent a potential Russian aggression.
Key Dates to Watch
March 29: The United Kingdom’s scheduled exit from the European Union.
May 23-26: Elections across the European Union for members of the European Parliament.
Aug. 25-27: A G-7 summit is scheduled to be held in France.
Late October: Deadline for EU governments to select the presidents of the European Commission and the European Central Bank.
November: General election in Poland.
November: Selection of the new president of the European Council.
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Nov 28, 2018 | 15:14 GMT 7 mins read
South Asia
Everything that informs geopolitics can be found in South Asia: challenging demographics, geographic diversity, and contentious, ill-defined borders. The Himalayan Mountains form the northern border of South Asia, whose two main rivers, the Indus and the Ganges, support the region’s great population centers. India is the region’s dominant country, home to the world’s fastest growing economy. But its rivalry with neighboring Pakistan, a fellow nuclear power and growing consumer market, has made South Asia one of the world’s most dangerous nuclear flashpoints. The region is also a testament to how militancy and militarism can undermine the regional integration needed to unleash higher economic growth.
Key Trends for 2019
India and the U.S.-Russia Balance
India will cautiously advance its defense partnership with the United States in spite of disputes over trade and sanctions. After all, their shared rivalry with China makes the U.S.-Indian partnership mutually beneficial. At the same time, to maximize its strategic autonomy, New Delhi will safeguard India’s relations with Russia, which it depends on for arms. To support indigenous production, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will emphasize technology transfers from key U.S. and Russian weapons suppliers. All the while, he will resist U.S. pressure to lower tariffs — especially on dairy products and medical devices – and will seek expanded access for India’s services sector ahead of the 2019 elections as he tries to protect jobs under his “Make in India” campaign. Read more on India’s cautious approach to tightening U.S. relations.
Managing Tensions With China and Pakistan
India and China will maintain their phase of managed tension during 2019. India is the reactive power in the relationship, and Modi’s focus on winning re-election means that New Delhi will not provoke Beijing. But his stance doesn’t preclude skirmishes or incursions along their disputed border. It does mean that neither country will deliberately escalate tensions to the point of a Doklam-style standoff.
As long as the United States remains China’s primary focus in 2019, Beijing will seek to maintain stable relations with the powers on its periphery, including India.
Once Indian elections conclude in May — and given that Pakistani elections took place in 2018 — the two rivals will have the space to restart negotiations stalled since 2016, even if the talks don’t lead to a resolution of their dispute over Kashmir. Pakistan, in particular, wants to bring tensions to a more manageable level as its military focuses on securing the volatile border with Afghanistan and as Prime Minister Imran Khan’s government explores the possibility of trade talks with New Delhi. For more on the what Indian elections will bring, read our latest assessment.
Contesting the Indian Ocean
Even as India manages tensions with China on the tactical level, its strategic competition with Beijing for basing rights, infrastructure projects and defense partnerships will play out across the Indian Ocean. To bolster its position in the Indo-Pacific, India will move to strengthen relations not only with the United States but also with Japan and Australia using a bilateral, more than a multilateral approach, with emphasis on building its relationship with Japan, especially. New governments in Bhutan, the Maldives and Bangladesh, all of which have signed on to China’s Belt and Road Initiative will lead India to renew its engagement with them. This analysis explains more about India’s strategic approach to China’s growing presence.
The Spotlight on India’s Elections
The Indian political opposition will focus on uniting in an effort to dislodge Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) from power. Although Modi will have the advantage going into the state and parliamentary elections, the BJP will fail to win as big a majority as it did in 2014 as frustration rises among voters over economic and job-creation problems. Ahead of the elections, the party will emphasize Hindu nationalist issues. Meanwhile, a strengthening dollar means the rupee will remain weak, and the persistent threat of inflation will compel the Reserve Bank of India to maintain a monetary tightening policy, which will be a key point of contention between the government and the central bank.
If the Indian government attempts limited labor reforms after elections, the opposition will do its best to thwart them — meaning major legislation on the subject will fail to materialize.
Finally, India will delay concluding a deal on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) until after the elections. India has a trade deficit with 10 of the 16 RCEP countries — China accounts for the biggest share — so New Delhi’s acceptance of any deal will hinge on earning concessions that can protect its industry from a surge of Chinese imports that would threaten local jobs. India will also seek expanded market access for its information technology services sector to address the trade imbalance, a key part of its offensive trade strategy. Learn more about the ruling party’s strategy as elections approach.
The U.S. Status Quo in Afghanistan
Despite limited success thus far, the United States will maintain its current strategy in Afghanistan, deploying a mix of military and diplomatic force to pressure the Taliban on the battlefield while urging Pakistan to bring the Taliban to negotiations. The U.S. pressure will continue to drive Pakistan toward a stronger security partnership with Russia and Iran as part of its regional foreign policy pivot. And Islamabad, Moscow and Tehran will use the threat of the Islamic State to strengthen their security partnership.
The situation in Afghanistan is unlikely to change drastically in the year ahead.
As the United States runs out of medium-pressure tactics (such as cutting off funding, revoking Pakistani officer training and curbing defense sales), it is more likely to impose harsher measures such as revoking Pakistan’s non-NATO major ally status. The Taliban will express more serious interest in negotiations, but talks will only begin if NATO commits to a drawdown, which is unlikely next year given concerns that the Afghan army isn’t strong enough to handle security on its own. Read more on the growing relationship between Pakistan and Russia.
Pakistan’s Trade Deficit and Slowing Growth
As the prime minister implements austerity measures to strengthen Pakistan’s economy, growth will slow and unemployment will rise, compelling him to focus on anti-corruption measures to demonstrate his administration’s progress. He will also push China to emphasize agriculture projects in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor while pushing for jobs creation and inviting third-party countries to invest in the country.
Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s focus on economic growth won’t affect his deference toward the country’s military.
But a strong dollar means that dollar-denominated purchases will maintain pressure on the trade deficit. On the political front, Khan will avoid tampering with the army, meaning its hold over foreign policy will endure. If the prime minister tries to assert his authority over the military, the army will either engineer parliamentary defections causing his coalition to collapse, or corruption cases will suddenly arise against members of his administration. Take a more in-depth look at Khan’s balancing act in office in our latest assessment.
Related Forecasts These Stratfor analyses provide additional insights for the year ahead
New Delhi will seek to protect its Indian Ocean shipping routes and deny China a regional military advantage.
Even as India strengthens its defense partnership with the United States, its doctrine of strategic autonomy means it will avoid treaty alliances and will try to balance relations among the great powers.
Afghanistan is becoming another space for great power cooperation and competition, as major powers try to prevent the Islamic State from using it as a base.
Key Dates to Watch
December: India and China hold military drills.
December: The Indian states of Rajasthan, Mizoram, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Kashmir conduct elections.
Dec. 30: Bangladesh conducts national elections.
January: Deadline for International Monetary Fund bailout talks with Pakistan
January: Sri Lanka to hold snap elections.
April 1: Start of India’s fiscal year.
April 20: Afghan scheduled to hold presidential elections.
April-May: Indian parliamentary elections and state elections in Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh are held.
July 1: Start of Pakistan’s fiscal year.
Summer: India, Japan and the United States participate in Malabar naval exercises.
September: Deadline for Pakistan to complete Financial Action Task Force plan to be removed from anti-terrorism “gray list.”
December: Preparations begin for Sri Lanka’s 2020 presidential elections.
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Nov 28, 2018 | 17:57 GMT 6 mins read
Eurasia
Eurasia is the world’s most expansive region. It connects the East to the West, forming a land bridge that borders Europe, the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East and South Asia. Forming the borders of this massive tract of land are the Northern European Plain, the Carpathian Mountains, the Southern Caucasus Mountains, the Tien Shan Mountains and Siberia. At the heart of Eurasia is Russia, a country that throughout history has tried, to varying degrees of success, to extend its influence to Eurasia’s farthest reaches — a strategy meant to insulate it from outside powers. But this strategy necessarily creates conflict throughout Russia’s borderlands, putting Eurasia a near constant state of instability.
Key Trends for 2019
Military Buildups and an Intensifying Arms Race
The U.S. decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) will intensify ongoing military buildups by the United States and Russia throughout 2019, particularly in the European borderlands. Poland, Romania and the Baltic states will be the most willing to host additional U.S. assets, though it will be at least another year before the United States deploys intermediate-range missiles in the region. For its part, Russia will add to its military presence and assets in Kaliningrad, western Russia, Crimea and the Black Sea. Negotiations between Washington and the Polish government about building a permanent U.S. military base in the country will move forward, though construction will not likely begin in 2019.
Beyond its saber-rattling, Russia will physically bolster its military footprint in the former Soviet periphery through 2019.
In turn, Russia will advance its own efforts to increase its military presence and infrastructure in Belarus, including the opening of an air base. Another front in the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia will continue to develop in the Sea of Azov. Both countries will build up naval assets, and the United States will weigh in with security support for Ukraine. The U.S. withdrawal from the INF will put pressure on other arms control arrangements but will not cause a full break between Russia and the United States over New START, the strategic arms treaty signed in 2010 that limits the number of nuclear warheads each country can deploy. Read more about the ramifications of the U.S. withdrawal from the INF in this assessment.
The Hybrid Warfare Campaign Intensifies
Russia will vigorously pursue its hybrid warfare campaign against Western and Western-leaning countries by interfering in national politics, spreading propaganda and launching cyberattacks and covert operations in a bid to undermine European Union and NATO unity. EU parliamentary elections in May will give Russia an opportunity to support far-right and anti-establishment parties throughout Europe, particularly in Hungary, Italy and France. Russia will also target the Balkan states, especially Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro, with a mix of political meddling, disinformation tactics and economic sweeteners to try to stymie their EU integration efforts. Russia will be most effective in its hybrid warfare efforts in Moldova, where parliamentary elections in February are likely to produce political gains for the pro-Moscow Socialist party. That result would drive Moldova to deepen its pivot to Russia while freezing — if not reversing — its integration efforts with the European Union.
The West will counter Russian hybrid tactics by increasing sanctions pressure while intensifying and coordinating cybersecurity and counterpropaganda strategies.
The United States can be expected to impose sanctions on more Russian officials and entities and cut off trade channels and could perhaps downgrade diplomatic ties. The U.S. Congress could pressure the White House to take the more extreme option of targeting Russian sovereign debt or banning dollar transactions with its largest state banks. Sanctions will be more controversial in the European Union, but the bloc will maintain them throughout the year. Russia’s efforts to insulate itself from sanctions by building up foreign exchange reserves and wealth funds, diversifying trade ties, and decreasing its exposure and dependence on dollar transactions will enable it to avoid a major economic crisis in 2019. As the United States increases security support for pro-Western states such as Ukraine and Georgia, Washington will also push back against Russian influence in states closer to Moscow’s orbit, like Armenia and Uzbekistan. See our assessment of the U.S. outreach on Russia’s former Soviet periphery.
Challenging the U.S. World Order
Russia will seek to expand its ties and involvement around the world to peel back Western hegemony and challenge the U.S.-led world order. China, whose interests in challenging Washington within the great power competition align with its own, will be a key focus of Russia’s efforts. Russia and China will ramp up their economic and energy ties this year, and Beijing will also increase its investment in building factories, pipelines, roads, railways and other infrastructure projects in Russia, especially in its Far East. The countries will also strengthen military ties, likely increasing the size and scope of their joint military exercises both bilaterally and multilaterally such as through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Moscow and Beijing will sustain their trade in weapons despite sanctions pressure from the United States and their competition for the same weapons markets.
Elsewhere in Asia, Russia will seek to strengthen its economic relationship with Japan, though their lingering territorial spat over the Kuril Islands will limit significant expansion of ties. Russia will sustain political and economic support for North Korea — including pushing for inter-Korean infrastructure projects — while resisting and circumventing U.S. sanctions against Pyongyang. In the Middle East, Russia will maintain its military support for Syrian President Bashar al Assad and increase ties with Iran as a source of leverage against the United States. Read our assessment for a more in-depth look at the deepening relationship between Russia and China.
Russia’s Domestic Challenges
Unpopular economic reforms like the increases in the Russian retirement age and the value-added tax will drive domestic protest, spurred by opposition figures like Alexei Navalny. The Kremlin will respond to demonstrations with a mix of crackdowns, political reshuffles and selective concessions to public demands. The ruling United Russia party’s dominant position will diminish as systemic (or Kremlin-friendly) opposition parties like the Communists, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and A Just Russia contest gubernatorial and parliamentary seats in regional elections in September.
Russia can expect continued domestic turbulence in 2019, but political parties opposing President Vladimir Putin’s rule will struggle to seriously challenge him.
Opposition parties will increase their cooperation with one another to form a more potent challenge to United Russia, a move that President Vladimir Putin will cautiously allow to prevent the rise of non-systemic opposition forces. On the security front, Russia will reshuffle the leadership of the GRU military intelligence agency following a series of controversial operations abroad and disperse some of its responsibilities and assets among other security organs, most notably the Federal Security Service (FSB) and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Read our assessment of United Russia’s recent political defeats for more on Russia’s internal political shifts.
Related Forecasts These Stratfor analyses provide additional insights for the year ahead
Regardless of who wins its presidential and parliamentary elections, Ukraine will keep its broader foreign policy toward integration with the West.
Azerbaijan’s relationship with Iran will come under strain as the government pivots toward the U.S. containment strategy.
Russia and China will cooperate in counterterrorism initiatives in Central Asia, particularly in Tajikistan and the Tajik-Afghan border area.
Russia’s resumption of natural gas imports from Turkmenistan to help ease a prolonged economic downturn and to stave off the West’s overtures related to the Trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline project.
Key Dates to Watch
Early 2019: Japanese Prime Minister Abe is expected to visit Russia.
Early 2019: Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to visit Washington, D.C.
Jan. 1: Russian pension and value-added tax reforms take effect.
Jan. 1: Russia is scheduled to resume natural gas imports from Turkmenistan.
Feb. 24: Moldova holds parliamentary elections.
March 31: Ukraine holds a presidential election.
June: Kyrgyzstan hosts a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
September: Russia holds regional elections.
Oct. 27: Ukraine holds parliamentary elections.
December: The Power of Siberia natural gas pipeline from Russia to China is expected to come online.
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Nov 28, 2018 | 19:59 GMT 7 mins read
Americas
The Americas stretch from the Arctic Circle in Canada to the southern tip of Chile. This geographically, culturally and politically diverse region is home to the United States, a nation whose geography helped it become the foremost economic and military power in the world — an ascendance aided in part by bringing Mexico and Canada into its sphere of influence. Farther south, the nations of South America are like islands, separated by vast spaces of impenetrable mountains, rivers and jungles. Try though these countries may to integrate more closely, deeper ties such as those that characters North America will prove elusive.
Key Trends for 2019
In North America, Domestic Issues Are Front and Center
Now that they’ve put the finishing touches on the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), the pact’s three members will face less risk of trade upheaval in 2019. The divided political control of the U.S. Congress will be a key factor shaping President Donald Trump’s policy agenda. Lawmakers will not significantly curtail the president’s powers on foreign trade, especially related to the auto industry, given that White House actions will have less effect on the domestic vehicle sector. Still, the House of Representatives, led by the Democratic Party, won’t cooperate with the administration’s plans for foreign policy, military spending, immigration and tax reductions. Gridlock will hinder policymaking, meaning the White House will make little headway on immigration reform or tax cut plans.
A divided U.S. Congress reduces Trump’s ability to taper foreign aid to Central American governments in response to illegal immigration from their countries.
Accordingly, Mexico’s success in stemming the flow of people from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador to the United States will be crucial to the administration’s immigration policy. To avoid a political confrontation with the United States, Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador will not significantly alter his country’s policy on countering illegal immigration or its domestic security policy against organized crime.
The United States, Canada and Mexico will continue to spar throughout 2019.
In Canada, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party will face stiff competition from the opposition Conservative Party in October’s federal elections. During the year, Trudeau will try to seal a trade agreement with China, although that will raise the ire of both Washington and the Canadian opposition, particularly as U.S., Canadian and Mexican lawmakers prepare to ratify the USMCA. Though that negotiation will irk Washington, it is largely powerless to prevent Ottawa and Beijing from pursuing the talks. For more about what changed and what remained the same in the NAFTA overhaul, see our most recent analysis.
AMLO Makes a Left Turn in Mexico’s Domestic Affairs
Now that he has formally assumed power, Lopez Obrador — popularly known as AMLO — will turn his attention to implementing his populist domestic agenda in 2019. Lopez Obrador’s coalition will strive to obtain the congressional support necessary to raise wages, adjust energy legislation and amend the constitution to hold more frequent binding referendums. But his proposed changes to energy legislation, such as local content increases, will make Mexican oil and natural gas less attractive to foreign companies.
Will AMLO’s populist agenda help or hinder Mexico?
Even without constitutional reform on referendums, the president and political parties in Mexico will promote a spate of informal votes to demand government action on certain issues, such as public works projects and fuel prices. More frequent referendums will raise the risk that Mexican courts or the government will side with voters against the private sector on controversial issues that are approved in nonbinding plebiscites. Read our analysis for more about how plebiscites could bring disruptions to Mexico.
Mercosur Takes a Cautious Step Toward Free Trade
Brazil’s government will negotiate with other member states in the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) to eliminate restrictions on bilateral trade and lower the bloc’s common external tariffs. To enact its desired changes, Brazil will require a unanimous vote from the bloc’s members.
Domestic political concerns among Mercosur’s member states will once again influence the trading bloc’s behavior in the coming year.
Argentina and Uruguay will be open to liberalizing the bloc’s trade restrictions, but the prospect of a tight presidential election in Argentina will make President Mauricio Macri reluctant to agree to a deal. If Macri hesitates, negotiations are likely to stretch into 2020. And if a candidate from one of Argentina’s populist Peronist parties beats Macri, he or she will favor more protectionist trade policies – which would put it on a collision course with Brazil. Read more about Mercosur and why the bloc won’t suffer many effects from U.S. auto tariffs in our assessment.
In Its Fight for Survival, Venezuela’s Government Irks Its Neighbors
Running on empty amid a dearth of oil revenue, Venezuela’s government desperately needs cash anywhere it can find it. The country’s plight will force Caracas to seek revenue from illicit avenues, such as the illegal mining of gold and other minerals, as well as shady financial transactions. The shift will give illegal miners incentives to expand their activities in eastern and southern Venezuela and into western Guyana and northern Brazil. But the spread of such activities into Brazil will attract the attention of the new presidential administration, giving Brasilia direct leverage over Venezuelan economic interests. To prevent a greater spillover of Venezuela’s crisis, Brasilia will coordinate with Washington and the new government in Colombia to ramp up financial and political pressure on Caracas, possibly through sanctions or greater scrutiny on Venezuelan financial flows.
Cash-strapped Venezuela’s ability to defend itself from internal threats, such as coup attempts or protests, will diminish throughout the year. Complicating matters, the shift away from oil revenue toward illicit funding will increase competition among Venezuela’s political elites, who will jockey for their share of national wealth. The government will try to generate more cash to satisfy the elites by diverting some oil shipments to cash-paying customers instead of using the money to pay down its debts. This makes it likely that Caracas will fall behind on debt repayments to Russia and China. In response, these lenders will slow funding to Caracas, exacerbating Venezuela’s oil production decline and contributing to greater conflict and competition among political elites intent on grabbing some of the government’s rapidly shrinking revenue. Take a closer look at how Venezuela’s illicit activities are angering neighboring Colombia, Guyana and Brazil.
Brazil’s New Ruler Gets Ready to Overhaul Security and Investment
Jair Bolsonaro, who will assume Brazil’s presidency on the first day of 2019, is preparing big changes to his country’s policy on Chinese investment and domestic security. Bolsonaro’s government will aim to manage or curb Chinese investment in strategic sectors, such as mining and energy infrastructure. The president will also begin courting congressional votes to implement security policies like lowering the age of criminal responsibility. But even if Brazil’s new government fails to find the votes for security reforms, it will deploy the armed forces and police to curb criminal activity, which will have short-term security benefits in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Read more about the strategies Brazil’s incoming president will use to try to enact his agenda.
The Argentine President’s Difficult Path to Re-Election
Argentine President Mauricio Macri will face an uphill battle if he is to win re-election in October 2019. Though he retains enough popularity to advance to a second round, he faces uncertain prospects for success in a runoff. Because Macri’s public approval is tenuous, any further currency depreciation or unhappiness over inflation will open the possibility that a populist challenger will defeat him in a second round in November. See more about the challenges awaiting Macri in 2019.
Related Forecasts These Stratfor analyses provide additional insights for the year ahead
In Mexico and Brazil, new leaders will look for ways to fulfill campaign promises to root out corruption in their respective countries.
A divided U.S. Congress will give the Democrats more leverage over the administration’s agenda as the party will wield greater influence over federal funding and lawmaking.
In Argentina, a populist opposition stands to gain the presidency due to Macri’s political troubles.
Bolivian President Evo Morales will stand for re-election, but that will likely incite protests that will disrupt trade and business activity.
Key Dates to Watch
Jan. 1: Jair Bolsonaro will take office as Brazil’s president.
Jan. 3: The 116th U.S. Congress convenes.
Feb. 3: El Salvador will hold elections.
May 5: Panamanians will cast their ballots in general elections.
June: Guatemala will go to the polls.
Oct. 21: Canada will hold federal elections.
Oct. 27: Bolivia will conduct presidential elections.
Oct. 27: Uruguayans will elect a new president.
Oct. 27: Argentina will stage the first round of federal elections for president and members of Congress.
Nov. 24: Argentines will vote in a likely runoff election.
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Nov 28, 2018 | 22:31 GMT 6 mins read
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa is a study in diversity. Covering an area that spans the entire width of the continent beginning at the Sahara Desert and ending at the southernmost tip of South Africa, the region is home to countless cultures, languages, religions, plants, animals and natural resources. It’s no surprise that it captured the imagination of Europe’s earliest explorers — and that it continues to capture the imagination of current world powers eager to exploit it. And yet despite the region’s diversity, Sub-Saharan African countries have common challenges — transnational terrorism, rapid population growth, endemic poverty and corruption — that prevent them from capitalizing on their economic potential. The coming years will be critical for the region, especially as its political institutions mature in a rapidly globalizing world.
Key Trends for 2019
Ethiopia’s Rise in a Changing Region
Peace between landlocked Ethiopia and its erstwhile coastal province, Eritrea, allows for the reopening of transport routes and increased opportunities for foreign investment. Ethiopia is the region’s rising economic giant, and its reform-minded government intends to partially privatize state-owned enterprises, hoping to attract money from countries including the United Arab Emirates and China.
Ethiopia is a rising star in the Horn of Africa, but economic and ethnic factors could make 2019 a pivotal year for Addis Ababa.
Much depends, however, on the degree of transparency in the process — as well as the profit returns from completed megaprojects. Furthermore, the country’s need for continued structural economic reforms, along with its shortage of foreign exchange reserves, will hamper growth in the short term. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed will have to carefully manage these key issues, as well as enduring ethnic divisions, if his country is to become a potent driver for change in the region. Take a more in-depth look at the promise and peril of Ethiopia’s economy.
A Rising Tide Buoys Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti and Sudan
Ethiopia’s rise is generating interest in neighboring Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti and Sudan from China, Russia and the United States. Somalia and the breakaway republic of Somaliland will try to harness that interest to strengthen trade and supply chains. For Eritrea, peace with Ethiopia means it can devote more resources to its economy than in recent decades, with manufacturing, mining and tourism most likely to attract investment. The lifting of U.N. sanctions will increase investment and security interest from Washington and others, but human rights concerns will prevent any investment rush.
Great power competition over countries in the Horn of Africa will be a feature of 2019.
Powers such as Russia are likely to increase ties with Eritrea, with Moscow promising to construct a logistics center at one of the country’s two ports. Meanwhile, Sudanese President Omar al Bashir will cooperate with Washington on counterterrorism measures to ingratiate himself as he seeks to extend his time in office beyond 2020. Even so, he will maintain balances by deepening ties with Moscow and Beijing, which are seeking greater influence across Africa. Djibouti will continue to leverage its geostrategically important position on the Bab el-Mandeb strait for influence and financial gain. China holds roughly 80 percent of Djibouti’s external debt, however, which gives Beijing a significant degree of influence. Read more about the United States’ growing interest in the strategic Horn of Africa.
South Africa’s ANC Braces for Elections
Ahead of South Africa’s 2019 general election, a weak economy will compel President Cyril Ramaphosa to pursue populist policies such as land expropriation without compensation to shore up electoral support among the traditional base of the ruling African National Congress. The impact will scare away some foreign investment, increase currency volatility and induce fears about the country’s direction.
Efforts to root out corruption, particularly in state-owned enterprises, will feature prominently in South Africa’s electoral run-up.
Ramaphosa’s administration will focus on reforming businesses such as the public power monopoly Eskom to tackle endemic corruption and improve services. Ultimately, however, if Pretoria fails to overhaul key state companies, it will become more inwardly focused, hindering its efforts to project influence across the continent. For a more detailed look at Ramaphosa’s political calculations ahead of national elections, see our analysis.
Buhari’s Last Stand?
When Nigerians vote in February, they will choose between two northerners battling it out for the country’s top office — a development guaranteeing that region’s hold over the south’s lucrative oil industry. President Muhammadu Buhari will continue his efforts to institutionalize the country’s struggle against corruption, but his challenger, Atiku Abubakar, will likely put the issue on the back burner if elected. Regionally, the next president will finally sign the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, whose largest non-signatory is Nigeria. Despite pressure from the domestic manufacturing industry and unions to steer clear of the deal, Abuja fears it will fall behind if it doesn’t ratify the agreement, which will significantly boost intra-African trade.
Nigeria’s general election in mid-February will be important to watch, but irrespective of presidential appointment, there are things the country needs to do in 2019.
On the security front, the Islamic State West African Province, which showed signs of resurgence around Lake Chad in 2018, will struggle to conduct attacks beyond Nigeria’s northeast in 2019 as its supply lines remain stretched and the government prepares more effective strategies to counter the group. Meanwhile, militants in the oil-producing Niger Delta remain dormant thanks to Abuja’s successful appeasement strategy, and both Buhari and Abubakar will avoid aggression against the fighters to maintain peace in the country’s most lucrative industry. Read more about the issues dominating Nigeria’s upcoming elections.
The Kabila System Fights for Survival
Whatever its result, the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Dec. 23 election will be flawed as outgoing President Joseph Kabila seeks to maintain a system that maximizes the political and economic spoils for his family and minimizes the weaknesses of his hand-picked successor, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary. The ruling alliance’s control of the security services and other state institutions will enable it to win a tightly controlled contest despite opposition pressure. Subsequent stability in the key commodity producer will ultimately depend on the internal, regional and international reaction to the vote.
With the results likely to be dubious, opposition protests will result in violence and a government crackdown that will prompt the European Union and the United States to enact targeted sanctions. Elsewhere, Kinshasa will stick with the hard-line measures it implemented against international mining companies in 2018. After all, the government, which controls a significant chunk of the global cobalt supply, maintains the advantage — and Chinese producers will be only too willing to step in if Western producers push too far. Read more about the strategic importance of cobalt.
Related Forecasts These Stratfor analyses provide additional insights for the year ahead
Leadership changes in southern Africa are generating economic opportunities, but not all emerging or frontier markets are equal.
Ahmed, the Ethiopian premier, seeks greater ethnic stability inside his country, but the growth of interregional violence may challenge this effort. If Addis Ababa fails to foster calm before elections in 2020, ethnic factions are likely to take sides, endangering the ruling coalition and the country’s economic liberalization drive.
The rising popularity of Ugandan pop star and political upstart Bobi Wine highlights an emerging trend as a youth population disenchanted with the status quo becomes enamored with politicians promising change.
The threat from upstart jihadist groups in Mozambique remains limited for now, especially when compared to those posed by established organizations.
Key Dates to Watch
Dec. 23, 2018: The Democratic Republic of Congo holds its long-delayed presidential election.
January: The heads of state of the African Union will hold a summit in Egypt.
February: A conference of the heads of state of the Group of Five Sahel alliance will be held in in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
Nuclear weapons issues will be a big part of the next U.S. president’s agenda.
North Korea will continue its nuclear program, and the United States will have little leeway to contain or counter it.
As India and Pakistan amend their military doctrines, the presence of tactical nuclear weapons will increase the risk of nuclear conflict in the region.
Although the United States’ cornerstone arms control agreements with Russia are increasingly fragile, the next administration may be able to renegotiate them.
Analysis
When U.S. President-elect Donald Trump assumes office in January, an array of vexing foreign policy and security challenges will await him. Between conflicts in the Middle East, the enduring standoff with Russia, competing claimants in the South China Sea and upheaval in the European Union, the next administration will have its hands full. On top of these, Trump will have to contend with matters of nuclear weapons proliferation, balance and arms control, pressing concerns that are sure to command attention.
A Nuclear North Korea
Foremost, Trump will have to decide how to address North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Once a means to exact political and economic concessions from rival powers, the program has since becomea cornerstone of the country’s national security policy. Pyongyang is no longer interested in negotiating over its nuclear program and instead regards it as the ultimate deterrent against attack. In light of this development — and the steady progress that North Korea is making toward a viable nuclear arsenal — the United States will be compelled to respond yet will be limited in its options to counter the emerging nuclear power. Sanctions have so far done little to deter Pyongyang from pursuing its nuclear ambitions. At the same time, military intervention is a risky proposition given the dearth of intelligence on North Korea, the threat of retaliation and the consequences of a full-scale war.
With so few options at its disposal, Washington will be left to build up its anti-ballistic missile defenses. But here, too, the United States will run into complications, not only from China and Russia, which oppose such efforts by the United States, but also from its regional allies, Japan and South Korea. Lingering grudges between Tokyo and Seoul will make it difficult for Washington to coordinate a unified response. As North Korea ramps up its missile testing cycle, meanwhile — and as South Korea adopts increasingly aggressive policies to pre-empt an attack from the North — the prospect of armed confrontation grows ever more likely.
Standoff in South Asia
Over the next four years, the United States will also have to contend with a heightened risk of nuclear conflict in South Asia. Long-standing disputes between India and Pakistan occasionally flare up, as recent violence in Kashmir has shown, and each country will keep revising and adapting its military doctrine in an effort to contain or defeat the other. On both sides of the rivalry, nuclear weaponry has become an important component of military strategy.
Pakistan has assembled an impressive arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional military capabilities that pale in comparison with India’s. (Islamabad also must secure its border with Afghanistan, where insurgent fighting has been on the rise.) In the event of war, Pakistan hopes that its collection of low-yield nuclear weapons would be enough to overcome a large-scale Indian offensive. New Delhi’s current nuclear policy prohibits first use, and Islamabad reasons that using nuclear weapons in its own territory would stop India from escalating an attack. India, however, has repeatedly stated that it would respond in kind if Pakistan were to resort to nuclear weapons, even within its borders. In fact, India’s defense minister has called for New Delhi to reconsider its policy on first use — though he was quick to clarify that those were his own views and that the country’s official stance had not changed. Some members of India’s defense policy circles have even suggested that the country amass a tactical nuclear arsenal of its own to keep the upper hand on Pakistan.
Fragile Arms-Control Agreements
As the Trump administration evaluates the United States’ policy toward Russia, it will find that the countries’ differences are not limited to issues such as Ukraine and Syria. Though it has weathered its share of challenges since its signing in 1987, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) is facing its biggest trial yet. The treaty, a foundational arms-control agreement, bans ground-based nuclear or conventional missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers (300 to 3,400 miles) and eliminated thousands of destabilizing nuclear weapons, particularly in Europe.
But Russia increasingly feels that the treaty puts it at a disadvantage relative to the United States, which has continued tomodernize its nuclear arsenal and develop its ballistic missile defenses. Washington has begun to question the agreement as well because it does not extend to China’s land-based missiles. In 2014, the United States formally accused Russia of developing missiles in breach of the treaty, namely the R-500 ground-based cruise missile and the SS-27 Mod 2 intercontinental ballistic missile, which Moscow started testing at ranges prohibited by the INF. Russia, in turn, has alleged that the United States’ deployment of Mk41 launchers in Europe — along with its development and use of armed drones with ranges in excess of 500 kilometers — violates the terms of the agreement.
The New START treaty, which aimed to reduce the number of strategic nuclear missile launchers by half, may also be in peril — albeit less than the INF. Conducting inspections in April, the United States reportedly discovered that Russia was improperly disposing of SS-25 mobile missiles and could not verify that missiles slated for elimination had been destroyed. Furthermore, Russia has fallen far behind in eliminating warheads, raising doubts about its intent or ability to comply by the February 2018 deadline. Efforts to extend the treaty by another five years, postponing its expiration date to 2026, have also failed to gain much traction given the acrimonious relationship between Moscow and Washington.
The Trump administration may usher in an era of improved relations between the United States and Russia, as the president-elect has hinted. Washington, moreover, stands a better chance of stabilizing its fragile arms-control agreements with Moscow than of changing the nuclear balance in South Asia or on the Korean Peninsula. Regardless, nuclear weapons issues will figure prominently throughout the next four years, requiring a significant amount of attention from the next administration.