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Is this the Beginning of the End for Turkey’s Erdogan? Stratfor Enterprises, LLC.
Jul 3, 2019 | 19:25 GMT

By Sinan Ciddi

Board of Contributors

Sinan Ciddi

Board of Contributors

(MIKHAIL SVETLOV/Getty Images)
Contributor Perspectives offer insight, analysis and commentary from Stratfor’s Board of Contributors and guest contributors who are distinguished leaders in their fields of expertise.

Highlights

In Turkey, the opposition’s Ekrem Imamoglu soundly defeated his ruling party opponent by more than 800,000 votes in the June 23 Istanbul mayoral election redo — a vast increase from Imamoglu’s first, narrow win on March 31.

The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) experienced major metropolitan loses not only in Istanbul but also in the capital, Ankara, and elsewhere as voters expressed their dissatisfaction with the AKP and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

In the coming days or weeks, former AKP officials and Erdogan allies will break away from the governing party to establish a rival political party. The move will weaken the AKP and Erdogan’s base of power and force supporters to choose between Erdogan and the splinter group.

The June 23 redo of the Istanbul mayoral election produced an embarrassing outcome for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. More than 800,000 votes separated Ekrem Imamoglu, the opposition Republican People’s Party candidate, from Binali Yildirim of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), a monumental increase from Imamoglu’s narrow 13,000-vote margin of victory in the first Istanbul vote on March 31. The outcome reflected voter frustration with Erdogan’s attempt to impose a victory in Turkey’s premier city by nullifying the result of the first election and ordering a do-over. The outcome can also be seen as an expression of voter dissatisfaction with the way Turkey’s economy is being run and the lack of attention the AKP is giving ordinary citizens’ concerns about inflation, unemployment and divisive political rhetoric.

A Turning Tide

Erdogan, seemingly caught by surprise, has not been able to articulate a clear response to Imamoglu’s overwhelming victory. The AKP will likely respond by taking away various mayoral powers, such as the issuance of zoning permits and public procurement tenders, and centralize them under presidential authority. Such a move would ensure that the most lucrative aspects of city governance fall under the jurisdiction of the president, who can continue to distribute spoils to loyal supporters and business cronies, and deprive the new mayors who are not from the AKP of the resources they need to run their cities successfully. Over time, voters might become increasingly discontented with the new mayors as they fail to deliver much-needed city services and decide to return AKP candidates to office in the next elections — or so the AKP and Erdogan might hope.

Erdogan has consistently said that if you lose Istanbul, you lose Turkey. He knows of which he speaks. One in five Turkish voters lives in Istanbul and Erdogan’s own rise to power began in 1994 when he was elected the city’s mayor. He and the AKP ran an inflammatory and divisive campaign and tried to demonize Imamoglu throughout. They accused him of being of Greek origin, described his supporters as an “uncouth minority” and said that a vote for Imamoglu was a vote for Abdel Fattah al-Sisi — the unelected ruler of Egypt. By contrast, Imamoglu ran a largely positive and inclusive campaign. Voters rewarded him. The tide appears to have turned against Erdogan and the AKP, and Imamoglu now has a favorable national presence that could position him to challenge Erdogan for the presidency when the next national elections are held in 2023.

The next four years give Erdogan the opportunity to hunker down and concentrate on rebuilding his and the AKP’s public image and support. The primary place to start is to ensure strong economic growth. Turkey’s sharp economic downturn is Erdogan’s Achilles heel. Erdogan can also work over the next four years to undermine the newly elected opposition mayors, not only in Istanbul but also in Ankara, the capital, and beyond, to try to reinforce the message that Turkey can be successfully governed by only him and the AKP. There are many variables at play, however, and any one — or combination of them — may further result in Erdogan’s political demise and ultimate departure from power.

Rivals, Party Dissidents and Other Variables

Turkey’s presidential election system mandates the winner to secure at least 50 percent of the vote plus one. Erdogan only succeeded in becoming president with the active support of Devlet Bahceli’s Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Even if we assume that Bahceli will continue to support and work with Erdogan (and this is a big “if”), their alliance will likely fail to reach the 50 percent threshold in 2023. The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), meanwhile, has led a successful bloc of voters that formally includes the Good Party of Meral Aksener, made up of dissidents who broke away from the MHP, and informally the support of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). The broad majority of Istanbul’s HDP-aligned supporters backed Imamoglu for mayor after the party’s imprisoned chairman, Selahattin Demirtas, encouraged them to do so. In the near future, Turkey’s Kurdish voters could be more closely aligned with the CHP, representing a formidable voter block that will further erode the AKP’s base.

There are many variables at play. But no matter how they play out, one thing is clear: Erdogan and the AKP have been weakened.

Sensing Erdogan’s weakness, former high-profile AKP officials are poised to resign from the party and establish a new political party. Former President Abdullah Gul and former Finance Minister Ali Babacan are reported to be spearheading this effort. These individuals have sat on the sidelines for some years, disgruntled with Turkey’s trajectory under Erdogan, but afraid to outright challenge him for fear of retribution. It remains to be seen whether voters will find this new party a credible alternative to the AKP. Yet, it will cause a fundamental split in the AKP regardless, and individuals will have to choose whether they are with Erdogan or his dissenters.

No matter how these variables play out, one thing is clear: Erdogan and the AKP have been weakened. Furthermore, it is far from certain and less than likely that they will be able to recover voter confidence. In contrast, the CHP has found a way to communicate with and persuade voters that it may have candidates and an electoral platform focused on credible policies that will solve societal problems, whereas Erdogan and the AKP only seem to be concerned about preserving their base of power. The result of the Istanbul mayoral election needs to be carefully interpreted and processed, as it does not spell the end of Erdogan. But when history looks back, it may very well be the moment that ushered in the beginning of the end for Turkey’s beleaguered leader.

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August 8, 2019
An Impatient Turkey Gets Ready to Enter Northeastern Syria, Stratfor Enterprises, LLC
Aug 7, 2019 | 09:00 GMT

(DELIL SOULEIMAN/AFP/Getty Images)
Highlights

Turkey has long warned of an imminent offensive into northeastern Syria, but its latest warnings suggest an incursion is imminent this time.

A combination of Turkish impatience and a narrowing window for action could drive Ankara to finally launch the military operation.

But given that a unilateral operation would greatly displease the United States, Washington would likely respond with significant retaliation.

Editor’s Note: This assessment was published shortly before the United States and Turkey reached a last-minute deal to jointly coordinate the establishment of a safe zone in northeastern Syria. At present, the countries have not released any details regarding a timeline for the buffer zone’s implementation or its geographical scope.

He’s made the threat before, but this time, it might just be the real thing. On Aug. 6, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated his warnings that Turkey is poised to launch a military operation against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) east of the Euphrates River in northeastern Syria. The latest note came two days after Erdogan said Ankara had already notified both the United States and Russia of its plans.

This is certainly not Turkey’s first warning of an impending offensive in northeastern Syria. Turkey has long sought to push into the area, where the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) hold ground. Until now, Turkey has not made an incursion because of the presence of U.S. troops there, as well as Washington’s opposition to any such move. But Ankara’s patience appears to have run out, and several factors suggest Turkey will make an incursion sooner, rather than later — regardless of the economic cost that would entail.

The Big Picture

A number of events in recent years have strained the once-close partnership between the United States and Turkey. A Turkish offensive into northeastern Syria would further shake this battered alliance, resulting in drastic consequences, including potentially heavy economic sanctions on Turkey.

See Middle East and North Africa section of the 2019 Third-Quarter Forecast

See The Kurdish StruggleSee Turkey’s Resurgence

Tired of Waiting

One primary factor driving a potential Turkish incursion is the failure of U.S.-Turkish negotiations on the issue. For months, Ankara has held out hope that the two could agree to a substantial buffer zone in northeastern Syria that would permit its troops to enter the area without the unavoidable deterioration in bilateral ties that would accompany a unilateral Turkish operation. Turkey has pushed for a 32-kilometer-deep (20-mile) zone across the length of the Turkish-Syrian border east of the Euphrates River that would provide a significant buffer between YPG forces and Turkey, allow Ankara to resettle more Syrian refugees in the area and give Turkey a chance to establish allied Syrian proxies as it has done west of the Euphrates River. Unsurprisingly, the YPG has categorically rejected the proposal, countering that it would only agree to a 5-kilometer buffer in mostly non-populated areas of the border, as some of the region’s largest cities lie right on the Turkish border. Additionally, the YPG has said it will not accept any buffer zone under Turkey’s control.

According to The Washington Post, a U.S. Department of Defense delegation arrived in Turkey on Aug. 5 for last-ditch negotiations on the impasse, offering a compromise proposal that includes a 14- to 15-kilometer-deep buffer zone along a third of the Syrian-Turkish border east of the Euphrates that would be jointly patrolled by U.S. and Turkish forces. While it is still possible that the two countries will reach an eleventh-hour deal, it is more likely the talks will fail given the sizable discrepancy between their positions on the size and scope of the proposed buffer. If the talks do collapse, Turkey — fed up with what it sees as both a lack of U.S. concessions and stalling tactics — is likely to proceed with a unilateral push into northeastern Syria with the tens of thousands of combat-ready troops that it has deployed to the border.

The timing might also push Turkey to enter northeastern Syria sooner rather than later. Ankara is concerned that if it waits any longer, the United States will find the time required to bring in more allied troops to the area — something that would make it more politically costly for Turkey to intervene there. At the same time, Turkey has managed to hammer out another cease-fire deal with Russia covering their respective proxy forces and allies in Idlib in western Syria. But as evidenced by the Syrian army’s resumption of airstrikes against rebels on Aug. 5, that cease-fire is inherently fragile, meaning Turkey only has a limited window to launch an offensive in the northeast before fighting almost certainly resumes in the northwest, creating a distraction. Regardless of the prospect of a likely end to the truce in Idlib, the cease-fire itself suggests that Russia has given the green light to Turkey’s plans in the northeast, with Moscow undoubtedly all the more pleased to drive a deeper wedge between Ankara and Washington as a result of the operation.

Turkey’s Soft Underbelly

Of course, a Turkish offensive against the SDF east of the Euphrates would deal a hammer blow to U.S.-Turkish relations, which have already nosedived since Turkey purchased the Russian S-400 missile defense system, prompting Washington to retaliate by banning F-35 sales to Ankara. And then there’s the added risk of an accidental confrontation between the incoming Turkish troops and the U.S. troops currently embedded there. Equally concerning for the United States is the prospect that the pitched fighting between the Turks and the SDF could allow remnants of the Islamic State to take advantage of the chaos to regroup.

Of course, a Turkish offensive against the SDF east of the Euphrates would deal a hammer blow to U.S.-Turkish relations.

Until now, U.S. President Donald Trump has resisted imposing Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) stipulations and other sanctions against Turkey, but Washington would likely implement new sanctions against Ankara following any such Turkish operation, further spiking hostility between the two states. In response, Ankara may choose to retaliate against U.S. companies operating in Turkey, while it would likely seek even closer ties with Russia and China to counterbalance its eroding relationship with the United States.

A renewed push into northeastern Syria would also present a great risk to the Turkish economy, which is heavily debt-ridden and only recently emerged from a recession that plagued the country at the end of 2018. Inflation and unemployment remain high, while the domestic consumption of goods and services has slumped. Apart from the looming threat of CAATSA sanctions, the White House has threatened to sanction Turkey if it does not comply with U.S. policy wishes in Syria; such a shock could heap more downward pressure on the fragile lira, which already experienced one currency crisis in 2018. In the end, for all his mercurial qualities, Erdogan has been consistent on one policy front: privileging national security over the concerns of the economy. And as Turkey prepares to strike at northeastern Syria, the country is about to learn how low its economy — and its relations with the United States — can go.

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Copyright ©2019 Stratfor Enterprises, LLC. All rights reserved.
August 8, 2019
Turkey’s Delicate Dance in Iraqi Kurdistan
Jul 24, 2019 | 09:00 GMT

(FERIQ FEREC/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)

Highlights

After a brief hiatus following the September 2017 failed independence referendum, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) has reclaimed its place at the helm of the Kurdish government in northern Iraq.

The return of the political status quo in the region will open the KDP up to deeper diplomatic and economic cooperation with Turkey, its most important external ally.

The KDP will continue to grant Turkey leeway to increase its military operations against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in exchange for closer economic and trade ties with Ankara.

But in its effort to curtail an independent Kurdish state, the Turkish government will further irk its own Kurdish population, thus exposing itself to additional security and political risks at home.

On July 17, a Turkish diplomat was shot and killed in eastern Arbil, the capital of Iraq’s northern Kurdish region. The assassination was likely perpetrated by a sympathizer of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the Kurdish group that Turkey has been targeting in regional military operations for decades. Ankara’s high-risk tolerance will serve it well in the months ahead, as it continues to prioritize building its Iraqi-Kurdish ties — taking advantage of the economic leverage it wields over the newly formed Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). But just how much violence and political backlash Turkey can endure to prevent the formation of an independent Kurdish state will be tested because the ricks in the region, as evidenced by the latest incident, remain as high as ever.

The Big Picture

Iraqi Kurdistan contains roughly a third of the known oil and gas reserves in Iraq, one of the world’s most oil-rich countries. After a tumultuous couple of years, politics in the region are now seemingly returning to equilibrium. Meanwhile, its most important economic and political ally, Turkey, is eager to capitalize on this renewed stability for its own gain.

See Rebalancing Power in the Middle East

See Turkey’s Resurgence

A Return to the Political Status Quo

The KRG has operated as a semi-autonomous region of Iraq since the United States backed a no-fly zone over the province in 1992 to help shield ostracized Kurds from then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. In September 2018, the country held an election that failed to produce a government due to inter- and intraparty fighting over coveted Cabinet positions. The election was the first attempt to return to political normalcy after a long-promised independence referendum in September 2017 yielded only lost territory and lost political capital for the Kurdish government. But after a couple of tumultuous years, Kurdistan politics are now seemingly returning to equilibrium.

In early July, the government selected a new, streamlined Cabinet. Longtime energy and foreign ministers have stepped down in recent weeks, creating space for fresh blood in the government for the first time in almost 15 years. But any new faces must still be approved by the old guard, which is led by the Barzanis — the leading family of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). On July 10, Mansour Barzani was sworn in as prime minister of the KRG, shortly after Nechirvan Barzani (the nephew of the former longtime President Massoud Barzani) was selected as the Kurdish government’s president in June, thereby extending the clan’s long reign as the dominant political force in the region.

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is the KDP’s primary rival, run by the Talabani clan. Other smaller parties, including Gorran, speckle the playing field and contest elections. But Iraqi Kurdish politics still primarily centers around the KDP and the PUK, with the latter jostling for dominance and the former typically coming out on top. Despite lacking both leadership positions in Arbil, the PUK is still a force to be reckoned with. In addition to having influence with the presidency in Baghdad via Iraqi President Barham Salih, the party has so far been able to thwart the KDP’s ability to name a Barzani member to the now-vacant energy ministry position, and also maintains seats in the Kurdish parliament. Several key points of contention, such as control of the oil-rich Kirkuk province, will cause the two parties to butt heads in the coming months — thus reinstalling the familiar tug-of-war that has long defined Kurdish politics in Iraq.

A New Chapter for Turkey-Kurdish Cooperation in Iraq

The KDP’s renewed place in power, along with its perpetual need to edge out the PUK, opens the door for Turkey to fortify its own economic, political and security ties in northern Iraq. Ankara has historically worked closely with the KDP because of its proximity (the Barzanis’ tribal reach includes swaths of Iraqi Kurdistan that borders Turkey) and power (the Barzanis have always controlled the levers of the Iraqi Kurdish government including, most importantly, oil and gas policymaking).

Although the KDP-Turkish relations have hit low points over the years, Ankara has recently solidified its relationship with Arbil. Turkey is well-positioned as a much needed economic partner of the Kurdish government (and thereby, the KDP), providing the semi-autonomous region with a valuable trade route out for Kurdish oil. The two border crossings between Turkey and northern Iraq help facilitate $10 billion in annual trade flow. And Turkey is currently in discussions with Arbil to open yet another border crossing to facilitate even more trade.

But for the KDP, this inflow of Turkish funds comes at a cost. Turkey and the KDP have a tacit understanding of Ankara’s ability to target the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militant group — that is, as long as the KDP grants Ankara the freedom to conduct anti-PKK activities in the region, Ankara will continue to provide economic support to the Kurdish government in Iraq. This is possible in part because, among all the many inter-Kurdish rivalries across the region, there is none as pronounced as the animosity between the KDP and the PKK. So while there is an inherent tension in allowing Turkey to target fellow Kurds, the KDP’s own deep-rooted distrust for the PKK helps facilitate this unspoken policy.

Turkey’s Renewed Anti-PKK Push

Here, it is important to understand that when it comes to its regional strategy, Turkey’s primary imperative is preventing the PKK or any of its secessionist sympathizers from forming an independent Kurdish state. Some within Turkey’s own Kurdish population, which makes up roughly 20 percent of its population, have threatened to secede for decades. And Ankara knows that the establishment of a Kurdish state elsewhere in the region could fan the secessionist flames back home, which would have dire consequences for Turkey’s territorial integrity, social stability and economy.

Thus, for years, one priority within Ankara’s regional strategy has largely focused on keeping the PKK from gaining ground and spreading its message. In Syria, this has included amassing troops near Tel Abyad to fight against a PKK ally, the People’s Protection Units. And in northern Iraq, this has meant going head-to-head against the PKK itself in places like Qandil (which is the militant group’s current hub) and Sinjar.

Eager to secure more Turkish economic cooperation, the ruling KDP in Arbil will continue to grant Turkey leeway on its military operations in northern Iraq. And in turn, Ankara will capitalize on that added freedom to move more aggressively against the PKK, which it is already doing. Turkey is deepening its existing military presence in the province via a military operation against PKK militants called Operation Claw, which just recently entered its second phase. And as part of this phase, Turkish forces have also begun killing high-ranking PKK leaders.

The Inherent Risks

These deepening operations, however, will complicate Ankara’s relations with its own Kurdish population at home. Ramped up military action against the PKK will ultimately hamper the prospects for negotiation between the Turkish government and Kurdish interest groups across the political spectrum while fueling the Peoples’ Democratic Party’s (the dominant Kurdish political party in Turkey, also known as the HDP) opposition against the country’s ruling Justice and Development Party.

Allowing Turkey to continue fighting against the PKK also poses political risks for the KDP. Some Kurdish groups in the region are opposed to Arbil working so closely with Turkey, which they see as actively fighting against the whole of Kurdish interests. This delicate balance of allowing certain Kurds to be killed in order to maintain its lucrative ties with Ankara has always been difficult for Arbil to navigate. With its solidified place in power, the KDP is now in a better political position to withstand some of the potential domestic pressure from anti-Turkey Kurdish groups. But the more Turkey pushes against the PKK in the region, the harder it will be for the KDP to justify Ankara’s actions with its citizens.

Targeting Kurdish insurgents in northern Iraq will make Anakara a target of retaliation anywhere their sympathizers reside.

But perhaps most importantly, the recent assassination of a Turkish diplomat in Arbil serves as an acute reminder that there is a direct link between what Turkey does in Iraq and what Turkey does at home. In other words, targeting Kurds in one place makes Anakara a target of retaliation anywhere their sympathizers reside. As Turkey broadens its anti-PKK operations in northern Iraq, it exposes itself to more risk of blowback and retaliatory attacks.

Violent clashes between PKK and Turkish forces are already a common occurrence in parts of the country. And this renewed anti-Kurd push in Iraq could result in even more frequent or deadly acts of violence in retaliation. But Ankara sees curtailing the PKK’s ability to extend its reach as more important than protecting Turkey’s overseas presence from overseas attack. And thus, the country will continue to take advantage of the KDP’s renewed power to do just that — opening the door for more political backlash and bloodshed on both sides in the process.

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July 25, 2019
Turkey: Erdogan Appears Willing to Trade Economic Risk for Political Gain

Turkey: Erdogan Appears Willing to Trade Economic Risk for Political Gain

(Stratfor)

The Big Picture

A number of converging events recently have increased the risks to economic and political stability in Turkey. Even so, as Stratfor’s Third-Quarter Forecast pointed out, the Turkish government will maneuver among its numerous domestic and external problems, calculating that it can withstand the pressure from both its own constituency and foreign powers.

Representatives from each of the European Union’s members met July 10 to discuss the bloc’s options for sanctioning Turkey after it decided to send a second drillship into disputed waters around Cyprus on a hydrocarbon exploration mission. They considered possible actions including suspending some $150 million in EU funding earmarked to pave the way for Turkish accession to the bloc, suspending some European Investment Bank programs in Turkey and canceling high-profile meetings between EU and Turkish officials. On July 15, EU foreign ministers are expected to make a formal decision over which, if any, of those options to exercise. According to Cypriot media, the government in Nicosia sees these sanctions as a starting point and warned that new measures (such as targeted sanctions against companies and individuals) could be taken in the future.

Why It Matters

The threat of impending EU sanctions comes at a time when a number of other blows could damage Turkey’s already creaky economy. The European Union is Turkey’s most important trade partner, and Ankara values maintaining productive economic ties with the bloc. Despite that, Ankara is tempted by the economic value of any oil and gas discoveries the ships might make. Besides, the exploration itself serves to solidify Turkish claims to the Eastern Mediterranean waters that it alone recognizes and, in its defiance of international norms, appeals to nationalist sentiment in Turkey. In turn, that will shore up domestic political support for embattled President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is still trying to recover from the surprising defeat that opposition parties inflicted on his Justice and Development Party (AKP) in some former AKP strongholds in the recent municipal elections. Turkey’s relationship with the United States faces a similar risk of sanctions over the impending delivery of S-400 air defense missile systems from Russia. But neither threats that U.S. sanctions could be imposed against the Turkish defense industry nor that Turkey could be kicked out of the joint development program for the F-35 fighter jet have changed Ankara’s mind about acquiring the Russian hardware. Despite the threats from Washington and the damage the purchase would cause to its relationship with other NATO allies, Turkey calculates that the boon to its diplomatic sovereignty and the technology transfer rights that come along with the S-400 purchase will be worth it.

With Erdogan’s political popularity in danger, he has apparently made the calculation that his need to solidify support among his political base is worth the economic risk.

Erdogan’s unorthodox approach to monetary policy has given rise to another threat to the Turkish economy. He had long pushed for Turkey’s central bank to cut interest rates to boost economic growth, no matter the effect on the lira, and this week, he moved to make his wish a reality. After the president of Turkey’s central bank spurned Erdogan’s entreaties to slash the country’s prime rate yet again, the president fired him and named a compliant loyalist as a replacement. He now has a team in place at the bank much more likely to bow to his wishes, despite the chance that rate cuts could send Turkey’s fragile currency value down (in turn adding to the private sector’s sizable debt picture). The move has stirred anxiety among the foreign investors and the domestic industries on which Turkey’s economy depends.

Finally, there is a more distant threat of potential future penalties that Turkey could face if it has been found to have had dealings with Iran or Venezuela in defiance of the current U.S. sanctions regime. After all, a Turkish bank aided Iranian oil-smuggling efforts under Obama administration sanctions. If it comes to light that Turkish entities have repeated that history, economically damaging punishment could certainly follow.

Context

Certainly, Turkey has taken actions in the past to strengthen its own sovereignty and nationalist policies. With Erdogan’s political popularity in danger, he has apparently made the calculation that his need to solidify support among his political base by pursuing strongman policies in the Eastern Mediterranean, with the United States and at home is worth the economic risks. Former AKP loyalists are now openly discussing a splinter party that could threaten Erdogan’s hold on parliament, giving this strategy to staunch the bleed of domestic political capital a new urgency. Turkey’s rate of inflation has improved somewhat in recent months after the country entered a recession in the last quarter of 2018.

Dates to Watch

July 15: Expected EU decision on sanctions and penalties on Turkey. Countries along the Balkan migration route, including Hungary, Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovenia, could be reluctant to authorize tough sanctions on Turkey out of fears that Ankara could retaliate by withdrawing from the immigration agreement it reached with the European Union in 2016, unleashing a flood of refugees bound for Europe.
July 25: The Turkish central bank holds a monetary policy committee meeting. Considering the recent changes in bank leadership, an interest rate cut is widely expected.

July 11, 2019
Geopolitics Keeps Pushing Turkey and Israel Back Together
(HANS SLEGERS/Shutterstock.com)
Highlights

Turkey and Israel’s strategic alliance in the Middle East, fostered by their shared aim to limit Iran and prevent Arab states from aligning against them, will preserve their relationship through most external shocks.

Intensifying U.S. efforts to find regional allies it can rely on to contain Iran helps keep the two countries together.

Turkey’s defense of Palestinian statehood will always be a caustic wedge between the two: While it provides Turkey with important credibility in the Muslim world, it conflicts with Israel’s defense strategy.

Israel and Turkey appear to be testing the waters in preparation for resuming diplomatic relations. Officials from the two countries are thought to have met in the United Arab Emirates last month to discuss improving their diplomatic ties, which have been on pause since May. Other signs also point to a rapprochement: Turkey recently sent an economic attache to Israel, and Israel recently opened an internal job listing for an ambassador to Turkey. The two countries — sometime allies, sometime enemies — are again being pushed toward reconciliation as they move to counter Iran, cope with U.S. demands and defend their positions in the Middle East.

The Big Picture

Among the countries that the United States depends upon in the Middle East, Turkey and Israel stand out as cornerstones. Though they vacillate between friendship and hostility with one another, their ties rest atop a foundation of mutually beneficial trade, which survives even the most contentious times. Since hitting a low in 2010, their relations have been slowly on the mend. In their regional balancing act, Turkey and Israel always find that strategically they have more in common than not, but they will never see the need to entirely bury the hatchet.

See Israel’s Survival StrategySee Turkey’s Resurgence

The Search for Common Ground

Many strategic factors bind Turkey and Israel. They are two of the key non-Arab powers in the region and critical to its balance of power, which includes Persian Iran and Arab powers such as Saudi Arabia. They also have two of the strongest militaries in the Middle East. Turkey maintains the most powerful navy, and Israel the strongest air force. Each sees the other as too powerful to have as an enemy.

Ultimately, for Israel to protect itself in an unfriendly neighborhood, it must maintain at least a working relationship with Turkey. The alternative means contending with a big regional power while living next door to hostile Arab nations. Also, Turkey is the larger, more influential and more strategically crucial power due in large part to its location between the Mediterranean and Black seas and its status as a counterbalance to Russia, Iran and other regional heavyweights. This same strategic value came into play during the Cold War when the United States joined with Turkey and Israel to offset Soviet penetration of the Arab world.

Over the past two decades, Israel has had to adjust to Turkey’s way of building regional relationships; that method included picking fights with Israel — particularly over the treatment of the Palestinians — to gain traction with the Arab public. And for Turkey, Israel’s relationship with certain Kurdish factions — some of which it has heavily armed in the past — hits close to home and hampers its goal of weakening a potential Kurdish state. Keeping Israel close could help prevent it from arming the Kurds again.

Despite their differences, some of their regional goals overlap, especially when it comes to containing Iran’s influence. This objective plays out most clearly in the Syrian conflict, where Turkey and Israel want to direct Damascus away from Tehran and toward Ankara. While Israel is concerned primarily about the stability of the corners of Syria that affect its border, the Iranian presense there unsettles it. Much like Russia, Turkey can influence the Iranian presence but not control it. Israel also knows that Turkey, more than any other power active in Syria, is critical to ensuring that rebel groups there remain distinct from extremists.

In Lebanon, both have sought to curb Hezbollah’s influence, though they have used different means. Israel fights Hezbollah from time to time, keeping its military expansion in check. Turkey has chosen to take a nuanced and more gradual approach by supporting political and security forces opposed to Iran, counteracting Hezbollah and other proxies of Tehran.

The Economic Ties That Bind

Improved trade is perhaps the most deeply shared goal, because even in times of diplomatic rupture, import-export commerce has continued apace. Israel imports about $3 billion worth of raw materials and manufactured goods, such as cement, steel and tomatoes, from Turkey, whose current economic fragility highlights the importance of their trade relationship. For Israel, the imports help ensure that its manufacturing companies have a steady supply of materials.

Israeli arms sales to Turkey have also played a significant role in their relationship. While Turkey’s weapons industry has matured considerably over the past decade, the arms trade remains a promising area of cooperation. The energy sector, as well, could eventually become another area for collaboration. The two have been competing for natural gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean even as they had discussed over the past couple of years the possibility of building a pipeline between them. But the deal between Noble Energy and Israel’s Delek Drilling and the Egyptian East Gas Co. signed in late September to deliver natural gas from the Tamar and Leviathan fields in Israel to Egypt, compounded with the difficulty of building a pipeline across contested Cypriot territory, puts to rest any Israel-Turkey pipeline dreams in the near term.

The Most Recent Split

The May 2018 breakdown in ties between Israel and Turkey was just one of many periodic ruptures in their carefully balanced relationship. In December 2017, the United States decided to move its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, aggravating the most contentious issue between Turkey and Israel: the Palestinian conflict. In May, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused Israel of genocide and expelled Israeli Ambassador Eitan Naeh after dozens of Palestinians were killed in unrest in Gaza driven in part by the embassy move. Caustic rhetoric from Turkey about Israel’s actions against Palestinians has been a familiar refrain under Erdogan. Turkey is seeking to be a champion of the Palestinian cause because it raises Ankara’s stature and leadership influence in the Muslim world. In his role as a patriarch of political Islam, the president is building his strongman image at home and solidifying his domestic legitimacy.

Israel is focused primarily on its security, and denying Palestinian statehood is a means of ensuring that security as well as stability. Turkey will continue to be a bit unpredictable on how far it is willing to go to ensure Palestinian rights. And Israel can withstand all manner of tough rhetoric from the Turkish government; it is used to it. But any new, outright meddling by the Turkish government in the restive Palestinian territories will be seriously troublesome. Israel is already concerned about the Turkish funding of civic and Islamic associations in east Jerusalem. That support is meant to bolster Turkey’s soft power there in its competition with the Arab states of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

The Role of the United States

That the U.S. embassy decision could spur the most recent Turkish-Israeli split underlines the influence the United States has on their contentious relationship. The United States had previously played a key part in bringing them together. In 2013, President Barack Obama pressured Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to apologize for the deaths of Turkish activists killed when Israel intercepted the “Gaza Freedom Flotilla” in 2010 and agree to compensate their families.

Now, the United States needs the cooperation of both and a working relationship with both, as during the Cold War, to counterbalance Iran and reduce its own burden in the region. And the pressure this time, heightened by its economic problems, is on Turkey. Despite the low tide in U.S.-Turkish relations, the United States will continue to encourage Turkey to work with Israel. At the same time, the United States and Israel are in an unusually close period in their relations, which could embolden Israel in its regional and domestic policies, knowing that America has its back. Israel has exploited this greater U.S. pressure on Turkey when dealing with Ankara and has included its own pressure on the United States to not sell the advanced F-35 jet to Ankara.

Finally, Turkey must consider the quiet Israel-Saudi Arabia rapprochement. Their cooperation, encouraged by Washington and driven by the mutual desire to contain and combat Iran, could undercut Ankara’s goal to increase its influence across northern Syria and northern Iraq. This situation naturally leaves Turkey wanting to work more closely with Israel, so it can mitigate any Saudi moves that might threaten Turkish security imperatives, such as the possibility of arming certain Kurdish groups that fight against Iran. And an improved Turkish relationship with Israel could also help alleviate some of the U.S. pressure as well.

The Road Ahead

Though most signs point to an eventual reconciliation, Turkish actions could hinder progress. Turkey is still looking for ways beyond rhetoric to reinsert itself into the Palestinian issue. Ankara’s proposal for a Gaza seaport, which would facilitate Turkish aid reaching the area, could make some headway. And Ankara will forge ahead with building up ties in east Jerusalem, hoping that Israel would prefer to have it involved there in lieu of other powers, namely Iran. But Turkey likely would only provide funding with Israel’s approval. Otherwise, the resumption of further diplomatic ties could be restricted.

But for now, the ties between Turkey and Israel will remain pragmatic, limited and businesslike, subject to the influence of events in the region. Rapprochement could open economic opportunities for Israeli companies looking to invest in and with an economically weak Turkey. The two countries can be expected to continue discussions on the future of Syria and on ways to isolate Iranian influence there. Those two issues — trade and Iran — remain at the center of their on-again, off-again relationship.

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May 31, 2019
Ankara Calculates the Risks of an Offensive in Northeastern Syria
(OMAR HAJ KADOUR/AFP/Getty Images)
Highlights

Amid the U.S. drawdown of forces from Syria, Turkey is gearing up for further incursions in the country to reduce the power of the Syrian Democratic Forces.

Residual U.S. and allied forces will remain, however, raising the risk of a miscalculation or confrontation as Turkish forces push into the area.

Despite improved ties with Russia, Ankara will also have to contend with Moscow’s opposition to Turkey’s full ambitions in the country.

With the United States on the cusp of a significant withdrawal from northern Syria and Turkey continuing to court better relations with Russia, Ankara is gearing up to cross its southern border to pursue its cherished goal of taking on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). But even as Turkey might soon enjoy clear sailing into northeastern Syria to seek to drive the SDF away from key positions, particularly around the Euphrates, pitfalls remain. From remaining U.S. forces to possible Russian resistance, Ankara’s likely offensive into the area could even drag it into a dangerous conflict with the numerous other countries involved in Syria.

The Big Picture

In our 2019 Annual Forecast, we highlighted the increased risk of clashes between regional and global powers in Syria. The U.S. decision to draw down its forces from Syria has galvanized Turkey to fulfill its goal of launching a military operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces. Such an assault, however, raises the possibility of clashes between Turkey and the other countries operating in the area.

See 2019 Annual Forecast

See The Syrian Civil War

NATO Allies in the Way

Ever since the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a mostly Kurdish militia, emerged as a significant force in Syria, the Turks have been focused on ensuring their ultimate defeat. Fearing the YPG’s ties with Ankara’s archenemy, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) — particularly the prospect that the latter could use northeastern Syria as a platform to launch potential attacks into Turkey — Ankara has prioritized its efforts to eradicate the YPG above all others in Syria, even over the removal of its main ostensible foe in the country, President Bashar al Assad. Turkey’s August 2016 Operation Euphrates Shield to capture parts of northern Syria like Azaz and al-Bab, for instance, came at the cost of supporting the Syrian rebel battle for Aleppo, as Turkey drew a number of rebel forces away from that fight and limited its assistance to the insurgents in the city in exchange for a Russian green light for the operation. Last year, Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch dealt a further blow to the YPG by seizing the group’s longtime stronghold in Afrin. With the announcement that the United States is drawing down its forces, Turkey’s goal of staging another military operation, this time a decisive one east of the Euphrates River to extend Turkey’s buffer in Syria, finally appears to be on the cards.

Still, the picture is not entirely rosy for the Turks. Aware of the U.S. penchant for abrupt strategy changes in Syria, Ankara has remained cautious following U.S. President Donald Trump’s sudden announcement that he was initiating a full withdrawal of troops from the country pending imminent victory over the Islamic State. As it is, Trump gave Turkey more cause for caution after threatening to “devastate Turkey economically” if it attacked the YPG after the U.S. withdrawal. Indeed, the United States has once again retracted its decision to withdraw all of its forces from the area; instead, it now plans to keep a residual force of 400 personnel in Syria, 200 of whom will remain in SDF areas in the northeast.

Other U.S. allies like France and the United Kingdom could bolster these U.S. forces with their own troops, even if these countries could be wary about deploying significant forces in the absence of a larger U.S. presence on the ground. A few hundred American and allied troops are unlikely to deter Turkish military operations against the SDF in such a large area, but their presence could still throw a wrench into Turkey’s plans, as Ankara will strive to avoid moving into specific areas where they are present. More important, the presence of such troops in the vicinity of Turkish military operations raises the risk of miscalculations or accidental clashes that could lead to a rapid escalation in tensions between Turkey and the United States and other NATO members.

Russian Resistance

But other NATO members are not the only countries Ankara will have to worry about. Although Turkish-Russian relations have undergone a remarkable improvement in the last few years, the two nations do not entirely see eye to eye in Syria. Russia remains wary of Turkey’s further expansion in the country, especially if it impinges on the Syrian government, which Moscow is attempting to prop up. While Russia is unlikely to block all Turkish operations in the northeast, it will seek to discourage Turkey from pushing too deep into Syrian territory. And because the SDF is likely to turn to Damascus for assistance in the face of a Turkish assault, Ankara will also have to factor in the potential that it will end up battling Syrian government forces and associated militias — many of which also enjoy Iranian or Russian backing.

Yet another potential Russian stumbling block to Turkey’s operations in the northeast lies far in Syria’s west. In line with the Astana process, in which Russia, Turkey and Iran have sought to manage aspects of Syria’s war, Ankara and Moscow have succeeded in handling the rebel-controlled western province of Idlib, but the countries remain deeply divided on policy in the area — something that could obstruct future cooperation.

Previous agreements between Turkey and Russia facilitated the creation of a so-called de-escalation zone in Idlib, as well as the establishment of a dozen observation posts manned by Turkish forces. Turkey agreed to the arrangement to forestall further Russian-backed Syrian government offensives that would have further weakened Turkish-backed rebel groups in the province, driven further waves of refugees into Turkey and eroded Ankara’s attempts to establish an expansive buffer zone in northern Syria. For its part, Russia was happy to avoid additional military commitments in Syria, both because it wished to draw down its forces in the country and because it did not want to endanger its relations with Turkey. Moscow, however, always intended for the Idlib arrangement to be temporary; what’s more, the agreement stipulated that Turkey would move to dismantle the more extreme rebel groups in the province, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the latest incarnation of Jabhat al-Nusra.

The situation in Idlib is a potential flashpoint that could seriously undermine not just Turkey’s position in Syria, but also its wider relationship with Russia.

But Russian patience has been wearing thin over the last six months as Turkey has not just failed to crack down on Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, but failed to contain it to the extent that it has driven other rebel groups, including Turkish-backed groups, from key positions in the province. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and its allies have also continued to conduct attacks on Syrian government forces along the provincial border in response to cease-fire violations by Damascus, which has never been particularly enthused by the Russian-Turkish arrangement.

Distracted as it is by its primary focus on northeastern Syria, Turkey is now unlikely to stage a significant crackdown on Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. And as the extremist group further entrenches itself in the province, Russia, Iran and the Syrian government might give the go-ahead for an offensive. Naturally, such an assault could have far-reaching consequences. Lodged between the rebels and Syrian government forces, Turkish troops could find themselves under fire. And because Turkey has shown no inclination to abandon its rebel allies in Idlib, it could well choose to reinforce them if they came under heavy attack. Accordingly, the situation in the province is a potential flashpoint that could seriously test and undermine not just Turkey’s position in Syria, but also its wider relationship with Russia.

The U.S. decision to draw down its forces in Syria (even if pared down from the initially declared full withdrawal) will likely pave the way for more Turkish incursions into northern Syria. But as Turkey gears up for military operations against the SDF, it will run the risk of a confrontation with residual U.S. and other NATO forces in the area, along with Russian- and Iranian-backed Syrian government forces that will likely seek to forestall Turkish gains by coming to the YPG’s defense. An attack on Turkey’s rebel allies far to the west could also divert Turkey’s attention from any offensive on Kurdish areas in the northeast. In such a situation, Ankara’s road south may be open, but it will have more than a few bumps.

The Syrian Civil War

The Kurdish Struggle

Turkey’s Resurgence

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