Tag: Stratfor

Turkey’s Economic Weakness Fuels a Slow-Burning Political Crisis

Emily Hawthorne

Middle East and North Africa Analyst, Stratfor

Feb 17, 2020 | 10:00 GMT

A Turkish tea seller carries a tray of glasses through the streets of a historic market district in Ankara. Rising inflation and slipping consumer confidence could cause the government in Ankara to continue to pursue an aggressive foreign policy to boost nationalism and buoy its popularity.

(DIEGO CUPOLO/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

Although the ruling party calculates that it has the political heft to withstand growing economic concerns, it has hedged its bets by pursuing an aggressive foreign policy that appeals to nationalism. …

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February 19, 2020
Turkey Digs In Its Heels in Idlib

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Turkey Digs In Its Heels in Idlib

Ryan Bohl

Middle East and North Africa Analyst, Stratfor

Turkish-backed Syrian fighters man an anti-aircraft gun in Saraqeb, in the northwestern Syrian province of Idlib on Feb. 1, 2020. Turkey and Russia could be on a collision course in the province.

(OMAR HAJ KADOUR/AFP via Getty Images)

Ankara has no intention of abandoning its presence in the northwestern Syrian province — even if that drives a wedge between it and Russia….

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February 6, 2020
Erdogan’s White House Visit May Have Only Delayed the Inevitable Storm
Sinan Ciddi

Board of Contributors

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (L) and U.S. President Donald Trump hold a news conference at the White House on Nov. 13, 2019. Other than Trump, Erdogan appears to have few friends left in Washington.

(HALIL SAGIRKAYA/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
Highlights

Despite some worries otherwise, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Washington was largely free of drama, but it also didn’t achieve any breakthroughs toward resolving long-standing bilateral disputes.

U.S. President Donald Trump essentially has given Turkey a chance to reconsider its position on buying S-400 missile defense systems from Russia, dangling the possibility of readmittance into the F-35 program as a lure.

Satisfying Washington will be tough, as doing so would likely anger Russia, which could retaliate by imposing measures on Turkey that could prove damaging to the interests of both Erdogan and his country.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s White House visit on Nov. 13 can be regarded as a win for Erdogan only in a narrow, yet significant sense. Amid the threat of looming U.S. sanctions, Erdogan’s meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump ended with the Turkish president voicing Ankara’s demands in the Oval office and, apparently, managing to stave off punitive U.S. measures.

To be clear, Erdogan’s visit resolved none of the long-standing bilateral disputes between the United States and Turkey, and Erdogan — who is viewed with contempt by nearly all U.S. federal agencies — would not have been welcome in Washington had it not been for Trump’s personal invitation. Turkey, after all, has few friends left in the U.S. capital after its recent incursion into northern Syria to attack the U.S.-backed Kurdish military forces that have been fighting the Islamic State and its purchase of Russian S-400 missile defense systems, which many see as a violation of its NATO commitments.

Conversely, it is unclear what Trump gained from giving numerous photo opportunities to a leader whom American governmental institutions widely regard as an unreliable partner at best, as well as an authoritarian leader who is visibly cozying up to Russia at the expense of the Western alliance’s interests. Most observers of Turkey have reached the conclusion that the alliance between Turkey and the United States exists in name only and definitely not in substance. There is ample reason to believe that Turkey and the United States will continue to drift further apart without more substantive engagement on the issues that divide the beleaguered allies.

Erdogan arrived in Washington with a long list of requests, most of which seemed aimed at preserving himself and his government. Worries that the United States was going to disclose some of the more questionable sources of Erdogan’s vast personal wealth and the future of Turkey’s Halkbank apparently topped the list. Last month, U.S. prosecutors in the southern district of New York charged state-owned Halkbank with violating U.S. sanctions on Iran.

Erdogan arrived in Washington with a long list of requests, most of which seemed aimed at preserving himself and his government.
Additionally, Erdogan angered administration officials and a group of U.S. senators who attended his Oval Office meeting with Trump when he showed a video on an iPad depicting the leader of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi, as a terrorist who should be apprehended and handed over to Turkey rather than invited to visit Washington. When U.S. Sen. Lindsay Graham brushed aside this act of propaganda, the focus of the discussion moved to Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missile defense systems. From the joint statement that followed Trump’s meeting with Erdogan, it is clear the United States was interested in driving home one key ask of Turkey: Find a verifiable way to shelve the S-400s and, in return, rejoin the F-35 fighter jet program. If not, expect severe and debilitating sanctions.

Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place

On the S-400 issue, Erdogan faces an interesting conundrum and one of the most consequential decisions he will make. More than just losing face, Turkey would find it difficult to nullify its purchase of the S-400s. From past experience, Erdogan is keenly aware that angering Russian President Vladimir Putin is a sensitive issue, and there are credible reports suggesting Putin could release a trove of embarrassing and compromising materials that would showcase Erdogan and his family’s questionable financial dealings and international connections. Putin also could punish Turkey economically by terminating existing trade and tourism agreements vital to the health of Turkey’s economy.

On the flip side, failing to satisfy Washington on the S-400 issue could unleash a barrage of sanctions. For the time being, the United States appears to have given Turkey an opportunity to think hard about the issue and act appropriately. As it stands, the U.S. case against Halkbank and a proposed resolution in the U.S. Senate to recognize the killing of Armenians by Ottoman Turks as genocide (the U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed a similar resolution last month) have both been put on ice as a gesture of goodwill and a signal that the United States is serious in its interest to bring Turkey back into the Western fold. As aggressive and credible as the U.S. position may be, some American officials worry that pushing Turkey too hard and punishing it with sanctions will drive it deeper into the open arms of Russia. Although Turkey has few friends in the U.S. Defense and State departments, no one is interested in Turkey formally pledging itself to the Russian camp.

A Fatigued and Insecure Ruler

It appears from observing Erdogan that hubris increasingly masks a lack of confidence, while insecurity shadows and undergirds his 17-year rule. Shortly before his scheduled visit to Washington, Erdogan gave a 36-minute speech on the 81st anniversary of the death of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the modern Turkish Republic. He underplayed the achievements of the republic to focus instead on a series of inaccurate observations that modern-day Turkey’s successes basically lay in the heritage of its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire. Lack of historical knowledge and nuance aside, it apparently was lost on Erdogan that the Ottoman state would never have allowed someone with a common background like his to occupy an influential government position, let alone become head of state.

Erdogan should not be underestimated, however. He is a master tactician, with the ability and will to change the public discourse and political climate to his advantage on a whim. Over the past six years or so, he has mobilized such prowess solely for his self-preservation. It remains to be seen if he can use his powers and influence in the service of his country’s national interests.
November 21, 2019
Turkey and the West: A Gathering Storm?

Nov 7, 2019 | 23:02 GMT

The strategies pursued by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan may have alienated some of the country’s traditional allies, but they have boosted his nationalist credentials at home.

(ATTILA KISBENEDEK/AFP via Getty Images)

Turkey, straddling a strategic geographic nexus between Europe and Asia, is the focus of conversation in this episode of the Stratfor podcast. Domestic economic and political challenges are pulling at the rule of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Meanwhile, relations between Turkey and the United States, a key NATO ally, are at an ebb, and after Ankara launched an offensive into northeastern Syria, the U.S. Congress has called for sanctions. In the meantime, Turkey’s relationship with the European Union, which Ankara ostensibly aspires to join, appears now to be fraying at the edges. All of this raises the question: Will Turkey now turn to Russia?

Stratfor’s Emily Hawthorne speaks with Sinan Ciddi, assistant professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, the director of the Institute of Turkish Studies and a frequent contributor to Stratfor Worldview, about Turkey’s current situation and its political future.

November 12, 2019
Turkey and the West: A Gathering Storm?

Nov 7, 2019 | 23:02 GMT

The strategies pursued by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan may have alienated some of the country’s traditional allies, but they have boosted his nationalist credentials at home.

(ATTILA KISBENEDEK/AFP via Getty Images)

Turkey, straddling a strategic geographic nexus between Europe and Asia, is the focus of conversation in this episode of the Stratfor podcast. Domestic economic and political challenges are pulling at the rule of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Meanwhile, relations between Turkey and the United States, a key NATO ally, are at an ebb, and after Ankara launched an offensive into northeastern Syria, the U.S. Congress has called for sanctions. In the meantime, Turkey’s relationship with the European Union, which Ankara ostensibly aspires to join, appears now to be fraying at the edges. All of this raises the question: Will Turkey now turn to Russia?

Stratfor’s Emily Hawthorne speaks with Sinan Ciddi, assistant professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, the director of the Institute of Turkish Studies and a frequent contributor to Stratfor Worldview, about Turkey’s current situation and its political future.

November 9, 2019
Turkey May Have Stepped Into Its Own ‘Endless War’ in Syria
Charles Glass

Board of Contributors

oct 25, 2019 | 10:00 GMT

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to deploy joint Russian-Turkish patrols in the so-called security zone Erdogan has ordered Syrian Kurds to evacuate.

(SEFA KARACAN/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
Highlights

Since its emergence as a republic after World War I, Turkey has largely considered it futile to intervene in the former lands of the Ottoman Empire. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s involvement in Syria reverses that outlook.

Erdogan’s decision to expand Turkey’s military occupation in Syria has prompted international outrage, but the action is widely popular in Turkey.

Turkey has much to gain if its incursion into Syria succeeds, but it also has much to lose. Turkish history provides a warning: Offensives that start well can end badly.

“The Turks have always pursued an unhappy policy in regard to native populations,” wrote German Gen. Erich Ludendorff of his World War I Ottoman allies. “They have gone on the principle of taking everything and giving nothing. Now they had to reckon with these people (Kurds, Armenians and Arab tribes) as their enemies.” The Turkish army, driven out of Syria after four centuries in 1918 by the British and “native populations,” is back. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s involvement in Syria reverses the policy of the republic’s first president, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, that kept Turkey out of the Arab world. Ataturk looked westward and saw the futility of returning to lands that had rejected Turkish rule.

That arrangement worked for Turkey until 2011, when the uprising in Syria opened the way to foreign interference. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were backing assorted militias in their effort to depose Syrian President Bashar al Assad. Erdogan would not be left out. His border with Syria offered the most extensive terrain for infiltrating fighters and war materiel. Moreover, his Justice and Development Party had a long friendship with Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood, whose attempt to depose al Assad’s father, Hafez al Assad, in 1982 ended with the infamous massacre in Hama. Erdogan looked to the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots to play a leading role in the resistance to the younger al Assad. In 2012, a Syrian former Cabinet minister told me that Erdogan had asked al Assad to put Muslim Brothers into his Cabinet. When al Assad refused, the former minister said, Erdogan made clear that he would back all efforts to remove the president and replace him with Islamists.

Step by Step Into Syria

One of the stated reasons for excluding the Muslim Brothers, in addition to their history of violent opposition to the regime, was that Syria had not legalized religiously based political parties. The divisive effects of sectarian parties had played out badly in Lebanon after 1975 and had done little to benefit Iraq after the U.S. invasion in 2003.

Al Assad countered Erdogan’s support for his opponents by allowing Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to threaten Erdogan from Syria. The PKK was instrumental in the formation of the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) that fought with the United States against the Islamic State without joining the U.S.-backed opposition to al Assad.

Erdogan went step by step into Syria, opening the border to jihadists, facilitating weapons deliveries and, when needed, backing the rebels with firepower — as when Turkish artillery shelled the Armenian Syrian village of Kassab before the Islamists conquered it in March 2014. Barely one year later, Erdogan sent Turkish troops over the border on an innocuous mission, code-named Operation Shah Euphrates, to rescue the remains of Suleyman Shah, an ancestor of the first Ottoman sultan. Erdogan’s next venture into Syria was an all-out invasion, Operation Euphrates Shield, ostensibly to combat Islamic State militants but effectively to force the YPG to retreat from the border zone in the northwest.

George Orwell would have appreciated Turkey’s operational code names in Syria.
Then came Operation Olive Branch from January to March 2018 in the largely Kurdish province around Afrin. In that onslaught into a hitherto peaceful corner of northwestern Syria, Turkey relied on about 25,000 Free Syrian Army and other rebel fighters to occupy towns and villages. “Instead of protecting vulnerable civilians’ rights, these fighters are perpetuating a cycle of abuse,” Human Rights Watch declared. The United States refrained from assisting its Kurdish allies, a precedent for its behavior when, following his now-famous telephone conversation with President Donald Trump, Erdogan ordered his army and its allied Islamist militia to advance into northeastern Syria on Oct. 9. Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring followed the Operation Olive Branch game plan (George Orwell would have appreciated these operational names) that expels Kurds, civilians and fighters, from the northeast, executes Kurdish politicians and gives Turkey control of a 20-mile-wide belt from the Mediterranean to the Iraqi border.

Despite international outrage and sanctions, Erdogan’s decision to expand his military occupation of northwest Syria to the northeast and destroy the YPG is popular among all factions in Turkey. The new mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu, who won office on promises to resist Erdogan’s Islamist and anti-Kurdish policies in Turkey’s most cosmopolitan city, backs the military operation. On Twitter, he called the YPG a “treacherous terror group,” betraying the Kurds who helped elect him. A leading opposition daily, Sozcu, headlined its front page, “Americans, Europeans, Chinese, Arabs — all united against Turkey. Bring it on.” The pro-war fever infecting Turkey replicates the parades, flag-waving and oaths of allegiance that accompanied the country’s entry into World War I in 1914. When the Ottoman fleet attacked Russia’s forts along the Black Sea, Turkish political parties and media outdid each other to demonstrate support for an offensive that started well and ended badly. Turkey lost its empire, and the European Allies occupied Istanbul.

Much to Gain, Lots to Lose

Turkey has much to gain if its Syria gamble succeeds — control of a large area it abandoned in 1918, removal of thousands of Syrian refugees from Turkey to parts of Syria they do not know, containment of the YPG and PKK to areas south of its so-called safe zone and a voice in Syria’s future. It also has much to lose — the lives of its soldiers, perpetual warfare along its border and the undying animosity of Kurds in both Syria and Turkey.

Erdogan’s new collaboration with Russian President Vladimir Putin — with whom he agreed at Sochi, Russia, on Oct. 22 to deploy joint Russian-Turkish patrols in the 20-mile security zone that he has ordered the Kurds to evacuate — dilutes his control in northeastern Syria. It also permits al Assad’s Syrian army to return to an area where Syria has a greater claim to sovereignty than has Turkey. The obstacle to ending the eight-year Syrian civil war remains Turkey’s sole control of the northwestern Syrian provinces of Idlib and Aleppo and the estimated 60,000 rebels, most of them jihadists, it controls there and has used as its mercenaries against the Kurds. The politician most likely to decide the fate of that area is, as with the Kurdish northeast, neither Trump nor Erdogan, but Putin. Watch that space.

The politician most likely to decide the fate of northwestern Syria is, as with the Kurdish northeast, neither Trump nor Erdogan, but Putin.

Trump permitted the Turkish invasion, then decided it was not such a good idea and, while not sending the Turkish army back into Turkey, imposed selective economic sanctions, which he lifted Oct. 23. Many Americans support Trump’s stated desire to end the “endless wars” in the belief that taxpayers’ money is better spent on education, health and infrastructure at home than on military operations abroad. Trump, however, has not brought troops home. About 200 American soldiers are to remain at al-Tanf military base, part of a 55-square-kilometer (21-square-mile) area of oil-rich desert where the borders of Syria, Iraq and Jordan meet. He redeployed 1,000 special operations forces from Syria to western Iraq. He is sending 1,800 soldiers to Saudi Arabia. He is threatening Iran with war following his abrogation of the 2015 nuclear deal. He supplies weapons, intelligence and logistical support to Saudi Arabia’s relentless war in Yemen.

Ending the endless wars is not unlike decolonization, which Europeans undertook following the bankruptcy of their economies during World War II. Most of the colonial withdrawals were as disastrous for the countries involved as the colonial conquests had been. Think of the massacres that followed the partition of India in 1947, the war in Palestine when the British withdrew in 1948, the French wars in Algeria and Vietnam, and Belgium’s criminal actions in the Congo. Among the most irresponsible colonial retreats was Portugal’s from lands it had occupied for four centuries: Angola, Mozambique and East Timor. The first two suffered protracted civil wars, while Indonesian troops invaded East Timor in December 1975 with American approval and massacred a third of its population by the time they were forced to leave in 1999. Now the United States, after arming and earning the trust of Syria’s Kurds, is leaving them to face the Turkish onslaught.

When President Barack Obama considered the covert operation to train and equip Syrian rebels in 2013, code-named Operation Timber Sycamore, he said to his aides, “Tell me how this ends.” As Turkey is discovering, it doesn’t.
Turkey Fights a Losing PR Battle Over Syria Oct 16, 2019 | 09:10 GMT

The Syrian Civil War Grinds On, Largely Forgotten Jul 25, 2019 | 09:07 GMT

An Impatient Turkey Gets Ready to Enter Northeastern Syria Oct 09, 2019 | 14:10 GMT
October 26, 2019