Tag: Soner Cagaptay

How Revolutions Work: Turkey, America, and the Arab World

By Barry Rubin

A fascinating article on Islamism in Turkey also reflects on the situation in Arabic-speaking countries has been written by Soner Cagaptay, director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy’s Turkish research program. I’m a fan of his analysis so nothing in the following article should be taken as criticism but rather as an exploration of his article’s themes.

There’s also a very interesting parallel here with domestic events in the United States. But first, Cagaptay’s theme us as follows:

–There are strong limits on how far Islamism can go in Turkey.

–The Arabic-speaking states are very different from Turkey in lacking a strong secularist (or at least anti-Islamist) sector that is deeply embedded in the country’s culture and history.

I think he is right on both points but let’s look more into the details.

First, on Turkey itself. Cagaptay’s article was prompted by a personal experience in Istanbul. In a café he saw a group of Salafists, who had just finished prayers in a near-by mosque, interact politely with a waitress who had tattoos and wore a short-sleeved shirt. He writes that in both words and body language one could see there were no real “tensions between the two opposing visions of Turkey brought into close encounter for me to witness.”

He continues that while “Turkey’s two halves…may not blend, neither will [either one] disappear. Turkey’s Islamization is a fact, but so is secular and Westernized Turkey.” After a decade of Islamist rule—I should note here that few Western experts, journalists, or political leaders acknowledge or understand that the regime ruling Turkey is Islamist in a real sense—there has been, “a rising tide of Islamization in Turkey.” He mentions a recent law that mandates teaching Islam in public schools and a shift in Turkey’s professed identity from European to being Muslim and Middle Eastern.

But, Cagaptay adds, there are limits in a country “so thoroughly westernized that even the AKP and its Islamist elites cannot escape trappings of their Western mold.” As examples he cites the role of women and Turkey’s membership in NATO. He explains that “Turkey’s Islamization is meeting its match” because, for example, there was a consensus that Turkey deploy NATO Patriot missiles on its territory to defend itself from a possibly attack by Syria. “The Turks have lived with NATO too long to think outside of its box.”

Now there is no question that in the broader sense Cagaptay is correct. Turkey is not going to be another Saudi Arabia or Iran. And yet beside that glass is half-full argument is a shocking glass is half-empty counterpart. As Cagaptay notes, Islamist or semi-Islamist parties received 65 percent of the vote in the 2011 elections. That means, he continues:

“35 percent of the population, totaling twenty-five million people, did not vote for the [Islamist regime]. These voters stand for secularism, and they will never buy into the religious movement in Turkey. This block will constitute the domestic limitation of Turkey’s Islamization. After ten years in power, and likely to run the country for another term with a humming economy boosting its support, the AKP is making Turkey in its own image. But the new Turkey will have a uniquely distinct flavor: a bit Islamist, a bit secularist, a bit conservative, and a bit Western.”

Absolutely true. And yet who would have believed twenty years ago that about two-thirds of the people would vote for Islamist candidates, even after a decade of Islamist rule. Will that 35 percent ever be able to get the Islamists out of power and reverse the process? And what about the process itself? Revolutions, even quiet ones, keep on going. Will 35 percent of the nine-year-olds now likely to get Islamic teaching (which may well amount to Islamist indoctrination) vote for secular parties when they grow up?

And doesn’t much of Turkish foreign policy on regional issues under the AKP look like Iran or Egypt today? The attitude toward Israel, Iran (despite competition in Syria), the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hizballah are all in line with an assessment of it as a radical Islamist policy.

And how real is the current regime’s commitment to democracy? Not that much deeper than that of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Prime Minister Erdogan’s latest remarks have stirred a controversy in Turkey but haven’t even been reported in the West. In a speech in Konya, Erdogan said: “Separation of powers is hindering service to the people. We have to do something about it.” In other words, having now laid the foundation for beginning the Islamizing of the courts, he’s now going to go after parliament.

And what about the patronage enjoyed by Islamist leaders? For example, I’m told that men working for the government know now that they are more likely to be promoted if their wives wear “Islamic clothing.” Companies know they are more likely to get government contracts if they toe the line. Once Islamists are permanently in power—even if they have to face elections—the transformation of the country continues.

When Islamists–like Communists, fascists, or Arab nationalists, reach a certain level of power their behavior becomes more authoritarian. Let me tell an anecdote. A friend of mine who fits the profile of a left-secularist Turk has energetically argued with me in conversation that the current Turkish regime is not really threatening to transform the country. But he told me that the nanny for his children, though secular, must wear “Islamic clothing” when she goes to work because otherwise she might be physically assaulted in her neighborhood. I have heard journalists talk in private about how scared they are to offend the regime, though some still do speak their conscience in very loud voices.

Thus, the fact that there will still be a lot of secular people in Turkey doesn’t mean things will remain static. And having about one-third of the population on your side is cold comfort indeed in a democratic state when those people’s votes don’t really count in writing laws, choosing judges, and determining school curricula.

This is where an interesting comparison to the United States comes in. Within Turkey, most of the mass media and almost all of the universities are still in the hands of secular forces. By way of comparison, in the United States those two institutions are overwhelmingly in the hands of the left. This institutional control has gradually led to a remarkable change in popular attitudes that may end up enshrining the left in power for a long time to come. Other views will certainly not disappear in America. But, again, how important is that when the power to set law and customs resides in the hands of one side?

So, yes, Turkey will remain in large part a secular country but that will not determine public or foreign policy. As for NATO, the Turkish regime is accepting NATO support in order to promote an Islamist regime in Syria. Let’s also remember that the revolutionaries in Libya accepted NATO backing and those in Syria would quickly do so if it were available. Both of these groups include large Islamist elements.

As for Cagaptay’s second argument, he writes:

“Countries such as Egypt lack Turkey’s institutional westernization experience and constitutionally-mandated secular heritage, and are therefore more susceptible to thorough Islamization. In Turkey, Islamization will be tempered by the unique heritage of institutional and structural westernization. This has ushered in a blend of Western ways and Islamist politics — a first anywhere in the world.”

True. But this makes me think of two Arab countries with a somewhat similar profile, Tunisia and Lebanon. Both countries are ruled by Islamists, the former by the Muslim Brotherhood, the latter largely by Hizballah. They might also be seen as blends. Even in Egypt, the secularists will not disappear. Yet they, too, are likely to be powerless. In Egypt’s presidential election, only 52 percent voted for the Muslim Brotherhood in the second round. Even in the first round the Islamist candidates got around two-thirds, the same as in Turkey’s election.

The point is that if a radical movement seizes control of the state, even by elections, and can hold it for a very long time, it can fundamentally transform policies and foreign policy. If they stay in power long enough they might even change the country’s political culture. If a minority of secularists remain but, for example, are also intimidated by threats and encouraged to conform by the offer of government benefits, it’s still a revolution.

Turkey will remain Turkey; Egypt, Egypt; Lebanon, Lebanon; and so on. But they will nevertheless be very different for their own people, pose tremendous challenges for Western interests, and basically change the nature of the Middle East.

Incidentally, Erdogan recently unleashed his police on the students of the Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara where I once spent a very enjoyable semester teaching. No previous government in Turkey could have gotten away with such a violent action against students not threatening any violence. See here, here and here

And for the best article about the struggle for power between Islamists and moderates in Tunisia, see this superb article by Bruce Maddy-Weitzman here. He concludes:

“Tunisia’s political and economic prospects, and with it the secular-Islamist partnership which had guided Tunisia for nearly a year, appeared increasingly fragile. To be sure, the underlying rationale that had resulted in the partnership still existed. The fact that Tunisia’s primary Islamist movement was relatively “soft”, in comparison to sister movements elsewhere, had rendered it more amenable to cooperating with secular forces. Tunisia’s fragmented secular camp, while certainly militant in its desire to protect the Bourguiba-modernist legacy and suspicious of the Islamists, was similarly desirous of avoiding a ruinous confrontation with the Islamists which would destabilize the country beyond repair. Tunisia’s neighbors, in this case Egypt and Libya, continued to provide examples of what to avoid. But the public sphere appeared increasingly polarized, and the way forward in the process of institution-building appeared murky, which did not bode well for the future. Tunisia had made important strides in its democratization experiment but, as with all such cases, there was no guarantee that it would culminate in a functioning, institutionalized democracy. Olivier Roy’s argument that Arabs can become democrats without becoming secularists or liberals, and that, indeed, the new context of Arab society is mandating exactly such a circumstance, may well apply in Tunisia. But it will hardly be a democracy that the country’s secular-Left camp will find easy to digest, let alone be enthralled with, thus ensuring that Tunisia’s political life will be messy and contentious for years to come.

March 16, 2013
Turkey’s Distinctive Brew

Soner Cagaptay

Also available in العربية

The Atlantic

December 11, 2012

Don’t look to Ankara to be a model for the new Islamist governments of the Arab Spring.

It is 5 a.m. in Istanbul, and I am looking for coffee. Having arrived in Istanbul’s old city the night before and seriously jetlagged, I decided to walk into the Eyup quarter, which hosts Istanbul’s most sacred mosque, Eyup Sultan. I hoped the revered shrine, which attracts early morning worshippers, would have an open coffee shop nearby, and I was right. As prayers ended, I watched Eyup’s worshipers flow from the mosque, sipping a bland cup of instant coffee, unaware I was about to be treated to an experience of cultural flavor unique to Turkey.

A large group of Salafists, with their trademark trimmed beards and kaftans, walked out of the mosque, heading to my coffee shop. What happened next is a lesson in Turkey’s distinctive direction compared to its Muslim neighbors: The Salafist men ordered coffee and Turkish bagels (simit) from the barista, a young woman sporting a tattoo and sleeveless shirt. Neither the exchange between the barista and the Salafists, laden with polite honorifics and formal Turkish speech, nor their body language, suggested tensions between the two opposing visions of Turkey brought into close encounter for me to witness.

As this encounter so succinctly encapsulates, Turkey’s two halves are like oil and water; though they may not blend, neither will disappear. Turkey’s Islamization is a fact, but so is secular and Westernized Turkey. But the historical roots and current manifestations of this synthesis indicate that it is a model that will be difficult to replicate elsewhere in the region, as Islamist governments rise to power after the Arab Spring.

Starting with the late 18th century, Turkey went through two centuries of societal and structural Westernization under the Ottoman sultans, a unique experience among Muslim societies to this day. The Ottomans considered their state a European one, and borrowed European institutions, setting up women’s colleges and building secular schools and courts, to catch up with the continent. Enter young Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who imbibed the secular mindset in such Ottoman schools. The sultans’ rule was followed by eight decades of constitutional secularism installed by Ataturk during the 20th century. This campaign, unique among Muslim-majority Middle East societies, mandated strict separation of religion, government, and education.

Since coming to power in 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, rooted in Islamism, has challenged these premises, and the firewall between religion, politics, and education has collapsed. The result has been a rising tide of Islamization in Turkey. Take for example, a recent law that mandates the teaching of religion in public schools for nine-year-old children. What is more, Turkey now has a different identity. It considers itself Middle Eastern, rather than European, and views other Muslim countries as brother nations. This is a far cry from Ataturk’s vision that viewed Turkey as a European country, only accidentally placed in the Middle East.

Turkey’s Islamization is old news. But what is new — as demonstrated by my encounter at the coffee shop — is that such Islamization is taking place within the constraints of pre-existing and institutionalized Westernization, a feature unique to Turkey among its Muslim neighbors in the Middle East. The country is so thoroughly westernized that even the AKP and its Islamist elites cannot escape trappings of their Western mold. From the role of women in society, to the country’s membership in the NATO alliance, Turkey’s western legacy is an insurmountable fact. Perhaps most importantly, it is Turkey’s embrace of liberal economics that has driven the AKP to the top in the first place.

Regardless of how Islamicized Turkey becomes, it will be impossible to take women out of the public space. Women’s participation in public life, so deeply engrained in secularist Turkey, is also a trademark of the new Turkey. Consider Turkey’s first lady Hayrunnisa Gul, the wife of President Abdullah Gul. The Turkish first lady has a very public presence, runs her own policy initiatives, and her website appears to be a mirror image of the White House website set up for Michelle Obama.

When it comes to the country’s foreign policy orientation, Turkey’s Islamization is meeting its match as well. To be sure, the new Turkey does not consider itself a de facto member of the Western world, but neither does it consider itself antithetical to the West, as it did until a few years ago. This point was underlined during Turkey’s recent debate on deploying NATO Patriot missiles on Turkish territory against Syria. This happened without significant domestic opposition: The Turks have lived with NATO too long to think outside of its box.

This is where Turkey’s structural Westernization — its institutional connections to the West and its adoptions of Western ways — makes a difference compared to other Muslim-majority societies in the region. It is hard to imagine that NATO presence would be so welcome in other Muslim majority countries. Even the most diehard Islamists in Turkey had reason to support the NATO alliance because it is what protected Turkey against “godless” communism.

As a Muslim country that takes NATO seriously, the new Turkey’s foreign policy falls somewhere between Ataturk’s Turkey and the AKP’s vision. Regional instability has made Turkey’s access to NATO a valuable asset, hence Ankara’s pivot towards Washington and away from the lofty notion of Muslim solidarity. This has been most significantly demonstrated by Turkey’s 2010 decision to join NATO’s missile defense project that aims to protect alliance members against missiles coming from Iran, hardly an expression of solidarity with a Muslim nation. The civil war in Syria has accelerated Ankara’s run for cover under NATO’s embrace: when Damascus shot down a Turkish place in June, Turkey swiftly asked the Western alliance to come to its assistance. Further unrest in the Middle East and competition against Iran in Iraq and Syria will only increase Ankara’s pivot towards the United States and NATO.

All this suggests that Turkey’s Islamization is bound by the country’s deep-rooted and institutional traditions of Westernization, as well as continued regional instability. Accordingly, Turkey and its Muslim neighbors in the Middle East may be heading in different directions. Countries such as Egypt lack Turkey’s institutional westernization experience and constitutionally-mandated secular heritage, and are therefore more susceptible to thorough Islamization. In Turkey, Islamization will be tempered by the unique heritage of institutional and structural westernization. This has ushered in a blend of Western ways and Islamist politics — a first anywhere in the world.

Sheer numbers require this culture of co-existence, if not tolerance, to take root. In the most recent 2011 elections, the AKP received nearly 50 percent of the vote. Excluding the 15 percent of the voters that supported other Islamist and conservative parties, 35 percent of the population, totaling twenty-five million people, did not vote for the AKP. These voters stand for secularism, and they will never buy into the religious movement in Turkey. This block will constitute the domestic limitation of Turkey’s Islamization. After ten years in power, and likely to run the country for another term with a humming economy boosting its support, the AKP is making Turkey in its own image. But the new Turkey will have a uniquely distinct flavor: a bit Islamist, a bit secularist, a bit conservative, and a bit Western.

Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute.

March 16, 2013
Turkey can be a global power, not just a Muslim power

By Soner Cagaptay

March 6, 2013, 4:21 p.m.

Turkish Airlines’ ascent exemplifies the new and economically rising Turkey. (Associated Press / July 2, 2012)

Turkey is rising. In the last decade, the country’s economy has nearly trebled in size. Just 10 years ago, the average Turk had one-fifth the income of the average European. Today, Turks are only 30% less wealthy than European Union citizens. Given Europe’s financial doldrums, Turkey could catch up in the coming years and realize its 4-centuries-old dream of becoming a great power again.

But on the political front, Turkey is still a mixed bag. The nation is vacillating between becoming a global power or taking a parochial path under the governing Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) straitjacket of conservatism.

In years past, following the vision of its founder, Kemal Ataturk, Turkey exercised a strict version of secularism, mandating no religion in government. But lately, with the rise of the AKP, the firewall between politics and religion has become porous, with Turkish society flooded by government-led social conservatism. For example, the AKP recently passed legislation mandating religious education in public schools starting at fourth grade.

Or take the case of Turkish Airlines, a publicly owned company whose ascent exemplifies the new and economically rising Turkey. The airline flies to more than 200 destinations from its hub in Istanbul, up from about 75 in 2002. It twice has been voted Europe’s best airline. As a frequent flier on the carrier for decades, I remember when the flights were full of Turkish families and businessmen. Today, they are full of Europeans flying to Istanbul for connections across Turkey and Eurasia.

But even as Turkey’s supercharged economy propels the airline forward, parochial conservatism is pulling it in another direction. The company recently announced that it will ban alcohol from most of its domestic flights. If Turkish Airlines aspires to be a global brand, it needs to stop acting like the Muslim airline for a Muslim country.

The same can be said for Turkey as a rising power. Turkey needs to convert its potential into actual political weight. To this end, Ankara has to forge a truly global identity that transcends its affinities with co-religionists. In recent years, with civil war in Syria next door and competition against Iran in Iraq heating up, Ankara has moved closer to the United States and NATO. But Turkey is still tempted by the desire to cast itself as purely a Muslim power that has sway over the Muslim Middle East.

Turkey’s economic rise over the last decade should have taught its leaders that turning parochial is not a recipe for success. Its economic miracle has been driven by a blend of political stability, European and American money, and access to emerging markets and Muslim-majority economies. Only by striking this balance has Turkey been able to accomplish what none of its Muslim-majority neighbors has managed so far. And if Ankara can now repeat this pattern in politics — embracing its Muslim identity while providing political stability in its neighborhood and maintaining strong ties with Europe and the United States — this would truly fulfill the promise of an ascendant Turkey.

Turkey’s regional ambitions also would be best served by restoring this delicate blend of Western affiliations and Muslim identity. For its Muslim-majority neighbors, Turkey’s value lies in the fact that it has been able to bring something more to the table while maintaining its Muslim character. Take, for instance, how Saudi Arabia viewed the Turkey of the late 2000s, before it struck this balance: a nation isolated from NATO and Washington that had begun to resemble a wealthy Yemen — a large, prosperous Muslim nation that did little to enhance regional security.

Turkey can regain its uniqueness, but only if it revitalizes its ties with the West. Access to NATO hardware — which proved crucial with the recent NATO Patriot missile deployment in southern Turkey against Syria — and close ties with Washington endow Ankara with unique and respected regional assets.

From Washington’s perspective, Turkey is at its best when it can engage in dialogue with all sides in the region’s intractable conflicts. This is why Ankara would be well served to rebuild ties with Israel, so it can talk to both Israelis and Palestinians, as well as engage with the diverse elements of post-revolutionary Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. Ankara also needs to build ties with all groups in the Syrian opposition, not just the Muslim Brotherhood, if it wants to be a player in a post-Assad Syria.

To complete its rise, Turkey needs to nurture a liberal political culture at home, ending the debilitating culture wars between the AKP’s supporters and opponents.

This question has even greater currency now that the country is considering its first civilian constitution. If this new charter outlines the groundwork of true liberal democracy — for instance, providing for freedom of religion as well as freedom from religion — AKP supporters and opponents alike could feel welcome.

A new liberal social contract would allow Turkey to enter the ranks of globally respected powers, as well as focus its energy overseas rather than being bogged down in domestic polarization.

Soner Cagaptay, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is the author of the forthcoming “Turkey Rising: 21st Century’s First Muslim Power.” Follow him on Twitter @sonercagaptay

Copyright © 2013, Los Angeles Times

via Turkey can be a global power, not just a Muslim power – latimes.com.

March 7, 2013
Talking Turkey

From left, Anthony Beyer, Dr. Soner Cagaptay and Vanessa Beyer at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy briefing in Palm Beach. (Submitted photo / February 20, 2013)

By Shani McManus, Staff Writer

2:26 p.m. EST, February 20, 2013

The strategic position of Turkey, its relationship with Israel, the United States, and its neighbors, was the topic of conversation when The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Beyer Family Fellow, Dr. Soner Cagaptay, addressed organization leadership at a recent briefing in Palm Beach.

Cagaptay, a respected source of analysis on Turkey’s foreign policy and relations with the United States, also touched on the growing tensions with Syria regarding sectarian spillover and cross-border shelling. In an interview with the Jewish Journal, he talked about the tenuous relationship between Israel and Turkey.

“I think that the relationship is at a crucial point,” Cagaptay said. “Both countries want to repair ties, but if ties are not repaired in the short-term, the unfriendly nature of the relationship will persist, and the relationship could enter a chronically downward spiral.”

A prolific author who has written extensively on U.S.-Turkish relations, Turkish domestic politics and Turkish nationalism and frequent commentator in the media, Cagaptay said the new Turkey is “a blend of old Turkey,” when the Turks considered their country to be European, “and the AKP’s vision,” which sees the country as Middle Eastern.

“Israel’s challenge is to understand that the old Turkey is not coming back and decide on the kind of relationship it wants with the new Turkey,” he said. “The new Turkey desires to become a Middle East power, but Ankara cannot become a Middle East power unless it can talk to all sides in the region, that includes the Israelis.”

Looking at the future, Cagaptay noted, this suggests that when Turkish-Israeli ties are restored, they will “not look like the bilateral ties of the 1990s,” when the relationship was shaped by affinity and agreement at almost all levels.

“Rather, the future relationship will likely be defined by overlapping security interest, such as in Syria, but also disagreements, such as on Hamas,” he said.

The well-attended briefing event at Palm Beach’s Cafe Boloud was hosted by Vanessa and Anthony Beyer, who are involved in numerous civic and charitable causes, including the Norton Museum of Art and the Israel Museum. The Palm Beach businessman and philanthropist and his wife established the Washington Institute’s Beyer Family fellowship to support the organization’s work in the study of contemporary Turkish politics and Turkey-U.S. relations.

“Turkey’s importance as a regional power and NATO member has only increased in light of the changes sweeping across the Middle East,” Anthony Beyer said. “It is our hope that this fellowship enables Dr. Cagaptay to expand the well-respected analysis that has made him a trusted resource for governments, academia and the media.”

Beyer said many people who attended the briefing were “very informed” about what’s been happening in Turkey. “The fact that a once-secular society has gone to an Islamist-secular one has people very concerned,” he said.

A third-generation member of the Washington Institute, Beyer noted that he’s “not been able to find another organization that has been able to have such an impact on policy makers to promote a sound peace policy in the Middle East.

For more information about The Washington Institute, call Jeanne Epstein at 561-328-9033 or visit

Copyright © 2013, South Florida Sun-Sentinel

via Talking Turkey – South Florida Sun-Sentinel.com.

February 22, 2013
Can Turkey seize the ‘Kurdish card’ for itself?

By Soner Cagaptay, Special to CNN

Editor’s note: Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. His publications include the forthcoming book ‘Turkey Rising: The 21st Century’s First Muslim Power.’ The views expressed are his own.

Turkey’s Syria policy now seems to have one goal: take down the al-Assad regime. With this in mind, Ankara has become actively involved in the Syrian uprising, supporting the opposition and allegedly allowing weapons to flow into Syria to help oust Bashar al-Assad. But not everyone vying for power in post-al-Assad Syria has welcomed Turkey’s helping hand.

Enter the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Ankara’s archenemy for decades. The PKK and its Syrian franchise, the Party for Democratic Unity (PYD), which holds sway over the Syrian Kurds, have recently secured parts of northern Syria adjacent to Turkey. This suggests that when the al-Assad regime falls, Turkey will be confronted with PKK and PYD-run enclaves across from its border with Syria.

As hostile as the PKK has been towards Ankara, though, the PKK cannot afford to carry this menacing anti-Turkish attitude into Syria. After al-Assad is gone, the Syrian Kurds represented in the PYD will discover that they are fated to become woefully dependent on Ankara for survival, much like the Iraqi Kurds were after the end of the Saddam regime in Iraq.

Simple geography dictates this. The PYD holds sway among the Syrian Kurds in the northwestern part of that country. These Kurdish-dominated areas are non-contiguous enclaves, surrounded by Arab majority areas with Turkey to the north. One emerging battle in Syria is conflict between Arabs and Kurds. When that struggle fully unfolds, the Kurds in northwestern Syria will have no friend but Turkey to rely on as leverage against that country’s majority Arabs. This will present the PKK in Syria with a stark choice: fight both Turkey and the Arabs on all four sides and perish, or rely on Turkey to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the country’s Arab majority. Survival will require the second path, and as surreal as it sounds now, the PKK’s Syrian branch will acquiesce to Turkish power.

More from GPS: Why U.S. should rethink Syria Kurds policy

This corresponds to a seismic shift in Turkey’s Kurdish policy. Until recently, Ankara had seen the “Kurdish card” in the region as a threat to its core interests. Now, this appears to be changing. Ankara has reportedly built intimate commercial and political ties with the Iraqi Kurds. Now, Ankara wants something similar with the Syrian Kurds. If the PKK in Syria is deft enough to curry favor with Ankara, Ankara will return the favor.

The Turkish Kurds are the last piece of the puzzle. If recently announced peace talks between the Ankara government and jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan succeed, Turkey may be able to turn the “Kurdish card” to its favor.

If the peace talks go as planned, PKK members will lay down their weapons. In return, Turkey would issue a blanket amnesty to the group’s core membership currently located at the Kandil enclave in northern Iraq, and possibly grant some cultural rights to its Kurdish population. And Ocalan, who has been in solitary confinement in an island jail, will see an end to his isolation.

Still, the Syrian Kurds in the PKK’s Kandil enclave in mountainous northern Iraq could spoil this process. Many among the PKK’s membership, especially those from Turkey, will listen to Ocalan. But some hardline leaders could refuse to buy into what they might perceive as a personal deal to set himself free.

All this means that while the PKK in Syria will moderate its behavior towards Turkey because it has to, the Syrian Kurds in the PKK will likely maintain a hardline stance against Ankara.

Turkey may be able to preempt such a scenario by showing the Kurds in Syria a degree of friendship that exceeds even the outreach it has shown to the Iraqi Kurds. Such a strategy might help placate the animosity of the Syrian Kurds in Kandil towards Ankara, though it will not fix the problem.

For now, it appears that while the PKK in Syria will not bite Turkey, Syrian Kurds in the Kandil enclave will remain the biggest hurdle to Turkey being able to claim the Kurdish card for itself.

Post by: CNN’s Jason Miks

via Can Turkey seize the ‘Kurdish card’ for itself? – Global Public Square – CNN.com Blogs.

February 7, 2013
Is Turkey Finally Ready to Make Peace with the Kurds?

Why Prime Minister Erdogan is willing to compromise

Turkish riot police stand guard outside the French Consulate during a protest against the killing of three Kurdish activists, in central Istanbul January 11, 2013. (Murad Sezer/Reuters)

Last week’s massive funeral in Turkey of three Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) activists killed in Paris last week speaks volumes about the PKK’s appeal among the Turkish Kurds in Turkey’s southeast.

Turkey recently entered peace talks with the PKK, and if these talks succeed, they could bring an end to the bitterest aspects of the four-decade-old conflict between Ankara and the group. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems determined to achieve a settlement with the PKK, if for no other reason than that brokering a peace deal will effectively eliminate the last hurdle to achieve his goal of getting elected as the country’s next president in 2014.

Turkey has engaged in talks with the PKK before, but they were always in secret. This time, however, Erdogan is comfortable going public with the negotiations, suggesting that he is confident that the talks will succeed. This optimism most probably stems from the predicament of his counterpart, the PKK’s jailed founder and leader Abdullah Ocalan, who was caught by Turkish security forces, with U.S. assistance, in 1999, and sent to solitary confinement after standing trial. Ocalan, who has spent over a decade by himself on the Imrali island jail in the middle of the Marmara Sea, is aching to go free, and hence wants to strike a deal with Erdogan.

Such an agreement would involve a “ceasefire” between the Turkish government and the PKK, after which the PKK would pull its estimated 3,000 members out of Turkey. The PKK would then disarm. Next, Turkey would allow the PKK’s top leadership to find a home in Europe while the group’s rank and file would be allowed to return to Turkey and integrate into civilian life and politics.

In return, Ocalan would get his freedom, most likely entering house arrest. Even if Erdogan publically denies he will make this concession, the writing is on the wall.

For Erdogan to maximize his gains from the deal, the PKK needs not only to lay down its arms, but also to stay quiet. Fighting with the PKK has resulted in over 900 deaths since August 2011, according to a tally by the International Crisis Group, constituting the heaviest toll on Turkey in more than a decade.

This makes PKK violence the salient political challenge for Erdogan. The Turkish prime minister has almost all the pieces in place to be elected as the country’s next president. He has defanged the once staunchly secularist Turkish military, eliminated many elements of Turkey’s secular state, and neutralized the formerly anti-AKP business community and media. Still, Erdogan is not guaranteed to surpass 50 percent of the popular vote in the presidential race, and more PKK attacks will only pull him further from this mark. Hence, Erdogan needs the PKK to stay quiet during the run-up to the country’s election in 2014.

Another factor suggests that these talks may work. This time, Erdogan has chosen the PKK as his negotiating counterpart rather than the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), the political wing of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey. The PKK is the mother ship of Kurdish nationalism in the country, out of which the BDP was born. This is essentially the reverse of the Irish case, wherein the IRA was born out of Sinn Fein. So for Ireland, talks with the Sinn Fein made sense, whereas in Turkey, the PKK runs the show.

Peace between Ankara and the PKK would have ramifications beyond Turkey. Ankara’s support for the Syrian uprising has not been entirely successful, due in some part to the fact that Ankara abhors the PKK presence among the Kurds in Syria. This has become a wedge issue between Turkey and the Syrian Kurdish opposition. A Turkish-PKK rapprochement could pave the way for better ties between Ankara and the broader Syrian opposition by bringing the Syrian Kurds into the fold.

The stumbling blocks are many, however. PKK hardliners, including the group’s seasoned leaders such as Cemil Bayik and Duran Kalkan, might refuse to buy into Ocalan’s personal deal to set himself free. This leadership is committed to the maximalist political goals of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey: the formation of a separate Kurdish state. What is more, Bayik and Kalkan are known to be close to Iran, and Tehran does not want to see a Turkey-PKK deal now. Ever since Ankara threw its lot behind the Syrian uprising in late 2011, Iran has encouraged the PKK to punish Turkey for its stance against Assad. If the PKK disarms, Iran will be deprived of this lever.

Even if Ocalan delivers the large parts of the PKK under a peace deal, splinters from this group will likely remain committed to fighting Turkey, and they will enjoy support from Iran. Just as radicals broke away from the IRA after the peace deal in Northern Ireland, forming the “Real IRA” and continuing to fight the British government, a “Real PKK” could arise.

Unless Ankara’s deal with Ocalan includes substantial cultural and political rights for the country’s Kurds, such as Kurdish language education, a potential “Real PKK” would find some support among the Kurds in Turkey. In other words, Turkey’s terror problem would not disappear, although it would become a smaller threat. This is still better for Turkey than the alternative. Importantly, this might be all that Erdogan needs to get elected as Turkey’s next president in 2014. But this will require outmaneuvering PKK splinters and their Iranian patrons.

via Is Turkey Finally Ready to Make Peace with the Kurds? – Soner Cagaptay – The Atlantic.

January 24, 2013