Turkish Forum

Tag: Soli Özel

  • A Turkey-Israel Opening

    A Turkey-Israel Opening

    By SOLI OZEL and CHARLES A. KUPCHAN

    During his recent visit to Israel, President Barack Obama pulled off a major breakthrough in relations between Israel and Turkey. After forging very close ties during the 1990s, Jerusalem and Ankara have of late gone their separate ways. The estrangement peaked as a result of Israel’s 2010 interdiction of the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish ship that was attempting to break the blockade of the Gaza Strip. The Israeli operation resulted in the death of nine activists on board the vessel. The Turkish government was incensed, and an Istanbul court went on to indict four Israeli commanders allegedly responsible for the mission.

    On March 22, Obama succeeded in orchestrating a phone call from Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, to his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Netanyahu apologized for the loss of life on the Mavi Marmara, a gesture that sets the stage for the repair of relations between the two countries.

    This breakthrough, however, is only a tentative beginning; the rupture between Israel and Turkey runs deep. Unless Netanyahu’s apology is followed by a robust action plan for rekindling cooperation between the two countries, the current opening will prove nothing more than a fleeting flirtation.

    For the better part of a decade, Turkey and Israel have been growing apart politically. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party has Islamist leanings; confrontation with Israel is part of its popular appeal. The A.K.P. caters to a more conservative and religious cross-section of the Turkish electorate than the secular governments that preceded it. Indeed, Erdogan has undermined the political strength of Turkey’s traditional power base: the business elite and the military. The Turkish military has long had strong ties to Israel’s security establishment, meaning that its diminished domestic influence has weakened one of the main institutional linkages between Turkey and Israel.

    Meanwhile, Israeli politics has been undergoing its own transformation. Netanyahu has presided over a rightward shift in the Israeli electorate, producing governments committed to expanding Israeli settlements on the West Bank. By diminishing the prospects for a two-state solution, this stance has alienated the Turkish government as well as its electoral base. Iran’s nuclear program and the turmoil arising from the Arab Awakening have contributed to a siege mentality among many Israelis, weakening moderates who lament Israel’s growing international isolation.

    With Turkish and Israeli politics heading in opposite directions, a meaningful and lasting repair of relations will be an uphill battle. Especially when it comes to the peace process and the fate of the Palestinians, Ankara and Jerusalem are miles apart. Turning back the clock is impossible; the traditional Turkish and Israeli constituencies in favor of strong ties are today too weak. Instead, a new partnership must be built from the ground up.

    The new partnership should rest on three pillars, all of which entail concrete acts of cooperation.

    First, Turkey and Israel should closely coordinate their efforts to contain the conflict in Syria and facilitate the prompt downfall of the Assad regime. Ankara and Jerusalem should share intelligence, team up to prevent arms flows to Hezbollah and other extremist groups, and work together to aid the Syrian opposition.

    Over the horizon, Israel has a strong interest in securing a post-Assad Syria in which Turkey enjoys broad sway. The likely alternatives are chaos or a regime under the influence of radical forces. In the meantime, Israeli willingness to host Syrian refugees would improve its standing throughout the region.

    Second, Turkey and Israel should further deepen their economic linkages, nurturing new constituencies in favor of a lasting rapprochement. Even since the Mavi Marmara incident, trade and investment between the two countries have continued to expand, a clear sign that private sectors on both sides are hungry for more commerce. Flights between Turkey and Israel are increasing in number. Jerusalem has also broached with Ankara a proposal to build an underwater pipeline from new Israeli gas fields in the Mediterranean to Turkey, affording Israel access to Europe’s lucrative energy market. Such joint projects would provide a firmer societal foundation for political reconciliation.

    Third, Turkey and Israel, with support from the United States and the European Union, should launch a regional forum to address urgent issues of common concern, such as the violence in Syria, its implications for Lebanon and Iraq, and Iran’s nuclear program. Egypt should be at the table, and drawing Cairo into this forum would help anchor the country’s new leadership in regularized regional engagement. Israeli movement on the Palestinian peace process would help immeasurably in improving the prospects for constructive dialogue.

    Progress on these three fronts is urgent. Netanyahu and Erdogan are both taking political risks by reaching out to each other. Their bold stroke may come to naught unless it is followed up by demonstrable cooperation between their two countries.

    Charles Kupchan is a professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Soli Ozel is a lecturer at Kadir Has University and a columnist for the newspaper Haberturk.

    A version of this op-ed appeared in print on April 2, 2013, in The International Herald Tribune.

    via A Turkey-Israel Opening – NYTimes.com.

  • Why Turkey would still benefit from EU Accession

    Soli Ozel

    While the EU continues to work toward a solution to the eurozone crisis, Turkey has experienced a period of strong economic growth. Soli Özel argues that although Turkey’s interest in EU membership has declined in the wake of the crisis, the country could still gain substantial benefits from European integration. The crisis may also have a positive effect for Turkey if it produces a more flexible arrangement in the EU’s structure, potentially opening the door for the country’s accession.

    During a recent TV interview, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan jokingly referred to a conversation he had with Russian President Vladimir Putin: following questions from Putin regarding Turkey’s desire to enter the EU, Erdogan replied “Include us in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization then we might give up on the EU”. A quip is a quip, but in the context of the EU’s declining appeal for and influence over Turkey it is worth taking note of.

    Officially Turkey’s quest for EU membership continues. The Minister for EU Affairs, Egemen Bagis, spends a lot of time and energy to keep the flame alive even if, at times, he cannot conceal his exasperation with his European counterparts. The Minister also has a hard time, like the rest of his cabinet colleagues, defending Turkey’s recent record on freedom of expression and freedom of the press as well as many of the outlandish, if not outrageous, court decisions that make a mockery of the concept of the “rule of law”. Rare are the moments these days when the possibility of EU membership provides the framework for debate on any big political issue. Apart from the die-hard integrationists, who have a difficult time finding an audience for the EU process, membership related issues are of little if any interest to the Turkish public.

    Undoubtedly the deep political crisis of the EU, going beyond the eurozone crisis, accounts for much of the sagging interest in becoming a member of a not-so-attractive club. However, the disenchantment of the Turkish public with the EU preceded the severe economic crisis that shook the Union at its core. In Turkey’s view, the EU’s handling of Cyprus and the French determination to block the process at all costs, was widely seen as not giving the Turkish candidacy a fair shake. As the Turkish economy performed beyond expectations and the country prospered while new markets were being explored, the importance of the EU in Turkey’s economic growth seemed to recede.

    On political matters, Turkey moved on some of its most pressing issues, such as the Kurdish problem, mainly independently of the accession process. In the meantime, with the EU’s complacence, Turkish democracy began to suffer setbacks although the process of demilitarization/civilianization went forcefully ahead. Furthermore, the developments in the Middle East that culminated in the profound transformative turbulence of the Arab Spring greatly elevated Turkey’s profile as a consequential actor in the developments in the region. As geopolitical considerations moved to the fore and Turkey had to rejuvenate its alliance relations following the failure of its high profile engagement with Iran, Turkish-American relations became closer.

    Most everything that happens in the European Union affects Turkey. The current cooling of relations does not change this essential fact. It is also true that the lure of the European Union today is much weaker given its economic predicament. Turkey by itself created more private sector jobs in the past five years than all the EU states put together. The Turkish public undoubtedly has a strong feeling of Schadenfreude but still it is remarkable that support for EU membership does not fall below 40 per cent. Particularly in light of the fact that the EU reneged on promises given to the Turkish part of Cyprus, and that some EU members have been crass and behaved improperly towards Turkey.

    The EU’s crisis arguably stemmed from the paradox of “economic integration/political fragmentation”. If and when it manages to finally overcome the crisis, the nature of the Union and its structure will be different and possibly will reflect a more flexible arrangement. Despite enviable economic performances and a rising geopolitical profile, the benefits that Turkey would draw from continuing integration with the EU are not exhausted. In particular, the developments of the past five years have shown that the aspirational force of EU membership, as well as the disciplining framework of the Copenhagen criteria (Hungary’s current politics notwithstanding) is essential for the deepening and further institutionalization of Turkish democracy.

    Similarly, if the current crisis leads to a more flexible arrangement in the Union’s structure, absorbing a country the size of Turkey might be easier, giving an opportunity for EU members to re-evaluate the Turkish file. The economic, political, and strategic benefits of further integration are there for all to see. In addition, EU-Turkey relations could easily move forward if they too reflected a more flexible arrangement, even if the member states’ politics do not inspire much confidence for such farsighted and imaginative openings on the part of the Union. Ultimately, the record of European history still allows one to hope for a breakthrough.

    This article is based on the German Marshall Fund paper Turkey and the European Sclerosis and was first published by EUROPP@LSE

    via Why Turkey would still benefit from EU Accession — Social Europe Journal.

  • What does Turkey think?

    What does Turkey think?

    Understanding the new Turkey from within

    “What does Turkey think?” is a collection of nine essays by Turkish experts and political figures from different backgrounds – Islamists, secularists, Kurds and liberals. The essays examine how questions of identity, democratisation and Ankara’s evolving foreign policy are seen from within the new Turkey.

    turkeysideThe authors of “What does Turkey think?” are Dimitar Bechev, Mustafa Akyol, Ayşe Kadıoğlu, Orhan Miroğlu, Şahin Alpay, Hakan Altinay, Osman Baydemir, Ibrahim Kalın, Atila Eralp, Zerrin Torun, Suat Kınıklıoğlu, Soli Özel and Ivan Krastev.

    “What does Turkey think?” was made possible by the support of Stiftung Mercator, and is a collaboration between ECFR, Stiftung Mercator, the Sofia-based Centre for Liberal Studies (CLS) and the Istanbul-based Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM).

    There are three key areas of public discussion:

    1. Can the new Turkey deal with its internal diversity, reconcile historical tensions and heal deep wounds?

    2. Is Turkey moving in the direction of consolidating democratic achievements, or is it threatened by a populist tyranny of the majority or even authoritarian rule?

    3. Why is Turkey acting independently of the West, and is it a partner or rival for the EU and US, particularly in its own neighbourhood?

    Many Turks feel alienated by the EU’s increasing reluctance to admit Turkey as a member. As a result the EU is absent from many internal Turkish debates, although it still matters in crucial ways:

    * In identity politics the EU may help Turkey reconcile its internal differences, for instance in finding a peaceful solution for the Kurdish issue.

    * The EU has helped to anchor domestic Turkish democratisation and now has the potential to allay fears that the power of the AKP is unchecked as a new constitution is drafted.

    * The EU remains vital for Turkish economic success, thanks to its proximity and the heavy connectedness with Europe’s massive internal market. Although Turkey has been growing quickly, it cannot compete with East Asian labour costs and needs Europe as it tries to move up the value chain and develop a modern knowledge-driven economy.

    * Turkey’s attractiveness to neighbours in the Middle East benefits from its close economic and political ties with Europe.

    Download the PDF of “What does Turkey think?” here

    Click here for more ECFR work on Turkey, including articles, blog posts and a range of podcasts.

    “Turkey is now an actor, an economic pole, and perhaps an aspiring regional hegemon. Shunned by the EU, Turkey has paradoxically become more like it: globalised, economically liberal and democratic.”

    Dimitar Bechev, editor and ECFR senior policy fellow.

    “The new dynamism in Turkish foreign policy over the last decade has prompted a range of questions. To answer such questions, one needs to understand the changes in Turkish domestic politics, in surrounding regions and in the global order over the first decade of the 21st century.”

    Ibrahim Kalın, Senior Advisor to Prime Minister Erdogan on foreign policy and public diplomacy.

    Background:

    * GDP per capita (PPP) was $14,243 in 2010, compared to around $6,000 a decade earlier. Its GDP is expected to average 4% growth per year over the next decade.

    * Turkey’s economy is the 16th largest in the world, and the 6th largest in Europe.

    * The EU accounts for 40.5% of Turkish imports (€40.5 billion) and 45.9% of exports (€33.6 billion). It is also the source of 80% of FDI into Turkey.

    * The AKP is expected to win a third term in power in this June’s parliamentary elections. The opposition CHP (People’s Republican Party) is also likely to perform strongly, thanks to its new leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and its shift towards social democracy while still playing the role of guardian of Kemalism.

    * The economy, constitutional change, the Kurdish question and democratic consolidation are all key electoral issues.

    Notes:

    * This paper, like all ECFR publications, represents the views of its authors, not the collective position of ECFR or its Council Members.

    * “What does Turkey think?” is part of a series of studies carried out by ECFR to explore the internal debates of other powers in an increasingly multipolar world at the level of ideas as well as power. This publication follows the same methodology as ECFR’s earlier project on “What does Russia think?”, and ECFR director Mark Leonard’s book “What does China think?”

    via The European Council on Foreign Relations | What does Turkey think?.