Tag: Shiite-Sunni conflict

  • Iraq Accuses Turkey of Meddling

    Iraq Accuses Turkey of Meddling

    By JOE PARKINSON in Istanbul and SAM DAGHER in Erbil, Iraq

    Iraq summoned Turkey’s ambassador on Monday to protest what it called Ankara’s meddling in Iraqi politics, the latest sign of a rising rift between Sunni Turkey and its Shiite neighbors.

    Iraq’s government was angered by recent warnings from Turkish leaders that Sunni-Shiite tensions in Iraq could engulf the entire Islamic world, as well as by Turkey’s support for a Sunni rival to Iraq’s Shiite prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki.

    “Turkey interferes by backing certain political figures and blocs” in Iraq, Mr. Maliki told The Wall Street Journal last month. “I believe Turkey is unqualified to intervene in the region’s flash points.” In a weekend interview with Arabic language Al-Hurra TV station, Mr. Maliki went further. “Unfortunately, Turkey is playing a role that could lead to a catastrophe or civil war in the region,” he said.

    Iraqi officials were particularly angered by public Turkish comments on the case of Tariq al-Hashemi, Iraq’s Sunni vice president. Mr. Hashemi took refuge in Kurdish-ruled northern Iraq late last year, after the government accused him of leading death squads against Shiites.

    But analysts say the rapid deterioration of relations between Ankara and Baghdad also reflects the wider conflicting interests of Sunni Turkey and Shiite Iran in the wake of the U.S. drawdown from Iraq and of the Arab Spring, now lapping at the borders of both Iraq and Turkey, in Syria.

    Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu warned on the eve of a visit to Tehran earlier this month against the risk of a “Cold War” developing between Shiites and Sunnis across the Middle East.

    “Tension is now rising between Turkey and Iran and it will be increasingly difficult to manage as it’s being aggravated by sectarian tensions. These problems are likely to be long-term; I don’t see an easy solution,” said Sinan Ulgen, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

    Baghdad’s concerns also have been fueled lately by fears that Syria’s uprising is developing into a Sunni insurgency that Mr. Maliki has said could spread “like a house on fire,” into Iraq. A fresh wave of violence has killed more than 200 Iraqis since the end of the U.S. military mission on Dec. 18.

    Unlike Iraq, which is majority Shiite, Syria is about 75% Sunni, but it is governed mainly by a minority of Alawites, a Shiite sect. Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad’s Tehran-backed regime has expressed deep anger and distrust of Ankara due to its decision to provide haven to mainly Sunni Syrian rebels.

    Turkey says its actions are purely humanitarian, made in the face of Syria’s brutal crackdown on protesters. It also denies any effort to meddle in Iraqi politics.

    Turkish analysts say Ankara is a reluctant hard-power player in the region. for all its neo-Ottoman pretensions, Only a year ago, Mr. Assad was Exhibit A in Turkey’s “zero-problems-with-neighbors” foreign policy. That approach boosted relations and trade with neighboring Muslim regimes, while downgrading ties with former ally Israel. The Arab Spring, however, upended that policy as allies such as former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi were pushed aside and Shiite-Sunni tensions rose across the region. In a major change, Turkey agreed last fall to host a North Atlantic Treaty Organization missile-defense system, which was designed by the U.S. to contain Iran.

    Turkish and U.S. diplomats say they now cannot remember a time when cooperation between Ankara and Washington was closer, after a period of significant strain in 2009-2010.

    “When Prime Minister Erdogan came to Washington in 2009, he sounded almost like the ambassador from Iran. Now he sounds quite different…After a period of suspicion, Turkey and the United States have come closer together,” said Stephen Kinzer, a visiting professor of international relations at Boston University.

    Turkish officials insist relations with Tehran remain strong.Turkey buys around 30% of its oil from Iran and is the second-largest consumer of Iranian gas, after Russia. Official data shows that Turkey’s bilateral trade volume with Iraq in 2011 jumped by nearly 50% on the year to $11 billion, with much of the increase coming in the Shiite-dominated areas around Baghdad and in the South.

    In an interview inside Iraqi Kurdistan this month, Mr. Hashemi said that while his political bloc had received advice from Turkey and others, it was no tool for outside powers. “I am not part of the Turkish geopolitical project,” said Mr. Hashemi. He criticized Mr. Maliki’s “conspiratorial” mind and said that his frequent visits to Turkey last year were mostly private.

    Earlier, in October, a key aide to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini told Iran’s Mehr news agency that Turkey should radically rethink its policies on Syria, the NATO missile shield and promoting secularism in the Arab world. Otherwise, Ankara would face trouble from its own people and neighbors, he said.

    Still there is little disguising the building tensions between Ankara and its Shiite neighbors, including Tehran.

    In December, Ankara sought an explanation from Tehran after Hussain Ibrahimi, chief of the Iranian parliament’s national-security committee, told an Iranian newspaper that if Iran were to be attacked, its first retaliatory strike would be against the NATO missile defense radar in eastern Turkey.

    Earlier, in October, a key aide to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini told Iran’s Mehr news agency that Turkey should radically rethink its policies on Syria, the NATO missile shield and promoting secularism in the Arab world. Otherwise, Ankara would face trouble from its own people and neighbors, he said.

    via Iraq Accuses Turkey of Meddling – WSJ.com.

  • Turkey Wants to Resume Talks on Iranian Nuclear Program

    Turkey Wants to Resume Talks on Iranian Nuclear Program

    Turkey Wants to Resume Talks on Iranian Nuclear Program

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 6
    January 10, 2012
    By: Saban Kardas
    Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, paid a crucial visit to Tehran on January 6, amidst the increasing confrontation between Iran and the West. The visit mainly provided an opportunity to address bilateral issues, as it followed a heated debate in recent months which questions whether Turkey and Iran were involved in an undeclared rivalry in the Arab Spring. The two countries’ diverging positions on Syria, Turkey’s decision to host NATO’s early warning radar, as well as differences on the Palestinians’ quest for recognition, arguably pitted the two against each other. The confrontational mood was further worsened by harsh statements against Turkey by Iranian politicians and high-ranking officials (EDM, October 11, 2011).

    As such statements even led to direct threats voiced by some Iranian lawmakers and military officers, indicating that Iran might take military action against NATO facilities in Turkey, Davutoglu was prompted to convey his uneasiness and demand an explanation. Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, visited Ankara in an effort to allay Ankara’s growing concerns. Reiterating the two countries’ friendship, Salehi sought to assure his Turkish counterpart that such remarks reflected personal opinions and did not represent official Iranian policy on Turkey (Anadolu Ajansi, December 14, 2011).

    Ankara also downplayed such threatening remarks as personal opinions, in an effort to maintain channels for dialogue with Tehran. Though not hiding the differences of opinion on regional issues, Davutoglu and other Turkish officials prefer to focus on issues of converging views and continue to view Tehran as a major stakeholder in the region whose cooperation is essential. More importantly, Davutoglu is keen to reassure his Iranian counterparts that Turkey will not take part in any direct military action against Iran, which seems as a calculated move to comfort Tehran and convince it to steer away from the path of escalation.

    With such considerations in mind, Davutoglu paid a working visit to Iran on January 6, to meet Salehi and other Iranian officials. Davutoglu worked hard to stress the defensive nature of the ballistic missile shield and reiterated that Turkey would not let its territory be used in any attack against Iran. The two ministers also agreed to continue to discuss regional issues, and meet at least twice each year (Anadolu Ajansi, January 5).

    Beyond the immediate Turkish-Iranian frictions, Davutoglu addressed a number of regional issues with Iran. Foregoing the speculations of rivalry, Davutoglu invited his Iranian counterparts to work together in order to address the escalating tensions in the region, which some claim could lead to Sunni-Shiite sectarian divisions. In the last two days, because the uprising in Syria, the ongoing political crisis in Iraq, and the situation in Bahrain involve some sectarian elements, Davutoglu increasingly refers to an imminent danger of sectarian conflict and warns against a new Cold War in the Middle East (Dogan, January 8).

    Moreover, the uncertain future of the dispute over the Iranian nuclear program, especially in view of US sanctions policy and the Iranian brinkmanship in the Strait of Hormuz is a growing concern for Turkey. Ankara recognizes Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear technology, but also invites the country to be more transparent about its ongoing program and allay concerns on the part of Western powers.

    Since the talks held between Iran and the P5+1 in Istanbul one year ago, diplomatic channels were largely closed. In order to push things forward on that front, Davutoglu seems to have attempted shuttle diplomacy. In the wake of his Tehran trip, he announced that he was in touch with Catherine Ashton, the EU’s foreign policy chief, on this issue. Davutoglu raised expectations by maintaining that both parties were ready to resume nuclear talks in Turkey. Earlier, Salehi also expressed his readiness to return to nuclear talks in a suitable time and venue agreed upon by the parties, adding that Turkey would be the best option (Anadolu Ajansi, January 8). Commenting on this development, US State Department spokesperson, Victoria Nuland, said that the US remained in consultation with Turkey over Davutoglu’s trip and agrees with Turkey’s goal of bringing Iran back to the negotiating table and complying with its international obligations, though they might differ on tactics. She also emphasized Washington’s readiness to resume discussions, though adding that Iran has yet to formally convey its decision to start the talks (Today’s Zaman, January 7).

    Adding urgency to the matter, the United States and its European allies are initiating a new wave of sanctions to pressure Iran on the economic front. The sanctions recently approved by President Barack Obama involve penalizing the financial institutions doing business with Iran as well as halting oil imports from Iran, by targeting its Central Bank. Turkey abides by the sanctions regime introduced by the UN Security Council in the summer of 2010, but refuses to implement the unilateral Western sanctions on the grounds that they are non-binding. However, there has been growing US expectation for Turkey to join the new sanctions, while Ankara seeks an exemption, given its oil and gas imports from Iran, requiring it to work with Iranian financial institutions.

    A visit by a US delegation led by Deputy Secretary of State, William Burns, to Ankara on January 9, offered an opportunity to discuss these issues. During his talks with Turkish officials, the US delegation, among others, solicited Turkey’s support for unilateral sanctions. Prior to the meeting, some senior US Congressmen and diplomats visited Turkish government officials and bureaucrats, underscoring the importance attached to this issue (Haberturk, January 9).

    Commenting on the visit, Nuland dismissed the argument that Turkey opposes US policy on Iran. She emphasized that the US acknowledges Turkey’s sensitivities given Ankara’s trade ties, but the two sides will continue their dialogue on how to maximize the pressures on Iran to force it to comply with its international obligations (Haberturk, January 10). Turkish sources also reported that Ankara does not want to see a further escalation of the already heightened tensions in the region (Sabah, January 10).

    Uneasy at the growing escalation, Ankara seeks to dampen tensions through a reassertion of its facilitator role and engaging the parties, without taking any side. Once again, Turkey is walking a diplomatic tightrope due to its difficult neighbor’s relations with the West.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-wants-to-resume-talks-on-iranian-nuclear-program/