Tag: Recep Tayyip Erdogan

12th president of Turkey

  • california: fetullah gulen conference

    california: fetullah gulen conference

    • Headlines

    Keynote by Reza Aslan

    The opening reception features a keynote from an acclaimed author,…

    Monday, 30 November 2009

    Press Release

    LOS ANGELES, Dec. 1 – Pacifica Institute – The Gulen Movement,…

    Tuesday, 11 August 2009

    Invitation

    Invitation to a conference on “East and West Encounters: The…

    Friday, 29 May 2009

    RSVP

    Thanks to our sponsors, conference registration is free of charge….

    Saturday, 18 April 2009

    East and West encounters: The Gülen Movement

    Office of Religious Life at the University of Southern California, Department of Theological Studies at the Loyola Marymount University, International Education Center, Santa Monica College, Department of Religious Studies at the Humboldt State University, Department of Religious Studies at Whittier College and Pacifica Institute are sponsoring a conference on the general theme of an encounter between “East” and “West” in the case of the Gülen Movement and the movement’s contributions to education, interfaith and intercultural dialogue, tolerance, and world peace.

    Objective
    To explore the appeal, meaning, and impact of Fethullah Gülen and the Gülen movement as exemplifying approaches to education, dialogue, and peace that transcend and mediate traditional distinctions between “East” and West”.

    Important Dates

    July 15, 2009 – Abstract submission deadline

    September 20, 2009 – Article submission deadline

    November 1, 2009 – Revised article submission deadline

    December 1, 2009 – Registration deadline

  • Why Obama Will Praise Erdogan

    Why Obama Will Praise Erdogan

    The Good Rapprochement: Why Obama Will Praise Erdogan
    Soner Cagaptay
    Hurriyet Daily News
    November 25, 2009

    What will U.S. President Barack Obama and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan discuss when they meet in the White House on Dec. 7? There is going to be some give and take on a variety of issues, including Iran. But both leaders will agree on Iraq.

    Ever since coming to power in 2002, the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, government in Ankara has come under fire for pursuing rapprochement with the wrong international partners. The AKP has faced criticism for warming up to Sudan and Iran, whose authoritarian and anti-Western regimes contrast with Turkey’s political system. Yet, another rapprochement the AKP has pursued deserves praise: The party has painstakingly built ties between Ankara and Baghdad, and improved relations with the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government, or KRG. Mr. Erdogan should expect praise from President Obama for holding Iraq’s and the KRG’s hands, and for helping the Iraqis emerge from the trauma of the war and rebuild. What is more, in a region wrought by win-lose thinking, the improvements in Turkish-Iraqi ties nurtured by the AKP serve as a sign that at least part of the Middle East is open to win-win politics.

    The most symbolic sign of Turkish-Iraqi rapprochement is the opening of two Turkish diplomatic missions in Iraq, respectively in Basra and Arbil. A Turkish consulate was opened in Basra recently, and another mission is scheduled to be opened in Arbil soon.

    These two missions serve as a sign that Turkish-Iraqi and Turkish-KRG ties have come around. Only two years ago, I was getting calls from frantic journalists asking whether the Turkish military was going to invade Iraq. Today, it is Turkish diplomats and businessmen who are doing the invading.

    One reason driving this change has been the shift in Iraqi Kurds’ evaluation of their strategic environment. Between 2003 and 2006, when a majority of Sunni Arabs and Shiite Arabs fought against the United States, the Iraqi Kurds were a significant ally for Washington in Iraq. This equation earned the Kurds American backing in Baghdad. In due course, the Kurds achieved many gains, such as recognition of the KRG as a federal entity.

    That situation, however, changed after 2006. First, the United States co-opted the Sunni Arabs through the Awakening Councils. Then, Washington made peace with the Shiite Arabs. The new relationship with both Arab groups allowed the United States to zoom out from Baghdad and see the big picture in Iraq. Washington realized that if the Iraqi state is to function, its modus operandi must continue to satisfy the Arabs, who constitute the vast majority of Iraq’s population.

    Hence, the United States started to back the Arabs over the Kurds on several crucial issues. In February 2007, Washington pressured the Kurds until they agreed to a hydrocarbon law favorable to the Iraqi Arabs and the central government. The United States dealt a second blow to the Kurds on the Kirkuk issue. Washington pressured the Kurds to drop their insistence on carrying out a referendum in Kirkuk by the constitutionally mandated deadline of Dec. 31, 2007. The referendum would have annexed oil-rich Kirkuk to the KRG, fulfilling a Kurdish dream.

    These U.S. actions convinced the Kurds, perhaps somewhat prematurely, that America had abandoned them in favor of the Iraqi Arabs. This rationale forced the Iraqi Kurds, already fearful of Iran’s influence in Iraq, to turn to their remaining neighbor: Turkey.

    The KRG’s turn towards Ankara brought the Iraqi Kurds into closer cooperation with Turkey against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. In the 1990s, the Iraqi Kurds helped Ankara against the PKK when Turkey helped them. At this time, Ankara provided the Iraqi Kurds with access to U.S. military protection against Saddam. After Saddam was removed in 2003, the Iraqi Kurds shortsightedly concluded that they did not need Turkey anymore. This calculus precipitated four years of KRG foot dragging on the PKK issue. That ended in 2007. Within the background of their new security environment, the Iraqi Kurds decided that they still needed Turkey and that they were better served by building a long-term relationship with Ankara.

    Enter the AKP. The party utilized this strategic opening, building ties with Iraqi Kurds. At the same time, the AKP was smart enough to also cultivate good ties with non-Kurdish Iraqi factions. In due course, Turkey emerged as an honest broker inside Iraq, enjoying good ties with Kurds and Arabs, Sunnis and Shiites alike.

    Subsequently, the KRG and Turkey have built strong ties, extending from Iraqi Kurdish commercial contracts awarded to Turkish companies, to likely pipeline and energy deals between Turkey and the KRG, to close contact between Turkish and KRG intelligence officials. Meanwhile, Turkey has become a force to reckon with inside Iraq, from Arbil in the north to Basra in the south.

    Turkey’s rapprochement with Iraq and the KRG has been quite smart. Iraq is more stable today thanks to Turkey. Ankara enjoys unprecedented political and economic power inside Iraq, and moreover, it has managed to align the Iraqi Kurds along its policy of countering the PKK.

    Furthermore, the AKP’s rapprochement with Iraq has earned it brownie points with the Obama administration. Since the administration wants to wrap up the Iraq war while ensuring the nation’s future stability, Turkey’s constructive involvement in Iraq has made Ankara an asset for President Obama ahead of Erdogan’s Dec. 7 Washington visit. The Turkish-Iraqi-KRG rapprochement is indeed a win-win case. That is rare indeed in the Middle East, and this is one reason why Erdogan should expect some praise from President Obama.

    Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute.

  • DAVUTOGLU:  Risky Diplomacy

    DAVUTOGLU: Risky Diplomacy

    Turkey’s foreign minister discusses his country’s expanding role as a regional power.

    By Owen Matthews, Yenal Belgici, and Semin Gumusel | Newsweek Web Exclusive
    Nov 28, 2009

    SPONSORED BY:
    Elvis Barukcic / AFP-Getty Images
    On the Road: Davutoglu in Bosnia on Oct. 16, 2009
    Has the West really "lost" Turkey? With Ankara showing a new cordiality to countries like Syria and Iran, foreign-policy analysts are scrambling to assess whether Turkey has shrugged off Europe and the United States in favor of its Muslim neighbors. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu sat down with NEWSWEEK's Owen Matthews, Yenal Belgici, and Semin Gumusel in Ankara recently to discuss NATO, Iran, Barack Obama, and the thinking behind Turkey's new diplomacy. Excerpts: Matthews: Many of Turkey's allies are wondering, after Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's recent visit to Iran, whose side is Turkey on? Davutoglu: In order to answer this question, you have to understand the geography and the history of Turkey. We are a European country and we are an Asian country. We have direct access to the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. So Turkish foreign policy has to be multiregional, multidimensional. We are also part of European history. But at the same time, the history of more than 20 [Middle Eastern and Balkan] countries could be written only using Turkish archives. We have more Bosnians in Turkey than in Bosnia itself, more Albanians than in Albania, as well as Kurds and Arabs. Because of these historic connections, all these countries have certain expectations from us.
    Triumph of the Turks
    Owen Matthews and Christopher Dickey
    Turkey is the surprising beneficiary of our misadventures in the Middle East.
    Davutoglu: Inside Turkey's New Foreign Policy
    Meet the Man Shaping Turkey's New Diplomacy
    Matthews: Yet during the Cold War you were unequivocally a U.S. ally. The Cold War was a static international environment; you had only two options—either [to be a] member of NATO or a member of the Warsaw Pact. There was no third alternative. After the Cold War, a dynamic situation emerged, and Turkey had to assume a foreign-policy role in all [its neighboring] regions regardless of their ethnic or religious background. But at the same time, Turkey's most institutionalized relationship remains its membership of NATO—this is Turkey's strongest tie. Similarly, the main objective of Turkish foreign policy is integration with Europe. Our history is part of Europe's, our culture is part of Europe's, and our process of modernization is parallel to the developments in Europe. Our membership of NATO and the negotiation process with the EU is the strategic priority of Turkey. But it doesn't mean that because of these strong ties we can ignore the Middle East, we can ignore Asia, Central Asia, North Africa, or Africa.
    Matthews: Isn't friendship with Iran mutually exclusive with membership in NATO? Our relations with Iran are not something new. The Turkish-Iranian border has been stable for 370 years. We have been implementing a policy of "zero problems with our neighbors," not just with Iran, but also Iraq and Syria and also with non-Muslim countries such as Georgia, Bulgaria, Greece, Russia, Romania, and with all of our other neighbors. All our [regional] relations improved. Today Russia is our biggest trade partner; our relationship with Greece and Georgia are excellent. So it's a consistent policy across the board. You can't say that Turkey is giving special priority to Iran. The question should be: is having zero problems with our neighbors compatible with being a candidate for the EU and a member of NATO? From our perspective, yes, they are compatible. This is the whole philosophy of the EU itself, which emerged through minimizing political problems with its neighbors. Similarly, we want to have a zone of security and stability around us. And this is exactly the European approach, based on European philosophy and European values. If you study Germany's Ostpolitik [of détente with the Soviet bloc] in the 1960s, you can understand Turkey's Eastern politics in 2009.Matthews: Turkey is now in a position of influence that it hasn't had in long time. Does that not mean that Turkey has emerged as one of the winners of the Iraq War? We would have the same foreign policy toward the Middle East even if there had been no war in Iraq. Our foreign policy toward the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans is not opportunistic but based on firm principles. In order to have a new prosperous, stable, secure Middle East, we have been implementing a proactive peace diplomacy. That's why we initiated direct Syrian-Israeli talks; that's how we were able to unite Sunni groups [in Iraq] and convince them to participate in politics in 2005. We have been very active in Lebanese politics to resolve disputes between Sunnis and Shias, and active in Gaza trying to achieve a ceasefire. We have also been trying to resolve issues regarding the Iranian nuclear program and signed agreements with Armenia and moved forward in resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijan dispute. During the Georgian crisis we initiated the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, and we have mediated in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. Matthews: But the Iraq War created a power vacuum that you are now filling. The same war in Iraq also created big risks for Turkey. This type of international issue creates risks and advantages at the same time. How this new context will be interpreted and be responded to depends on the political will of a country. Turkey implemented a consistent foreign policy; therefore, now we have excellent relations in the region. But it is because of our foreign policy, not because of the war in Iraq. We have been sincere, we have been active, and we did not change our policy because of some very conjectural short-term interests. Gumusel: Is Turkey's success at regional problem-solving inspired by Europe? Europe is a beautiful example to follow—I mean, the generation that fought [World War II] and caused millions of deaths in Europe was the same generation that established the European Union. We want to be a part of this beautiful example and to reflect this experience onto other regions. Matthews: Are relations between Turkey and the U.S. better than during the Bush administration? Much better. Obama's style is to encourage more multilateralism, more consultation, more interaction with allies, instead of preparing policy and implementing it before consulting with other allies. Matthews: What does the U.S. want from Turkey? If you permit me, that question is typical Cold War logic. It assumes that there is one power, the United States, who always wants something from us. But being an ally means sharing, being inclusive. If you ask Secretary [Hillary] Clinton what are the 10 most important issues facing American foreign policy today, and ask me the same question [about Turkey], we will come up with the same list. Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, energy security, the Caucasus, the Balkans. We share the problems, and we are therefore trying to solve these problems together.
    Gumusel: Where do you see yourself and Turkey in 10 years? I see a country that has managed to start economic integration and has solid relations with all its neighbors. Also, a country that has become a member of the EU. I see a Turkey which keeps an effective role within NATO and which is also a key player not only in security-related fields but also in economic organizations such as G20. I do not think these objectives are unreachable by the year 2023, the 100th anniversary of the Turkish Republic, 14 years from now. Bilgici: You emphasize that you criticize Israel on a moral basis. Doesn't it damage Turkish foreign policy not to criticize Sudan for what has happened in Darfur? We have been working on to provide a better dialogue between the parties in Darfur and the Sudanese government. When President [Omar] al-Bashir came to Turkey, our president criticized him in a most sincere and open way. We think that we have managed to develop a morally responsible relationship with Sudan. © 2009

  • “ARMENIA GETS PREPARED TO USE 1909 ADANA INCIDENTS AGAINST TURKEY”

    “ARMENIA GETS PREPARED TO USE 1909 ADANA INCIDENTS AGAINST TURKEY”

    26 November 2009

    Historian Cezmi Yurtsever claimed that Turkish government’s ’Armenia opening’ initiative will be undermined by ’Adana incidents’ file.

    Historian Cezmi Yurtsever claimed that Armenians are getting prepared to use ’Adana incidents’ as a political card against Turkish government as a reply to Turkish governments calls for Armenia to return to occupied lands to Azerbaijan.

    Yurtsever said, “Armenians initiated preparations in 2009. They held panels and conferences titled „What happened in Adana in 1909“ about the civil war in Adana in 1909. This issue was brought to the agenda in Yerevan, Beirut Cilicia Church and Istanbul Sabanci University by the support of Armenian diaspora. In case Turkey brings the demand of withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied lands of Azerbaijan on the agenda of the negotiations towards normalization of relations, Armenia and Armenian diaspora will bring the issue of Adana incidents on the agenda and they will demand for compensation for the real estates of Armenian people that changed hand during the civil war in Adana in 1909.”

    Reminding that Armenian archpriest of Cilicia Church in Beirut, Aram Sarksyan brought this issue on the agenda, Yurtsever said, “Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan, U. S. Ambassador to Beirut, and leading Christian religious leaders voiced these claims of compensation. But Aram Sarksyan claimed that Turkey should pay compensations for the real estates of 30 thousand Armenians that perished during Adana incidents. On the other hand, Ottoman archives show that the Armenian population in the province was about 18 thousand. This proves that statementsof Armenian religious leader were nothing other than speculation.”

    TURKISH HISTORIAN EXHIBITS DOCUMENTS ON ADANA INCIDENTS

    Historian Cezmi Yurtsever exhibits historical document that he collected from Ottoman archives and from the archives of other countries about 1909 Adana incidents. Yurtsever said, “I am aiming to bring the attention of Turkish officials to theintention of Armenian officials to demand for compensation on Adana incidents. Exhibitation will be open between November 24 to 28 in front of Adana Metropolitan Municipality Abidin Dino Park.”

  • Slipping in Turkey

    Slipping in Turkey


    An Islamist government’s commitment to democratic principles is looking shaky.

    Monday, November 23, 2009
    WallStreet Journal

    RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN has been the protagonist of an epic liberalization of politics in Turkey. The victory of his mildly Islamist AK Party in a 2002 general election was itself a breakthrough; even more so was his government’s defeat of repeated attempts by the military and courts to remove it from power. Mr. Erdogan is pushing through historic reforms of Turkey’s treatment of its Kurdish minority and recently took a major step toward opening the country’s border with Armenia.
    Yet, as his tenure lengthens, it is becoming evident that Mr. Erdogan’s commitment to democratic principles and Western values is far from complete. As Turkey’s prospects of joining the European Union have dimmed, the government’s foreign policy has taken a nasty turn: Shrill denunciations of Israel have been accompanied by increasing coziness with the criminal rulers of Iran, Syria and Sudan. Mr. Erdogan recently declared that Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, who has been indicted for war crimes in Darfur, was welcome in Turkey because “a Muslim can never commit genocide.”

    Even more concerning is Mr. Erdogan’s treatment of the Turkish media. Frustrated by hostility toward his government by media conglomerates that formed part of Turkey’s traditional secular establishment, the prime minister and his allies have resorted to increasingly heavy-handed measures. Two years ago a forced sale of the country’s second-biggest newspaper placed it in the hands of a company headed by Mr. Erdogan’s son-in-law. Once critical, it is now predictably pro-government.

    Now the government is threatening to destroy Turkey’s largest media company, Dogan Yayin. The conglomerate, which controls seven newspapers, 28 magazines and three television channels — including Turkey’s version of CNN — has been hit with an escalating series of tax bills based on questionable audits of past filings. The latest one, delivered in September, now stands at some $3.3 billion — a sum greater than the value of Dogan Yayin and its parent company.

    Faced with sharp criticism by the European Union, Mr. Erdogan and his foreign minister have insisted that the tax bills are a “technical matter”; in one interview the prime minister compared them to the tax case brought against gangster Al Capone. The parallel was unintentionally revealing. Mr. Erdogan’s real problem is not with the company’s supposed tax evasion but with its tough reporting on his government — beginning with reports about an Islamic charity that may have illegally funneled money to his party.
    Turkish journalists say that a pall of fear has fallen across their business. Editors practice self-censorship. Many journalists are believed to be among the more than 100,000 people whose phones have been tapped by the government in recent years. Some, including the chief executive of Dogan Yayin, have been swept up in a murky investigation of alleged coup plotting.
    Mr. Erdogan and his party were once seen by many in Washington as a model for how pious Muslims could practice democratic politics. That image is rapidly darkening. If it is not to be extinguished, Mr. Erdogan must stop coddling Muslim dictators — and stop following their practice of silencing domestic opposition.

  • Iran drops Russia for Turkey

    Iran drops Russia for Turkey

    Tuesday, 17 November 2009

    Meir Javedanfar: As Ayatollah Khamenei sidles up to Recep Tayyip Erdogan, he could learn from Turkey’s leader about balancing his alliances

    Ayatollah Khamenei

    The famous Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu, wrote in his book, The Art of War: “If an enemy has alliances, the problem is grave and the enemy’s position strong; if he has no alliances, the problem is minor and the enemy’s position weak.”

    Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is currently witnessing how the US, which he sees as the enemy for his nuclear ambitions, is working hard on building alliances, including with Russia. Khamenei is not happy.

    So much so that Iran recently cancelled a deal with Russia to launch its communication satellite, and turned to Italy instead. This is in addition to recent complaints from Tehran regarding delays from Russia in the delivery of the S-300 anti-aircraft system. Until recently, Tehran kept its complaints away from the cameras and behind closed doors. But now that Khamenei sees the Russians as disloyal, his regime is not shy about airing its criticism publicly.

    The Iranian government has decided to take the initiative and to look for a new partner to replace the Russians. Judging by the recent flurry of visits between Tehran and Ankara, it seems that Khamenei has found a willing partner in Turkey.

    Unlike Russia, Turkey does not have a veto in the UN security council. However, its stock in the Middle East and the Islamic world is certainly rising. Its prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is being seen more and more as a credible defender of Islamic and Arab issues. Many people on the Arab street respect his leadership, as he was elected in a genuinely democratic elections. The same can not be said about Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak, or King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who received their posts undemocratically.

    Erdogan’s relations with the US and the EU also count in his favour. Although he has recently been getting closer to his Muslim and Arab regional neighbours, he has not severed his ties with the west, but is masterfully playing both sides. His relations with the US are also not based on Turkey’s weaknesses. On one occasion, he resisted US pressure and even walked away from a promise of $6bn in grants and $20bn loan guarantees, because he did not find the agreement suitable. And his verbal attacks on Israel after the recent Gaza war have certainly helped his image in the region.

    Now that Khamenei has turned down Barack Obama’s nuclear offer, he feels that the prospect of sanctions is greater. Therefore, he needs a change of strategy to deal with the expected difficult time ahead. One strategy is to turn his struggle against Obama into a new west v Islam confrontation. Judging by the recent international TV debate in Qatar, where Iran’s nuclear programme was discussed in front of a select audience from the Middle East, there certainly is sympathy for his position. As far as many people in the region are concerned, Iran’s nuclear programme is the only way to counter Israel’s superior balance of power. Therefore this is a viable strategy. And Erdogan’s rising popularity in the region, and Tehran’s improving relations with his administration, will be a feasible way for Khamenei to improve his own position during the difficult times ahead. The absence of progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace track will also help him.

    However, the Iranian supreme leader should be careful about how he approaches his relations with Turkey and the price he is willing to pay for it, both at home and abroad. According to the Iranian news website Khabar online, the Ahmadinejad government concluded a secret gas agreement with Turkey in late October, without informing parliament. After the news was recently leaked to the press, parliament launched a full investigation. There are now discussions about cancelling the whole deal if, as the members of parliament say, it is found to be against the country’s interests. Many people suspect that Khamenei offered the deal in unfavourably good conditions to Ankara, as a means of buying its loyalty. Judging by its results it seems to have worked. However, the domestic backlash could damage the legitimacy of his regime even further.

    There is also the issue of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Turkey can not complete it. Only Russia can. Khamenei turning his back on Moscow could be even more detrimental to this important and expensive project. Perhaps Khamenei could learn from the Turks, and instead of constantly changing one ally for another learn to balance his alliances.

    UTV