Tag: Politics

Turkey goes to the polls this Sunday, with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Islamic-rooted Justice and Development Party (AK) fighting on its record of a decade of unprecedented economic growth. Its main adversary, the secular Republican People’s Party (CHP), is seeking to reinvent itself on a platform stressing that with growth has come increasing authoritarianism. For both parties, the support of younger voters will be crucial, with a third of the electorate under 25 years old. .

The campaign song of the ruling Justice and Development Party blasts out on the streets of the Besiktas district of Istanbul. The party is standing on its impressive record of nearly uninterrupted economic growth since it came to power in 2002, turning the country from the “sick man of Europe” into an economic tiger.

Giving out campaign literature is university student Ayse Demir. She says it is that transformation that has drawn her to the party.

Watch related Henry Ridgwell video report

“About 10 years ago, all the people were saying we had to join the European Union,” she said. “But now, I don’t think so. Because we can be power without European Union. For example, the Middle East; now all the Middle East countries want to as Turkey it’s important.”

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has announced a host of huge infrastructure projects – roads, hospitals and even new cities. His platform is very different from the last general election, when he emphasized his democratic credentials in facing down Turkey’s then-powerful army over its opposition to his choice for president. Now he faces the main opposition Republican People’s Party.

A CHP campaign TV advertisement is aimed at the youth vote. It stresses the party’s policies for women and ethnic minorities. It also warns of the dangers of what it calls the government’s growing authoritarian rule, citing increasing censorship of the Internet and state surveillance of telephones. The party, under the new leadership of Kemal Kilicdaroglu, is seeking to reinvent itself as a modern social democratic party and discard its staid pro-statist image.

At CHP campaign headquarters in Istanbul, party supporters claim its transformation is being rewarded. They say there has been a 10-fold increase in youth volunteers. One of them is law student Melis Ayanit.

“We needed a change, a new political ideology and this change came with Mr Kilicdaroglu. The people changed, now we have more young people in the party.” Ayanit said. “The young people saw the power of the first party. We are threatened. We are really threatened. For example, I don’t want to talk on mobile phone with my friend for political subjects. Because I am afraid, because someone can hear me.”

According to opinion polls, CHP is set to increase its support by as much 50 percent from the last election. But with Turkey’s economy growing at nearly nine percent, the same polls are predicting that the prime minister should still win a comfortable majority. The size of that majority is considered of crucial importance.

The prime minister has set a target of a two-thirds parliamentary majority, which will enable him to introduce constitutional reform. Sabiha Senyucel Gundoga of the Istanbul-based think tank Tesev says whether Mr. Erdogan achieves that goal will dictate in what direction the country is heading.

“Having the number of votes of 367 gives them big, big opportunity to make any changes that they want,” Gundoga said. “If there is a constitution with a consensus, everyone is satisfied to certain extent. Otherwise if there are tensions in that political climate, the polarization will be much more tense.”

While there is little excitement about the question of who will win, there is growing expectation – if not concern – over the margin of victory in this Sunday’s poll.

via Two Major Parties Fight for Votes in Turkey Election | Europe | English.

ISTANBUL, Turkey — Turkey is in the final days of an election campaign that will affect one of America’s biggest Middle East allies for years to come.

The elections center around one party and one man — Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

In Istanbul, it’s hard to escape posters of Erdogan, the head of the ruling Islamist party, the AKP. The polls point to a sizable victory for the AKP, and that would be the third straight election win for a party that worked hard to make one of the most secular Muslim nations on earth even more Islamic.

“I don’t think we’re going to go to sharia law, but many people fear we are going more and more to our Middle Eastern roots,” Cansin Ilgaz told CBN News.

Political adversaries like Gursel Tekin, the No. 2 man in Turkey’s main opposition party, say the world is now finally seeing the real Erdogan.

“The dear prime minister in America and Europe was very popular and they supported him in 2004 and 2007 and his mask looked very liberal,” Tekin, vice president of Republican People’s Party, told CBN News while he was campaigning in Instanbul.

“But now they see that he’s not liberal,” Tekin said. “He’s restricted freedom and the journalists can’t express themselves because of the prime minister. Therefore, the mind of Ergogan is fascist and it’s a dictatorial regime.”

Some accuse the AKP of using democracy to gain power and then limit freedoms. CBN News asked Erdogan’s second in command, Egemen Bagis, about those charges.

“Turkey has never been as democratic as she is today. Some people might not enjoy the fact that Turkey’s becoming a stronger country,” Bagis said.

“We can understand their feelings, but Turkey’s becoming more and more democratic every day,” he said.

But if Erdogan’s party wins a majority of seats in this election, some fear he’ll re-write Turkey’s constitution, set up a presidential system and consolidate his power.

The AKP party is closely linked to the worldwide Gülen Islamic movement, and some even feel he hopes to re-establish an Islamic caliphate with Turkey as its head.

Whatever the outcome of Sunday’s elections, Turkey will be a different country come Monday. What kind of country is still to be decided.

That’s why many Christians in the Middle East are praying for Turkey and the future of the region.

“As Christians we have a very special calling. No matter what the government is, whether it’s evil or whether it’s good, we need to pray for them,” Turkish pastor Levent Kinrin told CBN News.

“We need to bless them,” he added. “And we need to pray they would also recognize, realize the gospel of Jesus Christ, come to know it, come to accept it because God wants the salvation of all men.”

via Turkey Election Sparks Fears of Islamic Caliphate – Inside Israel – CBN News – Christian News 24-7 – CBN.com.

A beautiful woman with long, curly hair, blowing gently in the breeze, stares mournfully at the blue sky, tears rolling down her cheeks; a stubble-jawed hunk, his own blonde locks swept back behind his ears by a solid plastering of hair gel and a pair of dark sunglasses, stands behind the woman, smouldering silently; and from Trabzon to the West Bank to Astana, crowds gather around television sets in cafes and living rooms to catch the latest episode in one of Turkey’s extremely popular soap operas. This is the modern face of Turkish soft power, which has grown to reflect Ankara’s steadily increasing role as a modern regional pole, rather than the appendage to the West that Turkey has sometimes seen since the days of Ottoman decline.

This rise in Ankara’s influence means that even predictable political events – like the parliamentary elections of 12 June – matter. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is on its way to a third consecutive term in office. But this vote is not about business as usual, and the result will leave its imprint on the political model Turkey is heading towards. It will certainly raise important questions about Turkish neighborhood policy, and that means that it will also raise important strategic questions for the EU.

Turkey’s aspirations towards regional hegemony have a solid economic foundation. Ankara’s policies are designed to serve commercial and security interestsacross a neighbourhood that spans the erstwhile territories of the Ottoman Empire and beyond.Economic links with Russia are thriving. Turkish traders and investors are now a familiar sight even in sub-Saharan Africa. And wherever there is a television, steamy soap operas are quietly building up that Turkish soft power.

This burgeoning influence means that Turkey seems to have overtaken the EU in the race to exert ‘transformational power’. As Europe upgrades its Schengen walls, Turkey’s neighbours travel en masse for business and leisure to Istanbul or the alluring sea resorts. This human contact also helps spread ideas, and the Arab Spring has given currency to the talk of Turkey as a democratic model for countries in the Middle East and North Africa. As ECFR’s latest report “What Does Turkey Think?” argues, Europe needs to follow this new Turkey closely.

Turkey’s recent economic success is striking. With the EU struggling to stabilise the eurozone, the Turkish economy can point to 9% growth in 2010 (per capita GDP has risen from $6,000 to $14,243 in a decade) and a steady rise up the value-added ladder. Although this success owes much to the (now stalled) EU accession process, thanks to the 1996 Customs Union, there is a justifiable sense of schadenfreude in Ankara. Europe may now be reluctant to have Turkey as a full EU member, but perhaps it needs Turkey more than the other way around.

Just like in Turkish soap operas, however, there is no certainty that good times continue, and that is why these elections – however predictable – are so important.

Firstly, the new Grand National Assembly will shoulder the difficult task of drafting a new constitution. “What Does Turkey Think?” shows there are competing, often deeply opposed views. AKP and its liberal supporters maintain that the new basic law will strengthen democratic reform, entrench human rights and solve the Kurdish issue. By contrast, secularist critics see the spectre of Putin-style presidentialism and a fallback to authoritarianism (this time tinged by religious conservativism). It is clear that an inclusive political process with all voices represented (pro-AKP, Kemalists, liberal democrats, Kurds) is necessary to legitimise any new constitution.

Secondly, a new AKP government has to continue its pro-growth policies while addressing immediate concerns such as the current account deficit and the threat of growing inflation. Basking in its own glory, it should not lose sight of structural challenges to do with the labour market, savings rates, skills and education, and welfare provision. The CHP has been campaigning extensively on such issues, which is likely to pay off at the ballot box.

Turkey’s democratic and economic achievements are the pillars of its neighbourhood policy, but the Turkish example is not without its blindspots. It is a challenge for Ankara to preach conflict resolution in neighbouring countries while the Kurdish issue remains unresolved, and there is tension in the southeast.  Criticisms over freedom of expression should also be taken seriously if Turkey should serve as a source of inspiration for the new Middle East. A return to the boom-and-bust cycles of the pre-2002 period would tarnish Turkey’s reputation of an economic powerhouse.

All these concerns highlight the continued importance of the EU. Between 1999 and 2006, the golden period in the EU-Turkey saga, Brussels provided the much needed external push towards democratisation. Without the EU, Turkey may lack sufficient internal capacity to resist the authoritarian temptation. Even if a backslide is improbable, Brussels could accelerate positive change and keep the AKP focused on liberal reform. The EU is the origin of 80% of FDI and by far Turkey’s biggest trading partner. Turkey needs European pressure if it is to grow, develop and remain competitive.

This does not make the EU indispensible, and Turkey does not fear a continuation of the status quo. The accession negotiations will not be called off, but Ankara will continue to pursue economic and diplomatic relations with its neighbourswith vigour and confidence. Sadly, interdependence does not rule out conflict: continued accession deadlock may inject a hefty dose of antagonism into the relationship. Competitive friction already exists in places like Bosnia (playing for far lower stakes than, for instance, in Iran). To make interdependence work, the EU needs to engage the new Turkey, and that means paying close attention to the forthcoming elections, no matter how predictable they may seem.

This piece also appears on EUobserver

Sarah Rappaport

This weekend Recep Tayyip Erdogan is widely expected to win a third term as Turkey’s Prime Minister in the country’s Parliamentary elections.

While the fate of the election seems certain, other questions remain.

First, the constitution issue. Soli Ozel, an academic and commentator in Istanbul, told The Economist that “this election is not about who is going to win. It is about getting a big enough majority to change the constitution.”

Erdogan will need a 2/3 majority in Parliament to change the constitution without a referendum. Many argue the 1982 constitution is indeed in dire need of an update. The Economist argues that if done correctly, a new constitution might add life to Turkey’s dead-in-the-water EU bid.

However, there are worries that Erdogan might change the Constitution’s term limits — perhaps becoming a vastly more autocratic leader.

Erdogan has been heavily criticized by Western media outlets, such as WSJ and The Economist in the run-up to the election. Turkey’s harsh press restrictions have been a particular source of controversy.

The International Press Institute says that Turkey has the most journalists jailed out of any nation, edging out Iran and China.

Alison Bethel McKenzie, director of the IPI, said, “Turkey, at the crossroads between east and west, is a major regional power with an ancient cultural heritage. The country is also often held up as an example of a healthy Muslim democracy. For Turkey to step away from this history and to jail more journalists than any other country in the world is damaging.”

The Economist mentions these press freedom abuses, and argued in an editorial that while Turkey’s economy has improved during Erdogan’s tenture, he had also eliminated many checks and balances in the government, freeing him to “indulge his natural intolerance of criticism” and feeding his “autocratic instincts”.

The Economist felt Erdogan’s abuses were so bad it recently lent its support to CHP. Erdogan retaliated, saying the critique came about because The Economist is part of the “Israel-supported international media”.

There are also further worries that Erdogan may be turning away from the West.

A recent editorial in Hurriyet, an English language newspaper in Turkey, warned that “those who are worrying now that Turkey will shift axis away from the West even more after the elections seem to be justified. It is clear the West will certainly have a very abrasive Erdoğan to deal with if the election results return his party with a landslide, as some polls indicated it might.”

Erdogan’s possible turn away from the West may have been a response to Turkey’s stalled bid for the EU. Turkey became an EU member candidate in 2004, but little progress has been made in the past seven years. The Telegraph reports that while nearly 70 percent of Turks want to be part of the European Union, only 36 percent of them believe it will happen during the next decade.

Erdogan’s party has blasted the “unfair and unfounded opposition” of certain EU countries (namely, France and Germany) to Turkey’s bid, and Erdogan himself spoke of what he saw as European racism in the EU’s treatment of the Arab Spring.

It remains to be seen where Erdogan and Turkey are headed in the future, but it is clear that the results of this election are vital for Turkey’s future. If Erdogan wins a large majority, the West may be forced to tread carefully around a potential autocrat.

via Why This Weekend’s Election In Turkey Will Be Decisive For The Country’s Future.

By Palash R. Ghosh | June 7, 2011 4:21 PM EDT

IBTIMES: The Justice and Development Party (AKP) is widely expected to win the general election in next month’s general election in Turkey. If they do, will they automatically rewrite the nation’s constitution? Why?

ACHILOV: One of the main campaign promises of AKP has been the writing of a new civil constitution that would replace the old, 1982 military junta-sponsored constitution.
Even though AKP was successful in pushing for major sweeping reforms and changes to the 1982 constitution (as a result of national referendum in September 2010), its inconsistent and vague language — regarding certain civil and political rights and their interpretations — still prevail.
Unless AKP can secure 367 votes in the parliament (two-thirds of all seats), the road to a new constitution will be tough. It is possible that AKP may reach this critical mass; if not, AKP will have to rely on the support from other party members to reach the 367 figure.
In principle, all major political parties — including AKP, Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) — agree that a new, civil constitution is a must. Yet, there is no intra-party consensus on the means of achieving this goal together. This division is largely commanded by party ideologies. Each party promises to draft a new constitution if elected to power; each party wants to do it on its own way; each party is blaming the other parties of “incompetency, unfairness and abuse” which may lead to a failed constitution unless done by itself.
However, the absence of consociational political platform in Turkish politics will make it hard for AKP to rewrite the constitution unless it secures the critical number of votes in the parliament. At any rate, it will be imperative that AKP bring all voices of Turkish society (Kemalists, secularists, conservatives, nationalists, Kurds, etc) on board as it will attempt to draft a new constitution.

IBTIMES: AKP has ruled Turkey since 2002. Over that time, what have they accomplished in terms of human rights and economic advancements?

ACHILOV: During the tenure of AKP rule, Turkey has accomplished highly impressive economic performance and a record number of bills regarding civil and political rights.
Yet, the level of democratic rights still remains insufficient with a lot of room for further reforms. The new civil constitution may be the final solution to close the human rights gap in Turkey.
Since AKP came to power in 2002, Turkey appears to have accomplished some major political and developmental benchmarks. To cite a few:
*High and steady economic growth (Turkey is the fastest growing economy in Europe; it posted an astounding 8-plus percent growth in 2010, which stunned both the EU and AKP itself).
*GDP (PPP) per capita today stands at over $12,000. It was about $6,700 in 2002. Thus, living standards have nearly doubled in Turkey.
*In the past, criticizing the military elites, let alone prosecuting them in civilian courts, was a taboo and almost unthinkable. After the 2010 Constitutional reforms, this restriction was lifted; the previously untouchable military officers are now being tried in civilian courts and equally being brought to justice (a critical milestone for the rule of law and Turkish democracy).
*The state of civil society has dramatically improved and became significantly transparent and free as lauded by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) in 2010. Yet, concerns on unresolved human rights and civil liberties issues still remain. The gains, however, for Turkish democracy have been substantial over the past nine years.
*The corruption index for Turkey improved by 37 percent since 2002 according to Transparency International. In 2010, Turkey was 51st least politically-corrupt country in the world (with a score of 4.4). In 2002, Turkey ranked 91st least corrupt state. Even though corruption levels have decreased during the AKP rule, the grim effects of political corruption in Turkey are still gravely high. As a comparison, the least corrupt country was Denmark with a score of 9.3 in 2010.
*Turkey has substantially reduced its foreign debt balance. For instance, Turkey only owes $5.5 billion to the IMF today. The debt balance was $23.5 when AKP first came to power. At a time when many industrialized EU member states are seeking higher debts from IMF, Turkey is paying them off. It is an important accomplishment.

IBTIMES: AKP is regarded as a conservative, Islamist group (though not extreme). Who is the base of their support?

ACHILOV: Even though the base of AKP is largely conservative sect of population who support wider a role for Islam in politics, the composition of the AKP’s base has changed over the past ten years. There is a significant mass of non-conservative, secular-oriented liberals who increasingly voted for AKP. It would be a fair statement to argue that increasing numbers of liberals are supporting AKP in Turkey.
The main reason for AKP’s growing popularity is the growing economy, effective social services extended by elected AKP regional governors, wider civil liberties and emboldened image of Turkey in global arena.
Citizens of multiple political colors are behind the AKP today. If it was only the conservatives that would vote for AKP in 2007, it would not have won a landslide victory with a stunning 47 percent vote share in 2007 national elections.

IBTIMES: Is AKP disliked and distrusted by the left-wing intelligentsia? And what do the genuinely conservative Muslims think of AKP?

ACHILOV: It would probably be more accurate to say that the left-wing intelligentsia is split and shows mixed reactions to AKP (depending on how far left they are on political spectrum).
However, the ultra-secular Kemalists widely distrust the AKP and view the AKP’s policies as a threat to Turkish secularism. What we see in Turkey today is the emergence of competing political views and relatively open discussions which are benefiting the state of Turkish civil society.

Although the hardline conservatives often criticize AKP for not being genuinely “conservative,” an increasing percentage if this faction is choosing to vote for AKP for pragmatic reasons given the fact that the hardline conservative political parties, such as HAS (Voice of People) and SAADET (Felicity) parties are not expected to win enough votes to enter Turkish parliament.

IBTIMES: The opposition MHP Party has suffered a wave of
resignations due to sex scandals. Was MHP a serious challenger to AKP? Does the Turkish media feel that the MHP was the victim of a conspiracy?

ACHILOV: Recent sex scandals have shaken MHP ranks significantly. The senior executives of MHP had no choice but to step down after scandalous tapes were released into video-sharing social network websites.
MHP, nonetheless, is not a serious challenger to AKP. We have yet to see the effects of these sex tapes on the upcoming elections . It is possible that MHP may not reach the minimum required 10 percent vote-share benchmark to enter Turkish parliament. Similarly in 2010, the sex scandal forced the former leader of CHP, Deniz Baykal, out of office. Numerous conspiracy theories are floating around. Indeed, there is little doubt that a well-calculated conspiracy is at play on the eve of national elections.
According to multiple sources and numerous political pundits, these tapes were secretly and strategically orchestrated by certain illicit forces that seek to shape or restructure CHP and MHP executives.

IBTIMES: Does the right-wing MHP have significant support in the country? Do they present a threat to democracy?

ACHILOV: The right-wing nationalists constitute a sizable minority: MHP is believed to represent 8-14 percent of the Turkish electorate.
Often, we see rising nationalist rhetoric in the country as a reaction to a growing threat of PKK (Kurdish) terrorists who often orchestrate assassinations and bombings against peaceful civilians and state institutions. The hardline nationalists pose serious tensions to Turkish-Kurdish coexistence primarily stemming from PKK’s terror-driven separatist activities.
It is important to highlight that some policy tendencies of the MHP are discriminatory in nature against minorities (e.g., Kurds). On the whole, it would be premature to consider MHP as a threat to democracy. The nationalists contribute to a political plurality in emerging civil society and increasingly strengthening Turkish democracy. In addition, as a movement of more than 50 years, MHP should be judged more comprehensively and not by contemporary volatile political dispositions.

IBTIMES: Does AKP need the MHP as an ally in parliament?

ACHILOV: Surprisingly, MHP did not support the constitutional reforms (changes) in the 2010 national referendum just because it was advocated by AKP ruling party. It surprised many observers. The MHP base was somewhat surprised by the MHP leadership. The ideological framework of MHP, as portrayed and used by the MHP leader, Devlet Bahceli, is designed to counter AKP’s policies in virtually all matters.
In the macro perspective, however, MHP party ideology is much closer to AKP than it is to CHP. Surprisingly, over the past eight years, MHP appeared to align more with CHP (regardless of sharp ideological differences) compared to AKP.
In the end, AKP may need MHP’s help to pass the new civil constitution.

IBTIMES: Erdogan has been courting the Kurdish vote. Does this surprise you? And, are the Kurds a large enough voting bloc to make a difference in the election results?

ACHILOV: It is not surprising that AKP has traditionally tried to appeal to Kurdish votes. It has been successful, in fact.
The Kurdish votes are central in Southeast Turkey where they dominate. The Kurds make up 15 percent of Turkey’s overall population. What we see on the ground is a fierce battle for Kurdish votes between AKP and The Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).
If not for BDP, most likely, mainstream Kurdish people are expected to support for AKP, rather than CHP or, of course, MHP.
AKP has earned a good reputation for its pro-Kurdish minority legislations and wide-reaching social services (health care, education and infrastructure), which has been lacking in southeast region for many years. Polls show that AKP is expected to pick up more seats in 2011 from the southeast compared to 2007.

IBTIMES: The BDP cannot guarantee the support of the Kurds?

ACHILOV: While the Kurds are expected to support BDP, an increasing percentage has been leaning towards AKP and less to BDP in recent years.
This is not surprising given that the AKP has sponsored numerous “Democratic Openings” (bills geared towards) granting sweeping civil liberties to Kurdish minority. AKP consistently pursued “more integration,” “plurality,” and “dialogue” driven policies in sharp contrast to CHP and MHP’s more isolationist stance in regards to Kurds.

IBTIMES: In the event AKP is re-elected, what do you think is their vision for Turkey? Closer relations to the West? Or a move away from Europe and the US?
ACHILOV: For the first time, Turkey is trying to define its own path on the world stage. This path is clearly independent from Western influence and from Asian (and Middle Eastern) pressures. In this light, Turkey will move closer to the West only to the extent it will best serve its long-term strategic interests.
Likewise, Turkey’s closer alliance with the East will be determined by its long-term geo-strategic aspirations.
If AKP is re-elected, it will not move away from the West. To the contrary, AKP will most likely pursue deeper cooperation with the West, while maintaining its strong ties to Asia, Middle East and Africa.
On the whole, Turkey is expected to seek its own political leverage and regional influence by pursuing “balanced” diplomacy by keeping all its neighbors (including the West) closer to cooperation than confrontation while keeping its interests intact.