Turkish Forum

Tag: PKK

  • Iran Hangs Convicted Spy for Israel

    Iran Hangs Convicted Spy for Israel

    Security Official in Tehran Sees ‘Intensifying Intelligence War’

    By Thomas Erdbrink

    Washington Post Foreign Service

    TEHRAN, Nov. 22 — Iran has executed a man convicted of spying for Israel in an “intensifying intelligence war” between the two countries, a high-level Iranian security official announced Saturday at a rare news conference.

    Ali Ashtary, a businessman who sold communication and security equipment to Iranian security organizations, was arrested in 2007 and found guilty in June of spying for the Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, the semiofficial Mehr News Agency quoted the official as saying.

    The official, who heads the counterespionage unit of the Intelligence Ministry but was not identified by name, said Ashtary was put to death Monday morning. The Associated Press reported that he was hanged.

    The case “shows a new dimension and intensifying of the widespread intelligence fight between us and the Israeli intelligence service,” the official reportedly told a select group of local reporters.

    Israel has repeatedly said it is prepared to attack Iran over its nuclear program. Israel and the United States say Iran is trying to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran, which does not recognize Israel, maintains that its nuclear program is meant only for energy purposes.

    The counterespionage official said the Mossad is using satellite television advertisements and Internet chat rooms to recruit Iranians in order to obtain information about Iran.

    Pars TV, one of the dozens of Farsi-language opposition satellite television channels that broadcast from California, is running advertisements offering $10 million for information about a missing Israeli airman, Ron Arad, whose plane was shot down in 1986 over Lebanon. The ads urge Iranians to call or fax if they have information about his case.

    “Some people inside our country who were trying to make some money got in touch with that organization. But they fell into the intelligence operation created by the Zionist regime,” the official said. “Those people were changed into pawns in the hands of the Mossad, but they didn’t have any news on the Israeli pilot. Neither do we. They were used by Mossad to gather information.”

    Offering insight into Iran’s international intelligence operations, the official said that four people had been “identified and arrested” in the neighboring Kurdish region of Iraq, where anti-Iranian militant groups are active.

    “This team had gadgets and weapons made by Israel and intended to assassinate people who were not officials of the country. But now they are important for us,” he said, adding that the targets were not politicians or other members of Iran’s leadership. “Because we control the borders and have operations there, this group was arrested before they could carry out any action.” His comments were carried in the semiofficial Fars News Agency.

    Iranian officials accuse Israel and the United States of supporting several militant separatist groups inside and outside their country. One of the groups is a splinter of the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, which regularly attacks Turkish troops. Both militant organizations operate from the mountainous areas along the Iraqi-Turkish border. Since 2003, dozens of Iranian troops and insurgents have died in raids in the area.

    On Tuesday, at the start of a trial in Tehran, three men confessed to involvement in the bombing of a place of worship in the central city of Shiraz in April. Iranian officials have said the United States and Israel were involved in the blast, which killed 14 people.

    Ali Akbar Heidarifar, representing Tehran’s prosecutor general, called for death sentences in the attack, which also wounded 200, the official IRNA news agency reported.

    “I was brainwashed by the Iranian monarchy association to act against Islam and the system and told I had to save the people,” Mohsen Islamian, one of the defendants, reportedly said, referring to an unknown opposition group.

    Source: www.washingtonpost.com

  • TURKEY ADJUSTS ITS FOREIGN POLICY TO THE PLANNED U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ

    TURKEY ADJUSTS ITS FOREIGN POLICY TO THE PLANNED U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ

    By Emrullah Uslu
    Thursday, November 20, 2008

    U.S. and Iraqi officials finally agreed on a withdrawal plan requiring Washington to withdraw its forces within three years. The withdrawal will have a direct impact on Turkish-Iraqi relations. Ankara’s immediate concern is related to the control of Iraqi airspace, which will fall under the authority of Baghdad on January 1, 2009. This could affect Turkish air raids on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) camps in northern Iraq. With a green light from the United States, Turkish jets have been launching attacks on the camps since 2007. Moreover, since November 5, 2007, the United States has been sharing satellite intelligence from its Unmanned Aircraft Vehicles (UAV). Ankara is concerned about whether Iraqi officials will allow Turkey to continue its air raids (Milliyet, November 19).Although U.S. President-elect Barack Obama told the Turkish president that his country had the right to protect itself from PKK terrorism (Milliyet, November 19), Turkey wants to ensure that the raids will not be interrupted by the transition of control over Iraqi airspace. Turkish diplomats are working hard to adjust the Turkish position to fit the new situation. Turkey’s Interior Minister Besir Atalay paid a visit to Baghdad, during which the Iraqi government announced the establishment of a joint committee of senior Iraqi, Turkish, and U.S. officials to fight the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Today’s Zaman, November 20). While Turkish delegates were visiting Iraq, an Iraqi delegation was in Ankara; and there are plans for Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to meet with Iraqi Minister of State for National Dialogue Akram al-Hakim and Iraq’s Counter Terrorism special envoy Sirvan Elvai (Zaman, November 19).

    Turkey’s second concern is whether Iraq will be able to maintain its unity and, more precisely, how the Kurds will respond to the changing circumstances. How will the Kirkuk question be addressed? The relationship between the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the central government in Baghdad is becoming increasingly tense. KRG President Massoud Barzani used an appearance on local television to condemn Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki for attempting “to place power in the hands of one person and one party” (Al-Bayyna al-Jadidah, November 18).

    During security operations in March, Maliki created “Support Councils” that were made up of members of important tribes. They are funded and directed by Maliki’s office, and their ostensible aim is to give the tribes a role in maintaining local security and providing services (www.npr.org, October 22). The editor of the Kurdish Globe said that “Al-Maliki’s plan to establish Support Councils, including a tribal force in Kirkuk, is not only a direct threat to the Kurdish national interests but at the same time an issue that has the potential to destroy the already feeble relations between Kurds and Iraq” (Kurdish Globe, November 20).

    Barzani strongly reacted to the plan, stating that “the prime minister was one of the contributors of drafting the constitution, but any retreat from the constitution means retreating to dictatorship” (Kurdish Globe, November 20). He warned that Kurds who joined these Support Councils would be dealt with as “traitors” and Arabs who enrolled in them as “enemies” (Cihan Haber Ajansi, November 18).

    The Financial Times reported that the Kirkuk issue will become a pressing foreign policy concern for the next U.S. administration, not just because the Kirkuk dispute has the potential to pit Arab against Kurd and provoke intervention from neighboring states. It could also harm Washington’s relations with its closest allies in Iraq “the Kurdish authorities” (Financial Times, November 11, Zaman, November 13).

    It seems that the tension between Kurds and Arabs will continue for the near future. For this reason, the KRG wants to improve its relations with Turkey. The International Crisis Group maintains that when the U.S forces start drawing down significantly in the next two years, the Kurds will increasingly be dependent on the federal government and neighboring states such as Turkey and Iran. â EURO oeUnder this scenario, Turkey would be a more useful partner to the Kurds than either Baghdad or Tehran, because of the prospect it offers of access to the European Union, its availability as a transit country for Kurdish oil and gas; its ability to invest in major infrastructure projects; and the better quality of the goods it sells to Iraqâ EURO ™s Kurdistan Federal Regionâ EURO (www.crisisgroup.org, November 13).

    Yet Turkish and Arab demands on the Kirkuk issue are similar. It will therefore be very difficult for the Kurds to convince Turkey to support its Kirkuk claim. Under the circumstances the KRG has two cards to play: first, the KRG could use PKK terrorism as a means of balancing the KRG and Turkish demands (Hurriyet, November 18); and second, after January 1 the KRG will have some authority to stop Turkeyâ EURO ™s air operations against the PKK in Iraqi territory. Thus, allowing Turkey to continue its air operations will be a bargaining chip for the KRG. For Turkish side, it is expected that the United States will use the Incirlik airbase and the port of Mersin for a quick withdrawal. In this case, Turkey could use Incirlik and Mersin as a bargaining chip for convincing the United States to persuade the KRG to cooperate with Turkey against the PKK (www.ntvmsnbc.com, November 18).

    No matter how and when the United States withdraws its troops from Iraq, it will create many complications that would unsettle the region for a while. The key issue during the withdrawal period is the Kirkuk question. If the United States uses its influence on the Kurds to recognize Kirkuk as outside of Kurdish Regional Government jurisdiction, the Kurds will have the benefit of easily establishing good relations with Turkey. Ankara will be happy to see the Kurdish region as a buffer zone between itself and Iraq in case a civil war erupts in Iraq. Otherwise, Kirkuk could potentially be the center of a civil war between the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmens.

  • Obama Presidency: Perils and Prospects for Turkey

    Obama Presidency: Perils and Prospects for Turkey

    By Ferruh Demirmen 

    Senator Barack Obama’s election as the next President of the U.S. has caused trepidation in many Turkish circles. How would his administration’s foreign policy toward Turkey be? Would Turkey’s relations with the U.S. improve or worsen?  Indeed, there are perils on the horizon, but better times cannot be ruled out. The imponderables suggest that a “wait and see” stance is prudent. 

    Harsh Reality 

    On the potential downside, the Armenian question weighs heavily in U.S.-Turkey relations. Turks are understandably concerned that the Obama administration would recognize the so-called Armenian genocide. As most U.S. politicians who have been at the receiving end of generous campaign contributions from the Armenian lobby, Obama, as U.S. senator, supported Armenian genocide claims. He made this clear during Senate confirmation hearings of U.S. Ambassador-Designate to Armenia Richard Hoagland two years ago, and again early this year when he called for passage of Armenian genocide resolutions H.Res.106 & S.Res.106 in the Congress. He was influenced and counseled on this subject by none other than Samantha Power, an ardent proponent of Armenian “genocide.”

    Samantha Power holds the dubious distinction of being a non-Armenian and a virulent Turk-hater at the same time. The loose-mouthed lady of supposed scholarly reputation disgraced herself last March when she called Senator Hillary Clinton a “monster.” She had to resign as adviser to Senator Obama. Not surprisingly, Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) strongly endorsed (probably in violation of its 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status) Senator Obama’s candidacy.

    The Armenian issue became more ominous for Turkey when Obama chose Senator Joe Biden as his running mate. As a U.S. senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Biden gave support to all Armenian genocide claims since they first came to the U.S. Senate floor in 1990. Biden urged President Bush to use the word “genocide” in his proclamations, and was an enthusiastic sponsor of the Senate Armenian Genocide Resolution (S.Res.106) in 2006. In early 2008, Senator Biden renewed his call for Congressional recognition of the resolution, and in July of this year he reiterated his commitment to have Armenian “genocide” officially recognized by both the American and Turkish governments.

    Also looming on the horizon is a Democrat-controlled Congress, with Nancy Pelosi as the House Speaker and John Kerry (unless appointed as the Secretary of State) at the helm of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The combination of Obama administration and a Democrat-controlled Congress augers a vexatious turn of events for Turkey as far as the Armenian issue. Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora will find that the confluence of events in their favor had never been better.

    Of course, there will also be geostrategic issues to consider, and the Obama administration may have second thoughts about recognizing a trumped-up allegation that would further sour an already-fragile relationship between the U.S. and Turkey – caused mainly by Iraq war. According to a June 2008 poll, only 12 percent of Turkish people have a favorable view of the U.S. – a historic low. With Turkey’s proximity to Russia, the Middle East and Central Asia, and its strategic location as an energy corridor, it would seem myopic from U.S. national security point of view to further alienate Turkey.

    In fact, just before the elections the Obama-Biden camp issued a foreign policy statement in which reference was made to strategic value of Turkey for U.S. interests. This suggests that Obama and Biden, as President and vice-President, might moderate their positions on Armenian “genocide.”

    A most likely scenario is that the Obama administration would spurn the Armenian lobby’s efforts to recognize Armenian “genocide” while remaining passive to Congressional initiatives to pass such a resolution. This would give the administration a diplomatic “cover” – a poor one at that – to disassociate itself from the genocide controversy.

    Disservice to History

    Such turn of events would still be regrettable. Surprisingly, Turks are generally content if official declarations from foreign sources relating to 1915 events do not use the word “genocide.” Hence the sigh of relief when, on April 24 every year, the U.S. presidents issue a declaration commemorating the 1915 events without referring to “genocide.” Such declarations do disservice to history, however, and are nearly as condemnatory of Turks as the use of the word “genocide.” Turks should demand fairness and disclosure of full facts.

    President Bush’s declarations, for example, have referred to “mass killings of as many as 1.5 million Armenians,” grossly exaggerating the number of Armenian victims. His declarations ignore the cause of the tragic events (Armenian rebellion) and the massacre of a half a million Moslems at the hands of armed Armenian gangs. Senator John McCain, while refraining from using the word “genocide,’ has taken a similar position on the Armenian issue. Such declarations imply that the sufferings and death of Moslems at the hand of Armenian gangs were somehow inconsequential.

    Before issuing commemorative declarations on the 1915 events, it would behoove President-elect Obama – and the members of the Congress for that matter – to listen to such eminent scholars as Bernard Lewis, Turkkaya Ataov, Justin McCarthy and Eric Feigl – to name a few – and hear the other side of a controversial issue. A one-sided condemnation of historical events, no matter how-oft-recited by propaganda, and no matter how-well-wrapped in campaign contributions, does not serve history. Nor does it serve the cause of human rights. History cannot be re-created by legislative or executive fiat.

    Equally important, it is long overdue for the Turkish government, and Turks in general, to be more proactive and aggressive in disseminating historical truth on the Armenian issue. If foreign politicians such as Obama and Biden, among others, have been misinformed on the subject, the Turkish government and Turks bear a good deal of responsibility. By default, the matter has been left pretty much to Armenia and the Armenian lobby to exploit. The dire consequences have been much too evident. Historians on the Armenian side do not even wish to debate with their Turkish counterparts.

    Iraq War and Cyprus

    The occupation of Iraq, spearheaded by neocon philosophy, has generated enormous tension between the U.S. and Turkey. The war has not only created violence and turmoil in a neighboring country, it also destroyed much of the bilateral trade (oil included) between Iraq and Turkey and seriously threatened the territorial integrity of Iraq. In this connection, Turks do not recall kindly the proposal made by Senator Biden in 2006 that Iraq be partitioned into three autonomous regions under a loose federation. His proposal was met with much disappointment in Turkey.

    Turks also view with much suspicion President Bush’s cozy relation with Iraq’s Kurdish leaders, with Masoud Barzani, a tribal leader, being a frequent guest at the White House and treated like a head of state. Ironically, the relatively “peaceful” Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq is where the PKK terrorists have recently gained strength. Within the past few years PKK attacks against the Turkish territory have become more frequent and more daring. These events have raised doubts in Turkey about the sincerity of President Bush to fight terrorism when terrorists do their dirty deed under the banner of PKK.

    Many in Turkish circles wonder whether the Bush administration is harboring clandestine intentions involving an independent Kurdistan at the expense of the territorial integrity of Turkey. Some have gone so far as suggesting that eventually the U.S. may have to make a choice between the Kurds and Turks.

    Such suspicions, if unchecked, could tear apart the long-held partnership between the U.S. and Turkey. Turkey’s membership in NATO could also be put on ice.

    There are signs that the Obama administration would reverse this ominous trend. First, unlike Bush, who favors an open-ended withdrawal, Obama favors a quick (but orderly) withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. Second, the pre-election foreign policy statement from the Obama-Biden camp, noting that the Bush administration’s intervention in Iraq had helped revive the PKK threat against Turkey, identified close relationship with Turkey as being in U.S. national interest. It was also noted that the Obama administration would lead a diplomatic effort to bring together Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish leaders to negotiate a comprehensive agreement that deals with the PKK threat, guaranteeing Turkey’s territorial integrity. These are very hopeful signs.

    On Cyprus, Turks are somewhat apprehensive about the Obama administration’s stance. The concern arises from Biden’s close ties to the Greek and Greek-Cypriot lobbies, his support ,

    as U.S. senator, of the 1974 U.S. weapons embargo against Turkey, and Obama referring to Turkish troop presence on the island as “occupation.” The pre-election policy statement from the Obama-Biden camp, however, also calls for a negotiated settlement on Cyprus based on the principle of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, giving hope for an unbiased approach.

    In a broader context, Obama’s multilateralism and emphasis on diplomacy, as opposed to Bush’s unilateralism and saber rattling, would help regional stability and bolster U.S.-Turkey relations.

    In summary, the Obama administration holds both perils and hopes for Turkey, and for U.S.-Turkey relationship. The imponderables abound, and a prudent stance is “wait and see.” But both countries should look forward to a closer partnership in a renewed spirit without the mistakes of the last eight years.

    [email protected]

  • US better understood Turkey after Sept. 11

    US better understood Turkey after Sept. 11
    Tuesday, 04 November 2008

    The United States understood Turkey much better after the Cold War and especially after Sept. 11, said Ross Wilson, the U.S. ambassador to Ankara in an exclusive interview.“Turkey is a democratic, stable, powerful and self-confident country, the majority of its population is Muslim. We much better understood these properties of Turkey after the Cold War and especially after September 11, in comparison to the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s,” Wilson said. Wilson has been ambassador to Turkey for three years and is preparing to go back to the United States.

    Wilson said if there is any change in U.S. policy toward Turkey, that is about the United States, better understanding the importance of Turkey for its own interests, it highlighted secularism in the past, but currently emphasizes that Turkey is a “country of moderate Islam.”

    Washington has never failed to understand the significance of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, issue for Turkey, including the existence of the PKK in northern Iraq, Wilson said.

    “When we first entered Iraq, however, our focus was on reading the complete picture correctly. (We) thought that the PKK issue would be easily solved if the Iraq project settled down,” he said.

    The increasing PKK attacks made the United States understand the urgency of the issue, Wilson said, adding that they saw leaving the issue on its own might negatively affect efforts and Iraq and also the enthusiasm of Turkey to play its role in the Iraq project.

    “After that our president’s contribution to the PKK issue came forth. Today northern Iraq is not safe for the PKK,” he said.
  • Israel to begin new UAV deliveries to Turkey

    Israel to begin new UAV deliveries to Turkey

    TURKISH DEFENSE MINISTER VECDI GONUL VISITS ISRAEL

    Saban Kardas

    Turkey’s Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul visited Israel on October 29 and 30 to expedite the Turkish Armed Forces’ (TAF) purchase of 10 Heron Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) from Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI). He was accompanied by a large delegation that included Undersecretary for Defense Industries Murad Bayar and several military officers and civilians. The meeting also provided opportunities to discuss regional diplomacy and bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel.

    In 2005 Turkey awarded a $180 million contract for the off-the-shelf purchase of 10 UAVs to IAI and Elbit Systems, which outbid offers for the U.S. Predator UAV (Zaman, October 25). In response to the acceleration of the PKK’s terror campaign, the TAF’s new counter-terrorism strategy has been centered on the effective use of intelligence (Terrorism Focus, August 12). In addition to real-time images provided by U.S. satellites, the reconnaissance missions conducted by UAVs have come to play a crucial role in the air strikes against PKK strongholds in Northern Iraq and PKK militants inside Turkey.

    Despite the urgency of the TAF’s order, however, the Israeli contractor has postponed the delivery of 10 Herons to Turkey several times over the past year, citing technical failures in the camera system that will be produced by a Turkish subcontractor. In addition to accelerating domestic programs to develop national UAVs and the purchase of three Israeli Aerostar Tactical UAVs, Turkey leased Herons from Israel in 2007 (Yeni Safak, December 28, 2007). When one Heron at the TAF’s disposal crashed in July due to engine problems, Israel could not replace it because it did not have one available in its inventory (Referans, October 21). Turkey instead bought a smaller UAV called the Searcher.

    The shorter range of the Aerostars has hindered the flow of intelligence for the TAF. Surveillance shortages are speculated to have played a part in the TAF’s failure to prevent the PKK attack on Aktutun outpost, which claimed the lives of 17 soldiers on October 3 (Milliyet, October 18). Domestic debate on this attack has refocused attention on the difficulties Turkey has experienced with surveillance aircraft. On the eve of the trip, Gonul was urged to put pressure on Israel to speed up the delivery of the UAVs (ANKA, October 21).

    Gonul visited Israel at the invitation of Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak to observe the test flights of the Heron UAVs. Following the demonstrations, Gonul found the drones’ performance excellent and remarked that they would fill the requirements successfully and strengthen Turkey’s military capabilities. Reiterating the urgency of the UAVs for Turkey, Gonul noted that two of the Herons would be delivered to the TAF by the end of November and the remaining eight in early 2009 (Yeni Safak, October 31). At a meeting with Barak and Israeli Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, Gonul stated that cooperation with Israel in defense projects would not be limited to UAVs, although he declined to name any other specific projects (Milliyet, October 31).

    For its part, the Israeli side also is keen on deepening its partnership in defense projects with Turkey. When Barak visited Ankara in February as Gonul’s guest, he called for greater cooperation between the two countries and emphasized that Israel did not harbor any concerns about transferring sensitive technology to Turkey (Voice of America, February 12). Barak was particularly eager to convince Turkey to purchase Israel’s Ofeq spy satellites (Jerusalem Post, February 11). Israel’s flexible attitude has definitely been welcome to Ankara, because most of Turkey’s ambitious defense procurement and modernization programs contain stringent rules requiring greater domestic contribution in production or technology transfers to Turkish companies. Given the problems that U.S. weapons producers face in obtaining Turkish defense contracts due to the Turkish procurement policy, Israel provides an alternative for the Turkish military to obtain high-tech weapons systems for its fight against the PKK and to upgrade its aging weapons systems with larger domestic input. It has been reported, however, that the TAF is close to acquiring U.S.-made Predators to meet its urgent needs but is constrained by the Turkish procurement rules (Today’s Zaman, October 29).

    Vecdi Gonul also met Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Foreign Minister Tzipora “Tzipi” Livni, both of whom emphasized Turkey’s strategic importance in the Middle East and the value they attached to maintaining bilateral relations. They commended Turkey’s constructive efforts to contribute to stability and peace in the Middle East, in particular its role in the recent Syrian-Israeli negotiations. Livni, however, used this opportunity to express Israel’s displeasure with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to Turkey in August, and she called on Turkey to support international efforts to increase pressure on Iran. Israel and the United States have been critical of Turkey’s warm relations with Iran at a time when they are seeking to isolate Tehran on the nuclear issue (see EDM August 14). Gonul avoided confronting his Israeli hosts but clarified Turkey’s position by maintaining that Turkey would continue to develop relations with all countries in this volatile region on the principles of nonintervention in domestic affairs and good-neighborliness (CNNTurk, October 30; Milliyet, October 31). At a meeting with Israeli President Shimon Peres, Gonul discussed possibilities for building industrial zones on the West Bank (Zaman, October 31).

    Political differences aside, the two countries share a common ground: Turkey needs cooperation with Israel to fill its deficiencies in combating the PKK, while Israel views Turkey as a lucrative market for its sophisticated weapons systems. The recent visit reaffirmed both parties’ determination and ability to put an occasional divergence on regional diplomatic issues aside and maintain cooperation in mutually beneficial projects.

  • Destruction of Turkish Outpost by PKK Leads to Counterterrorism Reforms

    Destruction of Turkish Outpost by PKK Leads to Counterterrorism Reforms

    10/30/2008 – By Emrullah Uslu (from Terrorism Focus, October 30) – The PKK’s October 3 attack on the Aktutun military outpost sparked a controversy over whether Turkish counterterrorism strategy is on the right track. In its three decades old battle against the PKK, the Aktutun attack marked the first time the Turkish Armed Forces (Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri – TSK) was strongly criticized by mainstream media outlets. Two major factors played a role in the surprisingly harsh criticism. First, despite the fact that the PKK has organized four attacks on Aktutun outposts in the last year, the military failed to successfully defend its outpost, with 17 soldiers losing their lives. Second, the TSK failed to manage the sequence of events after the attack.

    Soon after the fatal attack, the Turkish press reported that Turkish military intelligence was aware of PKK intentions to attack Aktutun a month before it happened. Liberal daily Taraf published an intelligence report showing that the intelligence service detected and reported the details of the planning process. Along with the military intelligence reports, Taraf also published the three images from American satellite intelligence, which showed the preparation process of the attack (Taraf, October 14).

    The second source of criticism was the TSK’s failure to inform the public about what actually happened at Aktutun. On October 4, the PKK’s attack was posted on the TSK webpage, which announced 15 soldiers were killed and two were missing while 23 PKK fighters were killed in the clash (tsk.mil.tr., October 4). It turned out the PKK’s reported losses were inaccurate – only nine PKK bodies were found on the scene (cnnturk, October 5).

    On October 5, the Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff informed the media that the TSK had planned a year ago to move five military outposts to geographically secure places to avoid such an attack. Because of financial shortages the posts haven’t been moved yet (Hurriyet, October 5). This information sparked a controversy over whether the government provides sufficient financial support to the military (Hurriyet, October 6). Even soccer fan clubs became involved in criticizing the government by offering financial help to build a better military outpost (antu.com, October 8). The Finance Ministry responded by releasing a statement denying allegations the military was not financially supported. On the contrary, the Finance Ministry stated that “the Military in 2007 did not use 250 millions Turkish Lira from its budget and returned it back to the treasury” (Aksam Gazetesi, October 9).

    In addition, an anonymous source told mainstream daily Hurriyet that since Turkey’s land operation in northern Iraq last February, America had stopped sharing its satellite intelligence (Hurriyet, October 6) This disinformation attempt by Turkish sources was immediately rejected by the U.S. embassy in Ankara. An embassy spokesperson told Hurriyet: “There is no such termination on the intelligence sharing program with Turkey. It continues as it should be” (Hurriyet, October 7). A further explanation claimed the terrorists who attacked the Aktutun outposts did not come from PKK bases in northern Iraq, but from Turkish territory. Because American satellite intelligence devices are not programmed to monitor PKK movements in Turkish territory, the gathering of 300 PKK fighters could not be detected (Hurriyet, October 13).

    While the TSK has been trying to cover its failure through the release of selected information to pro-state media outlets, Taraf reported that the commander of the Air Force, General Aydogan Babaoglu, was playing golf in Antalya while the soldiers in Aktutun were fighting in their posts. Even worse was the fact he was one of the last people to hear what happened in Aktutun, some 24 hours after the clash ended. As the press noted, some of the dead soldiers had already been buried before Babaoglu was informed of the attack (Taraf, October 7). The TSK released a press statement to deny the allegations raised by Taraf, though the statement confirmed that General Babaoglu was in fact not informed of the attack until his golf game ended on Saturday, October 5 (tsk.mil.tr, October 8).

    The revelations prompted an angry response from the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Ilker Basbug, who held a press conference to denounce the publication of classified information; “Those who present the actions of the separatist terrorist organization [a euphemism for the PKK] as successful acts are responsible for the blood that has been shed and will be shed… This is my last word: I invite everyone to be careful and to stand in the right place” (Today’s Zaman, October 14). While almost all mainstream Turkish media was critical of at least the format and the tone of General Basbug and his apparent threats against the media, he received unexpected support for his statements from Prime Minister Erdogan, who joined Basbug in criticizing Turkey’s news organizations; “There is no room in this fight [against terror] for weakness or hesitation. Nobody should dare to show our government or security forces as weak” (Taraf, October 17; Turkish Daily News, October 17). Erdogan’s comments were met with a sarcastic response in some parts of the Turkish media, to which the Prime Minister replied; “Some people in the media are trying to provoke us. Where this is coming from is the question that we have the right to ask” (Turkish Daily News, October 18).

    The TSK insisted that the aerial photos published by Taraf were in fact from Kandil (125 kilometers away from Aktutun) and Kerintepe (20 kilometers away). A publication ban was imposed on further reproduction of the images on the grounds that it might jeopardize the investigation into who leaked the photos to the press (Bianet, October 17; Turkish Daily News, October 18).

    Taraf’s reporting opened the door for the mainstream media to question what went wrong at Aktutun. Even well known Kemalist intellectuals, who almost always support the TSK, began questioning whether Turkish counterterrorism policies work (Radikal, October 7; Sabah, October 8). Kemalist Republican Peoples Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi -CHP) leader Deniz Baykal blamed the military’s failure on the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP); “There were almost no terrorist actions or attacks [before the AKP took power in 2002]. Terrorism has significantly risen since 2002. The government has either been unable to understand the term ‘terrorism’ or it has chosen not to understand it. It has not grasped the significance of the fight against terrorism” (Aksam, October 8; Today’s Zaman, October 8).

    Such questioning led the TSK and the government to take a series of new steps. First, the TSK, for the first time in its counterterrorism history, openly invited counterterrorism experts to give their opinion (Vatan, October 8). In a counterterrorism meeting between military generals and the government, the generals requested extended powers and the creation of an institution to better coordinate the fight against terrorism (Radikal, October 10) Another significant development is the decision of the Turkish National Police (TNP) to send seven thousand men of its Special Forces units to the ethnic-Kurdish region of southeastern Turkey. During the 1990s the Police Special Forces were a leading element in the fight against the PKK, but during the February 28, 1997 political crisis between the Turkish military and the civilian government, the generals put pressure on the government to withdraw police forces from the region (Yeni Safak, October 10).

    On October 15 the government released its plan to reorganize government institutions in Ankara to better coordinate counter-terrorism efforts (Today’s Zaman, October 15). Furthermore, in the National Security Council (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu -MGK) meeting the government’s plan to reorganize the bureaucracy in Ankara to better coordinate state institutions in the fight against the terrorism was approved (Vatan, October 21).

    The new plan calls for the military to relinquish control for domestic security to the civilian Interior Ministry and its police and gendarmerie units (the latter are now under the effective, if not official, control of the TSK). The government is planning to coordinate all the state institutions to concentrate their efforts on counterterrorism problems by addressing the economic, social and educational aspects of terrorism. It was also announced that the Chief of Staff will be briefing government cabinet members about counterterrorism efforts. This marks the first time in three decades that the Chief of General Staff will brief civilian cabinet members. Prime Minister Erdogan revealed the “briefing will be about the details of the counterterrorism efforts to see what the government can do to coordinate counter-terrorism efforts for today and the future” (Anadolu Ajansi, October 24; Hurriyet, October 28). One consequence of the transfer of responsibility for counterterrorism efforts is the civilian government will now be accountable when there is a failure such as Aktutun.

    After two stormy weeks for the Turkish military, politicians and media, what seemed evident was that most of Taraf’s initial reporting was accurate. Indeed, despite the fact that the TSK received intelligence from various sources, it failed to prevent the PKK from attacking. Making matters worse, the TSK also failed to handle the aftermath of the Aktutun attack, harming its image in the process. By supporting General Basbug, Prime Minister Erdogan has lost his credibility in the eyes of Turkish Kurds and faced protests in his last visit to the predominantly Kurdish city of Diyarbakir, where Erdogan’s AKP was expecting to be successful in next March’s regional elections (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 24).

    On the positive side, however, there is now a clear effort to reorganize the state bureaucracy to better address the terrorism problem and, most importantly, the civilian government will finally be actively involved. Turkish diplomacy is at work and new channels of communications are being established with the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq to uproot PKK bases from in its territory. Following the disaster at Aktutun, it appears the civilian government and the military are finally on the same page in Turkey’s war on terrorism.