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  • Petition seeks to smash Turkish taboo over Armenian massacre

    Petition seeks to smash Turkish taboo over Armenian massacre

    Last Updated: Tuesday, December 16, 2008 | 3:24 PM ET Comments8Recommend26

    CBC News

    A group of 200 Turkish intellectuals is tackling one of the great taboos of Turkish society — the 1916 massacres of Armenians in the country.

    A group of writers, journalists and academics, many of them prominent members in their fields, has posted an online apology for the killings and invited ordinary Turks to sign it.

    “My conscience does not accept that [we] remain insensitive toward and deny the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected in 1915,” reads the apology, posted online on Monday.

    ‘Many djinns are out of their bottle, and many taboos are becoming public and people are freely discussing them.’—Cengiz Aktar, professor at Istanbul’s Bahcesehir University

    “I reject this injustice, share in the feelings and pain of my Armenian brothers, and apologize to them.”

    The apology stops short of using “genocide” to describe the massacres because use of the word would be “extremely counterproductive,” according to Cengiz Aktar, one of the authors of the petition.

    More than 6,200 ordinary Turks had signed the petition as of Tuesday morning, when Aktar, a professor of European union studies at Istanbul’s Bahcesehir University, spoke with CBC’s Q cultural affairs program.

    “We have not had the opportunity to talk about these horrible things in the last 92 years and we told ourselves maybe we will offer a forum to the ordinary Turks to apologize, to make their conscience talk,” Aktar said.

    The treatment of Armenians in Turkey has been such a taboo that Nobel Prize-winning author Orhan Pamuk faced prosecution after he said in an interview that a million Armenians had died.

    Aktar’s friend, the Armenian journalist and editor Hrant Dink, was shot and killed last year after being prosecuted over his comments about the massacre.

    But Aktar insists there have been changes in Turkish society and attitudes that encouraged the intellectuals, who range across the political spectrum, to come forward.

    “When I had the idea of starting an online petition, I had the feeling, this feeling that there is something in the heart and minds of the Turks regarding these events. And it doesn’t necessarily correspond what the Turkish state is telling them the past 90-plus years,” he said.

    ‘Taboos becoming public’

    Turkey has been reforming itself in an effort to join the European Union, and reforms implemented in 2002 and 2004 “are conducive for a freer environment and a more worldly culture, and we are now collecting the fruits of that,” Aktar said.

    He said he was partly motivated by the killing of his friend, Dink, but also by Turkey’s increasing openness.

    “Many djinns are out of their bottle, and many taboos are becoming public and people are freely discussing them,” he said.

    One potential benefit would be fewer attempts at censorship of journalists or writers who mention that period of history.

    Using the word “genocide” might have polarized the issue and made it less likely that ordinary people would take notice, Aktar said.

    The government has not responded to the petition, though the two ruling nationist parties have condemned it.

    However, Turks themselves seem interested and each signature on the petition makes it more likely that the government will have to respond in some way, he said.

    “I would dream of sizable figure by end of year to give the world a very strong message,” Aktar said.

    Historians estimate that, in the last days of the Ottoman Empire, up to 1.5 million Armenians were killed by Ottoman Turks.

    Armenians, including many in the diaspora spread across Europe and North America, have long pushed for the deaths to be recognized.

    Turkey and Armenia recently have taken steps toward repairing ties, with President Abdullah Gul becoming the first Turkish leader to visit Armenia this September.

    There are also steps being taken to reopen the border between the two countries, closed since 1993, when Turkey protested Armenia’s occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh.

    With files from Q, Associated Press

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    A Alfredo wrote:Posted 2008/12/17
    at 1:25 PM ET    This apology is a good step in the right direction and I applaud the brave men and women who have spearheaded this initiative. Turkey must honestly and openly address its past, in order to move forward and to help heal old wounds. 

    They can never fully make up for the horrors that Ottoman Turks perpetrated on their Armenian citizens, but there is no point in continuing to deny a truth that festers under the surface of Turkish society.

    The truth will set you free.

    2Peoplerecommendedthis comment2Recommend this comment Report abuse
    Fan wu ren wrote:Posted 2008/12/17
    at 7:18 AM ET    esseff 

    I’m not saying that you are wrong about the atrocities.

    Turkey invaded the island in 1974. Why? Because Nicos Sampson, a former EOKA Terrorist staged a coup. Shortly afterwards, the G Cypriots started to massacre the T Cypriots. The invasion was to protect the T Cypriot minority population

    I lived there also. I lived in the Buffer Zone, between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish armies. I was an intelligence officer in the Army on a UN mission. I saw both sides. Studied the history and the current situation every day. I don’t pretend to know everything, but I’m pretty well informed and impartial. I saw pictures on both sides and a whole lot of real stuff also.

    Neither side is innocent and both sides are guilty.

    In my view, Turkey doesn’t need to apologize for the invasion and occupation of the island.

    2Peoplerecommendedthis comment2Recommend this comment Report abuse
    esseff wrote:Posted 2008/12/17
    at 1:34 AM ET    Fan wu ren: 

    I have photographs to prove what I am saying… not what the propaganda says. I taught there for a year… it’s not twenty-five years…. but it’s an entire year. In fact, I sell a couple of photographs in my shop. I would post them but they won’t allow links here.

    In the end, I am not confused.

    The Greeks did some very nasty stuff there (as you pointed out). They are no angels. I have first-hand experience in Nicosia and was treated that way.

    Let me put it to you this way: I had a conversation with a fellow music prof. It ended with me saying to her: “I’m Canadian.. and I don’t hate Germans anymore.”

    Recommendthis comment Recommend this comment Report abuse
    SapereAude wrote:Posted 2008/12/16
    at 6:19 PM ET    Uh, why not post a link to the petition while you’re at it, CBC?
    2Peoplerecommendedthis comment2Recommend this comment Report abuse
    Fan wu ren wrote:Posted 2008/12/16
    at 5:48 PM ET    esseff ; You are confused. EOKA was a Cypriot (ethnic Greek Cypriot) terrorist group. The concept of ENOSIS was to unify Cyprus with the Greece, the ethnic brethern or the Greek Cypriots. 

    There are also ethnic Turk Cypriots. Who were of course the victims of EOKA, but so were the occupying British Forces.

    There has been plenty of atrocities to go around on Cyprus. Turks to Greek Cyriots and vice versa. Centuries of hatred and atrocity make for interesting politics until today.

    Since the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974 and subsequent partition of the island, things have been largely stable. Thanks in large measure to the UN force there.

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  • Ankara, Baghdad, and Erbil Reportedly Near a Deal to Deter the PKK in Northern Iraq

    Ankara, Baghdad, and Erbil Reportedly Near a Deal to Deter the PKK in Northern Iraq

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 5 Issue: 238
    December 15, 2008
    By: Saban Kardas

    The attempts to resolve Turkey’s Kurdish problem have focused increasingly on Iraq. Turkey has stepped up its diplomatic contacts with both the Iraqi central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to boost its fight against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), based in Northern Iraq.

    Turkish-Iraqi bilateral relations have been flourishing lately. Although the central government in Baghdad supported the Turkish air and ground offensive in the winter of 2007 to 2008, it could not pressure the KRG, which controls Northern Iraq, into limiting the activities of the PKK in the region (EDM, April 18). The officials in KRG were critical of Baghdad’s rapprochement with Turkey and condemned Iraqi President Celal Talabani’s visit to Turkey in March (Milliyet, March 7). This situation has changed; and a constructive dialogue is being held between Ankara, Baghdad, and the Kurdish capital of Erbil. During Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s trip to Baghdad in July, the parties signed an agreement to initiate high-level strategic cooperation (EDM, July 11). In anticipation of the American withdrawal from Iraq, Turkey met with the Iraqi central government and the United States to set up a trilateral security commission to coordinate activities against the PKK with the participation of the KRG (Terrorism Monitor, December 8).

    For some time it has been expected that Turkish President Abdullah Gul would visit Iraq. Gul accepted an invitation from Talabani, but the exact date of the visit was not made public for security concerns. Following the terror attack last week, Talabani went to Kirkuk, where he met with representatives of the Iraqi Turkmen community. He announced that the conditions among the Turkmen would be improved, a move that should please Turkey. Talabani reportedly said that Gul’s visit might take place on December 20 and that the two of them might go to Kirkuk together. In the wake of the deadly terror attack, such a trip might be a demonstration of solidarity against terrorism (Cihan Haber Ajansi, December 12).

    The Turkish President’s office confirmed that Gul would be visiting Baghdad soon, depending on the state of his health (he currently suffers from an ear infection that prevents him from flying). A trip to Kirkuk has not yet been confirmed, however. The Turkish daily Milliyet claimed that Turkish diplomats were displeased with Talabani’s statements (Milliyet, December 13). In October Talabani also invited Gul to participate in a ceremony for the opening of Erbil airport; the invitation was declined (www.cnnturk.com, October 13). Given the disputed status of Kirkuk and Turkey’s objections to the Kurdish stance on the status of these cities, the Turkish president might be hesitant to add Northern Iraq to his itinerary. For nationalist forces in Turkey, such a move could be construed as de facto Turkish recognition of the KRG’s right to statehood. As a matter of fact, in seeking the KRG’s cooperation against the PKK within the framework of the Turkish-American-Iraqi trilateral security commission, Turkey prefers to deal with the KRG as part of the Iraqi delegation.

    The mechanism set up between Turkey and Iraq might be paying off. The Turkish daily Taraf, which is known for its pro-Kurdish position, ran a story about a new plan being worked out between Ankara, Baghdad, and Erbil. Citing Iraqi Kurdish sources, Taraf claimed that the two major parties in Iraqi Kurdistan—Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—had decided to work against the PKK on a unified platform. They agreed to initiate a project to disarm PKK militants in Northern Iraq and return them to Turkey, under a plan to be supervised by the United Nations. As part of the plan, moreover, the PKK would be declared an illegal organization by the Iraqi Parliament, so that its activities inside the country could be curbed (Taraf, December 14). Given Taraf’s warm relations with the KRG, the report might indeed reflect the negotiations in progress among the parties. The report also notes that the KRG would seek to convince the PKK that maintaining that armed struggle harms Kurdish nationalist movement. The KRG has apparently not made any contacts with the PKK to seek its approval on this deal, however. It is unclear whether the KRG would go the extra mile to enforce such an arrangement, if the PKK resists.

    At this juncture, another visit to Northern Iraq becomes important. A delegation from Turkey’s pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) traveled to Northern Iraq from December 13 to 15 where they met KRG President Massoud Barzani in Erbil on December 13 and KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Idris Barzani (a nephew of the president) on December 14. On December 15 they will be in Suleymaniye to meet representatives of the PUK and in Baghdad to meet Talabani. Their discussions have included the latest developments on the Kurdish question, including the Turkish army’s recent cross-border strikes against the PKK camps and the diplomatic talks between Ankara and Erbil (www.cnnturk.com, December 14).

    It is no secret that many of Turkey’s Kurdish nationalists look to the KRG as a source of inspiration and guidance, and they welcome normalization of Turkey’s relations with Northern Iraq. It remains to be seen whether the leaders of the Iraqi Kurds can use their leverage on the DTP to convince the PKK to comply with the new agreement.

    https://jamestown.org/program/ankara-baghdad-and-erbil-reportedly-near-a-deal-to-deter-the-pkk-in-northern-iraq/

  • Iraq presents a lesson from history

    Iraq presents a lesson from history

    As Britain prepares to pull its troops out of Iraq, former BBC Baghdad correspondent Andrew North looks back to a previous military campaign and considers whether history is destined to repeat itself?

    As the insurgency spread, the letters from the British diplomat in Baghdad grew bleaker.

    “We are in the thick of violent agitation and we feel anxious? the underlying thought is out with the infidel.”

    And then: “The country between Diwaniyah and Samawah is abandoned to disorder. We haven’t troops enough to tackle it at present.”

    A month later: “There’s no getting out of the conclusion that we have made an immense failure here.”

    In fact, this insurgency was in 1920, the uprising against the British occupation of what was then still Mesopotamia.

    The diplomat was Gertrude Bell, an energetic and passionate Arab expert who literally drew Iraq’s borders. “I had a well spent morning at the office making out the southern desert frontier of the Iraq,” she wrote in late 1921.

    ‘Mass of roses’

    But read her letters and diaries and you can easily imagine she’s describing events since 2003, as American and British forces lost control of the country they had invaded.

    The latest unhappy chapter in Britain’s involvement in Iraq is approaching its end, with the government likely to announce soon a plan to withdraw most of its forces over the course of next year.

    There are plenty of parallels with 90 years ago, says Toby Dodge, the widely-respected Iraq expert at London University’s Queen Mary College, but “in the run-up to the invasion, both in Downing Street and the Foreign Office, there was no sense of history whatsoever”.

    The hundreds of letters Bell wrote to her parents during her time in Iraq and other parts of the Middle East, complete with requests for supplies of “crinkly hairpins”, are available to anyone via the internet.

    Born in County Durham, her papers are now held by Newcastle University’s Robinson library, which has been putting them online, together with her many photos.

    It is a record of a unique person, who also managed to find time to be an enthusiastic Alpine mountaineer and accomplished archaeologist, her first passion.

    But it was the creation of Iraq that would consume her most.

    There was a sense of elation when Britain took Baghdad from the Ottoman Turks in the spring of 1917 and a belief in the inherent rightness of the cause – much like the mood in the White House and Downing Street in April 2003 after the toppling of Saddam Hussein.

    “Baghdad is a mass of roses and congratulations,” Bell wrote, shortly after taking up her post as Oriental Secretary in the occupation administration. “They are genuinely delighted at being free of the Turks.”

    ‘Full-blown jihad’

    A few weeks before, the British commander Lt Gen Sir Stanley Maude had promised the people of Baghdad that: “Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators.”

    Fluent in Arabic, Bell threw herself into her task of setting up a pro-British Arab government and was soon the main link to the country’s new politicians.

    Her instinct was to give the Arabs more independence than London wanted. For several years things proceeded peacefully. The slower communications of that time meant any dissension took longer to spread. Iraqi insurgents today have mobile phones. But dissension there was.

    She had misjudged the power of the leaders of the Shia majority, particularly their clerics.

    “There they sit in an atmosphere which reeks of antiquity,” she wrote dismissively to her mother in early 1920, “and is so thick with the dust of ages that you can’t see through it – nor can they.”

    By that summer, they were leading an uprising against the British, who found themselves insufficiently equipped to handle it.

    “We are now in the middle of a full-blown jihad,” she confessed to her mother a few weeks later.

    Burning villages

    As things fell apart, anger and opposition to the Iraq venture grew in London. But Bell didn’t shirk the blame. “The underlying truth of all criticism is? that we had promised self-governing institutions and not only made no step towards them but were busily setting up something entirely different.”

    Her letters capture too the contradictions of being an occupying power, however good it believes its intentions to be. “It’s difficult to be burning villages at one end of the country by means of a British army and assuring people at the other end that we really have handed over responsibility to native ministers,” she said in November 1920.

    A new government was created though, in spite of the insurgency – as in Iraq today. It did meet one of London’s goals – it was pro-British and in 1921, Iraq officially became a nation state.

    But nearly 10,000 Iraqis had died in the process. And that government – with the imported King Feisal I at its head – was inherently unstable, led by the minority Sunnis, with the Shia majority excluded – the model by which Iraq would subsequently be governed by Saddam Hussein.

    The Shias have today reversed that perceived injustice – as they dominate the current government – although through an arguably more open process than in the 1920s.

    But their experience under the British is etched into their collective soul in a way that will condition Iraqi politics for many years yet. The other day in Baghdad, I was talking to a senior Shia figure who referred simply to “1920” as he explained his political outlook. And now it is the Sunnis who feel disenfranchised.

    Sleeping tablets

    Gertrude Bell died in the Iraqi capital in 1926 after taking an overdose of sleeping tablets. The last few years of her life she had returned to her original love of archaeology – setting up a museum that still stands – after falling out of favour in the colonial administration.

    Many older Iraqis still talk affectionately of the woman they called “Miss Bell”, despite her controversial record.

    She’s buried in a small date-palm fringed Christian cemetery in central Baghdad.

    The sprightly caretaker started working there in 1955, in the time of the last British-backed king, Feisal II, surviving the coups, dictatorships and chaos that have followed.

    Fighting has often engulfed the area around the graveyard in recent years. The British and Americans should have learnt “from the experience of others, like Miss Bell, and the lessons from history,” says caretaker Ali Mansour. “Iraq has always been a difficult country.”

    With the reduced levels of violence, there is a view in the outside world that Iraq is now somehow fixed.

    But attacks still claim 10-20 lives every day. And Toby Dodge sees many similarities between the “unstable, unrepresentative” state the British left behind in the early 20th century and what has emerged today.

    “The Americans as far as we know will leave Iraq in 2011 with an unstable state and an unpopular ruling elite using a great deal of violence to stay in power,” he says.

    What would Gertrude Bell have made of all of this? She did foresee the outline of things to come. In late 1921, the increasingly powerful Americans were manoeuvring to sign their own treaty with the new Iraqi state: “Oil is the trouble, of course,” she spat. “Detestable stuff!”

    Story from BBC NEWS:
    http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7774888.stm

    Published: 2008/12/10 12:34:59 GMT

    ) BBC MMVIII

  • Obama’s Turkish Partners

    Obama’s Turkish Partners

    A democratic Turkey that has respect in Muslim capitals is exactly what the West needs.

    By Mustafa Akyol | NEWSWEEK

    Published Dec 6, 2008
    From the magazine issue dated Dec 15, 2008

    For years Ankara’s foreign policy was fixated on a few narrow topics—how to handle the Greeks, the Kurds and Armenians—and Turkish policymakers seemed unable to solve even these chronic problems, let alone the problems of others. But these days Turkey has tackled such regional concerns with a new gusto—making the first real headway on the Cyprus issue in decades, for instance—while playing a far larger role in global affairs. In May Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government mediated indirect peace talks between Syrian and Israeli officials in Istanbul. The talks are now ongoing, and further meetings have reportedly been scheduled. Erdogan also recently stepped forward to offer help to U.S. President-elect Barack Obama to deal with Iran, which Turkey’s prime minister and many others expect to be Obama’s biggest foreign-policy challenge. On November 11 Erdogan told The New York Times his government was willing to be the mediator between the new U.S. administration and Tehran. “We are the only capital that is trusted by both sides,” he reiterated later in Washington. “We are the ideal negotiator.”

    This surge of interest in becoming something of a global peacemaker is in part the result of the ongoing process of Turkish democratization. The nation’s old elite consisted of the more isolationist Kemalists, the dedicated followers of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who established a republic without democracy in 1923 to westernize and secularize the nation. For many decades to come, society remained divided between the dominant Kemalist center and the more traditional periphery it kept under its thumb. But things fundamentally changed after the election victories of Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 and 2007. The “other Turkey” was now out of the periphery and into power, and while it proved to be more religious than the old elite, it also proved to be more pro-Western, and more committed to the European Union accession bid than its growingly xenophobic secular rivals.

    This was not simply a convenient tactic, as some have argued. Turkey’s conservative Muslims had been undergoing a silent reformation since the 1980s, as evidenced by the country’s growing “Islamic bourgeoisie,” which sees its future in global markets, not Sharia courts. Ideas about the compatibility of Islam and liberal democracy flourished, as recently evidenced by headscarved women rallying in the streets for civil liberties for all.

    Meanwhile, Ahmet Davutoglu, an erudite scholar who became Erdogan’s chief adviser, outlined a new foreign-policy vision. Turkey had unwisely denied its cultural links with the Middle East for decades, he argued, but the time had come to turn Turkey into a “soft power” that exports peace, stability and growth in its region. Hence came the rapprochement in recent years and months with Greece, Lebanon, Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan and most recently Armenia, where President Abdullah Gül paid an ice-breaking visit in September.

    Kemalist Turks dislike this “neo-Ottoman” approach, which prescribes closer relations with other Muslim nations. When Erdogan greets his Arab counterparts “in the name of God,” they are horrified and argue that the country’s secular principles are under threat. And to garner support from Westerners who are concerned about political Islam, for good reasons, they try to depict the AKP as Taliban in sheep’s clothing. But, in fact, a democratic Turkey that has respect in Muslim capitals, that can speak their language and that is willing to use this leverage for peace and reconciliation is exactly what the West needs.

    Some in the West fear this approach as well, taking notice of AKP’s interests in Islam and the rampant anti-Americanism in Turkey, and sometimes conflating and confusing the two. Yet that anti-American wave is a reaction to the Iraq War and its aftermath. By empowering the Kurds in the north, the post-Saddam era unleashed the deepest of all Turkish fears: the emergence of a Greater Kurdistan. In other words, anti-Americanism is almost a derivative of anti-Kurdism, and, not too surprisingly, is strongest in the nationalist circles, which include the Kemalists. These groups, represented by the two main opposition parties, deride the AKP as American puppets and Kurdish collaborators. A 2007 bestselling book, whose Kemalist author was covertly financed by the military intelligence, even argues that both Erdogan and former AKP member President Gül are actually covert Jews who serve “the elders of Zion” by undermining Atatürk’s republic.

    Turkey’s new elites are not covert Jews as some fringe Kemalists fantasize, of course. But neither are they creeping Islamists as smarter Kemalists portray. In fact they are Muslim democrats, who can both take Turkey closer to becoming a true capitalist democracy and inspire other Muslim nations to follow a similar route. For sure, they need to combat ugly nationalism inside their borders and take continued steps toward deepening liberal reforms. With such a combination of sound domestic leadership and visionary foreign policy, they would be ideal partners for the Obama administration in its own effort to reach out to the troublesome actors in the Middle East.

    Akyol is a columnist for Istanbul-based Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review.

    © 2008

    Source: Newsweek, 6 December 2008

  • THE FUTURE OF TURKEY?

    THE FUTURE OF TURKEY?

    Ramday Javed Iqbal (lead)

    Alistair Corbett

    October 2008

     

    The Royal College of Defence Studies

     

    RCDS 2008 – CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC ISSUES

    Key Judgements

    • Turkey is likely to internally consolidate its democracy, resolve conflict between secularism and political Islam and sustain economic growth. Some tension between democratic forces and secular elite will remain.

     

    • The Kurdish problem will slightly ease up due to mitigating internal political developments but essentially stay frozen due to external regional situation.

    • While Turkey-EU dialogue will continue, Turkey is likely to face continuous hurdles in securing full membership of the EU, in the foreseeable future.

    • Turkey’s position as a hub of energy pipelines linking Caspian Sea with Europe will increase its importance to EU for its energy security.

    • In view of the efforts at resolution of Cyprus issue the likelihood of its settlement has increased.

    • The EU attitude towards Turkish membership, Russian reassertiveness in her “near abroad”, the stability and orientation of the Persian Gulf region, Chinese influence in Central and West Asia and the orientation of the future Iraq will determine Turkey’s role as regional power.

     

    Discussion

    • Having lost an empire Turkey has been trying to find its soul for a century. Internally, it decided to make a break with the imperial past by opting for a harsh form of western secularism. Economy remained on the rocks. Turkish nationalism was brittle and paranoid. Externally, problems with Greece persisted even as both had membership of NATO. The twenty first century has begun with changes in the internal and external scene for Turkey. How Turkey perceives threats and opportunities in the new environment will dictate the future of Turkey. This paper essentially follows and examines dominant factors to draw relevant conclusions and reach key judgments.

     

    • Secularism vs Political Islam. In recent years the long drawn battle between secularism and political Islam has come to the fore. Although Justice and Development Party (AKP) is not yet clearly out of the woods the tide of political legitimacy seems to be turning in favor of democratic forces. The military and judiciary seem to have realized that, political space will have to be conceded to democratic forces particularly when it brings along economic prosperity, keeps Turkey on track for EU membership and safeguards the security interests. Slowly, and due to EU membership requirements, the democratic culture will mature in the mid-term.

    • Economy. After the shock of 2001, Turkey embarked upon macro institutional reforms opening up the economy, within the framework of an IMF programme. As a result, Turkish economy has witnessed sustained and robust growth. The current global financial crises will impact Turkey less than others. Having received the dividends it is unlikely that any government will reverse course.

    • Kurds. No other security issue has engaged the Turkish mind and energies as the Kurdish problem. The broader issue is not the PKK but Kurdish independence. The US invasion of Iraq and resultant autonomy for the Kurds in the north has raised the spectre of an independent or autonomous Kurd region with Kirkuk oil wealth. This could further create a pull on the Turkish Kurds. In the past, Turkish response to the challenge has been brutal suppression of any Kurdish cultural or political expression. Recently, in addition to military operations the AKP government has slightly eased the political environment. While this may work, the external regional linkages are likely to strain the Turkish restraint in the foreseeable future. The issue will continue to dog Turkish governments for at least another generation.

    • EU. The AKP government has undertaken several political, legal and economic reforms to prepare itself for EU membership. It has also maintained a steady political course for securing membership. Meanwhile, it has made reasonable economic progress, remains important to European energy security and made moves to reduce the baggage of its Cyprus issue. On the EU side however, still there are significant historical, religious and psychological barriers to Turkish entry in to the club. In the mid-term this could change. However, this is not, and will not be a settled issue till at least 2015. Eventually, Turkey may choose to be a beneficiary of EU “variable geometry” (ie not a full member but economically integrated while independently sovereign). Turkey will certainly continue to seek markets and allies to the east also.

    • US and NATO. Increasingly, Turkey’s anchors to the west are drifting or are under strain. NATO, for decades the bedrock of Turkey’s western identity, particularly for its influential military, has lost lustre. Despite laudable garden-tending by senior officials on both sides, US-Turkish relations have not recovered the depth and breadth they had in the 1990’s. This is happening at a time when Middle East, West Asia, Central Asia and Caucasus are transforming and Turkey’s relevance to the US is increasingly going to come to the fore. Recently, in the wake of August war in Georgia, Turkey has opposed introduction of NATO forces in to the Black Sea. While a dramatic NATO split is not envisaged, in the future the alliance will come under strain.

    • Greece and Cyprus. Turkey – Greece rivalry goes back several centuries. However, starting in 1999, the earthquake diplomacy has helped thaw the relations and Greece has supported Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership. Meanwhile, Greek Cyprus has joined the EU – granting Nicosia a veto over all things Turkish. There are efforts at hand to resolve the Cyprus issue. Should they succeed, they will free Turkey from a significant burden and improve her chances for the EU membership as well. 

    Conclusions

     

    •Turkey is the heir to the Ottoman Empire, which at various points dominated the eastern Mediterranean, North Africa, the Balkans, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Black Sea region until it met the expanding Russian empire. Its collapse after WW-I created an oddity – an inward looking state in Asia Minor. It sat out 20th century or allowed its strategic space to be used. The situation has changed dramatically.

     

    • Turkey is at a critical stage in its quest for a democratic political dispensation and economic upswing. The road ahead remains rocky. However, the signs indicate that Turkey will most likely stay the course and internal stability will lead to its increased potential for playing a regional role.

    • Turkey has quietly emerged as the prize in a new great game over who will develop and bring to the EU / world markets the vast oil and gas resources of the Central Asian states. Turkey will in the years ahead become one of the world’s major energy hubs, supplied by the pipelines which will crisscross Anatolia. It will depend on US and EU as to where those lines run and whose products pass through those lines.

    • Turkey’s EU project faces a hopeful but uncertain future. The relevance of NATO has dimmed. The US nexus has fallen victim to the US invasion of Iraq and support for the Iraqi Kurds. Yet, all this happens at a time when Turkey is rising and in the future the West’s need for Turkey will increase. The strategic spaces around Turkey are all in turmoil. They have also been traditional areas of Turkish influence. Turkey will inevitably attempt to influence these spaces. How and to whose advantage this happens will depend as much on US / EU, as on Turkey.

     

    Ramday Javed Iqbal (lead)

    Alistair Corbett

  • Turkey’s PKK Responds to AKP Flirtation with the Kurdistan Regional Government

    Turkey’s PKK Responds to AKP Flirtation with the Kurdistan Regional Government

    Turkey’s PKK Responds to AKP Flirtation with the Kurdistan Regional Government

    Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 23
    December 8, 2008 03:25 PM Age: 44 min
    Category: Terrorism Monitor, Global Terrorism Analysis, Terrorism, Turkey
    By: NIhat Ali Ozcan and Saban Kardas
    Turkey had high hopes its cross-border operations in the winter of 2007-8 would eliminate the threat posed by the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan – PKK). The ability of the PKK to strike back in the spring and summer of 2008 through staggering attacks raised questions about the effectiveness of Turkey’s strategy. The PKK survived the Turkish winter offensive and endured heavy weather conditions without losing its operational capability, thanks to its safe havens in northern Iraq. This situation led to a reevaluation of Turkey’s policies. Boosting the dialogue between Turkey and northern Iraqi authorities has emerged as the new approach to the solution of the PKK problem.

    The center of gravity for the PKK problem has shifted to the political and diplomatic realm, and will remain so in the coming months. Unlike the relative calm in the area of military operations in rural southeastern Turkey, the political debates continue unabated and will intensify further as municipal elections approach. The PKK also has been a subject of Turkey’s international and regional diplomatic initiatives (see Terrorism Focus, November 19). We will analyze the AKP government’s new openings in domestic and foreign policy and the PKK’s response to the new political setting.

    Preparing for the Winter

    PKK activity in Southeastern Turkey has declined considerably with the approach of winter. Most PKK militants are getting prepared to cope with the harsh winter conditions; some have withdrawn to their safe havens in northern Iraq, while others are moving to higher elevations where they have traditionally sought shelter in hidden caves. The PKK militants will need to survive through the winter with minimum mobility, living on the limited amount of food they were able to store during the summer. The Turkish Armed Forces (Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri – TSK) has also called back most of the commando units from the region; most will be stationed in their barracks, preparing for new offensives in the spring. The TSK will most probably continue to use high-tech winter equipment to carry out its special operations. The level of armed activity in the region may remain low over the next few months as the PKK shifts to attacks in urban areas, like its December 1 attack on the Istanbul offices of the  Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) (Milliyet, December 3). The key question is whether Turkey will be able to quell the PKK threat through political openings and prevent new attacks next spring and summer.

    Turkey’s Dialogue with the Northern Iraqi Regional Administration

    The PKK has taken advantage of the mountainous terrain of northern Iraq and used the region as one of its encampment areas since 1983. This situation has had direct implications for Turkey’s relations with northern Iraq’s majority Kurdish population. The main determinant of the nature of this relationship has been the changing balance of power in the region. Despite the historic importance attached to Turkey’s recent dialogue with the Kurdish authorities in Iraq, such cooperation is not a political taboo. Turkey worked closely with Kurdish peshmerga forces and conducted joint operations against the PKK throughout the 1990s. However, the dynamics of regional politics over the last couple of years changed this picture drastically. Growing American influence in the region following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 resulted in the severance of ties between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds. The Iraqi Kurds’ newfound partnership with the United States heightened the Kurds’ perception of their relative power in the region, resulting in a rather daring and at times confrontational attitude toward Turkey. Kurdish authorities in Northern Iraq did not refrain from increasing tensions with Turkey when Turkey protested the Iraqi Kurds’ lenient attitude toward the activities of PKK guerillas in northern Iraq (Radikal, October 22, 2007).

    Within Turkey, the image of northern Iraq’s Kurds as the sponsor of the PKK has created a domestic constituency against any sort of dialogue with the Kurdish authorities, thus contributing to the hostile environment. Relations between Turkey and Iraq’s Kurds are nevertheless going through a new period of optimism lately, after hitting several low points over the last year. The Turkish media abandoned its policy of bashing Jalal Talabani (President of Iraq and leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan – PUK) and Massoud Barzani (President of the Kurdistan Regional Government – KRG – and leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party – KDP). Barzani has since adopted a softer language toward Turkey. There are signs the pragmatism of the 1990s might be returning.

    Developments on both sides of the Turkish-Iraqi border lay behind these changes. On the one hand, the anticipated changes in America’s Iraq policies in the wake of the U.S. presidential elections and new developments in Iraqi domestic politics have forced the Kurdish groups to re-evaluate their uncooperative attitude vis-à-vis Turkey’s demands. On the other hand, the growing consensus within the Turkish security establishment on the need to cooperate with the Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq has facilitated changes in Turkey’s policies.

    The Impact of the US-Iraqi Security Accord

    The U.S.-Iraqi security accord requiring the United States to pull out from Iraq by 2011 has important implications for the PKK and the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq. The KRG is uneasy about the growing power of Shiite and Sunni Arabs in Iraq. In a post-American Iraq, the Iraqi Kurdish leadership will not only lose the political leverage they obtained through alliance with the United States, but will also have to calculate the possible risks of a civil war scenario. To hedge their bets against these future uncertainties, Iraqi Kurds have reasons to be on good terms with Turkey. [1] The Kurdish leadership has come to realize that the key to normalization with Turkey is abandoning their tolerance of the PKK by limiting the group’s freedom of movement in areas controlled by the KRG. Recent developments indicate a consensus between the Turkish government and the Barzani administration to increase their grip on the PKK. The question may no longer be whether to fight the PKK together, but how.

    The Trilateral Permanent Security Commission

    Although the first signs of a possible Turkish-Iraqi Kurdish rapprochement emerged during Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Washington in October 2007, the AKP government took concrete steps toward normalization only recently. Here one has to note the crucial role played by the TSK’s decision to support establishing relations with the Kurdish administration.

    The AKP government made its initial overtures last spring. Most significantly, following the decision of the National Security Council (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu – MGK) to enhance relations with “all Iraqi groups” in its meeting on April 24, a Turkish delegation led by Ahmet Davutoglu, Erdogan’s chief foreign policy advisor, met a team of Iraqi officials, including Nechirvan Barzani, the KRG Prime Minister and nephew of Masoud Barzani (Zaman, May 2). [2] The real impetus came with the second phase in early October. An official Turkish delegation composed of high-level representatives including Davutoglu and Murat Ozcelik (Turkey’s Special Envoy to Iraq), met Masoud Barzani in Baghdad (NTV, October 15). In the ensuing days, diplomatic relations improved significantly and areas of cooperation diversified. Turkish Interior Minister Besir Atalay visited Baghdad and held a tripartite meeting with representatives of the Iraqi central government and the United States on November 19, only a few days after the Iraqi-American security accord was agreed upon. The parties decided to establish a permanent commission to streamline Turkish, American and Iraqi efforts in fighting the PKK and to regulate Turkey’s access to Iraqi airspace and territory to carry out cross-border operations in northern Iraq (NTV, November 20). KRG representatives were included as part of the Iraqi delegation. By sending the interior minister, the Turkish government signaled its determination to recognize the Kurdish administration, but only as part of the central government (Radikal, November 23).

    PKK to Kurdistan Regional Government: Don’t spoil Kurdish gains

    PKK sources have been observing the KRG’s attempts to reorient its policies closely and with growing anxiety. They view this development as the main threat to the gains of the Kurdish nationalist movement. The collaboration of the Kurdish administration with the trilateral permanent commission is seen as a shortsighted move that is extremely damaging to the national cause. For the PKK, the only novelty of this new arrangement is its pitting the southern Kurds against the PKK, for the United States and Baghdad government have already worked with Turkey to eliminate the PKK (see Terrorism Focus, November 26). Therefore, the PKK criticizes the shift in Barzani and Talabani’s positions, as this will inevitably undermine the Kurds’ position in the region and in Iraq. From the PKK’s perspective, Turkey’s decision to initiate dialogue with the Barzani administration marks Turkey’s return to its old strategy of the 1990s, which in the PKK’s opinion is bound to fail (Gundem Online, November 30).

    More specifically, PKK sources are critical of the operations carried out by Barzani’s peshmerga militias. The PKK accuses Barzani’s peshmerga of limiting civilian movement in PKK-controlled areas and confiscating villagers’ excess food. The PKK militants depend on local food and the continuation of their freedom of movement in northern Iraq to maintain their logistical infrastructure. Tactically, the PKK seeks to settle civilians in proximity to its camping grounds in order to blend into the local population. Moreover, in case of Turkish airstrikes against these camps, the PKK might use civilian casualties to mobilize international public opinion against Turkey. Another PKK criticism takes aim at the KRG’s failure to protest TSK airstrikes against PKK positions (Gundem Online, November 30).

    PKK to Turkey: Put Your Own House in Order

    The representatives of Turkey’s Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi – DTP) have started to criticize Turkey’s rapprochement with Barzani. For instance, Selahattin Demirtas, deputy chairman of the DTP, criticized the AKP government’s willingness to speak with Barzani while at the same time refusing to talk to the DTP. For Demirtas, Barzani “is a party to the problem. He is an outside power,” whereas the DTP is a native force represented in Turkey’s Parliament. Demirtas also distanced the DTP ideologically from the KRG by labeling it a “feudal, conservative, rightist movement,” while the DTP represents a “democratic, pro-human rights and leftist movement” (Zaman, November 30-December 1).

    As the municipal elections approach, the competition between the governing AKP and DTP over winning Kurdish votes has heightened. In the midst of growing tensions caused by the exchange of fighting words between the representatives of the two parties, as well as violent demonstrations in streets, Justice Minister Mehmet Ali Sahin suggested that if imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan called on the PKK militants to lay down their arms, the government might consider easing his conditions in the prison.

    For Ocalan, the real solution is contingent on dialogue. Domestically, he called for the establishment of a “truth and reconciliation commission,’” similar to those established in other post-civil war societies. Only a democratic project at home could save the state and solve the Kurdish question and make Turkey a true regional power. Ocalan seeks to reach out to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani by asking him to get involved by using his status in the Socialist International to promote a democratic solution by mobilizing international actors. Ocalan, however, did not give up covert threats to Turkey; “Right now there is a condition of uprising. It might turn into a hurricane in spring” (Gundem Online, November 28).

    PKK commander Murat Karayilan noted the movement is in favor of a peaceful solution through dialogue but ruled out a unilateral ceasefire; “If the Turkish state comes out and says that it seeks dialogue, and ceases its operations, no bullet will be fired. We are not the attacking side, we are in defense … How can we lay down our arms? We survive thanks to our arms” (Gunderm Online, December 2). Karayilan criticized Erdogan for failing to live up to his promise to find a democratic solution to Kurdish problem by reverting back to the military option. Karayilan underlined that the PKK is prepared for a political solution but also remains vigilant to meet military challenges. He also paralleled Ocalan’s’ threats, by maintaining that if Turkey continues its military operations and fails to develop a settlement that recognized the role of the PKK, the group would abandon its defensive strategy of “low-intensity warfare” and elevate its armed campaign to offensive “medium-intensity warfare.”

    Karayilan, however, recognizes that the PKK is being pressed hard militarily. The mounting Iranian offensive on Kurdish positions along the Iranian-Iraqi border, conducted in coordination with Turkey’s airstrikes, has caused worries for the PKK. Karayilan has criticized Iran for supporting Turkey, citing the economic and energy cooperation between the two countries. He called on Iran to give up futile military measures, and embrace the Kurdish people’s demands for peace and dialogue (Gundem Online, December 2).

    Conclusion

    Through its diplomatic initiatives, the Turkish government may be hoping to worsen the conditions for the PKK during the winter, curbing its operational ability in the spring. In their rapprochement with Turkey, the Iraqi Kurds are driven by a concern to readjust to the new strategic reality of Iraq after an American withdrawal and the development of Iraqi domestic politics.

    The PKK leadership and the DTP are worried about the implications of Turkey’s diplomatic opening to Kurdish groups in northern Iraq. On the military front, the PKK claims to possess the military capability needed to resume its armed activities in Turkey. Through its sabotage attack against the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline on November 22, the PKK might have been sending a warning to both the Iraqi central government and the KRG about their decision to support Turkey.

    The PKK has sought to bring to the fore the argument that a real solution to the Kurdish problem requires the Turkish government to deliver political reforms, meaning it should recognize the PKK as a legitimate actor. In regards to electoral competition, the DTP and the PKK have started to invoke speculation that the Turkish government could use fraudulent techniques to manipulate the local elections. DTP deputies have emphasized this point as part of their election campaign.

    The AKP government came under criticism from pro-reform forces and international observers for abandoning domestic reforms and prioritizing a military solution to the Kurdish issue. It has sought since to use diplomacy and limited political openings to further curb the PKK’s military strength. The DTP, however, consistently calls for “true democratic openings” at home, without relinquishing PKK violence. The AKP is forced to engage in a delicate balancing act—on the one hand, it has to assume political responsibility for the armed struggle against the PKK’s terror campaign; on the other hand, it has to compete with the DTP in the democratic field. While the AKP realizes that tightening the military grip on the PKK may harm its electoral chances in southeastern Turkey, letting up on the PKK now risks more attacks in the spring and may harm the party’s prestige in the West.

    Notes

    1. Turkish analysts believe that a common understanding between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds about the future of Iraq is emerging. Some claim that in case of a civil war, Turkey might throw its support behind the Kurds. See Mete Cubukcu, “Turkiye’nin Irak’taki B Planinda Kurtler Var,” Referans, November 27.
    2. National Security Council Press Briefing, April 24, 2008. www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2008/24nisan2008.htm.