Tag: PKK

  • Turkey to buy Russian Night Hunters

    Turkey to buy Russian Night Hunters

    16:02 15/06/2009

    MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik) – A Turkish military delegation has come to Russia to discuss the possible acquisition of Mi-28 attack helicopters. This is not the first time the two countries have discussed cooperation.

    In the 1970s and the early 1980s, Turkey bought 32 used AH-1P/S Cobra attack helicopters in the United States and later upgraded them to the AH-1F specifications. The Turkish army still has 23 AH-1P/S Cobras. However, Turkish military authorities started thinking about replacing them in the mid-1990s.

    During the subsequent tender they considered several models of combat helicopter, including the Ka-50-2 Erdogan, a version of the Russian Ka-50 Black Shark developed by Russia and Israel for Turkey. Unlike the Ka-50 where the pilots sit side-by-side, the seats in the Erdogan are placed in tandem as in the U.S. Cobra chopper.

    However, Turkey did not choose the Kamov helicopter for political reasons, such as growing U.S. influence in Turkey and, conversely, the lack of Russian influence. Also, Russia could not then guarantee the timely production of the required number of new helicopters or post-sale service. Lastly, the Ka-50 was not mass-produced even for the Russian army at that time.

    An updated Cobra with new weapons and equipment was the most probable winner in the Turkish tender, but the contract was eventually awarded to a European producer, the Anglo-Italian AgustaWestland, which proudly proclaims to be “a total rotorcraft capability provider.”

    AgustaWestland, announced as the winning bidder in March 2007, pledged to assemble 50 T129 prototypes in Turkey. However, the first T129 will be rolled out only in 2015, whereas Turkey needs choppers now to fight Kurdish militants.

    The purchase of seven used AH-1W SuperCobras in 2008 has not solved the problem either. Turkey needs modern attack helicopters to fill the gap until 2015 and for several more years while its pilots learn to fly the T129 choppers.

    As a result, Turkey has decided to purchase Russian machines. It has opted for the Mi-28N Night Hunter, which, unlike the Ka-50, has been mass-produced since the 1990s and is supplied to the Russian Armed Forces.

    Turkey may buy between 12 and 32 helicopters within two or three years. It is unclear if it wants the choppers with or without top-mounted radar, which is an extremely expensive option.

    The Turkish military had once considered buying the Mi-24 Crocodile, which has several common structural elements with the Mi-28. The Mi-17 multirole helicopter is currently used in Turkey for military, police and civilian purposes.

    Significantly, the Mil helicopters have for years been used in similar terrain in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Moreover, Russia’s influence and relations with Turkey have grown dramatically and many contradictions in bilateral ties have been smoothed over since the 1990s.

    Therefore, Turkey could buy the Mi-28, whose track record over the past 20 years and the initial results of its combat use show that this highly versatile helicopter could remain on combat duty even after T129 assembly start-up in Turkey.

    And the final touch: the protection and combat payload specifications of the T129 are below those of the Mi-28.

    The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

  • Turkey to establish anti-terrorism undersecretariat

    Turkey to establish anti-terrorism undersecretariat

    ctISTANBUL – A Turkish government official said Monday a draft law to establish an undersecretariat to help counter-terrorism units was opened to signature.

    Speaking after a Cabinet meeting in the Turkish capital of Ankara, government spokesman Cemil Cicek said he hopes that the draft law would be put into effect within May.

    Cicek added the undersecretariat would function within the Interior Ministry.

    Ankara, provided with intelligence by the United States, stepped up its campaign to crackdown on the terror organization PKK both inside Turkey and its bases in northern Iraq, from where the terrorists launch attacks on the neighboring country.

    The PKK is listed as a terrorist group by Ankara and much of the international community, including the EU and the United States.

    Source: www.hurriyet.com.tr,  May 04, 2009

  • The Dream of a Kurdish State

    The Dream of a Kurdish State

    By Hewa Aziz

    Sulaimaniyah, Asharq Al-Awsat- Throughout its long history, the forty-million strong Kurdish nation has never had its own independent state. Since the decline of the Median Empire some 3000 years ago, the Kurds have remained part of other states or, at the best, managed to establish scattered principalities as part of larger empires dominating the region such as the Islamic and Ottoman Empires.

    The Kurds established the principalities of Baban in Sulaimaniyah, Ardalan and Botan, and later founded the province of Sharazor, the capital of which was Kirkuk, and Mosul and other cities.

    The idea of establishing an independent Kurdish state was not a priority for the Kurds, nor was it a matter of necessity. This is because the concept of the modern state was yet to emerge or appear in the region until the late nineteenth century when states began to emerge according to a modern system.

    At the time, despite their potential, Kurdish leaders were preoccupied with minor issues that took their attention away from realizing the dream of establishing an independent Kurdish state, a dream that the Persian and the Ottoman Empires, and modern-day Iran and Turkey have fought against.

    After World War I, an opportunity arose for the Kurds to outline the features of their independent state within the framework of treaties and the international and regional coalitions that dominated that period. However, the Kurdish leader Sheikh Mahmoud al Hafid in particular, was content with establishing his small kingdom in Sulaimaniyah. The kingdom soon collapsed following bloody wars with the British occupation forces that brought down the Ottoman Empire and with it all its allying bodies including al Hafid’s kingdom. He failed to make the most of Kurdish sentiment at the time regarding the Kurdish right to establish a homeland.

    Sheikh Mahmoud al Hafid was unaware of the fact that the new age required a new a vision and conduct, and as a result, the Turks established their own state and the Kurds were dispersed between four of the regional countries: Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

    Almost a century has elapsed since then. That experience was followed by other attempts to establish a Kurdish state such as the Republic of Mahabad by Qazi Mohammed in Iranian Kurdistan back in 1946. This attempt was short lived and was brought down by the army of the Pahlavi regime. The dream of establishing an independent Kurdish state is yet to be realized. But the main question is: will this dream ever come true?

    Many Kurdish politicians, intellectuals and decision-makers agree that this dream is possible and can be realized in the right political regional and international circumstances. Others are of the view that the dream is unattainable for geopolitical reasons whereas others predict that more than one autonomous or semi-autonomous state will emerge in the four parts of Kurdistan shortly in view of recent developments and the potential political shifts in the new Middle East over the next two decades.

    Fareed Asasard, a leading figure at the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK] party and the director of Kurdistan’s Strategic Studies Centre based in Sulaimaniyah, believes that the idea of forming or founding an independent Greater Kurdistan comprising of Kurdistan’s four areas continues to be a hypothetical issue.

    “The basic components required for establishing any state are still unavailable [to the Kurds] at the present time and I believe that they will not be available in the long term for several reasons, the most important of which is that the world will witness a shift in the decades to come causing it to rely on geo-economics instead of geopolitics as the case is at present,” said Asasard.

    Asasard, who has conducted a lot of research on this topic, stresses that the idea of founding a greater independent state has failed a number of times. For example the Turks failed to found the Greater Turkish Empire from China to the Mediterranean to ensure the existence of the Turkish race everywhere. Asasard adds, “In the mid-1990s, I presented a research paper on the geopolitics of Kurdistan in which I made clear that establishing an independent Kurdish state in Iraqi Kurdistan would be very difficult as it requires changing the map of a significant part of the world. Besides, even if this state were established, it would remain isolated from the world as it would have no seaports.”

    Asasard expects that there will be several small Kurdish statelets in other parts of Kurdistan in the long term especially as the initial step in this direction has already been taken in the sense that the political and administrative structure of Iraqi Kurdistan is quite independent. However, he stressed that the link between these Kurdish states on the economic level in the future will be very weak and that these states will remain linked to the central systems in Tehran, Turkey and Baghdad.

    Asasard stated that he believes that international politics will be subject to the logics and authority of the economy in upcoming decades. Therefore, the Kurdish statelets, if they emerge, will be economically weak and this will be their biggest problem, not to mention their unfortunate location, which will always tip the scale in favour of their neighbours, making it subordinate to these neighbouring countries. Therefore, the idea of founding an independent Kurdish state is an unachievable dream.

    On the other hand however, Dr. Jaza Toufi Taleb, professor of geopolitics at the University of Sulaimani believes that all the basic constituents are available for an independent Kurdish state to be established on Kurdish land such as the geographical borders, nation, economy and seaports. However, the political atmosphere is completely unsuitable for outlining the features of the state at present, especially as the concerned countries continue to reject even marginal autonomy for the Kurds in their countries. Dr Taleb explained that even though several independent states around the world, such as Kosovo for example, do not have the potential that Iraqi Kurdistan enjoys.

    “I believe that if reformists in Iran and the moderates in Turkey gain power in the upcoming elections, and with the geopolitical changes in Syria that are taking place, this would allow for the rise of political bodies in the Kurdistan region, specifically in Turkey which wants to join the EU but a precondition is the acknowledgement of the rights of all minorities. In Iran, there are signs of such bodies emerging under the rule of reformists. These bodies will represent the initial step towards the establishment of the Kurdish state in the long term. Turkey will be the starting point towards this goal. However, geopolitically, the dream of establishing the greater Kurdish state remains a difficult dream to make come true,” explained Dr Taleb.

    But Hussein Yazdan Bana, Vice President of the Kurdistan Freedom Party headed by Ali Qazi Mohammed, the son of the founder of the Kurdish Mahabad Republic in Iranian Kurdistan, stressed that the Kurdish nation has the right to an independent state on its land in accordance with international law. He emphasized that Kurdistan possesses all the requirements necessary for establishing an independent state just like other countries in the world. “Conspiracies and international interests were, and still are, the major obstacles to the establishment of the Kurdish state. This is exemplified by what happened to Sheikh Mahmoud al Hafid’s kingdom and the Kurdistan Republic [of Mahabad] founded by Qazi Mohamed.”

    Yazdan Bana emphasized that the most important prerequisite for the establishment of any state is the will and resolution of the nation itself and the favourable external factors and circumstances that have not been agreeable to the Kurds until now.

    “If the British had not been present and the superpowers did not have their own interests, the Kurdish, Baban, Botan and Ardalan principalities would have been successful in establishing Greater Kurdistan. In addition, the very few opportunities that were made available to the Kurds throughout history, specifically after World War I, were not utilised well by Kurdish politicians to establish that state.”

    Yazdan Bana confirmed that international policies in the current age of globalization are not resistant to the aspirations of countries seeking to establish their own independent states. These conditions can be utilised to make the Kurdish dream come true provided that there is a unified political will among the Kurds.

    Yazdan Bana said, “The establishment of the Kurdish state is a goal that the Kurds and their political powers should act to achieve, and we can do this provided that a unified and a solid political will is made available. At present, the establishment of this state is not possible for several reasons, but once the Kurdish politicians abandon their personal dreams and ambitions for power and influence then forty million people will be able to establish their own state.”

    Abdul Baqi Yousef, member of the politburo of the Kurdish Yekiti Party in Syria highlighted that the establishment of an independent state is the right of the Kurdish nation and it is not an impossible dream. However, he explains that this is conditional upon future political developments in the region that will outline existing ties between the Kurds and the Middle East region and will result in establishing ties between all the parts of Kurdistan.

    “States are not established based on emotions or desires but basic factors such as geography, economy and others factors that are all available in Kurdistan. I believe that the future developments, in the long run, will allow for the establishment of several Kurdish statelets in the region, and this will lead to the establishment of independent greater Kurdistan.”

    But the issue differs for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party [PKK] in Turkey, which called for establishing greater Kurdistan since it began the armed struggle in 1984. The party reduced its demand to establishing a confederation system that ensures national and cultural rights for Kurds whose population exceeds ten million in Turkey’s Kurdistan region alone.

    Ahmed Deniz, the PKK’s foreign affairs officer, believes that the municipal elections that took place recently in Turkey were promising as they indicated fair democratic and political solutions to the Kurdish cause in Turkey.

    Deniz told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Kurdish nation, whose land was split between the four countries following the Treaty of Lausanne that was signed after World War I, is still the only nation with no independent state in the region despite that its population exceeds 40 million.

    “In the PKK, we believe that a confederation system based on the freedom and rights of the Kurdish people is best suited to the Kurdish cause not only in Turkey but in the entire Kurdistan region as is the case with several advanced European countries. However, the PKK still believes in the right of the Kurdish people to an independent state. But the PKK’s political strategy at present does not aim to establish an independent state that requires a particular atmosphere that we lack at present, especially as an independent state does not necessarily mean freedom for nations. What is more important to us is that the Kurds gain their freedom, enjoy real democracy and human rights. Only then can the Kurds decide themselves the nature of the political identity they want,” said Deniz.

    As for the renowned Kurdish-Syrian writer Nouri Brimo, he said that “the [establishment of the] Kurdish state is not a dream but a political course and its supporters increase as it gains strength through the sacrifices of its people. In all cases, the Kurds have been able to prove throughout history that they have always been rational in their political discourse and presentation and that they have always respected their neighbours.”

    But Sami Davood, a renowned researcher at the Syrian Sardam cultural institution, stated that the establishment of the Kurdish state is related to geographical factors first and foremost. In other words, the issue requires the liberation of Kurdistan’s geographical region before an independent identity can be built.

    Due to the geographical nature of the Kurdish areas in Syria, there cannot be any armed struggle unlike in the Kurdish regions in Iraq, Turkey and Iran in addition to the population density of each of the four regions. Therefore, Davood believes that any attempt by the Kurds to establish their own state will be confronted with strong opposition from the regional states not so that they can keep the Kurds within the boundaries of their own countries by force, but because the majority of water and energy resources are situated in the Kurdish areas of the four countries.

    Source: aawsat.com, 10/04/2009

  • Erdogan to Challenge Merkel on NATO Dispute

    Erdogan to Challenge Merkel on NATO Dispute

    4 April 2009

    Nato
    Nato

    The election of the new Chief of NATO has opened a new rift between Turkey and the Western Alliance. Turkey shows resistance to the election of Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen as the new Chief of the NATO due to Danish politician’s attitudes regarding the latest caricature crisis. Moreover, Turkey shows resistance to Rasmussen on the ground that Danish Prime Minister has not suspended a television channel’s activities in Denmark that is associated with PKK, a terrorist organization in Turkey.

    Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan¸ said that “we do not want NATO to lose power. The media organ of the terrorist organization in my country broadcasts from Denmark. We submitted documents four years ago, but he still could not or did not stop them. We had a cartoon crisis as well. We asked them how to overcome the situation, but they still did not approach positively. Indeed, I take a dim view of his candidacy.”

    These statements create new tensions between Germany and Turkey. Since German Prime Minister Angela Merkel strongly supports the candidacy of Rasmussen, objects Turkey by saying that “it would be wrong for a candidate country to try to block the candidacy of an EU member state’s Prime Minister.” Ms. Merkel also implies that this would create new obstacles in front of Turkey for her full membership.
    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in his recent statement challenged Chancellor Merkel and dismissed her statements as being “unacceptable.”

    Prof. Dr. Mehmet Ozcan, the Head of USAK Center for EU Studies commented o the issue by saying that “carrying international problems under the umbrella of EU integration is not compatible with the EU’s policies up to now. The latest attempt, in this regard, is the Cyprus question and the EU members understand their mistake. Making international problems an integral part of the EU integration process, does not yield good results. In this sense, Merkel is playing with the fire by using Turkey’s EU membership bid as an instrument to convince Erdogan on Rasmussen’s candidacy.”

    The German newspapers write that “if Ms. Merkel can not succeed to convince the other leaders on Rasmussen, it would be a clear embarrassment for her.” Ozcan underlined this point by saying that “due to the incoming elections in Germany, Ms. Merkel tries to politically benefit from NATO summit. Yet, it is obvious that it would not be good trade-off for the future of European enlargement.”

    By JTW and news agencies

    Journal of Turkish Weekly

  • The Evolving Turkish Role in Mideast Peace Diplomacy

    The Evolving Turkish Role in Mideast Peace Diplomacy

     

    Author:

     
    Steven A. Cook, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies

     

    April 2, 2009

    As President Obama arrives in Ankara, he will find a Turkish government eager to play an influential role in the Middle East. While Turkey has made important contributions to the region in recent years, its activism has been controversial in Washington. When Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stormed out of a contentious panel on the Gaza crisis at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January, he injected additional controversy into Turkey’s diplomatic foray in the Middle East.

    The incident produced a torrent of criticism from some U.S. policymakers, analysts, and journalists who regarded the uproar in Davos as proof positive that Turkey, under Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, which is rooted in Turkey’s Islamist movement, had made the turn away from the West in favor of the radicals of the Middle East. Erdogan’s behavior at Davos, his seeming embrace of Hamas during Israel’s Gaza offensive, and his strong criticism of Israel, which at times veered into classic anti-Semitism, left observers wondering whether Turkey could continue to play a constructive role in the Middle East.

    The Prodigal Pasha

    Since the Justice and Development Party (known as AKP) came to power in late 2002, Ankara has pursued a conscious strategy of reestablishing Turkey’s links with the former Ottoman domains to the south and the east. To be sure, there have long been Turkish diplomatic missions throughout the Middle East, but given Ankara’s foreign policy orientation, which placed a premium on relations with the West and the official secularism of the republic, Turkey was a marginal player at best in the Middle East. The AKP governments, first under Prime Minister Abdullah Gul and since early 2003 under Erdogan, embarked on an ambitious foreign policy–concomitant with their equally bold domestic political and reform program–that sought to secure Turkey’s bid to become a member of the European Union while simultaneously cultivating relationships with Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Riyadh, and Tehran. Turkey’s effort to draw closer to both Europe and the Middle East reflected a belief within the AKP that its foreign policy needed to be normalized. Although Turkey’s almost exclusive orientation toward Europe and the United States might have been appropriate during the Cold War, when its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was a paramount foreign policy fact, Turkey’s interests now demanded a multidimensional foreign policy.

    The Justice and Development Party’s approach was met almost immediately with skepticism in Washington.  The often testy negotiations between Washington and Ankara in late 2002 and early 2003 over the use of Turkish territory for the planned invasion of Iraq and the parliament’s subsequent inability to pass legislation giving U.S. forces permission to launch the attack from Turkey angered the United States.  Yet Iraq was just the first in a series of episodes where Ankara and Washington found themselves on opposite sides in the Middle East. In 2005, for example, as the United States sought to isolate Syria over Damascus’s alleged responsibility for the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and its central role in funneling jihadis into Iraq, the Turkish government continued a policy of deepening its diplomatic and economic ties with the Syrians. After Hamas won the Palestinian elections in January 2006, then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul and other Turkish foreign ministry officials hosted Hamas’s external leader, Khaled Meshal, at AKP headquarters in Ankara. These developments came against the backdrop of improved relations between Ankara and Tehran and Prime Minister Erdogan’s periodic tough rhetoric that Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were tantamount to “state terrorism.”

    Ties Shift, Eyebrows Rise

    Each of these developments at first blush raises serious questions about Turkey’s foreign policy orientation. Ankara’s seemingly abrupt divergence from the Western consensus was disorienting to policymakers and other observers who concluded that Turkey could no longer be considered a reliable partner or play the “honest broker” role in Middle Eastern conflicts that Turkish officials coveted. Hosting Khaled Meshal, who is responsible for a fair number of both Israeli and Palestinian deaths, was clearly a mistake. Not only did the Hamas leader resist Turkish entreaties to recognize Israel and to renounce armed struggle, the encounter also angered Jerusalem and Washington–two strategically critical relationships for Ankara. Yet, it is important to note that with all the questions about who “lost” Turkey and whether Turkey is “tilting East,” there is nothing extraordinary about Ankara’s approach to the Middle East. Against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s tortured relationship with the European Union, and the security fallout from the invasion of Iraq, any Turkish government would likely pursue a foreign policy similar to that of AKP.  The Hamas episode aside, it is abundantly clear that Turkey’s Middle East policy is consistent with Turkey’s national interests, and importantly, one that Washington can leverage to advance its own regional goals.

    On the range of important issues from Iraq and Iran to Middle East peace, Turkey’s policies are generally consistent with those of the United States. The Turks have long sought a stable, federal Iraq. The flowering of relations between Ankara and Irbil, the seat of the Kurdish Regional Government, combined with considerable Turkish investment in northern Iraq mitigates a complicating factor in Washington’s Iraq policy. The situation in Kirkuk and the persistence of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) violence against Turkey remain flashpoints, but as the Turks and Iraqi Kurds develop closer ties, the magnitude of these problems diminishes, forestalling some of the most dire scenarios about Turkish military intervention that could unravel the progress that Iraq has made over the last eighteen months. In the context of improved Turkish-Iraqi Kurdish relations, the Kurdish president of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, has called upon PKK terrorists to lay down their arms or leave Iraq. For the United States, Turkey is no longer the malevolent wildcard in the game of stabilizing Iraq.

    Iran, Syria, and Mammon

    Viewed from a U.S. standpoint, Turkey’s two most controversial relationships in the Middle East are Iran and Syria. While critics have often used these ties as clear indications of AKP’s Islamist worldview, Ankara nurtured relations with Tehran and Damascus in the late 1990s (before Justice and Development even existed) and early 2000s.  The Turkish leadership supports the Obama administration’s efforts to establish a dialogue with Tehran. From Turkey’s perspective, good bilateral relations with Iran and regional stability are critically important, not for ideological reasons, but economic calculation. Iran is the largest supplier of natural gas to Turkey only after Russia. Although the Turks would like to diversify their supplies and have plans to invest in large-scale renewable energy programs, in the short and medium term, Ankara will do all that it can to ensure its relations with both Tehran and Moscow remain cooperative and friendly.

    The exigencies of energy supplies are not bound up in Turkey’s relations with Syria, but there is a strong economic component to the relationship. Turkey’s predominantly underdeveloped southeast is closer to Damascus than to Kayseri, Ankara, or Istanbul. The Turks believe that increased bilateral trade serves two critical purposes–it promotes development in places like Cizre, Gaziantep, and Diyarbakir and provides a boost to the Syrian economy. The architects of AKP’s foreign policy make the argument that if Turkey’s neighbors prosper, they are also more likely to be pacific, ensuring Turkish security and providing a regional environment more conducive to peace. Turkey’s ties with Syria serve another geostrategic interest. In 2006-2007, some foreign policy analysts were seized with the idea that Damascus could be “peeled away” from its strategic relationship with Iran. Although it is unlikely that Damascus will easily relinquish its ties with Tehran, the Turks can play an important role in providing the regime of Bashar al-Assad with an attractive alternative to Iran. It is surely preferable to Washington for the Turks to be engaging in dialogue with the Syrians than for Assad to be speaking with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in isolation. Turkey’s ties with Syria have already paid dividends in the Middle East as Ankara sponsored indirect talks between Israelis and Syrians in 2008. Those negotiations did not produce an agreement and were halted over Israel’s invasion of Gaza in December 2008, but by all measures the Syrians and Israelis made progress with the help of Turkish mediation.

    O, Jerusalem

    Perhaps Turkey’s most complex relationship in the Middle East is with Israel. While the two countries maintain close military and economic ties, relations have been decidedly uneasy. From the start, the Israelis perceived a Palestinian tilt in AKP’s approach to the Middle East and were wary of Ankara’s relations with Tehran. At the same time, the Israelis, by their own admission, have complete trust in Prime Minister Erdogan’s efforts to mediate between Israel and Syria. For their part, the Turks were concerned about reports that the Israelis were developing ties with both the Iraqi Kurds and an organization related to the PKK, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan or PJAK, which is battling Iran. Ankara also argues that Israeli actions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip only undermine their efforts and those of others to broker peace. Relations between the two countries deteriorated during Israel’s Gaza offensive, yet recent reports that the Israelis have dispatched a senior foreign ministry official to Ankara may indicate that both governments are looking for ways to reestablish trust. If incoming Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu places an emphasis on striking a deal with Syria, as many expect, Turkey will initially play a prominent role in bringing the two parties together and brokering their negotiations.

    Ultimately, the challenge for Turkey is, first, whether it has the capacity to pursue an activist role in the region without undermining its other priorities, and second, the extent to which other regional powers want Ankara to play the role it intends. Thus far, the Turks seem able to balance their desire to be influential in the Middle East with other national interests in the Caucasus, Cyprus, and Europe. There is also a palpable sense in the Middle East that Turkish activism, while helpful at times, can nevertheless undermine the efforts of more traditional regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. As Cairo and Riyadh seek Palestinian reconciliation, there is concern that Turkish activism will provide a way for Hamas to resist Arab pressure to come to terms with Fatah. Still, there is no question that Turkey can play a constructive role in the Middle East. It has gained the confidence of the regional players on most of the major issues of great importance. As a result, in an era of diminished resources for the United States, Turkey can be a critical ally in the pursuit of Washington and Ankara’s overlapping interests.

  • Significance of Gul’s Iraq visit

    Significance of Gul’s Iraq visit

    VISITS abroad by heads of state are different to those by heads of government. They are a symbolic endorsement of good relations between countries; prime ministerial visits are about the nitty-gritty of politics — trade, military agreement, and foreign policy decisions. That is as true for Turkey as any other country. The visit to Iraq by its president, Abdullah Gul, is therefore something of a landmark. No Turkish head of state has visited Baghdad in over 30 years, although Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was there for talks with his Iraqi counterpart Nuri Al-Maliki last July.

    That, however, was a political initiative and even then the Kurdish issue ensured that relations between the neighbors remained fraught. A year ago, Ankara dispatched thousands of troops into northern Iraq to crush militants from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) who used it as a base for their campaign of violence against Turkey — a campaign that over the past 25 years has resulted in 40,000 people killed. Since the offensive, there have been other Turkish raids.

    Although the Kurdish issue is far from resolved, President Gul’s visit is a clear indication of warming relations. It is a change based on mutual need. Even though a few months ago, Turkey still felt that Iraq was failing to stop the PKK, it knows that with American troops preparing to leave, it has to cooperate with Baghdad if the PKK is to be neutralized. Likewise, Iraq knows that it has no chance of normality if the PKK continues to threaten Turkey and the Turks respond with cross-border attacks. The stability of Iraq requires good relations between Baghdad and Ankara — and will require it all the more when US troops leave.

    Turkey has other concerns, not least the well-being of the Turkmens of northern Iraq. It is complex situation. That the government of one country should see itself as the protector of a community in the country next door has obvious dangers; local disputes could end up poisoning national policies — and in the case of Iraq, the Kurds and the Turkmens are anything but friends. Kirkuk, one of the main centers of the Turkmen population but which the Kurds want in their autonomous region in a new federal Iraq, could be such a poison.

    Turkey, not least because the city is also the center of northern Iraq’s oil wealth, does not want to see it fall into Kurdish hands. But then neither does Prime Minister Al-Maliki who is busy building alliances to ensure a strong central government following parliamentary elections later this year.

    His vision ties in neatly with Turkey’s that likewise sees a strong central government in a united Iraq as the best guarantee of dealing with the PKK and lowering Kurdish ambitions. But that is not certain and elections are still some way off. All eyes in Ankara (and Baghdad) will, therefore, be on the much-talked about grand Kurdish conference expected soon in northern Iraq at which the PKK will be asked to end its violence against Turkey. If it does so, it would spell a much-needed end to the troubles in southeast Turkey. It would also remove any impediment to normal relations between it and Iraq.

    That is what President Gul’s visit seems to herald.

    US striking new tone with Tehran

    THE West’s overarching aim of preventing Iran acquiring an atomic bomb is best achieved by a “grand bargain”, offering Iran security but making it part responsible for the security and stability of the region, said the Financial Times in an editorial yesterday. Excerpts:

    Barack Obama’s overture to Iran, delivered by video on the eve of Monday’s Iranian New Year, is a smart move, tone-perfectly delivered, and a clear departure not just from George W. Bush’s bellicose attitude but the visceral animosity that has bedeviled relations between Washington and Tehran since the Islamic Revolution of 30 years ago.

    His use of the formal title of Islamic Republic implies US recognition of the revolution and abandonment of regime change. The emphasis on rights and responsibilities — the sort of discourse tailored for, say, China — suits Iran’s sense of entitlement and ambition to be acknowledged as a regional power. The address is well aimed, furthermore, not just at Iran’s leaders but at the Iranians.

    The more recent history, in which Iranians feel under US and Western siege, has enabled the theocrats to consolidate their puritan hegemony and their dense network of material interests. But this artificial national unity cracks and debate flourishes when Iranians sense the West is willing to engage with them. Not for nothing were the mullahs discomfited by the advent of Obama: He faces them with choices.

    But the US and Europe, as well as Israel and the Arabs, face choices too. After the enlargement of Iranian influence that followed the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the resolution of most conflicts in the region — Iraq itself, Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine and Lebanon — needs at least Tehran’s quiescence. The West’s overarching aim of preventing Iran acquiring an atomic bomb is best achieved by a “grand bargain”, offering Iran security but making it part responsible for the security and stability of the region. If we ever reach that point — a big if — the US and its allies will have had to decide if they can accept that Iran has reached technological mastery of the full nuclear fuel cycle.