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  • Between the Hammer and the Anvil: An Exclusive Interview with PJAK’s Agiri Rojhilat

    Between the Hammer and the Anvil: An Exclusive Interview with PJAK’s Agiri Rojhilat

    Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 31

    October 23, 2009 11:46 AM Age: 3 days

    Featured By: Derek Henry Flood

    Agiri Rojhilat

     

    Agiri Rojhilat is one of the top seven members of the Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistane (PJAK) which is a part of the larger umbrella organization Koma Civaken Kurdistan (KCK) that includes the PKK. The Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan portrays itself to be more of an armed democratization movement rather than a traditional national liberation movement for Kurdish sovereignty. PJAK says it is taking a stand in the name of all of Iran’s ethnic and religious minorities and it is much more than a Kurdish ethno-nationalist organization. Its expressed aim is to change the regime of the Iranian Ayatollahs to form an inclusive, multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic participatory, federalized democracy in Tehran. Jamestown spoke to Rojhilat at the PJAK base in Qandil, northern Iraq.

    JT: Can you tell our readers about PJAK’s internal political framework?

    AR: Every four years we will have a congress that is made up of two-hundred delegates that from come from within our organization representing our women’s wing, youth wing and armed wing. This congress assembles itself in secret in Kurdistan. Because of the situation for Kurds in Iran, the elections for our congress cannot be held in the open. From the 200 assembled delegates, a thirty-person parliament is elected. Of those thirty elected, seven are chosen to form the coordination board of PJAK.

    JT: How precisely are these elections conducted? Since your organization is not a legal party in Iran, they must be done clandestinely, no?

    AR: The elections are done secretly. I want to let you know that we have over a million supporters inside Iran today. There is a lot of support for PJAK. But these elections cannot be perfectly [democratic] but of the secrecy in which they must be conducted.

    JT: It has been reported that PJAK is very concerned about women’s issues and gender equality. What can you tell us about this aspect of your organization?

    AR: I want to emphasize that women’s issues and women’s rights are paramount to our organization and we have a quota for female PJAK membership. Women are active at all levels of our organization. From the delegates to the parliament to the coordination board, we require a forty percent quota for females in PJAK. From top to bottom, we stress female participation in PJAK.

    JT: Even participating in guerrilla attacks?

    AR: Even fighting, yes.

    JT: Do the PKK and PJAK conduct joint military operations or are their kinetic activities totally isolated from one another?

    AR: What the PKK and PJAK have in common is that we both follow the ideology and philosophy of [imprisoned PKK leader] Abdullah Ocalan and we are both Kurdish parties. Let me explain this; there are four parts of Kurdistan since it was divided. Within both the PKK and the PJAK, there are Kurds from the different parts of Kurdistan. So within the PKK, there are Iranian Kurds and there are Germans and within PJAK there are Kurds from other parts of Kurdistan, but the PKK and PJAK are different groups with different political objectives.

    JT: You are referring to diaspora Kurds from Germany or European Germans?

    AR: Both. Let me explain; there are Kurds from all four parts of Kurdistan participating in the PKK, diaspora Kurds as well as some Germans. All of these types of Kurds are also participating in PJAK as well but I want to stress that the PKK and PJAK are two different organizations with different aims and objectives.

    I want to add something else. If the regime in Syria attacks Syrian Kurds, PJAK is obligated to have a reaction to such behavior. Despite the fact that PJAK operates primarily in Iranian Kurdistan, we feel we have a responsibility to protect Kurds from the other sectors of Kurdistan as well. There are not different kinds of Kurds. There is one Kurdistan and one Kurdish people.

    JT: Is PJAK a purely Kurdish liberation movement or is its appeal more broad based within Iran?

    AR: In our movement, there are several nationalities. We have Azeris, Baluchis as well as ethnic Persians fighting.

    JT: What is the geographical scope of the insurgency you are mounting?

    AR: We have guerrillas in place from Maku all the way to Kermanshah. Throughout Iranian Kurdistan we have over one million sympathizers.

    JT: What is the size of PJAK’s current military force?

    AR: Until now, we do not like to give out precise figures for this but we have over one thousand active guerrillas. Eighty percent of which are inside Iranian territory.

    JT: How are the values and teachings of Abdullah Ocalan carried out by PJAK?

    AR: Of course it is a matter of evaluating the philosophy of Abdullah Ocalan according to our specific needs. The PKK and PJAK are two different organizations and the situation in Turkish Kurdistan is different than in Iranian Kurdistan. We implement his teachings according to the needs of Kurds in Iran. Do we put everything exactly as Ocalan says into practice? Not necessarily. You cannot say exactly that whatever Ocalan says we put into practice…

    JT: What can you tell us about how PJAK was founded?

    AR: For about five or six years before 2004 when our organization was officially announced, we were having some meetings to decide about how to organize ourselves politically and improve the situation for Kurds in Iran.

    JT: Can you answer the allegations that PJAK has received support in any form from the Central Intelligence Agency? Journalist Seymour Hersh and former CIA officer Robert Baer have stated the United States government is very likely aiding PJAK in its proxy struggle with the Iranian regime. Is there any truth to these assertions?

    AR: It is not right that the CIA is helping PJAK. That is not the reality or right at all. Once we had a meeting with Americans in Kirkuk to discuss possible cooperation. Our friend Akif Zagros [a former member of PJAK’s seven person leadership council who the author was informed was killed in a flash flood] talked with them but the Americans said PJAK should abandon the ideology of Abdullah Ocalan and our brotherhood with the PKK if we want help from them. Akif Zagros told the Americans PJAK would not abandon the teachings of Ocalan or our friendly relations with the PKK. Because of the way the Americans approached the issue, shaheed Zagros left the meeting. Since the meeting in 2004, no other such meetings occurred.

    JT: If the United States were to approach you again asking to work with your organization against the Iranian regime, but this time without such preconditions, what would be the reaction of PJAK’s leadership?

    AR: We have nothing against the United States of America. We are not closing our doors to anyone. We are open to dialogue with everyone. We are open to America, Europe and still Iran for talks. We decide what is best for our people based on our own will. We decide democratically when, where and with whom we will engage in such dialogue. We do not want to be simply used against others…

    JT: So PJAK does not want to be used in a proxy war even if its interests temporarily converge with an outside power?

    AR: Until now, both the U.S. and the European Union approach Iran for their own benefit. Within these dialogues, the Kurds are always used and then thrown aside after we have served their purposes. Because of these failed policies, we do not accept these kinds of approaches.

    JT: Why do you believe that the Americans put PJAK on the Treasury Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations?

    AR:  Last year, there was a small bit of rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran and the nuclear issue and then suddenly PJAK gets put on this terrorist-financing list. We know there are some political parties [in Iran] that get some support from the U.S. but we are a totally different kind of party. We have our own will and objectives.

    JT: Out here in Qandil, I do not see any visible economy with which your organization can sustain itself. How is PJAK funded? Do you benefit from the Afghan opium trade? Do you receive donations from sponsors?

    AR: Our economy is based purely on the Kurdish people living in Iran. We collect voluntary donations from the Kurdish people according to how much they are able to give within their relative means. To explain to you the level of support that we receive, the Kurdish people even bring their children to us to join our organization.

    JT: Children of what age?

    AR: Normally eighteen. You must understand that Kurdish society is very different than the West. Because there are so many operations to suppress us, Kurdish society has turned inward. This stress from the outside strengthens our communities. We have some recruits that are under eighteen, maybe sixteen, but they are not participating in our military operations. Where we are from in Iran, there is a very large youth population and our party sees a lot of potential in them as we consider ourselves a young party. The Islamic Republic of Iran has three elements it uses in the destruction of our youth. Firstly it encourages and facilitates drug use among them. Secondly, it employs the Basij [militia] system and tries to brainwash our young people to be against the U.S. and Europe, saying, “We [Iran] stand for Islam and therefore the U.S. and E.U. are our enemy.” Thirdly, the regime systematically imprisons and tortures them in order to annihilate us and discourage them from joining PJAK or supporting the Kurdish freedom movement.

    JT: Can you be more specific about how the guerrilla movement is financed?

    AR: For example, certain Kurdish people that have relations with PJAK come and visit us. They pledge to sponsor maybe fifty or one hundred guerrillas from top to bottom for an entire year. They buy everything for them and it is their way of supporting their own freedom struggle. All of this is done through voluntary sponsorship.

    About the drug question you brought up, Iran has very special policies in regard to this matter. They encourage Kurdish youth in Iranian Kurdistan to use drugs and the percentage of addiction among our youth has been increasing. The Iranian state wants our young people to remain outside the political framework of the country. Let me give you an example of how this policy affects our people. Recently, a mother came here from Iran asking us to help her deal with her son who was badly addicted to drugs and she felt powerless to do anything about it. She said she could not turn to the Iranian state for help and came to us because she felt that by joining PJAK, [her son] could shake his addiction. We told her “bring your son to us. We can help him.”

    JT: PJAK does not profit from the transit of Afghan narcotics through its territory?

    AR: There have been clashes with police in Iran with Sunni groups who are fighting the Islamic regime in Baluchistan and Khorosan. Sometimes these police die. From time to time, we also have clashes between our armed wing and regime elements. When some pasdaran [Revolutionary Guards] die, the regime says it is because of bandits involved in the drugs trade. They describe clashes with PJAK as banditry and try to link us to the drugs. Iranian authorities do not like to mention the name PJAK after some pasdarans die, just referring to us as bandits. These Iranians are not dying because of the drugs trade. They are being killed because they are oppressing Sunnis and Sunnis in these provinces are fighting the regime. If you come back to me on another visit, I can provide you with names of those in the regime that are involved in the drugs trade.

    When the Iranian regime prepares its annual budget, it does not have enough money to sustain itself and so it supplements governmental coffers with money from the transshipment of Afghan narcotics. The drugs are shipped across Iranian territory under the supervision of Ettela’at (Iranian Intelligence: Vezarat-e Ettela’at Jomhuri-e Eslami – VEVAK) to Orumieh (provincial capital of West Azarbaijan Province). From Orumieh they are sent to Hakkari Province in Turkey where they are shipped under the supervision of the MIT (Milli Istihbarat Teskilati – Turkish intelligence) and from Turkey these drugs reach Europe. Both Iran and Turkey may employ some Kurds as part of their trafficking apparatus but the trafficking is state organized by both countries’ intelligence services.

    Can you imagine this high volume of drugs coming into Turkey from Iran without the Turks’ knowledge? It would be impossible. Turkey has many checkpoints. How could they not know about all of these drugs passing through their territory?

    JT: Is PJAK a 100% independent organization that exists without the support of international actors?

    AR: Yes that is completely right. I will stress that we have not so far [received] any international aid or weapons from anyone. We are an independent organization.

    JT: There has been a lot of speculation [surrounding] your leader Abdul Rahman Haji Ahmadi’s visit to Washington in the summer 0f 2007. Can you comment on it?

    AR: As you can see Haji Ahmadi is not here for comment. Whatever I say is on the record as a PJAK official. As the president of PJAK, he is available to have dialogue with anyone. He can visit different countries and meet with different people. Yes, he did visit Washington, as it was within his power to do so.  He has the power to do such things. But I want to reiterate that until now we have not received support from any outside powers…

    JT: What is PJAK’s attitude toward the Turkish-Iranian military alliance?

    AR: Iran and Turkey have an alliance against us and [have worked] on joint military operations together for the past few years. Despite their differences, they are unified on the Kurdish issue. The alliance between Iran and Turkey is not purely a military one though, it is also now political…

    Turkey is taking intelligence that it is receiving from the U.S. in regard to PKK positions here in Iraq and passing it on to Iran so they can attack PJAK. So Iran is now acquiring U.S. intelligence meant for Ankara in this Turkish-Iranian bilateral military strategy against the Kurds. Through this cooperation, we are attacked here in Iraq by Turkish warplanes while Iran fires Katyushas from the other side of these mountain ridges. We believe there are even Turks training members of the Revolutionary Guard Corps to fight Kurds inside Iran.

    Additionally, I want to let you know that besides Iran’s increased alliance with Turkey, it is also greatly expanding its bases along the Iran-Iraq border. It says it is doing this to defend the Islamic Republic against a possible invasion by the United States. But what this effort is really meant to do in our view is to separate the Kurds and stop the flow of our movement across the border. From our observations, some of these expanded military bases look to be modeled on Israeli bases.

    JT: What can you tell of your organization’s military strategy against Iranian forces?

    AR: Iran and Turkey insist that the PKK and the PJAK are the same and this works very well for their own propaganda efforts. We are being shelled here. If you look beyond you, you can see the entire mountainside is burned from Katuysha fire.  Our strategy is one of pure self-defense. We do not make offensive operations against the Revolutionary Guards. We defend Iranian Kurds and ourselves. We have a right to retaliate against the Iranian state as part of our self-defense policy. If Iran attacks our people, we will respond. Iran uses the death penalty and likes to hang people. If they will hang more of our friends, we have plans to retaliate directly… Our main work is political but we have to have an armed wing because Iran is not a truly democratic state and it does not allow people to organize themselves politically.

    JT: What can you tell our readers about PJAK’s philosophy and ideological outlook?

    AR: Our aim is a free Kurdistan and a democratic Iran.

    JT: Are you speaking of creating an independent Kurdish state?

    AR: What we are talking about now is not the changing of borders or the replacing of flags but creating an all-inclusive Iran.

    JT: Does PJAK seek to overthrow the religious government of Iran?

    AR: We do not oppose religion and we are in no way against the Islamic religion, nor do we have any animosity toward any other ethnic groups living in Iran today. Our goals are not limited to the freedom of Kurds. We wish for all the ethnic groups living in Iran to have their democratic rights.

    JT: Do you seek a structure of parallel government for Kurds in Iran comparable to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq that has its own parliament and issues its own visas?

    AR: Not at all. We would prefer to have much more participation in a democratized central government. To achieve this, we are trying to permeate Iranian Kurdistan with democratic values so that our people can improve themselves and organize themselves politically. We never want to impose cultural hegemony on others and would like to see Baluchis and Azeris organize themselves similarly as well.  

    JT: Do you believe that Iran is a Shia chauvinist regime that uses Khomenism and evangelical Mahdism similar to the way Turkey uses the notion of Turkism at the expense of its minorities?

    AR: Yes, that’s right. Iran gives Kurds a degree of recognition but with other groups like Azeris, they practice a forced assimilation policy. Iran also practices a divide and rule policy to pit different groups against one another. There is discrimination against Sunnis as well…

    JT: Does PJAK have a relationship with the Jundullah insurgency in Sistan-Baluchistan Province?

    AR: For us, yes, we have some relations with Baluchi people. However, we do not have a specific relationship with Jundullah. Baluchis have a special meaning for us because of their oppression by the Islamic Republic. Iran’s policy has been to make the Baluchis depend on the income from the transit of Afghan narcotics as well as depend on the Iranian state.

    JT: Do you have any connections with Ahwazi Arabs in Khuzestan Province? There has been some unexplained political violence there.

    AR: We do not have guerrillas there but we do have some indirect political relations.

    JT: In closing, can you tell our readers what core principles drive PJAK’s internal dynamics?
     
    AR: Our movement operates under three core principles: democracy, women’s rights, and ecology. We believe these three principles must be integrated into our everyday activities. Did you know that every year, it is required that every member of PJAK must plant two trees? PJAK strongly believes that understanding ecology improves people’s lives in the region where we are active. We have programs to help surrounding villages to acquire fresh water and PJAK also believes in helping to educate the people in our surroundings.

    https://jamestown.org/program/between-the-hammer-and-the-anvil-an-exclusive-interview-with-pjaks-agiri-rojhilat/

  • Is Turkey new light ray in darkness of Middle East?

    Is Turkey new light ray in darkness of Middle East?

    UlviyyaSadigovaTrend News Middle East Desk Commentator, Ulviyya Sadikhova

    Perhaps, after the end of the Israel – Hamas war in the Gaza Strip in January, 2009, Turkey did not seek to solve the acute problems in the Middle East with such zeal, as it has shown in the last two months.

    Ankara made its debut in the Middle East by nominating itself as the chief mediator in the resolution of the Syrian-Iraqi dispute, which erupted after Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki accused the Syrian regime of sheltering organizers of two major terrorist attacks on Baghdad, which killed nearly 100 people.

    Although Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davudoglu said his country does not mediate in the reconciliation of Damascus and Baghdad, since the very beginning of disagreements Davudoglu has met with Bashar al-Assad in Damascus and then with al-Maliki in Baghdad.

    At a meeting of the League of Arab States in Cairo the Arab countries acknowledged Turkey’s success in preventing acute Syria-Iraq conflict.

    In fact, Ankara needs to pacify the situation in the Middle East, which went out of control as a result of constant internal collisions. One can mention several reasons, but the most prominent are two: the fight against the separatists of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the immense progress in relations with Syria.

    Regarding the PKK matter, the Iraqi government has never been the best assistant for Turkey. Firstly, views on cooperation with Turkey in the fighting against separatists, who are based in the north, have split up in Iraq. Despite President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd by origin, expressed his full support in the fight against PKK terrorists in Iraq, the issue of an independent Kurdistan is still questionable. Analysts also believe the Shiite parties in Iraq, including al-Maliki’s party, are unlikely to disregard the Kurdish political organizations on the eve of elections in January 2010. Therefore, Turkey will not benefit from the agreement with Iraq to cooperate against the PKK. Taking into account the internal weakness of Iraqi state power due to the struggle among of pro-Iranian Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni parties, new differences with Syria could offer a ground for further division of the country. Realizing this risk and the fear that the PKK will take advantage of the situation to strengthen fighting, Turkey demanded the Iraqi authorities to clarify accusations against Damascus and provide substantial evidence.

    Besides, a slight warming has been observed recently between the Iraqi pro-Iranian bloc and Turkey. One of the most influential Iraqi Shiite leaders, Muqtada al-Sadr, visited Turkey in summer.

    The cooperation with Syria in the fight against PKK terrorists is another issue. Though the PKK issue was about to cause the Syria -Turkey war ten years ago, now this is one of the pillars of relations between the two countries. Syria, where head of the Kurdistan Workers Party, Abdullah Ocalan, hid more than ten years ago, stated on its readiness to open its borders to the Syrian citizens of Kurdish origin, who are fighting against the Turkish government in mountainous areas, if the latter lay down their arms against Ankara.

    It seems Syria could not offer better one, because Turkey virtually received a guarantee and the place, where it will be able to banish the terrorists and extremists, whereas the Kurdistan administration of Iraq and the Kurdish parties in Iraq do not give any guarantee to Ankara in suppressing the PKK.

    It is interesting, since 2008, Turkey has focused on improving relations with Syria. Turkey started with the weak point – negotiations with Israel and the returning of the Golan Heights. Although a year later Turkey’s mediation failed, Syria and Israel were able to come together in only one – both were satisfied with Ankara’s role.

    In addition, Turkey’s rapprochement with Syria is not accidental. Damascus – Iran’s main ally among the Arab countries – has a direct impact on the internal situation in Lebanon, where a pro-Iranian Party of Hezbollah operates. More likely, Turkey wants to participate in an internal crisis in Lebanon and the Palestinian split, as well as to find alternative routes to Iran through Syria, given the ambitions to assume the role of chief peacemaker in the Middle East.

    Cooperation with Turkey is advantageous also for Syria, especially to improve relations with Sunni and pro-Western Arab countries.

    Al-Assad’s surprising visit to Riyadh on Wednesday, following the Turkish president’s meeting with King Abdullah II in Jeddah, was the first signal that Damascus resumed dialogue with the Saudis, who will have a direct impact on the political crisis in Lebanon, shaken by grim struggle for power between the pro-Saudi majority of Saad al-Hariri and the pro-Syrian opposition Hezbollah. Analysts predicted that the formation of government in Lebanon will delay until Syria and Saudi Arabia come to an agreement. However, Syria and the Saudi kingdom have very different interests in Lebanon and now Turkey, which is one of the largest Sunni countries, interferes in the dialogue. Ankara wants to show Saudi Arabia that it could persuade Syria to take a more moderate position in Lebanon. Al-Assad’s visit to Riyadh, on the backdrop of the refusal of the Saudi king Abdullah II to visit Damascus, is a great chance for Syria to demonstrate its “humility” in the Middle East policy and select a diplomatic way to solve the Arabian interior problems.

    Experts believe that attraction of Syria to the pro-Western Ankara is a hidden attempt to weaken Iran.

    Ankara has never had open tensions with Tehran and even enshrined Iran the right to peaceful atom in the issue of nuclear program. However, speaking to the 64th UN General Assembly in New York, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan supported Russia’s plan and the United States to clear up the Middle East from nuclear weapons. Is Turkey decided to throw down a secret challenge to Iran? Although nuclear program exists in Israel and will soon appear in Saudi Arabia, it is still associated with the enrichment of uranium by Iran. Does Turkey strive for a new mediation in the nuclear program between Tehran and Western countries, what had Davudoglu hinted at during a visit to Iran?

    To prove and to demonstrate the effectiveness of its diplomacy in the Middle East – that is what Turkey wants to demonstrate to the West. Still the old interests of the Middle East will define whether Turkey will achieve it easily and what else Ankara has to do.

    Source:  en.trend.az, 26.09.2009

  • Turkish Military Supports the Government’s Kurdish Initiative

    Turkish Military Supports the Government’s Kurdish Initiative

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 175September 24, 2009 By: Emrullah Uslu

    General Ilker Basbug

     

    As Turkey has recently concentrated on the debate over whether the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) Kurdish initiative to end the long running campaign of violence, the two key actors in the conflict, the Turkish military and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) have entered the debate. The Chief of the General Staff, General Ilker Basbug visited troops in the Kurdish populated part of the country and shared the views of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). Basbug said that fighting against terrorism requires time and patience as well as pursuing every possible option aimed at ending the use of political violence. Regarding the Kurdish initiative, Basbug explained that the TSK supports the government’s policy (Star, September 23)

    The opposition Republican Peoples Party (CHP) reacted negatively to Basbug’s statement. The Deputy Chairman of the CHP, Hakki Suha Okay stated that the CHP does not approve of the TSK’s involvement in politics (www.nethaber.com, September 23).

    The critical issue is how and to what degree the TSK will support the Kurdish initiative. Indeed, the PKK has often asserted that if the TSK ends its combat operations against it in the mountains it will reciprocate by no longer targeting Turkish military units or civilians in the region (Radikal, September 13). Yet, the TSK does not consider this offer as a viable option to end the conflict. In fact, on September 14 the TSK applied to the Turkish parliament to prolong its mandate to conduct military operations in northern Iraq (NTV, September 18). Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has declared that his government will review the TSK’s request and ask parliament to extend the mandate which authorizes the TSK to conduct operations in Iraqi territory (Star, September 22).

    While the Turkish actors have concentrated on the Kurdish initiative process, Kurdish actors have adopted a more skeptical view. Ahmet Turk, the Chairman of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) criticized the AKP for not addressing the root causes of the problem, but instead presenting the state’s traditional position toward the Kurds as if it were a new initiative.

    At this critical moment, the PKK announced its decision to extend its unilateral ceasefire for the fourth time this year. The PKK issued a press statement criticizing the AKP’s Kurdish initiative for not recognizing Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK as a negotiating figure, or suspending counter-terrorist operations conducted against its militants in mountainous areas (Firat News Agency, September 23).

    The PKK’s decision to extend its ceasefire will potentially impact positively on the Kurdish initiative for two reasons. First, it will allow the government and the DTP to prepare the psychological basis for a possible peace settlement. The main obstacles, however, are the funeral ceremonies for Turkish soldiers and PKK militants. In recent years sharp divisions have existed over how to organize such funerals. For instance, on September 23, 50,000 Kurds attended the funeral of a PKK militant (ANF News Agency, September 23). Similarly, approximately 40-50,000 Kurds attended another funeral on September 13 in Hakkari province (Firat News Agency, September 13).

    The funerals of Turkish soldiers have become places of protest against the PKK and even the government. On September 10, there were three funerals held for soldiers in various Turkish provinces. In Kirsehir province 5,000 people attended, in Siirt province 3,000, and in Kutahya 10,000 (Vatan, September 10). To a certain degree, these funeral ceremonies have recently become contested zones for the Turkish and Kurdish communities, which serve to further divide both societies. Thus, the PKK’s decision to extend its ceasefire will help the political actors involved in the peace process to ease these tensions.

    Moreover, the extension of the PKK’s ceasefire will allow time for the political actors involved to agree on the details of any possible peace. One of the problems for the government is to implement the Kurdish initiative rapidly, since the debate on the issue has raised expectations among ordinary citizens. As the process has unfolded, popular support has thus been tested. Therefore, the PKK’s decision to extend its ceasefire provides an additional opportunity for the Turkish government to widen support for the Kurdish initiative. Nevertheless, it is too soon to speculate on whether the process will prove successful, since many factors might yet serve to disrupt the initiative.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-military-supports-the-governments-kurdish-initiative/

  • Turkey poised to give Kurds more rights

    Turkey poised to give Kurds more rights

    Published: Monday 31 August 2009   

    Despite an attack by Kurdish militants killing four soldiers, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan voiced determination on Sunday (30 August) to push forward his plan to grant more rights to the country’s largest minority.

    Background:

    The Kurds are ‘a nation without a country’. According to the CIA ‘factbook’, 18% of Turkey’s population of 77 million people are Kurdish. Similarly, 15-20% of Iraq’s population of 30 million are Kurds, and so are 7% of Iran’s 66 million population. Up to two million Kurds are estimated to live in Syria. 

    After the US-led war that brought down the regime of Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s Kurds enjoy a high degree of autonomy, parliamentary democracy and the highest living standards in the country. ‘Iraqi Kurdistan’ is even allowed to have independent foreign relations. 

    Turkey’s Kurdish problem, which has fuelled separatist conflict in the mainly Kurdish southeast, has long been an obstacle to Ankara’s EU membership ambitions. 

    According to the Turkish press, the Kurdish conflict in Turkey has cost the lives of about 40,000 people since 1984, resulted in more than 17,000 unsolved murders, wasted billions of dollars in military expenditure and countless billions more in missed opportunities. 

    The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which launched a campaign in 1984 for Kurdish self-rule in the southeast, is believed to number 4,000 fighters. It has been weakened recently by Turkish military operations against bases in northern Iraq. 

    PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in 1998 and was sentenced to death, before the punishment was converted into life imprisonment. 

    “I see this attack as an attempt to axe, to prevent the democratic opening process,” said Erdogan, adding that those initiatives are doomed to fail. 

    The prime minister added that the army’s struggle against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) would continue unabated. PKK is a separatist military organisation recognised as a terrorist group both by the EU and the USA. 

    Last month, Erdogan said his government was preparing a “package” of reforms to boost the rights and freedoms of Turkish Kurds. Although few details are known, the two main opposition parties, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), slammed the announced opening. 

    According to the press, the measures include allowing political campaigns in the Kurdish language, providing opportunities for Kurds to learn their mother tongue, allowing the Kurdish language to be spoken in prisons, restoring the former names of thousands of Kurdish towns and villages, and ensuring Kurdish language and literature teaching in two universities – Mardin Artuklu and Diyarbakir Dicle. 

    Plan under fire

    Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) deputy chairman Mehmet Şandir said that granting political freedoms to ethnic groups would turn Turkey into a “hell of minorities,” the Zaman daily wrote. MHP, which has a nationalistic platform, won 14% of the vote in the 2007 elections. 

    “If you grant political freedoms to all the ethnic groups in Turkey, whose number is claimed to be 36 by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, then you will turn Turkey into a hell of minorities. Unfortunately, Turkey is today being dragged to a very dangerous point due to a reckless act by the AK Party,” Şandir reportedly said. 

    The authorities rebuked allegations that the announced plan was a result of US pressure and a ‘secret’ US plan to defuse regional problems affecting Iraq, embraced by the ruling AKP. 

    The Turkish armed forces, which traditionally play the role of ‘guardian of secularism’, indicated there were some “red lines” which must not be crossed. 

    “The Turkish Armed Forces [TSK] will not allow any harm to be done to the nation-state and the unitary state structure,” Chief of General Staff General Ilker Başbug was quoted as saying by a Kudish online website. 

    Government defends its ambition 

    Speaking to editors-in-chief of major newspapers on 28 August, Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arinç said the process was a national project and emphasised that Turkey needed to solve its issues on its own. 

    Arinç, however, conceded that Washington supported his country’s plan both logistically and psychologically, against a background of US troop withdrawals from Iraq by 2011, looming Iraqi national elections in January and the future prospects of northern Iraq, where Kurds enjoy substantial autonomy. 

    “Maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq at a time when terror is wreaking havoc among Kurds, Shiite and Sunni Arabs is in the interest of both Turkey and the US,” the deputy prime minister said. 

    Rejecting contacts with Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed leader of the PKK, Arinç however indicated the government’s readiness to work with DTP – the Kurdish Democratic Society Party, which he said should not be considered as a terrorist organisation. 

    “If you consider the DTP a terrorist organisation or an illegal structure, you are putting over two million voters who cast their ballots in favour of this party in the same place as the terrorists,” he stressed. 

    Arinç said he was visiting DTP mayors as parliament speaker, despite objections from Ankara-appointed local governors. He added that he had long suggested that Erdogan meet with DTP leader Ahmet Türk. 

    Positions:

    The Turkish press wrote that the government’s efforts to provide some sort of answer to Turkey’s long-pending Kurdish question had led to a frenzied altercation instead. Columnist Andrew Finkel wrote for the Zaman daily that Erdogan had embarked on a reform process from which he could not withdraw. 

    “His credibility is at stake, and he must either succeed with his overture or step aside. The opposition parties […] are content to pursue policies which divide Turkey into camps,” Finkel writes. 

    Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, called on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) to accept peace with Turkey and lay down their arms, saying the Kurdish people faced a historic opportunity to be accepted into Turkish society. 

    Talabani told Reuters he perceived a “new climate” in Turkey toward the rights of its Kurdish people, and that he supports its leaders in their efforts to end the 25-year conflict with the PKK, whose guerrilla fighters have bases in the Iraqi Kurdistan mountains. 

    “The Kurds are trying to convince the PKK to accept the peace proposals of the Turkish government, then to lay down their arms and go back home to participate in political activities in Turkey,” said Talabani. 

    Azad Aslan, editorialist for the Kurdish Globe website, argues that the governing AK party in Turkey is under pressure from the EU to deliver on the democratisation process in Turkey. He also saw the development in the context of Turkey seeking to acquire regional power status. 

    “It has already joined the G-20 bloc and was given the green light from US Congress to develop nuclear power. Turkey signed the crucial and strategic pipeline project of Nabucco and got strategic positions in energy transport and energy corridors. Due to its geostrategic position, Turkey can play a regional role both in the Middle East and Central Asia. This new regional position necessitates Turkey to resolve its internal affairs and questions – the Kurdish question ranking top among them,” Aslan argues. 

    Mentioning the developments in neighbouring Iraq, Aslan also stresses that “while five million or so Kurds in one part of Kurdistan enjoy collective national-political rights, it would be difficult to grant only individual-cultural rights to more than 10 million Kurds in Turkey”. 

  • Erdogan Puts Turkey on the Move

    Erdogan Puts Turkey on the Move

    Whether it’s handling the Kurdish question, trade with Iraq, internal security, or other issues, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is working hard in many arenas, offering Turkey’s leadership in the region, and enhancing life for the Turks, notes Patrick Seale.

    After a long and bitter stalemate, broken only by bloody clashes, the Turkish government and the Kurdish Revolutionary Workers party (PKK) seem at last to be moving towards a political settlement.

    This month, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey and the PKK leader Abdallah Ocalan, now serving a life-sentence in an island prison ever since his arrest in 1999, have both spoken of the need for a negotiated end to the conflict — a conflict which has claimed more than 40,000 lives since the PKK launched an armed rebellion against the Turkish state 25 years ago.

    On both sides, this indicates a striking change of tone, as well as a willingness to breach long-standing taboos. Indeed, both Erdogan and Ocalan have announced their intention shortly to publish suggestions about how reconciliation can be achieved. There seems even to be some sort of competition between them over who will first come up with a credible peace plan.

    Earlier this month, Erdogan held a four-hour meeting with key ministers to discuss the Kurdish questions. Interior Minister Besit Atalay said that “If it can solve this problem, Turkey will free itself from shackles.” Erdogan has also sought the views of the United States and Iraq.

    Meanwhile, conciliatory remarks have also been made by Murat Karayilan, who took over the PKK leadership from the jailed Ocalan. In an interview with the French daily Le Monde (16-17 August), conducted in the Qandil mountains of northern Iraq, Karayilan declared: “The two sides must lay down their arms…We have not been separatists for more than ten years.

    “The solution lies within the actual borders [of Turkey], but only if Turkey adopts the norms of European democracies… What is required is recognition of Kurdish identity, and of cultural and political rights… For the moment, however, the State only lists what it will not do: no freedom for Ocalan, no education in the Kurdish language, no autonomy. Why cannot Kurds be educated in their own language?”

    Several factors account for the more promising climate between Turkey and PKK, a hard-line Marxist movement, which until recently did not hesitate to resort to terror. The anticipated departure of U.S. forces from Iraq is creating a new situation for all the interested parties — for the Iraq Government in Baghdad, for the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil, and for the PKK in their mountain camps.

    Soon to be deprived of U.S. protection, Masud Barzani’s KRG is in need of good relations with both Ankara and Baghdad. It knows that it will eventually have to reach an amicable agreement with Baghdad over the future of Kirkuk, an oil-rich province it covets — or risk a war in which it may not come off best against the well-trained and re-equipped Iraqi army.

    The PKK, in turn, fears that it will be sacrificed on the altar of Turkish-KRG relations, which are improving by the day, fuelled by booming cross border trade. Ankara is evidently wooing the KRG, having decided that Masud Barzani’s administration in Erbil is a potential ally against the wild men of the PKK. There are plans to open Turkish consulates in Iraqi Kurdistan.

    Turkey’s leaders, for their part, are well aware that if their country is to play its ambitious role as an energy hub between Central Asia and the Caucasus on the one hand and Western Europe on the other, peace in Kurdish-inhabited eastern Anatolia is a must.

    An important factor in the equation is Prime Minister Erdogan’s gradual demilitarisation of Turkey’s political system. Step by step, he has managed to tame the once all-powerful Turkish armed services which, since the creation of the Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal in 1923, have carried out several coups d’etat and often acted like a state within the state.

    A recent reform, much encouraged by the European Union, was the adoption of a law under which members of the armed services, accused of grave crimes, can be tried by civil rather than by military courts. The military’s influence in politics has also been reduced by the appointment of a civilian to head the National Security Council.

    Needless to say, the armed service chiefs are the fiercest opponents of reconciliation with the PKK, a movement against which they have waged a pitiless struggle for a quarter of a century. Thus, Erdogan has had to curtail the independent political power of the military to allow his opening to the PKK to have a chance of success.

    A significant development has been the arrest since 2007 of dozens of retired military officers, businessmen, academics, and other secular opponents of Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AP). They have been accused of membership of a shadowy organisation of extreme nationalist views, known as the Ergenekon network. At a series of trial this summer, some of the alleged members, including two senior general, Hursit Tolon and Sener Eruygur, have been accused of seeking to destabilise the government by planning violent attacks.

    Prime Minister Erdogan and his close colleague President Abdallah Gul — who shares his Islamic background — have pioneered a revolution in relations with Turkey’s immediate neighbours, Iran, Iraq and Syria, as well as with the Arab states of the Gulf. Turkey is seeking a greatly expanded role in Middle East affairs — as a trading partner, a peace broker and a bridge to Europe.

    According to Iraq’s Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, Turkish-Iraqi trade was worth $7bn dollars in 2008 and is due to soar to $20bn by the end of 2010. A clue to the new warmth is Turkey’s decision to release more Euphrates water to both Syria and Iraq, which have faced severe droughts. Iraq is in its fourth consecutive year of drought and has recorded its lowest harvest in a decade.

    This has occurred at a time when the Erdogan government’s relations with Israel have cooled. A large majority of Turks — and Erdogan himself — were outraged by Israel’s brutal war on Gaza at the beginning of the year, and by its continued oppression of the Palestinians. In contrast, the Turkish army has long had close ties with Israel, buys Israeli defence equipment, and allows the Israel Air Force to exercise in Turkish airspace.

    Meanwhile, the Emir of Qatar, Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani — who has himself pioneered an activist foreign policy in the region and beyond — paid a two-day visit to Turkey this week. Two hundred Turkish companies will be exhibiting their products at the Qatar International Exhibition Center next October. Turkey’s trade with Qatar grew from $132m in 2005 to $1.32bn in 2008.

    Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East, and the author of The Struggle for Syria; also, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East; and Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire.

    Copyright © 2009 Patrick Seale

    Source: www.middle-east-online.com, 21.08.2009

  • PKK Forces Await Orders from Imprisoned Leader Abdullah Ocalan

    PKK Forces Await Orders from Imprisoned Leader Abdullah Ocalan

    Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 25
    August 13, 2009 02:59 PM
    By: Wladimir van Wilgenburg

    Bozan Tekin, Vice President of the KCK

    Reports indicate that Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (Parti Karkerani Kurdistan – PKK), will release a “roadmap” for resolving Turkey’s decades-old Kurdish insurgency on August 15 (see Terrorism Monitor, August 6). Branches of the PKK continue to operate in northern Iraq’s Kurdistan region both on the political and the military levels, despite Turkish military and diplomatic pressure. It seems that the political branch of the PKK is heavily restrained inside Iraq’s Kurdistan region, but military operations against the PKK are unlikely to resume in the near future.

    The PKK Waits for Ocalan’s Roadmap

    The Kurdistan Democratic Confederation (Koma Civaken Kurdistan – KCK), the umbrella organization bringing together Kurdish militant groups and political branches in Iran (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistane – PJAK), Iraq (Partiya Careseri u Demokrasiya Kurdistan – PCDK), Syria (Partiya Yekiti ya Demokratîk – PYD), and Turkey (PKK), is waiting for new orders from Abdullah Ocalan. The KCK’s Executive Council operates in the Haftanin, Metina, Zap, Gara, Avasin, Hakurk, and Qandil camps. The PKK also maintains a strong presence in the Mahkmur camp, which is controlled by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR).

    According to PKK member Roj Welat, the PKK’s series of unilateral ceasefires is not a new strategy born out of weakness. [1] During this period the guerrillas have refrained from carrying out offensive operations. Welat says it is a strategy to solve the Kurdish issue peacefully, although the Turkish state believes the PKK’s five unilateral ceasefires are a sign of weakness.
     
    KCK vice-president and PKK general Bozan Tekin says they will support the roadmap to the end; “In fact we don’t know what this roadmap is, but Ocalan said he is working on preparing it.” Tekin says it might look like the Basque or Scottish democratic model. [2]

    Tekin said the PKK wants its own protection force, the release of the PKK leader and freedom of politics and identity. The PKK is ready to form a Kurdish PKK unit within the Turkish military if a solution is reached. But if Turkey doesn’t accept Ocalan’s roadmap, “we are ready to defend our country till our last drop of blood.” Although Ocalan says he will remain silent if the state doesn’t listen to his “last roadmap for peace,” PKK members emphasize that Ocalan will remain the leader of the PKK and that it’s not a dead-end for the PKK-leader if his proposals are not accepted.
     
    The PCDK Has More Problems with Iraq than the Kurdish Regional Government

    Besides the KCK leadership and military forces that operate in the near-inaccessible mountains, there is also a political branch of the PKK that operates in Iraq and the Kurdistan region. This organization is called the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party (PCDK), which tried to participate in the Kurdistan regional elections of July 25 with its political slate “Hiwa” (Hope). The logo of the list was a combination of the flag of the PKK and the logo of the legal Kurdish opposition party in Turkey, the DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi – Democratic Society Party).

    The PCDK was banned by Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) in June and is considered an illegal party in the Kurdistan Region. Najiba Omar, the female president of the Hiwa list, said they were informed by the IHEC that the list could not operate because the PCDK is not considered a legal party. [3] The Hiwa list believes that the KRG pressured IHEC to ban them.
     
    The PCDK’s offices were also closed down in the provinces of Erbil and Sulaimaniya. According to Najiba Omar, “We cannot have offices in regions controlled by the KRG. We don’t have a problem with the Iraqi government, but with the Kurdish government.” While the PCDK is seeking support among Kurds, it cannot operate in KRG-administered regions; therefore the main headquarters of the PCDK is in Kirkuk.

    The PCDK has other offices in Baghdad and Mosul while members operate from their own homes in the Kurdistan region. The PCDK also has party meetings and offices in villages near the border regions controlled by the PKK. Members of the party are not usually arrested, but after protests against the Hiwa list ban in June, some members were arrested for a short time.

    The main aim of the PCDK is to change Kurdish society according to the principles of Abdullah Ocalan. The PCDK is suspicious of northern Iraq’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which have dominated the region since 1991. The PCDK is also wary of the new Kurdish “Change list,” a reform party that separated from the PUK and received a number of seats in the new parliament. The Change list will also participate in the Iraqi elections and Kurdistan local elections and could become stronger within the Kurdistan region. However, the PCDK suspects them of being supported by outside forces and thinks they won’t change the policies of the KRG.

    The Kurdistan Regional Government’s PKK Policy

    Minister Falah Mustafa Bakir, Head of the KRG’s Department of Foreign Relations, says that the KRG will make sure that their territories are not used as a launching pad by the PKK. “For us it’s important to have good relations with our neighbours. We don’t want our people to pay the price, we want a peaceful solution.” [4]

    The KRG says it has taken the following measures:

    • Cordoning off the mountain areas on the border with Turkey to cut PKK supply routes.

    • Stopping foreign and Kurdish journalists from visiting PKK camps near the border regions.

    • Closing down offices of the PKK’s political fronts in Erbil and Sulaymaniya.

    • Monitoring airports to ensure that no PKK personnel enter or leave the region.

    • Preventing PKK demonstrations in KRG territory and curtailing their activities.

    • Banning PKK-affiliated political parties.

    • Sharing intelligence with Turkey and the United States.  

    In February a tripartite U.S.-Turkish-KRG intelligence center was established in Erbil, Kurdistan’s political capital, to coordinate efforts and share intelligence in the fight against the PKK (Taraf, July 24). The KRG Foreign Minister says this does not mean that the KRG supports military action against the PKK but that the center only collects information on the PKK.

    The Kurdistan government also supports the PKK’s ceasefire; Bakir says the government hopes the ceasefire “will help the peace process and [ensure] stability and we hope this will be maintained.” The KRG is against solving the PKK issue with military actions. “We don’t believe there is a military solution towards the PKK issue; there is no more need for violence or weapons.”

    The PKK confirms that it is unlikely that the KRG will send forces to attack the PKK. “There is a red line among Kurds, that there won’t be another brother war [civil war] again. We don’t think this will happen. Kurds have learned from the past,” says KCK member Bozan Tekin. Tekin also denies claims that the PKK gets support from the KRG. “These are lies by Turkey to put pressure on the KRG.”
     
    Independent Kurdish journalist Kamal Chomani says that the Kurdish government fears the PKK as a strong alternative and therefore tries to stop them from operating. [5] However, despite KRG measures, foreign and Kurdish journalists can still visit the PKK through “secret” roads and bypass KRG checkpoints.

    The PKK also still manages to organize its own logistics, media campaigns, and support from surrounding villages, because the mountains are impossible to control without a massive deployment of Iraqi or Kurdish military forces. The PKK has checkpoints with PKK flags near the Qandil mountains.

    Kamal Chomani says that even during the time of Saddam a complete mountain cordon was impossible. Chomani emphasizes that the triangular area with four borders was never controlled by any force. “This is a haven for rebel forces.”

    Members of Peshmerga forces that fought against the PKK in the past confirmed that it would be very difficult to remove PKK forces from the mountains without many casualties. For the moment, the KRG seems more interested in controlling the regions it disputes with Baghdad than in the PKK camps in the border regions with Turkey and Iran.

    The Central Government’s PKK Policy

    Baghdad’s policy does not differ much from that of the KRG. Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh told a Kurdish newspaper that Iraq is not in favor of military operations against the PKK, nor does it want to close down the Makhmur refugee camp (Rudaw, August 6).  “Iraq is against the PKK using its territory, but we don’t support Turkey in performing military operations against this party. We help the KRG to limit and decrease their presence inside Iraq and end their problem with Turkey.”

    Although no PKK military forces are located in the territory controlled by the Iraqi central government, the political branch of the movement, the PCDK, has more freedom there than in the region controlled by the KRG. The PCDK headquarters was moved from Erbil to Kirkuk after the closure of PCDK offices in northern Iraq. PCDK official Najiba Omar says this is because, legally speaking, the Iraqi government cannot ban PCDK offices or activities in Iraq.

    Assessing the PKK’s Future

    The PKK indicates that they will renew their insurgency if the Turkish government does not listen to Abdullah Ocalan. The PKK wants the government to accept a Kurdish identity and release the PKK leader, which is unlikely.

    The KRG has successfully curtailed PKK political activities in the Kurdistan region, but cannot eliminate the PKK’s border camps without starting military operations against the PKK, which does not serve their own interests. The KRG maintains the belief that the PKK is not a KRG problem, but an internal Turkish problem. It is unlikely, therefore, that the KRG will attack the PKK.

    The Iraqi government might close down PCDK offices in its territory if pressured by the United States and Turkey, which would effectively leave the PCDK dysfunctional and cripple their level of support. The Kurdish and Iraqi governments will continue to share intelligence with Turkey, but will not support military operations against the PKK. The Iraqi army is not trained for counterinsurgency campaigns in the mountains nor does it have a sufficient amount of troops near PKK camps.
     
    Therefore it is unlikely that the PKK will leave Qandil in the near future and will keep pressuring Turkey with attacks to solve the Kurdish issue. The PKK’s military forces and commanders will only leave the mountains if the PKK and Turkey reach a solution. Even the launch of Turkish military operations against the PKK inside Iraqi territory is unlikely to dislodge the PKK and will only result in more media attention for the PKK.

    Notes

    1. Author’s interview with PKK official Roj Welat in the Qandil mountains, August 5.
    2. Author’s interview with PKK vice-president Bozan Tekin in the Qandil mountains, August 5.
    3. Author’s interview with head of the Hiwa list, Najiba Omar, in Erbil province, Iraq, August 7.
    4. Author’s interview with Falah Mustafa Bakir in Erbil, August 6.
    5. Author’s correspondence with Kamal Chomani, a freelance journalist who writes for Livin magazine and the Kurdish newspaper Awena in northern Iraq, August 5.

    https://jamestown.org/program/pkk-forces-await-orders-from-imprisoned-leader-abdullah-ocalan/