Tag: PKK

Kurdish rebels tell Turkey: keep your promises or ceasefire is over

By Catrina Stewart in the Qandil mountains, northern Iraq

Kurdish PKK supporters clash with Turkish riot police in Diyarbakir.

Kurdish rebels will end their military ceasefire at the end of the month if Turkey hounds its supporters and prepares for an attempt to rout the group after 26 years of conflict, their leader told The Independent from his mountain hideout in northern Iraq.

Murat Karayilan said time was running out for the Turkish authorities to pursue a peaceful solution amid suspicions that Turkey was drumming up support from Syria and Iran to rout the guerrilla group, which has entrenched itself in the mountains along Iraq’s border with Turkey and Iran.

“During all of [our] ceasefires, the Turkish state has used these periods to try to surround and destroy us,” Mr Karayilan, the de facto leader of the 5,000-strong Kurdish Workers’ Party, or PKK, said from a secret location in the Qandil mountains in northern Iraq.

“We will wait another 15 days,” Mr Karayilan said at the weekend. “If something positive develops, we will extend the unilateral ceasefire. If there are no concrete steps, we will evaluate developments and do what we have to do to defend ourselves.”

The PKK has fought since the 1980s to establish an independent Kurdish state separate from Turkey, but in the face of punishing Turkish attacks has rowed back on its demands and will now settle for cultural and political freedoms in Kurdish-majority areas. The conflict has cost tens of thousands of lives, most of them Kurdish.

The PKK had held to a 14-month ceasefire until a suspected PKK proxy blew up a military bus in Istanbul in June. The PKK agreed to renew its ceasefire after Turkish officials promised the movement’s jailed leader, Abdullah Ocalan, that it would seek peaceful solutions to end the conflict, the movement’s leaders say. The PKK recently extended its ceasefire to 30 October to give the two sides time to pursue a peaceful solution.

But the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has backtracked on promised reforms for the Kurds, including a de facto amnesty for PKK fighters who gave themselves up, in part because of fears that the army and opposition parties will seize on any concessions as a sign of weakness.

Instead, the state has continued with military operations against the Kurdish guerrillas, has rounded up elected pro-Kurdish politicians and human rights defenders accused of supporting the movement’s ideology, and has sought Iranian and Syrian assistance to destroy the group. Mr Erdogan has pledged to “annihilate” the PKK, promising that they will “drown in their own blood”.

The PKK’s leaders have been forced to take elaborate precautions to survive. Reaching the PKK’s base in the Qandil mountains involves a four-hour drive from Erbil, the capital of the Kurdish Autonomous Region. Flanked by a dozen guerrillas, Mr Karayilan arrives for the meeting at a tent hidden to the casual observer, and any electronic device that might pinpoint his location is surrendered to a PKK checkpoint.

Bands of fast-moving guerrillas have been able to outrun Turkish offensives, as well as to fend off assaults by their Kurdish brethren in Iraqi Kurdistan. But the movement now fears that Ankara is planning a more sophisticated operation targeting the PKK’s leaders with the help of surveillance technology from the US and special forces.

While Turkey may have enlisted regional support in its fight with the PKK, it remains unclear if Ankara would get the necessary support from the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq, which has long tolerated the PKK’s presence along its borders. Moreover, some observers fear such a strategy could prompt an even bloodier response.

“If attacks are carried out, all the Kurdish people will be part of the defence strategy,” says Mr Karayilan, in a reference to uprisings in Turkish cities, where the PKK has many supporters. “The issue is not between the Turkish state and the PKK. It is between the Turkish state and the Kurdish people.” Many Kurds believe the PKK played a critical role in drawing attention to the Kurdish question, but its attacks on Turkish military targets have prompted the US and the European Union, among others, to list it as a terrorist organisation.

A product of socialist ideology, the PKK was formed by a group of Kurdish and Turkish students in the late 1970s, emerging only later as a military movement in response to repressive policies against the Kurds.

The Independent

October 19, 2010
Is the PKK being finished off?

Turkey has been resorting to numerous channels to ensure that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) lays down its arms. In this context, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had an important meeting earlier this week with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. It is also known that Turkey has been nurturing positive dialogue with Iraq as well.

Massoud Barzani, the head of the regional Kurdish government in northern Iraq, has adopted a prudent approach in determining its attitude towards Turkey.
Now, the plan is to isolate the PKK and to urge it to lay down arms through efforts in cooperation with Europe and NATO against the group.

The next step is to discuss the issue with Iran. An item at the top of the agenda for the visit to Iran, scheduled in the near future, will be how to strip the PKK and its Iranian offshoot, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), and Turkish officials will seek options for concrete cooperation to this end. During the meeting with Kurdish officials in northern Iraq, it was agreed in principle that a new camp should be established and that PKK leaders and militants who want to stay in Iraq should be allowed to do so or go to another country. Two important issues Prime Minister Erdoğan emphasized during his visit to Syria were ensuring that PKK militants of Syrian origins return to Syria and issuing such individuals ID cards. Actually, Assad had previously made a promise to this end. It is also believed that Syria can persuade the PKK to lay down arms.

Indeed, PKK leaders stayed in Syria for a long period of time. But will Syria step in to do this?

OK, why would Europe or NATO step in at this point? Let us first look at Germany. Visiting Turkey, German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere recently said at a press conference: “We would like to lend support to Turkey in the political settlement of the Kurdish issue and in its fight against the PKK. There are many Kurdish citizens living in the EU. We do not want these people to lend material, logistical or operational contribution to the PKK. We decided to set up a joint committee on counterterrorism. Our intelligence service knows well about the executives of the terrorist organization living in Germany.” This was the first sign to come from the European side. Then, during Erdoğan’s talks in Germany last week, Turkey and Germany decided to take concrete steps in this regard. In particular, Germany will start to pursue a more active policy in blocking material or financial aid to the PKK.

The second important development was NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s recent visit to Turkey and his emphasis on the issue of eliminating support from European countries for the PKK. Rasmussen assured Turkey on this issue.

And the final development in this regard were meetings with two prominent leaders of the PKK, Zübeyir Aydar and Remzi Kartal, that were held in Brussels with a view to secure the involvement of the European wing of the PKK in the process. If rumors are true, the PKK’s European wing is eager to contribute to the settlement process. In short, Turkey is trying not only to secure the support of its neighbors, but also to ensure that Europe’s support for the PKK is severed and that the PKK’s European wing is made part of the negotiations. Much progress has been made, and it is very likely that the PKK may lay down its arms if the cease-fire continues.

Everything seems fine at this point. The strategy is to ensure the positive contribution of neighboring countries and major European countries to the process. But, it seems that this does not mean taking the PKK itself into consideration. If the plan is not to solve the major sources of the Kurdish issue, but instead purging the PKK and urging the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) towards a solution, then nothing will go as planned, and we will roll back to the beginning. The issue can only be solved permanently by eliminating the factors that lead to the emergence of the PKK.

October 16, 2010
Syria might grant conditional amnesty to PKK members

Damascus has once more underlined that it is ready to grant amnesty to Syrian members of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), but according to experts, Syria can take this step only if Turkey does so simultaneously and if Turkey’s efforts for a solution are based on a general expansion of democratic rights, as opposed to the specific recognition of the rights of Kurds as an ethnic group.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on Monday coordinated the two countries’ ongoing cooperation against PKK activities and also discussed the government-formation crisis in neighboring Iraq.

After meeting with al-Assad, Erdoğan answered a question regarding the possibility of amnesty for the Syrian members of the PKK, saying this subject is not new and has been on the agenda for a while. “We have to open a gate for everybody who committed a mistake. This door should remain open. The doors of amnesty should not be opened only once and closed later but should be kept open all the time, whether in Turkey, in Iraq or in Iran,” he said.

Erdoğan brought up the fact that some PKK members’ families are in Syria and stated that he believes that if this issue is addressed in cooperation with Syria the problem will be at least minimized. Erdoğan did not elaborate further. It is known that many of the Syrian members of the PKK emigrated from Turkey to Syria during the Kurdish uprisings after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Syria has not granted citizenship to most of these individuals, and they are believed to number around 200,000, according to Syrian journalist Husni Mahalli.

Mahalli has stated that most Syrian PKK members come from such immigrant families and that the Syrian government recently prepared a plan to further integrate these families by granting them citizenship and some other rights gradually; however, this plan was not implemented due to unrest a few years ago in Qamishli, a border town mostly populated by Kurds.

“This is a difficult issue to solve. Erdoğan did not elaborate on it but mentioned cooperation. Maybe these people will be told that they might go back to Turkey if they want, maybe they will be granted citizenship,” he said.

Mahalli added that Syria can grant amnesty to Syrian members of the PKK, but only if Turkey does so as well, and added that another condition is that any solution should not open the gate for any movements that might harm the territorial integrity of Turkey. “For the solution of the Kurdish problem in the region, the situation in Turkey has a determining effect. Any step in Turkey will affect the future of Syria, too. If there is a move that may lead to autonomy or something similar to that, it will not be accepted by Syria since it will obliged to do the same,” he told Today’s Zaman.

İbrahim Güçlü, a prominent Kurdish intellectual, explained that the most radical elements within the PKK actually come from Syria and that it is this group that defends the idea of terrorist attacks. “The Syrian members of the PKK think that Turkish members are ready to compromise, but they are against it. Any possible amnesty might change the whole situation on the ground and also the Kurdish movement itself, but Syria will obviously not say yes to any solution that includes recognition of Kurd’s rights. If this happens, it will feel threatened,” Güçlü told Today’s Zaman.

In a July interview with Today’s Zaman, Assad said he backed the PKK’s possible decision to lay down its arms so that it could transform itself into a political actor and added that any campaign against terrorism should include political and social measures along with military ones. “If the PKK lays down its arms and becomes a political party, this would be a positive development. As long as there are no weapons and no terrorism, countries in the region, including Turkey, can have dialogue with the PKK. If it lays down its arms, we can also welcome back 1,500 Syrian nationals within the PKK,” Assad had said at the time.

13.10.2010
News
AYŞE KARABAT

October 13, 2010
Do more on PKK, Turkey tells EU

ISTANBUL, Turkey, Oct. 5 (UPI) — The European Union should do more to take on Kurdish militants if it is serious about addressing the threat, the Turkish prime minister said.

Turkey is lobbying to become a member of the European Union. Member states, however, say Ankara needs to do more to address internal issues and repair relations damaged over problems in Greek Cyprus.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that if EU members states were truly in favor of enlargement, “(they) should support Turkey’s membership,” he was quoted by Turkish daily newspaper Today’s Zaman as saying.

Ankara recently passed a series of constitutional reforms, meanwhile, that observers said broke through many psychological barriers to addressing problems with the Kurdish minority.

Conflict with the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, has taken a heavy toll on Turkey. Ankara lashed out at Russia recently for failing to control illegal arms shipments to the Kurdish militant group and Erdogan accused Europe of being equally unconcerned.

“If the EU declares the PKK a terrorist organization, then the fight (against them) should be carried out in cooperation,” he was quoted as saying. “Unfortunately, this is not what some EU countries appear to be doing.”

The EU, Iraq, the United States and several others list the PKK as a terrorist organization. German, Italian and Belgian authorities rounded up scores of suspected PKK militants during the spring because of recruitment efforts at alleged training camps.

Source: Special Reports on UPI.com

October 6, 2010
Turkey’s Kurdish Strategy

Summary

Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is in talks with Kurdish militant group the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its patron, Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government, to ensure that violence does not erupt after the scheduled Sept. 20 expiration of the PKK’s unilaterally declared cease-fire. The AKP appears to be gaining ground on that front, as Iraqi Kurdish support for a recent Turkish referendum indicates. However, a Sept. 16 attack on a Turkish civilian minibus is a reminder of the spoiler potential attached to Turkey’s Kurdish strategy.

Analysis

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Kurdish militant group operating in Turkey, denied having any connection with a Sept. 16 explosion on a minibus near the city of Hakkari on Turkey’s border with Iran and Iraq.

The attack, which killed nine civilians, risks undermining a cease-fire unilaterally declared by the PKK that is set to expire Sept. 20. Already, a meeting between the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Cicek has been called off due to the attack.

Though the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) faces a significant challenge in quelling Kurdish militancy in the lead-up to October 2011 elections, the government appears to be making some progress in sowing divisions between the Kurdish militant camp and its main external patron, Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) — a critical element to Ankara’s broader Kurdish strategy.

People stand near a damaged vehicle after a landmine blew up a minibus in Turkey’s Hakkari province Sept. 16 STR/AFP/Getty Images

The perpetrator of the attack remains unclear. Bombings in Turkey are usually linked to the PKK, making the group the most obvious suspect, though the PKK typically focuses its attacks on military targets. This attack on mostly Kurdish civilians risks significant backlash for the group, but it could also be the work of a more radical Kurdish militant strand upset with the PKK’s negotiations with the AKP. Less discussed but on many minds, including that of Kurdish political leader Selahattin Demirtas of the Kurdish Democratic Society Party, is the potential for “deep state” elements in the Turkish military to instigate such attacks in hopes of undermining AKP-PKK cease-fire talks as part of their tumultuous power struggle with Turkey’s AKP-led religiously conservative faction.

Turkey’s Kurdish Strategy at Home

The AKP on Sept. 12 secured a critical referendum vote that strongly asserted the party’s clout while undermining that of the staunchly secularist military and judicial establishment. The AKP owes that victory in no small part to a sizable number of Kurdish voters in Turkey’s southeast that defied calls by the PKK and the mainstream Kurdish political faction, the BDP, to boycott the vote. The Turkish military, now clearly on the defensive, can be expected to exploit acts (or at least suspected acts) of PKK terrorism to try to undermine the AKP’s Kurdish policy, including the party’s shaky cease-fire negotiations with the PKK. The AKP, however, is attempting to stay two steps ahead of its political rivals in dealing with the Kurdish issue.

Turkey, a rising regional player, is keen to use the United States’ withdrawal from Iraq as an opportunity to not only fill a power vacuum in Mesopotamia but also use Iraq as a launch pad to extend Turkish influence into the Persian Gulf. The first step of that strategy entails seeking some resolution to Turkey’s daunting Kurdish problem. The AKP has taken steps at home to try to rally Turkey’s Kurdish population by promoting a more pluralistic political system that asserts civilian authority over the military (this idea was ensconced in the recently approved constitutional amendments). Parallel to this strategy, the AKP, in coordination with Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization, has quietly established direct communication with the PKK leadership in hopes of maintaining a cease-fire. Many Kurds in Turkey remain deeply distrustful of the AKP’s intentions toward them but also see the party as a lesser rival than the military. The AKP has used this opening to try to come to an understanding with Kurdish politicians, civilians and militants in Turkey. However, the AKP also has to be careful not to alienate Turkish nationalist votes by appearing too accommodating to the Kurds, especially if attacks continue to take place. The complications involved in this delicate balancing act have caused the AKP to stumble early on in trying to pursue its Kurdish policy, but the stronger the party becomes at home, the more effort it will put into seeing this policy through.

Turkey’s Kurdish Strategy Abroad

For the AKP to address its Kurdish problem at home, it must also deal across the border with Iraqi Kurdish political leaders. The PKK’s survival in many ways depends on the group maintaining a sanctuary in the mountainous borderland between Iraq and Turkey, particularly the PKK hideout at Mount Qandil. The KRG’s hospitality toward the PKK, however, may be waning.

The KRG is in an unusual spot. On one hand, Iraq’s Kurdish faction is confident it can play kingmaker in Iraq’s arduous coalition-building process, since it has a sufficient number of votes to cap off any assortment of coalition partners to form a majority. On the other hand, the Iraqi Kurds know what trouble could lie ahead once the United States, the KRG’s security guarantor, withdraws from Iraq and the Kurds are left to fend for themselves against their Sunni and Shiite Arab rivals in everything from oil production rights to defense integration. At the same time, the KRG will be facing an assertive Turkey with every intention of keeping any bids for Kurdish autonomy tightly contained.

Sensing the KRG’s vulnerabilities, Turkey has an opening to present itself as the KRG’s new security guarantor. While seemingly ironic, this would not be the first time Iraq’s Kurds have been drawn into alliances with their enemies. The region’s jagged landscape provides the Kurds with mountainous refuge from a host of adversaries but also encourages deep-seated divisions within the Kurdish camp itself. For example, when current KRG President Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and current Iraqi President Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were in a full-blown civil war in the 1990s, the PUK sought help from Iran, while Turkey and then-Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein lent the KDP a helping hand. For each of these larger powers, the primary interest lay in exploiting inter-Kurdish rivalries to compete against each other while keeping the Kurds sufficiently divided to dislodge the threat of an independent Kurdistan to their territorial integrity.

With the PUK and KDP currently more united than ever, Turkey’s AKP sees greater utility in incentivizing the KRG into cooperation, as opposed to dealing with its broader Kurdish problem with an iron fist. The AKP has done so by encouraging high levels of Turkish investment across Iraqi Kurdistan and by making clear to the KRG leadership that their economic security depends wholly on Turkey’s good graces since Turkey is the KRG’s main export route. In other words, Turkey can help KRG prosper, but the KRG will need to play by Turkey’s rules in curbing talk of Kurdish independence and in clamping down on militancy across the border.

Making Headway?

The AKP’s agenda for the KRG appears to be gaining traction, as evidenced most visibly by the KRG’s recent praise for the AKP’s referendum victory as a move toward democratic reform. In the lead-up to the referendum, Turkish officials made a point to hold high-level meetings with Barzani, Talabani and Kurdistan Islamic Union leader Salahadin Bahadin. STRATFOR sources have said Turkey prefers dealing with former KRG prime minister and KDP senior official Nechirvan Barzani, who prioritizes the KRG’s economic sustainability and has shares in several large Turkish companies. Though KDP leader Massoud Barzani has been more nationalist in his views and has long had a tense relationship with the Turks, the AKP understands that he is also a key player to deal with in the Iraqi Kurdish political spectrum. Not only is Massoud Barzani in a more secure political position than Talabani in the KRG and can thus exert more influence in this issue, but Talabani is also considered too friendly toward Iran for the AKP’s taste. The AKP also has a strong relationship with Bahadin, who benefits from staying outside the KDP-PUK rivalry and can thus negotiate more easily with the AKP.

In these meetings, the AKP sought help from the KRG to use its influence over Kurdish political and militant factions in Turkey to participate in and support the referendum process. Though the BDP attempted to boycott the vote and is calling its boycott a success, about 35 percent of the population in Diyarbakir — Turkey’s most Kurdish-populated province in the southeast — still came out to vote and most of them voted yes.

According to STRATFOR sources in the region, the KRG also appears to have sent a strong signal to the PKK that the group’s sanctuary in Mount Qandil can be threatened if the PKK does not cooperate with the cease-fire order. One Kurdish source in the area claims that KRG forces are blocking the paths leading to Qandil, though this information has not been fully verified. In return for the KRG exercising its leverage over Turkey’s Kurdish factions, the AKP has promised greater investment in northern Iraq and a hold on military incursions into northern Iraq. The more the PKK feels hedged in, the more likely (the AKP hopes) the appeal of the militancy option will wane and the more pragmatic leaders in the group will be pressured into substantial negotiations with the Turkish government.

The AKP appears to be making some headway in its Kurdish strategy, but STRATFOR remains cautious in this assessment. The KRG understands the utility of holding on to the PKK as its only real leverage against the Turks, and Kurds on both sides of the border will want to see more concrete concessions from the AKP on Kurdish rights in Turkey before they commit to any broader understanding. At the same time, negotiations between the AKP and these Kurdish factions can be expected to strain these groups greatly, producing splinter factions that can act to undermine any tacit agreements with the Turkish government.

Finally, elements within Turkey’s security apparatus that feel the secularists are facing an existential threat as the AKP consolidates power could find ways to exploit the PKK threat to undermine the government’s Kurdish initiative. The AKP thus has a lot riding on the Sept. 20 expiration date of its cease-fire agreement with the PKK. While there is still much more to be done before the party can realistically attempt a more enduring understanding with Turkey’s political and militant factions, the AKP has taken notable steps in establishing the right communication channels to pursue a more serious dialogue on the Kurdish issue.

September 18, 2010
UK Proscribed terrorist groups

These terrorist organisations are currently proscribed under UK legislation, and therefore outlawed in the UK.

Proscribed terrorist groups

46 international terrorist organisations are proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. Of these, two organisations are proscribed under powers introduced in the Terrorism Act 2006, as glorifying terrorism

14 organisations in Northern Ireland are proscribed under previous legislation.

List of proscribed International terrorist groups

The information about the groups’ aims was given to Parliament when they were proscribed.

17 November Revolutionary Organisation (N17)

Aims to highlight and protest at what it deems to be imperialist and corrupt actions, using violence. Formed in 1974 to oppose the Greek military Junta, its stance was initially anti-Junta and anti-US, which it blamed for supporting the Junta.

Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO)

ANO’s principal aim is the destruction of the state of Israel. It is also hostile to ‘reactionary’ Arab regimes and states supporting Israel.

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

The precise aims of the ASG are unclear, but its objectives appear to include the establishment of an autonomous Islamic state in the Southern Philippine island of Mindanao.

Al-Gama’at al-Islamiya (GI)

The main aim of GI is to overthrow the Egyptian government and replace it with an Islamic state through all means, including the use of violence. Some members also want the removal of Western influence from the Arab world.

Al Ghurabaa

Al Ghurabaa is a splinter group of Al-Muhajiroun and disseminates materials that glorify acts of terrorism.

These terrorist organisations are currently proscribed under UK legislation, and therefore outlawed in the UK.Proscribed terrorist group

s46 international terrorist organisations are proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. Of these, two organisations are proscribed under powers introduced in the Terrorism Act 2006, as glorifying terrorism14 organisations in Northern Ireland are proscribed under previous legislation.List of proscribed International terrorist groupsThe information about the groups’ aims was given to Parliament when they were proscribed.

Al Ittihad Al Islamia (AIAI)

The main aims of AIAI are to establish a radical Sunni Islamic state in Somalia, and to regain the Ogaden region of Ethiopia as Somali territory via an insurgent campaign. Militant elements within AIAI are suspected of having aligned themselves with the ‘global jihad’ ideology of Al Qa’ida, and to have operated in support of Al Qa’ida in the East Africa region.

Al Qa’ida

Inspired and led by Usama Bin Laden, its aims are the expulsion of Western forces from Saudi Arabia, the destruction of Israel and the end of Western influence in the Muslim world.

Al Shabaab

Al Shabaab is an organisation based in Somalia which has waged a violent campaign against the Somali Transitional Federal Government and African Union peacekeeping forces since 2007, employing a range of terrorist tactics including suicide bombings, indiscriminate attacks and assassinations. It’s principal aim is the establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Somalia, but the organisation has publicly pledged its allegiance to Usama Bin Laden and has announced an intention to combine its campaign in the Horn of Africa with Al Qa’ida’s aims of global jihad.

Ansar Al Islam (AI)

AI is a radical Sunni Salafi group from northeast Iraq around Halabja. The group is anti-Western, and opposes the influence of the US in Iraqi Kurdistan and the relationship of the KDP and PUK to Washington. AI has been involved in operations against Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I).

Ansar Al Sunna (AS)

AS is a fundamentalist Sunni Islamist extremist group based in central Iraq and what was the Kurdish Autonomous Zone (KAZ) of Northern Iraq. The group aims to expel all foreign influences from Iraq and create a fundamentalist Islamic state.

Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armée) (GIA)

The aim of the GIA is to create an Islamic state in Algeria using all necessary means, including violence.

Asbat Al-Ansar (‘League of Partisans’ or ‘Band of Helpers

Sometimes going by the aliases of ‘The Abu Muhjin’ group/faction or the ‘Jama’at Nour’, this group aims to enforce its extremist interpretation of Islamic law within Lebanon and, increasingly, further afield.

Babbar Khalsa (BK)

BK is a Sikh movement that aims to establish an independent Khalistan within the Punjab region of India.

Basque Homeland and Liberty (Euskadi ta Askatasuna) (ETA)

ETA seeks the creation of an independent state comprising the Basque regions of both Spain and France.

Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA)

BLA are comprised of tribal groups based in the Baluchistan area of Eastern Pakistan, which aims to establish an independent nation encompassing the Baluch dominated areas of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.

Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)

The main aim of the EIJ is to overthrow the Egyptian government and replace it with an Islamic state. However, since September 1998, the leadership of the group has also allied itself to the ‘global Jihad’ ideology expounded by Usama Bin Laden and has threatened Western interests.

Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM)

The traditional primary objective of the GICM has been the installation of a governing system of the caliphate to replace the governing Moroccan monarchy. The group also has an Al Qa’ida-inspired global extremist agenda.

Hamas Izz al-Din al-Qassem Brigades

Hamas aims to end Israeli occupation in Palestine and establish an Islamic state.

Harakat-Ul-Jihad-Ul-Islami (HUJI)

The aim of HUJI is to achieve though violent means accession of Kashmir to Pakistan, and to spread terror throughout India. HUJI has targeted Indian security positions in Kashmir and conducted operations in India proper.

Harakat-Ul-Jihad-Ul-Islami (Bangladesh) (Huji-B) The main aim of HUJI-B is the creation of an Islamic regime in Bangladesh modelled on the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

Harakat-Ul-Mujahideen/Alami (HuM/A and Jundallah)

The aim of both HuM/A and Jundallah is the rejection of democracy of even the most Islamic-oriented style, and to establish a caliphate based on Sharia law, in addition to achieving accession of all Kashmir to Pakistan. HuM/A has a broad anti-Western and anti-President Musharraf agenda.

Harakat Mujahideen (HM)

HM, previously known as Harakat Ul Ansar (HuA), seeks independence for Indian-administered Kashmir. The HM leadership was also a signatory to Usama Bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa, which called for worldwide attacks against US and Western interests.

Hizballah Military Wing

Hizballah is committed to armed resistance to the state of Israel, and aims to seize all Palestinian territories and Jerusalem from Israel. Its military wing supports terrorism in Iraq and the Palestinian territories.

Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)

Led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who is in particular very anti-American, HIG is anti-Western and desires the creation of a fundamentalist Islamic State in Afghanistan.

International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)

ISYF is an organisation committed to the creation of an independent state of Khalistan for Sikhs within India.

Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)

The IAA’s aims are the overthrow of the current Yemeni government and the establishment of an Islamic State following Sharia Law.

Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)

The primary strategic goal of the IJU is the elimination of the current Uzbek regime. The IJU would expect that following the removal of President Karimov, elections would occur in which Islamic-democratic political candidates would pursue goals shared by the IJU leadership.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

The primary aim of IMU is to establish an Islamic state in the model of the Taleban in Uzbekistan. However, the IMU is reported to also seek to establish a broader state over the entire Turkestan area.

Jaish e Mohammed (JeM)

JeM seeks the ‘liberation’ of Kashmir from Indian control as well as the ‘destruction’ of America and India. JeM has a stated objective of unifying the various Kashmiri militant groups.

Jeemah Islamiyah (JI)

JI’s aim is the creation of a unified Islamic state in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Southern Philippines.

Khuddam Ul-Islam (Kul) and splinter group Jamaat Ul-Furquan (JuF)

The aim of both KUI and JuF are to unite Indian administered Kashmir with Pakistan; to establish a radical Islamist state in Pakistan; the ‘destruction’ of India and the USA; to recruit new jihadis; and the release of imprisoned Kashmiri militants

Kongra Gele Kurdistan (PKK)

PKK/KADEK/KG is primarily a separatist movement that seeks an independent Kurdish state in southeast Turkey. The PKK changed its name to KADEK and then to Kongra Gele Kurdistan, although the PKK acronym is still used by parts of the movement.

Lashkar e Tayyaba (LT)

LT seeks independence for Kashmir and the creation of an Islamic state using violent means.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

The LTTE is a terrorist group fighting for a separate Tamil state in the North and East of Sri Lanka.

Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)

The LIFG seeks to replace the current Libyan regime with a hard-line Islamic state. The group is also part of the wider global Islamist extremist movement, as inspired by Al Qa’ida. The group has mounted several operations inside Libya, including a 1996 attempt to assassinate Mu’ammar Qadhafi.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad – Shaqaqi (PIJ)

PIJ aims to end the Israeli occupation of Palestine and to create an Islamic state. It opposes the existence of the state of Israel, the Middle East Peace Process and the Palestinian Authority, and has carried out suicide bombings against Israeli targets.

Revolutionary Peoples’ Liberation Party – Front (Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi – Cephesi) (DHKP-C)

DHKP-C aims to establish a Marxist-Leninist regime in Turkey by means of armed revolutionary struggle.

Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat) (GSPC)

Its aim is to create an Islamic state in Algeria using all necessary means, including violence.

Saved Sect or Saviour Sect

The Saved Sect is a splinter group of Al-Muajiroon and disseminates materials that glorify acts of terrorism.

Note: The Government laid an Order in January 2010 which provides that Al Muhajiroun, Islam4UK, Call to Submission, Islamic Path and London School of Sharia should be treated as alternative names for the organisation which is already proscribed under the names Al Ghurabaa and The Saved Sect.

Sipah-E Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) (Aka Millat-E Islami Pakistan (MIP) – SSP was renamed MIP in April 2003 but is still referred to as SSP) and splinter group Lashkar-E Jhangvi (LeJ)

The aim of both SSP and LeJ is to transform Pakistan by violent means into a Sunni state under the total control of Sharia law. Another objective is to have all Shia declared Kafirs and to participate in the destruction of other religions, notably Judasim, Christianity and Hinduism.

Note: Kafirs means non-believers: literally, one who refused to see the truth. LeJ does not consider members of the Shia sect to be Muslim, hence they can be considered a ‘legitimate’ target.

Jammat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)

JMB first came to prominence on 20 May 2002 when eight of its members were arrested in possession of petrol bombs. The group has claimed responsibility for numerous fatal bomb attacks across Bangladesh in recent years, including suicide bomb attacks in 2005.

Tehrik Nefaz-e Shari’at Muhammadi (TNSM)

TNSM regularly attacks coalition and Afghan government forces in Afghanistan and provides direct support to Al Qa’ida and the Taliban. One faction of the group claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on an army training compound on 8 November 2007 in Dargai, Pakistan, in which 42 soldiers were killed.

Teyre Azadiye Kurdistan (TAK)

TAK is a Kurdish terrorist group currently operating in Turkey

(Note: Mujaheddin e Khalq (MeK) was removed from the list of proscribed organisations in June 2008, as a result of judgements of the Proscribed Organisations Appeals Commission and the Court of Appeal.)

Proscribed Irish groups

Continuity Army Council Cumann na mBan Fianna na hEireann Irish National Liberation Army Irish People’s Liberation Organisation Irish Republican Army Loyalist Volunteer Force Orange Volunteers Red Hand Commando Red Hand Defenders Saor Eire Ulster Defence Association Ulster Freedom Fighters Ulster Volunteer Force

August 6, 2010