Tag: PKK FILES

  • PKK FILES : Hands Off Our Heritage

    PKK FILES : Hands Off Our Heritage

    PKK: Hands Off Our Heritage

    Mesopotamia has been the cradle of many civilizations such as the Sumerians, Acadians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Semites, Romans, Byzantines, Seljuks and Ottomans for a millennia and harbors the cultural heritage of the entire world. The city of Diyarbakır is home to invaluable historical heritage from this multicultural history of civilizations, and there are ancient ruins in its city center. Various cultural structures ranging from the Virgin Mary Ancient Assyrian Church to the Grand Mosque in the Diyarbakır Citadel.

    This cultural site has been occupied by the people who fled their homes in the rural towns which include Lice, Dicle, Kulp, Silvan and other surrounding provinces amid the rise of PKK terror in the 1990s. Inadequate substructures and the reluctance of municipal officials to address the issue turned the area into a slum. The narrow-minded, low-educated, impoverished new residents of the Citadel became the targets of intense PKK propaganda and provocation in the past two decades. Now, under the influence of the Syrian civil war, the PKK extended its violent campaign from the rural areas to urban centers like Diyarbakır, turning the historical site of the Citadel into a PKK post aimed at attacking local law enforcement.

    THE MEGALI IDEA THIS TIME FOR SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY

    Claiming to have gained public ground among Citadel residents – either by brute force, intimidation or coercion, the PKK has insisted that the urban fight in the city center emerged as a reflex response by the region’s youth reacting negatively to governmental policy. After the June 7 general elections, masked young people – ages 15 to 20-something –brought AK-47s to the streets and began digging trenches and erecting barricades in the streets of the Citadel. Indeed, the young people who started this so-called civil disobedience were the frontier actors for the PKK’s urban warfare strategy, which was intentionally designed using the experience gained during the ongoing Syrian civil war. Behind the young people with limited military training were the PKK’s cell cadres who were experienced in fighting in rural areas of Turkey and urban centers in Syria, particularly in northern Syrian, which is called “Rojava” in Kurdish. these cell cadres were responsible for the recruitment of young people via civil organizations, training them at rural base camps around the city of Lice, that symbolizes the establishment of the PKK in the late 1970s, and sending some of them into Syria to gain urban combat experience before organizing and arming them to conduct urban warfare against Turkish security forces.

    Contrary to the PKK’s expectations, the fight in the urban areas did not evolve into a civil war, but, rather, alienated the locals, depriving them of basic services such as power, water and sewage along with economic assets and a daily routine, igniting critical public reaction against the group. Local people became the targets of terror; their homes were occupied by the terrorists and used as posts to stage counterattacks against the security forces. Some were even forced to serve in the urban militia and some family members were killed in armed conflict to make it appear as if the security forces were responsible. During this course of action, the PKK reinforced its armed elements with more experienced fighters and took over the fight from the manipulated young people in the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H). The PKK’s armed elements; namely, the People’s Defense Forces- (HPG), oriented Civil Defense Unit (YPS) forces which carried out relentless attacks on civilians and security forces – roads were blocked, vehicles were set on fire, local political figures were kidnapped, power lines were destroyed, GSM base stations were damaged and construction sites for new roads, dams and other aquatic projects were also targeted. The PKK’s atrocities spilled into urban life, resulting in immense humanitarian, political and economic costs for the people of Diyarbakır. Hundreds of people, including civilians, security personnel and terrorists, have been killed in the last two months. Thousands of people had to flee their homes and neighborhoods. Schools were set on fire and students are unable to attend school. Businesses are closing, causing unemployment to rise.

    The PKK not only attacked civilians, but government officials and security personnel as well, who were either harassed, kidnapped, assassinated or came under direct armed attack and the threat of improvised explosive devices. In response to the PKK’s confrontation in urban centers, the Turkish government has initiated a simultaneous, indignant counterterror operation in some urban centers and is expected to realize its goal very soon. Problematic neighborhoods were contained, curfews were imposed, the majority of civilians were evacuated and terrorists were disengaged. While an estimated 400 PKK fighters, both experienced rural PKK fighters and agitated youths, were presumed responsible for the terrors attacks in the Citadel area of Diyarbakır. Many deceived young people had to flee the conflict zone, leaving the fight to PKK cadres. As of Jan. 29, 144 PKK terrorists were killed and 30 more are presumed perpetrators of ongoing attacks. More than 250 inexperienced fighters are thought to have fled the site among civilians as they were being evacuated. More importantly, the PKK is using child soldiers, forcing them to carry strategic messages to other terrorists in the conflict zone.

    Amid the recent atrocities, the PKK is assumed by many locals not to be a representative of the people, but a deceptive organization. Even though it is common knowledge that the PKK runs on hatred and violence, people are intimidated to the point of silence, refusing to voice their criticism of the terror organization. Hatred and violence are two vital components, both vying for the PKK’s cycle of survival. Indoctrinating children with a mentality of hatred is one of the ruthless methods that PKK-affiliated associations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) frequently apply. Below is a simple example of how the PKK roots hatred in the minds of young children.

    UNPRECEDENTED TERROR AGAINST FOLKLORIC AND ARTISTIC VALUES

    The Tigris Euphrates Culture and Art Association was founded on April 13, 2003 and took its name from the two famous rivers, attributing the meaning of “rebellious” to the Euphrates and “free” to the Tigris. Symbolizing violence and enmity with these local rivers, the association has organized and performed folkloric and artistic activities under the names of folk dance, theater, painting, photography, music and so on. It recently organized an activity to bring school children to draw pictures of curfews and urban damage in the Citadel area, calling the areas besieged. These children are 7 to 10 years old from the İskenderpaşa district of Sur, which is near the conflict zone. Instead of giving hope for the future, these children are inured with hatred by being encouraged to draw pictures of abstract, anti-government concepts created in their minds to be potential PKK fighters in the future. More to the point, the PKK strategically uses civil society organizations as the main facilitator to shape radical tendencies in youth by framing all these activities in terms of democracy.

    Associations such as the Mesopotamia Youth Research Center Association (MEGAM-DER) in downtown Diyarbakır are hubs to organize older children to turn to violent actions. MEGAM-DER organized a picnic in the vicinity of the village of Yolçatı in Lice on April 23, 2014. High school students aged around 15 were taken to a rural area where the PKK’s rural activities are rather common and they were encouraged to protest the ongoing building efforts of a gendarmerie post in the vicinity. Later on, these children were accompanied by female PKK terrorists and some of them were taken to a nearby rural PKK base camp. Among those taken to the training camp were Halime Gündüz and Fırat Aydın Eren. After figuring out that their children were being recruited by PKK, the Gündüz and Eren families claimed their children from the PKK. Families found no people to address at MEGAM-DER, the pro-PKK Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) or the PKK itself regarding their children’s return. Almost one month later, on May 19, 2014, families started a vigil in front of the HDP-run Diyarbakır Municipality and were accompanied by other families. Some of the children, including Halime and Fırat, were released by the PKK due to public pressure, but the PKK’s radicalization efforts have not stopped since then.

    The PKK claims the two important points of heritage are history and children. Both struggle to coexist under PKK manipulation, agitation and psychological and physical damage. Government investments, together with local, national and international contributions for recovering children, and seizing historical sites from the PKK are the only ways to bring real peace, welfare and stability to the southeast. Ankara’s master plan for how to end the urban fights should provide a platform for local people to state their stance against the PKK. There is no doubt that the peace initiative is necessary in publically debatable terms and conditions.

    This article published by Murat Yeşiltaş and Necdet Özçelik.

    [Daily Sabah, February 5, 2016]

  • PKK FILES : The PKK’s New ‘Reconciliation Table’ Strategy

    PKK FILES : The PKK’s New ‘Reconciliation Table’ Strategy

    The PKK's New 'Reconciliation Table' Strategy

    The ongoing conflict between the state’s armed forces and the PKK in the southeast continues with growing intensity. While on the one hand the state is moving forward around a new and encompassing security concept of destroying the PKK in cities to establish public order once again, the PKK is, in turn, continuing the struggle around a new battle concept of digging ditches, setting up barricades and planting roadside bombs in the middle of city centers and apartment buildings.

    Throughout this process, the PKK has been conducting a policy of intimidation against civilians, especially due to the lack of support from the Kurdish population in the region for the new, armed rebellion it began after July 14, 2015. The PKK terrorizes daily life by systematically causing civilian deaths and the destruction of public buildings and civilian dwellings. Currently, PKK leaders encourage the Kurdish public to “rebel in every area” and ask them not to receive any public services from the Turkish government. The PKK can easily use violence against those it considers to be conspirators in the Kurdish population for receiving public services from the state. Furthermore, the people who are killed or injured due to PKK violence are being cast as victims of “civilian massacres” systematically conducted by the state.

    The petition that has been widely debated in the past few days that was signed by 1,128 academics that mostly support the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), titled “We will not be a party to this crime,” also has the purpose of spreading the propaganda of this particular approach of the PKK. Indeed, the petition, which accuses the government of Turkey of having conducted genocide against its own people, has received harsh reactions from government officials. At the foundation of this lie is the thought that there is a desire to impede the state’s struggle with terrorism. In the petition, the theme of genocide is placed at the fore, and public officials who are at the head of the struggle against terrorism are threatened with being convicted by international courts. Additionally, the petition serves to garner legitimacy in the international arena for the PKK’s armed struggle with its agenda of separatism. Just as the HDP has taken up serving the PKK’s ends with politics as its principle, so have academics who support the HDP taken up the effort to garner international legitimacy for the PKK and cast the state as a systematic killing machine. In this sense, the petition underlines the PKK and HDP’s perspective of either autonomy or fascism, and thus labels the PKK the founding actor of autonomy, while the state is the fascist actor.

    PKK SOFT POWER

    The PKK organizing such a campaign by assembling pro-HDP academics is not just about military ends. While the PKK is attempting to win on the ground through hard power, it is also in search of developing a new soft power strategy. The most important reason for this is the PKK’s efforts to go back to the table. This means that because the PKK has been cornered, it now shows a desire to go back to the reconciliation table. It is obvious that the PKK has experienced many losses due to operations led by the state. But still, the PKK continues its efforts to get back to the reconciliation table in a manner that will serve its strategic aims. In this sense, the PKK is doing two things. The first is to write a new history about the now defunct reconciliation process, and the second is to find an international partner for a new reconciliation process.

    The PKK has been advancing the thesis that the reconciliation process that began in 2013 ended due to the state’s fears. The developments in Rojova are alleged to be the main cause for this fear and the legitimacy gained there has brought President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his crew to the point of madness, the argument goes. With this, the National Security Council’s Oct. 30, 2014, meeting is shown as the turning point, and the reconciliation period ended due to the decision arrived at there.

    However, three weeks before this meeting, the PKK and HDP had called on Kurds to come to the streets using the DAESH siege of Kobani as a pretext, and more than 50 civilians lost their lives in the ensuing street violence. Another question that requires answers is why the PKK currently keeps referring to the “Dolmabahçe meeting” that occurred after this date and why it waited until July 14, 2015, to say, “The reconciliation process has ended, the revolutionary people’s fight has begun,” when its imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, had given a Nevruz message on March 21 in favor of the reconciliation process.

    The second step the PKK has taken within the framework of returning to the reconciliation table has been to find itself an international partner. In this sense, as has frequently been said previously, it has requested that the U.S. be involved as a third party in the process. A few days ago Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) Vice-Chair Cemil Bayık repeated this call and invited the U.S. to the table.

    As before, the PKK is attempting to use the reconciliation table as a means of creating a hegemonic arena for itself in the new period. From the start, however, the Turkish government considered the reconciliation process quite legitimately as a means of establishing its hegemony within national borders. It is not possible now to establish a new reconciliation process without placing this concern of the Turkish state in the center. The one who must know this before anyone else is Turkey’s ally, the United States.

    [Daily Sabah, January 22, 2016]