Tag: PJAK

  • Military Bus Bombed In Istanbul, Killing 5

    Military Bus Bombed In Istanbul, Killing 5

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    A Wall Street Journal Roundup

    ANKARA, Turkey—Suspected Kurdish rebels detonated a remote-controlled bomb in Istanbul, killing five people and wounding 12 on a bus carrying military personnel and their families, Istanbul Gov. Hüseyin Avni Mutlu said on Tuesday.

    European Pressphoto AgencyTurkish forensic officers survey the scene of Tuesday’s bomb blast in Istanbul.

    turkey0622

    turkey0622

    The state-run Anatolia news agency said the dead in the early-morning attack included the 17-year-old daughter of an officer.

    Kurdish rebels fighting for autonomy in Turkey’s Kurdish-dominated southeast have dramatically stepped up their attacks on Turkish targets this month and had threatened to expand their war to cities in the west of the country. Local CNN-Turk television said there was no immediate claim of responsibility but that Kurdish rebels are believed to be behind the attack. The rebel group rarely claims responsibility for its attacks.

    The Turkish military said in a statement on Tuesday that members of the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, attacked a gendarmerie post in the southeastern town of Silvan with light arms and grenades late Monday, killing one soldier. The military said five PKK militants were killed during the clash.

    The statement also said that Turkish troops clashed with a group of PKK militants in the northeastern Gumushane-Kelkit region early Tuesday, killing two.

    Twelve soldiers died in PKK attacks over the weekend, triggering nationwide anger and putting pressure on the government to adopt tougher tactics. On Tuesday, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan pledged in a speech to parliament to continue with a government initiative to give ethnic Kurds greater cultural rights.

  • Kurdish guerrillas launched an attack on Turkish troops

    Kurdish guerrillas launched an attack on Turkish troops

    June 19, 2010
    SON DAKIKA

    Kurdish guerrillas launched an attack on Turkish troops in southeast Turkey overnight. The attack marked a fresh escalation of conflict in the region and military reinforcements were sent to the scene of the attack at Semdinli in Hakkari province, near the border with Iraq.
    There has been an increase in separatist violence in the mainly Kurdish southeast in recent weeks, as warmer weather brings increased infiltration of PKK rebels from the mountains of northern Iraq, where several thousand of them are based. On July 2, 2010 the PKK have scrapped a year-old unilateral ceasefire and resumed attacks against Turkish forces. More than 40,000 people have been killed in the conflict since the PKK launched its armed insurgency against the Turkish state in 1984 with the aim of creating an ethnic homeland in southeast Turkey.

    The military arms of PKK participate in these operation.

    The YJA STAR is the name of the female combat units within the separatist group Kurdistan Workers’ Party . The current Headquarters Commander is Çigdem Dogu (code name Rengin Botan).

    The term YJA STAR is an acronym for “Yekîtîya Jinen Azad” and means unity of the free woman.” STAR is a reference to the goddess Ishtar.
    The army of women units, were part of Kurdish ARGK (until 2000) or the Popular Defence Forces (HPG), since 2000). Later, the women organized themselves in the TAJK Tevgera Kurdistan Freedom Falcons Jinen (freedom of movement of women of Kurdistan). The most prominent figure to identify with the women’s movement was Gülnaz Karatas , the KDP[1] peshmerga who fell from a cliff in order to avoid a seizure. People’s Defence Forces (HPG) is the military wing of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

    There is also The Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (Kurdish: Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan, TAK), also called the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks, is a militant paramilitary group that has committed attacks throughout Turkey, operating in southern Turkey and northern Iraq with a goal of securing Kurdish secession from Turkey. It is unclear whether or not TAK is connected to any other Kurdish nationalist organizations, though it is believed they split off from the Kurdistan Workers Party
    (PKK) when they became dissatisfied with the group’s tactics.

    This group goes by other names including, but not limited to Kurdish Vengeance Brigade, Kurdistan Freedom Falcons Organization, Kurdistan Liberation Hawks

    [1] One of the two major Kurdish parties the KDP and the PUK. Pêsmerge or ????????? ??) is the term used by Kurds to refer to armed Kurdish fighters. Literally meaning “those who face death” (Pesh front + marg death).

  • Kerkuk and the Kurdish aspiration

    Kerkuk and the Kurdish aspiration


    Mofak Salman Kerkuklu
    msalman@eircom.net
    2010 / 4 / 14

    Kerkuk and the Kurdish aspiration

    By Salman Mofak
    Ireland- Dublin
    msalman@eircom.net

    Mofak Salman Kerkuklu graduated in   England with a BSc Honors in Electrical and Electronic Engineering from Oxford Brookes University and completed MSc’s in both Medical Electronic and Physics at London University and a MSc in Computing Science and Information Technology at South Bank University.  He is also a qualified Charter Engineer from the Institution of Engineers of Ireland. Mr. Mofak Salman is an author of books “Brief History of Iraqi Turkmen” and “Turkmen of Iraq”. He is the Turkmeneli Party representative for both Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. He has written a large number of articles that were published in various newspapers and electronic website.He is a distiquished Author withinTurkish Forum.

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    The US and TURKEY: END OF AN ALLIANCE

    One of these ethno-linguistic groups is the Türkmen [ ], who have made a major effort to define themselves, both internally and to the world community. Their real population has always been suppressed by the authorities in Iraq for political reasons and is officially estimated at 2%, whereas in reality their number should be put between 2.5 and 3 million, i.e. 12% of the Iraqi population. The Türkmen of Iraq settled in Türkmeneli. [ ]
    The Türkmen are a Turkic group with a unique heritage and culture, as well as linguistic, historical and cultural links with the surrounding Turkic groups, such as those in Turkey and Azerbaijan. Their spoken language is closer to Azeri but their official written language is similar to the Turkish spoken in present-day Turkey. The Türkmen of Iraq settled in Türkmeneli in three successive and constant migrations from Central Asia, and increased their numbers; this enabled them to establish six states in Iraq.

    The Kerkuk city holds strategic as well as symbolic value for the Iraqi people in general and for the Türkmen especially! The Türkmen consider the city of Kerkuk as pumping mechanisms for their survival. The city contains about 60% of Iraq s oil reserves, and 4% of the world oil reserves and it is one of the finest types of crude oil in the world. The city is important because gas and the ocean of oil beneath its surface. Since 25% of the Iraqi oil lies beneath the city of Kerkuk and expert estimate, the oil and natural resources in Kerkuk would be enough to fuel independent Kurdistan, the ultimate goal for many Kurds. Thus, the city is important for the Kurds only for economical reason and sources for independent homeland.

    In the view of many historians, the Kurds have no historical link in the city but the Kurdish migration and settlement in the city of Kerkuk could be summarized in several stages. Firstly, the establishment of the Iraqi Petrol Company “IPC “ by the British in the twenties had encouraged the Kurdish population to move to the city of Kerkuk seeking for an employment as a workers in the IPC oil company. In the view of many Iraqi’s and historians. This Kurdish migration considered as the first wave of Kurdish settlement in the city.
    The second wave of Kurdish migration and settlement in the city of Kerkuk were due to the commercial and business reasons, especially when Kurdish middle classes businessmen migrated to Kerkuk from the city of Erbil and Sulymaniya to sale their product in general and especially smuggled cheap products from Iran to be sold in Kerkuk and surrounding region.
    The third wave of the Kurdish migration to the city of Kerkuk occurred after the establishment of the Kerkuk to Erbil railway line, which encouraged and facilitated the migration of large number of Kurds to Kerkuk, seeking jobs and affording an opportunity for a better life.
    The fourth waves of Kurdish migrations to the city of the Kerkuk were due to the establishment of the military command for the Iraqi army in Kerkuk that resulted the establishment of several military camps in and around of Kerkuk.
    The establishment of the military compounds in city of Kerkuk had encouraged several thousand of Kurds to be recruited by the Iraqi Army as soldiers and overwhelming majority of these recruited soldiers were accommodated in the military compounds. In addition, these soldiers brought their families to settle in Kerkuk.
    The fifth wave of Kurdish migration to Kerkuk was after the coup of 1958, when the General Abdul-Karim Qasim Socialist Government built several neighbourhoods in Kerkuk and these neighbourhoods were filled with the Kurds. Moreover, the Kurdish revolt and rebellion against the Iraqi government caused the Iraqi government to retaliate against the Kurdish rebels by bombarding their villages and forcing them to leave their villages. They have settled in the Turkmen populated towns as a safe place this happened when thousands of Kurdish families were forced by the Saddam Hussein regime during the Enfal era. They were settled in the Türkmen sub district of Tuz Khormatu.

    The final Kurdish migration and settlement were after the fall of the Saddam Hussein government when the Kurdish parties brought over 700,000 Kurdish settlers into the city of Kerkuk with the help of the US forces under the pretext these settlers were expelled by the previous Saddam Hussein government during the Arabization policy, s the matter of fact overwhelming majority the expelled Kurds were not originally from the town but they have been brought by the both Kurdish parties to change the demography of the town.
    In the view of many Iraqis, Kerkuk is belonging to the Iraqis and it is a part of Iraq. During of a successive Arab government that has ruled Iraq, most of the lands of Kerkuk are belong to the Türkmen. Throughout the history of Iraq, the Kurds had no historical link to the city of Kerkuk and the city itself was never being a part of Kurdish regional government as the Kurds claims. The Kurdish militia’s hope is to make the city of Kerkuk and its vast oil reserves part of an autonomous Kurdistan, whereas the Türkmens, Chaldo Assyrians, and Arabs are fiercely and staunchly opposing the inclusion of Kerkuk into Kurdish autonomous region. For the Kurds Kerkuk is important because for the Kerkuk oil and gas. Expert estimate the oil and natural resources would be enough to fuel independent Kurdistan.

    After the fall the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003. The Türkmens, Arabs and Chaldo Assyrians had high expectations, of the interim administration established after 9th of April 2003. The Türkmen expected to see democracy, justice, equality, fairness, an end to discrimination, the right to self-determination and an end to violence. Unfortunately, the opposite has occurred regarding the human rights situation in Iraq, in particular concerning the Iraqi Türkmen.
    In order to suppress the Türkmen voice in northern Iraq, the Kurdish militias have established several puppet Türkmen parties to serve their own purpose. All the Türkmen parties, which were established by the Kurdish militia, are of Kurdish origin and working for the Kurdish party and all the bodyguards are from the Kurdish militia. The Türkmen parties established by the Kurds are designed to divide the Türkmen people and are used to smear the name of the Türkmen Republic in Iraq and to discredit the real representatives of the Türkmen.

    The changing demography that was carried out by the Kurds after 2003. Saddam Hussein was not able to do it within 35 years. The city has been changing, a wave of Kurdish migrants moving to Kerkuk since the 2003. With the help of both Kurdish parties stretches of the recently build house pup up everywhere, there visual testimony the city is shifting demographics. The Türkmen and the Arab see the mass Kurdish migration is a potential political moneverouse and attempt a demographic takeover. The majority of the returned Kurds are not from Kerkuk and even lived in Kerkuk before if they are really genuine from Kerkuk they should claim their properties since they are not thus they settled in lived in the football stadium and properties which is belonging the previous government, military camps and houses belonging to the previous Iraqi army compound.
    The economic, political, and cultural aspects for the Türkmen completely changed when the Kurds brought over approximately 700,000 settles’ to Kerkuk from North of Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran. The majority of the returning Kurds settlers were not originally from Kerkuk but were brought to Kerkuk with the help of two Kurdish parties. In the meantime, both of the Kurdish parties have utilizing more aggressive ethnic cleansing policy by changing the demography of the Kerkuk. For instant the Kurds who were deported by the Saddam Hussein government from Kerkuk and currently are working as a civil servant at the Kurdish controlled province such as Sulymaniya were forcibly transferred to Kerkuk against his willing, they were also prevented to purchase a land or properties in the city of Sulymaniya and they were also forced to register their children in Kerkuk although they were born in Sulymaniya this clearly shows the degree of the demographic changes that have been utilized by the Kurds in north of Iraq.
    The demographic structure of Kerkuk have changed seriously and distorted as Kurds, backed by armed Peshmerga forces, migrated into the city in large groups claiming to be original residents. After 2003, thousands of Kurdish settlers backed by the Kurdish militia have poured into Kerkuk and occupied houses, government building, football stadium, military camps, Ba’ath party Head Quarters. After the toppling of Saddam Hussein regime, the Kurds intensified their Kurdization campaign in the city of Kerkuk. The Türkmen have been subject to campaigns by the Kurds in Türkmeneli in an often more brutal fashion than carried out on Kurds by Saddam Hussein. Türkmen and Arabs have been kidnapped, assassinated, imprisonment and, arbitrary arrested.

    During the Arabization policy, Saddam Hussein regime expelled Türkmen and Kurds from Kerkuk to change the demography of the town by encouraging the Arab population to migrate and settle in the city of Kerkuk.
    On 10 April 2003, Kerkuk had 810,000 inhabitants. Today, seven years after the occupation of Kerkuk by the Kurdish militia and the massive influx of Kurds to Kerkuk, the population in the city of Kerkuk has exceeded 1.5 million. Kurds brought over approximately 700,000 Kurdish settlers from Northern of Iraqi, Turkey, Syria and Iran.
    The demographic structure of Kerkuk have changed seriously and distorted as Kurds, backed by armed Peshmerga forces, migrated into the city in large groups claiming to be original residents but in the reality the majority of the returning Kurds were not originally from Kerkuk but they have been brought to Kerkuk with the help of the two Kurdish parties in order to change the demography of the city and to win the referendum that was planned to be carried out by December 2007. Whereas the Kurds claims that these returnees were forcibly expelled from their homes by the government of Saddam Hussein during the 1980s and 1990s. Mr. Barzani declared that 250,000 Kurds, including Türkmen were expelled from Kerkuk while in fact and according to the official information that was obtained from Saddam Hussein regime showed the actual numbers of the deportees from all ethnic groups in Kerkuk according to the ration cards until 30/3/2003 was 11,568 people.
    In addition to, an article was published in the Kurdish Al_taakhi newspaper reported prior of the fall of the Saddam Hussein government the number of people that were expelled from Kerkuk by Saddam Hussein exceeded 60,000 whereas the sstatistical data were taken from the Ministry of Commence, showing the number of people who have been transferred to/out of Kerkuk according to ration cards.

    1- The number of people registered in Kerkuk according to the ration cards up to 19/3/2003 was 834,973 persons.
    2- The last ration card number that was transferred before 20/3/2003 to outside of Kerkuk is 136512 and was issued under the name of Delir Hassan Ibrahim.
    3- The last ration card number that was transferred to Kerkuk before 20/3/2007 is 179898 and was issued to Azad Kadir Jaber.
    4- The number of ration cards transferred to Kerkuk up to 30/9/2004 was 43,386.
    5- The number of people transferred to Kerkuk according to the ration cards is 347,818 persons, all of whom originate from Suleymaniyah, Erbil and Duhok towns.
    6- The actual numbers of the deportees from all ethnic groups in Kerkuk according to the ration cards until 30/3/2003 was 11,568 people.

    After the fall Saddam Hussein government, the Kurdish militia ransacked the Municipality building in Kerkuk and the land deeds for the Türkmen were deliberately taken from Registry Office making it difficult for the Türkmen to establish themselves as original inhabitants of the province.
    Moreover, the Kurdish parties have brought huge numbers of Kurds to the city of Kerkuk. The Türkmen are worried that the country drag into another phase was deliberate migration to Kerkuk within the last few years; this mass migration to Kerkuk has changed the city demography. The new Kurdish settlers have been paid $4000 (5millions Dinar) to each repatriated Kurdish family and promised a piece of land to build small house. Tens of thousands” of Kurds have resettled in the city and surrounding villages with the help of the both Kurdish parties. These Kurds are brought to Kerkuk in order to vote for referendum under article 140.
    The article 140, dealt with very important and sensitive issues, not only for the Türkmen of Iraq but also for all Iraqis. Furthermore this article 140 deals with the normalization process of the situation in Kerkuk governate, a process which consists of three major steps, each one with it is time limit:-
    • The return to Kerkuk of all its forcefully displayed inhabitants by the Ba’ath Regime during the Arabisation processes of the province by the regime and the recuperation of their confiscated lands and properties shall be completed before 31 March 2007.
    • A new population census for the original population of the province to be held before 31 August 2007.
    • A referendum for the future of Kerkuk to be attached to the Kurdish Autonomous Region or not, to be voted before 31 December 2007.

    One of the anomalies of this article 140 of the New Permanent Iraqi Constitution is that it imposed a fixed time limit for its implementation, stating that it must be completed before 31 December 2007. The fate of the city of Kerkuk has been one of the thorniest issues of Iraq s constitutional process. Under Article 140 of the document that was ratified by Iraqis on 15th Oct.2005, a referendum on the status of Kerkuk implemented in the province no later than Dec. 31, 2007. This will happen only after the Iraqi government takes measures to repatriate former Arab residents and resettle Türkmen and Kurds or compensate them, carry out the normalization and census.

    The 140th article expired on the 31st Dec.2007, and according to the Iraqi constitution that was established after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, article 140 should not be modified or extended since it was imposed a fixed time limit for its implementation, stating that it must be completed before 31st December 2007, therefore at the end of the 2007 it was automatically expired and had lost its constitutional validity since the article was not fully implemented before the end of the 2007.

    In addition, the Iraqi constitution clearly stated that any extension or amendment on the article needs an approval of 2/3 of the Iraqi parliament’s members and the approval of the public in form of a referendum. However, unfortunately the UN representative in Erbil Mr. Staffan de Mistura recommended extending the expiry date of article 140 for a further six months, this happened. Mr. Staffan de Mistura’s suggestion among the Türkmen was considered unwise and biased, since he failed to pay any attention to the Iraqi constitutional but Prime Minister of Iraq Mr. Nuri al-Maliki did not support the initiative because he stated that any extension of the work to rule 140 after the time limit was unconstitutional.

    In addition, the article is an Iraqi internal matter and the UN representative was not entitled and had no full authority and constitutional right to change, extent and even to modify any article within the Iraqi constitution. Iraq is sovereign country and it was not under the UN mandate therefore a UN employee working in Iraq had not an authority to suggest, recommend and an extension for any article within the Iraqi.
    In the middle of July 2008, Iraq s parliament reached an agreement on the Provincial Council Election Law, particularly with regard to Paragraph 24 of the law, which deals with the election mechanism in the Kerkuk Governorate. The postponement of the elections and adaptation of the division of Kerkuk to the three constituencies that include the proportion of 32 % for Arabs, Kurds, and Türkmen and 4% for Assyrians. Türkmen, Arab and Assyrians proposed equal distribution of provincial council seats in the Kerkuk region – which is outside the Kurdish territory.
    On 22 July 2008, decision was made by 127 Iraqi members of parliament they voted in favour of the Provincial Council Election Law, particularly with regard to Paragraph 24 of the law, which deals with the election mechanism in the Kerkuk Governorate. The distribution of power that include the proportion of 32 % for Arabs, Kurds, and Türkmen and 4% for Assyrians. Moreover, the central government rather than the current military forces that are stationed in the town shall control the security of the town and the security forces that are linked to the political parties have to leave.
    The number of the deputies attended the meeting were 140 and 127 out of 140 deputies that attended the meeting approved the bill and the Iraq s parliament still passed the law. President Jalal Talabani and his deputy, Adel Abdul Mahdi, vetoed this.
    Nevertheless, the Kurdish Brotherhood List at the Kerkuk Governorate Council held meeting on 31 July 2008. The 24 members of the 41-member of the Kerkuk Governorate Council presented a request to the Kurdistan Region Government and the Iraqi parliament to make the governorate part of Kurdistan Region. Whereas the Türkmen and Arabs regarded this extraordinary session as illegal. In addition, the Türkmen leadership has requested to replace the Kurdish police in Kerkuk with army forces from central and southern Iraq.

    The Kurds considered as a minority in the city of the Musul comparison to the Sunni Arabs and large size of Türkmen population in the province of the Musul. However, after the fall of the Saddam Hussein government by the occupation forces of US forces, both the Türkmen and Sunni Arab have boycotted the election that was carried out in year 2005 in protest of the USA occupation for Iraq thus the Kurdish parties took the advantageous of the absent the Türkmen and Sunni Arab and thus they Musul governor was controlled by the minority of Kurds who is belonging to the KDP party. While the Kurds minority were in power they commenced to take advantageous of their position in the government by changing the demography of the city and , , takeover more land that are not belong to them and ethnic cleansing a large number of villages ad districts and especially in the Türkmen populated area of Telafer.

    However, in the provincial election in 2009 the Sunni Arabs and Türkmen have decided to participate in the election as the consequences the Sunni Arabs and the overall whelming majority of seat won by the Sunni Arabs. In response of the Sunni Arabs, victory the Kurdish politician and parties have rejected the Sunni Arab won and have refastened to participate in the collation government that was established by the Arabs. In the view of many of Iraqi and international observer the Kurds has a dream to establish to establish a state of Kurdistan and Sunni Arab won a setback to Kurdish dream. In the view of many Iraqi the Kurds should realise, accept the reality that the province of Musul is not a part of Kurdistan, and accept the provincial election result as democratic election. The Kurds should accept the result of the fair election and democracy.
    Many Iraqis believe that greater Kurdistan cannot be achieved without controlling more strategic areas such as Kerkuk and Mosul, which the Kurds do lay claim to, Kerkuk and Mosul are disputed territories. At present, the Kurds cannot realize their dream, due to the weakness of the economical resources, lack of the geographical interconnectedness, lack access of the seaport and opposition of the neighboring countries. The Kurds have a plan for a great Kurdistan but at the present time, it would not be suitable for the Kurds to declare it.

  • Between the Hammer and the Anvil: An Exclusive Interview with PJAK’s Agiri Rojhilat

    Between the Hammer and the Anvil: An Exclusive Interview with PJAK’s Agiri Rojhilat

    Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 31

    October 23, 2009 11:46 AM Age: 3 days

    Featured By: Derek Henry Flood

    Agiri Rojhilat

     

    Agiri Rojhilat is one of the top seven members of the Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistane (PJAK) which is a part of the larger umbrella organization Koma Civaken Kurdistan (KCK) that includes the PKK. The Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan portrays itself to be more of an armed democratization movement rather than a traditional national liberation movement for Kurdish sovereignty. PJAK says it is taking a stand in the name of all of Iran’s ethnic and religious minorities and it is much more than a Kurdish ethno-nationalist organization. Its expressed aim is to change the regime of the Iranian Ayatollahs to form an inclusive, multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic participatory, federalized democracy in Tehran. Jamestown spoke to Rojhilat at the PJAK base in Qandil, northern Iraq.

    JT: Can you tell our readers about PJAK’s internal political framework?

    AR: Every four years we will have a congress that is made up of two-hundred delegates that from come from within our organization representing our women’s wing, youth wing and armed wing. This congress assembles itself in secret in Kurdistan. Because of the situation for Kurds in Iran, the elections for our congress cannot be held in the open. From the 200 assembled delegates, a thirty-person parliament is elected. Of those thirty elected, seven are chosen to form the coordination board of PJAK.

    JT: How precisely are these elections conducted? Since your organization is not a legal party in Iran, they must be done clandestinely, no?

    AR: The elections are done secretly. I want to let you know that we have over a million supporters inside Iran today. There is a lot of support for PJAK. But these elections cannot be perfectly [democratic] but of the secrecy in which they must be conducted.

    JT: It has been reported that PJAK is very concerned about women’s issues and gender equality. What can you tell us about this aspect of your organization?

    AR: I want to emphasize that women’s issues and women’s rights are paramount to our organization and we have a quota for female PJAK membership. Women are active at all levels of our organization. From the delegates to the parliament to the coordination board, we require a forty percent quota for females in PJAK. From top to bottom, we stress female participation in PJAK.

    JT: Even participating in guerrilla attacks?

    AR: Even fighting, yes.

    JT: Do the PKK and PJAK conduct joint military operations or are their kinetic activities totally isolated from one another?

    AR: What the PKK and PJAK have in common is that we both follow the ideology and philosophy of [imprisoned PKK leader] Abdullah Ocalan and we are both Kurdish parties. Let me explain this; there are four parts of Kurdistan since it was divided. Within both the PKK and the PJAK, there are Kurds from the different parts of Kurdistan. So within the PKK, there are Iranian Kurds and there are Germans and within PJAK there are Kurds from other parts of Kurdistan, but the PKK and PJAK are different groups with different political objectives.

    JT: You are referring to diaspora Kurds from Germany or European Germans?

    AR: Both. Let me explain; there are Kurds from all four parts of Kurdistan participating in the PKK, diaspora Kurds as well as some Germans. All of these types of Kurds are also participating in PJAK as well but I want to stress that the PKK and PJAK are two different organizations with different aims and objectives.

    I want to add something else. If the regime in Syria attacks Syrian Kurds, PJAK is obligated to have a reaction to such behavior. Despite the fact that PJAK operates primarily in Iranian Kurdistan, we feel we have a responsibility to protect Kurds from the other sectors of Kurdistan as well. There are not different kinds of Kurds. There is one Kurdistan and one Kurdish people.

    JT: Is PJAK a purely Kurdish liberation movement or is its appeal more broad based within Iran?

    AR: In our movement, there are several nationalities. We have Azeris, Baluchis as well as ethnic Persians fighting.

    JT: What is the geographical scope of the insurgency you are mounting?

    AR: We have guerrillas in place from Maku all the way to Kermanshah. Throughout Iranian Kurdistan we have over one million sympathizers.

    JT: What is the size of PJAK’s current military force?

    AR: Until now, we do not like to give out precise figures for this but we have over one thousand active guerrillas. Eighty percent of which are inside Iranian territory.

    JT: How are the values and teachings of Abdullah Ocalan carried out by PJAK?

    AR: Of course it is a matter of evaluating the philosophy of Abdullah Ocalan according to our specific needs. The PKK and PJAK are two different organizations and the situation in Turkish Kurdistan is different than in Iranian Kurdistan. We implement his teachings according to the needs of Kurds in Iran. Do we put everything exactly as Ocalan says into practice? Not necessarily. You cannot say exactly that whatever Ocalan says we put into practice…

    JT: What can you tell us about how PJAK was founded?

    AR: For about five or six years before 2004 when our organization was officially announced, we were having some meetings to decide about how to organize ourselves politically and improve the situation for Kurds in Iran.

    JT: Can you answer the allegations that PJAK has received support in any form from the Central Intelligence Agency? Journalist Seymour Hersh and former CIA officer Robert Baer have stated the United States government is very likely aiding PJAK in its proxy struggle with the Iranian regime. Is there any truth to these assertions?

    AR: It is not right that the CIA is helping PJAK. That is not the reality or right at all. Once we had a meeting with Americans in Kirkuk to discuss possible cooperation. Our friend Akif Zagros [a former member of PJAK’s seven person leadership council who the author was informed was killed in a flash flood] talked with them but the Americans said PJAK should abandon the ideology of Abdullah Ocalan and our brotherhood with the PKK if we want help from them. Akif Zagros told the Americans PJAK would not abandon the teachings of Ocalan or our friendly relations with the PKK. Because of the way the Americans approached the issue, shaheed Zagros left the meeting. Since the meeting in 2004, no other such meetings occurred.

    JT: If the United States were to approach you again asking to work with your organization against the Iranian regime, but this time without such preconditions, what would be the reaction of PJAK’s leadership?

    AR: We have nothing against the United States of America. We are not closing our doors to anyone. We are open to dialogue with everyone. We are open to America, Europe and still Iran for talks. We decide what is best for our people based on our own will. We decide democratically when, where and with whom we will engage in such dialogue. We do not want to be simply used against others…

    JT: So PJAK does not want to be used in a proxy war even if its interests temporarily converge with an outside power?

    AR: Until now, both the U.S. and the European Union approach Iran for their own benefit. Within these dialogues, the Kurds are always used and then thrown aside after we have served their purposes. Because of these failed policies, we do not accept these kinds of approaches.

    JT: Why do you believe that the Americans put PJAK on the Treasury Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations?

    AR:  Last year, there was a small bit of rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran and the nuclear issue and then suddenly PJAK gets put on this terrorist-financing list. We know there are some political parties [in Iran] that get some support from the U.S. but we are a totally different kind of party. We have our own will and objectives.

    JT: Out here in Qandil, I do not see any visible economy with which your organization can sustain itself. How is PJAK funded? Do you benefit from the Afghan opium trade? Do you receive donations from sponsors?

    AR: Our economy is based purely on the Kurdish people living in Iran. We collect voluntary donations from the Kurdish people according to how much they are able to give within their relative means. To explain to you the level of support that we receive, the Kurdish people even bring their children to us to join our organization.

    JT: Children of what age?

    AR: Normally eighteen. You must understand that Kurdish society is very different than the West. Because there are so many operations to suppress us, Kurdish society has turned inward. This stress from the outside strengthens our communities. We have some recruits that are under eighteen, maybe sixteen, but they are not participating in our military operations. Where we are from in Iran, there is a very large youth population and our party sees a lot of potential in them as we consider ourselves a young party. The Islamic Republic of Iran has three elements it uses in the destruction of our youth. Firstly it encourages and facilitates drug use among them. Secondly, it employs the Basij [militia] system and tries to brainwash our young people to be against the U.S. and Europe, saying, “We [Iran] stand for Islam and therefore the U.S. and E.U. are our enemy.” Thirdly, the regime systematically imprisons and tortures them in order to annihilate us and discourage them from joining PJAK or supporting the Kurdish freedom movement.

    JT: Can you be more specific about how the guerrilla movement is financed?

    AR: For example, certain Kurdish people that have relations with PJAK come and visit us. They pledge to sponsor maybe fifty or one hundred guerrillas from top to bottom for an entire year. They buy everything for them and it is their way of supporting their own freedom struggle. All of this is done through voluntary sponsorship.

    About the drug question you brought up, Iran has very special policies in regard to this matter. They encourage Kurdish youth in Iranian Kurdistan to use drugs and the percentage of addiction among our youth has been increasing. The Iranian state wants our young people to remain outside the political framework of the country. Let me give you an example of how this policy affects our people. Recently, a mother came here from Iran asking us to help her deal with her son who was badly addicted to drugs and she felt powerless to do anything about it. She said she could not turn to the Iranian state for help and came to us because she felt that by joining PJAK, [her son] could shake his addiction. We told her “bring your son to us. We can help him.”

    JT: PJAK does not profit from the transit of Afghan narcotics through its territory?

    AR: There have been clashes with police in Iran with Sunni groups who are fighting the Islamic regime in Baluchistan and Khorosan. Sometimes these police die. From time to time, we also have clashes between our armed wing and regime elements. When some pasdaran [Revolutionary Guards] die, the regime says it is because of bandits involved in the drugs trade. They describe clashes with PJAK as banditry and try to link us to the drugs. Iranian authorities do not like to mention the name PJAK after some pasdarans die, just referring to us as bandits. These Iranians are not dying because of the drugs trade. They are being killed because they are oppressing Sunnis and Sunnis in these provinces are fighting the regime. If you come back to me on another visit, I can provide you with names of those in the regime that are involved in the drugs trade.

    When the Iranian regime prepares its annual budget, it does not have enough money to sustain itself and so it supplements governmental coffers with money from the transshipment of Afghan narcotics. The drugs are shipped across Iranian territory under the supervision of Ettela’at (Iranian Intelligence: Vezarat-e Ettela’at Jomhuri-e Eslami – VEVAK) to Orumieh (provincial capital of West Azarbaijan Province). From Orumieh they are sent to Hakkari Province in Turkey where they are shipped under the supervision of the MIT (Milli Istihbarat Teskilati – Turkish intelligence) and from Turkey these drugs reach Europe. Both Iran and Turkey may employ some Kurds as part of their trafficking apparatus but the trafficking is state organized by both countries’ intelligence services.

    Can you imagine this high volume of drugs coming into Turkey from Iran without the Turks’ knowledge? It would be impossible. Turkey has many checkpoints. How could they not know about all of these drugs passing through their territory?

    JT: Is PJAK a 100% independent organization that exists without the support of international actors?

    AR: Yes that is completely right. I will stress that we have not so far [received] any international aid or weapons from anyone. We are an independent organization.

    JT: There has been a lot of speculation [surrounding] your leader Abdul Rahman Haji Ahmadi’s visit to Washington in the summer 0f 2007. Can you comment on it?

    AR: As you can see Haji Ahmadi is not here for comment. Whatever I say is on the record as a PJAK official. As the president of PJAK, he is available to have dialogue with anyone. He can visit different countries and meet with different people. Yes, he did visit Washington, as it was within his power to do so.  He has the power to do such things. But I want to reiterate that until now we have not received support from any outside powers…

    JT: What is PJAK’s attitude toward the Turkish-Iranian military alliance?

    AR: Iran and Turkey have an alliance against us and [have worked] on joint military operations together for the past few years. Despite their differences, they are unified on the Kurdish issue. The alliance between Iran and Turkey is not purely a military one though, it is also now political…

    Turkey is taking intelligence that it is receiving from the U.S. in regard to PKK positions here in Iraq and passing it on to Iran so they can attack PJAK. So Iran is now acquiring U.S. intelligence meant for Ankara in this Turkish-Iranian bilateral military strategy against the Kurds. Through this cooperation, we are attacked here in Iraq by Turkish warplanes while Iran fires Katyushas from the other side of these mountain ridges. We believe there are even Turks training members of the Revolutionary Guard Corps to fight Kurds inside Iran.

    Additionally, I want to let you know that besides Iran’s increased alliance with Turkey, it is also greatly expanding its bases along the Iran-Iraq border. It says it is doing this to defend the Islamic Republic against a possible invasion by the United States. But what this effort is really meant to do in our view is to separate the Kurds and stop the flow of our movement across the border. From our observations, some of these expanded military bases look to be modeled on Israeli bases.

    JT: What can you tell of your organization’s military strategy against Iranian forces?

    AR: Iran and Turkey insist that the PKK and the PJAK are the same and this works very well for their own propaganda efforts. We are being shelled here. If you look beyond you, you can see the entire mountainside is burned from Katuysha fire.  Our strategy is one of pure self-defense. We do not make offensive operations against the Revolutionary Guards. We defend Iranian Kurds and ourselves. We have a right to retaliate against the Iranian state as part of our self-defense policy. If Iran attacks our people, we will respond. Iran uses the death penalty and likes to hang people. If they will hang more of our friends, we have plans to retaliate directly… Our main work is political but we have to have an armed wing because Iran is not a truly democratic state and it does not allow people to organize themselves politically.

    JT: What can you tell our readers about PJAK’s philosophy and ideological outlook?

    AR: Our aim is a free Kurdistan and a democratic Iran.

    JT: Are you speaking of creating an independent Kurdish state?

    AR: What we are talking about now is not the changing of borders or the replacing of flags but creating an all-inclusive Iran.

    JT: Does PJAK seek to overthrow the religious government of Iran?

    AR: We do not oppose religion and we are in no way against the Islamic religion, nor do we have any animosity toward any other ethnic groups living in Iran today. Our goals are not limited to the freedom of Kurds. We wish for all the ethnic groups living in Iran to have their democratic rights.

    JT: Do you seek a structure of parallel government for Kurds in Iran comparable to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq that has its own parliament and issues its own visas?

    AR: Not at all. We would prefer to have much more participation in a democratized central government. To achieve this, we are trying to permeate Iranian Kurdistan with democratic values so that our people can improve themselves and organize themselves politically. We never want to impose cultural hegemony on others and would like to see Baluchis and Azeris organize themselves similarly as well.  

    JT: Do you believe that Iran is a Shia chauvinist regime that uses Khomenism and evangelical Mahdism similar to the way Turkey uses the notion of Turkism at the expense of its minorities?

    AR: Yes, that’s right. Iran gives Kurds a degree of recognition but with other groups like Azeris, they practice a forced assimilation policy. Iran also practices a divide and rule policy to pit different groups against one another. There is discrimination against Sunnis as well…

    JT: Does PJAK have a relationship with the Jundullah insurgency in Sistan-Baluchistan Province?

    AR: For us, yes, we have some relations with Baluchi people. However, we do not have a specific relationship with Jundullah. Baluchis have a special meaning for us because of their oppression by the Islamic Republic. Iran’s policy has been to make the Baluchis depend on the income from the transit of Afghan narcotics as well as depend on the Iranian state.

    JT: Do you have any connections with Ahwazi Arabs in Khuzestan Province? There has been some unexplained political violence there.

    AR: We do not have guerrillas there but we do have some indirect political relations.

    JT: In closing, can you tell our readers what core principles drive PJAK’s internal dynamics?
     
    AR: Our movement operates under three core principles: democracy, women’s rights, and ecology. We believe these three principles must be integrated into our everyday activities. Did you know that every year, it is required that every member of PJAK must plant two trees? PJAK strongly believes that understanding ecology improves people’s lives in the region where we are active. We have programs to help surrounding villages to acquire fresh water and PJAK also believes in helping to educate the people in our surroundings.

    https://jamestown.org/program/between-the-hammer-and-the-anvil-an-exclusive-interview-with-pjaks-agiri-rojhilat/

  • New Kurdish Leader Asserts Agenda

    New Kurdish Leader Asserts Agenda

    29kurds.span.600 Joseph Sywenkyj for The New York Times
    Last week, a Kurdistan Democratic Party building in Sulaimaniya, Iraq, displayed a poster of Massoud Barzani in his youth, right.

    By SAM DAGHER
    Published: July 28, 2009
    ERBIL, Iraq – The president of the semiautonomous Kurdistan region, Massoud Barzani, on Tuesday rejected proposals by the United Nations to resolve Iraq’s explosive internal border disputes, and reiterated his determination to proceed with a contentious local constitution.

    29kurds.inline.190 Khalid Mohammed/Associated Press
    In Erbil, Iraq, supporters of Massoud Barzani, the Kurdish regional leader, on Sunday celebrated a projected election victory.

    Mr. Barzani, newly empowered after winning an estimated 70 percent of the vote in the region’s presidential and parliamentary elections on Saturday, made the remarks in his first interview with the news media since the vote.

    “Regrettably, the recommendations of the United Nations are unrealistic,” Mr. Barzani said, referring to a report by the United Nations in April outlining options for the settlement of territorial disputes that threaten Iraq’s fragile stability. They included making Kirkuk Province – including the oil-rich city of Kirkuk that is claimed by Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Turkmens – into an autonomous region.

    American officials have repeatedly stated their support for a United Nations-brokered solution.

    “We will not accept that the United Nations or anyone else present us with alternatives to Article 140,” he added, referring to the clause in Iraq’s national Constitution that calls for a census followed by a referendum to settle the fate of areas including Kirkuk.

    Tensions have been aggravated by the presence of Kurdish troops in parts of the contested areas. The situation worsened in June when the region’s Parliament, overwhelmingly controlled by the two governing parties, including Mr. Barzani’s party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, approved a draft constitution that enshrined Kurdish rights to the disputed territories.

    Although the document states that the final demarcation of the region’s boundaries is subject to Article 140, it is unequivocal in its assertion that the disputed territories are inseparable from the “geographic and historic entity” called Iraq’s Kurdistan region.

    Mr. Barzani said one reason he agreed to put off a referendum on the regional Constitution that was to have been held during Saturday’s elections was a request this month from Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. and other American officials.

    “They asked if it was possible to postpone it because the timing was inappropriate,” he said.

    Mr. Barzani said he was determined to put the constitution to a referendum this fall. Such a move would place him on a collision course not only with the central government, which opposes the document in its current form, but also with a new Kurdish political coalition that did surprisingly well on Saturday.

    Shaho Saeed, a top official in the coalition, Gorran, said his movement filed a complaint this month with Iraq’s federal court in Baghdad that questioned the legitimacy of the process that the previous regional Parliament adopted to approve the constitution.

    Mr. Saeed said Gorran opposed the document because it gave powers to Mr. Barzani “that exceed the powers of Parliament and the judiciary.” Gorran wants the proposed constitution redrafted, he said.

    Although the region’s two governing parties, including the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, retain a comfortable majority to form the next government, Gorran appeared to have clinched at least 25 of the new Parliament’s 111 seats, according to preliminary results.

    With the two parties expected to remain firmly in control of Parliament, Mr. Barzani said that no one has the two-thirds majority needed to redraft the document.

    “The new Parliament has no right to redraft the constitution,” he said. “It is over.”

    Mr. Barzani said he welcomed the emergence of an opposition movement like Gorran, but issued a warning to those who might interpret it as a loosening of the grip of the two parties that control the region’s security forces, economy and patronage network.

    “If any regional country or even Baghdad interferes in an internal matter, or any individual inside the region conspires against the region’s security and well-being,” he said, “actions will be taken in accordance with the law against those who want to undermine the unity of the Kurdish house.”

  • PJAK, Iran and the United States: Kurdish Militants Designated Terrorists by the United States

    PJAK, Iran and the United States: Kurdish Militants Designated Terrorists by the United States

    PJAK, Iran and the United States: Kurdish Militants Designated Terrorists by the United States

    Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 7 March 26, 2009

    Category: Terrorism Monitor, Global Terrorism Analysis, Home Page, Turkey, Iran, Terrorism, Featured
    By: Saban Kardas, Nihat Ali Özcan
    The United States Treasury Department added the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (Parti bo Jiyani Azadi la Kurdistan – PJAK) to its list of designated terrorist groups on February 4. [1] Operating on the Iranian-Iraqi border under the umbrella of the Kurdistan Workers Party (Parti Karkerani Kurdistan – PKK), PJAK has sought to create an autonomous Kurdish region within Iran since its formation in 2004, though the relationship between Iran and the PKK dates back to the creation of the Islamic State of Iran in 1979. This development also highlights unique dynamics of the relationship between a terrorist organization (the PKK) and a state sponsor (Iran).  

    The decision to designate PJAK as a terrorist group brought to the forefront the trajectory of Iran-PKK ties, which traditionally have oscillated between sponsorship and enmity. In this article, we will look at the ebb and flow of sponsorship-enmity dynamics between Iran and the PKK, and put this relationship into the context of regional developments.

    The PKK established contacts with Iranian Kurds who rebelled against Tehran following the Iranian revolution of 1979. Since then, the PKK’s relationship with the Islamic Republic has gone through several phases that can be analytically divided into five distinct periods. The first period (1980-1982) covers the immediate aftermath of the Islamic revolution. The establishment of the Iran-Syria alliance and Iran’s war with Iraq marked the second era (1982-1988), during which a sponsorship relationship gradually took root. During the third period (1988-1997), Iran and the PKK redefined the sponsorship relationship to adjust it to the new geopolitics brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fourth period (1997-2003) can best be described as controlled cooperation, during which the parties struggled to maintain a fragile partnership under the pressure of the rapidly shifting regional balances of power. During the fifth era (2003-2009), starting with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a rather adversarial relationship emerged between the parties, which occasionally turned into open confrontation.

    First period

    Initial encounters between the PKK and the Islamic Republic date back to the first years of the revolution. The Iranian Kurds, seeking to take advantage of the post-revolutionary turmoil and the onset of the Iran-Iraq war, initiated a rebellion against Tehran. Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, tasked some of his militants with establishing contacts with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, which was leading the rebellion against Tehran at the time. Ocalan was reportedly urged by Jalal al-Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), to engage Iranian Kurds. [2]

    The initial years of the PKK-Iran relationship were characterized by enmity, developing as they did under the shadow of the new Iranian regime’s Islamic credentials and the PKK’s Marxist agenda. Moreover, the possibility that the PKK might ignite a desire for independence among Iranian Kurds further exacerbated Iran’s suspicions of the PKK. However, subsequent developments replaced this short-lived period of ideological antagonism with a spirit of pragmatism dictated by changes in regional diplomacy that provided a fertile ground for the emergence of a sponsorship-alliance relationship between the Islamic Republic and the Marxist PKK.  

    Second period

    The emergence of the Iran-Syria strategic alliance in 1982 had direct repercussions for Iranian-PKK ties as well. In response to the geopolitical shifts brought about by the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq War, including the deterioration of U.S.-Iranian relations, Tehran and Damascus were increasingly drawn towards each other. A shared interest of this new alliance was the undermining of two pro-Western countries in the region through subversive activities, namely Turkey and Israel. To do this, the Tehran-Damascus axis decided to support the PKK and Hezbollah. [3] Following this agreement, Iran dispatched its Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon through Syria to train Hezbollah fighters. The PKK froze its ties to al-Talabani and signed a partnership agreement with Barzani. [4] This agreement allowed the PKK to relocate its militants in Syria to northern Iraq through Iranian facilitation.

    From Iran’s perspective, it had many incentives to engage in such a relationship:

    • Tehran and Ankara were involved in an enduring rivalry.

    • The Islamic revolution increasingly pitted Tehran against the secular regime in Ankara, adding an ideological fervor to the competition.

    • The close ties between Ankara and Washington exacerbated Tehran’s fears of Ankara. As part of American plans to contain the Islamic regime, some airfields in Turkish territory close to the Iranian border were expanded (Cumhuriyet, November 16, 1982). Moreover, the United States relocated some of the listening stations it had to withdraw from Iran to eastern Turkey, raising Iranian concerns about Turkey.

    • Following the revolution, many supporters of the Shah’s regime, seeking to reach Western countries, first flew to Turkey. Revolutionary leaders were worried that these refugees, whose numbers were in the millions, could organize themselves in Turkey to undermine the new regime.

    • The Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline carrying Iraqi oil to world markets through Turkish territory brought extra revenue to Baghdad, helping it to finance its war against Iran.
     
    These pragmatic reasons led Iran to support the Marxist PKK in its efforts to undermine Turkey. Nonetheless, Iran always denied its support for the PKK, which was partly a reflection of the fact that Iran needed to maintain relations with Turkey (Cumhuriyet, May 3, 1987). For instance, it had to use Turkish territory to ensure a flow of logistical supplies to maintain its war against Iraq.
    Despite Tehran’s official denial of any support to the PKK, its sponsorship gradually increased towards the end of the Iran-Iraq war. As the senior partner, Iran exerted some limitations on the PKK. [5] The PKK could not attack Turkish targets within fifty kilometers of the Turkish-Iranian border and would refrain from operating among Iranian Kurds. It also agreed to share the intelligence it gathered about Turkey and American bases there with Tehran. In return, Iran provided the PKK with weapons, medical assistance and logistical facilities. Through entering this relationship, the PKK gained access to a wider area of operability and eventually expanded its influence into the Turkish interior.
     
    Third period

    Concerned about the growing influence of the PKK among Iranian Kurds after the Iran-Iraq war, Iran changed its attitude towards the PKK and arrested some of its militants. [6] Nonetheless, this situation soon changed. Although Iran’s Kurdish population posed a challenge, it was not a vital threat to Iran’s territorial integrity. Since the Sunni Kurds were a numerically small minority dwelling in the periphery of the Iranian political system, Iran regarded the problem as manageable. A more serious threat was presented by Azeri nationalism, especially after Azerbaijan emerged as an independent country. Turkey’s increasing profile in the Caucasus and Central Asia (backed by the United States) and the growth of Azeri nationalism within Iran became major issues of concern for Tehran, which found itself forced to restore its ties with the PKK. Indeed, a growing number of PKK activities during the 1990s took place mostly around Turkey’s northeastern and Caucasus borders. [7] In this way, Iran sought to hinder Turkey’s ties to the Caucasus and Central Asia and limit its influence in the region. One direct effect of this policy was that the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline had to be postponed for another nine to ten years. The intensification of PKK terrorist activities consumed much of Turkey’s energy, turning its attention inward.

    Fourth period

    In this stage, Iran gradually reduced its support to the PKK parallel to a declining threat perception. The Turkish-Iranian competition lost its intensity as Azerbaijan and Azeri nationalism were no longer perceived as major challenges. Similarly, Syria’s diminishing support of the PKK following the capture of Abdullah Ocalan resulted in Tehran reconsidering its ties to the PKK. Iran adopted a wait-and-see approach given that the regional balance of power was full of uncertainties. Last but not least, the 9/11 terror attacks and the Global War on Terrorism made Tehran more cautious as it sought to avoid being labeled as a sponsor of terrorism.

    Fifth period

    The Iran-PKK relationship, which started to deteriorate following the capture of Ocalan, turned into one of open confrontation in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The extensions of the PKK operating among the Iranian Kurds declared the founding of PJAK in 2004 (see Terrorism Monitor, June 15, 2006).  Drawing on its past networks, the PKK consolidated its power among Iranian Kurds within a short period. It capitalized on the legacy of Kurdish nationalism and resistance to Tehran introduced to the region before the local Kurdish movement was crushed by Iran, while building its own economic and political networks. To give PJAK a local character, some Iranian Kurds were recruited to its leadership cadres. Despite PJAK’s claim to the contrary, it operated under the PKK umbrella and sought refuge in the Kandil Mountain region. As an indication of these organic ties, militants recruited from Turkey were sometimes deployed in Iran, while militants of Iranian origin sometimes took part in PKK operations inside Turkey. [8]  

    The PKK’s growing visibility in Iran and an acquiescent American attitude towards the PKK presence in northern Iraq (which came to be perceived as a de facto rapprochement between Washington and the PKK) pitted Iran and the PKK against each other. PJAK has increasingly engaged Iranian military personnel since 2003 in a bid to gain media attention. In response, Iran has occasionally shelled PJAK positions in the Kandil Mountain region. There were also unconfirmed reports from Kurdish sources of cross-border operations by Iranian security forces in September, 2007 (Today’s Zaman, August 24, 2007; McClatchy, August 23, 2007). Like Turkey, Iran preferred to present PJAK as an extension of the PKK and lent support to Turkey’s fight against the PKK. In this way it sought to boost its own popularity among the Turkish public and to undercut Turkish-American ties.  

    Although the Bush administration added the PKK to the list of designated terrorist organizations, it was more tolerant toward PJAK, which led to allegations that America and Israel supported PJAK as a way to destabilize Iran. [9] Shortly after coming to power, the Obama administration designated PJAK as a terrorist organization controlled by the PKK. By this decision, Washington signaled that it would adopt a more principled approach in the fight against terrorism. This development also signifies a change in the American attitude towards the intricate relationships between Turkey, Iran and the PKK. Turkey welcomed the decision and saw it as the fruit of its new policy of building international coalitions to eradicate PKK terror, particularly through closer collaboration with the United States and northern Iraqi Kurdish authorities. A statement from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs underlined Ankara’s satisfaction with the U.S. acknowledgment of PKK-PJAK ties (Anadolu Ajansi, February 6).

    The PKK, in contrast, increasingly feels that it is being encircled as a result of recent developments. PJAK officials condemned the U.S. designation and claimed that for over a year the United States already had a de facto policy of pleasing Turkey and Iran by intensifying pressure on PKK and PJAK. The organization noted that northern Iraqi authorities were also supportive of this new policy (Gundem Online, February 12; February 17). PJAK challenged the Obama administration, arguing that the terrorist designation would not deter their struggle.

    Conclusion

    Iran is carefully observing developments in Iraq and the evolution of Turkish-American relations. The next stage in the sponsorship-enmity cycle between Iran and the PKK will depend on Iran’s assessment of the changes in the regional balance of power and threats to its national security. To escape the pressures exerted by close coordination between Turkey, the United States and the Kurdistan Regional Government of northern Iraq, the PKK will have an incentive to redefine its relationship with Iran. Despite Iranian-PJAK border clashes, PKK leaders are already sending warm messages to Tehran (Gundem Online, February 24). Whereas playing the “Iran card” might increase the PKK’s bargaining power, Iran also has reasons to maintain the continued availability of the “PKK card.” Considering the ongoing uncertainty over the future of the region (especially northern Iraq) in the wake of a partial U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and discussions over the Iranian nuclear program, Iran might not want to see the PKK disappear from the game completely.

    Notes:

    1. www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg14.htm.
    2. Cemil Bayik, Parti Tarihi, Damascus, 1996, p.58.
    3. For the background of this relationship, see: Huccetulislam Hasimi Muhtesemi’s (former Iranian ambassador to Damascus) memoirs. Turkish translation: Dunya ve Islam, 1990, pp.53-64.
    4. Bayik, op.cit. pp.75,77.
    5. Abdullah Ocalan, Parti Tarihimiz Boyunca Disaridan Dayatilan Tasfiyecilik Uzerine (Damascus, 1991), p.17
    6. Bayik, op.cit. p.92.
    7. Reports submitted to PKK’s Fifth Congress, Damascus, 1995, p.283.
    8. For the personal records of PKK militants killed see: www.hpg-online.com/sehit/sehit_kunyeleri/2008_a.html .
    9. Seymour Hersh, “The Next Act,” The New Yorker, November 27, 2006. The U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Ross Wilson, denied those allegations; See www.cnnturk.com, June 30, 2008.  www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/12/AR2007091201133.html

     
    https://jamestown.org/program/pjak-iran-and-the-united-states-kurdish-militants-designated-terrorists-by-the-united-states/