Tag: PJAK

  • Kurdish PKK Using PJAK to Isolate Turkey

    Kurdish PKK Using PJAK to Isolate Turkey

    Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 33August 19, 2010 04:49 Featured By: Wladimir van Wilgenburg Rezan Javid, PJAK Coordinator

    The rising tension and provocative rhetoric surrounding Iran’s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons are a matter of public record. Yet, are there other agendas being played out amidst the larger confrontation between Iran and the West? One such agenda may be found in the mountainous border region between Iran and the Kurdish region of northern Iraq, home to camps of the Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistane (PJAK – Party of Free Life of Iranian Kurdistan), a Kurdish militant nationalist group that claims to be fighting for the “democratic autonomy” of the Kurdish community in northwestern Iran. The movement has been engaged in a low-level insurgency in the border region since 2006. Recently, there have been signs that the larger Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK – Kurdistan Workers’ Party) is using its junior partner PJAK to isolate Turkey by pushing Ankara into an alliance with Iran, which  would strengthen the PKK’s position vis-à-vis both Turkey and Iran and would result in weakened relations between Turkey and its Western allies.

    PJAK is part of the Koma Civaken Kurdistan (KCK – Kurdistan Democratic Confederation) headed by PKK General Murat Karayilan and is generally considered to be an integral part of its umbrella organization. The movement admits it has relations with the PKK and recognizes imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan as its own supreme leader (Rudaw.net, July 19). [1] According to the U.S. Treasury Department, PJAK is controlled by the PKK and has Turkish Kurds in its ranks. [2]

    Currently, Iranian artillery shells the border regions of northern Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to pressure the KRG to take action against the PKK/PJAK and to convince them to support Iranian-supported Shi’a parties in Iraq, according to local journalist Kamal Chomani. [3] Another source suggests that Iran is using PJAK and PKK to militarize the border regions in case of an American attack. Iran fears the United States could use the Iraqi Kurdistan region as a launching pad against Iran. [4] Despite this, the KRG does not carry out operations against PJAK and tries to limit media access and attention to PJAK by sealing off PJAK-controlled regions.

    The KRG sees PJAK as an internal Iranian problem and considers the Iranian bombardments interference in Iraqi affairs. Iran and the KRG prefer to maintain economic relations, but the KRG also wants to maintain a strategic relationship with the United States to give it leverage with Turkey and its Arab partners in Iraq. Officially, the KRG is against the presence of PJAK in its administrative territory and favors a diplomatic solution. According to KRG Foreign Minister Fallah Mustafa Bakir, “We don’t believe violence can solve this problem. We do not allow any groups to launch attacks.” [5]

    PJAK’s armed activities against Iran have made it the main Kurdish opposition party among Iranian Kurds. Other Kurdish Iranian parties are allegedly financed by the KRG and their camps are tolerated in the Kurdistan region. In exchange for this, these actors do not carry out attacks against Iran in order to prevent any damage to the KRG’s relations with that country. Furthermore, the main Iranian Kurdish parties and rivals to PJAK, the left-wing Komala Party and the Partiya Demokrata Kurdistan (PDK – Kurdistan Democratic Party), are both weakened and splintered after being defeated militarily by Iran.

    PJAK is attracting international attention and support from Kurdish youth through its armed actions and assassinations in Iran. A Kurdish political rival of PJAK confirmed that the armed struggle is making PJAK more popular among the young Kurdish population. Other sources indicate PJAK is making some inroads among Kurdish students in Tehran. [6] PJAK leader Hadji Amedi is a former member of the Partiya Demokrata Kurdistan – Iran (PDK-I) and according to journalist Hawar  Bayzan, 40% of the Kurds executed in Iran were PJAK-members. [7] This shows the growing influence of PJAK among Iran’s Kurdish community.

    Iran perceives PJAK as a minor threat and has tried to increase cooperation with Turkey against the PKK and its partners since 2004 (southasiaanalysis.org, August 3, 2004). Despite this, the Iranian consul in Erbil claims that the presence of PJAK is a “small issue.” While PJAK can kill a few soldiers, it cannot destabilize Iran or hurt relations between Iran and the Kurdistan region, according to the consul. [8] It indeed appears that Iran is robust enough to deal with internal enemies like PJAK, the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MeK) and the opposition Green movement, while increasing trade with the KRG. Apart from Iranian pressure, PJAK’s activities have been hurt by the U.S. designation of the movement as a terrorist organization. PJAK’s leader claimed negotiations to form a united Iranian opposition failed after the United States took measures against PJAK (Newsmax.com, November 24, 2009). According to PJAK Coordinator Rezan Javid, the movement is very positive about Iran’s new Green opposition movement. [9]

    Therefore, PJAK is trying to gain American support or induce America to stop cooperating with Turkey against PJAK/PKK. “My party hopes that in the future the United States changes its policies towards PJAK and Iran. We are not against the United States,” the PJAK-coordinator said, citing similar democratic goals in the Middle East. [10]

    A former PJAK commander, Mamand Rozhe, told an American daily in 2008 that the PKK wanted to have a relationship with the United States and formed PJAK as a means of attracting American support (Los Angeles Times, April 15, 2008). Now there are indications that PJAK/PKK is trying to lure Turkey into cooperating with Iran against a common cause (PJAK/PKK) to create tension between Turkey and the Western powers and Israel. For instance, both PJAK and the PKK welcomed recent tensions between Turkey and Israel. According to Javid, this stopped intelligence sharing between Israel and Turkey against the PKK. “Israel gave intelligence to Turkey, but after the flotilla crisis Israel stopped giving intelligence to the Turkish regime,” he stated. [11]

    The pro-PKK news agency Firatnews.com concluded after the fifth PJAK Congress that Turkey has to make a choice between Iran or the United States and that this would ultimately benefit the PKK (ANF, May 11). If Turkey chooses the United States, Iran could again resort to covertly supporting the PKK against Turkey. However, if Turkey chooses Iran, this opens the door for the PKK and PJAK to receive indirect Western backing and the removal of its terrorist designation. It seems that the PKK is using PJAK against Turkey, while Iran is using the PJAK threat to both pressure the KRG and build up a military presence in the border regions of Iran.

    Notes

    1. Author’s interview with PJAK Coordinator Rezan Javid in Qandil, August 12, 2010.
    2. Ustreas.gov, February 4, 2009.  The author has also spoken with PJAK members from Turkey.
    3. Author’s interview with journalist Komal Chomani, August 12, 2010.
     4. Author’s interview with Kurdish journalist Rebwar Karim, August 13, 2010.
    5. Author’s interview with the KRG Head of Foreign Relations, August 12, 2010.
    6. Author’s interview with the PDK-I’s UK representative, Loghman H. Ahmedi, August 4, 2010.
    7. Author’s interview with Hawar Bazyan, August 3, 2010.
    8. Author’s interview with Iranian Consul Seyid Azin Hosseini in the Kurdish capital of Erbil, August 13, 2010.  
    9. Author’s interview with PJA Coordinator Rezan Javid in Qandil, August 12, 2010.  
    10. Ibid
    11. Author’s interview with PJAK Coordinator Rezan Javid in Qandil, August 12, 2010.

    https://jamestown.org/program/kurdish-pkk-using-pjak-to-isolate-turkey/

  • Against all odds – Republic of Turkey

    Against all odds – Republic of Turkey


    “Today, the Turkish nation faces the biggest threat in its history. Even though some people still struggle to understand this, the solidarity of the Turkish Republic has never been as endangered as it is now. Even when the death toll from the PKK was at its peak in the mid-1990s, society never seemed to be as polarized as it is today.” Yurter Ozcan discusses Kurdish problem and the founding principles of the republic.

    YURTER OZCAN*

    WASHINGTON
    – Two weeks ago, my family and I had lunch with some friends at our home in Washington. One of them, a Turkish-American citizen of Armenian descent who has been living in the U.S. for 40 years said: “Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was a great man. In 1923, he made everybody [in Turkey] equal.”
    With that one short sentence, he was able to encapsulate the philosophy upon which the Republic of Turkey was founded: the creation of a modern state where being a Turk was based on citizenship instead of religion, race, class or ethnicity. Common denominators for citizenship were shared history, culture and language.
    Has Turkey been perfect in its 87 year history? No.
    Has it accomplished all of the goals that the founding fathers set for future generations? No.
    Is the creation of the Republic of Turkey one of the best political achievements in the 20th century? Absolutely yes.
    Despite all of its challenges, short-comings and mistakes, this Republic was born as a miracle. This miracle resulted not only from the Revolutionary Independence War that many at the time, including the Sultan, deemed impossible to win, but because it sought to create a country so far ahead of its time. A gift that at times served as a curse when people could not adjust to the speed of the revolution, or when successive administrations could not fill the shoes of the founding fathers.
    In one speech, Ataturk emphasized that he was not leaving any taboos or dogmas behind. He said the world was changing so fast that even people’s definition of happiness constantly changed. He asked his nation to follow logic and science, and adapt to changes as needed. This is what people need to remember most: The revolution that was born in 1923 is an ongoing revolution. In other words, it is a revolution based on constant change, adaptation and improvement. This is why I find it so difficult to understand when people criticize Kemalism by claiming it is outdated. How can an ideology that demands ‘constant change’ be outdated? Since when following logic and science become a taboo or an outdated inspiration? Admittedly, the application of some policies may have been ineffective at times and not succeeded in solving some of the problems the country still faces.
    However, such short-comings, including the Kurdish problem that I will further discuss, should not be used as a basis to attack the very birth of this nation.
    ***
    Today, the Turkish nation faces the biggest threat in its history. Even though some people still struggle to understand this, the solidarity of the Turkish Republic has never been as endangered as it is now. Even when the death toll from the PKK was at its peak in the mid-1990s, society never seemed to be as polarized as it is today. We have come to a point where ethnicity is now factored into everyday decisions—while doing business, renting an apartment or even friendship. This horrifying trend is more dangerous to Turkey than any terrorist organization. Turkey is becoming a place where people cannot tolerate living with each other. During these challenging times, I understand the founding principles of Turkey even better— building a country free of any dogma and solely focused on constant change where different people could live under the umbrella of Turkish citizenship.
    The Kurdish Opening announced by the AKP in the summer of 2009, a project understood by nobody, including the AKP officials, imposed a situation on the Turkish nation that is quite grave and in many ways underestimates the patriotism that runs so deep in this country’s veins. The debate became so absurd that the Turkish people are expected to tolerate terrorists and even discuss the territorial integrity of their country. This constant threat is usually mixed with debates on linguistic, cultural and traditional issues faced by Kurds in Turkey. I agree that Turkish citizens of different ethnicities should be entitled to their own language, culture and traditions. They should also be able to broadcast and receive education in their own language (as it is the case now in private institutions). The question that must really be answered is: what does the PKK want?
    The terrorist organization has at times changed strategies and even altered its rhetoric depending on the situation. We should not be bogged down in jargon and forget the sight of the PKK’s true end-goal, which is dividing Turkey. The latest slogan they have is ‘democratic autonomy.’ What is that even supposed to mean? Kurds need to sincerely question what the PKK has ever done to improve their lives. What social, educational or economic initiatives has the PKK created? None. It is a rogue, corrupt terrorist organization financed through the drug trade, arms dealing and embezzlement. Several weeks ago, Sirri Sakik, a Kurdish Member of Parliament with the BDP, said that over 3 million Kurds signed a statement declaring Ocalan as their leader. This is the same person who refused to call on the PKK to give up their arms. So what about the remaining 70 million people who live in this country? Shall they be sidelined in this debate and accept everything the PKK seeks to impose?
    The Kurdish problem will never be solved until peaceful Kurds who have no affiliation with PKK take the initiative. Unless they stand up and declare that the Republic of Turkey is where they want to live, establish political organizations that denounce PKK and stop referring to Southeastern Turkey as ‘Kurdistan,’ it will be impossible to solve this problem. The government should continue to enhance the rights of all ethnic groups in Turkey (not only the Kurds) and make Turkey a more democratic country. However, the following must be well-understood by everybody: The Turkish nation will continue to defend its territorial integrity despite all threats, will live up to the expectations set by its forefathers and protect its Republic at all costs. This country was created against all odds and its light will continue to shine for many generations to come.
    * Yurter Ozcan was a researcher at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy between 2009 and 2010. In the fall, he will pursue an MSc in Middle East Politics at SOAS London as a British Government Chevening Scholar and HSBC Fellow.
    20 July 2010
  • APO IS BARKING AGAIN

    APO IS BARKING AGAIN

    Turkey: PKK Should Consider Ceasefire – Leader
    July 2, 2010
    Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan said the group’s militants should consider a ceasefire with Turkey following Turkish bombings of PKK areas in northern Iraq, AFP reported July 2. Ocalan said he hopes to resolve the PKK’s conflict with Turkey through democratic channels, rather than through the escalation of violence and internal strife. The Kurds would comply with a ceasefire, should Turkey develop a process of nonviolence, Ocalan said.

  • INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES YOU NEED TO KNOW

    INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES YOU NEED TO KNOW

    PKK ye silahlari kim veriyormus

    Olaf Palme assassination PKK subcontracting and guns guns guns

    Right after the (Olaf Palme) assassination, a British consultant and

    MI6 operative, apparently Gordievsky, had gone to Stockholm, and told

    publisher and owner of a private intelligence company Ebbe Carlsson,

    and the two Sapo officers, who had bugged the KGB residency on the

    night of Palme’s assassination on the instruction of the CIA Stockholm

    station chief Jenonne Walker, that the Iranians had arranged for the

    PKK to kill the statsminister because of his stoppage of weapons

    shipments, starting in November 1985. (Jesus Alcala, “Polisen ville

    tro pa PKK-sparet,” Dagens Nyheter, Feb. 28, 1996) MI6, knowing now

    the safety in numbers, had the same operative, it seems, tell his

    friend Karl-Gunnar Back, the Swedish Chairman of Civil Defence, that

    mercenary Craig Williamson had arranged the assassination hit-team,

    Koevoet/COIN, for disgrunted groups within the Swedish and South

    African security services (Operation Longreach). (Roger Magnegard and

    Mari Sandstrom, “Sydafrika planlade mordet,” Svensk Dagbladet, May 27,

    1987, p. 7.)

    source:

    =======================================================================

    PKK ye silahlari kim veriyormus

    Marksist PKK ye silah satisini bir tek İşçi Partisi hem de on sene

    evveliben biliyor. Neden acaba? Aslinda haberin icinde ismi gecen

    aktorlere bakinca bu tur islere bulasik olduklarini anliyoruz. Ancak

    operasyonel tiyatrolari biraz farkli. Bu basin toplantisi ve kapak

    haberi aslinda sasirtmaca. Olayin icindekiler Aydinlik gurubundakiler

    tarafindan cok iyi biliniyor. Her kara haberci gibi “Devletin en

    yüksek kurumları” lafi arada ama isimlendirilmiyor. Bir kolu

    uyusturucu mafyasinda, bir kolu mason locasinda, silahlar alinip

    veriliyor. Italya’dan Portekiz’den patlayicilar teroristlere teslim

    ediliyor. Bunlari da bir tek Silivri ahalisi bilebiliyor. Susurluk

    nasil ortuldu biraz daha arastirin bakalim. Bu ortulus kime yaradi

    aktorleri kimlerdi?

    Gelelim yazinin yapici kismina Turk halki adina Turk halkinin kaderini

    cizmek isteyen devrimci kisvesi altindaki kisi ve kuruluslar tasviye

    yolunda.Ciyak ciyak otmeleri bundan. Olayi PKK yi bitirmeye indirmek

    istiyenler OHAL destekcileri  besleyip beslendikleri emme basma

    tulumba gibi calistirdiklari duzenin sonuna gelindigini elbette

    goruyorlar ama yigitlige cokella surdurmuyorlar.

    Olacak nedir?

    72 milyon icin Devlet, Ordu, iktidar ve muhalefet bir araya gelecek.

    Kimle gerekiyorsa onla gorusecek ve bu isin onu oyle alinacak sonu

    oyle gelecek. Gelinen noktada kendini acz icinde gormemesi gereken

    buyuk bir Devlet var. Cetin Altan’in dedigi gibi ulusal “ensemizi

    karartmayalim.”

    EA

    “Devletin en yüksek kurumları, Susurluk’la ortaya çıkan özel örgüt’ün

    PKK’ye silah sattığını saptadı. Özel örgüt’ün silah ticareti ile

    ilgilenen görevlileri isim isim belirlendi. PKK’ye silah satış

    faaliyetinin başında CIA-MOSSAD ekibi bulunuyor. Soruşturma devam

    ediyor…Soruşturmanın dayandığı istihbarat raporlarına göre,

    başlangıçta örgüt, Suriye devletine de silah satıyor. Bu silahların

    PKK’ye gittiği ortaya çıkınca ilişkiyi perdelemek için diğer kanallar

    kullanılıyor. Silah ticaretine aracılık yapanlar arasında MED TV’nin

    finansörleri de bulunuyor. Bunlar için “eroin ve silah

    tüccarları…PKK’ye ve çeşitli bölge ülkelerine silah satışını

    planlayan ve koordine eden ekibin başındaki kişi emekli Amerikalı

    General Harry “Heinie” Aderholt[1], General Richard Secord[2] ve Albay

    Tom McGravey. Söz konusu ekip, MOSSAD şeflerinden David Kimche[3] ile

    birlikte çalışıyor… Susurluk olayıyla ortaya çıkan özel örgüt’ün,

    PKK ile silah ve uyuşturucu ticareti yaptığı artık devlet belgelerine

    geçmiş bulunuyor.”

    Doğu PERİNÇEK’in yardımcısı, İşçi Partisi Genel Başkan Vekili Hasan YALÇIN

    3 Aralık 1998 tarihinde İP Genel Merkezi’nde yapilan basın toplantısı

    ve Aydınlık gazetesi 6 Aralık 1998 tarihli ve 594 sayılı kapak haberi.

    [1] Harry C. Aderholt (1920 – Mayis 20, 2010)

    Olum haberinden “…Aderholt, known as “Air Commando One” by friends

    and those who served with him, worked through the CIA and the Air

    Force to form what was originally known as the First Air Commando

    Wing. In the 1960s, he conceived and directed a unit of Air Commandos

    who waged an unconventional war against the North Vietnamese. It often

    was fought from locations in Laos, where United States leaders denied

    soldiers were deployed. “He’s probably one of the greatest leaders of

    unconventional warfare,” said Chuck Keeler, current president of the

    Air Commando Association.

    In October 1973, nearly a year after retiring as a colonel, Aderholt

    was recalled to active duty and promoted to brigadier general. His job

    was to negotiate the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, said

    close friend Dick Geron.”

    [2] Major General Richard V. Secord, Retired, was a United States Air

    Force officer convicted for his involvement with the Iran-Contra

    scandal. He was born in LaRue, Ohio in 1932. He graduated from West

    Point in 1955 and was then commissioned in the USAF. He was President

    of Stanford Technology Trading Group Intl., also known as the

    “Enterprise”, a company involved with arms sales to Iran during the

    Reagan presidency. Richard Secord was involved in the Secret War in

    Laos during the Second Indochina War. At the time he was stationed in

    Thailand as deputy air wing commander and provided Hmong military

    leader, and Royal Lao Army Major General, Vang Pao with tactical air

    support. Ron Rickenbach, a former USAID official who served at the

    time, made an unsubstantiated allegation that Vang Pao occasionally

    used these aircraft to transport opium

    [3] The name David Kimche became vaguely familiar to Americans who

    followed the Iran-Contra scandal, yet few now can recall exactly what

    role he played.

    David Kimche: Israel’s Leading Spy and Would-Be Mossad Chief By Leon T. Hadar

    ========================================================

    Terör örgütüne ABD silahları!

    18 Şubat 2007 13:35

    K.Irak’taki Kürt liderler PKK’nin silahlanmasına destek veriyor.
    Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt’ın, terör örgütüne silahları Talabani ve Barzani’nin verdiği uyarısı, gözlerin yeniden Türkiye-Irak sınırı güvenliğine çevrilmesine neden oldu. Son olarak örgütün Kürt grupların yardımıyla Türkiye’ye 750 kilogram C-4 ve Stinger füzesi sokarak İstanbul’a getirdiği iddia edilmiş ve bu yalanlanmamıştı.

    Örgütün silahları arasında RPG roketatarlarının da olduğu biliniyor. PKK’nin elindeki silahların ABD menşeli oldukları açıklanmıştı. Türk ve Amerikan istihbaratçıların araştırmaları, Irak’taki kaotik ortam nedeniyle ABD’lilerin birçok “kayıp silahının” da PKK’nin eline geçtiğini doğrulamıştı.
    Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt ‘ın PKK’ye C-4 patlayıcılarını Kuzey Irak’taki Talabani ve Barzani ‘nin verdiği uyarısı, gözleri yeniden Türkiye-Irak sınırı güvenliği ve örgütün silahlandırılması konusuna çevirdi. PKK militanlarında ele geçirilen çok sayıda silah ve patlayıcının ABD menşeili olduğu saptanırken, son olarak örgütün Türkiye’ye 750 kilogram C-4 ve Stinger füzesi soktuğu iddia edilmiş ve bu yalanlanmamıştı.

    Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Büyükanıt, ABD temaslarının ardından düzenlediği basın toplantısında, PKK ile Kuzey Irak’taki Kürdistan Yurtsever Birliği ve Kürdistan Demokrat Partisi yöneticilerinin PKK ile silah ilişkilerine işaret ederken, terörle mücadele konusunda bu gruplarla konuşmayacağını net bir şekilde ortaya koydu.

    PKK’nin elinde tonlarca TNT

    PKK ile Kuzey Irak’taki gruplar arasındaki patlayıcı ilişkisi birçok kez belirlenmişti. Son olarak aralık ayında, Türkiye’ye 750 kilogram C-4 patlayıcı ile 5 adet Stinger füzesinin girdiği bilgisine ulaşılmıştı. Buna göre, silahları taşıyan minibüs Afyon’a ulaşıncaya kadar 4 kez plakasını değiştirdi. Konaklamanın ardından silah yüklü aracın İstanbul’a ulaştığı saptanmıştı. Gazetelere de yansıyan bu bilgiler yalanlanmamıştı.

    Terör örgütünün sürekli olarak silah yenileme faaliyetlerine yöneldiği saptaması güvenlik birimlerinin raporlarına yansımıştı. PKK’nin elinde tonlarca TNT, binlerce mayın ve füze bulunduğu yönünde bilgilere de ulaşılmıştı. Örgütün elinde bulunan silahlar arasında RPG roketatarlarının da olduğu biliniyor. PKK’nin elindeki silahların ABD menşeili oldukları açıklanmıştı. Türk ve Amerikan istihbarat birimlerinin araştırmaları, Amerikalıların birçok “kayıp silahının” da PKK’nin eline geçtiğini doğrulamıştı.

    Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü de teröristlere yönelik operasyonlarda ele geçirilen patlayıcıların menşeini araştırmıştı. C-4 ve A-4 olarak bilinen patlayıcıların seri ve üretim numaralarından, Portekiz yapımı olduğu anlaşılmıştı.

    Portekiz’in patlayıcıları Irak’a, İran’la 7 yıl süren savaş sırasında sattığı belirlendi. Irak’ta yaşanan kaotik ortamdan yararlanan terör örgütlerinin depolardaki patlayıcılara ulaştıkları tahmin ediliyor.

    Terör örgütünün kullandığı patlayıcılar arasında TNT’de bulunuyor. Ancak, TNT patlayıcısına ulaşılması, ticari amaçla satışı yapıldığı için zor olmuyor. Büyükanıt’ın dikkat çektiği çok güçlü patlayıcı olarak bilinen C-4’ler piyasadan temin edilebilecek nitelik taşımıyor. Ancak ordularda bulunabilecek türden patlayıcılar kategorisinde değerlendiriliyor. Sınırda yapılan operasyonlarda ele geçirilen teröristlerde özellikle Irak işgalinin ardından fazlaca C-4 patlayıcısının çıkması dikkat çekiyor. Sınırda ele geçirilen teröristlerin sırt çantlarında C-4’ler bulunmuştu.

    Irak Savunma Bakanlığı’ndan da geçen yıl 5 ton C-4 patlayıcısı çalınmıştı. Patlayıcıların Irak genelinde faaliyet gösteren terör unsurları ile PKK tarafından Türkiye’de kullanılabileceği endişesi gündeme gelmişti.

    Cumhuriyet
    Bu kayıp silah olayı kulağa tanıdık geliyor.
    Yanlışlıkla atılan bombalar, yanlışlıkla geçirilen çuvallar gibi.
    Rastlantı olsa gerek.

  • Iraq’s Kurds Lose Political Dominance In Kirkuk

    Iraq’s Kurds Lose Political Dominance In Kirkuk

    June 25, 2010

    turcomansdemonstrate
    By Charles Recknagel

    Before the March 7 parliamentary elections in Iraq, there was no question of who dominated politics in mixed-population Kirkuk — it was the two main political factions in the neighboring Kurdish autonomous region.

    But as the vote count from Kirkuk city and its surrounding Tamin Province neared its conclusion, it was clear that the political landscape was changing dramatically.

    The secular Al-Iraqiyah coalition and the Kurdistan Alliance appeared to be in a virtual tie, with the balance between them shifting by only wafer-thin differences as the vote tally rose.

    If the current balance stood, it would mean that the divided province’s Turkoman and Arab populations would have a much louder political voice than before. That, in turn, could complicate Kurdish hopes of one day incorporating oil-rich Kirkuk into their autonomous region.

    Turkoman politicians in Kirkuk make no secret of the fact that they competed in the parliamentary contest precisely with that goal in mind.

    United Against Kurdish Ambitions

    Hicran Kazanci head of the foreign relations department of the Iraqi Turkoman Front, tells RFE/RL’s Turkmen Service that Turkoman candidates enlisted in a variety of coalitions for the March 7 race.

    But he says they all agree on one thing: “Despite the fact the Turkomans went into the election with different coalitions, on major and essential subjects they are united,” Kazanci says. “For example, about the future status of Kirkuk, all of them are united in opposition toward annexing Kirkuk into any federation. And they are united in making Turkoman one of Iraq’s official languages.”

    A map Iraq’s ethnic makeupTurkoman and Arab politicians made up the vast bulk of Al-Iraqiyah’s candidates in the local race, coming for the first time under a single political umbrella in the divided province. That is in sharp contrast to much of Kirkuk’s recent history, where the three main population groups — Kurdish, Turkoman, and Arab — have all competed against each other.

    In the years immediately following the United States’ toppling of Saddam Hussein, both Turkomans and Arabs boycotted attempts to form a provincial government. They expressed anger over what they said were Kurdish efforts to appropriate the province de facto after moving Kurdish peshmerga fighters into the area to support the U.S. invasion.

    The Turkomans and Arabs only agreed to take part in the running of the province after a power-sharing deal in 2008. Under that deal, the provincial governor is a Kurd while his two deputies are an Arab and a Turkoman.

    But Kirkuk’s provincial parliament is still disputed after Arabs and Turkomans largely stayed away from the first election in 2005, handing the Kurds a majority. The Iraqi government excluded Tamin Province from the January 2009 provincial elections due to fears of sparking sectarian unrest.

    Given this background, the fact that this month’s elections for deputies to the national parliament went peacefully in Tamin Province is a major surprise. To ensure security, the Iraqi police fielded 56 mobile patrols in Kirkuk city on election day, while Kurdish peshmerga also spread out less obtrusively across the provincial capital.

    Simira Balay, a correspondent for RFE/RL’s Radio Free Iraq, said the Kurdish coalition was caught unaware by the election results, after it “had expected to dominate the election, but it seems the Kurdish vote split among a number of Kurdish parties, including Goran.” She noted that the Kurdish bloc was “neck and neck with the Iraqiyah list, which got most of the Turkoman and Arab vote.”

    The Kurdish coalition comprises the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Goran, a recently created Kurdish opposition party, scored well in recent elections by running on an anticorruption platform.

    Resolving Kirkuk Issue

    In the aftermath of the elections, Kurdish political leaders — like their Turkoman counterparts — are stressing unity in their position over Kirkuk.

    The Kurds see the city as the natural and historic capital of the Kurdish region in northern Iraq. And they insist upon holding a referendum in the province to determine its future status.

    “The issue of Kirkuk is [already] in the Iraqi political arena to be solved in accordance with Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution,” says Rizgar Ali, the Kurdish head of Kirkuk’s provincial council.

    Major steps under Article 140 include resolving property disputes created by Hussein’s policy of “Arabizing” Kirkuk, the holding of a census and conducting a referendum to decide the province’s future status.

    To date, progress on all these steps has been painfully slow. Most property disputes remain unresolved and unrest in northern Iraq has prevented a census. The referendum, originally planned for no later than the end of 2007, has slipped accordingly.

    That limbo is unacceptable to the Kurds, who are sure to use their full representation in the Baghdad parliament, including deputies from the Kurdish region, to continue to press for swift implementation of Article 140.

    But it is likely that both the Turkomans and Arabs will use their new voice in the federal legislature to try to subject Article 140 to further negotiation.

    According to Rakan Said, the Arab deputy governor of Kirkuk, the election results “laid the ground for dialogue.” He adds that now there are “two parties to the issue of Kirkuk: one is Al-Iraqiyah and the other is the Kurdish coalition. So the platform [for dialogue] has become clear and without interference.”

    New Political Landscape

    Al-Iraqiyah, headed by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, ran on a nonsectarian, nationalist platform. Its success on the national level as a joint front-runner with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition has appeared to realign Iraqi politics by relegating sectarian- and ethnic-based parties to the background.

    As the vote count neared its end and with challenges to a final tally continuing, the Shi’ite religious parties’ Iraqi National Alliance were in third place and the Kurdistan Alliance in fourth. Still, Iraqi parliamentary politics is all about making coalitions and in the past the Kurds have proved adept at playing the role of kingmakers.

    Whether the Kurdish parties can continue to do so now, or are relegated to a less prominent role, will directly affect Kirkuk’s eventual status. The Kurds want it to be part of Iraqi Kurdistan. And the newly empowered Kirkuk Turkoman-Arab bloc is just as determined to play the spoiler.

    Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans all claim the province around Kirkuk based on a long historical presence in the area.

    The Turkic-speaking Turkomans, who claim to be the second-largest group in northern Iraq after the Kurds, trace their presence to the time of the Seljuk Empire, when migrating Turkic tribes conquered a vast expanse of territory stretching from modern Iran to Turkey.

    Muhammad Tahir of RFE/RL’s Turkmen Service contributed to this report

    Posted by M.A.M at 10:38 AM
  • PKK: Teyrebazen | DEPARTMENT OF STATE Public Notice 6057

    PKK: Teyrebazen | DEPARTMENT OF STATE Public Notice 6057

    June 25, 2010
    Teyrebazen | DEPARTMENT OF STATE Public Notice 6057
    The Kurdish Freedom Hawks[1], a separatist group, claimed
    responsibility for a bomb attack on a military bus in Turkey’s largest
    city of Istanbul that killed five people on Tuesday

    DEPARTMENT OF STATE
    [Public Notice 6057]
    Determination Pursuant to Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224
    Relating to the Designation of the Teyrebazen Azadiya Kurdistan aka
    TAK aka Kurdistan Freedom Hawks aka The Freedom Hawks of Kurdistan
    Acting under the authority of and in accordance with section 1(b) of
    Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, as amended by Executive
    Order 13268 of July 2, 2002, and Executive Order 13284 of January 23,
    2003, I hereby determine that the organization known as Teyrebazen
    Azadiya Kurdistan (aka TAK, aka Kurdistan Freedom Hawks, aka The
    Freedom Hawks of Kurdistan) has committed, or poses a significant risk
    of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S.
    nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the
    United States.

    Consistent with the determination in section 10 of Executive Order
    13224 that ”prior notice to persons determined to be subject to the
    Order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States
    would render ineffectual the blocking and other measures authorized in
    the Order because of the ability to transfer funds instantaneously,”
    I determine that no prior notice needs to
    be provided to any person subject to this determination who might have
    a constitutional presence in the United States, because to do so would
    render ineffectual the measures authorized in the Order.
    This notice shall be published in the Federal Register.
    Condoleezza Rice,
    Secretary of State, Department of State.
    [FR Doc. E8-274 Filed 1-9-08; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4710-10-P

    [1]Teyrebazen Azadiya Kurdistan, or TAK, carried out its first attacks
    in 2004. The early bombings were largely small and non-lethal, but
    from 2005 onwards TAK launched more deadly attacks. In July that year
    it bombed a minibus in the western Turkish holiday resort of Kusadasi,
    killing at least five people including a British woman and an Irish
    woman.

    In January 2008 the United States said it had designated the TAK as a
    terrorist group, subjecting it to U.S. financial sanctions.

    Although little is known about the TAK, the group is believed to have
    links with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the main separatist
    group operating in mainly Kurdish southeast Turkey. The PKK, founded
    by Abdullah Ocalan in 1974, had taken up arms against Turkey in 1984
    with the aim of creating an ethnic homeland in the southeast. Nearly
    40,000 people have been killed in the resulting conflict since then.
    The TAK has deliberately attacked Turkish and foreign civilians. The
    geographical spread of TAK attacks also suggests that its members live
    in Kurdish migrant communities in western Turkey and in Istanbul,
    rather than in the Kurdish heartlands of the southeast that were the
    focus of PKK actions.

    AIMS: It claims to oppose Turkey’s “false policies on the Kurdish
    issue”, and to be seeking revenge for the deaths of Kurds at the hands
    of the Turkish government.

    SOME ATTACKS:

    Six people were wounded, one seriously, after a bomb exploded at a
    supermarket in Istanbul in February 2006. The TAK claimed
    responsibility for the blast and pledged more attacks.

    Three people were killed and 87 injured in a blast in Antalya,
    southern Turkey in August 2006. The TAK claimed responsibility.

    In August 2008 the group claimed responsibility for bomb attacks in
    the Turkish coastal cities of Mersin and Izmir. A suspected suicide
    bomber detonated a bomb in his car near Mersin, killing himself and
    wounding 12 police officers. Two days later 16 people were wounded,
    including eight police and three soldiers, in a car bomb which ripped
    through a minibus in Izmir.