Tag: Pashinyan

Thirty two Armenian prisoners of war, languishing in a Baku jail for a long time, were finally freed and returned back to their overjoyed families. I will analyze the background and circumstances of their release, pointing out why Armenia should have gotten a much better deal.

1) The agreement to end the 2020 war, signed by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, and Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, included a clause that mandated that “an exchange of prisoners of war, hostages and other detained persons and bodies of the dead is to be carried out.” Pashinyan’s blunder was that no deadline was set for the implementation of this clause, thus allowing Azerbaijan to keep the Armenian prisoners as long as it wished.

2) Pashinyan’s second mistake was that, shortly after the end of the 2020 war, Armenia released all the Azeri prisoners, while Azerbaijan released only some of the Armenian prisoners. There was no all for all exchange.

3) Even though the 2020 agreement did not impose any preconditions for the release of the Armenian and Azeri prisoners, Pashinyan made his third mistake by turning over to Azerbaijan the maps of Armenian landmines in Azeri-occupied Artsakh in return for the release by Azerbaijan of a few more Armenian prisoners. Pres. Aliyev learned the valuable lesson that he can extract more concessions from Armenia by the slow and gradual release of the Armenian prisoners. In other words, Aliyev discovered that the Armenian prisoners were more valuable for him if he kept them in a Baku jail, and released a few at a time in return for further concessions from Armenia.

4) Pashinyan’s obsession over an unnecessary ‘Peace Treaty’ with Azerbaijan provides yet another opportunity for Aliyev to extract further concessions from Armenia, including the demand for additional Armenian territories during border adjustment negotiations, the return of Azeris to their previously inhabited villages inside Armenia, and acceptance of the so-called ‘Zangezur Corridor’ linking Eastern Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhichevan instead of a road under Armenia’s control, as mentioned in the 2020 agreement.

5) Pashinyan should have refused all meetings and negotiations with Azerbaijan until the removal of its forces from the territory it occupies inside Armenia and the return of all Armenian prisoners of war.

6) Azerbaijan agreed to exchange two Azeri soldiers with 32 Armenian prisoners of war because Armenia withdrew its own candidacy and lifted its veto of Azerbaijan hosting next year’s prestigious international climate change conference (COP29) in Baku. This is the only reason why Aliyev agreed to have such a lop-sided exchange of prisoners. None of the other publicly mentioned reasons are true. Contrary to baseless speculations, the U.S., EU, NATO, Russia, Turkey, and Iran played no role in arranging this prisoner exchange. It was Aliyev’s strong desire to use the conference as a means to show off Baku as an internationally significant capital in order to deflect attention away from Azerbaijan’s serious human rights violations and war crimes. Aliyev had gone to great lengths to host other major events in Baku, such as the Formula One Car Race, the Non-Aligned Conference Summit, Eurovision, European Games, etc.

7) Given Aliyev’s fixation on hosting the Climate Summit in Baku at any cost, Armenia should have sought the release of all Armenian prisoners of war, not just 32 of them. In addition, Pashinyan should have demanded the release of the high-ranking Artsakh officials who were captured and jailed by Azerbaijan at the end of September 2023.

8) In the meantime, over 100,000 exiled Artsakh Armenians are suffering in Armenia, deprived of the most basic necessities, such as housing, food, and medicines. Artsakh Armenians have left behind all of their possessions. The Armenian government should file a lawsuit in the World Court demanding that Azerbaijan pay compensation for the confiscated properties of Artsakh Armenians.

9) The above cited issues raise serious questions about the high praise lavished on Pashinyan by his supporters who are proud that he scored a major success with the release of 32 Armenian prisoners. Little do they know that a more competent Armenian leader could have gotten much more concessions from Azerbaijan than the return of some of the Armenian prisoners.

10) Pashinyan’s supporters are also ecstatic that various international leaders expressed their satisfaction with the exchange of the prisoners, hoping that this would lead the two countries to signing a ‘Peace Treaty.’ What Pashinyan’s supporters do not understand is that a ‘Peace Treaty’ would not actually bring peace to the two countries, since Aliyev has already violated most of the terms of the 2020 agreement. What assurance can anyone have that he will respect future agreements? These foreign powers care about only one thing: their self-interest rather than the national interests of Armenia. They are pleased that Pashinyan is making repeated concessions to Azerbaijan, so that the international community can benefit from Azerbaijan’s oil and gas, while ignoring Armenian interests and turning a blind eye to Aliyev’s violations of the human rights of his own people.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan attempted last month to distract attention from Armenia’s current tragic situation by blaming former Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian. This is a routine ploy used by Armenia’s current leader to cover up his defeat in the Artsakh War and failure to protect the country’s national interests.

This does not mean that the former leaders were faultless. They made plenty of mistakes and I repeatedly criticized them at the time while sitting in front of them in the Presidential Palace. Those who describe my criticisms of Pashinyan as defending the former leaders are totally mistaken.

Here is what Pashinyan said last month while testifying in a parliamentary committee investigating the circumstances of the 2020 Artsakh War: “On June 2, 2000, Aravot newspaper [in Armenia] published the following article: Vartan Oskanian, the Foreign Minister, on April 25, 2000, during his meeting with the Armenian community of Glendale [California], described by him as ‘very private, unofficial remarks,’ announced the following: ‘Meghri is being given to Azerbaijan, Lachin [Corridor] along with Artsakh is being given to Armenia. Through Meghri, Armenia is being given a sovereign road with which Armenia would be able to have a sovereign contact to enter Iran.’” Pashinyan added: “His [Oskanian’s] remarks were published in The California Courier weekly newspaper [in 2000] which also quoted Oskanian’s words that the above mentioned proposal has ‘some logic and needs serious consideration….’”

Since Prime Minister Pashinyan was referring to an editorial I wrote in The California Courier on May 25, 2000, a few lines of which were reprinted in Aravot, I would like to set the record straight by quoting from what I wrote 23 years ago, titled: “Exchanging Meghri with Karabagh: Good Idea or Political Suicide?”

What Pashinyan is referring to was a 1992 proposal by Paul Goble, Special Adviser to Secretary of State James Baker, to exchange Meghri, the strategically important Southern Region of Armenia, for Artsakh. This idea was rejected by then Pres. Robert Kocharyan and subsequently by Azerbaijan’s then Pres. Heydar Aliyev.

Pashinyan is partially distorting what Oskanian said in Glendale. In my editorial of 2000, I quoted Oskanian as saying: “There are many rumors about the resolution of the Karabagh conflict. There are criticisms alleging that the Armenian authorities want to give Meghri to Azerbaijan. In fact, there is a small degree of truth in those rumors. Such a proposal on the exchange of territories has been made to the Armenian Republic, to the President of Armenia. But, such a proposal was rejected. Armenia did not accept it as a basis of negotiations.” Oskanian repeatedly stated that this proposal was rejected by the Armenian government. The proof is that Meghri was not exchanged for Artsakh.

However, Oskanian continued his remarks, raising questions about his assertion that Armenia rejected the Goble Plan. Pashinyan is now capitalizing on Oskanian’s supplementary statement.

Here is what Oskanian said in his additional statement which I reported in my 2000 article: “But let me say the following: I don’t want you to misunderstand me. It’s been rejected, it will be rejected and it’s not a plan that can be realized. Nevertheless, this is such a proposal that is worth thinking about. It’s not happening. It won’t happen, but when people say it’s treasonous to even think about it, that’s what I would like to respond to: Let’s think a little deeply about it. This proposal has certain logic. To simply dismiss such a proposal on a purely emotional basis is wrong. We have done that. We must seriously analyze it. I wonder, maybe we are wrong in saying no. What are we afraid of? Why are we not analyzing it? Is it a taboo? Let’s make a checklist. Let’s analyze it in newspapers. It has pluses and minuses. What I’m calling for is that it’s possible to have a very healthy debate and a dialog on this issue, because this proposal is worth thinking about.”

I don’t know why Oskanian, after repeatedly rejecting the exchange proposal, went on to say that it is “worth thinking about.” In my opinion, there was nothing to think about. It was clearly an unacceptable proposal, suggesting that Armenia exchange one Armenian territory, Artsakh, for another Armenian territory, Meghri. Oskanian’s speculative words gave Pashinyan a reason to blame him for even considering such a bad idea.

I concluded my editorial in 2000 with the following words: “Armenia has nothing to gain and much to lose from such an exchange.” I am still of the same opinion.

Finally, for those who think that since Armenia lost most of Artsakh in the 2020 War, maybe Oskanian was correct about considering the exchange of Meghri for Artsakh, I must say that Azerbaijan’s insatiable appetite is not satisfied by the conquest of Artsakh or even Meghri. Azerbaijan’s imperialistic ambitions extend to the takeover of the entirety of Armenia. The more Armenia’s leaders make territorial concessions, the more Azerbaijan will be encouraged to demand further Armenian territories. The only solution is to arm Armenia’s military with modern lethal weapons and defend its territory from further Azeri incursions.

Two polls were conducted in Armenia recently, giving the people a chance to express their views on various issues, including the sharp decline in Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s popularity.

The first survey was conducted January 23-March 4, 2023 by the Center for Insights in Survey Research, a project of the Washington, D.C.-based International Republican Institute. This scientific survey, based on a random sample of Armenia’s population, was funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Question: “Do you think Armenia is heading in the right direction or wrong direction?” 52%: wrong direction (up from 11%-14% in 2018 when Pashinyan first came to power); 36%: right direction (down from 72%-73% in 2018).

Question: “How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the pace of democracy in our country?” 17%: satisfied; 46%: dissatisfied; 35%: no change.

Question: “How much interest do you have in politics?” 43%: very much or somewhat interested; 57%: not at all or somewhat not interested.

Question: “How would you evaluate the prevailing mood of the Armenian population?” 44%: future will be better or somewhat better; 55%: insecurity, worry, fear for the future, total disappointment, and disbelief in any improvement.

Question: “Which politician or public person do you trust the most?” 64%: none; 14%: Nikol Pashinyan; 3%: Ararat Mirzoyan; 2%: Robert Kocharyan; others 2% each.

Question: “Which political party or alliance, if any, you would vote for if national parliamentary elections were held next Sunday?” 47%: would not vote or refused to answer or don’t know; 17%: Civil Contract; 5% Armenia Alliance; 4%: Public Voice party; 2%: Prosperous Armenia party; 2%: ARF Dashnaktsutyun; others 1% each.

Question: “How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the following institutions?” Armenian Apostolic Church, 54%: very or somewhat satisfied; 40%: very or somewhat dissatisfied; Prime Minister’s office, 38%: satisfied (down from 82%-85% in 2018); 61%: dissatisfied (up from 13-17% in 2018).

Question: “How do you feel about the direction of each of the following spheres during the past six months?” Freedom of speech, 56%: improved a lot or somewhat improved (down from 73%-83% in 2018); 18%: regressed a lot or somewhat regressed (up from 3%-6% in 2018); 26%: no change (up from 19% in 2018). Foreign policy, 37%: improved a lot or somewhat improved (same as 2019); 33%: somewhat regressed or regressed a lot (up from 17% in 2019); 26%: no change (down from 39% in 2019). Armenia’s policy on Artsakh, 10%: improved a lot or somewhat improved (down from 32% in 2019); 69%: regressed a lot or somewhat regressed (up from 18% in 2019); 18%: no change (down from 45% in 2019). Direction of fight against corruption, 43%: improved (down from 82% in 2018); 22%: regressed (up from 2% in 2018); 32%: no change (up from 14% in 2018).

Question: “What do you think is the biggest success of the government in the last 6 months?” 43%: none; 21%: don’t know or refused to answer; 6%: development of diplomatic relation; other minor issues.

Question: “What do you think is the biggest failure of the government in the last 6 months?” 21%: don’t know or refused to answer; 15%: closure of Lachin Corridor; 9%: overturning the Artsakh issue; 8%: national security of Armenia and border issues; 7%: loss of territories; other minor issues.

Question: “What are the things Pashinyan’s government must achieve in the next 6 months?” 23%: improvement of army conditions; 22%: protection of Armenia’s national security and borders; 16%: creation of jobs; 15%: establish peace; 13%: opening of Lachin Corridor; 13%: Pro-Armenian settlement of the Artsakh issue.

Question: “To what extent is corruption a problem?” 73%: very large or somewhat large problem; 25%: somewhat small, very small or no problem.

Question: “How do you evaluate the relationship between Armenia and…?” 96%: France (very good or somewhat good); 91%: Iran; 88%: United States; 86%: European Union; 84%: China; 80%: Georgia; 50%: Russia; 44%: Ukraine; 23%: Turkey; 4%: Azerbaijan. The relationship between Armenia and Russia has gone down from 87%-92% in 2018 to 50% good in 2023. The relationship between Armenia and Turkey has gone up from 1%-11% in 2018 to 23% good in 2023, while 75% of Armenia’s citizens (down from 85% in 2018) consider the relationship bad.

A second poll was carried out in May 2023 by the Marketing Professional Group, affiliated with Gallup International. This is a scientific survey based on a random sample of Armenia’s population.

Question: How do you evaluate Nikol Pashinyan’s recognition of Artsakh as a part of Azerbaijan? 3.8%: definitely positive; 5.4%: rather positive; 63.4%: not positive; 18.5%: rather not positive; 8.9%: no answer.

Question: Do you think it is possible for Artsakh Armenians to exist as an ethnic minority in Azerbaijan? 2.8%: yes; 5.6%: rather yes; 77.7%: no; 8.7%: rather no; 5.1%: no answer.

Question: “Which of these judgments do you agree with?” 32.8%: Pashinyan is trying to conduct a balanced policy with the West and Russia; 20.5%: Pashinyan is trying to integrate Armenia with Europe, the West and NATO circles; 14.7%: Pashinyan is aiming to bring Armenia closer to Azerbaijan and Turkey; 12.9%: Pashinyan’s actions are directed to push Russia out of Armenia; 19%: no answer.

Question: “Given Armenia’s internal and external challenges, is it necessary to hold extraordinary parliamentary elections and form a new government?” 41%: definitely necessary; 18.9%: rather necessary; 12.2%: rather not necessary; 19.5%: not necessary; 8.5%: no answer.

Question: “Turkey expressed its displeasure at the placement of the Nemesis statue in Yerevan and as a first step closed its airspace to Armenian flights. Do you think the Armenian government or city officials should give in to Turkish pressures and dismantle the memorial dedicated to the Nemesis heroes?” 82.5%: definitely no; 7.7%: rather no; 2.6%: definitely yes; 3.5%: rather yes; 3.5%: no answer.

Question: “Did you participate in the 2018 revolution?” In the 2023 survey, 62.6%: no; 37.4%: yes. In the 2018 survey, 91%: yes; 9%: no.

Question: “Is it right for protesters to block streets and movement of cars?” In the 2023 survey, 44.5%: yes; 50.8%: no. In the 2018 survey, 87.1%: yes; 8.7%: no.

Question: “Five years have passed since the revolution: In the meantime, how well were your expectations realized?” In the 2023 survey, 3.8%: fully realized; 21.5%: partially realized; 18%: partially not realized; 52.1%: not realized. In the 2018 survey, 14.4 %: fully realized; 64.2%: partially realized; 7.6%: partially not realized; 10.9%: not realized.

Question: “Evaluate Prime Minister Pashinyan’s performance.” In the 2023 survey, 5.4%: fully positive; 13.4%: rather positive; 24.2%: rather negative; 47.1%: negative; 10%: no answer. In the 2018 survey, 45.4%: positive; 46.2%: rather positive; 3.9%: rather negative; 2.4%: negative.

We all have our personal opinions, but it is important to know what the citizens of Armenia think about these issues. There are major changes in their perceptions from 2018 to 2023.