Tag: Ottoman Empire

  • OTTOMAN EMPIRE & EUROPEAN THEATRE

    OTTOMAN EMPIRE & EUROPEAN THEATRE

    International Symposium in Two Acts
    OTTOMAN EMPIRE & EUROPEAN THEATRE

    II
    The Time of Joseph Haydn (1732-1809)

    From Sultan Mahmud I to Mahmud II (r.1730-1839)
    Organized by
    Don Juan Archiv Wien
    In cooperation with
    The UNESCO International Theatre Institute in Vienna
    and
    The Austrian Cultural Forum in Istanbul

    Vienna / Istanbul
    2009

    Vienna
    Dates: April 24 – 25, 2009 
    Venue: UNESCO – ITI 
    Palais Khevenhüller
    Türkenstraße 19
    A-1090 Wien 

    Istanbul
    Dates: June 4 – 5, 2009
    Venue: Austrian Cultural Forum 
    Palais Yeniköy
    Köybaşı Cadesi 44, Yeniköy
    TR-34464 Istanbul 

     

    Attached please find the symposium program with details, also including the abstracts and the short biographies of the speakers.

  • Will Untapped Ottoman Archives Reshape the Armenian Debate?

    Will Untapped Ottoman Archives Reshape the Armenian Debate?

    Turkey, Present and Past

    by Yücel Güçlü
    Middle East Quarterly
    Spring 2009, pp. 35-42

    http://www.meforum.org/2114/ottoman-archives-reshape-armenian-debate 

    The debate over what happened to Armenians in World War I-era Ottoman Anatolia continues to polarize historians and politicians. Armenian historians argue that Ottoman forces killed more than one million Armenians in a deliberate act of genocide.[1] Other historians—most famously Bernard Lewis and Guenter Lewy—acknowledge that hundreds of thousands of Armenians died but question whether this was a deliberate act of genocide or rather an outgrowth of fighting and famine.[2] In recent decades, the debate has shifted from academic to legislative grounds. In 2001, the French parliament voted to recognize an Armenian genocide.[3] In 2007, U.S. political leaders narrowly averted an Armenian genocide resolution in the House of Representatives. While Armenian activists lobby politicians to recognize an Armenian genocide formally, which is likely to be a first step toward a demand for collective reparations, and genocide studies scholars seek to close the book on the Armenian narrative, it is ironic that many of the archives that contain documentation from the period remain untapped.

    The Richness of Ottoman Archives

     

    37

    Ottoman soldiers march through a town. During World War I, Ottoman soldiers fought Russian troops in areas populated largely by Armenians.

    In 1989, the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri (the Ottoman Archives division of the Prime Minister’s Office) in Istanbul fully opened its doors to scholars regardless of their nationality or subject of research. The Ottoman Empire’s central state archives originally consisted of two groups of documents: the records of the Imperial Council and of the Grand Vizier’s office. From time to time, the state added other collections, for example, the records of the finance departments and the Cadastral Survey Office. The government registers include copies of the texts of imperial orders and decrees sent to provincial officials and judges and replies to reports from across the empire. They relate to questions of law and order, state revenues, military arrangements, foreign relations, administrative assignments, and other matters submitted for the sultan’s consideration. Survey registers of rural and urban populations and their production convey figures and other information collected for administrative purposes. Likewise, there are specific registers dealing with the non-Muslim peoples of the Ottoman Empire, such as church registers and registers concerning other non-Muslim communities (millets). These run through World War I and contain valuable information on the question of Turkish-Armenian relations.[4]

    There are approximately 150 million documents that span every period and region of the Ottoman realm in the stacks and vaults of the Ottoman Archives. Each day, new collections in these Ottoman archives are opened to researchers. All these extensive records are well preserved and organized.

    The first published catalog of Ottoman archival holdings appeared in 1955 and consisted of ninety pages of archival inventory and commentary.[5] Archivist Attila Çetin followed in 1979 with a more extensive catalog, which is also available in Italian.[6] As the classifying and organizing of the archives continued, the catalog grew. The 1992 edition is 634 pages long. The expanded 1995 compilation provides access to even more documents. Revised editions are to be forthcoming from time to time, as more detailed descriptions become available for the various fonds or individual record groups.[7]

    Ottoman archival documentation constitutes an unequaled trove of information about how people lived from the fifteenth through the early twentieth centuries in a territory now comprised of twenty-two nations. İlber Ortaylı, director of the Topkapı Palace Museum at Istanbul, argues that the history of the Ottoman Empire should not be written without Ottoman sources.[8] He is not alone in this. His position is buttressed by a number of specialists in the study of the Ottoman state and society. Albert Hourani, for example, the late British scholar of Middle Eastern affairs, argued that his best advice to history students considering Middle East specialization would be to “learn Ottoman Turkish well and learn also how to use Ottoman documents, since the exploitation of Ottoman archives, located in Istanbul and in smaller cities and towns, is perhaps the most important task of the next generation.”[9]

    The Archives and the Armenians

    There are few comprehensive sources about Armenian life in Anatolia outside of Ottoman archival sources. Diplomatic records, such as those cited by Armenian historian Vahakn Dadrian, as the basis for discussions among genocide scholars are spotty and intertwined with wartime politics.[10] The Ottoman Ministry of the Interior (Dahiliye Nezareti) was the government department directing and supervising the relocation and resettlement of the Armenian population. The collection of the ministry documents covers the period from 1866 to 1922 and consists of 4,598 registers or notebooks. It is classified according to twenty-one subcollections, according to office of origin. Among the available documents in the Ottoman archives are several dozen registers containing the records of the deliberations and actions of the Council of Ministers, which set policies, received reports, and discussed problems that arose regarding the relocations and other wartime events. The minutes of its meetings, deliberations, resolutions, and decisions are bound in 224 volumes covering the years 1885 through 1922. These registers include each and every decree pertaining to the decision to relocate the Ottoman Armenians away from the war zones during World War I. The Records Office of the Sublime Porte (Babıali Evrak Odası) also contains substantial documentation, including the correspondence between the grand vizier and the ministries, as well as the central government and the provinces that can illuminate the events of 1915.[11]

    It is ironic, therefore, as politicians seek to deliberate on questions of history, that few historians investigating Armenian issues have actually consulted the Ottoman archives. As Australian historian Jeremy Salt has explained,

    The Ottoman archives remain largely unconsulted. When so much is missing from the fundamental source material, no historical narrative can be called complete and no conclusions can be balanced. If the Ottoman sources are properly utilized, the way in which the Armenian question is understood is bound to change.[12]

    There is little explanation as to why more historians do not consult the Ottoman archives. They are open to all scholars. Bernard Lewis, Cleveland Dodge Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, who has worked extensively in the Ottoman archives since 1949, has argued that “the Ottoman archives are in the care of a competent and devoted staff who are always willing to place their time and knowledge at the disposal of the visiting scholar, with a personal helpfulness and courtesy that will surprise those with purely Western experience. [These records] are open to all who can read them.”[13] The late Stanford Shaw, Professor Emeritus of Turkish and Judeo-Turkish History at the University of California, Los Angeles, also spoke highly of the helpfulness of the archivists.[14] He argued that the sheer amount of new material available removed any excuse for any scholar investigating various nationalist revolts not to spend time examining the new sources.[15]

    Even Taner Akçam of University of Minnesota, one of the most vocal proponents of Armenian genocide claims, noted the improvement in the working conditions of the archives. In a recent article, he thanked the staff and especially the deputy director-general of state archives for their help and openness during his last visit.[16] The archivists are now helpful to all researchers, not only those pursuing research which supports the Turkish government’s line.

    Turkish Military Archives

    The archives of the Turkish General Staff Military History and Strategic Studies Directorate in Ankara (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Arşivleri) provide a military perspective. Indeed, more than the Ottoman Archives in the Prime Minister’s Office, this repository provides a rich trove of information about internal conditions in the empire, operations of the Ottoman army, and the Special Organization (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa), somewhat equivalent to the Ottoman special forces, for the period 1914-22.[17]

    The World War I and War of Independence archives alone number over five and a half million documents spread among Turkish General Staff Division reports and War Ministry files. Division 1 (Operations) contains military operations plans and orders, operations and situation reports, maps and overlays, general staff orders, mobilization instructions and orders, organizational orders, training and exercise instructions, spot combat reports. Division 2 (Intelligence) contains intelligence estimates and reports and orders of battle. Divisions 3 and 4 (Logistics) contain files concerning procurement, animals, munitions, transportation, rations, and accounting. The Ministry of War files contain the General Command’s ciphered cables to military units as well as the papers of the infantry, fortress artillery, and other divisions. Vehip Pasha’s Third Army (Erzurum), Jemal Pasha’s Fourth Army (Damascus), and Ali İhsan Pasha’s Sixth Army (Baghdad) are included among the staff files. These also include the Lightning Armies and Caucasian Armies groups.[18]

    The cataloging and microfilming of the military archives repository up to the end of 1922 is complete. Once-secret documents should provide new information on the Armenian issue.[19] In addition to the microfilmed documents, the Turkish General Staff Military History and Strategic Studies Directorate publishes volumes of documents from its collection, including Latin alphabet transliteration of all documents.[20]

    Justin McCarthy, professor of Middle Eastern history and demographer at the University of Louisville/Kentucky, one of the few Western scholars to have done systematic research in the Ottoman archives, has written that the “reports of Ottoman soldiers and officials were not political documents or public relations exercises. They were secret internal reports in which responsible men relayed to their governments what they believed to be true.”[21] Indeed, the military records have already called into question conventional wisdom about the Special Organization, namely, the organization’s involvement in the Armenian relocations. [22]

    Other Ankara Resources

    The Turkish Historical Society (Türk Tarih Kurumu) at Ankara is also open to the public. The society houses private collections relating to strategy and political matters in the twentieth century, which include the papers of World War I-era war minister Enver Pasha together with those of his chief aide-de-camp and brother-in-law, Kazım Orbay. The Enver Pasha collection, donated in 1972 by his daughter Mahpeyker Enver, consists of 789 single, disparate items of handwritten notes, memoranda, reports, military records, cards and invitations, dispatches, letters of appreciation of colleagues and opponents, photographic albums, topographic maps, charts, private correspondence, diaries, and miscellany for the period 1914-22. There are no restrictions on access to these.[23] Because in the early decades of the twentieth century it was customary for officials to keep their papers upon their departure, these remain a relatively rare resource. Orbay’s papers add additional insight because they enable historians to gauge which issues most occupied the Ottoman Empire’s highest ranking military official of the time. Few scholars have used this last collection perhaps because they remain unaware of it.[24]

    The National Library (Milli Kütüphane) at Ankara houses thousands of Muslim court records, most of which were transferred from local museums and offices scattered around Turkey. These records contain a vast array of information concerning imperial administration, city government, the affairs of townspeople and villagers and deal with almost every aspect of the lives of the subjects be it personal status, taxes, loans, sales, price regulations, complaints, flight, or theft. Any matter requiring official resolution, registration, verification, or adjudication was potentially the domain of the Muslim judge (kadı) even when the matters applied to non-Muslims, such as Armenian Christians.[25] Many Turkish historians have employed Muslim court records extensively for Anatolian regional studies, but they remain relatively untapped by Armenian historians.[26]

    Armenian Archives

    Sole reference to Ottoman archives will not and should not satisfy historians; a full study of the Armenians during World War I should consider material from all sides in a conflict. The Armenian community maintains a number of archives. The archives in Watertown, Massachusetts, contain repositories from the Dashnak Party (Dashnaksutiun, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation) and the First Republic of Armenia. Both of the above together with the archives of the Armenian patriarchate in Jerusalem and the Catholicosate, the seat of the supreme religious leader of the Armenian people, in Echmiadzin, Armenia, remain closed to non-Armenian researchers. Tatul Sonentz-Papazian, Dashnakist archivist, for example, denied İnönü University scholar Göknur Akçadağ access to the Watertown archives in a June 20, 2008 letter. Dashnaksutiun archives are also not available to those Armenians who do not tow the party line. Historian Ara Sarafian, director of the Gomidas Institute in London, complained that “some Armenian archives in the diaspora are not open to researchers for a variety of reasons. The most important ones are the Jerusalem Patriarchate archives. I have tried to access them twice and [been] turned away. The other archives are the Zoryan Institute archives, composed of the private papers of Armenian survivors, whose families deposited their records with the Zoryan Institute in the 1980s. As far as I know, these materials are still not cataloged and accessible to scholars.”[27] Beyond the closure of Armenian archives to non-Armenian and even to some Armenian scholars, few of these allow the public to access catalogs detailing their holdings.

    Many scholars writing on the Armenian question utilize Britain’s National Archives (formerly the Public Record Office) in Kew Gardens. While the British government has made available many of their diplomats’ reports for study, much material from the British occupation of Istanbul (1919-22) and elsewhere in Anatolia following World War I remains closed to researchers under the Official Secrets Act and are only partially available in the archives of the government of India in Delhi. British authorities say they remain sealed for national security reasons. Their release should be important to historians as they will include evidence regarding returning Armenian refugees and other related matters. Files of the British Eastern Mediterranean Special Intelligence Bureau also remain closed, perhaps because the British government does not wish to expose those who may have committed espionage on behalf of Britain. These are important because they should enable historians to research British espionage and sabotage, demoralizing propaganda, and attempts to provoke treason and desertion from Ottoman ranks during and immediately after 1914-18. The documents of the Secret Office of War Propaganda, which under the direction of Lord James Bryce and Arnold Toynbee developed propaganda used against the Central Powers during World War I, also remain sealed. Their opening will allow historians to assess whether British officials in the heat of war created or exaggerated accounts of deliberate atrocities.

    An International Historians’ Commission

    History cannot be decided by politicians weighing either constituent concerns or emotions more than evidence. Nor should the debate on history be closed while the existing narrative utilizes only a small portion of the source material. The same holds true not only for Armenian historians but also for their Turkish counterparts and others.

    Rather, historians should work together to consider all source material, both in Armenian and Turkish archives. Each should be open fully. Cherry-picking documents to “prove” preconceived ideas and to ignore documents that undercut theses is poor history and, in a politicized atmosphere, can do far more harm than good.

    On April 10, 2005, Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan extended an invitation to Armenian president Robert Kocharian to establish a joint commission consisting of historians and other experts to study the developments and events of 1915, not only in the archives of Turkey and Armenia but also in those of relevant third countries such as Russia, Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the United States, and to share their findings with the public.[28] Ninety-seven members of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly at Strasbourg signed a declaration calling on Armenia to accept the Turkish proposal.[29] In his annual commemoration message to the Armenian-American community in 2005, President George W. Bush expressed support for Turkey’s proposal, declaring, “We look to a future of freedom, peace, and prosperity in Armenia and Turkey and hope that Prime Minister Erdoğan’s recent proposal for a joint Turkish-Armenian commission can help advance these processes.”[30] Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reiterated the point two years later, telling Congress,

    I think that these historical circumstances require a very detailed and sober look from historians. And what we’ve encouraged the Turks and the Armenians to do is to have joint historical commissions that can look at this, to have efforts to examine their past, and in examining their past to get over their past.[31]

    It is unfortunate that the Armenian government has failed to accept the joint commission, for without joint consideration of all evidence, the wounds of the past will not heal and, indeed, when an incomplete narrative enters the political realm, the consequences can be grave.

    Yücel Güçlü is first counselor at the Turkish Embassy in Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey.

    [1] See, for example, Vahakn N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995), p. xviii.
    [2] Bernard Lewis, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, to Shaike Weinberg, director of the Holocaust Memorial Museum, Princeton, N.J., Oct. 11, 1991, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Director of the Museum: Subject Files of Jeshajahu ‘Shaike’ Weinberg, 1979-1995, Box: 7; Bernard Lewis, Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Co., 1986), p. 21; Bernard Lewis, The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years (New York: Scribner, 1995), pp. 339-40; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide ( Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2005), pp. ix, xii; Guenter Lewy, “The First Genocide of the 20th Century?” Commentary, Dec. 2005, p. 51; Guenter Lewy, “Revisiting the Armenian Genocide,” Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2005, pp. 3-12.
    [3] BBC News, Jan. 18, 2001.
    [4] Yusuf Sarınay, “Türk Arşivleri ve Ermeni Meselesi,” Belleten, Apr. 2006, pp. 291-310; Metin Coşgel, “Ottoman Tax Registers (Tahrir Defterleri),” Historical Methods, Spring 2004, pp. 87-100.
    [5] Murat Sertoğlu, Muhteva Bakımından Başvekalet Arşivi (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları, 1955).
    [6] Attila Çetin, Başbakanlık Arşivi Kılavuzu (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1979).
    [7] Yusuf Ihsan Genç et al., Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1992); Mustafa Küçük et al., Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Katalogları Rehberi (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1995); Ilber Ortaylı, “Başbakanlık Arşivinin 1995 Yılı Yayınları Üzerine: Verimli Bir Yılın Değerlendirilmesi,” Türkiye Günlüğü, Jan.-Feb. 1996, pp. 217-21.
    [8] Ilber Ortaylı, Osmanlı Barışı (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2007), pp. 217-29; idem, Osmanlıyı Yeniden Keşfetmek (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2006), p. 124.
    [9] Nancy Gallagher, ed., Approaches to the History of the Middle East: Interviews with Leading Middle East Historians (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1994), p. 43.
    [10] Lewy, “Revisiting the Armenian Genocide.”
    [11] Genç, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi, pp. 384, 352.
    [12] Jeremy Salt, “The Narrative Gap in Ottoman Armenian History,” Middle Eastern Studies, Jan. 2003, p. 35.
    [13] Bernard Lewis, “The Ottoman Archives as a Source for the History of the Arab Lands,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Oct. 1951, pp. 139-55; idem, From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 418-9.
    [14] Stanford Shaw, Studies in Ottoman and Turkish History (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2000), p. 600.
    [15] Stanford Shaw, “New Research Opportunities in the Ottoman Archives of Istanbul,” Belleten, Aug. 1994, p. 465.
    [16] Taner Akçam, “Deportation and Massacres in the Cipher Telegrams of the Interior Ministry in the Prime Ministerial Archive (Başbakanlık Arşivi),” Genocide Studies and Prevention, Dec. 2006, pp. 320-1, ftnt. 6.
    [17] Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Arşivleri (ATESE), Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Harp Tarihi Dairesi Tarihçesi (HTDT), 1961, folder: 1, file: 1, no. 1-14.
    [18] Author interview, Colonel Ahmet Tetik, chief of the archives division of the Turkish General Staff Military History and Strategic Studies Directorate, July 11, 2008; ATESE, HTDT, 1961, folder: 1, file: 7, no. 1-15; on the importance of the Ottoman military archival sources, see Edward Erickson, “The Turkish Official Military Histories of the First World War: A Bibliographic Essay,” Middle Eastern Studies, July 2003, pp. 190-8.
    [19] Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Genelkurmay ATESE ve Denetleme Başkanlığı Yayın Kataloğu (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 2005).
    [20] See, among others, Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri, 1914-1918, vols. 1-8 (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 2005-2008).
    [21] Justin McCarthy, Conference on the Reality of the Armenian Question (Ankara: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Basımevi, 2005), p. 57.
    [22] Edward Erickson, “Armenian Massacres: New Records Undercut Old Blame,” Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2006, pp. 67-75; Tuncay Öğün, Kafkas Cephesinin Birinci Dünya Savaşındaki Lojistik Desteği (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1999).
    [23] “1972 Yılı Çalışma Raporu,” Belleten, July 1973, p. 425.
    [24] Uluğ Iğdemir, Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Türk Tarih Kurumu (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1973), p. 51; Fahri Çoker, Türk Tarih Kurumu: Kuruluş Amacı ve Çalışmaları (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1983), p. 143.
    [25] Mahmut Şakiroğlu, “La bibliothèque nationale d’Ankara,” Turcica, 20 (1988): 243-6. The best descriptions of the contents of Turkish Muslim court records series and its various uses for historiography thus far to appear have been Ahmet Akgündüz’s Şer’iye Sicilleri: Mahiyeti, Toplu Kataloğu ve Seçme Hükümler, 3 vols. (Istanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı Yayınları, 1988); Amy Singer, “Tapu Tahrir Defterleri ve Kadı Sicilleri: A Happy Marriage of Sources,” Tarih, 1(1990): 95-125.
    [26] For insightful discussions on the importance of Muslim court records see Halil Inalcık, “Ottoman Archival Materials on Millets,” in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, vol. 1 (New York and London: Holmes and Meier, 1982), pp. 437-49; Cahid Baltacı, “Şer’iye Sicillerinin Tarihsel ve Kültürel Önemi,” Osmanlı Arşivleri ve Osmanlı Araştırmaları Sempozyumu 17 Mayıs 1985 (Istanbul: Türk-Arap Ilişkileri Incelemeleri Vakfı, 1985), pp. 127-32; Jon Mandaville, “The Jerusalem Shari’a Court Records: A Supplement and Complement to the Central Ottoman Archives,” in Moshe Maoz, ed., Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, the Hebrew University, and Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1975), pp. 517-24; Amy Singer, Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials Rural Administration around Sixteenth-Century Jerusalem (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 20-1.
    [27] Ara Sarafian, “Génocide arménien et la Turquie,” Nouvelles d’Arménie, Sept. 2008, p. 1.
    [28] Anatolian News Agency, Apr. 11, 2005.
    [29] For an appraisal on the subject, see “Turkey and Armenia: When History Hurts,” The Economist, Aug. 6-12, 2005, p. 26.
    [30] “President’s Statement on Armenian Remembrance Day,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Apr. 24, 2005.
    [31] Congressional transcripts, United States House of Representatives, Appropriations Subcommittee on State-Foreign Operations, Mar. 21, 2007; Associated Press, Mar. 21, 2007; United Press International, Mar. 21, 2007.

  • Why Turkey belongs to the EU

    Why Turkey belongs to the EU

    Sigurd Neubauer
    Friday 27 March 2009 – 07:30

    With its geographical location, at the crossroads of an East-West and North-South axis, Turkey has played a dominating geopolitical role from the days of the Ottoman Empire to the present. In recognition of Turkey’s strategic position, President Harry S. Truman was quick to incorporate Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As the alliance is celebrating its 60th anniversary, Turkey is again at a crossroad. This time, the choice facing the Turkish Republic is whether Ankara should continue its path towards becoming a full fledged member of the European Union, or if Turkey should adopt a “neo Ottoman” foreign policy brokering conflicts between Israel and Syria and between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

    Beyond its broad foreign policy implications, Turkey is also facing a significant internal identity crisis where traditional urban pro-Western elite are being challenged by a new and emerging conservative bourgeoisie originating from the Anatolian heartland. At the center of this power struggle, is the current ruling Islamic Development Party (AKP) led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan vis-à-vis the Turkish military establishment.

    Turkey’s powerful generals have long seen themselves as the “guardians” of secularism as they adhere to the principals of “Kemalism,” laid out by the Republic’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938). “Ataturk,” or “father Turk,” as his people called him, emerged on the political stage during the vanishing days of the Ottoman Empire. During these turbulent times, as pockets of Turkish populated settlements were threatened by increasing nationalism in the various regions of the empire, the young and ambitious army officer, Mustafa Kemal, was to become one of the most notable military leaders and statesmen of his generation.

    Transition from Empire to Republic

    From a small principality on the frontiers of the Islamic world at the turn of the 14th century, the Ottoman Empire became the most powerful state in the Islamic world stretching from central Europe to the Indian Ocean under the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566). Following the long wars of the 17th century, the Ottoman Empire declined as a world power in favor of the European mercantile powers. By the mid 18th century, what was left of the once mighty empire became known as the “sick man of Europe.” Despite countless reforms of the civil and bureaucratic structure, Ottoman political life continued under European tutelage.

    Recognizing Turkey’s state of decay, Ataturk envisioned a strong, independent, and secular republic. According to noted Ataturk biographer, Lord Kinross: “Ataturk differed from the dictators of his age in two significant respects: his foreign policy was not based on expansion but on retraction of frontiers; his home policy on the foundation of a political system that could survive his own time.” Some of the republic’s early reforms were instituting a constitutional parliamentary system in 1923, followed by the introduction of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926. From a legal perspective, the Swiss Civil Code replacing traditional Sharia laws was an important step in the direction of westernization of personal, family, and inheritance laws. Other significant changes promoted by the Kemalists were adopting the Latin alphabet, western numerals, weights and measures, and gender equality.

    Military and Democracy

    The political system during the early Kemalist era remained a one party state, where no legal opposition was active until after World War II. Turkey has since come a long way in its democratization effort, despite brief military interventions in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Each time, the generals provided important exit guarantees that enhanced the military’s position, yet civilian control of the Republic has prevailed, as Turkey has become a competitive multiparty system.

    With the reelection of the AKP in 2007, Prime Minister Erdogan has secured his base as he openly challenges Turkey’s ancient regime, on a verity of issues from the headscarf ban to, as the only NATO ally, inviting Iran’s controversial President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Istanbul. The notion that “Turkey has to follow an integrated foreign policy and cannot have priority with the EU at the expense of its relations with the Middle East—as advocated by senior AKP officials—is a clear break with Kemalist foreign policy. Yet at this critical juncture, it is important for Europe to fully embrace Turkey. Because of its strategic location and economic ties to continental Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea region, Turkey can fully complement the EU on a variety of issues from trade to security. In particular, Turkey can provide the European markets access to rich energy resources from the Middle East and Eurasia.

    The battle for Eurasia

    On the other hand, the Turkish government has shown increasing frustration, not only with U.S. policies towards the Middle East but also with the EU’s refusal to seriously consider its bid. Should Europe fail to embrace Turkey, this could be a fatal push of Turkey into the Russian orbit. Despite historical mistrust, Turkish-Russian economic ties have greatly expanded over the past decade, reaching $32 billion in 2008, making Russia Turkey’s largest trading partner. By taking advantage of cooling relations between Ankara and Washington, Moscow is determined to expand its sphere of influence over the black sea region and Eurasia. Through an aggressive trade and investment policy, Russia skillfully outmaneuvered the United States by closing its airbase in Manas, Kyrgyzstan.

    In the great powers struggle for influence, Turkey is an indispensable piece, too precious for the West to lose. Instead of remaining a “Christian Club,” the European Union should overcome its historical fear of “the Turks” and recognize that as a NATO member, Turkey will prioritize its ties with the United States and the West; as an EU member, Turkey will continue to cherish democracy, liberalism, and secularism. Europe turning its back on Turkey could be the nail in the coffin for an occidental oriented foreign policy and a secular national identity.

    Source: The Diplomatic Courier (USA), 25-03-2009

  • Turkey Cannot Open Its Borders

    Turkey Cannot Open Its Borders

    Turkey Cannot Open Its Borders to the

    Heinous, Rancorous Tyranny of Armenia

    Prof. Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis March 15, 2009

    If Turkey should be further democratized and harmonized with Europe, then why should Turkey open its borders to Armenia – a criminal tyranny denounced as such by the HRW in a lengthy and devastating Report?

    In four earlier articles entitled “Turkey´s Ongoing Colonization: Only Reason for Recognizing Racist Armenian Tyranny” ), “Devastating HRW on Armenian Tyranny Imposes Cancellation of the Gul – Erdogan Pro-Armenian Policy” ), “Recognition of the Armenian Tyranny by Ankara Equals Colonization of Turkey by Freemasonic EU – US” ) and “Turkish – Armenian Rapprochement to Be Linked on Human Rights Conditions´ Improvement in Armenia” ), I republished parts of the devastating HRW Report (the HRW Press Release issued on the occasion of the Report publication a few days ago, the Contents, the Summary, the Methodology, the Background, and the 2008 Presidential Elections).

    I called for a master coup against the unrepresentative Erdogan gang of high traitors, freemasons and besotted pseudo-Islamists, who implement the Anti-Turkish colonial agenda of England and France; in fact, the colonial powers imposed on the Freemasonic pupils Gul and Erdogan the Turkish – Armenian rapprochement.

    In the present article, I republish the HRW Report chapter on the Post-Election Protests and Violence. In forthcoming articles, I will republish further parts of the devastating HRW Report on the Armenian Tyranny.

    V. The Post-Election Protests and Violence

    Overview

    Prior to election day, Levon Ter-Petrossian had called on his supporters to gather in Yerevan on February 20-when preliminary election results would be known-for either a victory or a protest rally depending on the outcome.[43]From February 21 a continuous protest was installed on Freedom Square (also known as Opera Square), on the north side of Yerevan city center. Daily, several thousand protestors would gather to hear opposition leaders speak, and each night a group of protestors stayed in front of the National Opera House on Freedom Square, mostly in tents, their numbers varying from a few hundred to just over a thousand.[44]

    The authorities allowed the protest encampment and rallies for nine days. Ararat Mahtesyan, first deputy chief of national police, told Human Right Watch that although the demonstration was illegal-it was being conducted without permission from the Yerevan city authorities[45]-it was initially tolerated as the Central Election Commission had not announced final results of the presidential election, and police investigations into election day complaints were still ongoing.[46]Â

    The Yerevan mayor’s office issued a statement on February 25 saying the protests were unauthorized, “in violation of the law on assembly, rallies, demonstrations and marches,” and urging demonstrators to call a halt to them.[47] Two days later the Armenian police issued a statement urging an end to the unauthorized rallies, saying that “the police are fully resolved and intend to protect the constitutional order in the country and public safety within the bounds set for it by the law.”[48]

    The authorities moved to suppress the protests on March 1, and in several episodes of violent confrontation between law enforcement officials and protestors, at least eight protestors and two police officers were killed and more than 130 people were injured. President Kocharyan announced a 20-day state of emergency under which all public gatherings and strikes would be banned, and freedom of movement and independent broadcasting severely limited. The events of March 1 are described in detail below.

    Armenia’s International Legal Obligations on Police Use of Force

    Governments are obligated to respect basic human rights standards governing the use of force in police operations, including in the dispersal of legal or illegal demonstrations. These universal standards are embodied in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.[49] The Basic Principles provide the following:

    Law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use force and firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result.

    When using force, law enforcement officials shall exercise restraint and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and to the legitimate objective to be achieved. Law enforcement officials must seek to minimize damage and injury.[50]

    With respect to the dispersal of assemblies that are unlawful but non-violent, “law enforcement officials shall avoid the use of force or, where that is not practicable, shall restrict such force to the minimum extent necessary.”[51]

    The European Convention on Human Rights requires all states to prohibit and prevent the arbitrary taking of life and the infliction of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment especially by state officials. Case law of the European Court has confirmed that police authorities must prepare and carry out operations to minimize any risk to people’s lives, and to completely prohibit ill-treatment. Where there is evidence that the police have taken a life or committed inhuman or degrading treatment, the authorities must ensure that there is an open investigation leading to the investigation and prosecution of any police officer responsible.[52]

    The Council of Europe’s European Code of Police Ethics states that “police shall use force only when strictly necessary and only to the extent required to obtain a legitimate objective” and that “police must always verify the lawfulness of their intended actions.”[53]

    A recent viewpoint issued by the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner Thomas Hammarberg, on impunity for police violence, states that “illegal behaviour by policemen is particularly serious as the very role of the police in a democratic society is to defend the population against crime, including violent crime. When the law enforcement forces themselves break the law, the whole system of justice is derailed.” Citing European Court of Human Rights case law, the commissioner noted also that “[t]he use of force is justified only in a situation of absolute necessity and should be practiced with the maximum restraint.”[54]Â

    The statements Human Rights Watch took from demonstrators and bystanders suggest that the first police action, in the early morning of March 1 against the Freedom Square tent encampment, entailed excessive use of force, without warning and in the absence, at the start, of resistance. Although later protestors began throwing stones at police from side streets near Freedom Square, one participant described being beaten up by police who found him lying on the ground.

    The events that unfolded later in the day were both more violent and more contentious. Sections of the very large crowd gathered near the French embassy appear to have been armed with metal rods, sticks, paving stones, and even petrol bombs, and seem to have initiated some of the clashes with police, such as at Yerevan City Hall on the afternoon of March 1. On the other hand, participants’ statements to us show that police, in their actions that evening to end the demonstration, opened with overly aggressive measures (tracer bullet fire and teargas, and no verbal warnings to disperse), and used excessive force against people who were not physically challenging them. As protestors then responded with using force against police, at least some of the fatalities appear to have occurred because police discharged their firearms deliberately in circumstances where lethal force was not called for, or through improper use of crowd control measures, such as firing teargas canisters at close range.Â

    Armenia’s obligation to investigate all allegations of excessive use of force by police is discussed below, in Chapter VI.

    The March 1 Events in Detail

    Early morning removal of protestors and protest camp at Freedom Square

    On the night of February 29 to March 1, several hundred protestors were on Freedom Square, staying in some 25 to 30 tents.[55] Police moved against the protestors’ camp early on the morning of March 1.

    According to first deputy police chief Ararat Mahtesyan, speaking to Human Rights Watch four weeks later, the police had arrived at the square on March 1 to conduct a search, acting on information that demonstrators had been arming themselves with metal rods, and possibly firearms, in preparation for committing acts of violent protest on March 1. Mahtesyan said that initially a group of 25-30 police officers, including experts and investigators, were sent to do the search of the protestors’ camp. When the group tried to conduct the search, the protestors turned aggressive and resisted police with wooden sticks and iron bars, resulting in injuries to several policemen. At that stage more police had to be deployed and had to use force to disperse the crowd and support the group conducting the search. According to Mahtesyan, this operation lasted for about 30 minutes and 10 policemen sustained injuries as a result.[56] Despite Human Rights Watch’s request, Mahtesyan did not provide any details about these injured police and the nature of the injuries they sustained.[57]

    Several witnesses interviewed separately by Human Rights Watch consistently described a different sequence of events in front of the Opera House on the morning of March 1. According to them, sometime shortly after 6 a.m., while it was still dark and as demonstrators started waking, news spread that police were arriving at Freedom Square. Hundreds of Special Forces police in riot armor, with helmets, plastic shields, and rubber truncheons, started approaching the square, in four or five rows, from Tumanyan Street and Mashtots Avenue.[58] Police surrounded the square and stood there for a few minutes.[59]

    Levon Ter-Petrossian, who had been sleeping in his car parked at the square, was woken up. According to the account he gave Human Rights Watch, he addressed the protestors, some of whom by this time were out of their tents, asking them to step back from the police line, and then to stay where they were and wait for instructions from the police. He also warned the police that there were women and children among the demonstrators.[60]

    Even before Ter-Petrossian finished his address, police advanced towards the demonstrators in several lines, beating their truncheons against their plastic shields. According to multiple witnesses, the police made no audible demand for anyone to disperse nor gave any indication of the purpose of their presence. They started pushing demonstrators from the square with their shields, causing some to panic and scream and others to run. Some demonstrators appeared ready to fight the police, which was why, according to Ter-Petrossian, he urged the crowd not to resist the police. Others were still in their tents.[61]

    Immediately afterwards, without any warning, riot police attacked the demonstrators, using rubber truncheons, iron sticks, and electric shock batons. According to Ter-Petrossian, a group of about 30 policemen under the command of Gen. Grigor Sargsyan approached him and forcibly took him aside. When asked if he was arrested, Ter-Petrossian was told that police were there to guarantee his safety and that he was requested to cooperate.[62] Levon Ter-Petrossian was subsequently taken home and effectively put under house arrest.[63]

    Vahagn V., a 42-year-old economist who had spent the night on the square in front of the Opera House, gave this account:

    Without any warning police just started beating truncheons on their shields, making loud noises that created chaos. In a minute or so they started attacking from the side of Tumanyan and Mashtots. They switched off the microphones and electricity. It was still dark. The only lights I could see were small red lights that I thought were flashlights, but they turned out to be from electric shock devices. One of them touched me on the left hand and it burnt my skin. They were attacking from all sides and beating people. Women were screaming. We ran. It was complete chaos…[64]

    At least two witnesses described to Human Rights Watch how police ripped off the ropes supporting the tents and as the tents collapsed the police continued assaulting, with their truncheons, people who were still inside.[65] Gagik Shamshyan, a photo correspondent for political opposition newspapers who attempted to photograph the raid, was assaulted by police and then detained. He told Human Rights Watch:

    Policemen in riot uniforms in helmets, shields, and truncheons were beating the protestorsâ EURO |. They were also pouring buckets of water on the tents and continued to assault with truncheons. I was shooting photos and after making about 20-25 shots, some policemen saw my camera’s flash and about 15 of them attacked me. One of them recognized me and instructed others to beat me â EURO | Another one grabbed my camera and hit me with a truncheon on my back. I fell down and they continued to beat me with truncheons and kick me. They handcuffed me and were pulling my hands from behind. It was very painful … Two of them grabbed me by my jacket and dragged me for about 40 meters, with my face down on the pavement. Another officer who recognized me shouted, “Beat him! He writes bad stuff about us …” [He] approached me and threatened to gouge my eyes out, and even pushed his finger to my eye. I was terrified …[66]

    Police kept Shamshyan on the ground for about 20 minutes, assaulted him periodically, and then drove him to the central police station.[67] He was later released.

    A 54-year-old artist, Sanasar S., gave Human Rights Watch the following account of what happened to him that morning:

    There were at least as many police in riot gear as people gathered in front of the Opera. Without saying anything police surrounded us and attacked us with truncheons and electric shock devices. People panicked and started running away. I ran together with about 20 protestors towards the Northern Avenue, chased by the riot police. At the intersection of Pushkin Street and Mashtots Avenue about six of them caught up with me. I felt a blow to my head and I fell on the ground, losing consciousness. When I regained my senses I was surrounded by police. Two of them were holding me on my feet as I could not stand. My shoulder ached and my nose was bleeding.[68]

    It turned out that Sanasar S. had sustained a broken arm. His subsequent detention is described below in Chapter V.

    Murad M., age 30, told Human Rights Watch that a police officer chased him off the square and hit him on the head, causing him to lose consciousness. “I momentarily lost consciousness after a blow on the head, and fell … When I came to my senses, my brother was carrying me away from the square. My head was bleeding and my hat was all covered in blood.”[69] Murad M. required seven stitches on the right side of his forehead. He sustained bruises to his right hand, back, and legs. Fearing arrest, he refrained from going to a hospital and instead sought medical assistance from a private doctor.[70]

    Hovsep H., a 32-year-old designer, ran from the square with a group of about one hundred others, with the police chasing them. The group thinned out as some people split off, and was in a stop-and-go chase with police for about an hour. At times the group threw stones at the police. When police finally caught up with Hovsep H., he was assaulted. He told Human Rights Watch:

    I felt very tired and could not run anymore. I tried to get into an apartment block entrance, but it was locked. Three or four police ran after me. I felt really exhausted and decided to lie down and cover my face with my hands to protect it. Policemen who were after me started beating me. They were using truncheons and kicking me with their boots. They were beating on my back, head, and kidney area. I felt a huge blow on my head and I lost the feeling of reality, I could not even feel pain anymore and it all felt like a dream. I don’t remember anything else, but when I regained my senses, my head was bleeding and the jacket I wore was all bloodied. I was already in a police station by that time.[71]

    Hovsep H.’s experience of further ill-treatment in detention is recounted in Chapter V.

    As a result of the early morning police actions on Freedom Square, 31 people were officially reported to be injured, including six policemen.[72]

    The police claimed that after the demonstrators were dispersed they found a stock of real and makeshift weapons, including “three guns, 15 grenades, two bullet cases and 138 bullets of various calibers, plastic explosives, big number of makeshift weapons, syringes and drugs.”[73] All witnesses and victims interviewed by Human Rights Watch claimed that the alleged arms cache was planted after the demonstration was dispersed. The chairman of the ad hoc parliamentary commission established to investigate the March 1 events told Human Rights Watch in January 2009 that he had not seen any evidence linking the arms cache to the demonstration’s participants or organizers.[74]

    Notes

    43] OSCE/ODIHR, “Post Election Interim Report, 20 February â EURO” 3 March, 2008.” Addressing a mass rally in the capital Yerevan on 16 February, Ter-Petrossian warned the authorities that a rally planned by his supporters in Yerevan on February 20 would turn into open-ended protests if the election was rigged. Reported by Arminfo, February 16, 2008.

    44] Human Rights Watch interviews with Vahagn V., Yerevan, March 13; Hovsep H., Yerevan, March 26, 2008, Arsen A., Yerevan, March 28; and Ararat Mahtesian, first deputy chief of the Police of the Republic of Armenia, Yerevan, March 28, 2008.

    45] Â According to legislation in force at the time, organizers of mass public events had to notify the head of the community where the event was being held at least three working days in advance. Law on Conducting Meetings, Assemblies, Rallies and Demonstrations, 2004, as amended by the law adopted on October 4, 2005, http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/6628Â (accessed January 16, 2009), art. 11. Ter-Petrossian’s campaign notified the Yerevan city government that it would hold a rally on February 20 in Yerevan. However, the campaign did not lodge a notification with the city government on the subsequent assembly in Freedom Square from February 21 onwards. See OSCE/ODIHR, “Post-Election Interim Report, 20 February â EURO” 3 March 2008.”

    46] Human Rights Watch interview with Ararat Mahtesian, Yerevan, March 28, 2008.

    47] “Armenian capital’s mayor urges protestors to stop unsanctioned rallies,” Arminfo (in Russian), February 25, 2008; and “Armenian Officials Demand End To Election Protests â EURO” AFP,” Dow Jones International News, February 25, 2008.

    48] “Armenian Police urges opposition to suspend rallies in capital,” Arminfo (in Russian), February 27, 2008.

    49] Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 August to 7 September 1990, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 112 (1990).

    50] Ibid., principles 4 and 5.

    51] Ibid., principle 13.

    52] See, for example, Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria, Application No. 43577/98 and 43579/98, Grand Chamber Judgment of 6 July 2005

    53] Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2001)10 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the European Code of Police Ethics (Adopted on September 19, 2001 at the 765th meeting of Ministers’ Deputies), (accessed September 1, 2008), paras. 37-38.

    54] Thomas Hammarberg, “There must be no impunity for police violence,” Viewpoint of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, December 3, 2007, (accessed December 3, 2007).

    55] Ibid.; Human Rights Watch interview with Gagik Shamshyan, photo correspondent for Aravot and Chorrord Ishkhanutyun newspapers, Yerevan, March 12, 2008.

    56] Human Rights Watch interview with Ararat Mahtesian, Yerevan, March 28, 2008.

    57] Ibid.

    58] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Sanasar S., March 1, 2008; Human Rights Watch interviews with Vahagn V., March 13; and Arsen A., March 28, 2008.

    59] Human Rights Watch interview with Levon Ter-Petrossian, Yerevan, March 29, 2008.

    60] Ibid. This was confirmed by all witnesses and victims of the event interviewed by Human Rights Watch.

    61] Â Ibid.; Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Sanasar S., March 1, 2008; Human Rights Watch interviews with Vahagn V., March 13; and Arsen A., Yerevan, March 28, 2008.

    62] Human Rights Watch interview with Levon Ter-Petrossian, Yerevan, March 29, 2008.

    63] Ibid.

    64] Human Rights Watch interview with Vahagn V., March 13, 2008.

    65] Ibid.; Human Rights Watch interview with Gagik Shamshyan, March 12, 2008.

    66] Ibid.

    67] Ibid.

    68] Human Rights Watch interview with Sanasar S., March 26, 2008.

    69] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with interview with Murad M., March 1, 2008.

    70] Ibid.

    71] Human Rights Watch interview with Hovsep H., Yerevan, March 26, 2008.

    72] “Thirty-one injured as Armenian police disperse opposition rally,” Arminfo (in Russian), March 1, 2008. The report quoted Ministry of Health information.

    73] Human Rights Watch interview with Ararat Mahtesyan, March 28, 2008. See also, OSCE/ODIHR, “Post Election Interim Report, 20 February â EURO” 3 March, 2008,” March 7, 2008, (accessed June 10, 2008).

    74] Human Rights Watch interview with Samvel Nikoyan, Yerevan, January 13, 2009.

    Note

    Picture: Garni Mithraeum, a temple dedicated to Mithra, the Iranian god of the Ancient Armenians. Before being misunderstood and misused by the Armenian state authorities and academia, Armenian History has been totally falsified by the colonialist historians and philologists of France and England, who projected in it a touch of Hellenism, one of their fabrications that has never had any real effect in Armenia. It was all geared in order to set up a false sense of Greek – Armenian – Western European Anti-Islamic, Anti-Ottoman, and Anti-Turkish alliance which was a total catastrophe for all these Oriental populations and a real success for the colonial elites of France and England. Ancient Armenia is definitely a para-Iranian state that, although constantly opposed to the Persian supremacy within the wider Iran area, greatly contributed to the diffusion of Mithraism, a totally Iranian religion, among the Greek speaking peoples of Anatolia, the Aegean Sea and the Balkans, and further beyond throughout the Roman Empire and Northern and Eastern European territories out of the Roman imperial control.

  • Sultan Abdulhamid II and Descendants:

    Sultan Abdulhamid II and Descendants:

    UNCOVER MYSTERY HUNT


    Against Sultan Abdulhamid II and Descendants:


    Present and Past Plots and Slanderous Propaganda

    http://nadinevalidesultan.org/uncovermysteryhunt.html

    For some time now, my family and myself have been the victims of malicious propaganda in which our names are stolen for the purpose of presenting us FALSELY at functions to which we are not present. One of the motives seem to be prompted by the embezzlement of inheritance by these dubious people.

    Recently, a person named “Princess Nilufer” (former Mrs Katherine Luigi de Andrea) wrote a book in which she USURPED the name of my daughter, Karina, in order to present a person of bad character to an impressive Gala in Montreux, Switzerland. Not only, my daughter is the exact opposite, both physically and morally, from the person that was presented as my daughter (see one of her photos in Family Album on this site), but my daughter has NEVER been in Montreux, Switzerland, and she does not reside in Europe.

    Book published in French by Princesse Nillufer, entitled: “POUR L’AMOUR DE TATIANA: La sultane des enfants malades”.  Published in September 2006 by “PRESSES DE LA RENAISSANCE, BUSSIERE GROUP CPI.

    Below are the pages written by Nilufer.

    Verbatim quote from her book pages 182-183-184:

    QUOTE:— “…Nous allions donc, ma mère et moi, parmi les invités du gala, saluant ici et là, lorsque Méthaf Daouad, un ami et le manager général S.P.A. de la clinique La Prairie (fort connue à Montreux), voulut nous présenter une Sultane ottomane! J’en fus très étonnée car les seules Sultanes, en Suisse, à ma connaissance, étaient S.A.I. la princesse Nejla Ibrahim, qui d’ailleurs avait déménagé de Pully pour aller s’installer à Madrid, et moi-même! Était-ce S.A.I. la princesse Nejla dont parlait Méthaf Daouad?

    Pas du tout. Car, au lieu de voir ma tante Nejla, longue et svelte, s’avancer vers nous, nous vîmes, maman et moi, une personne blonde, assez corpulante, pas très grande et habillée d’une façon très clinquante, que Méthaf nous presenta en ses termes: “ Voici la princesse Karina!”

    Immédiatement, ma mère et moi-même lui fîmes subir un véritable interrogatoire, malgré le cocktail qui battait son plein, et tout le bruit environnant.

    Très embarrassée, la soi-disant “princesse” essayait d’esquiver nos questions. Elle ne se rappelait plus ni le nom de son père ni celui de son grand-père et finalement proposa d’aller chercher sa mère qui, elle, pourrait répondre à toutes nos questions.

    “C’est très bien, allez trouver votre mère et dites -lui que la princesse Nilufer Sultane voudrait la rencontrer.”

    Complètement décontenancée, elle tourna les talons. On ne la revit plus de la soirée! Des amis, les Badoux, qui nous rejoignaient, nous demandèrent en riant: “Qui est-ce? — “Encore un de ces imposteurs!” répondîmes-nous, ne croyant pas si bien dire!

    Nous avions raison, il s’agissait, en effet, de la fille de la fameuse madame Nadine Dawson qui se faisait passer pour une Sultane de la Famille Impériale ottomane depuis des années.

    L’histoire de l’imposture de Nadine Dawson était déjà ancienne. Il y a presque quinze ans de cela, apès un article paru dans Point de Vue Images du Monde, où un certain Serge Arabian se faisait passer pour le prince Selim….”

    Page 184:

    “…Ce ne fut d’ailleurs pas le seul cas. Une journaliste, qui travaillait pour le magazine l’Illustré, Shadya Ghemati, voulait aussi se faire passer pour une “authentique princesse ottomane” Cette fois-là, le doyen d’âge de notre Famille le Beyzadé Ömer Nami, qui était juriste, s’était chargé d’écrire, à notre demande, au magazine L’Illusté, un démenti pour que l’on cesse d’imprimer de telles bêtises!….”— UNQUOTE

    Too many erroneous statements and slanders in this book to report all of it here.

    Following is the translation in English of the above writing published in French by “Nilufer”

    Translation of pages 182, 183, 184 of libelous writings by the author against (Mrs) Nadine Dawson and her family. Starting from: “ Nous allions donc, ma mère et moi…”

    ——“We were going, my mother and I, amidst the gala’s guests, greeting them, here and there, when Methaf Daouad, a friend [of ours] and manager general S.P.A. from the clinic La Prairie (well-known in Montreux), wished to introduce to us an Ottoman Sultana! I was very surprised because the only Sultanas, in Switzerland, to my knowledge, are S.A.I. Princess Nejla Ibrahim, who by the way had moved from “de Pully” to reside in Madrid, and myself! Was it S.A.I Princess Nejla that Methaf Daouad was speaking of?

    Not at all. For, instead of seeing my aunt Nejla, tall and slim, walking toward us, we saw, mom and myself, a blond person, quite stout, not very tall and dressed in a very gaudy outfit, that Methaf introduced to us, and in these terms: “here is the princess Karina!”.

    Immediately, my mother and I submitted her to an intensive cross-examination, in spite of the cocktail-party that was in full swing, and lots of noise around.

    Very embarrassed, the so-called ‘princess’ was trying to dodge our questions. She could not remember neither the name of her father nor grandfather and finally she proposed to go find her mother, who, could answer to all our questions.

    “Very well, go find your mother and tell her that the princess Nilufer Sultana would like to meet her”.

    Completely mortified, she took to her heels!. We did not see her for the remaining of the evening! Some of our friends, Badoux, who were rejoining us, asked us in laughting: “Who was that?”

    Again one of these impostors! We replied, not thinking to be true!

    We were right, it was, in fact, the daughter of the famous madame Nadine Dawson who passed herself for a Sultana of the Ottoman Imperial Family for years.

    The story of the imposture of Nadine Dawson was already ancient. There are nearly 15 years of that, after an article published in “Point de Vue Images du Monde”, where a certain Serge Arabian was claiming to be prince Selim,…”

    Incidentally, this was not the only case. A journalist who worked for the magazine Illustre, Shadya Ghemati, tried also to pass for ‘an authentic Ottoman princess”. There also, the doyen of our Family, Beyzade Omer Nami, who is a jurist, took upon himself to write, upon our request, to the magazine Illustre, a denial so as to stop the printing of such stupidities. There were others.”——



    This is the second time (to my knowledge) that our identity is being used in order to spread false rumors. The Turkish journalist, Murat Bardakçi ( a friend of this Nilufer) STAGED an interview with a man proclaiming falsely to be my Father under the Armenian name of “ARABIAN” (see below his article verbatim in Turkish, and English translation). Not only my Father has never given an interview to Mr. Bardakçi, but his name has never been Arabian, but always Selim bin Hamid Han. Much later ( around the early 30’s), while in exile, the name “Arabi” was added to be used as a last name. This was due to the translation of the Ottoman word i rabi (meaning the fourth, since Prince Selim was the fourth Crown Prince by that name or Selim i rabi) into the name of the Sufi philosopher, Arabi. The identity of my father is well documented, both by official papers and by photographs.

    Article Verbatim in Turkish of Murat Bardakci:

    Quote
    “ARAPYAN’IN HIKÂYESI…


    On-on iki sene önceydi…Ingilizce konusan bir hanïm telefon etmis, benimle çok önemli ve gayet gizli bir hususta konusmak istedigini söylemisti…Kïrk yaslarïnda, Meksika sïnïrïnda falcïlïka mesgul, gayet heyecanlï bir hatun çïkagelmisti gazeteye…

    Adï, Nadine Dawson’du…Ilk sözü, “Ben, Abdülhamid’in torunuyum…Babam, yani Sultan’un oglu hayatta ve gizleniyor…Sizden onu Türkiye’ye tanïtmanïzï istiyorum” olmustu…

    Bu defa, ben sasïrmïstïm…Öyle ya, Sultan Hamid’in hayattaki son oglu Abid Efendi öleli, yirmi seneyi geçmisti o zamanlar ve hatunun hikâyesi, “Acaba gizlenmis bir baska ç,ocuk mu var” diye dert olmustu bana…Babasïnïn, Fransa’da yasadïgïnï söylemisti Nadine Dawson…”Gidip bir konusun, herseyi ondan dinleyin…” diyordu…Kalkïp gitmis, Paris’in banliyölerinden birinde, seksenine merdiven dayamïs halis muhlis bir Osmanlï Ermenisiyle karsïlasmïstïm…Isin altïnï biraz desince de, “sehzade-i civan-baht” adyïnïn, ömrünün yarïsïnï Istanbul’da, yarïsïnï da Kahire’de geçirmis Arapyan diye antikacï bir Ermeni’nin oglu oldugu cïkmïstï ortaya Hatta adamcagïzïn hiçbirsey iddia etmedigI, sultanlïk takïntïsïndaki kïzïnïn tarihleri bile birbirini tutmayan hayali senaryolarla babasïnï pazarlamaya kalktïgï anlasïlmïstï…

    Iste bugünlerde bir baska nevzuhur sehzadenin hilâfete hazïrlandïgï haberi, Nadine Dawson’u ve Avrupa’da hâlâ “Osmanlï Prensi” diye dolasan düzmece asilleri hatïrlattï bana…”. Unquote


    Recapitulation in English of the above article:
    In the above article, Mr. Bardakçi claimed that I had contacted him by telephone from the US, and that I had stated that I was a professional fortune-teller, and at the same time had arranged a meeting between him and my father. He claimed that the ensuing interview had occurred in the outskirts of Paris, at the residence of my pseudo-father. Murad Bardakçi reported that this gentleman gave his name as “Sehzade-I Civan Baht”, and was the son of Mr. Arapyan. He also said that he was an Ottoman Armenian, with no pretension to the House of Osman, and had been an antique dealer trading between Istanbul and Cairo. The story went on to say that “Sehzade-I-Civan-Baht” confided that his daughter (supposedly me) was of unsound mind. To sum up, the story’s aim, through the proliferation of false rumors, was to influence public opinion and perhaps also confuse members of the Ottoman Family.

    The libelous story was an instant success; it spread like wildfire.

    AGAIN, I AM STATING THAT NOT ONLY I AM NOT A FORTUNE TELLER, BUT MY FATHER NEVER MET OR GIVEN AN INTERVIEW TO MR. MURAT BARDAKCI AND THAT THE NAME OF MY FATHER HAS NEVER BEEN ARABIAN BUT SELIM BIN HAMID HAN AS CONFIRMED BY ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION.

    Mr. Bardakçi carries on still the propagation of his lies with the confidence that I shall not be aware of his writings since I reside in the USA, and, that alas I have forgotten the Turkish language of my childhood.

    The “Armenian theme” is an obsession as well as a favorite subject of these detractors of Sultan Abdülhamid II and some of his descendants; one wonders why?

    Both Murat Bardakci and “Nilufer” used the example of Paul Fesh, but they went even further in order to deceive their listeners/readers.

    In the case of “Nilufer” SHE STOLE THE IDENTITY OF MY DAUGHTER IN ORDER TO PRESENT HER FALSELY AND IN A VERY BAD TASTE TO A LARGE GATHERING IN A FUND RAISING GALA IN MONTREUX, SWITZERLAND. Thus, the persons (in these events) who thought in all innocence that they met us, shall perpetuate her lies and discredit us further.

    This was probably the same aim with the journalist Murat Bardakci who Staged an interview with a man claiming falsely to be my father!!

    Similar plots were used during the Ottoman Empire against the Ottoman Family, and in particular against Padishah Abdulhamid II, so as to discredit their integrity. Why against some members rather than others? For the same reason that it was done against Padishah Abdulhamid II rather than his brothers: his qualities and competence were obstacles to the greed and ambitions of a few, both within and outside the Empire as well as family members in the Palace itself. Today the motives are much more crude.

    Against the late Padishah Abdulhamid II, one of the many slanderous rumors had it that Sultan Abdulhamid II was an Armenian and an impostor. This incredible tale was told, not by a common journalist of no status, but by no less than a respected scholar and diplomat, Paul Fesh, who published in 1907 a book in which he states:

    Quote: —“On s’étonne de ne découvrir, dans Abdul-Hamid, aucune des qualités morales ou des prédispositions physiques d’Abdul-Medjid. Tandis que ses frères et soeurs tiendraient plus ou moins de leur père, sous un rapport ou sous un autre, lui n’a rien, absolument rien. Le fait est explicable si l’on ajoute créance au récit suivant que nous tenons d’une personne généralement bien renseignée. Selon un usage ancien Abdul-Medjid acceptait parfois les invitations des chefs des communautés non musulmanes. On le traitait en grand seigneur, par des dîners et des divertissements somptueux, après quoi on lui offrait une jeune fille vierge, qui, si une conception suivait ces relations passagères, entrait au harem impérial en qualité d’épouse. Or, certain jour, Abdul-Medjid se rendit chez un haut personnage Arménien où on le reçut avec le cérémonial consacré. Un mois plus tard, la jeune fille qui lui avait été offerte, ayant été jugée en état de grossesse, fut admise au harem. Mais il fut prouvé peu après que la grossesse était antérieure au jour où Abdul-Medjid la connut, au sens latin du mot. Celui-ci le sut-il par indiscrétion ou l’apprit-il de l’infortunée jeune Arménienne, prise de remords ? Q’importe ! Par bonté d’âme, cependant, et pour éviter un scandale, il garda la mère, dans l’espoir que peut-être elle donnerait le jour a une fille. Ce fut un fils qui naquit, et l’on comprend ainsi le geste de douloureuse colère que ne put maitriser Abdul-Mejid en apprenant cette naissance. Il prévit, dès lors, et prédit que ce fils régnerait, mais que ce serait pour le malheur de la Turquie. Certains philosophes verraient ainsi dans ce fait l’explication de la haine que, de tout temps, Abdulhamid a témoigné envers les Arméniens.” – Unquote

    Following is the translation of the above passage:

    QUOTE:—“We are surprised to find in Abdulhamid none of the moral qualities or physical characteristics of Abdul-Mejid. While his brothers and sisters resemble more or less their father in one trait or another, he [Abdulhamid] has absolutely none [resemblance]. This fact is easily explained, if we consider the following story, made known to us by a relatively well-informed person. Following an old custom, Abdul-Mejid sometimes accepted invitations given by leaders of non-Moslem communities. He was treated as a great lord, with sumptuous meals and entertainment, followed by the offering of a young virgin, who, should she become pregnant after these temporary encounters, would enter the imperial harem as a spouse. One day, Abdul-Medjid was invited by a high ranking Armenian who received him with the usual pomp. One month later, the young girl who had been offered him having been pronounced pregnant was admitted to the harem. Soon after, it was proven that the girl had been pregnant before her encounters with Abdul-Medjid. Did Abdul-Medjid learn this by indiscretion or from the unfortunate and repentant young Armenian herself? Never mind! Out of kindness and also to avoid a scandal, he [Abdul-Mejid] kept the [future] mother in the hope perhaps that the child might be a girl. Instead, a son was born, which makes it easy to understand Abdul-Mejid’s inability to repress a gesture of anguished wrath on learning of this birth. He foresaw, right then, and predicted that this son would reign, but that it would be for the misfortune of Turkey. Some philosophers would see in this explanation the source of the hatred that Abdul-Hamid has always shown towards Armenians”.— UNQUOTE


    Below are a couple of photographs representing a child “a little girl” that the author, Nilufer would like us to believe are pictures of the Ottoman Prince Burhaneddin Djem, that she claims is her father. I let the readers draw their own conclusions!! In comparison see the photograph of my Father, Prince Selim i rabi bin Hamid Han, taken in 1909 at the palace, in the Family Album of this site. I think it is obvious who is a true Ottoman Prince!!

    The photograph below of “a little girl” was published in “Nilufer’s” book with the caption: quote — “Le Père de la princesse Nilufer, SAI le prince Burhaneddin Djem, dans son palais avant l’ exil à l’âge de 4 ans.”—unquote

    ANOTHER PICTURE OF “A LITTLE GIRL” THAT THE AUTHOR “PRINCESS” NILUFER CLAIMED TO BE THE OTTOMAN PRINCE BURHANEDDIN DJEM !!! A PICTURE SUPPOSED TO BE TAKEN DURING THE RULE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND CALIPHATE!!

  • Turkey’s New Mission

    Turkey’s New Mission

    Shlomo Ben-Ami

    TEL AVIV – Ever since Turkey’s establishment as a republic, the country has oscillated between the Western-oriented heritage of its founder, Kemal Ataturk, and its eastern, Ottoman legacy. Never resolved, modern Turkey’s deep identity complex is now shaking its strategic alliances and recasting its regional and global role. Indeed, Turkey’s changing perception of itself has shaped its so-far frustrated drive to serve as a peace broker between Israel and its Arab enemies, Syria and Hamas.

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s missionary zeal to replace Egypt as the essential regional mediator, and his violent tirades against Israel’s behavior in Gaza, looks to many people like an attempt to recover Turkey’s Ottoman-era role as the guarantor of regional peace and security. Its credentials for this role in the Middle East are by no means negligible.

    Turkey is a true regional superpower, with one of the largest armies in the world. At the same time, it is the only Muslim country that, while no less worried than Israel about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, can maintain excellent economic and political relations with Iran, regardless of American displeasure. Of course, Syria is Iran’s ally, too, but no country in the region has the leverage with it that Turkey possesses. And Turkey’s diplomatic reach in the region is also reflected in its recent signing of a friendship treaty with Saudi Arabia, while maintaining excellent relations with Pakistan and Iraq.

    Europe’s persistence in snubbing Turkey’s attempts to join the European Union, the rise of violent anti-Western popular sentiment in the wake of the Iraq war, and strained relations with the US – owing in part to the forthcoming Armenian Genocide Act – are major factors in Turkey’s change of direction. The civilizing efforts that Ataturk’s revolution directed inward and in favor of disengagement from the Arab and Muslim worlds are now being revisited. The Turkey of Erdogan’s dominant Justice and Development Party (AKP) appears to be seeking a new mission civilisatrice , with the Middle East and the former Soviet republics as its alternative horizons.

    The uneasy challenge for Turkey is to secure its newfound regional role without betraying Ataturk’s democratic legacy. Turkish democracy and secular values have been greatly enhanced by the country’s dialogue with Europe and its American ties. Turkey can be a model for Middle Eastern countries if, while promoting its regional strategic and economic interests, it resists the authoritarian temptation and continues to show that Islam and democracy are fully compatible.

    For Israel, the long overdue message is that its future in the Middle East does not lie in strategic alliances with the region’s non-Arab powers, but in reconciling itself with the Arab world. In the 1960’s, David Ben-Gurion’s fatalistic pessimism about the possibility of ever reaching a peace settlement with the Arab countries led him to forge an “Alliance of the Periphery” with the non-Arab countries in the outer circle of the Middle East – Iran, Ethiopia, and Turkey (he also dreamed of having Lebanon’s Maronite community as part of that alliance).

    All of these countries did not have any particular dispute with Israel, and all, to varying degrees, had tense relations with their Arab neighbors. The myth of Israel’s military power, resourcefulness in economic and agricultural matters, and an exaggerated perception of its unique capacity to lobby and influence American policy combined to make the Israeli connection especially attractive to these countries.

    The “Alliance of the Periphery” was a creative attempt to escape the consequences of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It reflected the yearning of the Jewish state to unleash its creative energies in economic and social matters, as it created space for an independent, imaginative foreign policy that was not linked to, or conditioned by, the paralyzing constraints of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

    Shlomo Ben Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as vice-president of the Toledo International Centre for Peace, is the author of Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy.

    But the security that this scheme was supposed to produce could never really be achieved; the centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict could not be attenuated. The Arabs’ capacity to maintain their pressure on Israel and to keep world opinion focused on the Palestinians’ plight made Israel’s quest for evading the consequences of the conflict, either through periodic wars or by forging alternative regional alliances, a futile exercise.

    The Islamic revolution in Iran, the changes in Ethiopia following the end of Haile Selassie’s rule, the collapse of Maronite Lebanon, and Hezbollah’s takeover of that country left Turkey as the last remaining member of Israel’s Alliance of the Periphery. Turkey’s powerful military establishment may want to maintain close relations with Israel, but the widely popular change in Turkey’s foreign policy priorities, and the serious identity dilemmas facing the nation, send an unequivocal message that the alliance can no longer serve as an alternative to peace with the Arab world. From now on, it can only be complementary to such a peace.

    Shlomo Ben-Ami is a former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as the vice-president of the Toledo International Center for Peace. He is the author of Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy.

    © Project Syndicate 1995-2009

    Source:  www.guatemala-times.com, 03 March 2009