Tag: Ocalan

  • Is the KCK a party, an organization or an alternative state structure?

    Is the KCK a party, an organization or an alternative state structure?

    In recent times, Turkey has begun to hear about the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) more and more frequently.

    pkk

    The structure that these three letters describe, however, is not sufficiently understood. The KCK has been placed in the same basket as the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), due to its relations with the terrorist group. But the two are actually different. “Koma Ciwaken Kürdistan,” the KCK, is not, in fact, as the press says, “the urban extension of the PKK.” On the contrary, the PKK is just a piece of the overarching KCK, a fragment of the whole.

    Turkey first began to hear about the KCK when the April 14, 2009 operation took place. On the orders of the Diyarbakır public prosecutor, a few people were arrested. At later dates, the operations continued. A list of allegations prepared by the prosecutor regarding the KCK was accepted by Diyarbakır’s 6th Criminal Court on June 18, 2010. The 7,578-page list of allegations explains the general structure of the KCK, as has been revealed from documents obtained by authorities.

    The essence of what these documents reveal about the KCK is thus: The so-called legislative parliament of the Kongra-Gel terrorist organization on May 17, 2005 formed the “shadow state” of the KCK. Kongra-Gel then accepted the KCK contract as its constitution, and let the public know that it had done so. The new structure, with its own legislative, executive and judicial organs, was defined as a “confederate system.” The KCK possesses both a lateral and a pyramid organizational structure, and is active not only in Turkey but also in Syria, Iran and Iraq.

    By forming an alternative to the official organs of justice, management and politics in these countries, it provides a roof under which its supporters can gather.

    Abdullah Öcalan is the leader at the helm of the KCK, while the so-called legislative organ, Kongra-Gel, is headed up by Zübeyir Aydar, and Murat Karayılan leads the so-called “executive council.” Karayılan’s assistants are Duran Kalkan, Mustafa Karasu and Cemil Bayık. The armed terrorist units known as the “people’s defense powers” are autonomous organizations within the KCK. As for the PKK, in the KCK’s “constitution” it is defined as the “ideological power behind the KCK system,” responsible for bringing into practice its philosophy of leadership and its ideology. The top-ranked leaders of the terrorist PKK also comprise the KCK’s leadership cadre.

    The KCK bestows and revokes citizenship, imposes tax obligations, tries people in courts, engages in armed battle, has both local and central units, makes an effort to control regional leadership and in every way puts Öcalan forward as the leader of Kurdish society, irrespective of the desires of the people. The KCK –which has spread out to cities, towns, neighborhoods, streets, village organizations, communes and homes — uses a flag with a red star on a yellow sun with 21 rays on a green base. Its justice system includes an executive high court, a people’s free court, and a high electoral board. Crimes that occur in its military arena are addressed by its High Military Court.

    The founder and leader of the KCK is PKK leader Öcalan. According to the KCK’s “constitution,” Öcalan is the philosophical, theoretical and strategic doctrinarian of a democracy based on ecological awareness and equality of the sexes. He represents the people in every arena, and is the foundation of the leadership. He oversees basic policy-making, and gives final decisions on basic matters. He inspects decisions from Kongra-Gel to make sure they are in keeping with the revolutionary profile. He appoints the president of the executive council. All Kurds, no matter what country they live in, must acknowledge fealty to Öcalan.

    The goals of this structure are defined as such: “To create a society in Kurdistan based on the principles of radical democracy, that lives according to the essential elements of democratic societal co-federalism, and which is organized democratically, based on equality of the sexes and ecological awareness. To fight against every kind of backwardness in Kurdish society, and to both create and advance individual and societal spiritual and financial development. To see that every faction of society is able to create its own democratic organization, to create regional people’s parliaments based on the policy of ‘equal KCK citizens.’ To bring about a transition from an economy based on profit to a communal economy based on user value and sharing. To fight against any attacks on the leadership of the Democratic Confederation [Öcalan].”

    According to the KCK contract, those attached to the KCK system are defined as “citizens” or “countrymen.” People who betray the principles or aims of the KCK can have their citizenship revoked by decision of the “people’s courts.” Every person living in areas under the rule of the KCK is obligated to actively participate in defense actions when there is a state of war. Every KCK citizen is also obliged to pay taxes.

    The highest court in the KCK is Kongra-Gel (the Kurdish People’s Parliament). The highest executive organ is the one run by Karayılan from the Kandil Mountains in northern Iraq. This organ coordinates all of the various institutions, units and organizations of the KCK in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq. This unit is responsible for implementing all of the decisions made by the highest leader. It is obliged to submit regular reports about its actions to said leadership. As for Öcalan, he occupies a position which is literally not to be questioned within this structure.

    The Turkish section of the KCK is referred to as the “Turkey Parliament.” The organizational scheme for this section is led by one Sabri Ok, known by the codename “Amed.” This structure plans and carries out all of the various activities in provincial capitals. This runs the gamut from mass events such as throwing Molotov cocktails, burning tires and throwing stones to press conferences, rallies, concerts, festivals, marches and sit-ins. Since 2007, it has increased its involvement in civil disobedience events as well. A campaign to gather signatures in support of the statement “I accept Abdullah Öcalan as the representative of my political will,” a mass march which headed for Mudanya under the name “A March towards İmralı,” the “A Democratic and Peaceful Solution to the Kurdish Problem” rally, hunger strikes in protest of cell conditions imposed on Abdullah Öcalan, the violence and “Edi Bese” events that began in March of 2006 in Diyarbakır and spread quickly to other regions; these all followed on one another. There were street protests that occurred all over Turkey, starting in the East and the Southeast.

    Following the 1999 capture of Öcalan, the PKK developed a new dialogue. It began trying to spread a Palestinian-style “intifada” movement, known as “Serhildan,” which means “uprising.” Within the framework of civil disobedience, it followed a strategy of increasing tension by bringing security forces face-to-face with the people. More weight was placed on city structures, with the aim to create a paramilitary organization strengthened in its capacity to carry out normal daily obligations in city neighborhoods, to provide all sorts of financial and spiritual help, and to act according to the wishes of the organization. This is a critical matter that calls for sensitive and careful thought. Some experts note that the urban organization’s power has now surpassed that of the organization in the mountains. Diyarbakır Sunday’s Zaman

  • Turkey’s Demands and Kurdistan’s Answers

    Turkey’s Demands and Kurdistan’s Answers

    By REBWAR KARIM WALI

    Rebwar 413301926The wave of arrests of Kurds in Turkey as well as violence between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish security forces that began again in July show no signs of abating.

    The latest episode was the October 19 attack by PKK fighters on Turkish military bases in Hakkari province that led to the highest number of Turkish casualties since 1993.

    In response, the police have joined the military’s new operations against the PKK. The police have also detained and imprisoned hundreds of Kurdish political activists as part of what is known as “KCK dossier.”

    The KCK stands for the Union of Communities in Kurdistan, which was founded by the PKK’s jailed leader, Abdullah Ocalan. A PKK leader recently told me that the number of arrests have not been this high since the 1980 military coup.

    The most recent PKK attack shocked Turkey and drew a strong reaction from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as well. In a message of condemnation, Kurdistan Region’s President Massoud Barzani described the attack as a “crime” and noted that it came as there were ongoing efforts to find a political solution to Turkey’s Kurdish issue.

    The office of Kurdistan Prime Minister Barham Salih also denounced the attack. Shortly afterward, based on a request from Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, former Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani met with the Turkish prime minister and foreign minister in Ankara on a trip representing the region’s president. It was announced that the Kurdistan Region president would soon visit Ankara as well.

    Turkey demands the Kurdistan region provide military assistance in its fight against the PKK. But to what extent is that possible?

    “The Turkish army doesn’t have the same zeal and energy as it once did, and the PKK is no longer afraid of it”

    According to informed Turkish sources, the Turkish plan appears as follows: A) Turkey can militarily occupy all areas in the Kurdistan Region that the Kurdish Peshmarga and security forces cannot control; B) The Kurdistan Region should promise that its Peshmarga forces will not attack Turkey, aid the PKK or allow its fighters to attack Turkish soldiers.

    Turkey, in return, has promised to return control of all areas to the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Peshmarga forces when the forces are able to secure the areas.

    According to the Turkish sources, the response of the Kurdish delegation to this proposal has been the following: A) The Kurdistan Region understands its responsibility to not allow its soil to be used for attacks against its neighbors; B) The Peshmarga forces will not take part in any fighting in support of any side; C) There is only one solution to this problem and that is a peaceful and political one. D) Ocalan’s conditions need to be improved and the government should talk to him.

    Turkey is hoping to achieve two major goals in relation to the PKK.

    First, to lower the bar of Kurdish demands before the process begins to amend the constitution. This can be done by delivering a blow to the PKK.

    Second, the PKK has become a problem for Turkey’s ambitious foreign policy. The clashes between the PKK and the army undermine Turkey’s focus on its foreign and regional policy, so Turkey wants to rid itself of that problem.

    If these are the main Turkish goals in battling the PKK, the Kurdish group also wants to increase pressure on the PKK as much as possible.

    Even if Ocalan was not freed, he would be placed under house arrest. The PKK and Ocalan need be accepted as the only partners in resolving the Kurdish issue and need to engage in open negotiations.

    The Kurdistan Region cannot engage in any military cooperation with Turkey because the Kurdish political leadership believes this problem can’t be solved through war. The Kurdish public would never allow this to happen.

    Therefore, Barzani’s trip to Ankara can be only useful in terms of advancing a political solution. The direction Turkey has taken will lead to nowhere. The role that the Kurdistan Region has played in the past in convincing the PKK to announce a ceasefire needs to continue because that role is important for the PKK, Turkey and the Kurdistan Region.

    That role ending would especially harm the PKK. The current complications in Turkey’s Kurdish areas and the end of large-scale civilian activities are a testament to that claim.

    But it seems the PKK is no longer ready to accept a ceasefire because it sees the current circumstances as in its interest. Besides, the Turkish army doesn’t have the same zeal and energy as it once did, and the PKK is no longer afraid of it.

    The PKK has become a mobile state and has shown that neither the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) or any Kurdish political figure has the capital and initiative to make decisions in the name of Kurds. So, in the end, Turkey should decide that all roads lead to Ocalan and his conditions.

    If Ocalan is taken out of Imrali prison and is allowed movement, he will pour some water on the fire that has currently engulfed Turkey. The PKK will lay down arms and Turkey will rid itself of this conflict. The Kurdistan Region can play a crucial role in this regard.

    via Rudaw in English….The Happening: Latest News and Multimedia about Kurdistan, Iraq and the World – Turkey’s Demands and Kurdistan’s Answers.

  • Would Öcalan’s release bring peace to Turkey?

    Would Öcalan’s release bring peace to Turkey?

    Would Öcalan’s release bring peace to Turkey?

    In recent months the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) highlighted the following argument: If PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s prison conditions are eased, then the PKK would withdraw its units from Turkey and Öcalan would eventually convince the PKK militants to lay down arms as a quid pro quo for being released on house arrest.

    Just recently, Aysel Tuğluk brought this argument into the public sphere once again, and many liberal intellectuals really think that it is possible to bring peace in exchange for Öcalan’s release on house arrest.

    Just like any other debate, unfortunately, Turkish intellectuals have not paid attention to the details of the issue. Rather, they focus on what the political actors are saying and establish their thoughts on political actors’ statements. However, it is a proven fact that politics in the Middle East is larger than politicians and political actors. In many cases, political actors, who are expected to lead politics, cannot implement their policies on their own; however, they may very well become the object of the politics that they are in. This is especially true if you are dealing with an armed organization and if violence is part of its long-lasting policy.

    Those who think that Öcalan would stop the violence base their argument on Öcalan’s influential position on the Kurdish community. Yes, indeed Öcalan is an influential figure and pro-PKK Kurds in particular treat him as a prophet of their vision and policies and even their own existence. Thus, it would not be presumptuous to assume that Öcalan could stop the violence if he exerted his influence on his followers.

    Well, there are a number of problems in this argument. First, Öcalan highlights his release from the İmralı Island prison as a precondition for peace negotiations and a withdrawal of the PKK units from Turkey. Therefore, even Öcalan himself does not guarantee peace after his release from prison. He guarantees that he will convince PKK leaders to withdraw the PKK units from the country.

    There are two problems in this argument itself. First, Öcalan is not a trustworthy negotiation partner. The state has been negotiating with him since 2006 to bring peace; however, while negotiating with the state, Öcalan has ordered the PKK to re-establish its network as the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) to bring the armed wings into urban centers. Therefore, there is no trustworthy leader to begin negotiations with. Second, there are many factions within the PKK that would not listen to Öcalan even if he did order the PKK to withdraw its units. There is evidence that the opposite is true. When Öcalan ordered the PKK to withdraw from Turkey in 1999, some units in Tunceli province did not listen and did not return to northern Iraq.

    In addition, despite the fact that Öcalan just recently stated that he has reached an agreement with the state and that the PKK does not need to resume the fight, within a week of the statement the PKK resumed and intensified the fight, which proved that Öcalan cannot fully control the PKK, either.

    Also, the political climate in the Middle East is unpredictable. Therefore it would be a mistake to assume that the political status quo will continue to serve the interests of both parties, PKK-Öcalan and Turkey, after Öcalan’s release on house arrest, to bring peace. There are too many unknowns in this region that could drastically change the political situation, affecting both the PKK and Turkey and interrupting peace negotiations.

    The very existence of the PKK is an outcome of the changing political climate in the region, influencing the PKK’s ability to adapt to such change. In the last 30 years, the region that the PKK operates in has faced the end of the Cold War, and the PKK adapted itself to the new situation by denouncing its communist background and emerging as a nationalist party. After the first Gulf War, the PKK gained military advantages by confiscating Saddam’s weapon caches.

    When the US invaded Iraq, the PKK established the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), its Iranian units, with the hope of helping the US destabilize Iran. Three days before Russia’s attack on Georgia, the PKK sabotaged the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to let Russia know they could become partners. All in all, there is much evidence that the very existence of the PKK depends on the changing political circumstances of the region. Therefore, assuming that the circumstances will not change after Öcalan’s release on house arrest and that he would want to bring the PKK militants down from the mountains is childish.

    Even if he wants to, there are many unknowns that could change the political equations overnight and turn everything upside down. Therefore, if Öcalan is sincere about him being the man of peace, he should first show his ability and willingness to bring peace by ordering that the PKK units withdraw from the country. Then negotiations about the PKK’s laying down arms can resume.

    via Would Öcalan’s release bring peace to Turkey?.

    Emre Uslu
    Todays Zaman

  • Turkey quits negotiations with PKK for increasing attacks

    Turkey quits negotiations with PKK for increasing attacks

    ANKARA, Sept. 26 (Xinhua) — Turkey quit the negotiation strategy with the outlawed Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) as the organization sharply increased its attacks against soldiers and civilians.

    Ankara would only keep talks with the political leg of the Kurdish movement in the parliament, a Turkish official said Monday, indicating escalation of armed actions against the PKK.

    “The negotiations are now on the shelf. This struggle will last until the PKK lays its weapons down,” Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was quoted by Daily Hurriyet newspaper as speaking to a group of journalists on Monday.

    The PKK has declared unilateral ceasefire several times during the negotiations. However, it ended the latest six-month ceasefire in February and shifted to an “active defense” position in which its members defend themselves against any attack.

    Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK’s jailed leader, publicized in July through his lawyers that he had agreed with government officials to set up a “peace council” that aimed at ending the conflict. Just when his remarks nearly ended the decades-long struggle, intense attacks from the PKK changed the momentum of the talks and drove the government to return to hardline policies against the PKK.

    Last week, the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), a radical Kurdish group and a PKK front, claimed responsibility for a bomb attack that killed three people and injured 34 others in downtown Ankara.

    In an attack on a police station on Saturday, six Turkish soldiers died and 11 others injured in the Kurdish-dominated village of Belenoluk in Siirt province.

    The increase of PKK attacks came days after the Turkish government threatened to launch a cross-border ground operation against PKK camps in northern Iraq.

    In earlier September, Turkish Interior Minister Idris Naim Sahin signaled that Ankara was preparing a ground operation in northern Iraq. The Turkish Air Force has bombed suspected PKK targets repeatedly since Aug. 17.

    Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc announced Monday that the government would submit to the parliament a motion to allow the Turkish armed forces to launch cross-border air and ground operations for another year.

    The increasing attacks by the PKK “are a result of the cross- border operations” targeting the PKK bases in northern Iraq, which was “having significant results,” Erdogan said.

    “As far as I am concerned, they are now seeking revenge, as they incurred serious losses in the military operations,” Erdogan told journalists Monday, adding that the Turkish armed forces on the border would step up actions.

    “They will be more effective, as they will be permanently based there. 5,000 people have been recruited. They are now undergoing training. Special operation units will also enter the cities,” he said.

    In spite of the escalating tension, Erdogan is to hold discussions with the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which refused to enter the parliament in protest of the ban on their elected deputies.

    Several imprisoned Kurdish deputies were elected in the elections in July, but the court did not let them to enter the parliament.

    “If the BDP enters Parliament, then we would hold political negotiations with them,” Erdogan said.

    Turkey and Iran were also cooperating against the PKK, Erdogan said, recalling that he met with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Iraqi President Jelal Talabani in New York last week.

    Ankara was mulling every possible measures, “including ground operations into northern Iraq,” against the PKK, Erdogan said.

    On the other hand, Turkey’s main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) harshly criticized the government for mounting terror attacks and talks with Ocalan.

    “If there is terror in Turkey today, the (ruling party) AKP government holds the sole responsibility. They are the ones who dragged Turkey into the quagmire of terror,” said CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu.

    More than 40,000 people have been killed in the conflict since the PKK, which was listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States and the European Union, took up arms to create an ethnic homeland in southeastern Turkey in 1984.

    Editor: Mu Xuequan

     

  • Emboldened Kurds Press Demands in Turkey

    Emboldened Kurds Press Demands in Turkey

    The imprisoned leader of the Kurdish rebel group the PKK set a June 15 deadline for Turkey’s government to start negotiations to resolve Kurdish demands or face a return to conflict. Since the threat, made in April, Turkey’s pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party, the BDP, scored advances in last Sunday’s general election, increasing its representation from 20 to 36 in the 550-seat assembly.

    TurkeyElectionKurds480The success of the pro-Kurdish BDP in Sunday’s elections comes as concerns are being expressed that Turkey is the verge of a return to conflict and civil unrest because of the unmet aspirations of its Kurdish minority. One of the newly elected deputies, Altan Tan, has a stark warning to the new government:

    “We want a new constitution, we want an agreement with the government, which will give us our rights. If they don’t solve this problem, they could not do anything. We will make Kurdistan like Egypt, like Yemen, like Syria. We don’t want this,” Tan said.

    His warning follows the arrest over the last two years of nearly 2,000 party members, including 12 elected mayors, all accused of having links to the outlawed PKK, which has been fighting the Turkish state since 1984. The imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, has warned that the rebels will end their cease-fire on Wednesday unless the government starts negotiations to meet their demands.

    The escalating situation follows the collapse two years ago of government attempts to end the conflict, an effort known as the ‘Kurdish opening.”

    “Until now Turkish politicians have put condition to negotiate — stop the armed struggle. Kurds did. Nothing happened, with the exception of (the) short-lived Kurdish opening. As long as there is no political process, the armed struggle will probably continue,” said political scientist Cengiz Aktar, from Istanbul’s Bahcesehir University.

    In his victory speech following the re-election of Turkey’s ruling party, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan committed himself to a new constitution, which he said will be a politically inclusive process. But during the election campaign, in which he courted Turkish nationalist voters, he took a tough stance against Kurdish demands for education in Kurdish and greater autonomy. Mr. Erdogan even said he would have hanged PKK leader Ocalan if he had been in power when Ocalan was captured in 1999.

    But if Mr. Erdogan is prepared to negotiate, he may find more willing partners than in the past among the newly-elected pro-Kurdish deputies. according to Sinan Ulgen of the Turkish research firm Edam:

    “On the positive side, they have also included some representatives who have not been associated [with the] more radical line of the Kurdish movement. That might allow them to play a more constructive role on the Kurdish issue,” Ulgen said.

    But a political scientist at Istanbul University, Nuray Mert, questions whether any of Turkey’s main parties are ready to address the Kurdish movement’s warnings and calls to negotiate.

    “Unfortunately, neither the governing parties nor parties in opposition, they refuse to take it seriously, and think if [they] recognize [the] seriousness of the problem, it will be a surrender to Kurdish demands,” said Mert.

    During his campaign, the prime minister said there was no longer a Kurdish problem, but rather the problem lay with the BDP inciting unrest. The BDP countered that they represented Turkey’s last chance for a negotiated settlement, warning that the generation following them will be far more militant.

    That threat is real, according to the deputy head of the ruling AK party in Diyarbakir, Mohammed Akar.

    He says that if there is disappointment, the whole idea of integration will end. Separation and conflict will come to the fore. He says that if he can see this, the prime minister, the state should see it as well. Akar adds that “The danger that is lying ahead is a nightmare,” Akar said.

    Since the start of the PKK’s armed struggle, more than 40,000 people have been killed. Observers warn that Turkey’s new parliament may find the country at a crossroads – either peace or a return to conflict and civil strife.

    via Emboldened Kurds Press Demands in Turkey | Middle East | English VOA