Washington (CNN) — A proposal to reduce nuclear weapons highlighted the debate within the German government about when and how to get rid of nuclear weapons on its soil, a new WikiLeaks document shows.
Its release also reveals the presence of nuclear weapons in several European countries and Turkey, information not normally released by NATO.
During a meeting with two U.S. diplomats, German National Security Adviser Christoph Heusgen expressed his reservations about the German government coalition’s proposal to remove all tactical nuclear weapons from Germany, according to a November 2009 U.S. State Department cable published by WikiLeaks.
In February, five countries — Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Norway — sent a joint letter to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, signed by their respective foreign ministers, calling for a debate about NATO’s nuclear policy.
German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle has called for the removal of all nuclear weapons from German soil. However, Heusgen distanced the German government from the proposal they had signed onto, claiming that “this had been forced upon them by FM Westerwelle,” the cable said.
Heusgen told the U.S. diplomats that “from his perspective, it made no sense to unilaterally withdraw ‘the 20’ tactical nuclear weapons still in Germany while Russia maintains ‘thousands’ of them. It would only be worth it if both sides drew down,” the U.S. cable said.
U.S. Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip H. Gordon responded by noting the importance of considering the potential consequences of a German proposal before moving forward. The cable continues, “a withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany and perhaps from Belgium and the Netherlands could make it very difficult politically for Turkey to maintain its own stockpile, even though it was still convinced of the need to do so.”
Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, says the cable shows the intense deliberations going on in the German political process.
“The new in that is that it shows the battle going on inside the German government between the foreign minister and other elements of the government on this issue of how to push this issue of tactical nuclear weapons within the alliance.”
The Nuclear Threat Initiative defines tactical or nonstrategic nuclear weapons as “short-range weapons” which can include land-based missiles with a range of less than 500 kilometers (about 310 miles) and air- and sea-launched weapons with a range of less than 600 kilometers (about 370 miles). According to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the United States has 500 tactical nuclear weapons in its arsenal, of which approximately 200 are deployed in Europe.
The cable does not identify the origin of the nuclear weapons in any of the four countries, but the United States or NATO have military bases in all of them. According to Kristensen, these weapons are American. He points out that the British do not have tactical nuclear weapons, and the French keep their tactical nuclear weapons on their home soil.
“We don’t comment on the placements of nuclear weapons,” NATO spokeswoman Oana Lungescu told CNN. “As a matter of policy, we don’t comment on leaked confidential documents of any sort. We think diplomats should be able to talk to each other in confidence, because otherwise there is a risk that tensions can get out of control.”
As for Heusgen’s reference to “the 20” weapons on his country’s soil, Kristensen says it is not clear whether he is actually confirming that amount of weapons, or if he is using the estimate in a report written by Kristensen in 2005, which was picked up by German media and government officials as part of the debate. “Very few people in the German government know the exact number of weapons, and it’s not clear to me that the national security adviser would know.”
On the coupling of German and Russian denuclearization proposed by Heusgen, Kristensen says that would make very little sense. “It would be very strange to see formal linking of very small number of weapons in Germany with the large inventory of tactical nuclear weapons Russia has in general. It’s apples and oranges. Russian tactical nuclear weapons, their location and their mission is not linked to whether there are nuclear weapons in Germany.”
Kristensen estimates that Belgium, Netherlands and Germany each have between 10 and 20 tactical nuclear weapons on their soil, and there are 60 to 70 in Turkey.
via WikiLeaks: Heated debate in Germany over nuclear weapons on its soil – CNN.com.
Yet another Wikileaks document reports that Israel accused Turkey of allowing weapons and material for Iran’s nuclear program to be shipped across Turkey long before anyone had ever heard of the Mavi Marmara.
The materials were allowed through Turkey “with Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan’s full knowledge,” wrote Frederic Bereyziat, a senior French Foreign Ministry official for Israel and the peace process, who took notes on the second annual Franco-Israeli Strategic Dialogue in October 2009.
According to the leaked cable, the French replied that Israel would need to have clear and concrete proof of such activity before leveling accusations against Turkey. The Israelis replied that they were collecting evidence that they would eventually publicize.
The “five to six hours” of talks between delegations led by Pierre Sellal, director-general of the French Foreign Ministry, and Yossi Gal, director-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, covered a wide range of issues, including the Middle East peace process, Turkey, Syria and Iran, according to Bereyziat.
The French official said the Israelis explained that they would not take strong public positions condemning what they perceived as Turkey’s recent “strategic shift away from Western positions on the peace process, Iran and Israel’s nuclear program.”
Erdoğan’s public comments about Israel’s nuclear weapons had particularly irked the Israelis, Bereyziat said, describing the prime minister’s remarks as unprecedented by a Turkish leader.
Given that Turkey has announced that they support Hezbullah and that they do not want NATO to station missiles on their territory because they are afraid that those missiles will be used to defend Israel against Iran, I don’t doubt that the Turks are helping Iran’s nuclear program.
via Israel Matzav: Turkey let nuclear weapons related material into Iran?.
Turkey’s industry and trade minister said that it was impossible in a scientific atmosphere shaped up according to Islamic civilization to produce atomic bombs.
Turkey’s industry and trade minister said on Wednesday that it was impossible in a scientific atmosphere shaped up according to Islamic civilization to produce biological weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and atomic bombs.
Minister Nihat Ergun said technological products were a reflection of the mentalities that manufactured them, and they were not independent from those mentalities.
“Our civilization is based on an understanding that focuses on being constructive not destructive, attaches importance on ethical values and aesthetics as well as welfare, and regards justice above everything,” Ergun said during a panel discussion on “Technology Vision of Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Countries” in Istanbul.
The panel discussion took place as a part of the 14th International Business Forum (IBF) organized by the Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD).
Ergun said the recent global financial crisis had showed the entire world that economic and technological development was not sufficient enough, and countries should cooperate and establish partnerships.
The minister said technology was the most important parameter defining power in the world, and societies transforming information into technology had become rich, secure and strong countries.
“Many Islam countries have rich oil and natural gas resources. If we find a new technology that can exclude fossil fuels in the world, many Islam countries can face serious problems,” Ergun said.
Therefore, Islam countries should attach importance to private sector, entrepreneurship, production, trade, science and technology, Ergun said.
Ergun said economies that could not renew themselves, produce new products and develop their existing products could not have a word to say in the global competition.
“Therefore, there is need for R&D activities to push new products to market, raise quality and reduce costs,” he said.
Ergun also said Turkey would raise the ratio of R&D expenditures to its Gross Domestic Product to 2 percent by the end of 2013, and catch up with the developed countries.
International Business Forum (IBF) is a voluntarily-based, non-governmental platform with the motto of “Global Business Network among Muslim Nations” for gathering of Muslim business people from all over the globe where they try to stimulate trade, investment and co-operation.
The Independent Industrialists’ & Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD) organizes the IBF Congress every year since 1995.
The theme of this year’s congress, taking place in Istanbul between October 6 and 9, is “importance of technology for development in Islamic countries”
Over 3,000 overseas delegates from 65 countries including Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Czech, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Britain, Uzbekistan and Yemen attend the congress.
The 14th IBF Congress will also provide opportunities for national delegations to introduce their home country’s profiles from business project in the fields of industry, trade, finance or agriculture and having a multi-canal dimension.
Newly declassified documents shine a light on the deliberations of Israel’s leaders during the early days of the Yom Kippur War in 1973.
By Yossi Melman
Media outlets around the world have reported that state archive documents declassified this week showed that Israel’s leadership considered using “drastic means” during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
On October 9, a day after Egypt repulsed Israel’s counterattack on the southern front, prime minister Golda Meir convened a top-level discussion in her office.
The outlook was grim. Troop losses were high, and ammunition and weapons stores were running out. At one point, Meir blurted out that she had a “crazy idea.”
That idea, however, was not a nuclear attack, but many believe a lightning visit to Washington to meet with U.S. president Richard Nixon. The visit was to be so secret that Meir advocated not even informing the cabinet. Defense minister Moshe Dayan supported her plan, but it was never implemented.
Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Prime Minister Golda Meir in the Knesset on July 26, 1972. Photo by: AP Photo
At the same meeting, officials also discussed the option of having the air force bomb strategic sites in Damascus.
Was the “crazy idea” connected to a critical strike at Syria. It seems the answer is yes.
In another meeting – according to Hanna Zemer, the one-time editor of the newspaper Davar – Dayan spoke of the possibility that “the Third Temple,” meaning the state, would be destroyed. Foreign news outlets have reported that Israel readied its nuclear weapons and even considered using them as a last resort.
The Dimona nuclear facility was completed in 1960. Those same foreign reports say Israel had several dozen nuclear weapons in October 1973, as well as the means to deliver them: French-made Mirage and U.S.-made Phantom aircraft and the Jericho missile, an Israeli improvement on a French model. All of these, the reports said, were at full readiness.
Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh called his book on Israel’s nuclear program “The Samson Option.” The implication is that Israel would use atomic weapons if it viewed itself as facing certain, imminent destruction.
If these reports are accurate – and the documents released this week do not confirm them, but possibly only hint at them through portions blacked out by the military censor – this would be neither the first nor the last time Israel’s leaders have discussed their so-called “doomsday weapons.”
International researchers have posited that Israel had a nuclear device even before the 1967 Six-Day War.
In 1991, Israel again reportedly considered using atomic weapons in response to the Scud missile attacks launched by Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. Rightist ministers, including Yuval Ne’eman (a physicist involved in Israel’s nuclear program), Rafael Eitan and Rehavam Ze’evi, urged Yitzhak Shamir’s government to respond forcefully, but Shamir rejected Israeli military action out of hand.
In recent years, as Iran emerged as Israel’s foremost threat, experts at home and abroad have raised the nuclear option once again. In lectures in Vienna and Berlin, and later in an ill-considered op-ed in The New York Times, historian Benny Morris has urged Israel’s leaders to hit Iran with a nuclear bomb.
Thankfully, government officials on both left and right have thus far shown responsibility and stuck to the ambiguity policy instituted in 1961, under which Israel promised it would not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East.
They know as well as anyone that the first country to do so will not only forfeit its seat among the community nations, but will likely cease to exist.
The World Tribune’s Gregory Copley has broken the news that “U.S. powerlessness and EU confusion” have opened a “window of opportunity” for Turkey to seriously consider acquiring nuclear weapons. Just last month, Turkey defied its traditional allies, including the United States and Israel, by voting against a fourth round of U.N. sanctions against Iran, in punishments for Tehran’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons. Further, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has displayed growing Islamist sympathies and exercises an undemocratic stranglehold on power, raising legitimate questions about Turkey’s commitment to secular democracy as well as to NATO.
The news that Turkey is considering “going nuclear” is a game changer, and it should shake the Obama Administration to its core. A nuclear-armed Turkey would ride a coach-and-horses through Obama’s chief foreign policy goal of “getting to zero,” and it would expose his profoundly foolish strategy of neglecting traditional allies in order to engage America’s enemies. It would legitimize Iran’s illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons, and it would so profoundly change the balance of power in the Middle East that the ramifications could not be predicted with certainty for decades.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently stated that Turkey’s strategic drift away from the West is due in part to the European Union’s reluctance to grant Turkey full EU membership. Certainly the EU is not negotiating with Ankara in good faith, but Brussels cannot be entirely to blame. Ankara has distanced itself from Europe and the U.S. and has instead prioritized its relations with Russia and the Muslim world, especially Iran.
Turkey’s formerly close relations with Israel have deteriorated steadily since the AKP’s rise to power, and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo?an has demonstrated that he is willing to exploit anti-Israeli sentiments to boost his own political popularity. On its current trajectory, Turkey’s traditional strategic relationship with the West will devolve into a looser affiliation, while Ankara simultaneously enters into a closer alliance with Iran and other Middle Eastern powers hostile to U.S. leadership.
Much of this is entirely predictable. President Obama’s policies—namely, his commitment to eradicating nuclear weapons per se, the uncertainty surrounding the future of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and his water-treading missile defense program—have raised significant doubt in Turkey’s mind about the reliability of the half-century-old U.S./NATO nuclear and defense umbrella.
President Obama and NATO should not stand idly by and watch this happen. The destabilization brought to the European continent from a premature removal of American nuclear weapons, or an unacceptable degradation of its force, would be a major setback for global security and stability. America should stand behind its nuclear guarantee to Europe and adopt a protect-and-defend strategy that includes robust missile defenses.
Washington should also make clear to Turkey that Ankara’s acquirement of nuclear weapons will not be tolerated and would cost it both its strategic relationship with the U.S. and potentially its membership of NATO.
In 2006, now-Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Philip Gordon said the U.S. would soon have to ask itself, “Who lost Turkey?” Unless he wants the answer to be “President Obama,” the Administration should address this issue as a matter of urgency.
Exclusive:Secret apartheid-era papers give first official evidence of Israeli nuclear weapons
Chris McGreal in Washington
The secret military agreement signed by Shimon Peres, now president of Israel, and P W Botha of South Africa. Photograph: Guardian
Secret South African documents reveal that Israel offered to sell nuclear warheads to the apartheid regime, providing the first official documentary evidence of the state’s possession of nuclear weapons.
The “top secret” minutes of meetings between senior officials from the two countries in 1975 show that South Africa‘s defence minister, PW Botha, asked for the warheads and Shimon Peres, then Israel’s defence minister and now its president, responded by offering them “in three sizes”. The two men also signed a broad-ranging agreement governing military ties between the two countries that included a clause declaring that “the very existence of this agreement” was to remain secret.
The documents, uncovered by an American academic, Sasha Polakow-Suransky, in research for a book on the close relationship between the two countries, provide evidence that Israel has nuclear weapons despite its policy of “ambiguity” in neither confirming nor denying their existence.
The Israeli authorities tried to stop South Africa’s post-apartheid government declassifying the documents at Polakow-Suransky’s request and the revelations will be an embarrassment, particularly as this week’s nuclear non-proliferation talks in New York focus on the Middle East.
They will also undermine Israel’s attempts to suggest that, if it has nuclear weapons, it is a “responsible” power that would not misuse them, whereas countries such as Iran cannot be trusted.
A spokeswoman for Peres today said the report was baseless and there were “never any negotiations” between the two countries. She did not comment on the authenticity of the documents.
South African documents show that the apartheid-era military wanted the missiles as a deterrent and for potential strikes against neighbouring states.
The documents show both sides met on 31 March 1975. Polakow-Suransky writes in his book published in the US this week, The Unspoken Alliance: Israel’s secret alliance with apartheid South Africa. At the talks Israeli officials “formally offered to sell South Africa some of the nuclear-capable Jericho missiles in its arsenal”.
Among those attending the meeting was the South African military chief of staff, Lieutenant General RF Armstrong. He immediately drew up a memo in which he laid out the benefits of South Africa obtaining the Jericho missiles but only if they were fitted with nuclear weapons.
The memo, marked “top secret” and dated the same day as the meeting with the Israelis, has previously been revealed but its context was not fully understood because it was not known to be directly linked to the Israeli offer on the same day and that it was the basis for a direct request to Israel. In it, Armstrong writes: “In considering the merits of a weapon system such as the one being offered, certain assumptions have been made: a) That the missiles will be armed with nuclear warheads manufactured in RSA (Republic of South Africa) or acquired elsewhere.”
But South Africa was years from being able to build atomic weapons. A little more than two months later, on 4 June, Peres and Botha met in Zurich. By then the Jericho project had the codename Chalet.
The top secret minutes of the meeting record that: “Minister Botha expressed interest in a limited number of units of Chalet subject to the correct payload being available.” The document then records: “Minister Peres said the correct payload was available in three sizes. Minister Botha expressed his appreciation and said that he would ask for advice.” The “three sizes” are believed to refer to the conventional, chemical and nuclear weapons.
The use of a euphemism, the “correct payload”, reflects Israeli sensitivity over the nuclear issue and would not have been used had it been referring to conventional weapons. It can also only have meant nuclear warheads as Armstrong’s memorandum makes clear South Africa was interested in the Jericho missiles solely as a means of delivering nuclear weapons.
In addition, the only payload the South Africans would have needed to obtain from Israel was nuclear. The South Africans were capable of putting together other warheads.
Botha did not go ahead with the deal in part because of the cost. In addition, any deal would have to have had final approval by Israel’s prime minister and it is uncertain it would have been forthcoming.
South Africa eventually built its own nuclear bombs, albeit possibly with Israeli assistance. But the collaboration on military technology only grew over the following years. South Africa also provided much of the yellowcake uranium that Israel required to develop its weapons.
The documents confirm accounts by a former South African naval commander, Dieter Gerhardt – jailed in 1983 for spying for the Soviet Union. After his release with the collapse of apartheid, Gerhardt said there was an agreement between Israel and South Africa called Chalet which involved an offer by the Jewish state to arm eight Jericho missiles with “special warheads”. Gerhardt said these were atomic bombs. But until now there has been no documentary evidence of the offer.
Some weeks before Peres made his offer of nuclear warheads to Botha, the two defence ministers signed a covert agreement governing the military alliance known as Secment. It was so secret that it included a denial of its own existence: “It is hereby expressly agreed that the very existence of this agreement… shall be secret and shall not be disclosed by either party”.
The agreement also said that neither party could unilaterally renounce it.
The existence of Israel’s nuclear weapons programme was revealed by Mordechai Vanunu to the Sunday Times in 1986. He provided photographs taken inside the Dimona nuclear site and gave detailed descriptions of the processes involved in producing part of the nuclear material but provided no written documentation.
Documents seized by Iranian students from the US embassy in Tehran after the 1979 revolution revealed the Shah expressed an interest to Israel in developing nuclear arms. But the South African documents offer confirmation Israel was in a position to arm Jericho missiles with nuclear warheads.
Israel pressured the present South African government not to declassify documents obtained by Polakow-Suransky. “The Israeli defence ministry tried to block my access to the Secment agreement on the grounds it was sensitive material, especially the signature and the date,” he said. “The South Africans didn’t seem to care; they blacked out a few lines and handed it over to me. The ANC government is not so worried about protecting the dirty laundry of the apartheid regime’s old allies.”
Israeli president denies offering nuclear weapons to apartheid South Africa
Shimon Peres dismisses claims relating to secret files but US researcher says denials are disingenuous
Chris McGreal in Washington, Rory McCarthy in Jerusalem and David Smith in Johannesburg
Shimon Peres (left), whose office says Israel has never negotiated the exchange of nuclear weapons with South Africa, pictured with Ariel Sharon in Egypt in 1975. Photograph: Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images
Israel‘s president, Shimon Peres, today robustly denied revelations in the Guardian and a new book that he offered to sell nuclear weapons to apartheid South Africa when he was defence minister in the 1970s.
His office said “there exists no basis in reality” for claims based on declassified secret South African documents that he offered nuclear warheads for sale with ballistic missiles to the apartheid regime in 1975. “Israel has never negotiated the exchange of nuclear weapons with South Africa. There exists no Israeli document or Israeli signature on a document that such negotiations took place,” it said.
But Sasha Polakow-Suransky, the American academic who uncovered the documents while researching a book on the military and political relationship between the two countries, said the denials were disingenuous, because the minutes of meetings Peres held with the then South African defence minister, PW Botha, show that the apartheid government believed an explicit offer to provide nuclear warheads had been made.
Polakow-Suransky noted that Peres did not deny attending the meetings at which the purchase of Israeli weapons systems, including ballistic missiles, was discussed. “Peres participated in high level discussions with the South African defence minister and led the South Africans to believe that an offer of nuclear Jerichos was on the table,” he said. “It’s clear from the documentary record that the South Africans perceived that an explicit offer was on the table. Four days later Peres signed a secrecy agreement with PW Botha.”
While Peres’s office said there are no documents with his signature on that mention nuclear weapons, his signature does appear with Botha’s on an agreement governing the broad conduct of the military relationship, including a commitment to keep it secret.
Today politicians and academics in South Africa said the apartheid regime’s cooperation with Israel was an “open secret” and they welcomed the current government’s move to declassify sensitive documents which provided details of key meetings.
Steven Friedman, the director of Centre for the Study of Democracy at Rhodes University and the University of Johannesburg, said: “There was a close cooperation on a range of issues. In the 1970s and 1980s there was a sudden influx of Israeli nuclear scientists. We knew there was extensive military cooperation.”
Professor Willie Esterhuyse, who played a critical role in opening and maintaining dialogue between the apartheid government and the ANC, said: “Most of us knew there was close cooperation on nuclear research with not just Israel but also the French. But we had no factual evidence. We eventually figured out it was more than just rumours, but we never knew the precise details.”
Opposition politicians praised the post-apartheid government for resisting attempts by the Israeli authorities to prevent the documents from becoming public. David Maynier, the shadow defence minister, speculated that the ANC government had decided it would not be damaged by releasing the documents.
“It did not take me entirely by surprise, because I think it was a pretty open secret there was extensive cooperation between South Africa and Israel. But before now the details were super-secret,” he said.
The South African documents obtained by Polakow-Suransky and published in today’s Guardian, include “top secret” South African minutes of meetings between senior officials from the two countries as well as direct negotiations in Zurich between Peres and Botha.
The South African military chief of staff, Lieutenant General RF Armstrong, who attended the meetings, drew up a memo laying out the benefits of South Africa obtaining the Israeli missiles – but only if they were fitted with nuclear weapons.
Polakow-Suransky said the minutes record that at the meeting in Zurich on 4 June 1975, Botha asked Peres about obtaining Jericho missiles, codenamed Chalet, with nuclear warheads.
“Minister Botha expressed interest in a limited number of units of Chalet subject to the correct payload being available,” the minutes said. The document then records that: “Minister Peres said that the correct payload was available in three sizes”.
The use of a euphemism, the “correct payload”, reflects Israeli sensitivity over the nuclear issue. Armstrong’s memorandum makes clear the South Africans were interested in the Jericho missiles solely as a means of delivering nuclear weapons.
The use of euphemisms in a document that otherwise speaks openly about conventional weapons systems also points to the discussion of nuclear weapons.
In the end, South Africa did not buy nuclear warheads from Israel and eventually developed its own atom bomb.
The Israeli authorities tried to prevent South Africa’s post-apartheid government from declassifying the documents.
Peres’s angry response to the revelations is unusual, because of Israel’s policy of maintaining “ambiguity” about whether it possesses nuclear weapons. The Israeli press quoted anonymous government officials challenging the truth of the documents.
Polakow-Suransky said it is possible Peres made the offer without the approval of Israel’s then prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin. “Peres has a long history of conducting his own independent foreign policy. During the 1950s as Israel was building its defence relationship with France, Peres went behind the back of many of his superiors in initiating talks with French defence officials. It would not be surprising if he broached the topic in discussions with South Africa’s defence minister without Rabin’s authorisation,” he said.
Polakow-Suransky’s book, The Unspoken Alliance: Israel’s secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa, is published in the US on Tuesday.
Politician at heart of Israel
Shimon Peres, the man at centre of allegations over nuclear links with apartheid South Africa, has spent decades in government in various cabinet posts, including defence and foreign, as prime minister and now as Israel’s president.
Born in Poland in 1923, he and his family moved to Palestine under the British mandate when he was 11. Many of his relatives were murdered in the Holocaust.
In 1947, he joined the Haganah, the Jewish force fighting for Israeli independence. He was placed in charge of personnel and arms purchases.
He Peres rose quickly through the political world in the years immediately after independence, becoming Ddirector general, at 30, of the defence ministry. In the following years, he played a leading role in building strategic alliances and developing arms deals. One of the most important early on was with France, which played a crucial role in the development of Israel’s nuclear programme. Later, as relations with Paris cooled, he was at the forefront of building links with apartheid South Africa.
Peres was first elected to the Knesset in 1959. He persistently challenged Yitzhak Rabin for the Labour party leadership, only becoming leader in 1977 after Rabin was forced out over his wife’s illegal foreign bank account. He became the unofficial acting prime minister but lost the subsequent general election.
Peres, as foreign minister, won the Nobel peace prize in 1994 with Rabin and Yasser Arafat for the negotiations that produced the Oslo accords.
After Rabin’s assassination in 1995, he became PM and lost the subsequent election. In 2005, he quit Labour to back Ariel Sharon’s new Kadima party. Two years later, the Knesset elected Peres president. Peres married Sonya Gelman in 1945. They have three children.
