Tag: Necmettin Erbakan

  • Necmettin Erbakan

    Necmettin Erbakan

    Necmettin Erbakan, the former Turkish prime minister who died on February 27 aged 84, was his country’s most prominent Islamic politician, and an intellectual father to many key figures in the dominant party of the last decade, the incumbent AKP.

    6:29PM BST 10 Apr 2011

    Necmettin Erbakan  Photo: Reuters
    Necmettin Erbakan Photo: Reuters

    But to the end of his life Erbakan espoused a much-less pragmatic version of political Islam that current Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, who were eventually forced to split from their one-time mentor. As a result, by the time of his death Erbakan held a position only at the periphery of Turkish politics, as leader of the inconsequential Felicity [Saadet] Party, which does not hold a single seat in the current parliament.

    Necmettin Erbakan was born in Sinop, northern Turkey, on the national day, October 29, in 1926. As a student at Istanbul Technical University (ITU) he won a reputation as a talented scholar earning the epithet of hoca or “teacher”. At university he was a contemporary and friend of the future Turkish president, Suleyman Demirel, with whom he was to form a coalition in the Seventies.

    In the early 1950s Erbakan completed a PhD in Mechanical Engineering at Aachen University in Germany, where he ended up helping to design parts for the Leopard tank. The prejudice experienced by Turkish migrant workers in Germany at this time had a strong influence on his politics, and particularly on his suspicious stance towards the West.

    He returned to teach at ITU, and only entered politics in 1969, when he published Milli Gorus or “National Perspective”, a manifesto for a nationalistic brand of Islamic politics. It was fuelled by the sense of marginalisation that he had felt in Germany, a sentiment that would go on to fire all his parties – he founded five, of which four were closed down for deviating from the strict secularism that is enshrined in Turkish constitution.

    Erbakan’s political career began to blossom in the 1970s, but his rise was cut short in 1980, when he was one of many politicians (of all persuasions) who was banned from political life after the military coup of that year.

    He returned to politics in 1987 and eight years later found himself the Turkish Republic’s first overtly Islamic prime minister. His promotion to this position was largely due to fortune. A fallout between two major parties following 1995 elections propelled his Welfare Party, which had polled 21 per cent of the vote, to power.

    As prime minister he soon shocked the secular establishment with talk of alliance with the Arab world, and with his overt disdain for Turkey’s ongoing project of accession to the European Union. While existing protocol dictated that his first major visit should be to Washington, Erbakan flouted the advice of his foreign ministry and flew instead to Tehran, where he made an expensive deal to import gas from Iran. He later attracted criticism for attempting to relax the ban on government employees wearing headscarves, and for entertaining the heads of religious groups in his residence at Ankara.

    The military, as self-styled guardians of the secular character of the Turkish state, eventually managed to oust him in 1997. In contrast to the use of tanks of previous coups, however, this was effected through security memorandums strenuously advising the government to curb its “anti-constitutional” activities, as well as through pressure on politicians in Erbakan’s junior coalition partner. As Erbakan was levered gently from power, the military’s tactics were dubbed a “postmodern” coup.

    Erbakan was a man of many eccentricities, not all of them benign. A Versace-wearing Islamist, he unsuccessfully contested the closure, in 1998, of the Welfare Party at the European Court of Human Rights, apparently impervious to the irony that he was fighting the closure of his nationalistic party by appealing to the European sense of fair play. He also had an unlikely friendship with Jean Marie le Pen. This obeyed a curious logic, the two men seeming to reassure one another that the two civilisations they represented were forever incompatible.

    There was also a touch of the egomaniac about Erbakan. The articulate politician Numan Kurtulmus recently stood successfully for the leadership of Erbakan’s last political party, Saadet. Though Erbakan was then an octogenarian in poor health, he appeared to engineer his successor out of the party so that he could again assume control himself. Kurtulmus was driven to announce his resignation following a Ramadan dinner at which knives and forks were thrown at him by the Erbakan faction. Significantly, though, Erbakan’s followers were never called to rise to any greater display of violence than this.

    Despite these faults Necmettin Erbakan did prove that an Islamic party could get elected in Turkey, and function within a democratic framework. But his isolationist attitudes did not sit well with the upwardly mobile aspirations of many voters. Both of these facts were recognised by Erdogan and Gul, who split from Erbakan to form, in 2001, the AK Party, which has proved unstoppable ever since.

    Necmettin Erbakan is survived by two daughters and a son.

    via Necmettin Erbakan – Telegraph.

  • Turkey’s Veteran Islamist Erbakan Visits Iran

    Turkey’s Veteran Islamist Erbakan Visits Iran

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 76
    April 21, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Following the restoration of his political rights, veteran Islamist politician and former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, 83, returned to active politics, raising questions about the leadership of the Islamist Felicity Party (SP). Erbakan, the legendary leader of the National Outlook Movement (NOM) advocated a political Islamist platform in Turkish politics, and formed a succession of political parties since the 1970’s -training activists who became influential figures within Turkish political life. He skillfully mobilized the Turkish electorate behind his Welfare Party (RP) in the 1990’s and succeeded to rule the country in a coalition government between 1996 and 1997. His policies while in power irked Turkey’s powerful generals who perceived the RP as a direct threat to secularism and staged a campaign to force Erbakan out of power, known as the “February 28 process.” Erbakan was forced out of office, and subsequently the Constitutional Court closed down the RP in 1998, suspending political rights of Erbakan and other RP officials. The crackdown on Islamic social networks during the “February 28 process” led to a crisis within the Islamist movement, whereby the new generation questioned the platform and strategies of the NOM instilled by Erbakan. The split between the pro-Erbakan old-guard and the reformist wing became visible when the Constitutional Court shut down the WP’s successor Virtue Party (FP) on similar grounds in 2002. The two groups separated, with the reformists organizing themselves around the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power following a landslide election victory in 2002 and continues to rule Turkey. In contrast, the FP’s traditionalist offshoot, the SP, was defeated.

    Although he took over the SP leadership after his five-year ban came to an end in 2003, Erbakan faced political restrictions in another RP-related case. He was found guilty of forgery in the so-called “lost trillion case’ concerning the loss of more than one trillion Turkish Liras in Treasury grants to the RP. In addition to his political ban, he was sentenced to two years and four months, which he began serving under house arrest in May 2008. Citing Erbakan’s ailing health, in August 2008 President Abdullah Gul pardoned him, paving the way for the removal of his political restrictions (Today’s Zaman, April 6).

    Erbakan constantly expressed his opinions on political developments through his public appearances in the SP’s election rallies and other platforms. He acted as a vocal opponent of the governing AKP, criticizing it for following pro-Western policies and betraying the NOM spirit. After the restoration of his political rights in April, Erbakan’s press briefing in the SP headquarters was interpreted as marking his return to “active politics.” Despite his advanced age, he set himself an ambitious timescale for putting the SP on the political map, voicing the same anti-Western and confrontational discourse he had been advocating for decades (ANKA, April 10). Following his press briefing, Erbakan visited Iran, where he received a warm welcome from Iranian officials including President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. Erbakan and Iranian leaders vowed to continue their struggle against “Western imperialism and Zionism” and pursue the establishment of a pan-Islamic union (www.saadet.org.tr, April 19; Hurriyet, April 20).

    Erbakan’s return to politics has raised questions about the future leadership of the SP. Though his political socialization took place within the NOM tradition, the current party leader Numan Kurtulmus, a professor of economics, in many ways distinguished himself from traditionalists. Distancing himself from the doctrinaire outlook of the NOM cadres, Kurtulmus is known as a person who has embraced broader segments of society (www.cafesiyaset.com, December 16, 2008). He declined invitations from the governing AKP to join their ranks, and instead continued his political career within the SP, and eventually took on the challenging task of revitalizing the NOM tradition in Turkish politics. He overcame opposition from traditionalists and was elected as the new SP leader in October 2008 -succeeding Erbakan. He maintained his allegiance to Erbakan’s ideals but avoided being viewed as his caretaker (www.timeturk.com, October 22, 2008).

    Now that Erbakan has returned to the party, Kurtulmus’ position appears vulnerable. Kurtulmus was not present at the Erbakan press briefing, which triggered speculation that there might be an underlying leadership struggle within the party (www.habervitrini.com, April 11). Fuelling these rumors, Erbakan avoided telling reporters what his future role will be within the party. Kurtulmus ruled out such a contest, arguing that “we do not have a leadership problem. Mr. Erbakan does not harbor such goals… he has valuable views and we will continue to benefit from them” (Anadolu Ajansi, April 12).

    Alternatively, Erbakan might portray himself as an “intellectual guide” for the NOM, enabling him to exert influence over the SP. Though he may not assume the party chairmanship directly, given his personality, he is unlikely to disengage entirely from the SP and its policy making, not least for the purpose of consolidating his son’s position in the party. Since many analysts attributed the SP’s success in last month’s local elections to its new leader Kurtulmus, who was able to imbue a sense of dynamism through his moderate political discourse, the return of the old-guard Erbakan might damage the party’s future performance within Turkish politics.

     http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34886