Turkish Forum

Tag: NATO

  • Turkey: Spies Like Us

    Turkey: Spies Like Us

    TurkeySpiesLikeUS_CROPPEd

    A Turkish flag flutters near the monument of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk at Taksim Square in Istanbul June 24, 2013 (Marko Djurica/Courtesy Reuters).

    by Steven A. Cook

    I co-authored this piece with my friend and colleague, Michael Koplow, author of the blog Ottomans and Zionists.

    Ehud Barak’s political instincts have never been great, but his security instincts are generally top-notch. So when he warned in 2010 that any intelligence information shared with Turkey might be passed on to Iran, his fears may not have been completely unfounded. David Ignatius reported yesterday that in 2012, Turkey deliberately blew the cover of ten Iranians who were working as Israeli agents and exposed their identities to the Iranian government. Ignatius also wrote that in the wake of the incident, which was obviously a large intelligence setback for efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear program, the United States did not protest directly to Turkey and instead walled off intelligence issues from broader policymaking.

    There are lots of questions that Ignatius’s report raises, and it will take some time to parse them out and figure out the answers. First and foremost is the report completely accurate? This is a very big deal if true, and it casts increasingly cool U.S. behavior toward Turkey over the past year in a more interesting light, yet it also makes it puzzling to figure out how something like this was kept quiet. Likewise, it is tough to see how and why the United States would separate intelligence issues from larger policy issues in the wake of such a huge betrayal of an important U.S. intelligence ally. Especially when such duplicity amounts to a purposeful blow to joint American-Israeli aims to slow down Iran’s nuclear program.

    Next, who are the sources for this story, and why leak the story now? If this new information came from the United States, then it indicates that someone has finally had it with Turkey turning a blind eye to (if not actively enabling) a growing al Qaeda presence in Syria, and anger over Turkey’s deal to buy a missile defense system from a Chinese firm already under sanctions rather than from NATO. The flip side to this is that if it is a U.S. government source fed up with Turkish behavior, it also does not cast the United States in a great light given the lack of an official reaction following Turkey’s exposure of Israeli intelligence assets. If the leak came from the Israeli side, then the timing is strange since there would have been little reason to hold this information until now, as Israeli-Turkish relations were at their absolute low point. The only plausible reason for Israel to leak this now would be if it came from someone who is disenchanted with Bibi Netanyahu’s efforts to patch things up with Turkey, as these allegations are deeply embarrassing in light of the Mavi Marmara apology.

    Questions aside, and assuming that the veracity of the report– and so far no American or Israeli official has publicly denied it – the bigger picture here is not the future of Israel-Turkey ties, but how the United States views Turkey. It is important to remember that from its earliest days the Obama administration sought to rebuild and strengthen ties with Ankara during a particularly difficult period that coincided with the American occupation of Iraq and the return of PKK terrorism. The Turks got a presidential visit and speech to the Grand National Assembly, Obama punted on his promise to recognize the Armenian genocide, and more broadly brought a new energy and urgency to a partnership that American officials hoped would work to achieve common goals in a swath of the globe from the Balkans to Central Asia.

    What started off well-enough quickly ran into trouble. By the spring of 2010, the Turks had negotiated a separate nuclear deal with Iran (and the Brazilians) that the administration claimed it had not authorized and voted against additional UN Security Council sanctions on Tehran.  Then the Mavi Marmara incident happened, further complicating Washington’s relations with both Ankara and Jerusalem.  A “reset” of sorts occurred on the sidelines of the September 2010 G-20 summit in Toronto with a meeting in which President Obama and Prime Minister Erdogan talked tough with each other and cleared the air, setting the stage for what Turkish officials like to describe as a “golden age” in relations.  Even so, despite the apparent mutual respect—even friendship—between President Obama and Prime Minister Erdogan, there was a sense that the Turks did not share interests and goals as much as advertised.  For example, there was Erdogan’s visit to Tehran in June 2010 when he implicitly justified Iran’s nuclear program. There were also difficult negotiations over a NATO early warning radar system on Turkish territory and after Ankara finally agreed, last minute needless wrangling over Israeli access to the data from the system .

    More recently, Turkey has spurned its NATO allies in order to build a missile defense system with China.  Ankara has also been enormously unhelpful on Syria, even working at cross-purposes against current U.S. aims.  The Turks have complicated efforts to solve the political crisis in Egypt by insisting that deposed President Mohammed Morsi be returned to office and thus only further destabilizing Egyptian politics.  In addition, these new revelations (along with ongoing efforts to get around sanctions on Iranian oil and gas) make it clear that Turkey has been actively assisting Iran in flouting American attempts to set back Iran’s nuclear capabilities. The state-owned Halk Bank was, until recently, involved in clearing financial transactions for Iranian counterparts, though Istanbul’s gold traders continue to do a robust business with Iran. And this all comes on top of the general fallout that has ensued as a result of Turkey doing everything in its power to take shots at Israel (which, no matter if some Turkish analysts want to argue that Ankara is more strategically valuable to the U.S. than Jerusalem, is a critical U.S. ally), whether it be absurdly blaming Israel for the coup in Egypt or preventing Israel from participating in NATO forums.

    Considering Turkey’s record, how can the Obama administration continue to tout Turkey as a “model partner” or even treat it as an ally? Not a single one of its goals for Turkey—anchoring Turkey in NATO and the West; advancing U.S. national security goals such as non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and promoting democracy; and holding Turkey out a “model” of a secular democracy—have been met. Ignatius’s recent revelation, if true, undermine the first two goals. As for the third, Erdogan’s continuing harsh crackdown on protesters resulting from last summer’s Gezi Park demonstrations, pressure on journalists, efforts to intimidate civil society organizations, and other efforts to silence critics makes Turkey a negative example for countries struggling to build more just and open societies. We have crossed the line of reasonable disagreement and arrived at a point where Turkey is very clearly and very actively working to subvert American aims in the Middle East on a host of issues. That Erdogan and/or his intelligence chief, Hakan Fidan, were willing to undermine a broad Western effort to stop Iran’s nuclear development for no other reason than to stick it to Israel should be a wake-up call as to whether the current Turkish government can be trusted as a partner on anything.

  • Turkey Launches Military Drills Along Syria Border

    Turkey Launches Military Drills Along Syria Border

    Suriye sınırında yapılan NATO tatbikatı soru işaretleri doğurdu

    Exercise at NATO Base to Test ‘Readiness for Battle’

    by Jason Ditz

    syria3With tensions soaring in the wake of the weekend Israeli attacks on Syria, the Turkish military has launched a round of military drills at a NATO air base along the Syrian border.

    The 10-day drills will involve military and government ministry coordination in mobilization for a war with Syria. NATO says the mission was planned ahead of time, but was never reported until it began.

    The drill adds to speculation about the possibility of a NATO attack on Syria, though officials downplayed that possibility. The Assad government has not commented on the exercise.

    Indeed, military drills in NATO nations are so common that it is entirely possible that they did just plan a small drill they didn’t figure was worth mentioning and it became a bigger deal because of the tensions with Syria.

    via Turkey Launches Military Drills Along Syria Border — News from Antiwar.com.

  • Lessons in Extended Deterrence: Why the Status of Turkish F-16s Doesn’t Matter | Turkey Wonk: Nuclear and Political Musings in Turkey and Beyond

    Lessons in Extended Deterrence: Why the Status of Turkish F-16s Doesn’t Matter | Turkey Wonk: Nuclear and Political Musings in Turkey and Beyond

    Kuzey Kore gerilimi öncesinde Türkiye’deki nükleer silahlar ve F16’ların durumu

    Lessons in Extended Deterrence: Why the Status of Turkish F-16s Doesn’t Matter

    Posted on April 3, 2013 by aaronstein1

    DF-ST-87-12392

    In response to North Korea’s bellicose threats, the United States has been parading a bevy of nuclear dual capable aircraft near the Korean peninsula. Both the B-52 and the B-2 have a nuclear role and would, in the event of a nuclear conflict, likely use air launched nuclear cruise missiles against targets in North Korea. The F-22, which is on “static display” in South Korea, would, according to the aviationist, “probably escort the big bombers during the opening stages of an eventual campaign (after the rain of cruise missiles that would wipe out most of North Korea’s air defenses…), their role could not be limited to providing air superiority (to be easily and quickly achieved considered the status of the geriatric North Korean Air Force and its obsolete Migs): as demonstrated in last year’s Exercise Chimichanga,the F-22 has the ability to play a dual role in the same mission: HVAAE (High Value Air Asset Escort) and air-to-surface.”

    While the actual threat of conflict on the Korean peninsula is low, the American show of force sheds lights on the lengths Washington will go to demonstrate its commitment to use nuclear weapons in defense of an ally covered by its nuclear umbrella. Washington’s actions, as has been noted by many others, is a show force meant to demonstrate its commitment to extended deterrence. In other words, Washington is signaling its readiness to push the button. (It is also trying to deter an ROK nuclear weapons program, but I am not really going to talk about that – I will leave that for better informed Korean experts.)

    Anyways, the signaling is important for the Turkish leadership in Ankara. Turkey, as regular readers of the blog are well aware, is home to ~65 American nuclear weapons. [From an EDAM issue brief I wrote about Turkey and Tactical Nuclear Weapons] According to Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, 50 bombs are slated for delivery by U.S. aircraft, but do to basing restrictions American dual capable aircraft (DCA) are not stationed permanently in Turkey. If the order were given for the release of NATO nuclear weapons, American aircraft would first have to be flown to Incirlik from another European base and armed before finally flying on to their targets. The other bombs are reserved for delivery by Turkish dual capable F-16s. However, there are conflicting reports about the status of Turkey’s nuclear fighter-bombers. According to General Ergin Celasin (ret.), the former Commander of the Turkish Air Force, “The Turkish air force’s role in NATO’s nuclear contingency plans came to an end with the withdrawal of nuclear weapons in the 1990s from the Air Force units that were deployed in several air bases in Turkey.”

    However, Norris and Kristensen cite Pentagon sources who say that Turkey’s current fleet of nuclear capable F-16s are receiving a “stop gap” modification to carry the B-61-12. Reports indicate that Turkey’s nuclear capable combat aircraft no longer train for nuclear missions. In the past, the air force’s dual capable aircraft trained for nuclear missions and were certified to carry out nuclear strikes. Turkish aircraft reportedly now only train as non-nuclear escort aircraft for NATO’s nuclear fighter wings. However, NATO has made clear that it does not foresee any scenario that would require the rapid use of nuclear weapons, which raises a number of unanswered questions about Turkey’s current nuclear posture. In any future scenario that might call for the use of nuclear weapons, the return of American DCAs and the re-certification of Turkish DCAs would likely be an important signal to a potential adversary.* [snip]

    In any case, the Alliance, should the need arise, has ample time to move American aircraft into Turkey. The move, perhaps combined with a very public crash course for Turkish pilots to drop the Bomb, would be a very powerful signal to a potential adversary. Or, in other words, extended deterrence.

    Hence, I do not see a real difference in Turkey’s post-Cold War thinking about nuclear weapons, even though the threat of a nuclear attack has diminished tremendously since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In short, Turkey continues to value nuclear weapons because of the widespread belief that they are necessary to deter regional foes like Iran and Syria. (It is also worth nothing, that both of these countries are not covered by a US negative security assurance.)

    Moreover, I suspect that there is a small group in the Turkish Armed Forces that are looking at the American show of force in Korea with satisfaction. Ankara, for a number of very good reasons, is perpetually wary of the American security commitment. Turkey, therefore, sees the forward deployment of nuclear weapons as an important symbol of Alliance solidarity and as a symbol of the US commitment to come to Turkish defense. This belief, however, is predicated on the notion that the bombs will actually be used (debatable actually), should the need arise.

    The American show of force, therefore, should not solely be interpreted in Turkey as the US commitment to ROK security. In fact, the American moves are also aimed at the leadership in Ankara. And I can guarantee that they are paying attention.

    via Lessons in Extended Deterrence: Why the Status of Turkish F-16s Doesn’t Matter | Turkey Wonk: Nuclear and Political Musings in Turkey and Beyond.

  • Turkey’s Regional Policy Protected By American Bomb

    Turkey’s Regional Policy Protected By American Bomb

    Patriot missile installation is pictured at a positions near the city of Kahramanmaras, Feb. 23, 2013. Germany's defence minister inspected Patriot missile batteries close to the Syria-Turkey border. (photo by REUTERS/Axel Schmidt) Read more: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2013/03/american-middle-east-policy-turkey-nuclear-bombs.html#ixzz2PDsVinVg
    Patriot missile installation is pictured at a positions near the city of Kahramanmaras, Feb. 23, 2013. Germany’s defence minister inspected Patriot missile batteries close to the Syria-Turkey border. (photo by REUTERS/Axel Schmidt)
    Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/american-middle-east-policy-turkey-nuclear-bombs.html#ixzz2PDsVinVg

    By: Kadri Gursel for Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse. Posted on March 31.

    In recent years when the AKP government gave priority to developing strategic ties with the Baath regime, the neo-Islamic political class that rules Turkey did not think of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles in the Syrian army inventory as a strategic threat against Turkey.

    About This Article

    Summary :

    Turkey once sought a nuclear-free region but now covets the protection from its neighbors that is afforded by US nuclear bombs, writes Kadri Gursel.

    Original Title:
    Middle East Policy Under Protection of American Bomb
    Author: Kadri Gursel
    Translated by: Timur Goksel

    They thought at the time that Turkey, by using its soft power, was actually transforming Syria and even on the verge of integrating it. Visas were abolished between the two countries and contacts reached unheard of levels.

    For example on Dec. 22-23, 2009, in “The First Session of the Turkey-Syria High Level Strategic Cooperation Council” held in Damascus, 50 accords, memorandums of understanding and cooperation protocols were signed by two countries on education, culture, commerce, security, health, irrigation, agriculture, mass housing and other fields.

    We are talking of the not too distant past, when many were gushing with praise for Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s patented political strategy of “Zero Problems With Neighbors.”

    The joint communique of the meeting had a paragraph that revealed an interesting paradox:

    “The parties, agreeing on the necessity of purging the Middle East from nuclear weapons, have reviewed latest developments on the ongoing dialogue in the context of Iran’s nuclear program. With the conviction that all countries have the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes we have emphasized the importance of finding a diplomatic solution to this question.”

    The paradox that called for clarification was NATO-member Turkey, jointly with anti-West Syria, declaring its wish for “a Middle East purged of nuclear weapons.”

    “Nuclear weapon-free Middle East” was one of the themes of the anti-Israel policy that peaked between the Davos confrontation of January 2009 and the Mavi Marmara events of May 2010. Basically, there was nothing strange with that expressed wish. Everyone, at least a vast majority, would want to see the Middle East cleansed of nuclear weapons. But when it is Turkey that asks for it, one has to pause and think. Turkey is one of two countries in the Middle East that has nuclear weapons on its soil. That Israel is a nuclear power is a secret known to all in the world. That Turkey has American B61 nuclear bombs on its territory is also known by all, but disregarded.

    The difference between Turkey and Israel is that the nuclear bombs deployed at Incirlik base near the southern city of Adana are not Turkish but American property. These are air-launched gravity bombs and their quantity changes “according to need.” B61s  are the forward deployed elements of the nuclear umbrella the US provides for its NATO allies.

    B61s were deployed at Incirlik during the Cold War years to balance Soviet tactical nuclear weapons and they are still there. According to reliable sources, Turkish pilots are not trained on B61s and Turkish F-16s don’t have the capability of delivering B61s.

    In addition to Turkey, these bombs are deployed in territories of four other US allies: Belgium, Holland, Germany and Italy. All, except Italy, now don’t want these weapons on their soil.

    But there is no likelihood for Turkey to adopt such a position. To the contrary, actually.

    The B61s that are still offsetting the Russian tactical nuclear weapons, as they were in the past, now have an increasingly important role for Turkey in the new Middle East geopolitics: To deter Syria and Iran. The Syrian situation is well known. Since the uprising and the civil war than ensued in Syria, Turkey, which until recently tried to transform that country with its soft power and strategic cooperation, is now resorting to all possible means, except to openly declaring war, to topple the regime in Damascus and replace it with a Muslim Brotherhood-dominated fraternal regime. Turkey, aware that its approach is seen as hostile, is now wary of Syria’s chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. Against this threat, Ankara asked for NATO protection and the Western alliance deployed Patriot batteries around three cities close to Syria.

    On the other hand, despite all objections, Iran is making headway in becoming a new nuclear-armed power of the Middle East. No doubt a nuclear-armed Iran will constitute a strategic imbalance for Turkey in the Middle East geopolitics. For a long time, as a political choice prompted by the “zero problems” policy, Turkey ignored this threat. The engine of Ankara’s “zero problems” approach to Iran was to advocate a solution to the international crisis brewing around the Iranian nuclear program that would ensure a change of the global nuclear order, to the benefit of developing powers like Turkey.

    Three years ago on May 14, 2010, the declaration that Turkey, at that time challenging the global nuclear order, pronounced to the world from Tehran (along with Brazil and Iran) was a part of this strategy. Acting with the same philosophy, on June 9, 2010, Turkey voted against a UN Security Council resolution that called for aggravated sanctions against Iran’s suspicious nuclear program.

    Three years after the Tehran Declaration and the negative vote at the Security Council, Turkey, far from challenging the global order, is feeling more secure under the protective wings of precisely that order against a threat from Iran.

    It was Turkey’s Syria policy that led to this situation.

    On March 19, in a workshop on “Emerging Powers and the Global Nuclear Order” organized jointly by Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [CEIP] and the University of Brasilia at Brazil’s capital, Brasilia, this subject too was discussed. Turkey-based nuclear weapons were debated in the context of AKP’s ambitious Middle East policy.

    Sinan Ulgen, the Director of Istanbul-based Economy and Foreign Policy Research Center [EDAM], who submitted a paper to the workshop, said:

    “Ankara, (…) believes that the continued presence of NATO nuclear weapons deters chemically armed Syria and, potentially, a nuclear-armed Iran in the future.”

    Turkish officials continue their quiet support for nuclear weapons. While reluctant to discuss these weapons in public, Ankara’s actions suggest that Turkey is taking steps to ensure that it retains the capability to host and deliver US tactical nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. Despite taking on a more passive nuclear posture since the end of the Cold War, the current difficulties in the Middle East will likely affect Turkey’s thinking about nuclear weapons. As the Syrian civil war worsens, and Ankara continues to grapple with how to deter a Syrian chemical weapons attack, Turkey could opt to harden its support for the forward deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe.”

    Ulgen noted that divergent views of Iran and Turkey for solutions in Bahrain and Syria had led to tension between Ankara and Tehran, and this prompted Turkey to withdraw the public support it gave to the Iranian nuclear program.

    Turkey, along with treating Israel as whipping boy in 2009-2010 and pressing it with the call for a ‘’Nuclear-free Middle East,’’ is now sharing a new ‘’joint threat” with Israel at a different plane: Iran and its nuclear program.

    Certainly a peculiar historic twist.

    Let us repeat: This is all because of Turkey’s Syria policy.

    As Ozdem Sanberk, a senior, retired Turkish diplomat often says, foreign policy is the art of managing contradictions.

    Turkey is hard pressed to manage the phenomenal contradictions between its new and ambitious policy in the Middle East and the NATO membership it needs to alleviate its military capacity deficit.

    Kadri Gürsel is a contributing writer for Al-Monitor’s Turkey Pulse and has written a column for the Turkish daily Milliyet since 2007. 

    Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/american-middle-east-policy-turkey-nuclear-bombs.html#ixzz2PDrw744w

  • NATO’s Eastern Anchor. 24 NATO bases in Turkey

    NATO’s Eastern Anchor. 24 NATO bases in Turkey

    The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has 24 military bases in Turkey, which is the western neighbor of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a report says.

    The report, published on the Iran-Balkan news agency (IRBA) on Thursday, listed the names and locations of NATO’s military bases in Turkey and noted that the country has become a regional power.

    NATO’s Incirlik Base, which is located eight kilometers (five miles) east of Adana, Turkey’s fifth largest city, and 56 kilometers (35 miles) from the Mediterranean Sea, is an important regional logistical air base of the alliance.

    Izmir Air Station is the facility of the United States Air Force in Europe (USAFE) in Izmir, located 320 kilometers (200 miles) southwest of Istanbul. Forty-two airplanes and Roland and Hawk missile systems, manned by 300 personnel, are based there.

    The Izmir Air Station is the oldest NATO base in Turkey and its importance has increased in recent years. The headquarters of NATO’s Allied Air Component Command for Southern Europe has been located in Izmir since August 11, 2004.

    The Sile Air Base has been built according to international standards for launching stinger missiles.

    The Konya 3rd Main Jet Base Group Command was the base of NATO’s AWACS aircraft during the Iraq war. Konya was a Turkish F-100 base in the mid-1970s and the air forces of Israel, Turkey, and the United States conducted their first joint exercises at the air base, codenamed Anatolian Eagle, in June 2001.

    The Ninth Main Jet Base of the Balikesir Air Base, in which six vault missile systems have been deployed, is located in the Turkish province of Balikesir in the Marmara region.

    The Merzifon Air Base is a military airport located in the city of Merzifon in Amasya province in the central Black Sea region. Merzifon is the base of the 5th Air Wing of the 2nd Air Force Command of the Turkish Air Force.

    The Bartin Air Base is located in the northern province of Bartin. The Bartin Naval Base, a submarine base of the Turkish Navy and assigned to the Turkish Northern Sea Area Command, is also in this area.

    Pirinclik Air Base is a 41-year-old US-Turkish military base located near the southeastern city of Diyarbakir. It was once NATO’s frontier post for monitoring the Soviet Union and the Middle East, but it was closed on September 30, 1997.

    The Eskisehir Air Base is a military airport located in the northwestern city of Eskisehir. Eskisehir is the home base of the 1st Air Wing of the 1st Air Force Command of the Turkish Air Force.

    The Iskenderun Naval Base is a base of the Turkish Navy on the northeastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, 2.5 kilometers (1.6 miles) east by northeast of Iskenderun city in the southern province of Hatay. It is assigned to the Turkish Navy’s Southern Sea Area Command.

    Bandirma Airport is a military airbase and public airport located in the city of Bandirma in Balikesir province. Bandirma is the base of the 6th Air Wing of the 1st Air Force Command of the Turkish Air Force.

    The Afion-Kara-Hissar Air Base is Turkey’s largest and NATO’s second largest air base and is the headquarters of NATO operations in the country.

    The Sarkisla Air Base in Sivas province is located in the eastern part of the Anatolian region, and the Bornova Air Base is located in Izmir province.

    The Luleburgaz Air Base is in the northwestern province of Kirklareli, and the Corlu Air Base is located in the northwestern city of Corlu in the province of Tekirdag.

    The Pazar Air Base is located in Pazar town in the northeastern province of Rize in the Black Sea region, the Erzurum Air Base is in the city of Erzurum in eastern Anatolia, and the Persembe Air Base is located in Ordu province on the Black Sea coast of Turkey.

    The Izmit Air Base in located in Kocaeli province, and the Kutahya Air Base is a military airport in the western province of Kutahya in the Aegean region.

    The Canakkale Air Base is in the northwestern province of Canakkale.

    NATO also has a military facility in Ankara.

    Combined Air Operations Center-6 (CAOC-6) in Eskisehir is one of the ten command centers in Europe used by the United States Air Force to provide command and control of air and space operations.

    NATO’s Air Component Command Headquarters is located in Izmir and NATO’s Rapid Deployable Corps-Turkey is headquartered in Istanbul.

    Turkey joined NATO in 1952 and serves as the organization’ s eastern anchor, as it controls the straits leading from the Black Sea to the Aegean and also has borders with Syria and Iraq.

    via NATO’s Eastern Anchor. 24 NATO bases in Turkey | Global Research.

  • Turkey, the Unhelpful Ally

    Turkey, the Unhelpful Ally

    STOCKHOLM

    For Op-Ed, follow@nytopinion and to hear from the editorial page editor, Andrew Rosenthal, follow@andyrNYT.

    AMERICA’S stated goal is to remove President Bashar al-Assad from power in Syria. The United States also insists that any solution to the Syrian crisis should guarantee religious and ethnic pluralism. However, this rosy vision of a moderate and secular Syria after Mr. Assad’s downfall will not be achieved if the United States continues to depend on regional allies that have little interest in such an outcome.

    President Obama has relied heavily on Turkey in seeking to oust Mr. Assad and Secretary of State John Kerry is scheduled to visit the Turkish capital, Ankara, later this week. But Turkey is part of the problem. It is exacerbating Syria’s sectarian strife, rather than contributing to a peaceful and pluralistic solution.

    While the Obama administration has encouraged a broad Syrian opposition coalition, in which the influence of Islamists would be circumscribed, Turkey has not been of any assistance whatsoever. Instead, the Turkish government has continued to throw its weight behind the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood dominated the Syrian National Council, which is headquartered in Istanbul, and has succeeded in eclipsing other groups within the new opposition coalition, effectively thwarting the American effort to empower non-Islamists.

    Moreover, while sponsoring the Sunni cause in Syria, the Turkish government has made no attempt to show sympathy for the fears of the country’s Alawite, Christian and Kurdish minorities. The Alawites and the Christians have backed the government in large numbers and fear retribution if Mr. Assad is toppled.

    Turkey has provided a crucial sanctuary for the Sunni rebels fighting Mr. Assad and has helped to arm and train them.  Even more ominously, Turkey is turning a blind eye to the presence of jihadists on its territory, and has even used them to suppress the aspirations of Kurds in Syria. Last November, Islamist rebels from Jabhet al-Nusra,  which has reputed links to Al Qaeda in Iraq, entered the Syrian town of Ras al-Ain from Turkey and attacked fighters from the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, known as the P.Y.D., which had wrested control of parts of northeastern Syria. The Nusra fighters were initially repelled, but have continued to cross into Syria from their safe haven in Turkey.

    Mr. Obama has invested considerable political capital in Turkey, cultivating a close relationship with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. American and Turkish officials have held regular operational planning meetings since last summer, aimed at hastening the downfall of Mr. Assad. In a recent interview with the Turkish newspaper Milliyet, Mr. Obama thanked “the Turkish government for the leadership they have provided in the efforts to end the violence in Syria and start the political transition process.”

    But this praise is undeserved. America can’t expect the Sunni Arab autocracies that have financed the Syrian uprising, like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, to help empower secular and moderate leaders in Syria. However, Turkey, a NATO ally, should be expected to promote a pluralistic, post-Assad Syria. It has not.

    The Obama administration must therefore reassess the assumption that Turkey is playing a constructive role in ending the violence in Syria; it must also take a hard look at its own role in contributing to religious strife.

    America’s policy of punitive sanctions and not-so-veiled military threats toward Iran has encouraged Turkey to assert itself as a Sunni power. The perception that Turkey enjoys American “cover” for a foreign policy that directly confronts Iranian interests emboldened the Turkish government to throw its weight behind the armed Sunni rebellion against Mr. Assad, Iran’s main regional ally.

    Turkey quickly abandoned its stated ambition to have “zero problems with neighbors” and decided to join the United States in confronting Iran. It agreed to the deployment of parts of NATO’s antimissile shield, which is meant to neutralize a supposed Iranian missile threat.

    Turkey’s shift flowed from the belief that it would gain power and stature and reap the benefits if America succeeded in rolling back Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

    All of this suited the United States.  Washington no longer had to fear that Turkey might be “drifting eastward,” as it did during the short-lived Turkish-Iranian rapprochement a few years ago, when Turkey broke ranks with its Western partners over the Iranian nuclear issue. Turkey also appeared to be an American asset insofar as it could potentially offset the influence of more conservative Sunni powers like Saudi Arabia.

    But the Syrian crisis has had a radicalizing effect on all parties, including Turkey’s more moderate Islamist government. Under more peaceful circumstances, Mr. Erdogan might be able to live up to American expectations and promote a pluralistic vision for the Middle East. That won’t happen if the region is increasingly torn apart by violent religious conflict and its leaders believe that playing the sectarian card will enhance their power.

    Removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq in 2003 had the undesirable consequence of empowering Iran. A decade later, America’s effort to remove Mr. Assad is partly an attempt to remedy this geopolitical setback. But, as in Iraq, it has had unwelcome consequences. Moreover, American policy toward Iran is encouraging opportunistic Sunni assertiveness that threatens to trigger Shiite retaliation.

    The United States must beware of doing the bidding of Sunni powers — especially Turkey — that are advancing sectarian agendas that run counter to America’s interest of promoting pluralism and tolerance. Left unchecked, rising sectarianism could lead to a dangerous regional war.

    <nyt_author_id>

    Halil M. Karaveli is a senior fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the Silk Road Studies Program, which are affiliated with the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, in Washington, and with the Institute for Security and Development Policy, in Stockholm.