Tag: NATO-Russia Cooperation

  • Russia could attack the West ???

    Russia could attack the West ???

    That’s what it’s all about:

    According to the Bild newspaper, the German Bundeswehr is studying scenarios in which Russia could attack the West bevor the summer. The situation could escalate in the coming winter, the document continues.

    In the summer of 2025, NATO could finally deploy 300,000 troops to Ukraine’s eastern flank. While Ukraine is aiming for a summit at the highest level on its peace plan, Russian President Vladimir Putin probably has other intentions: According to a training plan of the German Defense Ministry, the Kremlin chief could prepare a hybrid attack on NATO as early as next winter. This is reported by the “Bild” newspaper.

    In the secret report, the German Defense Ministry outlines in detail a possible “path to conflict” between Russia and the Western defense alliance. Month after month, both Russian and Western actions are described. Among other things, the Bundeswehr expects the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of NATO soldiers and an imminent outbreak of war in the summer of 2025, according to the “Bild”. Large-scale Russian manoeuvres from September Russia wants to call up another 200,000 men into the army soon to launch a new offensive against Ukraine in the spring.

    In the summer months, Russia would then begin increasingly open attacks on the West – including through severe cyberattacks. The large-scale “Zapad 2024” manoeuvre with 50,000 troops is scheduled to start in western Russia and Belarus in September.

    At the end of the year, there would be a Russian invasion of areas of eastern Ukraine, whereupon NATO is to deploy around 300,000 soldiers to Ukraine’s eastern flank on the so-called “Day X” in the summer of 2025. Different scenarios considered The Ministry of Defense declined to comment on the information.

    Only this much: “Basically, I can tell you that the consideration of different scenarios – even if they are extremely unlikely – is part of everyday military business, especially in training,” a spokesman for the ministry told Bild. Just last week, Swedish security experts warned of the danger of war with Russia. “Many have said it before me, but let me say it by virtue of my office: there could be a war in Sweden,” said Carl-Oskar Bohlin, Sweden’s Minister of Civil Protection.

    Everyone must prepare for the worst-case scenario, such as a war with Russia, before it is too late, Bohlin said.

  • Turkey-Russia relations and missile defence

    Turkey-Russia relations and missile defence

    The ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) pursuit of a more muscular and independent foreign policy has helped change the perception of Ankara in Moscow over the past ten years from being in step with NATO aims to a more independent foreign policy actor.

    Turkish President Abdullah Gul (left) greets Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Turkey-Russia economic relations are a key component of bilateral ties. [Reuters]
    Turkish President Abdullah Gul (left) greets Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Turkey-Russia economic relations are a key component of bilateral ties. Reuters
    “There have been some remarkable milestones that affected Turkish-Russian relations and paved the way for further co-operation,” Habibe Ozdal, a researcher at the International Strategic Research Organisation, specialising in Russia and Black Sea Studies, tells SETimes.

    One of these significant milestones was the Turkish parliament’s refusal to allow the United States to invade northern Iraq from Turkish territory in 2003.

    After this decision, “Ankara started to be evaluated as an independent actor in the region. From this standpoint, Moscow began to evaluate Ankara as an important actor that can stand for its national interests, even against a longtime ally,” according to Ozdal.

    On the local level, growing bilateral trade and tourism has contributed to the thawing of relations. However, close relations with Moscow are still new, and the two sides are working to build trust at the upper echelons of government.

    “It [Turkey] has been a member of NATO since 1952, that together with the EU integration process, has built up a certain level of trust [with the West] … between Turkish policy spheres, state agencies, security, military and business elites,” European Geopolitical Forum founder Marat Terterov tells SETimes.

    “They don’t have the equivalent of that in the Turkish-Russian relationship. They are in the process of building it.”

    One potential point of contention is Russia’s stringent opposition to the NATO decision to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system, which includes the forward based radar on Turkish territory.

    “While [most] Russians generally accept the US and NATO concern about countries with missile capability, such as Iran, they do not see that capability emerging in the near future,” Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-proliferation senior fellow Nikolai Sokov told SETimes.

    “According to Russian assessments, Iran is still pretty far from long-range missile capability. Hence they suspect that the real reason for missile defence is not the reason that is publicly declared.”

    The recently concluded agreements for the launch of the newer Phased Adaptive approach with Turkey, Romania, Poland and Spain has been met with sharp criticism in Moscow.

    “This is not about the radar itself — it clearly does not have capability vis-a-vis Russia. It was rather seen as further evidence that NATO proceeded with implementing missile defence plans without co-ordinating with Moscow,” Sokov said.

    “People are making the argument that the missile defence would undermine the Russian strategic potential,” Pavel Podvig, director and principal investigator of the Russian Nuclear Forces Project, tells SETimes.

    “There is no way the system can be a threat to anyone,” according to Podvig, but “the military and defence agencies [in NATO member states] are using it as a pretext for new programmes and for more money.”

    This content was commissioned for SETimes.com.

  • Turkey Welcomes NATO-Russia Military Cooperation

    Turkey Welcomes NATO-Russia Military Cooperation

    Turkey Welcomes NATO-Russia Military Cooperation

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 125
    June 30, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu attended the informal meeting of OSCE foreign ministers on the Greek island of Corfu on June 27-28. In addition to presenting Ankara’s views on the future of the European security architecture, Davutoglu also discussed Turkey’s bilateral relations on the sidelines of the meeting. The OSCE foreign ministers initiated the “Corfu Process” to discuss concrete steps that might be taken to manage European security challenges, and prepare the way for the next ministerial meeting in December. OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyanni, outlined the new security challenges facing the members. She said that in addition to traditional security issues, new threats and challenges continuously emerge. She added that the participants “concurred that the OSCE is a natural forum to anchor [an open, sustained, wide-ranging and inclusive dialogue on security], because it is the only regional organization bringing together all states from Vancouver to Vladivostok on an equal basis” (www.osce.org, June 28).

    These declarations for improving security cooperation aside, in concrete terms, the meeting served as an important test for whether the divisions created following the Russo-Georgian war could be overcome. The NATO-Russia dialogue received a serious blow due to increased tension after the war. Since then, Russia has expected the West to accept the “new realities” in the region, particularly the independence of the breakaway Georgian regions. Moreover, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has called for a treaty to launch a new Europe-wide security structure.

    Although NATO-Russia relations thawed gradually after Obama’s election, formal military cooperation remained suspended. The NATO-Russia Council met on the margins of the OSCE’s Corfu meeting, which marked the highest level contact since the Georgian war. The outgoing NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced that the parties agreed to resume military cooperation, but noted that “fundamental differences of opinion” over Georgia remained. He added that the details of the cooperation will be fleshed out through further meetings. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, however, stressed that Moscow’s decision to recognize Georgia’s two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the war is “irreversible” (www.rferl.org, June 27; www.greeknews.com, June 29).

    Davutoglu attended the OSCE discussions, and held several bilateral meetings with his counterparts and E.U. officials. Davutoglu expressed Turkey’s satisfaction with the resumption of NATO-Russia dialogue and the OSCE’s decision to develop mechanisms to deal with future security threats. He added that maintaining institutional ties is needed for the promotion of effective security cooperation (Cihan, June 29).

    Turkey’s bilateral relations with Armenia and Greece were also on Davutoglu’s agenda. Diplomatic observers speculated on whether Davutoglu would meet the Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandyan. Although former Foreign Minister Ali Babacan met Nalbandyan several times during such multilateral meetings, Davutoglu has not held an official meeting with him since being appointed. He told reporters that he talked briefly with Nalbandyan, but his busy schedule did not allow time for an official meeting. Nonetheless, the Turkish-Armenian normalization process occupied an important part of Davutoglu’s agenda during his other contacts. He met the Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy Rey who is moderating the secret talks between Ankara and Yerevan, which resulted in the announcement of a roadmap for normalization (EDM, April 29). Rey also held a separate meeting with Nalbandyan. Since the announcement of the roadmap, however, Ankara has come under criticism for stalling the process in order to allay Baku’s concerns, and no concrete steps have since been taken towards normalization. Although this long silence raised fears that the dialogue might have prematurely ended, Swiss diplomatic sources reportedly told the Turkish daily Zaman that the parties had reached consensus, and the details of the roadmap might be announced soon (Zaman, June 29).

    Davutoglu also met his Greek counterpart Bakoyanni. Following the meeting, Davutoglu said that they had a very fruitful conversation and that the two sides agreed to “change Turkish-Greek relations from an area of risk into pursuing mutual interests through high-level contacts.” However, he added that differences of opinion between both countries remain deep rooted and cannot be resolved overnight. “It is essential that the parties appreciate each other’s positions and concerns,” he added (www.cnnturk.com, June 28). Greek media interpreted his attitude as maintaining Ankara’s stubborn position, and claimed that no common ground could be reached (Milliyet, June 29). Indeed, despite their ability to break the decades-old security dilemma, several issues continue to bedevil relations between Ankara and Athens, such as the Aegean disputes, Cyprus, concerns over illegal immigrants and the condition of minorities (EDM, June 22).

    Given its policy during the Russia-Georgia war and its flourishing ties with Russia, one might argue that Turkey is one of the few countries that wholeheartedly welcomed the resumption of NATO-Russia cooperation. Though disturbed by the Russian aggression last year, Turkey expressed openly its opposition to punitive NATO measures against Russia, and instead charted an independent course to balance its ties between the West and Moscow. This foreign policy approach even led to charges that Turkey might be drifting away from its traditional alliance commitments, which it vehemently refuted (EDM, August 27, 2008). Moreover, Turkey initiated the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform to bring a permanent solution to regional problems (EDM, September 2, 2008). Now that Russia and Turkey are seeking to mend fences, this new development removes an important source of tension in Ankara’s relations with the West.

    Moreover, in retrospect, Ankara might claim credit for its own policy of balancing and prioritizing its multidimensional security cooperation, during and in the aftermath of the Georgian crisis. Ankara’s new foreign policy approach prioritizes cooperative security to respond to traditional and non-conventional threats to regional and national security, an approach which is also shared by its military leadership (EDM, June 25). However, as the persistence of some disputes with its neighbors illustrate, it provides no magic bullet for the resolution of all disputes.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-welcomes-nato-russia-military-cooperation/