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Tag: Nagorno-Karabakh

  • Karabakh Eyes Armenia-Turkey Thaw With Suspicion

    Karabakh Eyes Armenia-Turkey Thaw With Suspicion

    The recent warming in the relations of the two estranged neighbours provokes ambiguous reactions in Nagorny Karabakh.

    By Karine Ohanian in Stepanakert (CRS No. 491, 1-May-09)

    In the Armenian enclave of Nagorny Karabakh, there is only one topic of discussion right now: the possible restoration of the ties between Armenia and Turkey, opening of the borders, and what it all means for people here.

    With the Swiss playing the role of mediators, Armenia and Turkey on April 23 announced they had agreed on a so-called road map leading towards normalisation of relations, broken off by Turkey in 1993.

    Political parties, NGOs and local authorities in Nagorny Karabakh have reacted by maintaining that the problem of Armenian-Turkish relations cannot be resolved aside from the Karabakh conflict.

    They say the border issue, acknowledgement of the 1915 Armenian genocide and the problem of Nagorny Karabakh’s status must be solved in one package.

    The unrecognised republic, which has a population of about 140,000, has been demanding independence from Azerbaijan since 1988.

    At the beginning of the Karabakh conflict, Turkey – which hotly disputes the scale of the killings of 1915, as well as use of the term genocide – proclaimed itself Azerbaijan’s “elder brother” and in 1993 imposed a blockade on Armenia.

    Many Armenians continue to regard Turks and Azerbaijanis as members of the same nation, associating both with the terrible events of 1915.

    Therefore, political experts in Nagorny Karabakh view the problem of Armenia-Turkey relations and the Karabakh issue as elements of a single national issue.

    “It’s a very tricky situation for Karabakh, since we place Armenia-Turkey and Armenia-Azerbaijan relations in one bracket,” Hrachia Arzumanian, a local expert on security issues, told IWPR.

    Arzumanian says local people were surprised to hear that Armenia and Turkey had agreed on a road map towards better relations just before April 24, when Armenians traditionally commemorate the events of 1915.

    They had been expecting to hear the word genocide in a speech by United States president Barack Obama that day. He had promised to use the term during his presidential campaign. In the event, Obama used the Armenian phrase mets yeghern instead, which means great massacre.

    “Now this trump card gives them [the Americans] a good excuse to draw back from recognition of the genocide,” Arzumanian continued.

    “Another strange thing here is whether Turkey has made this step forward towards warming relations without preconditions and whether Karabakh will pay the price for this.”

    David Babaian, head of information for the Nagorny Karabakh president, Bako Sakahian, doubts the entity will be sacrificed on the altar of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation.

    On the contrary, “the thaw in Armenia-Turkey relations simply rules out the rhetoric of one-sided concessions to Azerbaijan”, he said.

    “It’s in Turkey’s interests to emerge as the main geopolitical actor in the South Caucasus; but it must do so without setting any preconditions, because this undermines that whole process,” he went on.

    The information chief noted that in the Azerbaijan-Karabakh conflict, if the balance of power tilted too far against the entity, “this threatens not only us, but Armenia too. The Armenian authorities know this, so I think the [peace] process is for the sake of all Armenians and for Karabakh’s sovereignty as well”.

    Not everyone is convinced that Nagorny Karabakh stands to benefit from a rapprochement between Yerevan and Ankara, however.

    “I am against the border reopening right now, on the eve of anniversary of the genocide, and I’m afraid that in taking this step Armenian diplomacy is losing its advantage,” David Ishkhanian, a representative of Armenian Revolutionary Federation, ARF, in Artsakh (the Armenian name for Nagorny Karabakh), said.

    Ishkhanian said Azerbaijan and Turkey remained united in pursuit of their anti-Armenian policy.

    “It’s time to reopen a ‘Karabakh front’ in diplomacy and unite the efforts of the diaspora, Armenia and Karabakh towards reaching our common goals,” Ishkhanian said.

    Meanwhile, April 24, the 94th anniversary of Armenian holocaust, was marked by extraordinarily active and crowded rallies in Nagorny Karabakh.

    People lit candles all night long while youth organisations arranged a torch-lit procession, which ended with burning of the Turkish flag – notwithstanding the protests of law-enforcement agencies.

    A large number of Nagorny Karabakh residents gathered at the memorial to the genocide victims in the capital Stepanakert in spite of rainy weather.

    “This year, especially with regard to recent political developments, I was particularly eager to take part in the commemoration of the genocide and tell the whole world about the necessity of its recognition,” Anush Gavarian, of the Club of Young Political Analysts, said.

    “It wasn’t Armenia that closed its borders with Turkey but vice-versa. Turkey acted against Armenia and still tries to speak set preconditions.”

    No fan of the current reconciliation process, Gavarian said she feared a repeat of events in the 1920s, when Russia and Turkey “decided to sacrifice Armenians and possibly the whole of Karabakh for the sake of their own interests”.

    Gavarian was referring to Stalin’s decision to place overwhelmingly Armenian populated Nagorny Karabakh within the borders of Azerbaijan.

    Karen Ohanjanian, leader of the Social Justice Party, told IWPR that local people felt uninvolved and marginalised by much of the recent diplomatic activity.

    “The public has no knowledge of the context of the road map or about the talks between Armenian and Russian presidents on the principles of Karabakh conflict resolution,” Ohanjanian said.

    Russian president Dmitry Medvedev recently met his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sargsian near Moscow to discuss energy cooperation and the Karabakh conflict.

    “I hope no preconditions are set at our expense or, as leader of one of the most powerful parties in Nagorny Karabakh, I will take steps to mobilise the masses to prevent any alteration of the Karabakh security system,” Ohanjanian said.

    “Karabakh can’t cede any territories to the detriment of national and physical security of its residents.”

    All political parties in Nagorny Karabakh have released a common statement, urging the international community to acknowledge the genocide of 1915 and recognise the independence of the entity.

    According to Vahram Atanesian, head of the Democracy faction in parliament, “recent processes show Russia and Turkey are trying to solve the problems in the South Caucasus in accordance with their own interests”.

    He urged politicians from Nagorny Karabakh to “remind the international community and the mediators that a resolution of the Karabakh conflict in line with the concept of dividing the South Caucasus into spheres of influence is unacceptable.

    “Any solution that doesn’t envisage our independence within fixed borders is inadmissible for us.”

    But Masis Mailian, chair of Nagorny Karabakh’s Foreign Policy and Security Council, sounds a more cautious note.

    He describes the joint statement of the foreign ministries of Armenia, Turkey and Switzerland on the road map as convenient for Turkey but not as necessarily detrimental to Armenians.

    “If Turkey really claims a regional leadership role, it must no longer remain captive to the senseless ambitions of Azerbaijan,” he said.

    Mailian said he hoped Ankara’s more “pragmatic attitude” towards Armenia might lead to the restoration of diplomatic ties and reopening of the borders.

    “These moves might [then] prompt Azerbaijan to soften its position, leading to more constructive view of the resolution of the Karabakh conflict,” he added.

    Ashot Gulian, speaker of the Nagorny Karabakh parliament, also supports Yerevan’s drive to heal relations with Turkey.

    “The Armenian side is apparently more interested in reopening of the borders [than is Turkey],” he noted.

    But the speaker still describes the thaw in relations as mutually beneficial, adding that it need not undermine moves to gain world recognition of the 1915 genocide.

    “The opening of the Armenian-Turkish border is necessary for both sides,” he said.

    “But since it was stated before that the reconciliation process must lack any preconditions, the efforts to achieve recognition of the Armenian genocide can’t have any influence on the normalisation of Armenia-Turkey relations.”

    Meanwhile, the numerous traders who have been enjoying the more open border regime between Armenia and Turkey for some time – and who sell products brought from Turkey in Nagorny Karabakh – follow events with interest.

    “I have been traveling to Turkey to buy goods for seven years, and frankly, I have never had any problems there,” Marta Arzumanian, a shopkeeper, told IWPR.

    An acknowledged fan of the road map , Arzumanian added, “Personally, I think reopening the border will make our work much easier and will reduce taxes.”

    Karine Ohanian is a freelance journalist in Stepanakert.

  • Turkey and Armenia’s Rapprochement Watched Carefully by Azerbaijan

    Turkey and Armenia’s Rapprochement Watched Carefully by Azerbaijan

    Turkey and Armenia’s Rapprochement Watched Carefully by Azerbaijan

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 82
    April 29, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    On April 22, the Foreign Ministries of Turkey, Armenia and Switzerland issued a joint announcement saying that Ankara and Yerevan had agreed to work toward improving their relations within the framework of a roadmap under Swiss auspices. United States’ diplomats were also closely involved in the talks which preceded the deal. Although the decision appears as a breakthrough in resolving this long-term dispute, significant obstacles remain before the completion of the rapprochement.

    The joint statement read as follows:

    “The two parties have achieved tangible progress and mutual understanding in this process and they have agreed on a comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner. In this context, a road-map has been identified” (www.mfa.gov.tr, April 22).

    Subsequent statements from diplomatic sources clarified that no agreement has been signed and that the parties agreed to continue working toward fully normalizing their bilateral relations. Although the content of the ongoing talks were not disclosed officially, the deal is likely to include establishing diplomatic representations in their respective capitals, gradual re-opening of the border, Armenia’s recognition of Turkey’s international borders, and forming a joint committee of historians to examine the disputed events of 1915 (Sabah, April 24).

    Many observers believe that if the process can be concluded successfully, it will not only end the long-standing enmity within the South Caucasus, but it also will redefine the geopolitical map of the region -helping to connect Armenia with Western interests in the region. Therefore, the decision was welcomed by the international community as a constructive step toward reconciliation. A statement from the U.S. State Department commended these efforts and called on the parties to proceed with the talks without any preconditions and within a reasonable time frame.

    Initially this was anticipated against the background of the ongoing dialogue, which had accelerated over the past year. This was given a renewed impetus following Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s historic visit to Yerevan in September 2008. In addition to their various bilateral talks, the foreign ministers of both countries also met within the context of multilateral initiatives, raising expectations that a deal could be achieved. Earlier press reports speculated that the two capitals had agreed on a roadmap in late March, but they were debating the proper timing to announce this decision (EDM, March 27; Hurriyet Daily News, March 30). After Obama’s recent high profile trip to Turkey, Turkish-Armenian reconciliation was considered imminent.

    However, following Obama’s visit, Ankara stepped back from its commitment to find a solution in an effort to allay concerns in Baku. The Turkish Prime Minister and other officials declared publicly that they would avoid steps which might damage Azerbaijan’s interests, and Turkey would not re-open its border with Armenia unless the latter ended its occupation of Azerbaijani territories (EDM, April 17). These developments rendered an agreement less likely.

    The announcement that the parties had held secret talks and committed publicly to a roadmap represented a major breakthrough. Nonetheless, there have been conflicting accounts from each side as to whether concessions were made on preconditions to start the negotiations. The continued mystery surrounding the content of the talks may prove an obstacle to a final settlement. Nationalist forces and the opposition, both within Turkey and Armenia, remain opposed to the way in which the rapprochement is being conducted -in an absence of public scrutiny. Secret diplomacy is the key to achieving a breakthrough in such protracted disputes, and supporters of normalization on both sides insist that the governments should not bow to public pressure to abandon the process (www.ntvmsnbc.com, April 26). Nonetheless, the widening gap between the governments’ rhetoric and reality risks undermining this controversial foreign policy.

    The Armenian government came under intense domestic criticism, and a minor coalition partner withdrew from the government. Similar problems within Turkey have further complicated these efforts. The AKP government proceeded with the normalization without first preparing public opinion for such a radical decision. It has also failed to keep the opposition informed. Turkish opposition parties are now calling on the government to stop conducting diplomacy behind closed doors, and inform parliament of the current standing of the talks (Ortadogu, April 28).

    Moreover, the Turkish government is criticized for failing to give clear answers as to how the Turkish-Armenian roadmap might impact on Azerbaijan. Apparently, Turkey proceeded with the rapprochement without ensuring Armenia’s response to Azerbaijan’s demands, and this stance contradicted Ankara’s earlier statements that it would protect Baku’s interests. For some Turkish observers, this is an indication that the government did not have a genuine desire for reconciliation with Armenia, but it agreed the roadmap only to remove the word “genocide” from Obama’s April 24 message (Sabah, April 27). For others, Ankara’s zigzagging shows that it is acting opportunistically, which undermines the trust of its partners (Hurriyet Daily News, April 24).

    President Gul ruled out any damage to relations with Baku due to the roadmap, and maintained that it will serve the interests of both Baku and Ankara. The Turkish government is attempting to convince Azeri politicians that its efforts toward resolving its problems with Yerevan also promote Azerbaijan’s interests within international forums (Zaman, April 24). Nonetheless, Azerbaijan’s discomfort with these developments is well known.

    After noting that he was not in a position to tell Ankara how to handle its relations with Yerevan, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, said during a visit to Brussels, that Baku reserved the right to revise its policies according to the evolving realities in the region. Referring to the conflicting news about the content of the Turkish-Armenian roadmap deal, Aliyev added “The world, the region and the Azeris want to know whether the Karabakh issue was removed from the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. This is a simple question and has a simple answer” (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 28).

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-and-armenias-rapprochement-watched-carefully-by-azerbaijan/

  • TURKEY: ANKARA-YEREVAN RAPPROCHEMENT INITIATIVE FACES PUBLIC SKEPTICISM

    TURKEY: ANKARA-YEREVAN RAPPROCHEMENT INITIATIVE FACES PUBLIC SKEPTICISM

    Yigal Schleifer 4/28/09

    Turkey and Armenia have announced they are close to reaching an agreement to restore ties and reopen their borders. But observers caution that getting to a final deal will require both Turkey and Armenia to navigate through difficult domestic and external challenges.

    “There’s no going back now, that’s for sure. Everybody wants to solve this problem now. Both countries are very committed and being very careful,” said Noyan Soyak, the Istanbul-based vice-chairman of the Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council, referring to the April 22 joint announcement that Ankara and Yerevan had agreed on a “road map” to normalize relations.

    “Now it’s a question of timing and the implementation and how it’s going to be presented to the public. That’s very important,” Soyak added.

    Turkey severed ties and closed its border with Armenia in 1993, in protest of Yerevan’s war with Turkish ally Azerbaijan in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. In recent years, diplomatic and civil society traffic between Turkey and Armenia has increased, capped off by last September’s visit to Yerevan by Turkish president Abdullah Gul to watch a football game between the two countries’ national teams. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

    In their April 22 communiqué, Armenian and Turkish leaders said that, with the help of Swiss mediation, “the two parties have achieved tangible progress and mutual understanding in this process and they have agreed on a comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner. In this context, a road map has been identified.” The brief, 95-word statement was released only two days before Armenian commemoration of the mass slaughter of 1915 that Yerevan is striving to gain international recognition as genocide.

    Although the statement was thin on details, observers familiar with the negotiations said the basic parameters of the deal involve establishing diplomatic relations, opening borders and creating a bilateral commission that will have subcommittees that address the two countries’ outstanding issues, including historical matters.

    Both countries hope that opening their borders and engaging in a dialogue will boost trade, improve regional stability and help them move beyond the genocide debate.

    Sorting out the differences between Turkey and Armenia might be the easy part, experts say. It’s the other actors involved in the issue that may prove to be difficult, says Semih Idiz, a foreign affairs columnist with Milliyet, a Turkish daily. “There are more factors that are lining up to spoil this than to bolster this. These factors have to play themselves out in the coming weeks and months and we’ll see where we go,” said Idiz.

    One significant hurdle to the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement is Azerbaijan, which insists that the Nagorno-Karabakh problem must be resolved before Ankara restores its ties with Yerevan. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The Azeris have reacted angrily to the April 22 announcement, signaling that if Turkey proceeds unilaterally, then Baku may respond by strengthening ties with Moscow. The clear implication is that Azerbaijan may be willing to reorient its energy focus, and make Russia, not Turkey its main energy-export option.

    “I don’t think Turkey expected the strong Azeri reaction. At the moment there is anger on both sides,” Idiz says. “Turkey is not going to lose Azerbaijan — there are pipelines and trade that connect the countries, whether they like it or not — but it will cool relations for a while.”

    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and other officials have tried to placate Baku by saying no final deal with be signed with Armenia until there is an agreement on Karabakh. Armenia and Azerbaijan have been engaged in slow moving negotiations over the territory’s fate as part of the Minsk Group process, which is overseen by the United States, Russia and France. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

    Hugh Pope, a Turkey analyst with the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, says linking the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border with the fate of the Karabakh issue is a mistake. “Ankara would be ill-advised to hold up rapprochement with Yerevan because of protests from its ally, Azerbaijan,” Pope said. “In fact, normalizing relations with Armenia is the best way for Turkey to help its ethnic and linguistic Azerbaijani cousins. It would make Armenia feel more secure, making it perhaps also more open to a compromise over Nagorno-Karabakh.”

    “The way the Azeris are dealing with it now is that they are telling their people that they didn’t lose the war and they are talking about military reconquest and that’s completely unrealistic,” Pope continued. “Turkey obviously has a lot of work to do to convince the Azeris that their current concept is not working and that your only way to get their land back is through the Minsk Group process.”

    Turkish and Armenian leaders, meanwhile, are also facing rising domestic anger about the possibility of a deal. In Armenia, the hard-line nationalist Armenian Revolutionary Federation Party on April 27 quit the country’s governing coalition. In Turkey, the opposition Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Republican People’s Party (CHP) have criticized the government for its overtures to Armenia, claiming it has sold out Azerbaijan.

    “This demonstrates the fragility of the agreement, in that neither Turkey, nor Armenia nor Azerbaijan has done anything to prepare their societies or shape public opinion to prepare for an agreement,” said Richard Giragosian, director of the Armenian Center for National and International Studies, a Yerevan-based think tank.

    “The same can be said for Nagorno-Karabakh, where neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan has done anything to prepare society for an agreement,” Giragosian added. “I would also stress that right now we are only talking about normalization. Normalization infers open borders and even historical commissions. But the second step is reconciliation and for that to happen we need civil society and public opinion involved, especially for reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia, because that means dealing with the genocide issue.”

    “If the public isn’t on board, we can’t sustain normalization or transform it into a deeper reconciliation,” Giragosian emphasized.

     

    Editor’s Note: Yigal Schleifer is a freelance journalist based in Istanbul.

  • The Obama Administration’s Emerging Caucasus Policy

    The Obama Administration’s Emerging Caucasus Policy

    CAUCASUS UPDATE

    In this new section, we publish the weekly analysis of the major events taking place in the Caucasus. The Caucasus Update is written by our Editorial Assistant Alexander Jackson.

     

    On April 20 the US State Department announced that Richard J. Morningstar had been appointed special envoy on Eurasian energy issues to Secretary Clinton (State Department, April 20). Morningstar will “provide the Secretary with strategic advice on policy issues relating to development, transit, and distribution of energy resources in Eurasia”. He is certainly well qualified for the job – he served as special advisor on Caspian basin energy diplomacy in 1998-1999, prior to which he served as a special advisor on assistance to the former Soviet Union.

    The appointment of the special envoy suggests that the Obama Administration’s policy on the Caspian region is finally beginning to take shape. This should come as no surprise – the area does, after all, lie between two of President Obama’s biggest foreign-policy challenges, Russia and Iran, as well as Turkey, which has been highlighted as a key US ally in the drive to rebuild America’s image in the Muslim world.

    But even in these critical areas the delay in appointing officials – which is so clear elsewhere in the US government, particularly the Treasury – is also visible. As of April 23, the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Russia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine was still vacant. Although most of the headline-grabbing policies towards Moscow so far have been initiated by President Obama or Secretary Clinton, the lack of a dedicated high-level official for Russia is alarming.

    The profile of the Administration’s other Eurasia specialists suggests that the Obama Administration does not intend to make a radical break with the Bush era. Heading the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs as a replacement to Daniel Fried will be Philip H. Gordon, a Europe and Turkey specialist (Joshua Kucera over at Eurasianet wrote an excellent profile of Gordon on March 18). However, Gordon’s confirmation has been held up in the Senate by John Ensign, a Republican with links to the Armenian lobby. Ensign has allegedly blocked the confirmation in response to Gordon’s refusal, in a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to classify the tragic events of 1915 in the Ottoman Empire as ‘genocide’. This is not something new. Similar “refusals” prevented several other key appointments in the past including the appointment of an ambassador to Armenia for a couple of years up until 2008.

    Gordon’s argument, which appears to be echoed by President Obama, is that use of the term would inflame Turkish public opinion and embolden hardliners, ruining the new Administration’s attempts to rebuild ties with Ankara. This suggests a new emphasis on pragmatism, a trend also clearly visible in efforts to rebuild relations with Russia even if this means toning down support for Georgia. 

    However, a change in tone does not reflect a wholesale change in policy. This is to be expected. The parameters of US involvement in the Caspian region – energy, counter-terrorism, peaceful conflict resolution, containing Iran and providing a bridgehead for operational support in Central Asia, are not likely to change. It was therefore logical that Matthew Bryza, the State Department’s top official for the South Caucasus and co-chair from the US in the OSCE Minsk Group, remained at his post. He has built up a solid reputation in the region and possesses extensive experience of its problems.

    As noted above, any shifts in the new Administration’s policy towards the Caspian and the South Caucasus are likely to come through changing policies towards Russia, Iran, or Turkey. President Obama’s desire to reset relations with Russia has had mixed results so far, with agreements, for instance on strategic arms reductions, alternating with aggressive rhetoric against continued cooperation between NATO and Georgia (BBC News, April 16). The US so far has shown rhetorical restraint, and has made little fuss about the retrial of the ex-Yukos boss Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

    This pragmatism is also visible in the Caucasus: the Obama Administration has held back from the unequivocal declarations of support for Georgia’s President Saakashvili that he received during the Bush Administration. Seeing him replaced with someone less bombastic towards Russia would probably be a quiet relief for Washington. As for Georgia’s NATO aspirations, the Obama administration will probably stick to the line agreed at the December 2008 summit – Georgia will be a member of NATO, but not yet.

    There are three big questions with regard to Georgia. Firstly, how much military assistance is the US willing to offer to rebuild the country’s shattered armed forces? The cost of irritating Russia is likely to outweigh the benefits of re-equipping the Georgian military with American kit. Secondly, how would the US treat a revolution in Georgia? Its reaction to 2003’s Rose Revolution was generally supportive: it strongly criticised the falsified election which triggered the protests and was quick to congratulate President Saakashvili. His replacement by a Russia hawk would provoke grave concern in Washington. Thirdly, what would the new Administration do in a new Russia-Georgia war? Speculating on such a chaotic event is of course fanciful, but the US would certainly not go any further than the Bush Administration did in last August’s war. If John McCain – a noted Russia hawk and supporter of President Saakashvili – had won the election, things might be different.

    The second big issue is Nagorno-Karabakh. Matters are largely out of Washington’s hands here. Although it co-chairs the OSCE Minsk Group tasked with resolving the conflict, Russia is far more dominant in this framework and the US has been increasingly hedged out of the peace process by Moscow and, to an extent, Ankara. Turkey’s Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, which is apparently already operating despite a lack of fanfare (RFE/RL, April 20), was specifically designed to minimise the impact of outside powers on the Karabakh process.

    Nonetheless, Ankara remains Washington’s main way of leveraging the conflict, partly through its rapprochement with Armenia. President Obama’s high-profile visit to Turkey in March was an explicit attempt to enlist the assistance of Washington’s main Muslim partner in Eurasia and a key NATO member to improve the US’s standing in the Islamic world. The appointment of Gordon indicates the new importance of Turkey, as well as a clear-headed desire to solve the Armenian issue.

    Finally, Caspian energy, Morningstar’s new portfolio. His appointment suggests that the Obama Administration is hoping for the Nabucco project to be a repeat of the successful BTC pipeline, whose inception was overseen by Morningstar in 1999. This is optimistic, but there are few people with a better chance. His European expertise (he was ambassador to the EU 1999-2001) may help to nudge Europe into more active support of Nabucco, but once again there is only so much that Washington can do here. At an energy conference in Bulgaria on April 25, Morningstar bluntly stated that Nabucco is not a panacea for Europe’s energy problems.

    Although it is still early days, the outlines of Obama’s Caucasus policy are becoming clear. A renewed partnership with Turkey and a willingness to work with Russia are the core elements. The Armenian diaspora in the US will be a clear loser from this, but Washington’s support of the Turkish-Armenian thaw will certainly benefit Armenia itself. Georgia, or more specifically President Saakashvili, may also lose out. Azerbaijan may gain if the Administration invests more energy in the Karabakh conflict, notwithstanding its limited influence there. In any case, the big question mark remains the new period of détente with Russia: if ‘pressing the reset button’ fails, the Bush-era cycle of confrontation in the Caucasus could easily resume.

  • Azerbaijan wants to know what happens

    Azerbaijan wants to know what happens

    [ 28 Apr 2009 21:58 ] Brussels. Victoria Dementyeva – APA. On Tuesday, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev held joint press conference with President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso and answered the questions of journalists.

    Head of the President’s Press Service Azer Gasimov informed about it. The Head of State also answered the questions regarding the discussions he had conducted with José Manuel Barroso about Turkey-Armenia rapprochement: “I have discussed a number of issues, including regional development and cooperation issues with the President of the European Commission. Of, course while talking about the regional cooperation, we could not leave aside of the latest developments in the region you have mentioned about. We have expressed our position on this issue many times. The position is that we never intervene in the affairs of other states and the relations between the two sovereign countries. This is the decision what Turkey and Armenia can make. It’s their choice how to continue their relations. But while touching on some comments about the historical roots of this issue, I want to remind that the border between Turkey and Armenia was closed in 1993 as a result of occupation of Azerbaijan’s territories by Armenia. This occupation is still continuing today. Today, Armenia still continues keeping the internationally-recognized territories of Azerbaijan under its occupation.

    I reiterate that we do not have such a position to create obstacle for further development of relations between these two countries or prevent it. I want to mention that we also have a right to form our policy according to the new realities in the region and we will use this right. We receive different information from different sources. According to him, one source says that “Road Map” was accepted in certain circumstances, but another source says no circumstances have been determined yet. This is a kind of word game. I think the world, region and Azerbaijani People have a right to know what happens. Is Nagorno Karabakh problem left aside of Turkey-Armenia rapprochement? This is a very simple question and we need a very simple answer”.

  • Et Tu Obama?

    Et Tu Obama?

    Letter from a Former Admirer

    sassun-2

    [sassoun@pacbell.net]

    Mr. President, how could you!

    Your candidacy was a breath of fresh air. You stood for change. You made wonderful promises and the Armenian-American community put its trust in you.

    We are now terribly disappointed because you acted not much differently than your predecessors on the Armenian Genocide issue. Your April 24 statement fell far short of your solemn pledge to recognize the Genocide.

    As a Senator and presidential candidate, you left no doubt about your intentions on this issue. You spoke about it eloquently and passionately.

    Yet, when the time came to issue your April 24 statement, we were surprised to find out that “genocide” had been replaced by “Meds Yeghern,” a clever ploy, no doubt suggested by one of your ingenious aides.

    You may want to know that “Meds Yeghern” does not mean genocide; it means “Great Calamity.” Armenians used that term before the word “genocide” was coined by Raphael Lemkin in the 1940’s. “Genocide” in Armenian is “Tseghasbanoutyoun,” which is a much more precise term than “Meds Yeghern,” in case you decide to use it in the future.

    Not only did your aides come up with the wrong Armenian word, but they failed to provide its English translation, so that non-Armenians could understand its meaning. What was, after all, the point of using an Armenian word in an English text? Did your staff run out of English euphemisms for genocide?

    Just in case your resourceful advisors think that they were the first to devise the clever ploy of replacing “genocide” with “Meds Yeghern,” let me inform you that several previous leaders have employed that same trick. Pope John Paul II used that term in 2001 during his visit to Armenia. The BBC observed that the Pontiff had said “Meds Yeghern” in order not to offend Turkey. Your immediate predecessor, Pres. George W. Bush, used the English translation of that same tricky word in his April 24, 2005 statement — “This terrible event is what many Armenian people have come to call the ‘Great Calamity.’”

    Mr. President, last year when you were seeking votes and financial support from Armenian-Americans, you did not promise them to recognize the “Meds Yeghern!” You actually told them: “As President, I will recognize the Armenian Genocide.” Moreover, you did not state that your acknowledgment of the Genocide is contingent upon Armenian-Turkish negotiations, opening Armenia’s border, war in Iraq or anything else. You made a flat out promise, with no ifs or buts.

    There are also two sets of serious contradictions in the words you used before and after your election to the presidency. In your April 24, 2009 statement, you said: “I have consistently stated my own view of what occurred in 1915, and my view of that history has not changed.” Yet, on January 19, 2008, as a presidential candidate, you had said: “The Armenian Genocide is not an allegation, a personal opinion, or a point of view.” Furthermore, on April 24, 2009 you stated: “My interest remains the achievement of a full, frank and just acknowledgment of the facts.” Yet, as a candidate, you stated that the Armenian Genocide is “a widely documented fact supported by an overwhelming body of historical evidence. The facts are undeniable.”

    Mr. President, twice in one month, both in Ankara and Washington, you made a reference to your past statements on the genocide, in order to avoid using that word as president. This is an old trick that was also utilized by Pres. George H. W. Bush (Senior). In his presidential message of April 20, 1990, Bush stated: “My comments of June 1988 represent the depth of my feeling for the Armenian people and the sufferings they have endured.” In order to avoid saying genocide, Pres. Bush, like you, made an indirect reference to that word, by mentioning his earlier remarks as Vice President and presidential candidate: “The United States must acknowledge the attempted genocide of the Armenian People in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, based on the testimony of survivors, scholars, and indeed our own representatives at the time, if we are to ensure that such horrors are not repeated.”

    Dear Mr. President, there was no need for your staff to waste their valuable time trying to come up with such ploys and verbal gymnastics. If you did not want to say genocide, you did not have to say anything at all. The Armenian Genocide has already been acknowledged by another U.S. president, Ronald Reagan, who signed a Presidential Proclamation on April 22, 1981, in which he referred to “the genocide of the Armenians.”

    Armenians actually gain nothing by having one more U.S. president reiterate what has been said before. As you know, presidential statements, just as congressional resolutions, have no legal consequence. Pres. Reagan’s proclamation and the adoption of two House resolutions on the Armenian Genocide in 1975 and 1984 have brought nothing tangible to Armenians in terms of seeking reparations for their immense losses in lives and property.

    By not keeping your word on April 24, however, you have only succeeded in undermining your own credibility in front of the American people and world public opinion. Already, the Obameter website (politifact.com) has labeled your April 24 statement as “a broken promise.” This week, as you complete the first 100 days in office, major TV networks and the press are widely reporting your broken promise on the Armenian Genocide, thus undermining the trust of the American public in your other promises.

    Finally, Mr. President, it was improper for you to exploit Turkey’s “make- believe” negotiations with Armenia by using it as a pretext for avoiding the “genocide” word in your April 24 statement. Given your high position, you must know that the Turkish government’s intent all along has been to create the false impression that its discussions with Armenia are proceeding smoothly, making everyone believe that the border would be opened shortly. Turkish leaders have been dangling that carrot in front of Armenia for many years. The fact is that, once you were elected president, Turkish officials took seriously your campaign pledge to recognize the Armenian Genocide and were told by your close aides that unless Ankara made a friendly gesture towards Armenia, you could well carry out your promise to the Armenian-American community.

    While Turkish officials, with their fake diplomatic initiatives, managed to deceive the rest of the world, including Armenia’s relatively inexperienced leaders, you, Mr. President, knew better. You went along with Turkey’s false gestures knowingly, thus bartering away your principled stand on the Armenian Genocide in order to secure Turkish participation in the Afghan war, and carry out its U.S. assigned role with respect to Iraq, Iran, and Israel.

    You must have also known that Turkey would not open its border with Armenia in the foreseeable future, unless the Karabagh conflict was resolved to Azerbaijan’s satisfaction. Using various carrots and sticks, with the connivance of Russia, which pursues its own economic and political interests in Turkey and Azerbaijan, U.S. officials succeeded in pressuring Armenia into agreeing to issue a joint declaration with Turkey and Switzerland as mediator on the eve of April 24. This declaration was a convenient cover for you to duck the genocide issue in order to appease Turkey.

    Mr. President, by compelling Armenia to sign such a declaration, you have managed to pit the Armenian Diaspora, as well as the people in Armenia against the government in Yerevan. As a direct result of that action, the ARF, one of Armenia’s influential political parties, quit the ruling coalition this week. The ARF did not wish to associate itself with a government, still reeling from last year’s contentious presidential elections, which is negotiating an agreement with Turkey that could compromise the country’s national interests and historic rights. The ARF also vehemently opposes Armenia’s announced intention to participate in a bilateral historical commission that Turkey would use to question the facts of the Armenian Genocide.

    Mr. President, in the coming days, as your administration invites Armenia’s leaders to Washington in order to squeeze more concessions from them, please realize that they can only be pressured so much before they lose their authority. As was the case with Armenia’s first president, crossing the red lines on the Genocide and Karabagh issues could well jeopardize the tenuous hold on power of the remaining ruling coalition, regardless of how many promises are made and carrots extended to them by Washington.