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Tag: Nagorno-Karabakh

  • INTERVIEW-Turkey talks on Armenia “paused” – EU mediator

    INTERVIEW-Turkey talks on Armenia “paused” – EU mediator

    * Envoy does not see new Turkey policy on Armenia changing
    * Pause should not last so long as to lose momentum-envoy

    By Michael Stott

    MOSCOW, June 17 (Reuters) – Turkey has taken a “tactical step backwards” on normalising relations with Armenia because of hostile domestic reaction to the move, the EU’s envoy to the region said in an interview.

    “A step back was taken by the Turkish side … but this is not a U-turn,” said EU South Caucasus envoy Peter Semneby. “We expect the conversations will continue.”

    After decades of hostility, Muslim Turkey and Christian Armenia announced in April a “roadmap” for re-establishing diplomatic relations and opening their shared border.

    But Ankara’s Muslim ally Azerbaijan said Armenia should first leave Nagorno-Karabakh, a mostly ethnic Armenian enclave which broke away after fighting a bloody war with Azerbaijan in the 1990s and claims independence.

    Turkey then offered support for the Azeri position, complicating further progress in talks with Armenia.

    Semneby said in the interview, conducted at the end of a visit to Moscow last week, that it was important the “pause” in the peace process between Turkey and Armenia did not last too long because of the risk that impetus would be lost.

    “The normalisation (with Armenia) became the subject of quite widespread and heated discussion in Turkey,” he added in earlier remarks to a small group of reporters. “It seems to me, this discussion became more heated than was expected.” Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan promised Azerbaijan during a visit to Baku last month that Ankara would not open its border with Armenia — closed since 1993 — until Armenia ended what he termed its occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh.

    “I see this as a Turkish tactical step backwards,” Semneby told Reuters. “But fundamentally, the new foreign policy that has been pursued by the Erdogan government, I don’t see that this policy is changing.”

    PROGRESS

    Talks on the future of Nagorno-Karabakh have been dragging on for more than a decade under the auspices of the Minsk Group linking Russia, France and the United States.

    But Armenia, whose president, Serzh Sarksyan, is from Nagorno-Karabakh, is reluctant to budge and Azerbaijan periodically threatens military intervention.

    Nonetheless Semneby believes real progress is being made.

    “It is clear that if you look at the negotiating process, it is intensifying,” he told Reuters. “We had in a month two meetings and there will be another relatively soon between the presidents.”

    The Nagorno-Karabakh war, in which up to 30,000 died, was the bloodiest of a spate of conflicts which followed the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. Armed clashes still occur regularly along the lines separating Azeri and Armenian troops.

    Asked about the risk of conflict, Semneby said it would be foolish to neglect it but he felt both sides understood the enormous costs which would be involved in any large-scale military engagement.

    “Even with this very dangerous posturing that we see sometimes and the fact that the forces are not separated and there are incidents all the time, the two sides are by now used to managing incidents,” he said.

    “If anything, the Georgia war (last year with Russia), demonstrated the risks of military engagement … it was also a wake-up call to both countries how vulnerable they are.” (Editing by Alison Williams)

    Source:  www.reuters.com, Jun 17, 2009

  • Turkish ambassador to Azerbaijan: Turkey’s aim is to liberate Nagorno Karabakh

    Turkish ambassador to Azerbaijan: Turkey’s aim is to liberate Nagorno Karabakh

    Turkey wishes liberation of the occupied lands of Azerbaijan.

    pic53108Turkey will not open borders with Armenia, unless the lands are liberated, said Turkish ambassador to Azerbaijan Hulusi Kilic, speaking at the round table on the topic “Azerbaijani-Turkish relations in the regional geopolitical context” organized in the Center of Strategic Studies.

    “20% of Azerbaijani lands have been under Armenian occupation for already 18 years. Evil wishers attempted to make the two fraternal states argue, spread information about the possible opening of the Turkish-Armenian border. Yet Prime Minister’s visit to Azerbaijan has made the situation clear.

    The world got convinced that Turkey will never leave Azerbaijan and open borders with Armenia unless the territories are liberated from occupation”, noted the ambassador.

    /ANS PRESS/
    Source: www.today.az, 12 June 2009

  • Erdogan Prioritizes Foreign Policy in State of the Union Address

    Erdogan Prioritizes Foreign Policy in State of the Union Address

    Erdogan Prioritizes Foreign Policy in State of the Union Address

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 104
    June 1, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On May 30 Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan delivered his State of the Union address, focusing on Turkey’s enhanced profile in regional diplomacy. Erdogan provided details relating to his trips to Azerbaijan, Russia and Poland, and discussed recent foreign policy initiatives, most importantly Turkey’s role in energy security. Erdogan attempted to boost public confidence in the foreign policy agenda, which he described as “very active, dynamic and intensive,” essentially offering a restatement of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government’s position on these issues (www.bbm.gov.tr, May 30).

    Erdogan highlighted Ankara’s role in energy policies, which he described as one of the most important issues on the global political agenda. He illustrated how his government had “turned Turkey’s geographic position into an effective foreign policy instrument,’ while arguing that the country’s location enables it to act as an “energy corridor and terminal” between Western markets and the Middle Eastern or Caspian energy producers. However, he noted that if Turkey fails to develop longer term planning, it will be unable to fully capitalize on these opportunities or meet its domestic needs.

    Erdogan’s views on energy geopolitics reflect the growing energy demands of an emerging economy. Although Turkey has initiated various projects to increase its domestic production and invest in alternative energy sources, its domestic energy output accounts for only one third of the country’s needs. Recent Turkish foreign policy initiatives have endeavored to turn this ongoing dependence on imports from a liability into an asset, by capitalizing on Turkey’s position between the suppliers and Western consumers.

    Erdogan maintained that the AKP government had taken important steps toward diversifying suppliers and energy transportation routes. After summarizing several existing and planned oil and gas pipeline projects across Turkish territory, Erdogan added that Turkey had become an integral part of the discussions on ensuring European energy security. He claimed that once these projects are completed, “Turkey will emerge as the fourth largest hub after Norway, Russia and Algeria, in supplying gas to Europe.” He also suggested that the Turkish port of Ceyhan will become an “important energy distribution center and the largest oil sale terminal in the eastern Mediterranean.”

    In that context, Erdogan prioritized the Nabucco project, since it will consolidate Turkey’s role within European energy security. He hoped the construction of the pipeline will begin soon and become operational by 2010: “we will sign the [intergovernmental] agreement in June,” he added. Erdogan’s statements also reflect recent changes in Turkey’s position over the stalled Nabucco project, which raised expectations that the intergovernmental agreement might be concluded in June (EDM, May 15).

    Turkey’s diplomatic initiatives in the South Caucasus were another key feature of Erdogan’s agenda. After noting Turkey’s cooperative policies within the region, he highlighted his trip to Azerbaijan. He underlined the close ties between the two nations by referring to the growing bilateral trade volume, and Turkish investment in Azerbaijan’s economic development.

    Erdogan also stressed Turkey’s continued support for international initiatives to resolve regional issues, most importantly the Karabakh question. He repeated his government’s recent stance on the Azeri-Armenian dispute by maintaining that “Turkey and Azerbaijan will continue to share a common destiny, and walk on the same path” and that Turkey “will protect Azerbaijan’s interests as much as our own interests.” He warned the Turkish and Azeri peoples against those “who work to undermine the friendship and brotherhood between the two countries through false claims” (www.bbm.gov.tr, May 30).

    He was clearly seeking to alleviate domestic concern over the normalization process between Turkey and Armenia. Nationalist forces within Turkey had successfully mobilized public opinion against the AKP government’s overtures toward Armenia. They argued that it had betrayed the interests of Azerbaijan, by separating the Turkish-Armenian normalization from Azeri-Armenian negotiations. The mounting domestic pressure and criticism from Baku forced the government to reduce the pace of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement (EDM, April 29, May 6). Erdogan’s trip to Azerbaijan as well as other recent high level contacts between the countries, has served to reassure Baku (EDM, May 14). Nonetheless, these moves toward Baku added to uncertainty surrounding the future of the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, and Turkish politicians have recently proven reluctant to comment on the issue.

    He also referred to the recent naval exercises carried out by the Turkish military in the Aegean and Mediterranean. Erdogan stressed the use of high-technology weaponry and said the successful conclusion of the exercises was proof of the country’s power of deterrence in the region. Moreover, he emphasized that the Turkish army not only ensures national defense, but it also makes significant contributions to global security.

    Erdogan’s address provided significant clues concerning Ankara’s strategic vision, which underpins the thinking of the Turkish political elite on foreign affairs. Erdogan repeated the geopolitical argument that Turkey is uniquely located in a strategic position at the intersection of several regions. He maintained that Turkish foreign policy strategies are devised with the aim of turning this position into an asset. Moreover, he reflected on how a constant search for markets and energy supplies to sustain Turkey’s economic development now drives many of the country’s foreign policy initiatives. Equally, he revealed that military power remains an essential component of Turkish foreign policy, despite the government priding itself on its effective use of soft power.

    Erdogan’s use of geopolitical rhetoric also highlighted the shifting priorities of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government. He said that since a large part of Turkey’s territory is in Asia, that part of the world naturally occupies a vital place in Ankara’s foreign policy agenda. This admission is important, since some analysts describe the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East and the South Caucasus as an indication of an ideological shift and the emergence of neo-Ottomanism – whereas Erdogan rightly explains it as a geopolitical necessity.

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-prioritizes-foreign-policy-in-state-of-the-union-address/
  • Armenia and Turkey: “A Door Opens, Slowly”

    Armenia and Turkey: “A Door Opens, Slowly”

    Hugh Pope in Transitions Online

    28 April 2009

    Transitions Online

    These two old enemies should not get sidetracked as they look for a way to come to terms.

    After nearly a century of conflict and animosity, Turkey and Armenia are now close to a breakthrough. An agreement on the table would establish diplomatic relations, open the border, and set up a bilateral commission that will include an element to address the traumatic history of the two peoples. This is a historic opportunity for normalization that the leaders of both countries should seize.

    The stalemated Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh may yet impede progress, a situation that both sides should do their best to avoid. Plans to establish diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia have already been on hold since 1993, when ethnic Armenian forces captured most of the Armenian-majority enclave of Azerbaijan and advanced into a large surrounding area of Azerbaijan. To show solidarity with its ethnic and linguistic cousins in Baku, Ankara closed a railway line that was then the only transport link between Turkey and Armenia. Ever since, Ankara’s condition for improving bilateral relations has been based on Armenian troop withdrawals from occupied territory in Azerbaijan.

    Baku is nervous this condition may be lifted and says it may respond by restricting Turkey’s participation in the expansion of Azerbaijani energy exports and selling natural gas to Russia instead. But Azerbaijan ought to reconsider its position: bilateral détente between Turkey and Armenia could ease Yerevan’s fears of encirclement and help Baku recover its lost territory better than this current stalemate, from which nobody has gained anything for the past 16 years.

    On its side, Armenia should be aware that, even if Turkey compromises by delinking the opening of the border from Nagorno-Karabakh withdrawals, any further normalization will be unsustainable if there is no progress in its disputes with Azerbaijan. Armenia and Azerbaijan should in any case adopt the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Minsk Group’s basic principles for settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which include the eventual withdrawal of Armenian forces from territories ringing Nagorno-Karabakh, the return of residents displaced during the fighting, and a referendum to determine the enclave’s status.

    A TORTURED HISTORY

    A positive trend in Turkey-Armenia relations, including a firm and public Armenian acceptance of Turkey’s territorial integrity, will also do much to encourage Turkey to be more open in its approach to the politicized debate over whether to call destruction of much of the Ottoman Armenian population in 1915 a genocide, as more than 20 countries have already done.

    Decades of Turkish denial of Ottoman large-scale massacres and forced displacement of Armenians has changed in the past decade thanks to the efforts of Turkey’s intellectual elite. Continuing to prepare public opinion for truth and reconciliation is important. Universities in Turkey and Armenia should be encouraged to pursue broader research, preferably with third-party scholars, to agree on a common set of facts and archival resources. Both sides again should modernize history books and remove all prejudice from them.

    This will help build on the progressively intense official dialogue, vigorous activity in civil society, and evolution in public opinion that have already transformed the Turkey-Armenia relationship. Turks’ and Armenians’ once uncompromising, bipolar views of history are significantly converging, showing that the deep traumas can be healed. This advance in bilateral relations demonstrates that a desire for reconciliation can overcome old enmities and closed borders. New trends are also apparent among the Armenian diaspora, where hardliners dominate the narrative, and the process has the support of outside powers such as the United States, the European Union, and Russia.

    For Turkey, there are many other benefits to opening the Armenian border. Eastern Turkish towns are looking forward to trading directly with Armenian counterparts, and to welcoming a new generation of Armenian tourists to the many Armenian heritage sites in eastern Turkey. Turkey’s image in Europe will improve and give it better arguments when it comes to the painful issue of genocide recognition resolutions in the United States and elsewhere. For Armenia, the benefits are considerable as well. Its railroads and electricity networks will have profitable new partners, trade routes will become less vulnerable, and, strategically, Yerevan will have to worry less about a threat from Turkey.

    Despite its risks and possible pitfalls, the prospects for normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations are better than they have been for decades. Most importantly, both sides see the advantages of this process. If borders are opened and trade restarts, all will gain – chiefly Armenia and Turkey but potentially Azerbaijan as well – in terms of economic strength and national security. For healthy progress on overcoming historic divisions, the focus needs to be on joint work in the present and the future.

    Hugh Pope is the Turkey/Cyprus project director of the International Crisis Group.

    Transitions Online

    Source:  www.crisisgroup.org

    [Hugh Pope is author of “Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey,” and also “Sons of the Conquerors: The Rise of the Turkic World” -HD]

  • “We Are All Armenians”

    “We Are All Armenians”

    Hugh Pope in The Wall Street Journal

    27 April 2009

    The Wall Street Journal

    Obama was right not to jeopardize reconciliation between Ankara and Yerevan.

    President Barack Obama trod a fine moral line this month between his past campaign promises to use the word genocide to describe the World War I massacres of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and his present opportunity to nurture normalization between Armenia and Turkey. But his compromise was no capitulation to the realpolitik of U.S.-Turkish strategic interests, as some Armenians may suspect and some Turks may hope. It is actually a challenge to both parties to move beyond the stalemates of history.

    The opportunity could hardly be better. After a decade of civil society outreach and growing official engagement, Armenia and Turkey jointly announced on Wednesday a Swiss-mediated deal to establish diplomatic relations and open borders. The two sides will also set up a bilateral commission to study what Armenians commemorate each April 24 as the beginning of a genocide against their people by the Ottoman Turks in 1915, and what Turkey says were forced relocations, uprisings and massacres during the chaos of World War I.

    Before implementing the deal, however, Turkey is now seeking an Armenian commitment to withdraw from territory in Azerbaijan that ethnic Armenian forces occupied in the 1992-94 Nagorno-Karabakh war. But Ankara would be ill-advised to hold up rapprochement with Yerevan because of protests from its ally, Azerbaijan. In fact, normalizing relations with Armenia is the best way for Turkey to help its ethnic and linguistic Azerbaijani cousins. It would make Armenia feel more secure, making it perhaps also more open to a compromise over Nagorno-Karabakh.

    The border closure these past 16 years has done nothing to force a settlement over the contested region. The fragility of the 1994 cease-fire truce suggests that a new way forward is imperative. Armenian normalization with Turkey will not be sustainable in the long run, though, unless Yerevan and Baku agree to the ongoing international Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, leading to Armenian troop withdrawals.

    It is this complex situation that explains Mr. Obama’s diplomatic language. In this year’s April 24 memorial statement, the U.S. president chose not to use the word “genocide” to describe the events of 1915. The Turks resent this term partly because they want their view of the events to be taken into account and partly because the term genocide has potential legal implications involving possible demands for reparations and compensation. The Swiss-brokered deal will include an Armenian recognition of Turkey’s borders, banishing the shadow of long-lingering territorial claims.

    Instead, President Obama chose the Armenian term for the atrocities, “Mets Yeghern,” meaning “Great Man-Made Catastrophe.” The U.S. Congress, where a resolution to recognize the Armenian genocide was introduced on March 17, may want to follow the president’s lead and avoid confrontation in order to give the current Turkey-Armenia normalization process a chance.

    Armenians have a point when they argue that the past decade of international resolutions and statements recognizing the Armenian genocide have forced Turkey to end its blanket denial of Ottoman wrongdoing. But such outside pressures have got no closer to making Turkey accept the term genocide itself, especially when the bills before Congress and other parliaments are clearly the result of domestic political calculations rather than high-minded deliberation.

    On the Armenian question, many Turks, including government officials now publicly express regret over the loss of Armenian life. After more than eight decades of silence, when any open discussion of what happened in 1915 was considered taboo, the Turkish public is digesting an onrush of new facts and opinions about those past events.

    The past decade has seen much convergence between Turks and Armenians in understanding the history of 1915 as academic exchanges have grown and information become widely available. A 2005 conference on the Armenian issue by the front ranks of the Turkish intelligentsia demonstrated that the country’s academic and cultural elite wants to do away with the old nationalist defensiveness. In the east of Turkey, efforts have begun to preserve the surviving Armenian heritage. Far from worsening Turkish-Armenian relations, the murder of Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink in 2007 by a shadowy nationalist gang triggered a march of 100,000 people in Istanbul carrying signs saying “We Are All Armenians.”

    Opinion polls show two-thirds of Turks supported President Abdullah Gül’s decision in September to accept his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sarkisian’s invitation for a World Cup qualifier soccer match and to become the first Turkish head of state to visit Armenia. Then in December, 200 leading Turkish intellectuals began a signature campaign to apologize for what they called the “Great Catastrophe” of the Armenians. Nearly 30,000 people have signed it so far.

    Overall, Turkey’s efforts with Armenia also fit into decade-long efforts to improve ties with other neighboring countries. Ankara has successfully normalized its once tense relations with Syria, Greece and Iraqi Kurdistan. Ankara also tried its best to bring about a reconciliation between Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

    New trends are visible in Armenia too. As pride and security in the new Armenian statehood grows, genocide recognition no longer overrides all other national interests. Issues such as the need for more economic opportunities, a broader-based regional strategy and an open Turkish border that can be a direct gateway to the West are taking center stage. Armenians increasingly spend their vacation in Turkish resorts.

    Change is also evident in the diaspora, which outnumbers the population in Armenia and has a strong influence on Yerevan. The Armenian community in France led an international campaign, joined by Canadian filmmaker Atom Egoyan and more than 100 public intellectuals, to say “Thank You” for the Turkish apology efforts. Armenian-French intellectuals are increasingly seeking to reconnect with their heritage by cultivating their links to Turkey and Turks and visiting Istanbul.

    As President Obama has recognized, it is this trend of convergence that offers the best chance in decades to open the borders between these two states, moving beyond nearly a century in which Turks and Armenians have been held hostage to frozen conflicts, nationalist confrontation and the ghosts of the past.

    Hugh Pope, author of “Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey,” is the Istanbul representative of International Crisis Group.

    The Wall Street Journal

    Source:  www.crisisgroup.org

    [Hugh Pope is also author of “Sons of the Conquerors: The Rise of the Turkic World” -HD]

  • Turkey Prioritizing its Relations with Azerbaijan

    Turkey Prioritizing its Relations with Azerbaijan

    Turkey Prioritizing its Relations with Azerbaijan

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 87
    May 6, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    The recent uncertainty surrounding Turkish-Azeri relations is giving way to a new period of optimism, ahead of high level diplomatic contacts. Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will meet Azeri officials in a bid to reassure Baku of Ankara’s intention to protect Azerbaijan’s interests during the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process.

    Turkey’s policy of conducting diplomacy within the South Caucasus in coordination with Azerbaijan, came under strain when it attempted to accelerate normalizing its relations with Armenia. Baku expressed its reservations over the rapid increase in diplomatic activity between Ankara -Yerevan which it perceived as “developing at the expense of Azerbaijan.” Azerbaijani officials tried to understand the content of the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement and how this might affect Turkish-Azeri relations (EDM, April 29, May 4). At the height of the discussions on President Obama’s April 24 address, the possibility that Ankara might ignore Baku’s sensitivities was often discussed within both countries. In addition to the reaction of Azerbaijani officials, such speculation added to public outrage toward the AKP government’s policies, both within Turkey and Azerbaijan. While delegations of Azeri parliamentarians and civil society organizations visited Turkey to garner political support for their plight, their Turkish counterparts also traveled to Azerbaijan in order to express solidarity with their Azeri brethren. Azeri deputies frequently appeared on live discussion programs on Turkish TV, seeking to mobilize public opinion, exerting additional pressure on the AKP government.

    Against this background, the Turkish government is now refocusing its attention on addressing those concerns. At the same time, the Turkish press reported that Baku has toned down its criticism of Ankara’s policies toward Armenia. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev wants to reinforce bilateral ties, ensuring that he is kept informed about the progress on Turkish-Armenian rapprochement and securing greater leverage over Ankara’s policies toward Yerevan. Toward that end, Aliyev has decided to send a special envoy to Turkey (Referans, May 2).

    Turkey’s first attempts to reach out to Baku came on May 4 when Azerbaijan’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Araz Azimov, visited Ankara and held talks with Turkey’s newly appointed Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. Since it was Davutoglu’s first meeting after assuming office two days earlier, it had a symbolic meaning -demonstrating the value that Davutoglu attaches to Turkish-Azeri ties. In addition to exploring ways of improving bilateral relations through more frequent and high profile meetings between the leaders of the two countries, they also exchanged opinions on regional issues (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 4).

    As a further boost to Ankara’s policy to regain Baku’s confidence, Erdogan will visit Baku on May 12-13, and then meet Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on May 16 (Anadolu Ajansi, May 4). While commenting on his forthcoming trip, Erdogan sought to deflect recent criticism from Baku and domestic opposition parties. He maintained that his government did not deserve such heavy criticism, which he characterized as an unnecessary reaction to Turkey’s policy of rapprochement; especially concerning Ankara’s intention to re-open its border with Armenia. Erdogan also emphasized that some Azeri officials’ statements had hurt Ankara. He added that the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations will also serve Baku’s interests and he will seek to remove any misunderstandings during his visit next week (ANKA, May 5).

    Moreover, Erdogan’s plan to meet Putin reflects Ankara’s belief that Russia remains a significant stakeholder in the resolution of Turkish-Armenian-Azeri problems and must act in concert with Russia, in order to advance its interests within the South Caucasus. Russia is one of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group working to resolve the Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and has been mediating in talks between Baku and Yerevan.

    President Gul is taking additional steps toward addressing concerns over Ankara’s policies from Baku and domestic opposition parties. Gul met the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party Deniz Baykal, who had lambasted the recent moves towards rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia, arguing that Erdogan had betrayed Baku. Gul briefed Baykal about the developments within the South Caucasus in an attempt to influence Turkish public opinion (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 5).

    Gul also plans to hold two separate meetings with Aliyev and the Armenia’s President Serzh Sarksyan during the Eastern Partnership and Southern Corridor meetings in Prague on May 7-8 under the sponsorship of the Czech Republic, which currently holds the EU presidency (Anadolu Ajansi, May 5). In addition to discussing issues including energy security, the Prague summit will provide an opportunity to consider the resolution of problems between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Baku and Yerevan frequently conduct part of their diplomatic negotiations on the sidelines of such multilateral forums. In preparation for the Prague summit the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, met the foreign ministers of both countries separately in Washington. Clinton expressed her support and encouragement for these bilateral talks ahead of the Prague summit (www.cnnturk.com, May 5).

    The Gul-Aliyev meeting might equally hold symbolic meaning, marking an improvement of ties between Ankara and Baku, after their recent tension. Previously, Aliyev had declined to participate in multilateral meetings where he might meet Gul, spurning Gul’s invitation to attend the Alliance of Civilizations platform in Istanbul (EDM, April 8) and later cancelling his participation in an energy summit in Sofia, attended by Gul (Takvim, April 23). The Turkish press speculated that Aliyev was deliberately avoiding these meetings to convey his discomfort over Ankara’s failure to consult him on the Turkish-Armenian talks. Gul consistently denied any such row, and even claimed that he kept Aliyev informed about developments by telephone (www.ntvmsnbc.com, April 28). A face-to-face meeting between the two leaders might remove the basis for any future speculation, as well as mend strained Turkish-Azeri relations.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-prioritizing-its-relations-with-azerbaijan/