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Tag: Nagorno-Karabakh

Turkish Opposition Remains Skeptical of Government’s “Armenian Opening”

Turkish Opposition Remains Skeptical of Government’s “Armenian Opening”

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 169

September 16, 2009

By: Saban Kardas

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met the leaders of opposition parties as part of his attempt to brief them about recent developments in Turkish foreign policy, and solicit their support for the government’s “Armenian opening.” On August 31, Turkey and Armenia announced the details of a roadmap for the normalization of bilateral relations. The parties initialed two protocols regulating the steps to be taken toward the resolution of contentious issues. To allay concerns among domestic opposition parties and in Azerbaijan, the Turkish government emphasized that the final decision would rest with parliament and that Baku’s views would be taken into account during the parliamentary approval process (EDM, September 8).

Since accomplishing the objectives of normalization would require bold steps and political determination on the part of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, this new initiative is denoted as the “Armenian opening,” echoing the recent Kurdish opening. Given the necessity of parliamentary approval, the focus of the policy on Armenia has shifted to the domestic political processes.

Davutoglu, at the urging of Prime Minister of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has taken time out from his heavy international diplomatic agenda to win over the opposition parties for the normalization policy. Davutoglu met Deniz Baykal, the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), and the leaders of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Felicity Party (SP) Numan Kurtulmus and Masum Turker respectively. However, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli, who has been the most outspoken critic of the Armenian opening, refused to meet him. Earlier, Davutoglu met Parliamentary Speaker Mehmet Ali Sahin, and he is scheduled to have additional meetings with the leaders of parties that received at least 1 percent of the popular vote in the July 2007 parliamentary elections. He also met the opposition leaders in May, following his appointment as foreign minister (Today’s Zaman, September 16).

One common theme emerging from Davutoglu’s contacts is that the opposition leaders unequivocally state that any progress in Turkish-Armenian relations needs to be contingent upon the protection of Azerbaijan’s concerns over Karabakh. In response, Davutoglu sought to reassure them that normalization with Armenia would not come at the expense of harming ties with Azerbaijan, and that Baku was being informed about the progress of Turkish-Armenian talks (Anadolu Ajansi, September 15).

Another common theme is the skepticism of the opposition parties toward the contents and the form of the Armenian opening, especially the involvement of foreign actors. They continue to view the opening as an agenda imposed upon Turkey by external forces, and believe that the main benefactor of the process will be Armenia.

For instance, SP’s Kurtulmus maintained that according to popular perceptions, the process seemed to be driven by Armenia, and that Turkey appeared to be only a passive player. He asked Davutoglu to correct this image. He also expressed his reservations about the committee of historians, and maintained that the committee would be unlikely to reach a decision disproving Armenian genocide claims. Kurtulmus also criticized the government’s recognition of Switzerland as the mediator between Turkey and Armenia, arguing that as a country that punishes the denial of the “Armenian genocide” claims, Switzerland could not be considered as impartial in this issue. DSP’s Turker, also shared similar concerns (Cihan, September 15).

The main opposition leader Baykal raised the most vocal criticisms. During the joint press brief after meeting with Davutoglu, Baykal noted that the CHP considered foreign policy issues as “state policies” that require a national consensus. He added that his party’s decision to meet Davutoglu was meant to make a contribution to state policy, and should not be interpreted as representing “support” for the government’s agenda. He stated his disappointment with the government’s overall approach to this issue, and reiterated his earlier position that the normalization agenda is imposed upon Turkey. “There is a process and a roadmap underway which is beyond the knowledge of the opposition parties. Now, through these contacts, the government is not asking ‘Let us discuss Turkey’s interests, and formulate [the policies] together.’ The government is saying to us. ‘We are given a roadmap. We decided to implement it; come, help us realize this roadmap.’ This is not an effort to formulate a policy. This is an effort to find support for a program that is already formed,” Baykal objected (ANKA, September 15).

Baykal also characterized the two protocols as “traps.” He argued that although the protocols satisfy Armenian concerns by laying out the details of Turkey’s re-opening of the border, they fall short of meeting Turkish demands regarding Armenia’s recognition of the Kars Treaty on defining the Turkish-Armenian border, or the renunciation of its policy of having its genocide claims recognized worldwide, and ending its occupation of Karabakh. He expressed concern that the protocols offered no safeguards against the possibility that after Turkey opens the border, Armenia might later renege on its promises. Therefore, he demanded that the government must refuse to sign the protocols. Baykal also speculated that the government would sign the protocols with Armenia on October 13 (Hurriyet, September 16).

Both the Turkish and Armenian governments have to tackle domestic opposition, in addition to the dilemmas of overcoming differences of opinion and building trust in the bilateral talks. Indeed, the Turkish-Armenian declarations recognize the challenges of obtaining broad-based social and political support, and give the parties six weeks to engage in domestic discussions before the protocols are forwarded to parliaments for final ratification.

Given the strength of nationalistic sentiments in Turkey, one challenge for the AKP government has been to present the Armenian opening as a “national” policy, rather than a parochial agenda promoted by the AKP, or a project externally imposed upon Turkey. The six-week deadline has provided an impetus for each government to stimulate debate on the issue, but as the Turkish case suggests this deadline is too unrealistic to facilitate any meaningful and genuine democratic deliberation on a dispute mired in historical memories and current geopolitical conflicts. Davutoglu’s meetings further show that a new conflict is looming over the AKP’s foreign policy when the Armenian opening comes before parliament.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-opposition-remains-skeptical-of-governments-armenian-opening/

September 17, 2009
Turkish Press Reacts to Turkish-Armenian Normalization

Turkish Press Reacts to Turkish-Armenian Normalization

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 163

September 8, 2009

By: Saban Kardas

On August 31 a joint statement issued by Turkey and Armenia announced that both had agreed to start talks on the establishment of diplomatic ties and the development of bilateral relations. The parties initialed two protocols to regulate these issues, and the consultations on these will be finalized within six weeks before being forwarded to their national parliaments for ratification (www.mfa.gov.tr, August 31). The announcement generated a heated debate on the future of Turkish-Armenian relations as well as its implications for Azerbaijan and the involvement of other international actors.

The content of the protocols show that the parties built on the progress they had achieved by April, which was interrupted by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s intervention to allay the concerns of Azerbaijan. Following intense bilateral contacts, secret diplomacy and pressure from the United States and European countries, Turkey and Armenia announced a roadmap for normalization in April, the contents of which remained undisclosed. Due to mounting domestic opposition and protests from Azerbaijan, Erdogan reiterated unequivocally that the progress of Turkish-Armenian relations would be contingent upon Armenia’s constructive attitude in its dispute with Azerbaijan. To relieve Azeri concerns, Erdogan emphasized that Turkey would not proceed with normalization, without an end to the Armenian occupation of Karabakh (EDM, May 14). Although there were concerns that the normalization process might have come to a premature end, the parties maintained their secret dialogue facilitated by Switzerland (EDM, June 30).

By reiterating their commitment to the peaceful resolution of regional disputes, the parties implicitly recognize the Karabakh issue, but the protocols make no mention of it, nor set it as a precondition for opening the Turkish-Armenian border. In taking this step despite this “missing element,” the Turkish government again raised concerns as to whether it might accelerate the rapprochement with Armenia by decoupling it from the Karabakh issue. Consequently, opposition both domestically and in Azerbaijan expressed discomfort with these developments. In response, Erdogan reconnected the two processes politically, by arguing that the ratification of the protocols would depend on the resolution of Karabakh issue, reflecting Ankara’s concern to keep Baku on board (Vatan, September 2).

The leverage Azerbaijan exerts over Turkish foreign policy led to different interpretations from the Turkish press. The nationalist media continued to express their unconditional support for Azerbaijan’s position and criticized the government’s recent initiatives (Ortadogu, September 3)

Many mainstream commentators, however, maintain that returning to the status quo ante might be difficult, and that instead of seeking to restore Karabakh through military means, Baku should focus on diplomatic measures to free the occupied Azeri territories, and in return grant greater autonomy to the area and open a corridor between Armenia and Karabakh (Milliyet, September 3). Although Erdogan might ideally prefer a maximalist position on the return of Karabakh, other actors within the Turkish government also seem to be ready to settle for such an arrangement recognizing the new reality in the region. In fact, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and President Abdullah Gul are interested in seeing the process through and opening the border by the end of the year (Radikal, September 2), despite Erdogan’s occasional nationalistic outbursts.

Other commentators view the rapprochement as a partly American project and believe that both Turkey and Azerbaijan are urged, if not pressured, by the Obama administration to solve their problems with Armenia. They even suggest that the mediation services provided by Swiss diplomats might only represent a cover for American facilitation between the Turkish and Armenian delegations, which is partly shared by the opposition parties, mainly the Republican People’s Party (Milliyet, September 4; Hurriyet, September 2). The pro-government press, in contrast, challenges these arguments and maintains that searching for foreign actors behind such initiatives reflects a problematic attitude on the part of the Turkish opposition. It presents these recent developments as an achievement of the AKP government and treats them as affirmation of Turkey’s expanding role in regional diplomacy (Star, September 4).

Explaining the normalization with reference to the involvement of outside actors inevitably raises questions about the motivations of “outsiders.” At this juncture, the role of energy issues is emphasized by the Turkish media. There is a perception that the process is promoted by the West as part of its energy policies. They speculate that Turkish-Armenian normalization is promoted in order that Armenia might emerge as an alternative route to Georgia for the future transportation of Caspian basin resources (Milliyet, September 3).

Such analyses inevitably ignore the issue of the Russian position. There is already a process underway between Azerbaijan and Armenia toward the resolution of the Karabakh dispute, facilitated by Russia and supported by the United States. Although the Russian side claims that it is playing a constructive role, the Turkish media maintains some skepticism toward Moscow’s intentions. There are media reports maintaining that Russian intelligence found out about the secret talks between Ankara and Yerevan and passed this information to Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, which led him to distance himself from Turkey in April (Milliyet, September 3). If such reports are correct, they might indicate Russian efforts to sow seeds of distrust between Baku and Ankara, and undermine policies to integrate Yerevan into a Western orbit.

It is unclear whether Aliyev was aware in advance of the signing of the recent protocols, but Ankara apparently made efforts to inform Baku. Indeed, it has been a growing concern for Ankara to comfort Baku about the secret talks with Yerevan, and regain Azeri confidence since the bitter episode in April. A few days before the recent announcement to sign the protocols, Erdogan spoke to Aliyev on the telephone and sent two special envoys to Baku to brief him on the progress in Turkish-Armenian talks (Zaman, August 28). Azerbaijan’s Ambassador in Ankara Zakir Hashimov said that Davutoglu reassured his Azeri counterpart that the border would not be opened before the resolution of the Karabakh issue (Hurriyet Daily News, September 6).

In the days ahead, a new domestic and foreign policy challenge will confront the AKP government, as it seeks to refine the details of the normalization with Armenia. A breakthrough in Azeri-Armenian talks might untie the knot, but it remains to be seen whether the international and regional pressures on Baku and Yerevan will produce such an outcome.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-press-reacts-to-turkish-armenian-normalization/

September 9, 2009
Thaw Praised in Enclave

By Karine Ohanian in Stepanakert (CRS No. 509, 04-Sep-09)

Politicians in Nagorny-Karabakh have given a cautious welcome to the thaw in Armenian-Turkish relations, especially since the status of their own self-declared state was not included in the published “protocols”.

Ankara and Yerevan announced on the last day of August that, with two protocols, they had agreed the terms under which diplomatic relations between them could be restored, and the border opened, although the precise details of the agreement have not been released.

“We are closely following Armenian-Turkish relations, or more accurately, the true desire of Armenia to create these relations,” said Bako Sahakian, president of Nagorny-Karabakh.

Turkish politicians had previously linked a restoration of ties to a resolution of the status of Nagorny-Karabakh, which has declared independence but is internationally considered a part of Azerbaijan, a close ally of Turkey. Karabakh’s Armenian inhabitants have governed themselves independently since Baku’s troops were driven out in the early 1990s, and Sahakian said he was still concerned by Turkey’s position.

“This cannot inspire much hope for the creation of honest and true relations,” he said.

Other figures believed the thaw could mean Ankara had abandoned its insistence on Karabakh being handed back to Baku’s control.

“An important positive element of the protocol is the lack of a direct connection between the normalisation of Armenian-Turkish relations and the regulation of the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict, and the clear separation of these two conflicts,” Masis Mailian, a former candidate for the presidency and the current chairman of the Civic Council for Foreign Policy and Security, told IWPR.

“Azerbaijan, as a result of the Armenian-Turkish process, will become more compliant in the Karabakh talks process, which will allow a peace deal to be reached more quickly.”

Karabakh’s leaders will be closely watching the next six weeks, when the protocols will be discussed in the two countries, then submitted to the parliaments for approval. The removal of Karabakh from the discussions, as well as the lack of a mention of the Armenian genocide question has made the documents more likely to be accepted. At least half a million Armenians died when they were driven out of their homes in Ottoman Turkey in 1915 but Turkey denies it was genocide.

“It is currently too early to say what this possible Armenia-Turkey agreement could give to the Karabakh regulation process; it all depends on geopolitical developments. I welcome this thaw, but stress that attempts to connect Armenian-Turkish relations with regulating Karabakh-Azerbaijan are unacceptable. This cannot be done at the cost of Karabakh or the genocide,” said David Babaian, head of the president’s information service.

Karine Ohanian is a freelance journalist and a member of IWPR’s EU-funded Cross Caucasus Journalism Network.
The terminology used in this report was chosen by the editors.

September 6, 2009
The call of the pipes: Putin in Turkey

15:48 07/08/2009

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Andrei Fedyashin) – Things are now so mixed up in the pipe and gas business that it is difficult to see where pipes begin and politics ends.

Vladimir Putin’s one-day visit to Ankara was balanced on precisely such pipe and politics considerations. Plus the peaceful atom: Russia will now be building for Turkey its first nuclear power plant near Akkuyu on the Mediterranean coast.

To judge from the scale and trend of the documents signed, Ankara will soon turn into a huge energy-handling hub between Russia and the European Union in the southern sector. Now in the north we have Germany and Nord Stream, and in the south, Turkey and South Stream. Two friendships, Nordic and Ottoman.

Turkey has long been a regional heavyweight, and Porte’s added “gas weight” will only strengthen it in this role. In recent years Ankara has been increasingly urging Russia to join in a regional forum it conceived for solving crucial Caucasian issues.

The Caucasus war greatly puzzled Ankara, which has close economic ties both with Georgia and Russia. As a NATO country, Turkey “quietly” supported Georgia, to which it sent its military instructors and is now supplying equipment. But Turkey does not want to lose, let alone reduce or weaken, its ties with Russia either, especially in the current hard economic times. After all, Moscow satisfies 64% of Turkey’s requirements in gas, and can deliver even more.

If that is not enough, let us bear in mind that more than one million Russians visit Mediterranean Turkish resorts every year, leaving more than $1.42 billion there. Moscow is Turkey’s top foreign economic partner – last year Turkey’s trade with Russia totaled $38 billion. In the next four years, Ankara hopes to bring the figure to $100 billion. One should not mess about with such things.

By offering itself as a regional platform for settling Russia’s “Caucasian problems,” Ankara is perfectly aware that the Kremlin will not conduct parleys with Mikheil Saakashvili.

But the Turks, offering their mediating services, very much hope to get Russia’s help in an area where such help cannot be dispensed with: That is a settlement in Nagorny Karabakh and normalization of relations with Armenia. In its turn, this means the involvement of Azerbaijan, which Turkey is also proposing to include, “on the kinship principle,” in the membership of the Caucasian regional forum. Unless the Nagorny Karabakh issue is settled, Turkey will be unable to normalize its relations with Armenia.

Turkey is being prodded in the same direction by the European Union, or rather Turkey’s hope for admission to the EU (one of Brussels’ conditions is settlement of relations with Armenia), and its own regional economic interests. But the way to a Turkish-Armenian diplomatic thaw is blocked by Azerbaijan, which has long staked out its claim: It will not welcome Turkish diplomatic overtures to Armenia as long as the Nagorny Karabakh issue remains unsolved.

Only Russia, and this is something everyone realizes, can push Armenia to a softer stance on Nagorny Karabakh. True, Russia will never nudge Armenia to surrender all its interests in Nagorny Karabakh, implying its return to Azerbaijan with broad autonomy rights. That is especially true in the wake of recognizing Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence. So, whether we like it or not, our friendship will only thrive on gas, oil and the peaceful atom.

South Stream will make Russia and its customers less dependent on transit countries, in particular, Ukraine, because Turkey will not be a transit country technically. In 2013, the pipe will transport 63 billion cubic meters of gas. Investments in the project are estimated at 25 billion euros. Contractors are Russia’s Gazprom and Italy’s ENI, acting on a parity basis. In fact, South Stream’s inauguration ceremony was an affair for three: Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi also arrived for the occasion.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

August 8, 2009
JOINT LETTER TO PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA

President Barack Obama
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, D.C., 205000

August 4, 2009

Dear President Obama,

Last year’s war between Georgia and Russia punctuated the continued threat to peace and security in the South Caucasus arising from unresolved territorial conflicts that have spanned more than two decades since the fall of the Soviet Union. Recently, several Iranian officials openly threatened Azerbaijan for hosting Israeli President Shimon Peres in Baku. Similarly, four UN Security Council resolutions demanding that Armenian forces withdraw and cease the occupation of Azerbaijani lands since 1993 have achieved little for the displaced one million refugees and IDPs. All of this adds to the urgency of reaching a sustainable peace based on the fundamentals of international law and human rights, or, as you have stated earlier, “a lasting and durable settlement of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.”

With stronger support from the United States and increasing involvement of the Russian Federation, the peace process has produced some momentum at the latest meetings of the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia. U.S. Mediator Matt Bryza emphasized the productive position and leadership demonstrated by Azerbaijan during the negotiations, particularly Azerbaijan’s many concessions to Armenia and the Armenian people despite Armenia’s aggression in and military occupation of western Azerbaijan. A peaceful settlement, which involves respect for territorial integrity of the states in the region, repatriation of the displaced communities, opening of all borders and communications, security guarantees for both Azerbaijani and Armenian communities in occupied regions of Azerbaijan, and withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijan, and nothing less, is necessary to achieve a lasting and durable settlement.

The South Caucasus, a strategic global juncture, holds great promise for regional and global peace and prosperity. Yet the region’s potential has been disrupted and disable by two decades of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia’s own development has been paralyzed as a result of its self-imposed isolation from major regional projects. More than one million Armenians have left Armenia due to poor government, poor economics, and poor services. While the Azerbaijani residents of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and other Armenian-occupied regions of Azerbaijan have suffered ethnic cleansing, displacement, and destruction of personal and cultural property, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh continue to live in economic and political uncertainty. Armenia’s occupation of Azerbaijan has been costly in many ways.

A lasting and durable peace settlement would bring about a major positive change to the South Caucasus. The Azerbaijani-Georgian partnership has already shown what can be reached when the parties work towards regional cooperation. Should the Armenian leadership demonstrate productive pragmatism, it can help integrate the nation with the economic and democratic future of the region securing a peace and prosperity for its people. Such a future would include open communications and borders, including the Turkish-Armenian border, which was closed in response to Armenia’s invasion and occupation of the Azerbaijani region of Kelbajar, outside of NK region, in 1993. A lasting and durable peace would advance U.S. interests as it provides for lasting stability in a strategically important region where the United States requires solid friends. Significantly, as the value of the Caspian hydrocarbon resources increase for Europe’s energy security and the South Caucasus transport corridor serves as the key conduit for access to Afghanistan, a lasting and durable peace in this region becomes an even higher priority. In addition, helping Armenia and Azerbaijan to reach a settlement would demonstrate the new Administration’s commitment to the new foreign policy of global engagement and provide a positive tangible result for U.S.-Russian cooperation.

Therefore, on behalf of the Azerbaijani-American and Turkish-American communities, we support and encourage your Good Office to intensify U.S. efforts towards reaching a just peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan based on United Nations Security Council resolutions and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, and to seize this historic opportunity. While we recognize the significant pressures that bear from special interests opposed to peace for a variety of reasons, including nationalist and religious ones, who have previously succeeded to undermine peace efforts, we hope that America’s vision for the South Caucasus is informed by its national interests and its relationship with strategic partners in the region. Thank you.

Sincerely,

U.S. Azeris Network (USAN)
Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA)
Azerbaijani-American Council (AAC)
Federation of Turkish American Associations (FTAA)
U.S.-Azerbaijan Council (USAC)
U.S. Turkic Network (USTN)
Cultural Center of Caucasus Jews (CCCJ)
Azerbaijan Turkey America Foundation (ATAF)
Houston Baku Sister City Association (HBSCA)

Cc: The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Vice-President of the United States of America
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton, United States Secretary of State

www.USAzeris.org
www.FTAA.org
www.Azeris.org
www.ATAA.org
www.USTurkic.org
www.HoustonBaku.com
www.ATAF-Foundation.org

August 4, 2009
Aliyev and Sarksyan Meet in Moscow

Aliyev and Sarksyan Meet in Moscow

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 139

July 21, 2009

By: Saban Kardas

Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev met his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sarksyan in Moscow on July 17 in their latest round of reconciliation talks. Turkey has closely followed the talks between the two presidents, facilitated by the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, hoping that the resolution of the Karabakh issue might also facilitate Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.

The meeting was the sixth between Aliyev and Sarksyan since their first meeting in June 2008. As one of the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk group, Russia accelerated its peacemaking efforts toward finding a solution to the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Medvedev hosted the two presidents in Moscow for a second time in November 2008, and since then the two leaders have met in Zurich, Prague and St. Petersburg (Trend News, July 17).

The meeting came in the context of growing international interest. Other major actors had also expressed their support for this mechanism, hoping that it might facilitate a solution. The presidents of Russia, France and the United States issued a statement during the G8 summit in Italy the previous week, and urged all sides to step up their work toward the resolution of the remaining differences on Karabakh, on the basis of the principles outlined in the 2007 Madrid agreement (www.osce.org, July 10).

Representatives from the other two co-chairs of the Minsk group and the OSCE representatives were also in Moscow. On July 17, the Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov and his Armenian counterpart Edward Nalbandyan met with the Minsk group co-chairmen Yuri Merzlyakov (Russia), Bernard Fassier (France) and Matthew Bryza (United States), as well as the OSCE Chairman’s Special Envoy Andzey Kasprzyk. The Azeri and Armenian presidents also held bilateral talks, and later the ministers as well as the co-chairs joined them. The following day, the leaders held trilateral talks with the participation of Medvedev.

No documents were signed at the meeting and no official statement was issued. Medvedev’s spokesperson told reporters that the parties had a chance to discuss in detail the remaining issues. He added that he is optimistic that “it will be possible to settle the Karabakh conflict in the foreseeable future.” According to Armenian diplomatic sources, the presidents instructed their foreign ministers to work in close cooperation with the Minsk group co-chairs to organize a high-level meeting on Karabakh in the fall. The co-chairs of the Minsk group reiterated their support for the ongoing talks. They added that they would continue their contacts in the region. The two presidents might meet again in September, they added (Trend News, ITAR-TASS, www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 18).

On July 20, Mammadyarov said that some progress was achieved in Moscow. He added that the parties agreed on some principles of a possible solution, but that further work was required on the precise details. He maintained that both sides were working toward a schedule for withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the occupied Azeri territories. Once this is achieved, it will be possible to discuss other issues such as the repatriation of refugees, the rebuilding of the region and determining the status of Karabakh. However, he ruled out independence for Karabakh by saying “whatever its status, Karabakh will remain part of Azerbaijan” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 20).

Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, the head of the E.U. troika delegation visiting the region, said in Yerevan that the E.U. supported the Minsk group’s activities and was ready to assist in the implementation of an agreement. However, in implicit defiance of Mammadyarov’s statements, Nalbandyan said that the “return of any territories to Azerbaijan was not discussed in Moscow.” He also added that Armenia did not officially endorse the Madrid principles (ANKA, July 20; Trend News, July 21).

Despite the contradictory accounts from Yerevan and Baku, it appears that the removal of Armenian forces from the occupied Azeri territories has been on the agenda for some time. Prior to the meeting in Moscow, Aliyev had explained the details of the plan to a Russian TV station (www.cnnturk.com, July 8). According to the Turkish press, the two presidents in fact discussed the specifics of Armenian withdrawal from the occupied Azeri territories, even including the deployment of international forces. Whereas, the Armenian side insisted on Russian forces, the Azeris requested Turkish troops. Turkey reportedly expressed its readiness to send troops, if the parties agreed on such a solution (Zaman, July 19). However, no official Turkish diplomatic source has corroborated this proposal.

Turkey has been supportive of the process led by the Minsk group and Russian initiatives. Ankara reportedly plans to contribute to the initiatives of the Minsk group through a new round of contacts with Baku and Yerevan. Nonetheless, currently the earliest direct talks between Yerevan and Ankara to discuss Turkish-Armenian normalization are scheduled in September at the U.N. General Assembly (Sabah, July 20).

After intensive diplomatic traffic between Turkey and Armenia, which resulted in the announcement of a roadmap for normalization in April, Ankara had to slow down the process to satisfy concerns in Baku. During his visit to Baku in May, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan underlined clearly that Ankara would not proceed with its Turkish-Armenian rapprochement before a solution over the Karabakh issue could be achieved. Although Ankara came under criticism for stalling its dialogue with Yerevan, diplomatic sources maintain that secret talks between the two countries are continuing (EDM, June 30).

Commenting on these recent developments, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu denied that Turkish-Armenian normalization was stalled. He said that “[Turkish-Armenian and Azeri-Armenian] processes would affect each other positively.” Though declining to set a date on the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border, he expressed his hope that positive developments might take place before the end of the year (Hurriyet Daily News, July 20).

Erdogan took a very clear position, saying that he will maintain his support for Azerbaijan over the Karabakh dispute. It would be difficult for him to step back from this, given the enormous costs of such a move to his popularity at home and in Baku. Therefore, before taking any steps to revitalize its relations with Yerevan, Ankara hopes that the recent initiatives could produce at least partial progress between Baku and Yerevan.

https://jamestown.org/program/aliyev-and-sarksyan-meet-in-moscow/

July 21, 2009