Tag: Nagorno-Karabakh

  • Nagorno-Karabakh: Getting to a Breakthrough

    Nagorno-Karabakh: Getting to a Breakthrough

    INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP – NEW BRIEFING

    Baku/Yerevan/Tbilisi/Brussels, 7 October 2009: Armenia and Azerbaijan should endorse a document on basic principles to end stalemate on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by the end of the year, or they will face an eventual return to full-scale hostilities.

    Nagorno-Karabakh: Getting to a Breakthrough,* the International Crisis Group’s latest policy briefing, examines the two-decades-old conflict and concludes there is reason for optimism that the political stalemate can be broken in today’s more supportive regional environment. However, it also warns that both governments and the international community must step up their efforts, as the status quo is increasingly untenable.

    “Although a deliberate military offensive from either side is unlikely in the near future, the ceasefire that ended active hostilities fifteen years ago is increasingly fragile”, says Lawrence Sheets, Crisis Group’s Caucasus Project Director. “There has been a steady increase in the frequency and intensity of armed skirmishes that could unintentionally spark a wider conflict”.

    The dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh intensified following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, the two countries are now in substantial agreement on the framework of basic principles first outlined by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group in 2005. This framework revolves around three fundamental principles: non-use of force, territorial integrity and self-determination.

    As a first step to conflict resolution, Presidents Sarkisian of Armenia and Aliyev of Azerbaijan must prepare their publics for a possible peace deal. At present, there is a danger of a backlash, especially among Armenians, that could derail any basic principles agreement. After this agreement is signed, Nagorno-Karabakh’s de facto authorities and the Nagorno-Karabakh Azeri representatives should be part of subsequent peace talks. Crisis Group recommends the use of a multi-layered format, including direct contacts between Azerbaijan and Karabakh Armenians to help promote dialogue.

    The international community, in particular the U.S., France and Russia as co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, should intensify efforts to encourage Armenia and Azerbaijan to formally endorse the basic principles document and then open negotiations on a conclusive peace accord. The co-chairs should take advantage not only of their own productive collaboration, but also of current positive movement towards Armenia-Turkey rapprochement.

    “There are encouraging signs the sides are inching towards agreement”, explains Sabine Freizer, Crisis Group’s Europe Program Director. “But differences still remain between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the specifics of a final deal, most seriously over Nagorno-Karabakh’s final status, and there is mutual distrust between the societies. Though a definitive settlement may still be years away, this window of opportunity to make genuine progress and support sustainable regional peace must not be missed”.

    To listen to Lawrence Sheets, Crisis Group’s Caucasus Project Director, discussing the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, please click here for the podcast.

  • Turkish- and Armenian-American reactions to protocols

    Turkish- and Armenian-American reactions to protocols

    From: Javid Huseynov [javid@azeris.com ]

    I think the reactions shown by Turkish-American and Armenian-American organizations to protocols reveal some important structural differences worth noting.

    Turkish-American organizations (much like Azeri-American ones, by the way) remain strongly in line with the concurrent foreign policy of originating nation (i.e., Turkey, Azerbaijan, etc.). This is the most fundamental deficiency in diaspora, inability to have an independent decision making mechanism based solely on community’s view and thinking. Ultimately, such approach visibly turns diaspora into another tool of executing the foreign policy of home government, makes organizations dependent (including economically) on foreign country, lowers their significance in influencing the politics of the host nation, the United States.

    The reaction of Armenian diaspora shows exactly the opposite. It’s a strong and independent decision-making unit, able to influence the foreign policy of the United States, independently of Armenia, with or without its existence, and Sarkisian calculated this well too. Unlike Turkish reaction, the Armenian approach is driven by ideology and “soft power” not by state’s foreign policy, which makes Armenians so much more successful in achieving their goals on every front. And I hope both Turkish- and Azeri-American organizations can learn from this experience and have their own voice in future.

  • Azerbaijan: the next flashpoint between the U.S. and Iran

    Azerbaijan: the next flashpoint between the U.S. and Iran

    by Maksud Djavadov

    “The most widely propagated idea by the state controlled media in Azerbaijan is not the liberation of occupied Karabakh but the “unification” of Tabriz with the Republic of Azerbaijan: essentially, the partition of Iran. In the coming years, if not sooner it will not be surprising to witness Azerbaijan as the next U.S. theatre from which political, social and economic pressure will be exerted on Iran. The U.S. knows that Azerbaijan is Iran’s vulnerable spot.”

    Iran has played an important role in the crucial events affecting global politics for at least 3,000 years. At no time in history, however, has Iran been more important in global politics than since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Some historians might contend that during the rule of Cambyses II in 530 bc, Persia was at its peak because of the vast territory it controlled and the great power it wielded. But the Persia of those days was only first among equals. Indeed it controlled vast territory but it was a pagan state ruled by an absolute monarch with a hierarchy of social values and a political system similar to most other existing states at the time.

    Thus, it was simply part of an established political order lacking its own unique character and an alternative system. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 is radically different because it challenged the Western-imposed political order by demolishing many key pillars of its control through the implementation of an alternative system of governance. At no time since the victory of the Islamic Revolution has Iran been more of a challenge to the colonial powers, especially the U.S., than it is now. This challenge manifests itself at different levels globally. The next most probable point where this confrontation will heat up will be the Republic of Azerbaijan.

    The U.S.-Iran confrontation in Afghanistan, Lebanon and Iraq must be briefly analyzed in order to understand the potential for a new flashpoint. Before its invasion and occupation of Afghanistan the U.S. did not have direct military presence in regional conflicts. Prior to 9/11 the U.S. was mostly involved through its proxies, namely the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and Central Asia. The only occasion when it became directly involved in a Middle Eastern conflict before the invasion of Afghanistan was the Gulf War of 1991, but even then Washington tried to reduce its involvement by making other countries pay 85% of the total war bill of $61 billion and by not marching on Baghdad.

    After 9/11, the U.S. became a direct party to conflicts in the region. Many US officials thought that after invading and occupying Afghanistan, that borders Iran, Washington would gain the upper hand vis-a-vis Iran. In reality, the U.S. weakened its most powerful anti-Iranian partner in Afghanistan, namely the pro-Wahhabi movement of the Taliban. After the fall of the Taliban, Iran quickly moved into Afghanistan by investing over $600 million into the reconstruction of Afghanistan and strengthening the Hizb-e Wahdat Party, which shares similar ideals to that of Islamic Iran. Tehran also engaged selected elements in the newly formed Afghan government and secured some support. Through careful use of ideological and cultural bonds that unify the people of Iran and Afghanistan, Tehran managed to isolate the U.S. both politically and socially in Afghanistan. Washington tried to correct and compensate for its failure to pressure Iran through Afghanistan by occupying Iraq.

    Official thinking in Washington was that by deposing Saddam Husain so easily and installing a new government, the U.S. would whip up Arab and Kurdish nationalist sentiment to exert pressure on Iran. Again the U.S. failed to see the strong Islamic bond between Muslims in Iraq and Iran. Elimination of the former U.S. ally Saddam, created a political, economic and social vacuum in Iraq. Islamic movements who shared the same political and existential ideals of Islamic Iran quickly filled the vacuum. Once again, the U.S. became isolated politically and socially and had to rely entirely on its military to pressure Iran. However, after targeting those forces the US deemed “pro-Iranian” and triggering Islamic resistance spearheaded by the Mahdi Army, the US realized the limits of its power due to its political and social isolation and halted its military offensive. The U.S. desperation forced its military and intelligence services to establish links with former al-Qaeda members. This new structure came to be known as al-Sahwa whose main purpose was and remains countering political movements in Iraq that are not hostile to Iran. This also backfired and the mighty “superpower” was for the first time accused by its allies in the region of incompetence due to its inability to fully control former al-Qaeda members. Nevertheless, the U.S. has not given up on its desire to dominate the region.

    The U.S. launched its most desperate attempt to make up for losses against Islamic Iran by supporting Israel’s July 2006 aggression in Lebanon. Again, the US plan implemented by the Zionist military suffered a historic defeat at the hands of Hizbullah’s valiant resistance. The U.S. is currently trying to make up for its defeat by instigating armed conflict in Lebanon. This too is doomed to fail because of Hizbullah’s popularity among all segments of Lebanese society owing to its courageous defence of Lebanese territorial integrity.

    The foregoing review brings us to the next point where another U.S.-Iran conflict, this time in Azerbaijan, is a strong possibility. No two countries bond more strongly religiously, culturally and historically than Iran and Azerbaijan. Although ethnic Azeris inhabit a large part of Iran where they have always played a key role in various aspect of the Islamic Republic, Tehran appears not to have paid as much attention to securing its interests in Azerbaijan as it did in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon. Azerbaijan is the only country where Iran’s interests are vulnerable while the U.S. has struck deals with Baku to secure its interests. Azerbaijan alone openly supports the presence of forces hostile to Islamic Iran despite no direct U.S. military presence on its soil. Anti-Iranian forces are protected by the current regime in Azerbaijan. All other strategic locations bordering Iran that host opponents of Islamic Iran, also host U.S. military personnel because the proxy governments alone are not able to fully secure American interests. This is not the case in Azerbaijan.

    Over the years, the U.S. has built two radar stations in Azerbaijan. The first is located north of Baku while the second is near Azerbaijan’s southern border with Iran in the region of Astara. Officially, the American sponsored radars are designed to monitor the movement of weapons of mass destruction; unofficially, they are there to spy on Iran. The current Azeri regime has been a staunch supporter of U.S. strategic advances in the region. Baku supported the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by contributing troops and therefore conferring legitimacy on the fiction that the US had international support. Apart from siding with Iran’s political rivals, the Azeri regime that maintains tight control over the media has also been bolstering anti-Iranian sentiment inside Azerbaijan for over a decade.

    The most recent example was the anti-Iranian propaganda played out on September 3, 2007. From this date onward, major Azeri media sources continuously reported “breaking news” about alleged Iranian citizens serving with armed gangs of Armenian nationalists in Karabakh. The propaganda portraying Iran as an ally of the occupation forces in Karabakh is an old stunt, but one that has a strong effect. Iran has so far not countered even such false reports by simply reminding the Azeris that it was Iran that aided the arrival of 1,300 Afghan volunteers to fight for Azerbaijan during the war with Armenia. The Azeri regime blocks all information that may show Iran as a friend of the Azeri people.

    On the political landscape in Azerbaijan, Iran lacks the kind of allies it has in Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon. Most socio-political NGOs in Azerbaijan and the so-called political “opposition” groups are funded by the U.S. and its allies. However, any contact between Azeri socio-political movements with Islamic institutions in Iran is immediately branded as espionage by the Baku regime and the people involved are punished harshly. In addition to the government’s systematic policies against Islamic Iran, the regime has also managed to create a strong sense of Iranophobia in a small, but significant portion of Azeri society.

    The U.S. knows that unlike Iraq where Iran has the support of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and Lebanon where Hizbullah is a committed ally of Iran, in Azerbaijan Iran has few allies to counter U.S. pressure. Perhaps there is inadequate realization in Tehran that the Azeri government has supported all of the strategically important U.S. policies aimed at exerting pressure on Iran. The most widely propagated idea by the state controlled media in Azerbaijan is not the liberation of occupied Karabakh but the “unification” of Tabriz with the Republic of Azerbaijan: essentially, the partition of Iran. In the coming years, if not sooner it will not be surprising to witness Azerbaijan as the next U.S. theatre from which political, social and economic pressure will be exerted on Iran. The U.S. knows that Azerbaijan is Iran’s vulnerable spot.

    Source: usa.mediamonitors.net/, October 4, 2009)

  • Opening of Turkish-Armenian borders now contradicts Azerbaijan’s national interests: FM

    Opening of Turkish-Armenian borders now contradicts Azerbaijan’s national interests: FM

    Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov spoke with Trend News in an exclusive interview.

    pic56003

    Trend News: How do you assess your visit to the U.S.? With whom were the meetings held, and what the main issues were discussed?

    Elmar Mammadyarov: The UN General Assembly, which is in the focus of the world community and international organizations, provides good opportunities for the various meetings and discussions of bilateral relations. As part of my current visit to New York, besides the events as part of the UN General Assembly, I met with representatives of the United States, Austria, Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, Portugal, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Slovenia, Cuba, Switzerland, the European Commission, Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and also took part in events by several organizations such as GUAM, BSEC and the OIC. At the meetings, I discussed the current bilateral relations with these countries, as well as prospects of cooperation.

    During the visit, I had an opportunity to meet with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and twice with Foreign Minister of this country Ahmet Davutoglu. The meetings focused on the bilateral relations between the two countries in all fields, including the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

    Q: You were scheduled to meet with representatives of the OSCE Minsk Group so that to organize a meeting between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Chisinau. How do you assess this meeting?

    A: Right, I met with the representatives of the OSCE Minsk Group to discuss the current state of  the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as to prepare the forthcoming meeting between the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

    Q: In an interview with Vesti TV channel, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan said that the refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh have a  full legal right to return to their homes, but only after determining the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan takes the opposite position – definition of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh is possible only after the repatriation of the refugees and internally displaced persons.

    A: We have repeatedly expressed our stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenian troops must withdraw from the occupied lands of Azerbaijan. It is necessary to create favorable conditions for repatriation of internally displaced persons to the lands liberated from the occupation, including to Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as to restore communications. Only after this, the issue of status can be considered.

    Q: The new U.S.  administration has made some changes to regional policy in the South Caucasus and the Middle East. In which manner could it impact strategic relations between Azerbaijan and the United States, as well as the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?

    A: As part of my visit to New York, I met with U.S. Secretary of State. This was the second meeting with Hillary Clinton this year. Friendly and constructive talks focused on the Azerbaijan-U.S. relations in all directions, and the strategic partnership between the two countries was welcomed.

    The resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has become one of key issues of the discussions. Mrs. Clinton re-emphasized the inadmissibility of preserving the status quo in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, noting the importance of resolving this conflict to ensure peace and security throughout the region and reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the speedy settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

    Q: The world’s leading countries, especially the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairing countries, are showing great interest in the reopening of the Armenian-Turkish border. What do you think, how can opening of the border impact resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?

    A: We have an unambiguous attitude on this issue. Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993 after the occupation of Kalbajar by Armenian troops. The Azerbaijani lands have not been liberated so far. Opening of the border under such circumstances is contrary to the national interests of Azerbaijan. The senior Turkish officials have repeatedly made clear that these two issues are inter-related and the border with Armenia will not open until the liberation of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

    Q: The U.S. co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group has been replaced. Can one expect any new initiatives by Robert Bradtke?

    A: As I have already noted, in New York I met with the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs. At this meeting, I met with the American Co-Chair, Robert Bradtke. He also took part in my meeting with U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton.

    As I said, at the meeting, the Secretary of State reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the speedy resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and noted the inadmissibility of preserving the status quo and the importance of the conflict resolution for peace and stability throughout the region. I believe that Bradtke’s diplomatic experience will contribute to the resolution of the conflict.

    Q: During your speech at Columbia University, you spoke about the significance and an important role that Azerbaijan has in the region, as well as the U.S.-Azerbaijan strategic relations. How do you assess the current state of relations between the two countries?

    A: There is a strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and the U.S. The U.S.-Azerbaijan cooperation, covering many fields, successfully developed both bilaterally and multilaterally.
    Q: Does Azerbaijan have a target to join NATO? If not, why is the defense system being created in accordance with the standards of the alliance?

    As the country which shares the European and Euro-Atlantic values, Azerbaijan has become one of the first states joining the NATO Partnership for Peace Program. Currently, we are developing cooperation with NATO through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

    Cooperation with this organization is also continuing under the Individual Partnership Action Plan. This cooperation has contributed greatly to raising the level of training of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, law enforcement, border guards, the agencies, involved in preventing and eliminating consequences of emergency situations.

    http://www.today.az/news/politics/56003.html

  • Azerbaijan sends note to Turkey

    Azerbaijan sends note to Turkey

    25 September 2009 [17:09]

    The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry has presented a note to the Turkish Embassy in Azerbaijan.

    “The note stated that a while ago journalists of the Turkish NTV TV channel, who were issued accreditation in the so-called “Foreign Ministry of the Nagorno-Karabakh”, visited the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. The fact disappointed Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry strongly opposes such visits to country’s occupied territory and requests the Turkish Foreign Ministry to investigate this fact and take measures,” Foreign Ministry’s Spokesperson Elkhan Polukhov said.

    http://www.today.az/news/politics/55915.html

  • Turkey’s Erdogan Urges Progress On Nagorno-Karabakh

    Turkey’s Erdogan Urges Progress On Nagorno-Karabakh

    AB710225 B18C 45DA 855B 5561C8970F28 w393 s

    Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian (left) with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in January

    September 22, 2009

    ANKARA (Reuters) — Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan has urged international mediators to speed up efforts to resolve a dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave as Ankara aims to normalize ties with long-time foe Armenia.

    Talks on the future of Nagorno-Karabakh, disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan after a war in the 1990s, have been dragging on for more than a decade under the auspices of the Minsk Group linking Russia, France, and the United States.

    Turkey has said it hopes to open its border with Armenia by the end of the year under a protocol to establish diplomatic ties, but further progress has been hampered in the past by the frozen Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

    Turkey closed the frontier in 1993 in solidarity with Muslim ally Azerbaijan, which was fighting Armenian-backed separatists in the breakaway mountain region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

    “Erdogan said the Minsk group that is co-presided by the U.S. has an important role in contributing to the improvement of the relations with Armenia and asked the group to increase their efforts,” Anatolian quoted him as saying on September 22.

    Erdogan made his comments in New York, where he traveled to attend the UN General Assembly. Turkish newspapers have reported that Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu will meet his Armenian counterpart on the sidelines of the gathering.

    Anticipation over an Ankara-Yerevan thaw has been growing ahead of a planned visit by Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian to Turkey on October 14, when he is due to attend the return leg of a World Cup qualifying football match between the two countries.

    Sarkisian has said he will not travel to the game, the first leg of which Turkish President Abdullah Gul watched last year in Yerevan, unless the border has reopened or there are clear signs it is about to open.

    Turkey and Armenia have no diplomatic ties and share a history of animosity stemming from the mass killing of Armenians by Ottoman Turks during World War I.

    Turkey denies the 1915 killings amounted to genocide, but has agreed to set up a commission of international experts on the issue under the protocol it signed with Armenia.