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Tag: Nagorno-Karabakh

  • U.S. Intelligence Chief Warns Of Karabakh War

    U.S. Intelligence Chief Warns Of Karabakh War

    EB32266F 5F5E 4F47 A0AE 203E15688B8D w527 sU.S. — U.S. National Intelligence Director Dennis Blair testifies during a hearing before the Senate (Select) Intelligence Committee February 2, 2010 on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC.

    03.02.2010

    The likelihood of another Armenian-Azerbaijani war for Nagorno-Karabakh has increased as a result of the U.S.-backed rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey, according to America’s top intelligence official.

    “Although there has been progress in the past year toward Turkey-Armenia rapprochement, this has affected the delicate relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and increases the risk of a renewed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh,” Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair warned late Tuesday in written testimony to a U.S. Senate committee.

    Blair also warned of broader security and stability threats persisting in the South Caucasus. “The unresolved conflicts of the Caucasus provide the most likely flashpoints in the Eurasia region,” he said. “Moscow’s expanded military presence in and political-economic ties to Georgia’s separatist regions of South Ossetia and sporadic low-level violence increase the risk of miscalculation or overreaction leading to renewed fighting.”

    The United States has strongly supported and at times mediated in the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement that began nearly two years ago and led to the signing last October of two “protocols” envisaging the normalization of relations between the two historical foes.

    Azerbaijan has condemned the agreements, saying that an open border with Turkey would only discourage Armenia from seeking a compromise solution to the dispute. Azerbaijani leaders have also continued to threaten to win back Karabakh and surrounding Armenian-occupied territories by force.

    The authorities in Armenia and Karabakh have dismissed the war threats. International mediators have also disapproved of them, repeatedly urging the conflicting parties to refrain from bellicose rhetoric.

    U.S. diplomats have seemed confident, at least until recently, that chances for renewed large-scale fighting in Karabakh are slim. Speaking to RFE/RL in October 2008, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried said the danger of another war “has somewhat receded because the [August 2008] war in Georgia reminded everyone in this region how terrible war is.” “War is no joke,” Fried said. “It’s a bad option.”

    https://www.azatutyun.am/a/1947893.html
  • TURNING POINT IN TURKISH AMERICAN PUBLIC ADVOCACY

    TURNING POINT IN TURKISH AMERICAN PUBLIC ADVOCACY

    ATAA’s Statement on H.Res. 252

    Dear Turkish Americans and Friends of Türkiye:

    House Resolution 252 passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) by a vote of 23-22 after HFAC Chairman Howard Berman extended the voting period thrice and forced reluctant legislators to show up and vote in favor of the resolution.

    The passage of H.Res. 252 represented ethnic politics at its worst, and made a mockery of the U.S. legislative, judicial and foreign policy processes. Indeed, United States foreign policy regarding Turkey, Armenia and the broader region was hijacked by ultra-nationalist Armenian politics in a few Congressional districts.

    The recalling of Turkish Ambassador Namık Tan was an expression of Turkey’s disappointment in what now appears to be a contradiction in the United States’ position on Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. It was also an expression in defense of the dignity of the Turkish people to whom the U.S. now appears to have denied fair and just treatment by this prejudicial resolution plagued with blatantly libelous falsifications.

    At this stage it is difficult to expect the Turkish people to support the ratification of the Turkey – Armenia protocols, as the people’s interest now turns to whether U.S. President Obama will attempt to rehabilitate U.S. credibility in Turkey and among Turkish Americans, or permit further deterioration in a Proclamation on April 24. Furthermore, an alleged agreement between the White House and HFAC not to bring H.Res. 252 to a floor vote appears empty, if not also deceptive, as confidence in the ability of the Resolution to actually pass Congress is meager.

    House Resolution 252 signals a turning point in Turkish American public advocacy. The 23-22 vote reflects the growing efficacy of the Turkish American public advocacy network, including its infrastructure, technical abilities, critical mass, cooperation, solidarity, and resolve. In 2007, H.Res. 106 passed the HFAC 27-21, after the late Congressman Tom Lantos voted in favor of the motion, and was followed by three standby members. In 2005, H.Res. 316 and 195 passed overwhelmingly 42-7 and 35-11, respectively. This is just the beginning, as an awakening Turkish American community and a resurging Turkish Republic take command of their destiny for “Peace at Home, Peace in the World.”

    I thank the Turkish American community, particularly YOU – the individual Turkish American and friend of Türkiye — for your tremendous efforts. In solidarity within diversity, over 5000 letters were submitted through the ATAA-FTAA-TCA campaign. ATAA visited most of the HFAC members at least once at the local level and three times on Capitol Hill. On March 3, 2010, the ATAA and FTAA joined in solidarity on Capitol Hill, as we visited each HFAC member one final time.

    I also thank the Azerbaijani, Crimean, Turkmen, Turcoman, Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Uighur American communities for their support. The Azerbaijan Society of America in New York – PaxTurcica in Los Angeles – USAN in Washington, DC supported the ATAA-FTAA-TCA letter campaign and Congressional visits. In addition, the Azerbaijanian American Cultural Alliance traveled from Texas to show its support at the March 4 HFAC Hearing.

    I thank the Turkish Coalition of America (TCA) for their invaluable support and guidance.

    Finally, I thank the ATAA Executive Committee, Board of Directors and Board of Trustees, and ATAA’s dedicated staff for their excellence in representing the Turkish American community in opposition to H.Res. 252 and in support of U.S.-Turkish relations. They have done this in parallel with four major ATAA projects, including Census 2010, SayTurk, Turkish American Broad Advocacy Network (TABAN) grassroots program, Turkish Student Outreach, and www.MediaWatchNow.com.

    Our task is not finished, though. In fact, it might be said that it is just starting now. First, we should build on this momentum to maintain our contact with our representatives to educate them on matters concerning Turkey USA relations, so that such “ill-informed” resolutions will not be supported in Congress. We should establish lasting bonds of friendship for future. Next, we should revive, reinvigorate, and grow our component organizations to reach out and touch every Turkish American in 50 states, to deter future misguided attacks on our heritage.

    Together we can do it and ATAA is here for you.

    Gunay Evinch
    President
    Assembly of Turkish American Associations

    ***

    Sevgili Türk Amerikalı’lar ve Türkiye’nin dostları:

    Sözde Ermeni soykırımı ilgili yasa tasarısı (H.Res. 252) Meclis Dı İlikiler Komitesi (HFAC) den 22 hayır ve 23 evet oyu alarak geçti. HFAC Bakanı Howard Berman oylama süresini 3 kez uzatıp oy vermekte isteksiz gözüken üyeleri zorlayarak tasarı lehine oy vermelerini sağladı.

    Etnik siyasetin en kötü ekilde temsil edildiği H.Res. 252 oylaması, Amerikan, yasama, yargı ve dı ilikiler süreçlerini maskaralık haline getirmitir. Nitekim, Amerika Birleik Devletleri’nin, Türkiye, Ermenistan ve bölge ülkelerle olan dı politikası aırı milliyetçi Ermenilerin Kongre seçim bölgelerindeki politikaları yüzünden gasp edilmitir.

    Bir hayal kırıklığı ifadesi olarak, Türk Büyükelçisi Namık Tan’ın geri çağrılması, Türk-Ermeni yakınlamasını destekleyen ABD için bir çeliki gibi görünüyor. Bu aynı zamanda, Türk insanının onurunu savunmanın da bir göstergesi olarak da algılanabilir. Bu sakıncalı karar tasarısı ile A.B.D adil tavrından uzaklamı duruyor.

    Bu aamada, Türk halkından Türkiye ve Ermenistan arasındaki protokolleri deskteklemesini beklemek oldukça zor görünmektedir. imdi merakla beklenen, Bakan Obama’nın, Amerika’nın Türkiye ve Türk Amerikalılar için güvenirliliği yeniden sağlamak için çaba gösterip göstermemesi ya da 24 Nisan resmi açıklamasını yaparak ilikileri daha da zor bir hale getirip getirmemesidir. Ayrıca, H.Res. 252 tasarısının oylamaya getirilmemesi konusunda Beyaz Saray ve HFAC arasında bir karar sağlanamamakla birlikte bu tasarının Kongre’ den geçip geçmemesi u an için belirsiz gözükmektedir.

    H.Res. 252, Türk-Amerikan ortak savunmasında dönüm noktasının sinyallerini vermektedir. 23-22’lik oy sonucu, altyapı, teknik becerileri, kritik kütle, ibirliği ve dayanıma da dahil olmak üzere Türk-Amerikan ortak savunma ağının artan etkinliğini yansıtmaktadır. 2007 yılında, H. Res. 106, Kongre üyesi Tom Lantosun lehte geç oyuyla HFAC de 27-21 oyla geçmiti. 2005 yılında H. Res. 316 ve 195 sırasıyla 42-7 ve 35-11 lik ezici bir çoğunlukla geçti. Bu sadece bir balangıç, aynı zamanda Türk Amerikan toplumu için büyük bir uyanı ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin Yurt ta ve Dünya da Barı” için komutayı ele almasıdır.

    Türk Amerikan toplumuna, özellikle de “Siz” değerli Türk Amerikalılara ve Türkiye’nin dostlarına göstermi olduğunuz muazzam gayretten dolayı teekkür ediyorum. Farklılıklar içinde dayanıma ilkesinden yola çıkarak, ATAA-FTAA-TCA olarak yürüttüğümüz mektup kampanyası kapsamında 5000’in üzerinde mektup Kongre’ye gönderildi. ATAA, ABD Temsilciler Meclisi Dı İlikiler Komisyonu’ndaki üyelerin ofisleri yerel düzeyde en az bir kere ve Capital Hill’de birkaç kez ziyaret edildi. 3 Mart 2010’da ATAA ve FTAA birlik olup tüm Komisyon üyelerinin ofislerini ziyaret ettik.

    Azeri, Kırımlı, Türkmen, Özbek, Kazak, Kırgız ve Uygur toplumlarına bizden desteklerini esirgemedikleri için teekkürlerimi iletiyorum. New York’taki Azerbaycan-Amerikan Toplumu, Los Angeles’daki Pax Turcica, Washington DC’deki Amerikan-Azeri Network ATAA-FTAA-TCA mektup kampanyasında ve Kongre ziyaretlerinde bize hep destek oldular. Bunun yanı sıra, Azerbaycan Amerikan Kültür Birliği 4 Mart’ta Dı İlikiler Komisyonu’ndaki oturumda Teksas’tan gelerek bizi yalnız bırakmadılar.

    Ayrıca, Amerika Türk Koalisyonu’na çok kıymetli destek ve katkılarından ötürü ükranlarımı sunuyorum.

    Son olarak, ATAA İcra Kuruluna, Yönetim Kuruluna ve Mütevelli Heyetine ve kendini iine adamı olan profesyonel ekibine, Türk Amerikan toplumunu 252 yasa tasarısına karı en iyi ekilde temsil ettikleri için ve Türk Amerikan ilikilerine yaptıkları katkılardan dolayı teekkür ediyorum. Ayrıca bir diğer önemli nokta, ATAA ekibinin bütün bu çalımaları dört büyük ATAA projesi ile birlikte yürütmü olmasıdır. Bunlar sırasıyla, Nüfus Sayımı için balattığımız Saytürk kampanyası, TABAN projesi, Türk Öğrenci Eriim programı ve medyada Türkiye hakkında çıkan yazıları takip ettiğimiz www.MediaWatchNow.com’ dur.

    Daha görevimiz bitmedi. Hala iin baında sayılırız. Bu gibi temelsiz tasarıların Kongre’de destek bulmasını önlemek için, öncelikle yapmamız gereken; mecliste temsilcilerimizle ilikilerimizi sürdürmek ve onları Türk Amerikan ilikilerini ilgilendiren meseleler üzerinde eğitmek olmalıdır. Gelecek için sağlam temelli ilikiler kurmamız gerekir. Bundan sonra, mirasımıza yapılan asılsız saldırıları engellemek; canlanma, yenilenme ve yerel derneklerimize ve 50 farklı eyalette yaayan her Türk Amerikalıya ulamakla mümkün olacaktır.

    Beraber baarabiliriz ve ATAA her konuda sizin yanınızda.

    Gunay Evinch
    Bakan
    Türk Amerikan Dernekleri Kurulu

    ***

    Assembly of Turkish American Associations
    1526 18th St., NW Washington, DC 20036
    Ph: 202.483.9090 Fx: 202.483.9092
    www.ataa.org, assembly@ataa.org

  • How Gorbachev Contributed to the ‘Karabakhization’ of Azerbaijani Politics

    How Gorbachev Contributed to the ‘Karabakhization’ of Azerbaijani Politics

    Paul Goble

    Vienna, January 19 – Twenty years ago this week, Mikhail Gorbachev sent troops into Azerbaijan to crush the popular front there, but what the Soviet president achieved by his actions was the further radicalization of Azerbaijan and the “Karabakhization” of Azerbaijani politics, a situation that continues to this day, according to a leading Moscow commentator.
    In an article posted on the “Novaya politika” site yesterday, Sergey Markedonov says that the unwillingness of the Soviet government to force Armenia to return Karabakh to Azerbaijan and its dispatch of Soviet forces to Baku “became a transforming moment in the process of the national self-determination of Azerbaijan” (novopol.ru/text80474.html).
    Both Moscow’s failure to defend the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan SSR and the brutality of its forces in the Azerbaijani capital changed everything, Markedonov continues. Until then, Azerbaijan “had lacked a powerful dissident movement,” unlike Georgia or the Baltic states.
    However, “the striving of the Kremlin to refrain from the adoption of a one-sided resolution of the ‘Karabakh question’ and the refusal of Moscow to fulfill its political contract to guarantee Azerbaijani territorial integrity pushed Baku onto the path of the search for national independence and sovereignty.”
    And that drive, one based on a near universal popular consensus that Karabakh must be reintegrated into Azerbaijan, meant that nationalism rather than communism became the republic’s dominant ideology. Indeed, Markedonov says, it is possible to speak of “Karabakhization” as “the foundation” for Azerbaijan’s statehood.
    In response to the Soviet invasion, 45,000 Azerbaijanis quit the ranks of the CPSU, and Heidar Aliyev, who had been forced from the Politburo, reemerged as a national leader by speaking to a meeting of Azerbaijanis and others at the permanent representation of his republic in Moscow,
    For him and for all Azerbaijanis, Markedonov continues, “problem number one for independent Azerbaijan” was the question of the restoration of the territorial integrity of the country, because its military defeat by the Armenians had had such “a serious influence on the self-identification of Azerbaijanis.”
    In the judgment of the Moscow analyst, “Heidar Aliyev’s return to Azerbaijani politics” allowed the country to overcome ethnic separatism at home from the Talysh, Lezgins, and Avars) and “also to minimize the threat [to predominantly Shiite Azerbaijan] from the side of radical Islam.”
    After 1993, Markedonov says, “Baku easily dealt with both military risings and ‘rose revolutions,’ but “the main thing that Aliyev was able to achieve is an adequate assessment of the military and foreign policy resources of an independent Azerbaijan and on the basis of this assessment to form a sensible strategy.”
    Aliyev recognized that using military force to resolve the problem was not a promising strategy and thus was willing to reach a ceasefire accord with Armenia, and he also understood, Markedonov says, that Baku needed to “overcome the unique diplomatic vacuum around the republic” by reaching out to all major powers and portraying Azerbaijan as “a civilized state.”
    In recent years, many people have asked how long this “breathing space” and “concentration” can continue, Markedonov notes, but he argues that however emotionally powerful appeals to recover Karabakh may be, Azerbaijan would not profit from any use of military power anytime soon.
    First of all, the Moscow specialist on the Caucasus says, “both Armenia and unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh are serious competitors,” something that dashes any hopes for “a blitzkrieg.” Second, the unsuccessful use of force could threaten the stability of political arrangements in Azerbaijan, as the case of Elchibey in the early 1990s shows.
    And third, any military campaign “would create problems not only of a military but also of an informational-political character.” Overnight, such actions would “destroy the image of Azerbaijan, which has been carefully cultivated over the years, as a victim of ‘Armenian aggression.’”
    Even if Baku were successful, it would not be forgiven, Markedonov argues, saying that Azerbaijanis should not see the Russian moves in Chechnya as a precedent. That is because, he continues, “what the world forgave Moscow for is something it would not forgive Baku.” Consequently, Azerbaijan’s only option, he concludes is to “wait and ‘concentrate.’”
    But the passions ignited by the events of Black January and the centrality of the fate of Karabakh and the other occupied territories remain so great that it is perhaps no surprise that on this “round” anniversary, many Azerbaijanis are hoping against hope that the negotiations will lead to the recovery of their lands or seeking alternatives.
    And one of the most interesting – and, following Markedonov’s argument, instructive — is the call by the Sheikh ul-Islam Pasha-Zade, the head of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate in Azerbaijan, for Gorbachev to be brought to trial in the Hague for his crimes against the Azerbaijani nation (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=33786).
    That won’t happen, of course, but it is a reminder of the continuing sensitivity of the events of a generation ago in the Caucasus now, an impact that any who are seeking to address the problems there must not only acknowledge but also face up to, all the more now because these feelings have been allowed to fester so long.

    http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2010/01/window-on-eurasia-how-gorbachev.html

  • TURKEY-ARMENIA NORMALIZATION LINKED TO ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

    TURKEY-ARMENIA NORMALIZATION LINKED TO ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

    Wednesday, December 9, 2009—Volume 6, Issue 226  THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION


    by Vladimir Socor

    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has clearly reaffirmed the linkage between normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations and early substantial progress toward resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Ankara defines such progress as an agreement on withdrawal of Armenian troops from occupied districts of Azerbaijan beyond Upper Karabakh, pending a determination of the latter’s future status.

    Erdogan reinforced this linkage during his December 7-8 visit to Washington, despite U.S. and E.U. attempts in recent months to break that linkage and to convince Ankara also to break it. That course of action ignored and alienated Azerbaijan, playing into Russia’s hands and jeopardizing Western strategic interests in the South Caucasus. Washington and Brussels seemed to be guided primarily by internal political considerations in adopting that policy. They will now have to reconsider it, in the wake of Erdogan’s and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s latest clarifying statements.

    The U.S. agenda for Erdogan’s visit, as publicized ahead of the event (White House website, December 4) included neither the Karabakh conflict nor energy projects such as Nabucco among the issues to be discussed by President Barack Obama with Erdogan.

    The first omission reflected Washington’s attempts to de-link the Karabakh conflict-resolution negotiations from Turkey-Armenia normalization. U.S. policy (seconded by that of the E.U. and Russia) pressed for Turkish parliamentary ratification of the October 10 Turkey-Armenia protocols on establishing full diplomatic relations and opening the land border between them, without conditioning this on Armenian troop withdrawal from certain Azerbaijani districts.

    The omission of energy transit issues from the U.S.-prepared agenda remained without official explanation, but could be seen as relegating Caspian and European energy security to a secondary level on the White House’s list of priorities. This perception would ipso facto reduce Azerbaijan’s importance to U.S. policy in this administration, compared with preceding U.S. administrations of both parties. Obama solicited Turkish support on Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq as top U.S. priorities, while also urging Turkish ratification of the protocols with Armenia.

    Obama did not mention the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict or a Karabakh resolution process at the concluding news conference. It was Erdogan who reintroduced this issue into the equation: “We have also discussed [issues] between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which are of great importance in the context of Turkey-Armenia relations…because the normalization process between Turkey and Armenia is very much related to those issues,” Erdogan stated at the joint news conference (White House press release, December 7; APA, PBS, December 8).

    In follow-up statements in Washington, Erdogan recounted that he had “explained to him [Obama]” that Turkey-Armenia normalization is difficult without resolving the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. The Turkish parliament is “conditioning” the protocols’ ratification on conflict-resolution, it “feels strongly about this,” and it “cannot be dictated to,” he declared. He called for Armenian troop withdrawal from seven Azerbaijani districts and urged the “Minsk Group’s” co-chairs (U.S., Russia, France) to promote that goal (APA, December 8).

    U.S. policy makers were still pressing as recently as last month for de-synchronizing the two processes. On the eve of Erdogan’s visit, however, the Turkish position had become clear. During the OSCE’s year-end conference in Athens, Davutoglu stated that the Turkish parliament can only ratify the Turkey-Armenia protocols after the Karabakh issue is resolved (Trend, December 2).

    Erdogan clarified—in an interview televised in Azerbaijan––that “resolution” means, in this context, “reaching an agreement [between Azerbaijan and Armenia] regarding the seven districts….We have told U.S. officials all along: If you want to resolve the Turkey-Armenia issue, you should also resolve the Karabakh conflict. Otherwise any resolution would be impossible…The Turkish-Armenian issue and the Karabakh problems are closely related” (ANS TV cited by Day.az, December 4, 5).

    The Turkish parliament’s foreign policy commission chairman, Suat Kiniklioglu, corroborated this view in a public debate in Brussels. While Turkey-Armenia normalization has the potential to dramatically improve the overall situation in the South Caucasus, “it would be incomprehensible and illogical to normalize relations on one side while maintaining a conflict on the other side” (Day.az, December 4).

    Ankara was slow to clarify its position in recent months. For its part, Washington put domestic politics ahead of strategic considerations. To deflect pressures from Armenian advocacy groups and a large part of the U.S. Congress, the Obama administration decided to push for re-opening the Turkish-Armenian border before April 2010, when the Armenian genocide resolution comes up for reconsideration in Congress. Candidate Obama had promised to sign such a resolution, but President Obama cannot do so. Instead, the White House decided in April 2009 (at the time of Obama’s visit to Turkey) to press for re-opening the Turkish-Armenian land border, hoping to defuse the explosive potential from the annual political debate on the genocide issue.

    This course of action, however, could only be pursued at Azerbaijan’s expense and at the risk of fracturing the Turkey-Azerbaijan partnership, instead of nurturing it. That partnership largely accounts for the West’s strategic gains in the South Caucasus-Caspian region over the past decade. Strained recently by Russian advances in the region and a burgeoning Russo-Turkish partnership, the West’s gains could be severely jeopardized by policies that isolate Azerbaijan or sacrifice its interests.

    Baku does recognize—as presidential adviser Novruz Mammadov has put it (www.day.az, December 6)—that the U.S. initiative to help normalize Turkey-Armenia relations can generate positive dynamics for regional cooperation, if this initiative is synchronized with Karabakh conflict-resolution. But it would only exacerbate tensions in the region, if the two processes are separated, instead of converging.

    –Vladimir Socor

  • Lies, Damn Lies, and Armenian Deaths

    Lies, Damn Lies, and Armenian Deaths

    Bruce Fein

    Posted: June 4, 2009 06:10 PM

    On April 24, 2009–Armenian Remembrance Day– President Barack Obama issued a statement “remember[ing] the 1.5 million Armenian [deaths] in the final days of the Ottoman Empire.” The President stumbled.

    To paraphrase Mark Twain, there are three kinds of lies: lies, damn lies, and the number of Armenians who are claimed by Armenians and their echo chambers to have died in an alleged World War I genocide. Almost a century later, the number of deaths they assert oscillates between 1.5-2 million. But the best contemporary estimates by Armenians or their sympathizers were 300,000-750,000 (compared with 2.4 million Ottoman Muslim deaths in Anatolia). Further, not a single one of those deaths necessarily falls within the definition of genocide in the authoritative Genocide Convention of 1948. It requires proof that the accused was responsible for the physical destruction of a group in whole or in substantial part specifically because of their race, nationality, religion, or ethnicity. A political or military motivation for a death falls outside the definition.

    Immediately after the war, when events and memories were fresh, Armenians had no incentive to concoct high casualty figures or genocidal motivations for their deaths. Their objective was statehood. Armenians were encouraged by the self-determination concept in President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, (while conveniently forgetting that they were a minority in Eastern Anatolia where they hoped to found a new nation). Armenian leaders pointed to their military contribution to defeating the Ottomans and population figures that would sustain an Armenian nation.

    Boghus Nubar, then Head of the Armenian Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference (1919), wrote to the French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon: “The Armenians have been, since the beginning of the war, de facto belligerents, as you yourself have acknowledged, since they have fought alongside the Allies on all fronts, enduring heavy sacrifices and great suffering for the sake of their unshakable attachment to the cause of the Entente….” Nubar had earlier written to the Foreign Minister on October 29, 1918, that Armenians had earned their independence: “We have fought for it. We have poured out our blood for it without stint. Our people played a gallant part in the armies that won the victory.”

    When their quest for statehood shipwrecked on the Treaty of Lausanne and annexation by the Soviet Union in 1921, Armenians revised their soundtrack to endorse a contrived genocide thesis. It seeks a “pound of flesh” from the Republic of Turkey in the form of recognition, reparations, and boundary changes. To make their case more convincing, Armenians hiked the number of deaths. They also altered their story line from having died as belligerents against the Turks to having perished like unarmed helpless lambs.

    Vahan Vardapet, an Armenian cleric, estimated a prewar Ottoman Armenian population of 1.26 million. At the Peace Conference, Armenian leader Nubar stated that 280,000 remained in the Empire and 700,000 had emigrated elsewhere. Accepting those Armenian figures, the number of dead would be 280,000. George Montgomery of the Armenia-American Society estimated a prewar Armenian population of 1.4-1.6 million, and a casualty figure of 500,000 or less. Armenian Van Cardashian, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1919, placed the number of Armenian dead at 750,000, i.e., a prewar population of 1.5 million and a post-war figure of 750,000.

    After statehood was lost, Armenians turned to their genocide playbook which exploited Christian bigotries and contempt for Ottoman Muslims. They remembered earlier successful anti-Ottoman propaganda. United States Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire during the war, Henry Morganthau, was openly racist and devoted to propaganda. On November 26, 1917, Morgenthau confessed in a letter to President Wilson that he intended to write a book vilifying Turks and Germans to, “win a victory for the war policy of the government.” In his biography, “Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story,” Morgenthau betrays his racist hatred toward Turks (“humanity and civilization never for a moment enters their mind”) and unconditional admiration for Armenians (“They are so superior to the Turks intellectually and morally.”).

    British Prime Minister Gladstone’s histrionic figure of 60,000 Bulgarian Christians slaughtered in 1876 captured the imagination of the west. The true figure later provided by a British Ambassador was 3,500–including Turks who were first slain by the Christians.

    From 280,000-750,000, Armenians initially raised their death count to 800,000 to test the credibility waters. It passed muster with uninformed politicians easily influenced by campaign contributions and voting clout. Armenians then jumped the number to 1.5 million, and then 1.8 million by Armenian historian Kevork Aslan. For the last decades, an Armenian majority seems to have settled on the 1.5 million death plateau–which still exceeds their contemporary estimates by 200 to 500 percent. They are now testing the waters at 2.5-3 million killed as their chances for a congressional genocide resolution recede. It speaks volumes that champions of the inflated death figures have no explanation for why Armenians on the scene would have erred. Think of the absurdity of discarding the current death count of Afghan civilians in the United States-Afghan war in favor of a number deduced in the year 2109!

    Armenians have a genuine tale of woe. It largely overlaps with the tale of tragedy and suffering that can be told by Ottoman Muslims during the war years: 2.4 million deaths in Anatolia, ethnic cleansing, starvation, malnutrition, untreated epidemics, and traumatic privations of war under a decrepit and collapsing Empire.

    Unskewed historical truth is the antechamber of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. That is why the Government of Turkey has proposed an international commission of impartial and independent experts with access to all relevant archives to determine the number and characterization of World War I deaths. Armenians are balking because they are skeptical of their own figures and accusations.

  • Obama Should Forfeit his Nobel Prize

    Obama Should Forfeit his Nobel Prize


    Until he Tells the Truth on Genocide

    By Harut Sassounian
    Publisher, The California Courier
    sassounian3
    In his letter of November 20 to Armenian American organizations, Pres. Obama once again played shameful word games with the term genocide. At this point, one has to be incredibly naïve to believe that he is going to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide during the rest of his term in office.

    During the presidential campaign, when Sen. Obama was making repeated promises to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide, Armenian activists were nervously following the Turkish government’s attempts to use the false pretext of dialogue with Armenia to prevent him from fulfilling his pledge after the election.

    In early April, during a press conference in Ankara, when Pres. Obama was asked about his views on the Armenian Genocide, he dodged the question by stating: “My views are on the record and I have not changed views. What I have been very encouraged by is news that under President Gul’s leadership, you are seeing a series of negotiations, a process in place between Armenia and Turkey to resolve a whole host of longstanding issues, including this one.”

    Clearly, Presidents Obama and Gul, for their own reasons, were scheming to undermine the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by pushing forward the Armenia-Turkey negotiations. They were joined in this unholy alliance by Russia and the European Union in pressuring Armenia’s leaders, who were only too eager to comply.

    This sinister deal was sealed when on the eve of April 24, Armenia and Turkey issued a joint press release announcing a roadmap for reconciliation!

    Not surprisingly, in his first April 24 statement, Pres. Obama repeated all the euphemisms and word games for which he had strongly condemned his predecessor, President Bush! Obama used the old and all too familiar denialist terminology of past presidents, such as “atrocity,” “massacre,” “terrible events of 1915,” and most incredibly, “Meds Yeghern”!

    In that statement, Pres. Obama used the same evasive answer he gave in Ankara: “I have consistently stated my own view of what occurred in 1915, and my view of that history has not changed.” Yet, he adamantly persisted in refusing to state what his actual views were.

    Furthermore, Pres. Obama urged Armenians and Turks “to address the facts of the past as a part of their efforts to move forward.” He expressed his strong support for their “courageous and important dialogue…to work through this painful history…” and applauded the Armenian and Turkish governments for accepting “a framework and roadmap for normalization.”

    Consequently, Pres. Obama left no doubt that he was going to sacrifice the truth of the “Armenian Genocide” on the altar of an illusory Armenian-Turkish reconciliation, using it as a fig leaf to conceal his erstwhile pledge.

    Last month, in a letter to Armenian American organizations, Pres. Obama reconfirmed that his view on “one of the great atrocities of the 20th century” had not changed. Once again, he failed to detail his views! The President was responding to a letter from the AGBU, Armenian Assembly, and Diocese of the Armenian Church of America. The three Armenian organizations had expressed their support for the Armenia-Turkey Protocols and appealed to the White House to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide. In his response, Pres. Obama cleverly exploited the expression of support by the Armenian organizations for the reconciliation process, and downplayed his campaign pledge to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide. He reiterated that “the best way to advance…the just acknowledgment of the facts” is for Armenians and Turks to address the past “as part of their efforts to move forward.” He pledged “to continue to vigorously support the normalization effort in the months ahead.” The President was thus using the Protocols to undermine all efforts to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide.

    Keeping his pledge on the Armenian Genocide is in Pres. Obama’s own interest, as it would help rehabilitate his moral and political credibility by joining Pres. Reagan and scores of national parliaments, international organizations, and Holocaust and genocide scholars who are already on record confirming the facts of the Armenian Genocide.

    Pres. Obama should not be surprised if Armenian-Americans no longer trust him, and do not support him for re-election. Those who play games with genocide should not be rewarded.

    Anyone who lacks the courage to stand up for the truth does not deserve a Nobel Peace Prize!