Tag: Nabucco

  • Turkey and Russia Conclude Energy Deals

    Turkey and Russia Conclude Energy Deals

    a1Published: August 6, 2009

    ISTANBUL — Russia and Turkey concluded energy agreements on Thursday that will support Turkey’s drive to become a regional hub for fuel transshipments while helping Moscow maintain its monopoly on natural gas shipments from Asia to Europe.

    Turkey granted the Russian natural gas giant Gazprom use of its territorial waters in the Black Sea, under which the company wants to route its so-called South Stream pipeline to gas markets in Eastern and Southern Europe.

    In return, a Russian oil pipeline operator agreed to join a consortium to build a pipeline across the Anatolian Peninsula, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and Gazprom affirmed a commitment to expand an existing Black Sea gas pipeline for possible transshipment across Turkey to Cyprus or Israel.

    Energy companies in both countries agreed to a joint venture to build conventional electric power plants, and the Interfax news agency in Russia reported that Prime MinisterVladimir V. Putin offered to reopen talks on Russian assistance to Turkey in building nuclear power reactors.

    The agreements were signed in Ankara, the Turkish capital, in meetings between Mr. Putin and his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Italy’s prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, who has joined Mr. Putin on several energy projects, attended the ceremony. The Italian company Eni broke ground on the trans-Anatolian oil pipeline this year.

    While the offer of specific pipeline deals and nuclear cooperation represented a new tactic by Mr. Putin, the wider struggle for dominance of the Eurasian pipelines is a long-running chess match in which he has often excelled.

    As he has in the past, Mr. Putin traveled to Turkey with his basket of tempting strategic and economic benefits immediately after a similar mission by his opponents. A month ago, European governments signed an agreement in Turkey to support the Western-backed Nabucco pipeline, which would compete directly with the South Stream project.

    By skirting Russian territory, the Nabucco pipeline would undercut Moscow’s monopoly on European natural gas shipments and the pricing power and political clout that come with it. That may explain why Nabucco, which cannot go forward without Turkey’s support, has encountered a variety of obstacles thrown up by the Russian government, including efforts to deny it vital gas supplies in the East and a customer base in the West.

    Turkey and other countries in the path of Nabucco have been eager players in this geopolitical drama, entertaining offers from both sides. Turkish authorities have even tried, without much success, to leverage the pipeline negotiations to further Turkey’s bid to join the European Union, while keeping options with Russia open, too.

    “These countries are more than happy to sign agreements with both parties,” Ana Jelenkovic, an analyst at Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy, said in a telephone interview from London. “There’s no political benefit to shutting out or ceasing energy relations with Russia.”

    Under the deal Mr. Putin obtained Thursday, Gazprom will be allowed to proceed with seismic and environmental tests in Turkey’s exclusive economic zone, necessary preliminary steps for laying the South Stream pipe, Prime Minister Erdogan said at a news conference.

    After the meeting, Mr. Putin said, “We agreed on every issue.”

    The trans-Anatolian oil pipeline also marginally improves Russia’s position in the region. The pipeline is one of two so-called Bosporus bypass systems circumventing the straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, which are operating at capacity in tanker traffic.

    The preferred Western route is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which allows companies to ship Caspian Basin crude oil to the West without crossing Russian territory; the pipeline instead crosses the former Soviet republic of Georgia and avoids the crowded straits by cutting across Turkey to the Mediterranean.

    Russia prefers northbound pipelines out of the Caspian region that terminate at tanker terminals on the Black Sea. The success of this plan depends, in turn, on creating additional capacity in the Bosporus bypass routes. Russia is backing two such pipelines.

    Mr. Putin’s offer to move ahead with a Russian-built nuclear power plant in Turkey suggests a sweetening of the overall Russian offer on energy deals with Turkey, while both Western and Russian proposals are on the table.

    The nuclear aspect of the deal drew protests. About a dozen Greenpeace protesters were surrounded by at least 200 armored police officers in central Ankara on Thursday.

    Andrew E. Kramer contributed reporting from Moscow.

    The New York Times
  • Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement Signed in Ankara

    Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement Signed in Ankara

    Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement Signed in Ankara

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 134
    July 14, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On July 13 the Nabucco transit countries removed an important obstacle for the strategic pipeline project. Attending a high profile meeting hosted by Turkey, the prime ministers of Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Turkey inked the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA). The ceremony was also attended by several government officials and representatives of international organizations including the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, the E.U. Commission’s President Jose Manuel Barroso, E.U. Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs and the U.S. special envoy for Eurasian energy Richard Morningstar (Anadolu Ajansi, July 13).

    In the next step toward the completion of the legal framework, the Nabucco consortium will sign separate project support agreements with the five participating countries within the next six months. Construction work is expected to start by 2011 and the pipeline will be operational in 2014. The consortium will also open discussions with banks to raise the necessary capital and explore the marketing of transportation capacities. The project is valued at 7.9 billion Euros ($11 billion) and in its full capacity it will pump 31 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually to European markets (www.nabucco-pipeline.com).

    According to the Nabucco consortium, the “IGA will lay out a stable legal framework for the next 50 years and … 50 percent of the pipeline’s capacity will be reserved for the shareholders and the remaining 50 percent offered to third-party shippers.” Moreover, the IGA will develop a standard tariff methodology. The legal framework set by the IGA will remain in force for 25 years after the pipeline becomes operational so that it provides “strong comfort to the potential gas supply countries who are considering selling gas to the shippers of Nabucco” (www.nabucco-pipeline.com, July 13).

    The partners do not expect financing to become a major issue. The meeting signaled a possible imminent resolution over the uncertainty about securing gas to feed the Nabucco pipeline. Thus far, Azerbaijan is the only producer to commit gas to the project and it has promoted Nabucco as a strategic priority. Ahead of the signing ceremony, the head of SOCAR, Rovnag Abdullayev, reiterated support for Nabucco and maintained that Azerbaijan has enough reserves to supply alternative projects (Anadolu Ajansi, July 11).

    Turkmenistan’s President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov expressed his readiness to export gas through Nabucco (Zaman, July 12). Representatives from Iraq, Egypt and Syria also attended the signing ceremony and pledged to pump their gas through the Nabucco once it is completed. Al-Maliki said that Iraq could start supplying 17 bcm annually to Europe by 2017 (Today’s Zaman, July 14).

    Turkish officials continuously emphasized that the project is open to other potential suppliers if they wish to join. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated Turkey’s position that Nabucco does not necessarily exclude Russia and Iran, and maintained that Qatar might also join the project.

    Although Turkey has consistently expressed its interest in integrating Iran into the project, given recent political developments, this alternative currently appears unlikely. Matthew Bryza, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, did not rule out possible Russian participation in the project, but he expressed the Obama administration’s uneasiness over any effort to include Iran (Hurriyet Daily News, July 13). Nonetheless, given Moscow’s objections to Nabucco and the lack of Russian participation in the IGA ceremony, it remains to be seen how feasible that alternative will be.

    Reinhard Mitschek, Nabucco CEO, said that in the first phase, the main suppliers will be Azerbaijan and Iraq and that Turkmen gas will be accessed in the second phase. He maintained that the market prognoses showed a greater demand from buyers than initially expected (Anadolu Ajansi, July 13).

    Turkey expects to receive many benefits from the project. The transit countries will not raise fees, but will share the tax revenues proportionate to the length of the pipeline passing through their territories. Ankara projects obtaining 60 percent of the tax revenues, amounting to 450 million Euros ($630 million) annually. Moreover, the project will bring infrastructure investments to Turkey and create new jobs (Radikal, July 11). Most importantly, Turkey hailed the project as a significant development, which reaffirms its strategic value to the West. Through closer cooperation in energy security, Ankara hopes to cement its ties with the E.U. and remove the remaining obstacles to membership. Speaking at the ceremony, Erdogan and Barroso defined this new cooperation as a strategic bond and expressed their desire to see Nabucco further bolstering Turkey-E.U. ties.

    Nonetheless, although Turkey previously sought to link the Nabucco project to E.U. accession and implied that progress might be conditional on the E.U. opening the energy chapter, this remains unresolved. Another potential area of uncertainty relates to whether Turkey secured its request for a 15 percent lift-off. The international press reported that Turkey might have dropped this demand. Asked about this ahead of the ceremony, the Energy Minister Taner Yildiz gave only vague answers. Yildiz said that Ankara was granted other guarantees to ensure its supply security. He indicated that Turkey might bid for the 50 percent of the gas allocated for the transport countries and added that talks with other governments and corporations on this subject will continue.

    Moreover, he suggested that the pipeline will be built to enable the transportation of gas in both directions between east and west, in order that Turkey can cope with any unexpected winter shortages through swapping gas (www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 12). While Yildiz implicitly acknowledged that Turkey might have retreated from its position on the 15 percent issue, the head of the state-run gas company, BOTAS, ruled out that Turkey had abandoned its claim. “When the project support agreement is signed such details will be discussed there… This issue is still on the table: there is no sacrifice involved,” Saltuk Duzyol added (ANKA, July 13).

    The signing of the IGA marks a major step forward. However, such remarks, as well as the ongoing standoff in Turkish-Azeri price renegotiation talks, are indicative of the heavy bargaining that lies ahead.

    https://jamestown.org/program/nabucco-intergovernmental-agreement-signed-in-ankara/

  • Ankara Approves Nabucco Following High Level Visit to Moscow

    Ankara Approves Nabucco Following High Level Visit to Moscow

    Ankara Approves Nabucco Following High Level Visit to Moscow

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 128
    July 6, 2009 12:48 PM Age: 4 hrs
    Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Turkey, Energy, Foreign Policy, Economics, Featured
    By: Saban Kardas
    Ankara has reportedly finally given the green light to the Nabucco project, and the intergovernmental agreement might be signed on July 13. When the news broke on the Russian deal with Azerbaijan (EDM, July 2), the Turkish media initially suggested it represented a lethal blow to Nabucco. Partly as a result of the Russian media’s manipulation, it was interpreted as a negative development to undermine the viability of Nabucco (www.nethaber.com, June 30).

    On July 1-2, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu visited Moscow to meet his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. Before his departure, Davutoglu said that Turkey was unconcerned about the gas deal between Moscow and Baku, and supported enhanced cooperation between its neighbors. Davutoglu maintained that growing regional cooperation, especially in energy, will benefit everyone in the region, (Anadolu Ajansi, July 1).

    Energy Minister Taner Yildiz made a similar point, arguing that the different projects are not alternatives and choosing one does not necessarily mean foregoing another. Yildiz added that the Russian-Azeri agreement would not affect Turkish-Azeri talks on the re-negotiation of the price for Turkey’s gas imports from Shah Deniz-I, and the country’s future imports from Shah Deniz-II (www.iha.com.tr, July 1).

    In Moscow, Davutoglu held talks on bilateral relations as well as regional security issues. During their joint press briefing, Davutoglu emphasized that Turkey and Russia have developed close economic, commercial, cultural and political ties, while both countries could solve their differences through dialogue. Davutoglu told reporters that, though the date was not set, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin would visit Turkey in the near future. Lavrov also underlined that the approaches of the two countries toward regional and global problems overlap.

    Asked about the possibility of Turkey’s cooperation with Russia in the South Stream project, Davutoglu said: “There are no limitations and barriers on Russian-Turkish cooperation. We decided to consider all projects, including alternative energy projects. Therefore, I want to express our readiness to collaborate with Russia on South Stream or other projects in a transparent manner.” Responding to the same question, Lavrov said that if Turkey decided to join the project, the Russian side would prepare the necessary groundwork. He added that the Turkish energy minister will discuss the details with the Russian officials (Anadolu Ajansi, July 2).

    Indeed, Yildiz also visited Moscow at the same time, at the invitation of the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin. As the co-chairs of the joint Turkish-Russian economic council, Yildiz and Sechin discussed bilateral economic relations. Yildiz raised issues relating to Turkish investors operating in Russia, particularly the “customs crisis.” Cooperation in energy issues occupied a large part of Yildiz’s itinerary. Energy related topics included the Russian offer to build Blue Stream II beneath the Black Sea, the current status of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant tender which was awarded to a Russian consortium, preliminary negotiations for additional gas purchases from Russia, and the South Stream project (Milliyet, July 1).

    Sechin told Yildiz that Moscow has studied the feasibility of various possible projects to diversify energy supplies to Europe. He claimed that South Stream outperforms Nabucco in terms of its efficiency and economic feasibility, and invited Turkey to join the project. In particular, he claimed that Russia has enough proven gas reserves to feed South Stream. Nonetheless, the Russian delegation did not elaborate any specific role envisaged for Turkey in South Stream, which in its current form would not cross Turkish territory.

    Yildiz repeated Ankara’s frequent argument that Nabucco and South Stream are not necessarily competitors: “This is a strategic package. It includes important projects that concern the two countries, our regions and our neighbors.” The Turkish government will evaluate all offers on the table, and choose the project that satisfies both countries’ interests, Yildiz added (Cihan, July 2).

    These developments led to speculation that Nabucco was in crisis (www.cnnturk.com, July 2). On his return to Turkey, Yildiz dismissed Russian media reports that Moscow asked Ankara to withdraw from Nabucco. Moreover, Yildiz said that the negotiations on Nabucco were well advanced and the parties were close to signing a deal, though avoiding specifying a date. He added that the talks were being carried out by the foreign ministry and prime minister’s office (Hurriyet, July 3).

    On the same day, European Commission officials announced that Turkey extended an invitation to its Nabucco partners to attend a ceremony in Ankara to sign the long-delayed intergovernmental agreement on July 13 (Anadolu Ajansi, July 3). The commission spokesman and Nabucco officials provided no further details as to whether Turkish demands were met to ensure its supply security, especially the controversial 15 percent clause, which had been stalling the negotiations (www.euobserver.com, July 3).

    Davutoglu flew from Moscow to Bucharest at the invitation of his Romanian counterpart Cristian Diaconescu, where he met the Romanian president and other officials. He discussed bilateral partnerships and regional cooperation in the Black Sea. After emphasizing the flourishing ties between the two countries, Davutoglu praised their cooperation in the context of the Nabucco project. Though he noted that Nabucco and South Stream were not mutually exclusive, Davutoglu maintained “Nabucco is a strategic project for us. This will continue to remain our main priority” (Cihan, July 3).

    Both Davutoglu and Yildiz declined to set a date but affirmed that the intergovernmental agreement will be signed soon. Sources close to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s office, however, reportedly confirmed that the government plans to hold a ceremony on July 13. If the schedule of the heads of state from the other Nabucco partners, Bulgaria, Romania, Austria and Hungary permits, then the agreement will be signed in Ankara (Hurriyet, July 4).

    What led to this turnaround in Turkey’s position and whether it secured concessions from its partners will be clarified if Ankara hosts the intergovernmental agreement next week. However, last week’s heavy diplomatic traffic, combined with Erdogan’s earlier contacts in Brussels, shows the extent to which Turkey wants to maximize its political and commercial gains by pitting the rival pipeline projects against each other.

    https://jamestown.org/program/ankara-approves-nabucco-following-high-level-visit-to-moscow/
  • Europe nears gas pipeline accord

    Europe nears gas pipeline accord

    aEuropean governments are due to sign an agreement on the Nabucco gas pipeline on 13 July, the European Commission has announced.

    The Nabucco pipeline will bring Central Asian gas to western Europe via Turkey and the Balkans, bypassing Russia.

    Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria – the pipeline’s five transit countries – will sign the accord.

    The pipeline – which will compete with new rival Russian pipelines – should be operational by 2014.

    Germany is also a member of the consortium but the pipeline will not cross Germany.

    “I can confirm that the Commission has received an invitation to the signing ceremony of the intergovernmental agreement on the Nabucco pipeline on July 13 in Ankara,” a European Commission spokesman told a news briefing.

    Russian concerns

    Plans for the Nabucco pipeline come as European Union states are keen to reduce their reliance upon Russian gas because of Russia’s numerous price disputes in recent years with Ukraine.

    These rows have seen Gazprom temporarily cut supplies to Ukraine, which in turn has reduced Russian gas deliveries to western Europe that are piped through Russia’s neighbour.

    Work on Russian pipelines, which will bypass Ukraine, are underway.

    The major sources of gas for Nabucco are expected to be Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

    Azerbaijan has already promised Gazprom, the Russian state gas company, priority when it comes to buying gas.

    BBC

  • Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices Continue through “Soccer Diplomacy”

    Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices Continue through “Soccer Diplomacy”

    Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices Continue through “Soccer Diplomacy”

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 107
    June 4, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yildiz discussed energy issues with Azeri officials on the sidelines of a recent soccer game. Following his talks, Yildiz commented on the status of the Turkish-Azeri talks on pricing gas imports and Turkey’s position on the Nabucco project. The incident echoes what was referred to as the “soccer diplomacy” conducted last year between Turkey and Armenia.

    The Turkish and Azeri national soccer teams played a friendly game in Turkey’s central Anatolian city of Kayseri on June 2. There was huge public interest and over 30,000 spectators decorated the stadium with the Turkish and Azeri flags. They carried placards and chanted slogans reflecting the sense of solidarity between the two nations: “We are all Azeris,” “Karabakh belongs to Turks,” “We cannot be divided” (www.nethaber.com, www.tumspor.com, June 2).

    The sporting fixture also provided an additional venue to discuss contentious bilateral issues. The president of the Azerbaijani state petroleum company (SOCAR) Rovnag Abdullayev (also the head of the Azeri soccer federation), was in the audience. He watched the game alongside the head of the Turkish soccer federation and Yildiz. On the periphery of this event, Yildiz and Abdullayev continued their talks on pricing Turkey’s gas imports from Azerbaijan. Abdullayev flew back to Baku together with the Turkish ambassador to Azerbaijan in the same private jet (Hurriyet, June 3).

    Yildiz told reporters that both sides shared their views as well as new proposals on pricing. He added that the Azeri side will respond after further evaluating the Turkish proposals. Although Yildiz found Azerbaijan’s request for further deliberation quite natural as part of the negotiation process, he also stressed his hope that it might be accelerated. “It will be in both countries’ interest to reach a solution as soon as possible. Over the next week, technical delegations will continue their work on the [mutual] proposals. My opinion is that without losing further time, an agreement on Shahdeniz-I and Shahdeniz-II should be reached. Our Azeri brothers said they would help us on this issue” (Anadolu Ajansi, June 3).

    Abdullayev offered reassurance that no difficult issues existed between the two countries, but he said that there was no reason to rush into the project. He added “a thirty-year agreement and other issues cannot be resolved in one or two days. The game provided an opportunity to discuss these, but commercial matters cannot be concluded in haste… We received Turkey’s proposals on oil and gas and we will study them” (Milliyet, June 4).

    Currently there are two major elements on the agenda of the Turkish-Azeri gas talks. Azerbaijan expects Turkey to revise gas import prices. Moreover, anxious to transport its gas to European markets, Baku wants Ankara to adopt a more cooperative position on the Nabucco project.

    Under the terms of an agreement in 2001, Turkey annually imports 6 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas from Azerbaijan’s Shahdeniz-I site at a price of $120 per thousand cubic meters, which is far below current global energy prices. Turkey also plans to purchase 8 bcm of gas from the Shahdeniz-II for its domestic consumption. Since the 2001 agreement ended in April 2008, Turkey has continued to import Azeri gas at the old price. In recent months, Baku has demanded the revision of the price to reflect the current market value, although Ankara has reportedly been unenthusiastic (EDM, May 1).

    During his trip to Azerbaijan in May, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan promised that a new and “fair” price will be found (EDM, May 14). Yildiz, who accompanied Erdogan to Baku, later said that “the price [offered] was as fair as possible… I cannot give a figure. But it is not as high as [the price for] the Russian gas. We are trying to agree on a price that is not completely disconnected from world markets and one that will satisfy both us and our Azeri brothers” (Hurriyet, May 16). However, the fact that a final decision has not been reached, shows that Turkey’s price offer did not necessarily satisfy the Azeri side, and they preferred to continue the talks until a “fair” price is agreed.

    During his contacts in Kayseri earlier the same day, Yildiz commented on the future of the Nabucco project. Turkey has been viewed as the main obstacle to the conclusion of the intergovernmental transit agreement for the Nabucco pipeline, yet recent remarks emerging from Ankara has raised hopes for ending the stalemate (EDM, May 15, June 1). Yildiz reiterated Erdogan’s earlier optimism for signing the intergovernmental agreement in June, but added that the continuation of the negotiations indicated that a consensus on the exact date had not been reached (www.ntvmsnbc.com, June 3).

    Yildiz was asked about the Nabucco Managing Director Reinhard Mitschek’s earlier comments that Turkey’s demand for “the 15 percent out-take is not on the table” (Reuters, May 29). In response, Yildiz insisted that Turkey’s demand was still under consideration. After noting that lively bargaining was occurring, he maintained that the Europeans appreciated Turkish concerns. “They are not completely indifferent to 15 percent. The real problem is about its modality… It might be possible to exclude it from the intergovernmental agreement, and then regulate it under another agreement” (Cihan Haber Ajansi, June 3).

    This is not the first time that European and Turkish officials have issued contradictory statements on the Turkish position on the 15 percent issue (EDM, April 20). Ankara appears determined to get the best deal out of the Nabucco negotiations, even at the risk of further stalling the project and perhaps undermining Azerbaijan’s interests. For its own part, Baku also shows that it does not want the “brotherhood” to eclipse the country’s commercial interests, and will continue negotiations until a “fair” deal is finally secured.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-azeri-talks-on-gas-prices-continue-through-soccer-diplomacy/
  • Erdogan Prioritizes Foreign Policy in State of the Union Address

    Erdogan Prioritizes Foreign Policy in State of the Union Address

    Erdogan Prioritizes Foreign Policy in State of the Union Address

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 104
    June 1, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On May 30 Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan delivered his State of the Union address, focusing on Turkey’s enhanced profile in regional diplomacy. Erdogan provided details relating to his trips to Azerbaijan, Russia and Poland, and discussed recent foreign policy initiatives, most importantly Turkey’s role in energy security. Erdogan attempted to boost public confidence in the foreign policy agenda, which he described as “very active, dynamic and intensive,” essentially offering a restatement of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government’s position on these issues (www.bbm.gov.tr, May 30).

    Erdogan highlighted Ankara’s role in energy policies, which he described as one of the most important issues on the global political agenda. He illustrated how his government had “turned Turkey’s geographic position into an effective foreign policy instrument,’ while arguing that the country’s location enables it to act as an “energy corridor and terminal” between Western markets and the Middle Eastern or Caspian energy producers. However, he noted that if Turkey fails to develop longer term planning, it will be unable to fully capitalize on these opportunities or meet its domestic needs.

    Erdogan’s views on energy geopolitics reflect the growing energy demands of an emerging economy. Although Turkey has initiated various projects to increase its domestic production and invest in alternative energy sources, its domestic energy output accounts for only one third of the country’s needs. Recent Turkish foreign policy initiatives have endeavored to turn this ongoing dependence on imports from a liability into an asset, by capitalizing on Turkey’s position between the suppliers and Western consumers.

    Erdogan maintained that the AKP government had taken important steps toward diversifying suppliers and energy transportation routes. After summarizing several existing and planned oil and gas pipeline projects across Turkish territory, Erdogan added that Turkey had become an integral part of the discussions on ensuring European energy security. He claimed that once these projects are completed, “Turkey will emerge as the fourth largest hub after Norway, Russia and Algeria, in supplying gas to Europe.” He also suggested that the Turkish port of Ceyhan will become an “important energy distribution center and the largest oil sale terminal in the eastern Mediterranean.”

    In that context, Erdogan prioritized the Nabucco project, since it will consolidate Turkey’s role within European energy security. He hoped the construction of the pipeline will begin soon and become operational by 2010: “we will sign the [intergovernmental] agreement in June,” he added. Erdogan’s statements also reflect recent changes in Turkey’s position over the stalled Nabucco project, which raised expectations that the intergovernmental agreement might be concluded in June (EDM, May 15).

    Turkey’s diplomatic initiatives in the South Caucasus were another key feature of Erdogan’s agenda. After noting Turkey’s cooperative policies within the region, he highlighted his trip to Azerbaijan. He underlined the close ties between the two nations by referring to the growing bilateral trade volume, and Turkish investment in Azerbaijan’s economic development.

    Erdogan also stressed Turkey’s continued support for international initiatives to resolve regional issues, most importantly the Karabakh question. He repeated his government’s recent stance on the Azeri-Armenian dispute by maintaining that “Turkey and Azerbaijan will continue to share a common destiny, and walk on the same path” and that Turkey “will protect Azerbaijan’s interests as much as our own interests.” He warned the Turkish and Azeri peoples against those “who work to undermine the friendship and brotherhood between the two countries through false claims” (www.bbm.gov.tr, May 30).

    He was clearly seeking to alleviate domestic concern over the normalization process between Turkey and Armenia. Nationalist forces within Turkey had successfully mobilized public opinion against the AKP government’s overtures toward Armenia. They argued that it had betrayed the interests of Azerbaijan, by separating the Turkish-Armenian normalization from Azeri-Armenian negotiations. The mounting domestic pressure and criticism from Baku forced the government to reduce the pace of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement (EDM, April 29, May 6). Erdogan’s trip to Azerbaijan as well as other recent high level contacts between the countries, has served to reassure Baku (EDM, May 14). Nonetheless, these moves toward Baku added to uncertainty surrounding the future of the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, and Turkish politicians have recently proven reluctant to comment on the issue.

    He also referred to the recent naval exercises carried out by the Turkish military in the Aegean and Mediterranean. Erdogan stressed the use of high-technology weaponry and said the successful conclusion of the exercises was proof of the country’s power of deterrence in the region. Moreover, he emphasized that the Turkish army not only ensures national defense, but it also makes significant contributions to global security.

    Erdogan’s address provided significant clues concerning Ankara’s strategic vision, which underpins the thinking of the Turkish political elite on foreign affairs. Erdogan repeated the geopolitical argument that Turkey is uniquely located in a strategic position at the intersection of several regions. He maintained that Turkish foreign policy strategies are devised with the aim of turning this position into an asset. Moreover, he reflected on how a constant search for markets and energy supplies to sustain Turkey’s economic development now drives many of the country’s foreign policy initiatives. Equally, he revealed that military power remains an essential component of Turkish foreign policy, despite the government priding itself on its effective use of soft power.

    Erdogan’s use of geopolitical rhetoric also highlighted the shifting priorities of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government. He said that since a large part of Turkey’s territory is in Asia, that part of the world naturally occupies a vital place in Ankara’s foreign policy agenda. This admission is important, since some analysts describe the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East and the South Caucasus as an indication of an ideological shift and the emergence of neo-Ottomanism – whereas Erdogan rightly explains it as a geopolitical necessity.

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-prioritizes-foreign-policy-in-state-of-the-union-address/