Turkish Forum

Tag: Nabucco

  • Turkey Bolsters Ties With Turkic States

    Turkey Bolsters Ties With Turkic States

    Turkey Bolsters Ties With Turkic States Turkey Bolsters Ties With Turkic States

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 170

    September 22, 2010

    By Saban Kardas

    Turkey hosted the tenth summit of Turkic-speaking countries in Istanbul on September 16. The Istanbul summit, bringing together Turkish, Kazakh, Azeri, Kyrgyz and Turkmen leaders, took steps towards furthering institutionalizing this inter-governmental platform, in line with the conclusions of the previous meeting in Nakhchivan in October 2009. Through the Nakhchivan declaration, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had formed a Turkic-Speaking Countries Cooperation Council –or Turkish Council, as Turkey seeks to promote it. In Istanbul, the leaders agreed to implement measures to make the new bodies operational, including the Council of Heads of State, Council of Foreign Ministers, Council of Senior Foreign Ministry Officials, Wise Men’s Council and Permanent Secretariat. Moreover, they agreed to set up other institutions to protect joint cultural heritage, form a union of universities, and create a fund to support research activities (Anadolu Ajansi, September 16; for an English text of the final declaration, see: Today’s Zaman, September 17).

    Turkish President, Abdullah Gul, the host of the summit, emphasized the importance of the meeting to strengthen the commonalities among the brotherly nations in terms of language, history, religion and cultural values. He called upon the leaders to diversify relations in various areas. The leaders attending the summit highlighted the role of this burgeoning cooperation in contributing to peace and pledged to deepen solidarity to boost regional stability, human rights and a market economy.

    The conclusions of the meeting reflect the Turkish government’s desire to play a greater leadership role in the Turkish speaking world. Although Ankara sought to forge closer ties among these states in the early post-Cold War period, it failed to realize this ambitious objective. However, in recent years, the Turkish government has demonstrated its willingness to revitalize cooperation among Turkic countries. The recent decisions are, thus, products of Ankara’s determined moves in that direction (EDM, November 23, 2008). After the Nakhchivan declaration was passed last year, Gul presented it as a major success on Turkey’s part (www.euractiv.com.tr, October 6, 2009). Turkey expects the Turkish Council to develop based on the model of other similar organizations, such as the Commonwealth, Arab League or Francophonie (www.tcbb.gov.tr, September 16). Nonetheless, in an example of the limitations before this objective the Kazakh, Turkmen and Kyrgyz leaders spoke at times in Russian during the summit (Dogan Haber Ajansi, September 16).

    In a move that underscored Turkey’s leadership role, the first rotating presidency was assumed by Turkey and a senior Turkish diplomat, Halil Akinci, former ambassador to Moscow, was appointed as the Secretary-General of the council (Zaman, September 16). So far, there have been irregular summits as well as bilateral meetings between different states. Ankara believes the establishment of a permanent secretariat in Istanbul would increase the visibility of the council in regional and international affairs and contribute to the institutionalization of governmental ties.

    Speaking at the summit, Gul went as far as maintaining that “from now on, we are one nation, but six states.” The phrase “one nation, two states,” has been used to define the warm ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan. It remains to be seen if other Turkic states will embrace it to the same extent to identify themselves so closely with Turkey. Ankara has been unable to convince all Turkic states to participate. Uzbekistan has deliberately avoided attending the summits since the early 2000’s. Turkmenistan has also been aloof to this platform for some time. In that sense, Turkmenistan’s representation at the Istanbul summit can be considered as a positive step. Nonetheless, referring to its foreign policy principle of “positive neutrality,” Turkmenistan did not sign the Nakhchivan declaration. Uzbekistan again was absent from the Istanbul summit, underscoring continuing divisions.

    Besides its importance for intra-Turkic cooperation, the Istanbul summit also provided a venue for the participating leaders to hold various bilateral meetings with their counterparts to discuss issues of specific relevance. Turkey, for its part, used that opportunity to deepen ties with Azerbaijan. On the margins of the summit, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Azeri President, Ilham Aliyev, signed a framework agreement to form the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (Hurriyet, September 15). Ankara has signed similar agreements with several countries, mainly its Middle Eastern neighbors. The agreement with Baku was in preparation for some time, and its conclusion further highlights Ankara repairing its ties with Azerbaijan following the row caused by the Turkish-Armenian normalization process.

    Moreover, the energy ministers from Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan discussed energy cooperation. Ankara already has an agreement to purchase Turkmen gas, provided that transit problems are resolved. Thus, Turkey wants to contribute to the resolution of the disputes between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, for it would also deepen cooperation as part of the East-West energy corridor and enable the export of Turkmen gas to Europe through Turkey. Turkish Energy Minister, Taner Yildiz, noted that they avoided discussing the status of the Caspian Sea, especially border issues. He stressed that it could still be possible to develop trilateral cooperation in some undisputed sectors of the Caspian even before other major issues were resolved. Azeri Energy Minister, Natiq Aliyev, also expressed hope that the remaining disagreements could be resolved so that Turkmen gas could be exported through the Caspian and Azerbaijan. The Turkish side welcomed this meeting as a positive step, which might boost prospects for the Nabucco pipeline (Anadolu Ajansi, September 15).

    For some time, the Turkish government has been criticized for its neglect of Central Asia in its foreign policy priorities (EDM, June 25). In contrast, the government has presented its recent steps in the South Caucasus and Central Asia as proof that it has been pursuing a multidimensional foreign policy. Therefore, Ankara widely publicized the Istanbul summit as a great success. Nonetheless, those skeptical of the government urge caution and argue that one should wait to see if the declaration will be matched with deeds before judging the success of the government’s recent initiatives within the Turkic world (www.211yyte.org, September 17).

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-bolsters-ties-with-turkic-states/

  • Turkish-Azeri Deal May Herald New Competition in Southern Corridor

    Turkish-Azeri Deal May Herald New Competition in Southern Corridor

    Turkish-Azeri Deal May Herald New Competition in Southern Corridor

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 115

    June 15, 2010

    By: Saban Kardas

    On the sidelines of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) summit held in Istanbul, Turkey and Azerbaijan concluded agreements on natural gas cooperation. On June 7, during a ceremony attended by Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyip Recep Erdogan, Azeri President, Ilham Aliyev, the Turkish Energy Minister, Taner Yildiz, and his Azeri counterpart, Natiq Aliyev, signed an agreement which will end a two year long price dispute on Turkey’s gas imports from the first phase of Azerbaijan’s offshore Shah Deniz-I, as well as setting the volume and price for Turkey’s imports from the second phase of the field, expected to come online in 2016-17. A related agreement will regulate the terms and mechanisms for the sale and transit of Azeri gas to Europe through Turkey.

    Turkey currently imports 6 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas from Shah Deniz-I, paying $120/thousand cubic meter (tcm), well below the current market prices. However, the original agreement allowed for price renegotiation, which is exactly what Azerbaijan asked for when the pricing terms expired in April 2008. As the negotiations were underway, Turkey continued to import gas, though stressing that it would compensate for the price differences retroactively. Despite several rounds of negotiations, which were eclipsed by the discussions on gas transit, the parties failed to bridge their differences, which also raised concerns in the West that the delays might undermine Nabucco and other projects seeking to ensure supply diversification from the Caspian basin to Europe (EDM, February 26). Moreover, the gas disagreements also aggravated the diplomatic row between Baku and Ankara, caused by Turkey’s efforts to normalize relations with Armenia, raising questions about future relations between the two fraternal countries (EDM, October 21, 2009).

    Earlier, both parties announced that they had reached a breakthrough, and during Erdogan’s Baku visit in May, they expressed their determination to sign the deal in Istanbul (EDM, June 1). The recent deal, which apparently came about only after intense negotiations, signifies not only their willingness to reactivate the energy partnership, but also in repairing Turkish-Azeri strategic ties. As statements issued during Aliyev’s trip attest, Turkey will continue to place Baku at the center of its South Caucasus policy.

    Still, energy is likely to remain the most important component of Turkish-Azeri ties. For instance, the Azeri State energy company SOCAR is already a major player in Turkey’s energy market, through its control of the country’s largest petrochemicals group PETKIM. Recently, it was announced that PETKIM would expand its operations through new multi-billion dollar investments in the coming years (www.azernews.az, June 3).

    The exact details of the agreements have not been disclosed and some sources maintain that both parties still have to work towards elaborating many details. Yildiz declined to specify the revised price, indicating that it will be flexible in order to allow for adjustment to market conditions. Yildiz also added that it will be more favorable compared to what Turkey is currently paying to Russia (Anadolu Ajansi, June 8). However, Turkish media speculated that the price will be raised from $120 to $300/tcm. Turkey will have to pay around $1.5 to $2 billion to compensate for price differences. The price for Turkey’s imports from Shah Deniz-II, which will be around 6-7 bcm annually, is likely to be higher than $300 per tcm, and will be assessed by taking into account investment costs (www.haberturk.com, June 8).

    The other major item, terms for the transit of further Azeri gas to Europe, was also settled. Ankara had been insisting on purchasing Azeri gas and then re-exporting it to Europe on its own terms, as was the case for Shah Deniz-I. Neither side clarified whether Turkey retained that right (Hurriyet Daily News, June 8), but Yildiz indicated that Turkey would be able to re-export the gas it imports from Azerbaijan in collaboration with PETKIM (Cihan, June 7). Some sources maintain that Azerbaijan will pay Turkey $45 per tcm in transit fees for its direct export to Europe, passing through Turkish territory (Sabah, June 8). There remains some uncertainty over who exactly will export Azeri gas to Europe, as Azeri sources failed to confirm that Turkey retains the re-exporting rights (www.enerjivadisi, June 9).

    Previously, delays in negotiations with Turkey had invited the ire of Azerbaijan, because the development of the Shah Deniz-II had to be postponed. The resolution of the transit issue and the interest from different pipeline projects is definitely welcome news for Azeri officials, as they can now discuss with their European partners the commissioning of Shah Deniz-II. Both parties also publicized the agreement as a positive step that would facilitate other projects to transport gas to Europe, most notably Nabucco. Natiq Aliyev emphasized that they were willing to support Nabucco, but they still had not received any purchase commitment from Nabucco. Currently, Turkey is able to export Azeri gas to Greece through the Turkey-Greece Interconnector (TGI) which integrates Turkish and Greek grids. The planned Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which will run from Greece to Italy, also seeks to tap into Azeri gas.

    Impending competition between Nabucco and other pipelines forming the EU’s Southern Corridor seems certain. While many believe Nabucco will be a non-starter without locking in Azeri gas, TAP has been awaiting the conclusion of the Turkish-Azeri negotiations.

    Representatives from both TAP and Nabucco welcomed the Turkish-Azeri deal (www.today.az, June 8). Azeri officials, anticipating the country’s gas output to increase substantially in future, welcome such outside demand which will boost their export potential. However, as the initial phase of Shah Deniz-II might only have limited extra output after it was allocated for Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, it remains to be seen if Azerbaijan can supply all the Southern-corridor pipelines simultaneously at their desired levels. Turkish media maintain that Italy might soon sign a transit agreement with Ankara and a supply commitment agreement with Baku, which will commit the entire remaining volume from Shah Deniz-II to TAP, leaving no extra capacity for Nabucco (Referans, June 9). Yildiz stated that Turkey supports both projects and the final decision will be taken by the Shah Deniz consortium (ANKA, June 9). In any case, the Turkish-Azeri agreement might herald new competition in the Southern Corridor.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-azeri-deal-may-herald-new-competition-in-southern-corridor/

  • THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: A CASE OF SELECTIVE MEMORY

    THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: A CASE OF SELECTIVE MEMORY

    Dmitry Babich

    RIA Novosti
    15:44 09/03/2010
    Moscow

    A resolution on the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire, passed
    by the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Relations, has raised a real
    storm in international diplomacy.

    Feverish diplomatic activity and apparent hesitations of the
    U.S. administration are a clear sign that Turkey’s foreign policy
    influence has grown.

    The committee’s resolution is non-binding and it is not clear if it
    will be placed before the whole house, but Turkey has already recalled
    its ambassador to Ankara for consultations, while U.S. Secretary of
    State Hillary Clinton, according to The New York Times, has asked
    the Congress not to take up this delicate matter now.

    When, in 1915, 1.5 million Armenians “disappeared” as a result of the
    action undertaken by the Young Turks’ government, Turkey and Armenia
    froze all contacts with each other. It was only last year that signs
    of thawing first became manifest, and in the fall of 2009 the sides
    agreed to establish diplomatic relations. This was viewed as a success
    for the Turkish leadership, both the prime minister and the president.

    Will now a final “thaw” be postponed again?

    That is not likely, although Turkish politicians are certain to take
    advantage of the situation to improve their standing.

    It is very likely that the current scandal will only boost the prestige
    of Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Not so long ago,
    he was the first politician in Turkish history to challenge the
    military, saying he uncovered a military plot initially scheduled
    for 2003. Before that, Erdogan made out a successful case for the
    Palestinians as Muslim brothers, harshly criticizing Israel for
    its Gaza Strip operation. During the U.S. Iraqi campaign, Turkey
    never allowed American troops to pass through its territory, forcing
    Washington to invade Iraq only from the south.

    Now the ambiguous position the U.S. has maintained for years on the
    Armenian genocide, which helped Washington to draw Turkey into NATO,
    is beginning to backfire against U.S. interests. This is a good
    lesson for all, and it is not limited to the events of 1915. There
    are other examples. The Western mass media are still keeping silent
    about anti-Armenian violence in Baku in 1989-1990. Most reports
    mention only that Soviet troops were introduced into the city.

    The reason for such selective memory in American and West European
    media is understandable: it is simple to place the blame on Moscow,
    forgetting all about previous events. At that moment, the troops
    sent by Moscow saved the lives of thousands of Armenians and other
    “Russian speakers” in Baku. Even many Russian media find the subject
    of the violence in Baku unpopular and almost forbidden. Some say this
    could lose Russia advertising contracts and lead to conflicts with
    influential people.

    “I do not know what has to be done to get the mass media throughout
    the world to highlight those events,” says political analyst Andronik
    Migranyan, a member of Russia’s Public Chamber. “Will Armenia itself
    have to carry out PR campaigns to make things change?”

    The point is that the events of 1915 and those of the 1980s in Armenia
    and Azerbaijan do not concern only Armenians; they concern everyone.

    The anti-Armenian violence in Baku came after an inhumane expulsion
    of Azerbaijanians from Nagorny Karabakh, followed by the Khodzhala
    tragedy that shocked the world. People must remember everything,
    because destruction of human life cannot be forgotten or remembered
    selectively. Otherwise, diplomatic embarrassments like the present
    U.S.-Turkish spat may become regular.

    The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not
    necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

    =======================================\

    Dmitry Babich
    Dmitry Babich graduated from the Journalism Department of Moscow State University. From 1990-1996, he worked as a correspondent and senior parliament correspondent in Komsomolskaya Pravda, which was at the time a respected Russian daily newspaper with a circulation of up to 20 million. He the covered politics for the TV-6 television channel for three years before becoming head of the international department of the weekly newspaper Moscow News. While he was working at Moscow News, Dima won a prize from ITAR-TASS for developing Russian-Ukrainian information exchange following a series of reports from Ukraine. He joined Russia Profile as a staff writer at the beginning of 2004.

    ======REPONCE FROM ERGUN KIRLIKOVALI ===============================

    ergunk

    Re:  “ The Armenian Genocide: A Case Of Selective Memory”,  By Dmitry Babich, RIA Novosti, Moscow, 9 March 2010, (produced below for your convenience – the undersigned thanks www.TurkishForum.com.tr for bringing this anti-Turkish, anti-Azeri, andti-Muslim artcile to my atention, giving me a chance to respond.)

    THE BOGUS ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: A CASE OF SELECTIVE MEMORY

    Dear Editor,

    So this is what Journalism Department of Moscow State University produces:  cockeyed look at world events to promote Russian interests at all costs.  Here is a writer who will shamelessly complain about selective memory while “practicing” it.

    Did you read any lines about Azeris killed by Armenians above?

    Did you see any remorse about Khodjaly exterminations of Azeris (genocide?) by Armenian thugs using Russian advisors and weapons?

    Any word about the mass killings of Azeris in Karabagh by Armenian soldiers and paramilitaries under the command of Russian “advisors”  using Russian tanks?

    Azeris were killed by Armenians toting Russian Mosins in 1893 and Russian Kalashnikovs in 1993?  Both under the leadership of Russian “advisors”.  What has changed in the hundred years, other than the model of the murder weapon?

    How about Armenian aggression in the seven rayons (provinces) surrounding Karabagh?  Why is he silent about that?  Isn’t that pure aggression and persecution?

    Most dramatic of all, perhaps, is the embarrassing silence of the Russian writer (and I use the term loosely) about the million or so Azeri refugees bracing, made homeless by the Armenian thugs toting Russian rifles, bracing for the 18th scorching summer after 17th freezing winter endured in leaky tents with little food or medicine.  Is this how a Russian “journalist” sees events?  Through the prism of selective memory?

    Just like those biased promoters of a bogus genocide who will…

    a) remember Morgenthau’s falsified reports but not Bristol’s or Hubbard’s eyewitness reports;

    b) remember the long-discredited lie of 1.5 million dead Armenians, but not the Paris Peace Conference report dated 29 March 1919 declaring the number “…more than 200,000…” from which the current lie had originated;

    c)  remember the Armenian dead (about 200,00 according to Paris Peace Conference of 1919) but not more than 524,000 Muslim, mostly Turkish dead;

    d) remember 24 April as the start of a fake genocide, but not the fact that 24 April was nothing more than the Ottoman Guantanamo when the known Armenian terrorists, insurgents, and spies and their suspected accomplices, were arrested for questioning, some of whom were later released;

    e) remember Turkish retaliations but not the Armenian revolts that started them, the biggest one of all being the Van rebellion of April 1915 which was the 9/11 of the Ottoman Empire when Armenian killed more than 40,000 of thei Muslim neighbors and turned the city over to the invading Russian armies;

    f)  remember Dink, but not Arikan, and 70 other the Armenians killed since 1973;

    g)  remember Armenia Tereset (temporary resettlement of 1915) but not the facts that Armenians backstabbed their own country at a time when the motherland was under brutal foreign invasion in the West (Dardanelles by the French, and Anzacs, in the East (by Russians and Armenians), in the South (by the British in Sinai, Palestine, and Mesopotamia);

    h)  remember Armenians who were resettled because of their treasonous activities and revolts but not the Crimean Tatars (Turks) who were deported in cattle wagons to Kazakhstan, or Meshketian Turks to Uzbekiastan, or Koreans or Ukranians or Chechens or tens of millions of others  to  distant deserts and barren plains of Central Asia and icy regios of Siberia, who met worse tragic end, if such a thing is possible,  at the hands of their brutal Russian handlers… and many more (too long to list here)

    i)  remember to quote the Armenian commentator Andronik today but not the Armenian terrorist Andranik of last century who ruthlessly murdered many non-combatant, unarmed Muslims, mostly Turks, after torturing them in unspeakable manners;  or those other Armenian terrorists like Dro, Aram, and thousands of others who were trained and supported by the Russians all along the way;

    Russians are the last people on earth to talk about selective memory or persecution of defenseless ethnic people.

    Sincerely,   Ergün KIRLIKOVALI
    President-Elect, ATAA
    ergun@cox.net
    9741 Irvine Center Drive
    Irvine, CA 92618-4324 , USA
    Cell: (949) 878-1186
  • Turkey Reveals True Intentions in Protocols Game

    Turkey Reveals True Intentions in Protocols Game
    Asbarez Post
    		 Tuesday October 27, 2009

    Forward this email to a Friend jmml opgr1 img3




    WATCH NOW

    Turkey Reveals True Intentions in Protocols Game

    Protocols Ratification to Be Held Hostage For Concessions on Karabakh

    Turkey’s parliament will not ratify the normalization agreements with Armenia unless international efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict yield a breakthrough that favors Azerbaijan, according to Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu.

    “In order to get a yes [vote,] we need to have some progress in the [Karabakh] peace talks because Azerbaijan is a strategic ally and almost a domestic issue for Turkish foreign policy,” Davutoglu said in an interview with Al Jazeera television aired on Monday. The international community should help to end “the illegal occupation of 20 percent of Azerbaijani territories” if it wants a speedy normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, he said.  More…


  • Progress in Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices and Transit

    Progress in Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices and Transit

    Progress in Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices and Transit

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 153
    August 10, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Following the signing of energy cooperation agreements between Turkey and Russia, Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz continued his “energy diplomacy,” by visiting Azerbaijan. Prior to departing for the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, the Azerbaijani enclave between Turkey and Armenia, on August 8 Yildiz stressed that his trip followed the agreements Turkey recently signed on both the Nabucco project and South Stream. He also added that as part of intensive energy diplomacy, he will travel to Syria this week to sign an agreement for the construction of a pipeline that will connect the Arab gas pipeline with the Turkish grid (Anadolu Ajansi, August 8).

    In Nakhchivan, Yildiz met with the President of Nakhchivan Vasif Talibov and the head of the Azerbaijani oil company SOCAR, Rovnag Abdullayev. Turkey and Nakhchivan signed a memorandum of understanding on laying a pipeline from the East Anatolian city of Igdir to Nakhchivan, which will carry half a billion cubic meters (bcm) of Azeri gas annually to Nakhchivan (Cihan, August 8).

    Another major part of Yildiz’s agenda were talks between Turkey and Azerbaijan concerning the gas trade and transportation. Although the negotiations have been under way for some time, Ankara and Baku have been unable to reach an agreement on three inter-related issues: re-pricing the gas Turkey imports from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz I reserves, setting the price and volume for Turkey’s imports from the Shah Deniz II, and developing a regime for the transit of the gas through the Turkish territory (www.cnnturk.com, August 8).

    These issues have implications beyond bilateral relations between Ankara and Baku. In the context of the discussions concerning the construction of alternative pipelines carrying Caspian basin gas to European markets, there is growing interest in tapping into Azerbaijan’s resources, particularly the Shah Deniz II field, which is expected to be operational by 2016. Whereas the European companies are interested in purchasing Azeri gas to feed Nabucco, Russia has been trying to lock in the same resources through a long-term contract to supply its alternative South Stream project and to pre-empt Nabucco. Baku is looking to secure the best deal from this competition, and diversify its export routes as much as possible, which led it to export a symbolic volume of gas to Russia through a non-binding agreement in June, which seems to have paid some tactical dividends (EDM, July 17).

    Azerbaijan’s decision is considered as a “flexible tactical move” on Baku’s part (EDM, July 2). The agreement demonstrated to Ankara and its Nabucco partners that Azerbaijan was not short of options for the sale and transport of its gas. Indeed, the urgency induced by the agreement served as a wake-up call for Turkey and other European countries, which helped convince Ankara to end its stalling and open the way to sign the Nabucco inter-governmental agreement (EDM, July 6).

    Nonetheless, a second tactical goal of the Azeri-Russian agreement has yet to bear concrete results: “the $350 price offer [which Russia will pay for the Azeri gas] has set a benchmark that other importers of Azerbaijani gas may have to bid against” (EDM, July 2). Indeed, Baku’s sudden move surprised many in Ankara at the time, leading to speculation that Turkey might have to pay higher prices. Nonetheless, when asked about the impact of the Azeri-Russian deal on the Turkish-Azeri talks on re-pricing, Yildiz preferred to decouple the two processes from each other. “How much does the [Azeri-Russian agreement] affect the price? This question should be directed to Abdullayev. We had submitted our offer before the agreement with Russia, and we are still at the same position. Because, [we believe] our price offer takes into account both sides’ interests, and ensures that the project remains feasible” (www.haberturk.com, July 10).

    Ankara claimed that it offered a “fair” price to Baku, and it expected this to be accepted (EDM, June 4). Apparently Turkey proved unable to satisfy the expectations of the Azeri side, and Yildiz and Abdullayev have held several meetings to discuss this issue. Ankara’s reluctance to revise the price for Azeri gas raises suspicions that, using its geographic position as leverage, Ankara is resorting to “tactics of extortion” to maximize its benefits at Azerbaijan’s expense, which might eventually undermine the prospects for Nabucco (EDM, July 2).

    Nonetheless, Azerbaijan’s ongoing talks with Turkey demonstrate its willingness to export its gas to European markets independent of Russian-controlled pipelines and its treatment of Nabucco as an overriding national interest. However, the conditions that Ankara will attach to the use of its territory for exports, including transit fees and re-export rights, are a major factor influencing Baku’s decision, which raises a larger question about the Turkish government’s position on pipeline diplomacy.

    After signing agreements on both Nabucco and South Stream, Ankara maintains that the two projects are not necessarily exclusive. Moreover, in response to charges that Turkey’s agreement with Russia, which granted South Stream the right to conduct seismic feasibility studies in the Turkish zone of the Black Sea, was a serious blow to Nabucco, Turkish officials maintain that “Turkey is not a partner in the South Stream project and only allowed the use of its territorial waters in the Black Sea, while the country is a partner state in Nabucco.” They also added that Turkey still considers Nabucco as a strategic priority (Hurriyet Daily News, August 7).

    If Turkey indeed treats Nabucco as a priority project, one area where it could tilt the balance in favor of Nabucco is to facilitate the westward flow of Azeri gas. In this way, it could cement its ties to Baku and reassure its Western partners of its commitment to Nabucco. No agreement was signed during Yildiz’s meeting, but the statements by Azeri officials signaled a promising future. Abdullayev said that, “we came close to concluding Turkey-Azerbaijan gas agreements. We can soon finalize the issue of transit prices. Gas from Shah Deniz will also come to Turkey, and will flow to Europe through Turkey. This will support the two sister nations” (www.ntvturk.com, August 8).

    https://jamestown.org/program/progress-in-turkish-azeri-talks-on-gas-prices-and-transit/
  • Turkish-Russian Grand Bargain in Energy Cooperation

    Turkish-Russian Grand Bargain in Energy Cooperation

    Turkish-Russian Grand Bargain in Energy Cooperation

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 152
    August 7, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s August 6 visit to Ankara marked a new era for “enhanced multi-dimensional partnership,” between Ankara and Moscow. Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed some twenty agreements covering energy, trade and other fields. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi also attended part of the talks between Erdogan and Putin, considering the involvement of Italian companies in some of these projects. The most remarkable dimension of the various joint projects concerns energy cooperation, most notably Turkey’s expression of support for Russia’s South Stream project (Anadolu Ajansi, www.cnnturk.com, www.ntvmsnbc.com, August 6).

    In oil transportation, Russia committed to participate in the planned Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline (SCP), connecting the Turkish Black Sea city of Samsun to the Mediterranean terminal Ceyhan. Turkey has solicited Russian participation in the SCP, which will bypass the congested Turkish Straits. Moscow has proven reluctant, and has instead promoted another bypass option through Burgas-Alexandroupolis between Bulgaria and Greece. Meanwhile, Turkey took further steps to make the SCP attractive for the Russian side, by linking this project with the Turkish-Israeli-Indian energy partnership (EDM, November 25, 2008).

    Erdogan expressed his pleasure with the Russian decision to commit its crude. Ankara can consider this development as its greatest success in this grand bargain, given that Turkey has worked to convert Ceyhan, where the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline also terminates, into a global energy hub. However, Putin did not rule out interest in Burgas-Alexandroupolis, and instead emphasized that the two pipelines might be complementary in meeting the growing demand for export routes. This statement raises questions about how committed Russia will be to the SCP, given that Russian companies own the majority of shares in the other Burgas-Alexandroupolis option.

    In terms of gas cooperation, Turkey will allow Russia to conduct explorations and feasibility studies in the Turkish exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, as part of Russian plans to construct South Stream. Since this move comes against the background of Turkey’s decision to sign the rival Nabucco pipeline agreement last month, it raises many questions, as to how it will affect Nabucco, which Turkey considers a “strategic priority,” as well as European energy security issues. Despite the questions surrounding its feasibility and high costs, as well as its negative implications for Nabucco, Erdogan maintained that both projects contribute to diversification efforts.

    It appears that the “grand bargain” was between the SCP and Blue Stream. Ahead of the meeting, Yuri Ushakov, the Deputy Head of the Russian Government Staff said that “Turkey made concessions in South Stream and we made concessions in SCP,” but added that he had doubts over the SCP’s feasibility (Anadolu Ajansi, August 5). A statement from Berlusconi’s office also claimed that he had helped broker a rapprochement between both countries on these two issues (Hurriyet Daily News, August 6). However, domestically, there are concerns that in this “exchange” of concessions, Turkey did not gain much. The SCP’s importance was inflated, because it was developed by business interests close to the government (www.turksam.org.tr, August 7). Another gas deal concerned Ankara’s request to renew the contract under which it purchases Russian gas through the Western pipeline via the Balkans. Erdogan announced that the contract (which expires in 2011) will be renewed for 20 years. Turkey had complained about the high prices and the leave-or-pay conditions in its gas deals with Russia. Putin said it was renewed on favorable terms to Turkey, but the contract’s details are unclear.

    Erdogan also said that they discussed the extension of Blue Stream II to transport Russian gas to Israel, Lebanon and even Cyprus. Blue Stream, running underneath the Black Sea, is the second route carrying Russian gas to Turkey. Moscow previously raised the possibility that it could use Blue Stream II in order to transport gas to Europe, but this option was rejected, since it contradicted Nabucco and Russia sought to use Turkey only as a transportation route. Now, Ankara wants to revive it as part of a North-South corridor. Based on the leaders’ statements, it appears that the existing capacity of Blue Stream might be improved and gas could be transferred to the Mediterranean through this pipeline.

    However, although Erdogan praised this development as another major success, there is no guarantee that Russia will grant “re-export rights,” which indicates that if Blue Stream II is implemented, Moscow will continue to view Turkish territory as a mere conduit for its gas, which raises the question: how will Turkey benefit from the agreement? Russian priorities also involve Turkey’s first nuclear power plant tender, which was awarded to a Russian-Turkish consortium. As the original price was too high, the tender has long awaited cabinet approval (EDM, January 26). Meanwhile, the Russian side lowered the price, and offered a compromise. Prior to Putin’s visit, it was expected that with further “bargaining,” a final deal might be reached, but apparently it failed. Nevertheless, Ankara and Moscow signed protocols regarding energy cooperation, including the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, early notification of accidents, exchange of information on facilities, and to continue talks on the nuclear tender.

    The most controversial development is perhaps Ankara’s support for South Stream. Erdogan reiterated his belief that Nabucco and South Stream are complementary, yet turned a blind eye to several Russian officials’ (including Putin) statements to the contrary. It is assumed in Ankara that growing European energy demand will accommodate both projects; but this ignores the competition between both projects over the same downstream markets. Moreover, the Turkish side fails to appreciate the challenges Russia is facing in investing in its domestic gas industry, and acts on the assumption that “Russia has enormous reserves,” while failing to realize that Russia is also planning to tap into the same upstream producers, namely Central Asian and Caspian gas, just as the Nabucco project envisages (www.ntvmsnbc.com, August 6).

    Putin also added that a consensus was reached on Russia building gas storage facilities in the Salt Lake. Taken together with the announced joint investments between Turkish and Russian firms, including Gazprom, it is unclear whether the Turkish government recognizes the consequences of these decisions. Russia has effectively used the practice of co-opting the gas infrastructure of transport and consumer countries, as part of its efforts to monopolize downstream markets. It is unclear how this penetration into the Turkish grid might affect Ankara’s future energy policies.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-russian-grand-bargain-in-energy-cooperation/