Tag: Mustafa Akyol

  • Is Liberalism Islamic?

    Is Liberalism Islamic?

    An Interview with Mustafa Akyol
    By Haroon Moghul

    • akyol 302Haroon Moghul

      RD associate editor Haroon Moghul is a fellow at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, a senior editor at the Islamic Monthly and a doctoral candidate at Columbia University. His work has appeared or he has been otherwise featured on CNN, BBC, History Channel, al-Jazeera, Today’s Zaman, and Tikkun. He is the author of The Order of Light (Penguin, 2006).

      • Islam without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty
      • by Mustafa Akyol
      • W. W. Norton & Company , 2011

      It seemed a few years ago that the post-9/11 spike in the field of Islamic studies was waning, no doubt accelerated by economic crisis and fatigue with a long, uncertain war. But then the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt brought Islam, Arabs, and the Middle East, back to global attention.

      This interest will only continue to grow; the direction of the Middle East will be crucial to how our world turns out in coming decades. And with Islamist parties triumphing in recent elections across a democratizing region, we in America are ever more concerned—and confused.

      Who can we turn to for some insight, and not only thought, but actual ideas? What voices over there can we learn from—and should we listen to?

      I had the chance to speak with Mustafa Akyol, author of Islam Without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty; Akyol is a Turkish media personality, newspaper columnist, and intellectual. He also gets to live in Istanbul, which should properly go on his resumé.

      Many have argued Turkey’s experience is deeply important to the Middle East (and see my post this weekend about Newt Gingrich’s longtime admiration for Kemal Ataturk). Whether or not you agree, Akyol deserves to be more widely read, as he pushes well past the typical clichés—for him, Islam and liberalism are not merely reconciled, but—well, you’ll see.

      HM: Tell me a little bit about how and why you wrote this book.

      MA: This book is mainly about the problem of freedom in Islam. I argue that Islam, as its very core, is a religion that liberated the individual from the bond of the tribe and similar collective bodies. But I also show how the initial impetus of the faith was partly overshadowed as a result of some early theological controversies, and, moreover, political decisions. This also means that some of those early debates can be reopened, and coercive elements in Islamic law and culture can be reformed. And I am saying all these within a particularly Turkish outlook, as I explain the little known history of “Muslim liberalism” that emerged in the late Ottoman Empire and modern-day Turkey.

      Who did you write this for?

      I wrote this for both Muslims and non-Muslims who believe that Islam and liberal democracy are fundamentally incompatible. Obviously, I disagree with them. I rather want to show them that a genuinely Islamic yet liberal view of the world is possible. Muslims can tolerate the “freedom to sin,” for example, not because they condone sin, but that its judgment should be left to God.

      Can you explain what you mean by liberalism?

      By liberalism, I mean a political and economic system which limits the powers of the state, and gives individuals, and their voluntary associations, the freedom to shape their destinies. I think liberty has been a value throughout history, but liberalism became a full-fledged ideology in the modern age, for the modern state threatened liberty in unprecedented levels.

      I also think that today liberalism presents the best medium for Muslims to live Islam in the various ways that they understand it.

      Let me push you a little bit here. I would argue that most interpretations of Islam place a strong emphasis on the social, the communal, often above the individual—and if we stress the liberation of the individual from larger collectives, does Islam play any role in the great social questions of our time? Should Islam also speak to the intermediary institutions, between state power and individual life, to temper that power and protect that individual?

      Of course I am not saying that Islam does not have a sense of the community. It certainly does. Moreover, that sense implies a strong basis for civil society, which is of course very important for empowering and protecting the individual in the face of threats coming the from the modern state.

      However, I believe that the Qur’an, with its strong emphasis on the individual’s personal faith and deeds, presented a more individualistic worldview than some Muslims appreciate. I actually believe that the individualism of the Qur‘an was gradually overshadowed by a more communitarian mindset that shaped Islam in its formative centuries. I explore such differences between the Qur’an and the post-Qur’anic tradition, and how they came to be, in my book.

      You say Muslims should tolerate sin. But of course we don’t tolerate some sins—murder, cheating, lying in certain circumstances. Are there some sins that we must object to socially? And if it isn’t a matter of state power, should Muslims still condemn sins?

      You make a great point—and that is something I discuss in my book chapter, The Freedom to Sin. There, I suggest a distinction between sin and crime. Sins are acts of personal disobedience to God, like drinking wine or refraining from daily prayer. But crimes are acts that hurt other people, like murder or theft. Most crimes are also sins, but I am saying that not all sins should be considered as crimes. And I am saying that by looking at what the Qur’an really penalizes and what it does not.

      You mention the distinction between sin and crime. However, many Muslims—like many people of other faiths—believe that sins cause genuine harm in the world. For example, that sinning causes God to, say, withhold rain from the earth. This might lead religious folks to believe that sins, too, should be socially punished. What do you say to that?

      Well, first I would disagree with the theology there. The Qur’an tells us that some specific societies in history—such as Sodom and Gomorrah—were destroyed by God via natural disasters; but I think those are exceptional miracles and not the norm. The norm, I think, is that natural disasters happen via natural causes which God has set in place, and are not related with our sins. Earthquakes really do not selectively hit cities of vice, such as, say, Las Vegas. They just hit the cities that are placed on tectonic faultiness. Or raining patterns really do not show any correlation with levels of godliness or godlessness.

      Even if people believe that this or that disaster has happened because of this or that sin, this subjective idea cannot be the base of objective laws that will be imposed on us. Shall we impose vegetarianism by law, for example, because some Buddhists see meat-eating as the source of all evil? We have the right to believe in our theologies, but we cannot impose them to all.

      I walk through the bookstore, see your book, and as a Muslim I think, another book about Islam that frames us around extremism.  Do you think that perhaps framing Islam around extremism, even to push back against it, might just reinforce the same narrative?

      Well, “extremism” is a vague term, and I really wanted to focus on something more specific: authoritarianism in Islamic law and culture. In other words, this book is not about why Muslims should reject terrorism—the overwhelming majority of the world’s Muslims already do that. But not all of them tend to be that liberal when it comes to issues such as apostasy, blasphemy, sin, or different interpretations of Islam. That’s why one scholar said that there is a problem of “illiberal moderates” in the Islamic world. That is the problem that I am really focusing on.

      You have a lot of reach in Turkey. And of course, Islam in Turkey is increasingly seizing the world’s attention. From your perspective, how do you see Islam in Turkey right now? What are you pleased with, and what are you worried about?

      Of course, we Turks still have lots of problems with our own politics and culture. Yet it is fair to say that Islam in Turkey has a much healthier experience with democracy. Many people would readily say that Turkeys owes this to Ataturk and his ultra-secularist reforms. But, in my book, I argue that we actually owe our Islamo-democratic synthesis to the opponents of the strict Atat¸rkist tradition, such as Menderes of the ’60s, Ozal of the ’80s and most lately Erdogan. Today, the mainstream Islamic view in Turkey is at peace with the secular (but not secularist!) state, and how this came to be is a curious story that I relate in my book.

      Can you expand on the distinction between the secular state and the secularist state?

      Sure. A secular state is neutral to religion, and respects religious practices unless they cause harm to individuals. A secularist state, however, bears an ideological hostility to religion, and wants to secularize society by banning religious practices or institutions. Most communist dictatorships of the past century were secularist states. Kemalist Turkey, too, has been a secularist state—which banned the headscarf, Sufi orders, or religious education—and it has given a bad name to secularity among the world’s Muslims. Luckily, though, that excessive secularism of Turkey has been defanged to some extent in the recent years.

      I want to elaborate on this distinction between secular and secularist. In places like Egypt, and potentially Libya and Yemen as well, democracy will throw forward explicitly Islamist parties, however much some of them might want to deny it (although Islamist doesn’t mean authoritarian). Do you think these parties can contribute to building democratic societies? Is it possible to build post-secular states, neutral between religion and secularism?

      ”Islamist” does not mean authoritarian, if it implies a political party that is inspired by Islamic principles and values, but articulates them within the rules of liberal democracy. The closest example to that seems to be Ennahda in Tunisia, and I am hopeful about its future. But other Islamist parties such as the Freedom and Justice Party of Egypt, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, still seem to believe in an “Islamic state” that will impose an “Islamic way of life” on society. The problem with that is not just authoritarianism. It is also that whomever imposes Islam via the state will be imposing the “Islam” that he or she understands.

      But since no Muslim school of thought can claim an ultimate access to truth—as the “Postponers” of the 7th century realized, as I explain in my book—the state should better be neutral when it comes to religious matters. Whether the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and its counterparts in other Arab countries will be humble enough to see that is the next big question.

      How do you see Islam faring in Europe? In America? Do you think the Arab spring might make things better or worse?

      I think partly in America and more so in Europe, Islam suffers from being the religion of the immigrants. Immigrant communities sometimes have problems simply because of their “alienness,” and the unwelcoming-ness of their hosts, and these problems can appear as a friction between Islam and non-Islam.

      Whenever I speak about this, I note that the EU member country with the highest percentage of Muslims in its population is not UK, France or Germany but Bulgaria. Yet you never hear about Bulgaria’s “Muslim question,” for its Muslims are native Turks and Pomaks who have been living in that country for centuries.

      As for the Arab Spring, I am of course very supportive of it, for it is toppling or challenging the dictators who oppressed Arab societies for decades. (Right now, I am keeping my fingers crossed for the fall of the Baath tyranny Syria.) But democracies—let alone liberal democracies—do not emerge overnight, and the post-revolutionary countries will need some time and lots of effort to build them.

      I know this is a loaded question, but what is Islam’s purpose? Or, perhaps I’ll put it another way: What is it that attracts you, and keeps you affiliated with, this religion?

      Well, I believe Islam’s main purpose is the same with that of all other Abrahamic monotheisms: To make humans aware of their Creator and His intentions. In other words, it is primarily about connecting God and man. Of course, God, through the Qur’an, gives man some rules and principles that will guide his behavior to other men as well—that is where Islamic law comes from. But I also think that this law, in its divine origin, is intentionally limited and flexible, for social structures always change and laws should adapt to that change.

      What keeps me affiliated with Islam? Well, its main purpose: I believe that I have a Creator, and Islam is the straightest path that I know to connect with Him.

      Let’s say I run a madrasa. (Note: I don’t). What books, thinkers, ideas would you recommend to the next generation of Muslim scholars, theologians, and preachers?

      Well, if it were your madrasa, I am sure it would be a cool one, and I would be happy to support it. As for the religious curriculum, I would suggest, first, a good translation of and commentary to the Qur’an. Then a good book on the history of Islamic thought, which would expose the students to all the different colors of our religion that has evolved in the past fourteen centuries.

      Among modern writers, I would suggest books by the late Alia Izzetbegovic, the “philosopher-king” and the brave leader of the Bosnians, Muhammed Abduh, Fazlur Rahman, and even Said Nursi, a Turko-Kurdish Islamic scholar and hero whose emphasis on “freedom” is little known outside of Turkey. Finally, I would also add the Bible to the curriculum. The Qur’an repeatedly refers to it, and it is a pity that we Muslims have taken very little notice of that.

      What’s next for you?

      Well, God knows that best. On my side, I am just expecting many talks and conferences in the year to come. But then I have other books in mind. Perhaps something with the title, “Towards A Free Muslim Mind,” which will articulate a Muslim worldview that is genuinely religious but also consistently liberal. I am hoping to write a novel at some point, too—a novel that will put all my ideas into characters and events, and which will hopefully inspire the readers.

  • Why Turkey is bombing the PKK

    Why Turkey is bombing the PKK

    Turkey’s military operations against Kurdish separatists are a legitimate act of self-defense, according to analyst.

    Mustafa Akyol

    201191913996734 20
    In August, Turkish planes bombed PKK positions across the border in northern Iraq  [GALLO/GETTY]

    On the night of August 17, several Turkish military jets bombed the Qandil mountains in Northern Iraq. Their target was the headquarters and the training camps of the PKK, the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party, which is a terrorist group according not just to Ankara but also Washington and most European capitals. Since then, strikes have continued intermittently, and word has it now that the Turkish government is also planning a ground operation against the PKK.

    Criticisms have been raised in the face of this anti-terrorist campaign. Some PKK sympathisers in Turkey condemned the attacks and attempted to organise “human shields” to protect PKK bases. The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government argued that Turkish air strikes hit not just PKK militants but also seven civilians, although the charge has been denied by the Turkish military. Yet, due to this alleged collateral damage, some commentators draw parallels between Turkey and the Israeli incursions in Gaza to which Turkey strongly objects. Hence a tongue-in-cheek critique read, “Turkey Commits War Crimes in Iraq: Where’s Goldstone?,” while another one called for “a flotilla in support of the Kurds”.

    But what is really happening in North Iraq? And why Ankara is doing it?

    A troubled history

    In a sense, this is simply the latest round of the almost 30-year-old conflict between the Turkish security forces and the PKK. But, in another sense, things are different this time, for the Turkish approach to its “Kurdish problem” has changed significantly in recent years.

    To begin with, one has to acknowledge that Turkey has a shameful history with regards to its Kurdish citizens. The republic, which was founded in 1923 from the remains of the more pluralist Ottoman Empire, decided to forcefully assimilate its Kurds, which make up some 15 per cent of its population. Hence, from the mid-1920s, the Kurdish language was banned and Kurds were declared “of the Turkish stock”, or, in a later version, “mountain Turks” who forgot who they were. The successive Kurdish rebels who protested these official policies were brutally suppressed, making Turkey’s Kurdish-dominated southeast an ever-“sensitive” region.

    The PKK, which launched a guerilla war against the state in 1984, was partly a reaction to this authoritarian legacy of the Turkish state. But the PKK, with a blend of ethnic nationalism and orthodox Marxism-Leninism, was even more authoritarian, which was evident in the violence it unleashed even on the Kurds who refused to support its cause. Over the years, many such “traitor” Kurds, along with their families, were massacred by the PKK. PKK fighters attacked Turkish civilians as well, such as teachers in the region whom they saw as “agents of Turkish cultural imperialism”.

    The conflict between the PKK and state forces reached its peak in mid-90s, during which both sides committed various atrocities. It is now regrettably accepted in Turkey that the gendarme and the police committed thousands of extra-judicial killings during that massive anti-insurgency campaign, which achieved a temporal success in 1999 with the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, who is still in a special Turkish prison.

    A new beginning

    A new era began in Turkey in 2002, when the Justice and Development Party (JDP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to power. AKP’s vision not only differed from the official definition of secularism but also the official definition of national identity. In 2003, the AKP government introduced EU-encouraged legal reforms that lifted most of the bans on the Kurdish language. In 2005, when the PKK announced the end of its years-long cease-fire, Prime Minister Erdogan, in a speech in predominantly Kurdish Diyarbakir, acknowledged the “Kurdish question” in which “the state has made mistakes”. He also began speaking of a more pluralist Turkey, in which not everybody was Turkish, but Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Circassian, and other ethnic identities were bonded through citizenship.

    Yet none of this impressed the PKK, and its implicit political representatives in the Turkish parliament, as their demands focussed not on more rights for Kurds, but on more concessions for the group, such as the release of Öcalan and the amnesty for all terror convicts and suspects. In 2009, the AKP government signaled that it could accept some of these demands by launching a process called “the Democratic Opening”. Despite widespread suspicion among its voter base, and accusations of “high treason” from opposition parties, the Erdogan government opened a 24-hour state TV in Kurdish, lifted remaining bans on the language, and even welcomed a group of PKK guerrillas to Turkey as the first step of a “peace process”.

    However, the PKK remained not just unsatisfied but also growingly irritated for a specific reason: AKP’s “democratic opening” was not enough to satisfy the PKK, but it was enough to win many Kurds, making the AKP the most popular party among them. (Pro-PKK parties have never won more than 6 per cent of the votes, while the rest of the Kurdish vote, some 10 per cent, has gone overwhelmingly to the AKP in all elections since 2002.) This made the AKP, the most Kurdish-friendly mainstream political party in Turkish history, the greatest target of the PKK. No wonder more than a hundred AKP bureaus in the Kurdish southeast were attacked by PKK militants and supporters during the election campaign of 2011.

    A totalitarian problem

    Since the general elections in last June, which resulted in an overwhelming AKP victory, the PKK’s attacks have escalated, leading many Turkish liberals, who used to be more lenient with the organisation, to redefine it as a part of the problem and not the solution. In mid-June, in the wake of a terrorist attack, pro-PKK politicians took another step by unilaterally declaring “autonomy” in the southeast, whose blueprints talk about organising the whole Kurdish society beginning with “village communes”. Various Turkish political scientists, including liberals who defend Kurdish rights, have condemned the plan as a “totalitarian” vision to impose PKK ideology and control on all Kurds.

    This ongoing violence of the PKK – and its urban wing, the KCK – led the AKP government to respond with security measures. First came the 2009 arrest of hundreds of KCK members, who are accused of preparing terrorist attacks in urban centres. Yet still, the government refrained from a massive military operation against the PKK until very recently. However, the killing of more than 40 Turkish soldiers in late July and early August by the PKK led Erdogan to an enough-is-enough moment. Hence the air strikes.

    In short, the current Turkish operation against the PKK is a legitimate act of self-defence. Surely, as the government also knows, there is no definitive military solution to the problem, and what is ultimately needed is a political settlement. But no government can chose inaction in the face of aggression. Plus, it takes two to tango, and the PKK refuses to be one, by constantly raising the stakes and using violence to impose them. In the face of a Turkey which has changed so dramatically and positively, it remains an archaic terrorist force. So Ankara is right to use “sticks” to deal with the PKK, hoping that it might be interested rather in the “carrots”, which are always on the table.

    Mustafa Akyol is a Turkish journalist, and the author of the just-released Islam without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty(W.W. Norton)

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.

    Source:
    Al Jazeera
  • Islam–With Institutions of Liberty

    Islam–With Institutions of Liberty

    One of the most intriguing political writers today is Mustafa Akyol of Turkey, a journalist and commentator in Istanbul, whose book, Islam Without Extremes: An Islamic Case for Liberty, has just been published by W. W. Norton. It is Akyol’s argument that freedom in the ways recognized in the Western tradition, will be best promoted in Islamic countries if the government is in some sense Islamic rather than secularist.

    He has a point, indeed, several points. Most 20th and 21st century Arab dictatorships have been secular and have feared and siuppressed Islamists–Syria, Iraq, even Egypt and Tunisia. These regimes have been ruthless, as we see now in the cities of Syria.

    But we also see a different extreme in Iran, and, for that matter, in de facto daily governance in Pakistan. There Islamists cruelly attack people of other faiths and impose a tyrannous brand of Islam on their own co-religionists.

    Unfortunately, Akyol’s model of a beth path in contemporary life is Turkey. Its government has repudiated many of the excesses of the former secular government and turned its economy, at least, toward the West. However, Turkey is also a poor model on many accounts; press censorship, for example.

    Akyol therefore is most interested in historic examples of the kind of liberty-loving government he thinks is possible for Muslims. For these one must go back a long ways, and the record isn’t clear.

    On the other hand, the models of republican freedom for the American Founders were not untainted, either. Think of democratic Athens and Reublican Rome. In other words, the American Founders had to invent the system they wanted. The historic “models” were mainly points of reference.

    At his strongest, Akyol holds out the hope for a brand new version of government within an Islamic context.

    via Discovery News – Islam–With Institutions of Liberty.

  • What does Turkey think?

    What does Turkey think?

    Understanding the new Turkey from within

    “What does Turkey think?” is a collection of nine essays by Turkish experts and political figures from different backgrounds – Islamists, secularists, Kurds and liberals. The essays examine how questions of identity, democratisation and Ankara’s evolving foreign policy are seen from within the new Turkey.

    turkeysideThe authors of “What does Turkey think?” are Dimitar Bechev, Mustafa Akyol, Ayşe Kadıoğlu, Orhan Miroğlu, Şahin Alpay, Hakan Altinay, Osman Baydemir, Ibrahim Kalın, Atila Eralp, Zerrin Torun, Suat Kınıklıoğlu, Soli Özel and Ivan Krastev.

    “What does Turkey think?” was made possible by the support of Stiftung Mercator, and is a collaboration between ECFR, Stiftung Mercator, the Sofia-based Centre for Liberal Studies (CLS) and the Istanbul-based Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM).

    There are three key areas of public discussion:

    1. Can the new Turkey deal with its internal diversity, reconcile historical tensions and heal deep wounds?

    2. Is Turkey moving in the direction of consolidating democratic achievements, or is it threatened by a populist tyranny of the majority or even authoritarian rule?

    3. Why is Turkey acting independently of the West, and is it a partner or rival for the EU and US, particularly in its own neighbourhood?

    Many Turks feel alienated by the EU’s increasing reluctance to admit Turkey as a member. As a result the EU is absent from many internal Turkish debates, although it still matters in crucial ways:

    * In identity politics the EU may help Turkey reconcile its internal differences, for instance in finding a peaceful solution for the Kurdish issue.

    * The EU has helped to anchor domestic Turkish democratisation and now has the potential to allay fears that the power of the AKP is unchecked as a new constitution is drafted.

    * The EU remains vital for Turkish economic success, thanks to its proximity and the heavy connectedness with Europe’s massive internal market. Although Turkey has been growing quickly, it cannot compete with East Asian labour costs and needs Europe as it tries to move up the value chain and develop a modern knowledge-driven economy.

    * Turkey’s attractiveness to neighbours in the Middle East benefits from its close economic and political ties with Europe.

    Download the PDF of “What does Turkey think?” here

    Click here for more ECFR work on Turkey, including articles, blog posts and a range of podcasts.

    “Turkey is now an actor, an economic pole, and perhaps an aspiring regional hegemon. Shunned by the EU, Turkey has paradoxically become more like it: globalised, economically liberal and democratic.”

    Dimitar Bechev, editor and ECFR senior policy fellow.

    “The new dynamism in Turkish foreign policy over the last decade has prompted a range of questions. To answer such questions, one needs to understand the changes in Turkish domestic politics, in surrounding regions and in the global order over the first decade of the 21st century.”

    Ibrahim Kalın, Senior Advisor to Prime Minister Erdogan on foreign policy and public diplomacy.

    Background:

    * GDP per capita (PPP) was $14,243 in 2010, compared to around $6,000 a decade earlier. Its GDP is expected to average 4% growth per year over the next decade.

    * Turkey’s economy is the 16th largest in the world, and the 6th largest in Europe.

    * The EU accounts for 40.5% of Turkish imports (€40.5 billion) and 45.9% of exports (€33.6 billion). It is also the source of 80% of FDI into Turkey.

    * The AKP is expected to win a third term in power in this June’s parliamentary elections. The opposition CHP (People’s Republican Party) is also likely to perform strongly, thanks to its new leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and its shift towards social democracy while still playing the role of guardian of Kemalism.

    * The economy, constitutional change, the Kurdish question and democratic consolidation are all key electoral issues.

    Notes:

    * This paper, like all ECFR publications, represents the views of its authors, not the collective position of ECFR or its Council Members.

    * “What does Turkey think?” is part of a series of studies carried out by ECFR to explore the internal debates of other powers in an increasingly multipolar world at the level of ideas as well as power. This publication follows the same methodology as ECFR’s earlier project on “What does Russia think?”, and ECFR director Mark Leonard’s book “What does China think?”

    via The European Council on Foreign Relations | What does Turkey think?.