Tag: Missile shield

  • Arab Spring Sees Turkish-Iranian Rivalry Take a New Turn

    Arab Spring Sees Turkish-Iranian Rivalry Take a New Turn

    Arab Spring Sees Turkish-Iranian Rivalry Take a New Turn

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 186

    October 11, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey’s decision to host a NATO early warning radar in the US-led missile defense program continues to reverberate, especially for its relations with Iran. High ranking Iranian officials repeatedly criticize not only Turkey’s cooperation with the United States on the missile shield, but also Ankara’s recent foreign policy initiatives. These include the Turkish government’s efforts to set a model for the transformation of the regional countries in the wake of the Arab Spring, Ankara advocating a two-state solution for the Palestinian problem, or its increasingly assertive position on Syria.

    The decision on radar deployment apparently was a tipping point for Iranian officials, who now vocally criticize Turkey on a myriad of issues (EDM, September 20). Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said during a live TV interview that Iranian officials told their Turkish counterparts it was wrong to grant such permission and it would not benefit Turkey , October 5). Major-General Yahya Rahim-Safavi, the military advisor to the Iranian supreme religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, also maintained that Turkey had recently committed various strategic mistakes and would pay a heavy price if it failed to change course (Hurriyet, October 9). The Deputy Head of Iran’s Armed Forces’ Joint Chiefs of Staff Brigadier-General Massoud Jazayeri joined the wave of protest and urged Turkey to rethink its long-term strategic interests and side with Muslim nations instead of the West (www.presstv.ir, October 10).

    Iranian officials criticize Turkey on a range of issues of substantial importance. First, Iranian leaders increasingly label the missile shield as a project that is designed to boost Israel’s security against a counter-attack from Iran in case Israel strikes Iran’s nuclear facilities. However, considering that Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan repeatedly rebuff such claims, which were also raised by Turkish opposition parties, it appears that the Iranian campaign is driven by a concern to discredit Turkey in the eyes of regional countries.

    In order to contextualize Iran’s accusations against Turkey, it might be useful to recall Erdogan’s recent criticism of Israel’s nuclear program. As late as last week, Erdogan continued his recent criticism of Israel, going as far as arguing that he saw Israel as a threat to the region and surrounding countries, because it possessed the atomic bomb. Moreover, Erdogan raised a related criticism, when he pointed to the double standards of world powers: while Iran came under international scrutiny because of its nuclear program, there had been a lack of comparable debate on Israel’s nuclear weapons (Anadolu Ajansi, October 5). Iranian officials’ lambasting of Turkey through manipulative accounts, despite Erdogan’s staunch position on Israel at the expense of harming relations with the West, reveals their intent and approach toward Turkey.

    Iranian officials have recently expressed differences of opinion on the Palestine issue. Erdogan’s stance on Israel’s treatment of Palestinians has not necessarily contributed to forging common ground with Iran. Erdogan devoted a large portion of his address at the UN General Assembly last month to the rights of the Palestinians, supporting their bid for recognition. While Turkey has invested a great deal of political capital advocating a two-state solution in international venues, Khamenei, in a recent address at an international conference on the Palestinian Intifada, labeled this formula as tantamount to capitulation to the demands of “Zionists.” Rejecting the Palestinians’ bid for statehood at the UN, Khamenei argued that any solution based on the recognition of Israel’s right of existence would threaten the stability and security of the Middle East. Describing Iran as the greatest defender of the Palestinians, Khamenei criticized other regional powers that maintain close relations with Washington , October 1).

    Moreover, Turkish-Iranian divergence exists in an undeclared rivalry for regional leadership over the Arab Spring. For some time this rivalry was only evident in the realm of speculation by analysts. While Iran has been working to put its imprint on the regional transformation, by labeling the popular uprisings as an “Islamic awakening,” Turkish government sources or analysts close to the government have highlighted how Turkey’s democratic and capitalist model inspired the Arab revolutions. Perhaps in the first ever direct affirmation of this rivalry, Rahim-Safavi criticized Erdogan’s recent visit to the region. In Cairo, Erdogan stressed a secular-democratic form of government, which seems to have angered the Iranian leadership, sparking their more direct confrontation with Turkey.

    A related area of tension is over competing positions on the Syrian uprising. Faced with the continuation of the Baath regime’s violent campaign to suppress the popular uprising, Turkey has progressively downgraded its ties with Damascus, as well as providing shelter to the Syrian opposition. Turkey’s imposition of sanctions might also negatively affect Damascus’s direct ties to Tehran. Iran, viewing the maintenance of the current regime in Syria as vital to its penetration to Lebanon and Palestine, has grown anxious over Turkey’s policy on Syria, again reflected in Rahim-Safavi’s reactions.

    Some common themes are emerging in Iranian views on Turkey. First, there is a continuous and sustained reaction to Turkey, and it is worth noting that the mounting criticism of the country came from the religious leadership and the Revolutionary Guards. Second, Iranian officials work hard to present Ankara’s recent foreign policy initiatives as simply following the dictates of the US, in order to sustain their oft-repeated argument that they are the only genuine independent power in the region.

    Finally, there is a deliberate attempt to discipline Turkey by sending harsh messages as to how the country should behave. It is unclear whether this rhetoric reflects self-confidence on the part of the Iranian leadership or anxiety over Turkey taking an anti-Iranian position and siding with the US, which might lead to Iran’s isolation in the region. The Iranian side appears ready to exploit economic ties if necessary, in an effort to discipline Turkey. They daringly refer to Turkey’s gas purchase contracts with Iran as well as Ankara’s plans to boost the bilateral trade volume to $20 billion, going as far as sending veiled threats that Ankara might suffer if it fails to reverse its current position and accommodate Iranian concerns.

    https://jamestown.org/program/arab-spring-sees-turkish-iranian-rivalry-take-a-new-turn/

     

  • Turkey Risks Confrontation With Iran Over NATO Missile Shield

    Turkey Risks Confrontation With Iran Over NATO Missile Shield

    Turkey Risks Confrontation With Iran Over NATO Missile Shield

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 172
    September 20, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey has signed a memorandum with the United States on the deployment of a US radar station in the country, which will form part of the missile defense shield project to boost the protection of NATO members against potential missile threats from the East. Earlier this month, the Turkish foreign ministry confirmed that preparations had reached the final stage, and Turkey would host early warning radar to contribute to the Alliance’s missile defense system. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stressed that as part of the integrated NATO project, Turkey will host only radar components, and no interceptors would be installed in the country (NTV, September 4). Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan also maintained that after very detailed examination by the Turkish armed forces and foreign ministry, and broad-based consultation at cabinet level, they decided to proceed with the project, as it would enhance the country’s security (Anadolu Ajansi, September 6).

    On September 14, the Turkish press publicized the signing of the memorandum by the foreign ministry under-secretary Feridun Sinirlioglu and US Ambassador to Turkey Francis Ricciardone concerning the deployment of the radar at a military base in eastern Turkey, which is expected to be operational by the end of the year. The onsite security at the radar station will be provided by around 50 US personnel, while the area will be protected by the Turkish armed forces. The Turkish foreign ministry also confirmed these developments: “site surveys and the necessary legal regulations have been concluded, and the installation of the radar at a military facility in Kurecik has been decided” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, www.mfa.gov.tr, September 14, Cihan, September 19).

    The radars in Turkey, together with interceptors in Romania and Poland and missile launchers based on warships in the Mediterranean, will be part of the defensive system to protect NATO members against potential missile attacks. When the shield was endorsed by the Alliance at the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2010, it was surrounded by many controversies. Concerns over the feasibility and financing of the project aside, the most controversial aspect was Turkey’s reservations about it, which cast doubt on the future of the system (EDM, October 21, 2010).

    At the time, Turkey worked hard to ensure that Iran was not singled out as the country against which the system was developed, fearing that such a development would damage its ties with its neighbors with whom it had forged stronger relations. Over several months of discussion prior to the summit, Turkey even threatened to veto the project, leading to tensions in US-Turkish relations. Ankara later dropped its objections, arguing that the project would also boost its efforts to acquire defensive capabilities against increasing threats from ballistic missiles. Though Turkey claimed credit for preventing Iran from being named in the Lisbon declaration, Western political and military officials have made no secret of the fact that Iran’s missile capability and nuclear program was the main source of concern triggering this project.

    Iran has expressed its uneasiness over these developments. When Turkey first announced that it would go ahead with the plans, Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi criticized the project. “The West claims the radar system [in Turkey] is to confront Iranian missiles, but they should be aware that we will not tolerate any aggression against our national interests,” Vahidi said (Hurriyet Daily News, September 7). Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson, Ramin Mehmanparast, joined the criticism, noting that “We expect friendly countries and neighbors…not to promote policies that create tension and which will definitely have complicated consequences… Iran condemns any action that creates an arms race in the world and region” (www.worldbulletin.com, September 8). Likewise, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also warned Turkey against this development: “Turkey is among our brothers and sincere friends, but when enemies deploy a missile system there and admit that it is against Iran, we should be careful” (www.farsnews.com, September 17).

    The agreement is proving to be controversial domestically. Amongst Turkish public opinion, there is widespread perception fed by speculative newspaper reports that the missile shield is being built to protect Israel. Main opposition party representatives also express similar views, accusing the government of signing an agreement that would protect Israel, which Erdogan refuted as nonsensical (Anadolu Ajansi, September 6). As a NATO partner, Israel arguably seeks to be protected by the system, while US officials express willingness to fuse information obtained through the radars in Turkey and Israel for greater operability of the system. Yet, Davutoglu insisted that the information gathered through the radar station would not be shared with Israel. Moreover, he stated that Turkey used its veto threat to thwart Israel’s attempt to open an office at NATO Headquarters in Brussels under NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue program (CNN Turk, September 18).

    The Turkish government wants to signal that it remains steadfast in its policy of isolating Israel rather than simply bowing to pressure from Washington to deploy radars on Turkish soil. Instead, the government conveys the message that Turkey willingly participates in the project, because it deems the system vital for its own security. Yet, so far Iran appears unconvinced by this interpretation and might risk a confrontation with Turkey over the issue.

    The extent to which Iran reacts to Turkey’s move remains to be seen. But, Iran’s reference to “escalation” is important in many ways. Part of Iran’s military strategy is based on using its missile program as deterrence against attack by the United States and Israel. If the missile shield project is fully developed, it will reduce the utility of Iran’s missile system, perhaps forcing it to boost its strike capacity, hence triggering an arms race. This is certainly a scenario Turkey wants to avoid, and it will have to tread carefully to allay Iran’s anxiety. However, at a time when Turkey and the United States appear to be working closely in the Middle East, Ankara will likely find it difficult to convince Tehran.

    In contrast, the decision on the basing of the radars signifies a major turning point in US-Turkish relations, as part of Turkey’s broader strategic reorientation of its Middle East policies in a direction in tune with its senior ally. After years of rather confrontational relations, Ankara and Washington are now going through a much more cooperative phase in the region, using also the momentum generated by overlapping policies in response to the Arab Spring.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-risks-confrontation-with-iran-over-nato-missile-shield/

  • Bulgaria Teams up with Turkey for Military Projects

    Bulgaria Teams up with Turkey for Military Projects

    Bulgaria’s premier wants an antimissile shield over the whole territory of the country

    Bulgaria's PM Borissov had a 30-minute talk with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in the city of Varna  Photo: BTA
    Bulgaria's PM Borissov had a 30-minute talk with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in the city of Varna Photo: BTA

    Bulgaria may team up with Turkey, Romania and Croatia in buyng modern jet fighters. “If the relevant authorities reach consensus we may share the new fighters and have common training bases for pilots and technical personnel,” PM Boyko Borisov commented. Yesterday, the PM arrived in the Black Sea city of Varna together with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen where they will attend the conference of the Alliance. Before the discussions started the two statesmen had a tete-a-tete for over one hour. During the meeting the NATO top official extended his thanks to Sofia for the Bulgarian participation in the NATO missions in Afghanistan and Libya. According to Rasmussen the NATO potential should be used more efficiently and interoperability of the member countries should be enhanced. He gave as an example of good cooperation the purchase of three C-17 by NATO countries that will be used jointly. He recommended that similar projects should be implemented in other spheres, too.

    PM Boyko Borissov pointed out that in spite of the crisis last year the government has allotted 300M leva more for the defense budget. In his words currently Bulgaria is working with Romania, Croatia and Turkey on joint projects.

    Regarding the anti-missile shield PM Borissov stated categorically his support for dislocating elements of the system in Bulgaria. “Our only requirement is the system to protect the entire territory of Bulgaria. From that point on – in which countries what part and what elements to be dislocated depends entirely on NATO technical and strategic decisions,” PM Borissov underlined.

    PM Borissov appealed to NATO saying it should carefully consider Bulgaria’s position regarding the situation in Libya. As of next week Sofia will take part in a contact group which takes political decisions connected with the military operation in Libya.

    “My request is that the stand of Bulgaria’s Foreign Minister be carefully listened to by the members of the contact group as Bulgaria has had the possibility to hold negotiations with Libya and know well part of the opposition in Libya which is presently in Benghazi,” PM Borissov stated on the last day of the sitting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in the Black Sea city of Varna, northeastern Bulgaria.

    PM Borissov expressed his regret that the actions against Gaddafi had come late pointing that Libya held Bulgarian medics as hostages for many years before the eyes of the international community.

    Panayot Angarev

    Krastina Marinova

    via Bulgaria – Bulgaria Teams up with Turkey for Military Projects – Standart.

  • Erdogan Discusses Missile Defense with Obama Ahead of NATO’s Summit in Lisbon

    Erdogan Discusses Missile Defense with Obama Ahead of NATO’s Summit in Lisbon

    Erdogan Discusses Missile Defense with Obama Ahead of NATO’s Summit in Lisbon

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 207

    November 15, 2010

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey’s reserved position on the US-led missile shield ahead of NATO’s Lisbon Summit on November 19-20 continues to remain a major issue affecting Turkish-US relations. Since the US values this project as part of its overall policy on the Iranian nuclear program and its agenda of transforming NATO, Turkey’s rather reluctant attitude has raised questions about its commitment to the Alliance and its relations with the United States (EDM, October 21).

    There is growing consensus among foreign and domestic observers that pressure has been building on Turkey to clarify its position, especially at a time when most other NATO members (as well as Russia) seemingly adopted a cooperative position. If Turkey still treats NATO as the centerpiece of its defense and security policies, according to the argument, Turkey cannot diverge from its allies at this critical juncture.

    Earlier, Turkish officials dismissed any suggestion that Turkey is being pressured to support the project. However, one cannot deny the requirement of acting in concert with its allies, which is increasingly forcing Turkey to make a decision. In preparation for the Lisbon Summit, President Abdullah Gul convened a meeting, bringing together Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, and other top officials (Anadolu Ajansi, November 5). Recent statements by Turkish leaders reflect a broad consensus at the apex of the Turkish state, formed through such meetings. Overall, it appears that Turkey is unlikely to yield to pressure, and will perhaps continue to negotiate until the Lisbon summit to have its demands recognized by its allies.

    The missile shield also emerged on the agenda during Erdogan’s meeting with President Barack Obama at the G20 Summit in Seoul, where he conveyed Turkey’s sensitivities regarding the project (www.cnnturk.com, November 13). Commenting on his meeting with Obama, Erdogan reiterated Ankara’s position on the missile shield. First, he emphasized that as a NATO member, Turkey would take part in the project provided that it is developed within the NATO umbrella. Second, in Ankara’s view, the plans for the missile shield should not list any country as the potential target. Third, the project should provide protection for the entire Turkish territory as well as other members, underscoring the principle of the indivisibility of security. Moreover, the US needs to offer Turkey clarifications about the location of the system, and the technical details about its deployment and decision-making procedures.

    Erdogan also added that Turkey has yet to reach a decision. However, Erdogan underlined that he found the US responsive to Turkish demands for further clarification in the ongoing talks, and the points he listed would constitute the basis of Ankara’s position. At the Lisbon summit, Turkey will be represented by Gul, Davutoglu and Defense Minister, Vecdi Gonul. Depending on whether NATO officials satisfy Turkish concerns, Ankara would make a decision on participation in the program.

    During a hearing in the Turkish parliament on the foreign ministry’s budget, Davutoglu, ruled out any pressure on Turkey, yet admitted that NATO is justified to make contingency plans against the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. However, Davutoglu made a nuanced point, which he has been reiterating for some time. Davutoglu accepts that as a member of the Alliance, Turkey will act in coordination with its allies, but he emphasized that as an equal partner, or “owner” as he described it, of the Alliance, Turkey wants its voice to be fully heard since decisions in NATO are taken collectively (Anadolu Ajansi, November 12, Hurriyet Daily News, October 30).

    In other words, Davutoglu believes that Turkey’s role in NATO is not solely confined to saying “yes” or “no” to a decision already taken; rather it wants to take part in making critical decisions that will affect the future of the Alliance as a whole. Davutoglu rejects the presentation of Turkey as an outlying country that needs to be convinced by the rest of the allies. Rather, Turkey is at the center of Alliance and wants to actively shape its threat perceptions. In that regard, the missile shield debate has a broader meaning for Turkish foreign policy. It provides a major test for the sustainability of Davutoglu’s new foreign policy doctrine that emphasizes independent action and agenda-setting in international affairs.

    Likewise, Davutoglu maintains that the US-led missile shield should not undermine Turkish relations with its neighbors. As Erdogan emphasized, Turkey opposes mentioning any country as the target of the anti-ballistic system. Although ballistic missile programs of many countries are cited as posing a risk of proliferation, hence they are used in justifying developing a NATO missile shield, it is no secret that Iran has been viewed as the most immediate source of such a threat. Since Turkey raised reservations about referring to Iran as a potential threat during an earlier NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels last month, there have been signs of acknowledging Ankara’s concerns by US and NATO officials. In an interview, NATO Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, declined to name Iran as a potential threat that the planned missile shield is designed to counter (The New York Times, November 2).

    Turkish concern over the impact of the missile shield for relations with its neighbors again shows how another pillar in the new Turkish foreign policy affects Turkey’s thinking on this issue. Turkey has been working to overcome historical rivalries and build friendlier relations with its neighbors, as summarized in the “zero-problems-with-neighbors” doctrine. Turkey is concerned that if the proposed missile shield ends up singling out Iran or Syria, it might compromise its regional policy. Therefore, Davutoglu has been repeatedly arguing that NATO should avoid taking action that might draw new lines of division, making Turkey a “frontier country” as in the Cold War.

    Granted, Turkey so far has refrained from categorically rejecting the project, which adds some degree of predictability to its response in Lisbon. Turkey also has laid out its priorities unequivocally, which seem to be appreciated by other NATO members. It will be up to the other Allies to reach a common understanding with Turkey, so that a joint position is adopted in Lisbon.

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-discusses-missile-defense-with-obama-ahead-of-natos-summit-in-lisbon/

  • Turkey Maintains Reservations About US Missile Defense

    Turkey Maintains Reservations About US Missile Defense

    Turkey Maintains Reservations About US Missile Defense

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 190

    October 21, 2010 02:11

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey’s position on US efforts to create a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in Europe has emerged as another source of tension in US-Turkish relations. The Bush administration originally contemplated the installment of a missile shield in Eastern Europe, yet failed to achieve its stated objectives in the face of strong Russian opposition. At the time, Turkey expressed a cautious position on such proposals, arguing that it should not proceed in a manner threatening to Russia. Recently, the Obama administration revived the idea as a central component of its policy of containing the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program.

    Turkey has been considered as a possible location for the system, possibly hosting a radar battery on its soil, which would detect missiles launched from its surrounding regions so that they could be intercepted by missiles stationed in Turkey or Eastern Europe. The US also moved to present the revamped program as a joint NATO project, in obvious attempts to garner wider diplomatic support, and perhaps ease Ankara’s concerns. However, given Turkey’s position on the Iranian nuclear issue, which already had pitted it against the US, Ankara has remained lukewarm towards invitations from Washington to join the project. The recent trend in Turkish foreign policy towards pursuing independent policies and growing questions as to whether it is still committed to the Alliance and its traditional relations with the US has made Turkey’s position all the more puzzling.

    This issue has been at Turkey’s doorsteps visibly at least since Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Turkey in early September (EDM, September 8). Similarly, during his visit to Turkey in early October, NATO Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, discussed this issue (www.cnnturk.com, October 8). Ankara’s position was again one of the main items when NATO foreign and defense ministers met on October 14 in Brussels to discuss the Alliance’s new strategic concept, which will be adopted at the NATO summit in Lisbon next month. Rasmussen urged alliance members to consider the proposal for adopting a missile shield seriously against threats from rogue states, as underlined in the draft strategic concept.

    In Brussels, Turkish foreign and defense ministers, Ahmet Davutoglu and Vecdi Gonul, respectively, held a separate meeting with their US counterparts Hillary Clinton and Robert Gates. They conveyed Turkish concerns, especially its uneasiness with the proposed system being perceived as targeting Iran and Syria. They emphasized that the project must proceed as a defensive system, without designating any country as a potential aggressor. Otherwise, it could make these countries feel encircled and heighten tensions in the region. Turkey also reportedly expressed its desire to place the system under NATO’s command, and have it cover the entire territory of NATO members. Regarding the use of Turkish territory as a possible site for the system, the Turkish side apparently maintained its reservations (Dogan, October 14; Cihan, October 16).

    Speaking to reporters upon his return to Turkey, Gonul, however, did not rule out Turkey’s participation. Gonul rejected labeling Turkey’s stance as simply putting up objections, noting that the two sides were negotiating, which will continue until the Lisbon summit. Interestingly, Gates also denied speculation that the US was pressuring Turkey and said they were simply continuing negotiations with an ally. Gonul preferred to highlight the potential benefits of the missile shield for Turkey’s own security. Referring to some smaller scale defense systems Turkey is undertaking, Gonul maintained that if a future NATO missile shield also covers Turkey, it might help the country save huge costs (Zaman, October 16, October 17).

    Gonul apparently sees some opportunity for Turkey to participate in the missile shield project, since most of the costs would be borne by the United States. Turkey has considered missile defense systems since the 1990’s, but has failed to build an operational system, given its inability to shoulder the enormous costs of such a project and its limited technological know-how. One Turkish defense expert, Mustafa Kibaroglu, stressed that Turkey might opt to benefit from this project by seeking to gain a say in the decision making processes of the system and sharing technological expertise (Hurriyet Daily News, October 20).

    During his trip to the US where he attended the 29th annual American-Turkish Council (ATC) conference in Washington, Gonul, accompanied by Turkish government officials and diplomats, continued the talks on the issue with their American counterparts. “Contrary to some press reports, we are not pressuring Turkey to make a contribution. But we do look to Turkey to support NATO’s adoption at the Lisbon summit of a territorial missile defense capability,” Gates said, underscoring the ongoing difficulties in bridging the differences of opinion (Today’s Zaman, October 20).

    Unlike Davutoglu, who has been the architect of Turkey’s controversial Iran policy, Gonul might be less concerned about Turkey’s Iran portfolio and more sympathetic to the idea of benefiting from the missile shield project. Nonetheless, Ankara’s reservations over the ramifications of the project for its relations with its neighbors still run deep. Davutoglu has emphasized on many occasions that Turkey does not perceive any threats from the Middle East, and recently added that regional countries do not pose a threat to NATO, either (www.cnnturk.com, October 20).

    Turkey might increasingly find itself between a rock and a hard place. Irrespective of whether NATO designates any targets, Iran, whom the US has already dubbed as a “rogue state,” might nonetheless perceive the missile shield as a threat. Turkey, thus, will find it hard to explain its support for the missile shield to its Middle Eastern neighbors, especially as it pursues a “zero problems with neighbors” policy and forges deeper regional integration in the Middle East. In contrast, given the deep-running problems currently bedeviling US-Turkish relations, caused by the row over the Iranian nuclear issue and Turkey’s disputes with Israel, Turkey might not afford to be the deal-breaker at NATO. Ankara already sparked the ire of the US and other NATO members, when it contemplated vetoing Rasmussen’s election last year (EDM, April 6, 2009).

    Nonetheless, it may still be too early to determine the conditions under which Turkey could give its consent. Indeed, Turkey might prefer to continue “negotiations” on this issue until the Lisbon summit, and perhaps beyond.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-maintains-reservations-about-us-missile-defense/