Tag: MGK

  • Istanbul on the Nile

    Istanbul on the Nile

    Editor’s Note: Steven A. Cook is the Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square, to be published this fall.

    By Steven A. Cook, Foreign Affairs

    Cars drive on a bridge crossing the Nile River on February 9, 2006 in Central Cairo, Egypt. (Getty Images)
    Cars drive on a bridge crossing the Nile River on February 9, 2006 in Central Cairo, Egypt. (Getty Images)

    Cars drive on a bridge crossing the Nile River on February 9, 2006 in Central Cairo, Egypt. (Getty Images)

    In the weeks and months since Egypt’s military officers forced then President Hosni Mubarak from power and assumed executive authority, the country’s military rulers have shown an interest in applying what many have taken to calling the “Turkish model.” Spokesmen for the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), along with some civilian politicians, have floated the idea of replicating in Egypt today aspects of a bygone era in Turkish politics.

    Despite some similarities between the Egyptian and Turkish armed forces, Egypt’s officers would be ill advised to try to emulate their counterparts in Turkey. Not only would they be bound to fail but, in the process, would make the struggle to build the new Egypt far more complex and uncertain.

    Egypt’s military commanders are not so much interested in the latest manifestation of the Turkish model, in which a party of Islamist patrimony oversees political and economic reforms as part of an officially secular state, but rather an older iteration of it. This version of the Turkish model was a hallmark of Turkey’s politics from the time of the republic’s founding in 1923 until the early 2000s. It offers a template for civil-military relations in which the military plays a moderating role, preventing – at times, through military-led coups – the excesses of civilian politicians and dangerous ideologies (in Turkey’s case, Islamism, Kurdish nationalism, and, at one time, socialism) from threatening the political order.

    Turkey’s political system had a network of institutions that purposefully served to channel the military’s influence. For example, the service codes of the armed forces implored officers to intervene in politics if they perceived a threat to the republican order, and military officers held positions on boards that monitored higher education and public broadcasting. Meanwhile, various constitutional provisions made it difficult for undesirable groups – notably, Islamists and Kurds – to participate in the political process.

    The most prominent among the military’s channels of influence was the Milli Guvenlik Kurulu, or National Security Council, (known by its Turkish initials, MGK). Turkey’s 1982 constitution directed civilian leaders to “give priority consideration” to the council’s recommendations so as to preserve “the existence and independence of the State, the integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of the country.” The MGK’s directives were rarely defied. The officers who served on the council had a definition of national security that ranged well beyond traditional notions of defense policy, including everything from education and broadcasting to the attire of politicians and their wives.

    In some ways, the SCAF would not have to do much to approximate the Turkish model on the Nile. The two militaries do share some important similarities. For example, like the Turkish General Staff, which worked tirelessly to ensure the political order that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his commanders established after the end of World War I, the Egyptian officer corps has long maintained a commitment to the regime that its predecessors, the Free Officers, founded in the early 1950s. In both the Turkish and Egyptian cases, this sense of responsibility stems from a sense that the military, equipped with the best organization and technology, is set off from the rest of society and is the ultimate protector of national interests. This outlook tends to breed a suspicion – even hostility – toward civilian politicians.

    In addition, both militaries developed robust economic interests directly tied to their countries’ political systems. In Turkey, the armed forces became part of an economic landscape that favored large holding companies controlled by a few established families whose economic interests were connected to the status quo. In Egypt, the military itself is directly involved in a wide array of economic activities, including agriculture, real estate, tourism, security and aviation services, consumer goods, light manufacturing, and, of course, weapons fabrication.

    Both the Turkish General Staff and Egypt’s present-day officers have an aversion to politics and the day-to-day running of their countries. They prefer to leave the responsibilities and risks of governing to civilians, or, in Egypt’s case, to a delegate from the armed forces. This sort of arrangement is precisely what it means to rule but not govern.

    Now, with the SCAF effectively in control of Egypt, there is evidence that some Egyptians, both civilians and officers, are studying the Turkish model and its political implications. Since assuming power in February, the Egyptian military has taken measures to shield commanders from prosecution in civilian courts, a protection Turkey’s parliament just stripped from its own officer corps. They have also floated proposals through non-military representatives to shield the defense budget from parliamentary oversight, maintain ultimate authority over defense policy, and even establish a National Defense Council that resembles features of Turkey’s MGK before that body was brought to heel in 2003 through constitutional reforms. And the participation of military officers in Egypt’s electoral commission looks a lot like the Turkish military’s surveillance of society through membership on various government boards.

    If the officers’ moves seem like a backhanded way of creating the conditions favorable for an enduring political role for the Egyptian army, they are. Still, members of the SCAF have been careful to say that they will abide by Egypt’s new constitution when Egyptians ratify the yet-to-be written document. They say that whatever role the Egyptian people assign to them is the role that they will respectfully fulfill. Of course, if the Egyptian people want some approximation of the Turkish model, then the military is bound to discharge that mission.

    Yet if the members of the SCAF truly want to be like their Turkish counterparts, they are going to have to be more directly involved in the constitution writing process. Although some of the intellectuals, judges, and other figures on the National Council who are charged with drafting constitutional principles favor the military’s continued presence in politics, their support is unlikely to be enough given the mistrust with which revolutionary groups and others view the military.In Turkey, although the military was not directly involved in writing the 1961 constitution, the country’s officers stepped in a decade later to tighten up aspects of the document that they deemed to be too liberal. A little less than ten years later, Turkey’s generals stepped in again and directly oversaw the writing of a new constitution (which the country is now considering abolishing and replacing with a new document) that not only reinforced existing levers of military influence but also created additional means for the armed forces to intervene in the political system.

    The development of a Turkish-style role for the Egyptian officer corps also presumes that there is broad elite support for such a system. In Turkey, the officers enjoyed the support of judges, lawyers, academics, the press, big business, and average Turks who were committed to the defense of Kemalism against far smaller groups of Islamists and Kurds who were long considered to be outside the mainstream.

    Despite some high-profile advocates, such as the politician Amr Moussa and the judge Hisham Bastawisi, there are few influential supporters for the military becoming the arbiter of Egyptian politics. This does not bode well for the military should they seek to replicate the Turks. On the eve of recent protests intended to pressure the SCAF to meet various revolutionary demands, more than two dozen political parties demanded that the military outline when and how it will hand over power to civilians.

    The only place where the military has support is among the Muslim Brotherhood. This is significant. Indeed, the Brotherhood was a central player in an effort to bring a million people into the streets last Friday to demonstrate their support for the SCAF. Yet as important as the Brotherhood’s support for the military may be, the officers should take little comfort from its embrace. The Islamists in the Brotherhood do not support the military as much as they want to undermine the revolutionary groups, liberals, and secularist parties that they oppose.

    In addition, the Brotherhood and the officers are – just as they were in the early 1950s – competitors rather than collaborators. For its part, the Brotherhood can make claims to being better nationalists and potentially better stewards of Egypt than the armed forces, which are tainted by their association with the United States and Mubarakism. Whatever backing the Brotherhood is currently offering the military and the SCAF is surely tactical and does not extend to carving out a political role for the officers after a transition to civilian leaders.

    Finally, the most important feature of Turkey’s system under the tutelage of the military was the Turkish officers’ singular ideological commitment to Kemalism. This was a motivating factor for generations of officers and their civilian supporters.

    In contrast, it remains unclear exactly what the SCAF believes in. The Egyptians are not die-hard secularists, democrats, Islamists, or authoritarians. Other than generic platitudes about democracy and respect for the Egyptian people, the officers seem only interested in stability, maintaining their economic interests, and preserving the legitimacy of the armed forces despite having been the backbone of a thoroughly discredited regime for 60 years. As a result, the SCAF seems to be willing to hand over power to anyone who can guarantee those three interests. It is this kind of political opportunism that is fatal to a Turkish model on the Nile. Without a compelling narrative about what Egyptian society should look like and the role of the military in realizing this vision, it is unlikely that the officers will garner the kind of support necessary in order for elites to voluntarily give up their own potential power in favor of military tutelage.

    For all of the political dynamism, energy, and creativity that Egyptians have demonstrated since Mubarak’s fall, the country is also wracked with a host of debilitating problems: persistent protests, economic problems, political intrigue, intermittent violence, and a general state of uncertainty. To some Egyptians, it seems that the military’s firm hand is necessary to keep all of the country’s political factions in line while building the new Egypt. After all, the Turkish officers tamed Turkey’s fractious and sometimes violent political arena, and the country is now freer than ever before.

    But such analysis is backward. Turkey’s democratic changes, which remain far from complete, happened despite the military, not because of it. Regardless, attempts to replicate in Egypt aspects of Turkey’s experience would be met with significant opposition, increased political tension, more uncertainty, and potential violence, all of which create the conditions for the emergence of new authoritarianism. With the many potential drawbacks of trying to copy the Turkish armed forces, the Egyptian officers should not even bother trying.

    The views expressed in this article are solely those of Steven A. Cook. For more excellent long-form analysis, visit Foreign Affairs.

  • Intelligence report reveals links between PKK, Israel

    Intelligence report reveals links between PKK, Israel

    pkk terrorists
    Militants from the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party patrol the area around a PKK base in northern Iraq.

    ERCAN YAVUZ, ANKARA

    An intelligence report prepared by the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and presented at a National Security Council (MGK) meeting on Feb. 24 suggests that the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has been forging new ties with the state of Israel. The report also notes that the PKK has plans for a serhildan, the Kurdish word for uprising, in the spring in an attempt to manipulate the June 12 general elections. A senior security official, who asked not to be named, shared information about the intelligence gathered on the PKK with Today’s Zaman. According to the information, the group earlier this month ended a cease-fire it had announced late last summer.

    It also says some countries in the region seem to have convinced the PKK to re-launch its attacks ahead of the elections. The same official says that intelligence reports indicate Israel has intensified its contact with the PKK in retaliation for a meeting Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had with Hezbollah during a visit to Lebanon. Intelligence reports say the PKK is concerned about a drop in the votes of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), whose candidates will run as independents. For this reason, the decision to end the cease-fire came easily for the PKK, which is trying to stop Kurdish votes from slipping to the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). The terrorist group has plans to hold constant demonstrations and clashes in the Southeast and in eastern provinces with a significant Kurdish population.

    PKK-Israel links
    The MİT report presented during the MGK meeting in late February chaired by President Abdullah Gül also includes interviews with various PKK militants on the terrorist group’s action strategy for this spring. In these interviews, the militants confessed to having received training from Mossad officials.

    MİT also has footage from an interview in which PKK second-in-command Murat Karayılan says the PKK attacked the İskenderun naval base during the May 2010 flotilla crisis, in which Israel killed nine Turks on board a Gaza-bound civilian aid ship sailing in international waters. In the video, Karayılan says the PKK and Israel worked together during the Mavi Marmara incident. Experts say this video is evidence that the PKK and Israel work in coordination in some of the terrorist group’s attacks. The interview has already been aired on an Israeli television station.

    PKK action strategy
    The report also says the PKK plans to put pressure on Kurdish voters. It is planning a dramatic attack to make it clear that it has ended its cease-fire. The group was also inspired by the recent uprisings rocking the Arab world. Today, International Women’s Day, and the three-day-long spring festival of Nevruz, celebrated around March 20, will be the dates the PKK will focus on to start its campaign of agitation and chaos. It also has plans to sabotage the election rallies of political parties in the region other than those of the BDP.

    The PKK’s real concern is weakened support for the BDP in the region, but it will use as an argument for its attacks and demonstrations the slowdown in the government’s democratic initiative process.

    The plan includes nighttime demonstrations, press statements, illegal protests and passing out declarations. They will also engage in demonstrations that they will call “acts of civil disobedience” during visits from Prime Minister Erdoğan and officials of other political parties.

    The PKK also seeks to carry its demonstrations to cities with sizable Kurdish populations, such as İstanbul, Mersin, Adana, İzmir and Ankara. As has happened in the past, they are expected to use children in the front line during demonstrations in these cities. Intelligence information also suggests that the PKK will seek to manipulate the Kurds in the Southeast by passing out anti-Kurdish declarations. In fact, such fliers, referring to those participating in pro-Kurdish demonstrations as “anarchical punks and lowlifes” were passed around in Yüksekova, Hakkari province, on Feb. 19, 2011. It included other expressions likely to provoke the Kurdish people.

    www.todayszaman.com, 08 March 2011

     

  • Turkey Analysis: What Does Ankara’s New “Red Book” of Threats Mean?

    Turkey Analysis: What Does Ankara’s New “Red Book” of Threats Mean?

    On Wednesday, Haaretz’s Aluf Benn shared his notes from a recent visit to Turkey for an academic conference. His conclusion? Turkey and Israel could still benefit from increasing rate of bilateral trade, great potential of tourism and secular/democratic needs over religious ascendence.

    On the same day, Turkey’s National Security Council (MGK) agreed to make radical changes to a document. referred to as the “Red Book” or the “Secret Constitution”, in which the main threats over the next five years to Turkey’s security are outlined.

    In the document, religious reaction is no longer mentioned as a domestic threat. Instead, it mentions “radical groups exploiting religion,” a term which, under the Turkish Penal Code (TCK), refers to groups that, by employing violent methods, use religion for destructive and separatist activities.

    The activities of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) were also discussed during the meeting. The council once again drew attention to the clandestine support given to the PKK by some countries, accusing these countries of insincerity in supporting Turkey’s counterterrorism efforts. In addition, emphasis was placed on the trilateral mechanism among Turkey, U.S. and Iraq.

    Ankara removed Iran, Iraq, Syria, Bulgaria, Georgia and Armenia, Russia, and Greece from their list of “threatening countries”. The problem of the 12-mile limit on territorial waters with Greece as a possible casus belli retains its importance, but the Red Book puts into place the recent declaration of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu: ” We do not perceive any threat from any neighbor countries and we do not think our neighbors form a threat to NATO.”

    In contrast, for the first time since 1948, Ankara named “Israel’s instability-inducing actions in the Middle East” as a threat to its national security. “The region’s instability stems from Israeli actions and policy, which could lead to an arms race in the Middle East,” said the paper.

    Instead of a “regime threat” coming from Iran; the paper argued: “Within this scope, the attention was drawn for the importance of the immediate materialisation of the new tour of direct negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program between related parties.”

    Amongst non-state “new threats”, cyber terror, global warming, and ageing population were added to the agenda.

    Meanwhile, following Turkey’s conditions that a planned American missile defence system on its soil must not target either Syria or Iran and that the US must clearly state that the shield is not for the defense of a particular NATO member but a “deterrence” for the entirety of NATO’s territory Prime Minister Erdoğan, President Abdullah Gül. and Chief of General Staff Gen. Işık Koşaner had a brief meeting after the National Security session to discuss whether Turkey should be part of the defense shield.

    FM Davutoglu, visiting China, said on Saturday:

    We are an owner of NATO. We are not a partner… Missile shield, missile wars, where will Turkey be in this war? The discussions within NATO are not about this at all.

    First of all, Turkey is not a country that has to be convinced by NATO. Turkey is not alone; Turkey is at the center of NATO. Turkey is not in a position to be a frontier country. NATO, while doing threat planning on this issue, should cover all member states and should remain outside any formula that would geographically set one country against another.

    It is true that Turkey does not consider it appropriate to refer to neighboring countries in this [missile-defense] system… we want stability, prosperity and peace in our neighborhood.

    So, following the lines of Aluf Benn’s analysis, is the Erdogan government a new “De Gaulle” which is just pursuing its political calculations or is it the Trojan Horse aligning with “radicals” such as Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah?

  • Turkey Removes Armenia from, Adds Israel to ‘Threat’ List

    Turkey Removes Armenia from, Adds Israel to ‘Threat’ List

    mgk1

    ANKARA, Turkey (A.W.)—Earlier this week, Turkey’s National Security Council (MGK) approved changes in its National Security document, removing Armenia from, and adding Israel to the list of countries that pose a “major threat” to Turkey.

    Iran, Syria, Georgia, and Bulgaria were also removed from the “major threat” list.

    In addition to referring to it as a threat, the document accuses Israel of driving the entire region into an arms race.

    Other threats that were added to the list are global warming and online terror.

    The document, also referred to as “The Red Book,” informs the country’s policy towards its neighbors, and is generally revised every five years.

    The relations between Turkey and Israel have deteriorated in recent months. Most recently, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan said he would boycott a climate conference in Athens if Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends.

  • Turkey removes “reactionaryism” from new threat list

    Turkey removes “reactionaryism” from new threat list

    MGK agreed to make radical changes to a document referred to as the “Red Book,” in which the main threats to Turkey’s security are outlined.

    mgk

    The National Security Council (MGK) on Wednesday agreed to make radical changes to a document referred to as the “Red Book,” in which the main threats to Turkey’s security are outlined, referring to Israel’s instability-inducing actions in the Middle East as a threat.

    Turkey’s approach to its neighbors has changed with the revisions, which were drafted by a team of experts headed by Prime Ministry Undersecretary Efkan Ala. Syria, Bulgaria, Georgia and Armenia are no longer among Turkey’s list of external threats. The changes made to the National Security Policy Document (MGSB), which was drafted by the military in the past, are a sign that the government’s priorities are finally reflected in state policy.

    Turkey has for the first time referred to Israel’s actions in the Middle East as a threat to Turkey. In the section on relations with neighbors and external threats, the document draws attention to the instability in the region caused by Israel and the possibility that Israel’s actions may lead the countries in the region to be engaged in an arms race.

    Turkey’s bilateral relations with Israel have also changed since the deaths of nine Turks in a lethal attack by Israeli soldiers on a Gaza-bound humanitarian aid convoy on May 31.

    The MGK convened on Wednesday under the chairmanship of President Abdullah Gül to discuss changes to the MGSB, also known as Turkey’s secret Constitution or the Red Book. The statement made after the MGK meeting said, “The new MGSB was discussed and approved.” The new document will be in effect for five years.

    As for Greece, with which Turkey has come to the brink of war three times in the past over territorial disputes in the Aegean, Turkey still sees any Greek attempt to extend the country’s territorial waters to 12 nautical miles as a casus belli (a cause for war). Turkey and Greece are at odds over the boundaries of their territorial waters and airspace in the Aegean due to the peculiar geography of the Aegean Sea, where some Greek islands are lined up along Turkey’s western coasts. In 1995, Parliament declared any unilateral attempt by Greece to extend its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles from the current six miles as a casus belli.

    Greece is not included in the “external threats” list either, aside from the “12 mile problem.” Iran, seen as a major threat in earlier versions of the confidential document because of its Islamic rule and nuclear capacity, is no longer the number one threat for Turkey, although the document emphasizes that the Middle East should be cleansed of nuclear weapons.

    Reactionaryism no more a threat

    Turkey’s perception of domestic threats has also been revised with changes to the document, which has been in effect since 2005. In the document, religious reactionaryism is no more mentioned as a domestic threat. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) had been working on the changes for a long time and said the state should not see its citizens as potential threats. The military wing of the council also agreed with the government on the issue and the famous “reactionary threat” was not cited in the new document. Instead, it mentions “radical groups exploiting religion,” a term which, under the Turkish Penal Code (TCK), refers to groups that, by employing violent methods, use religion for destructive and separatist activities.

    The MGSB was prepared for the first time after Turkey became a NATO member with US support against the threat of communism. Until the coup d’état of Sept. 12, 1980, communists and all of the left were seen as the biggest threat to Turkey. After the coup, separatism was included in the list of domestic threats. With the rise of the Welfare Party (RP) in 1995, religious reactionaryism and separatism became the main domestic threats. The latest version of the MGSB was approved on Oct. 24, 2005 by the MGK and then by the Cabinet on March 20, 2006.

    New threats: Cyber terror, global warming and aging population

    The edited MGSB also contains new threats such as cyber terror, global warming and the aging population of Turkey. The document says cyber threats pose a threat to national security and that global warming may lead to environmental disasters.

    The problem of aging population, an issue which started to dominate Turkey’s agenda recently, also found a place in the new security document.

    Population increase has been a matter of debate since the foundation of the Turkish Republic; for decades people have argued about whether it poses a challenge or is an advantage for Turkey. Latest demographic data reveal that the productive population, aged between 15-65, is on the rise in Turkey, while the population below 15, which had been on the rise until recently due to the high fertility rate in Turkey, is now on the decline.

    Currently, 10.1 percent of the overall population is above 60 and it is predicted that that this percentage will increase to 10.7 in 2011, 14.3 in 2014 and 20.3 in 2020.

    The document says the aging population may pose a threat for Turkey if the country fails to develop specific policies on the issue.

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been expressing concern over the declining younger population in Turkey and suggests that his government may consider giving a “prize” to families that have at least three children.

    PKK and missile shield issue

    The changes made to the MGSB were not the only agenda item during Wednesday’s MGK meeting. Another topic on the agenda was a missile defense system project proposed by the US. Several US officials have implied in various statements that part of the missile shield could be set up in Turkey. The issue was taken up at a summit between defense and foreign ministers of NATO members in Brussels. Prime Minister Erdoğan, President Abdullah Gül and Chief of General Staff Gen. Işık Koşaner had a brief meeting after the MGK and reportedly discussed whether Turkey should be part of the defense shield.

    The activities of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) were also discussed during the meeting. The council once again drew attention to the clandestine support given to the PKK by some countries, accusing these countries of insincerity in supporting Turkey’s counterterrorism efforts.

    Cihan news agency