Tag: Mavi Marmara

  • Beyond the flotilla: Turkey’s anti-Israel turn

    Beyond the flotilla: Turkey’s anti-Israel turn

    Beyond the flotilla: Turkey’s anti-Israel turn

    David Ignatius trivialized the seriousness of Turkey’s distancing itself from Israel by suggesting that the action is simply a product of Turkey’s unhappiness over Israel’s level of apology for the flotilla tragedy [“Obama’s Turkish alliance,” op-ed, Dec. 8].

    Turkey apparently made a strategic decision long before the flotilla episode to diminish the warm and strategic relations that existed between the two countries. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s treatment of Israeli President Shimon Peres at Davos in 2009 was one of numerous examples of this. Indeed, the flotilla event would not have taken place in the first place if the old Turkish-Israeli relationship were intact.

    It is not only Israel but the United States that is concerned about Turkey’s growing enmity toward Israel. If Turkey is going to be the positive model for the Arab Spring, it needs to include in its outlook a return to the historic friendship of the Jewish and Turkish states.

    Kenneth Jacobson, New York

    The writer is deputy national director of the Anti-Defamation League.

    via Beyond the flotilla: Turkey’s anti-Israel turn – The Washington Post.

  • Alan Dershowitz: Apology won’t improve relations with Turkey

    Alan Dershowitz: Apology won’t improve relations with Turkey

    “Israeli media are overly critical; when you read an op-ed column in an Israeli paper, you think that Israel will be Iran within months.”

    12 December 11 13:02, Adi Ben-Israel

    Adv. Alan Dershowitz, who is known as the state of Israel’s attorney, and who defends Israel’s positions in the US, attacked the Israeli press today, claiming that senior commentators are overly critical of the government. Dershowitz also spoke about the wave of legislation that allegedly limits the media’s freedom of speech.

    “When you read an op-ed column in an Israeli publication, you immediately think that Israel will be like Iran within six months, and that women will sit in the back of the bus like in Alabama, and that the government is fascist. The Israeli media exaggerate. You must understand that there is no such thing as an internal Israeli matter; everything that happens in Israel ends up on the cover of the “New York Times” and around the world. If Israel has a problem at the Mugrabim bridge in Jerusalem, it turns into an international issue.”

    Dershowitz called for calm to be restored and for the criticism to be toned down. “Israel is not going to become fascist. I oppose all forms of censorship and limiting freedom of speech, but” Dershowitz said, “I suggest that people take responsibility for the exaggerations they are reporting in the media.”

    Dershowitz criticized the phenomenon of excluding women, and certain rabbinical rulings that he claims deviate from the path of Judaism, and exist “only in the minds of a few demented rabbis,” and suggested: “Let’s fight them using their own framework of ideas.”

    Dershowitz also criticized the bill that calls for the volume of muezzin speakers in mosques be lowered, and said that the fact that Israel is a Jewish state, “raises the bar for sensitivity on every issue, for better or worse.” On hatred of Israel, Dershowitz said that it ran deep, and that it was connected with anti-Semitism.

    Dershowitz claims that it is easy for him to defend Israel throughout the world, and explained why: “Every time that I speak about Israel and I turn to the audience and say: I want you to name one country in the world that faces the kind of threats that Israel faces, and has such an impressive record of upholding human rights, and the rule of law. Not one person has ever been able to think of such a country.”

    Dershowitz criticized the Palestinians, saying that they were not ready to hold political negotiations without preconditions, and complimented Netanyahu: “He wants to be tough on security issues, and to bring about a stable peace with security. I was at the UN in September when Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu-Mazen) gave a speech that Arafat would have been proud of. Both sides need to be ready for painful compromises. Netanyahu is ready.”

    In his comments about the Iranian issue, Dershowitz said that President Barack Obama was committed to preventing Iran from achieving nuclear weapons, and said that he hoped that Israel would not take unilateral military action. However, if Israel has to do so for security reasons, “As an international lawyer, I will defend Israel.”

    Dershowitz also said that Israel did not need to apologize to Turkey. “I do not believe that an Israeli apology to Turkey will improve relations between the two countries. Turkey has altered its approach, and is turning to the Muslim world after being rejected by Europe. It is using the apology as an excuse, and I do not think that Israel needs to apologize to Turkey.

    “Turkey never apologized for the Armenian genocide. That takes nerve! Turkey is asking someone to apologize? They have never apologized for murders that they committed!”

    When asked about the possibility that Turkey would sue IDF soldiers who participated in the takeover of the Marmara, Dershowitz answered: “Let’s see Turkey do that. I am ready to form a team of experts that would defend IDF officers against any country seeking to sue them overseas.”

    Published by Globes [online], Israel business news – www.globes-online.com – on December 12, 2011

    © Copyright of Globes Publisher Itonut (1983) Ltd. 2011

    via Alan Dershowitz: Apology won’t improve relations with Turkey – Globes.

  • US proposes Israel-Turkey compromise

    US proposes Israel-Turkey compromise

    Israel will “express regret” over the fatalities on the Marmara; Erdogan will say Israel apologized.

    Washington has proposed a formula for ending the diplomatic stand-off between Israel and Turkey. The US plan calls for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Turkish counterpart Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to hold a secret telephone conversation, following which each will make a separate announcement to his nation. “Ma’ariv” reported this morning that Erdogan will say that Israel apologized for the Marmara deaths, while Netanyahu will say that he only expressed regret.

    According to the plan, each of the countries will provide the other with adequate leeway to present the different types of reconciliation to his country. Following the prime ministers’ declaration, Turkey and Israel will raise the level of diplomatic relations, and ambassadors will return to Ankara and Jerusalem.

    With respect to the payment of compensation for the Marmara deaths, the US compromise is that instead of Israel transferring funds directly to the families, Turkey will create a special fund with which Israel will coordinate. The fund will then transfer the funds to the families. Although none of these suggestions is new, and despite the fact that it is still unknown whether the two sides will agree to implement them, the US will make every effort to promote it in an effort to preserve its interests in the Middle East.

    Published by Globes [online], Israel business news – www.globes-online.com – on December 12, 2011

    © Copyright of Globes Publisher Itonut (1983) Ltd. 2011

    via US proposes Israel-Turkey compromise – Ma’ariv – Globes.

  • Pulp Friction: Israel and Turkey

    Pulp Friction: Israel and Turkey

    By Ali Nuri Bayar and Mikhaila Fogel

    The long-standing friendship between Turkey and Israel seemed once to offer testament to the idea that Arab-Israeli Conflict based not on religion or ethnicity, but on solvable political difference. Since 1949, when Turkey became the first Muslim nation to establish relations with Israel, the two counties have created a beneficial partnership. Yet sixty years of cooperation appear to have been obliterated in the past three short years, as relations between Ankara and Jerusalem chill by the day. Nonetheless, current tensions largely reflect shifting geopolitical forces in the region, rather than ideological divisions. The driver of Turkey and Israel’s split remains the separation between Turkey’s new stature in the Middle East and Israel’s growing isolation in the region.

    The Good Old-ish Days

    Beginning with the election of Justice and Development Party in 2002, Israel and Turkey enjoyed a period of unprecedented diplomatic cooperation and economic exchange. Excluding revenues from natural gas and petroleum products, Turkey’s trade agreements with Iran amounted to $2 billion in 2011, while its trade agreements with Israel amount to over $4 billion. Shimon Peres enjoyed several visits to Ankara, Prime Minister Tayyip Erodgan to Israel, and the countries have exchanged hundreds of thousands of tourists every year.

    Erodgan’s reaction to the Gaza War of 2008-2009 catalyzed a break in the quasi-alliance between the two nations. In the so-called “One Minute Scandal” at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Erodgan offered a series of inflammatory remarks regarding the Gaza War, and ignited a verbal sparring match between the two nations. The conflict culminated in diplomatic debacle, in which the Turkish Ambassador to Israel was asked to sit in a lower chair than his Israeli counterparts. Although Israel apologized for the insult, residual resentment lingers in Turkey. A major turning point occurred on May 30, 2010 when nine Turkish activists were killed aboard the Mavi Marmara, a ship attempting to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza.

    Controversy over the flotilla continues to sour relations. Turkey demands a formal apology and compensation for the families of the deceased, while Israel defends the legitimacy of its actions. In September, the United Nations’ Palmer Commission released a report declaring that, although Israel used excessive force in the Mavi Marmara raid, its blockade of Gaza is legally justified. The day after the release of the Palmer Report, Turkey expelled the Israeli ambassador and suspended all military agreements.

    The New Middle East

    Despite these diplomatic disputes, the most important factors reshaping the Israel-Turkey relationship may not be these incidents, but rather the unprecedented transition in the Middle East. The revolutionary fervor of the Arab Spring has shifted the balance of power in the region, causing Western influence and regional authoritarianism to fall out, and enabled the ascent of a new order of Arab states, embracing democracy and religious expression.

    The effects of Arab Spring have purchased for Turkey a new role in the region. “We are there to set a model that market-economy, democracy, and local cultural values can interact in a positive way,” a Turkish diplomat told the HPR. Prime Minister Erodgan has emerged as a model for the new Arab leaders, and Turkey as the template for secular Islamic democracy. With the falls of Mubarak, Qaddafi, and Hussein, a severely weakened Assad, and diminishing American influence in the Middle East, Turkey has become the standard-bearer of sound governing in the region. While Turkey strives to maintain its traditional domestic policies, its foreign policy has become more active in taking advantage of a distinct power vacuum.

    Israel in Isolation

    On the other hand, Israel’s position has become weaker and more isolated as popular revolutions overturn regional allies. Dr. Charles Freilich, former Israeli Deputy National Security Advisor and Kennedy School fellow, pointed out that Israelis enjoyed “a strong emotion attachment” to the alliance with Turkey, precisely because it proved Israel’s conflict was based in politics, not ideology. The sudden breakdown of relations has led many to reject this optimistic belief and “feel betrayed” by Turkey. This feeling of betrayal has led to a backlash against Arab states and pushed the Israeli government under Benjamin Netanyahu further to the right. Uncertainty has created an impasse between the Turkish and Israeli governments, polarizing both sides further. With Turkey’s increasingly belligerent tone and Israel’s continuation of settlement construction and military operations around the Gaza Strip, prospects for reconciliation are fading at an alarming rate.

    Neither does reconciliation appear on any near horizon. According to a senior Turkish official, if Turkey’s demand for an apology for the flotilla had been met, Turkey would not have expelled the Israeli Ambassador, and the nations could have normalized relations. Yet, Itamar Rabinovich, President of Tel-Aviv University and former Israeli ambassador to the U.S., believes that an apology would not have made any significant diplomatic difference. Rabinovich argues that Turkey deliberately chose to distance itself from Israel in order to boost its standing in the Middle East.

    Transition

    The series of unfortunate events between Israel and Turkey has brought simmering tensions in regional relations to a boil. After repeated rejection from European Union membership, Turkey turned its attention back to the East, through increasing trade with its Muslim neighbors and increasing its advocacy for Palestinian statehood. Yet it would be too much to say that Turkey is shifting its axis and severing its ties with the West. Since the creation of NATO, Turkey has served as a poster child for Middle Eastern democracy, and continues to fulfill its duties as a central regional ally. Yet the Arab Spring and Turkey’s tradition of secular success means that Turkey faces a transition, from being bridge between two continents, to being a leader in its own right. This shift means that Turkey’s decisions will not be based on currying favor with any bloc, but rather focused on expanding its influence. As such, while revolutionaries in Egypt and Tunisia look to Turkey as a leader, Iran is threatening to cancel vital trade agreements with Turkey because of its NATO Early Detection missile defense systems and Turkey’s threat to sanction Syria.

    A Turkish official told the HPR, “[Turkey wants] a stable, secure, and prosperous Middle East”. Yet neither stability nor prosperity can be achieved without collaboration between Israel and Turkey. Collaboration existed for sixty years, proving that political shifts, not enduring ideology, have caused the present rift. If these two nations wish to be leaders of a secure region, they must be prepared to compromise, with the understanding that the Arab Spring has reshaped their geopolitical calculations.

    Ali Nuri Bayar ‘15 and Mikhaila Fogel ’15 are Contributing Writers

    World — November 11, 2011 8:39 pm

    Pulp Friction: Israel and Turkey

  • ANOTHER FLOTILLA? Ships Sailing From Turkey To Gaza

    ANOTHER FLOTILLA? Ships Sailing From Turkey To Gaza

    Nick Jardine | Nov. 2, 2011, 3:00 PM | 41 |

    turkey israel floatilla boat protestTurkey Israel Floatilla Boat Protest

    As two ships carrying pro-Palestinian activists sail from Turkey towards the Gaza Strip, Israeli’s navy is looking to block the vessels.

    Al-Jazeera reports that the two ships are now in international waters having previously been escorted by the Turkish coast guard. One ship is carrying six activists and five journalists while the other is carrying 12 Irish nationals, all activists.

    Both of the ships were reportedly also used in another unsuccessful attempt to reach Gaza in July this year.

    However, Reuters just tweeted that the Israeli navy is ready to intercept the boats as they move closer.

    We’re hoping another situation similar to the one in May 2010 doesn’t arise.

    via ANOTHER FLOTILLA? Ships Sailing From Turkey To Gaza.

  • Understanding the Turkish-Israeli row

    Understanding the Turkish-Israeli row

    Understanding the Turkish-Israeli row

    by Şaban Kardaş*

    The deterioration of the relationship between Turkey and Israel has become a conspicuous element not only of Turkey’s foreign policy but also the overall course of recent affairs in the Middle East, raising questions about the future of the region’s security.
    The most immediate issue of contention in the relationship is Turkey’s demand that Israel apologize and compensate appropriately for the killing of eight Turkish citizens and one Turkish-American by Israeli commandos aboard the Mavi Marmara humanitarian aid ship in May 2010. The ship was part of a flotilla which was trying to break Israel’s naval blockade of the Gaza Strip and raise awareness of the humanitarian tragedy caused by the blockade. A proper explanation of the causes of the current stalemate, however, requires going beyond this singular event and undertaking a more nuanced analysis into the underlying dynamics shaping Turkish-Israeli relations in recent years, which also paved the way for the Mavi Marmara raid and the subsequent rapid deterioration of bilateral ties.

    The Mavi Marmara incident and the ensuing crisis grew out of a complex background characterized by the Turkish government’s constant criticism, increasing in recent years, of Israel’s Palestinian policies, which especially gained momentum after Israel’s brutal offensive into the Gaza Strip in the winter of 2008-2009. Other events in the intervening period, including the Davos incident and “low chair” crisis, only accelerated the tensions. Efforts to find a solution through mediation or secretly discussing the ways in which Israel could issue an apology to Turkey failed.

    Given the high-level domestic stakes involved, both parties refrained from backing down and instead opted to continue their confrontational approach. Apparently, given their lack of urgency about reaching a compromise, they must also have calculated strategically that they could tolerate the costs of a breakdown in the relationship.

    Looking at the Palmer report

    Complicating matters further, the conclusions reached in the Palmer report, commissioned by the UN secretary-general to bridge the parties’ competing claims, have to the contrary risked deepening the divisions. The report’s controversial findings not only undermined Turkey’s efforts to internationalize the issue but also argued dubiously for the legality of the naval blockade of Gaza. In response, Turkey announced a series of punitive measures, intended to hold Israel accountable for the Mavi Marmara incident and challenge the legality of the blockade. Turkey’s statement that it would deploy its navy to ensure safe passage in the eastern Mediterranean was arguably the most contentious measure, as it could potentially escalate into a direct military confrontation.

    To understand Turkey’s perspective in the sequence of events culminating in the current standoff, one must look at a number of interrelated factors pertaining to the transformations of the strategic outlook of the Turkish foreign policy elite towards the new Middle East, and Israel’s role and place in it.

    First, Turkey has been working to redefine its priorities in response to what it perceived as a shift in the regional balance of power to its advantage. Second, Turkey viewed the declining influence and power of the United States, as well as President Barack Obama’s promise of a new American foreign policy in the Middle East, as an opportunity for regional powers to assert their influence. Third, and related to these points, Turkey has operated on the assumption that it has not only more space in which to maneuver but also a greater ability to develop autonomous policies in the region. Fourth, Turkey’s perception of threats from the Middle East has declined, reflected in the famous “zero problems with neighbors” policy, as Turkey pursued economic and political rapprochement with countries in the region.

    All these interrelated factors have coalesced in ways which have fostered a perception on the part of Turkish decision makers that a new Middle East is being built, one that is based on justice, equality and freedom, whereas Israel, with its power-based policies, remains stuck in a mentality representing the old Middle East. Turkish leaders saw themselves tasked with a project to build a peaceful and stable regional order based on principles of cooperative security, economic interdependence and universal moral standards. In this environment, the state of exception that Israel represented in the region, as reflected in Israel’s unjust policy toward the Palestinians, its defiance of UN decisions, its noncompliance with the non-proliferation regime and its protection by the US, was construed as an obstacle to Turkey’s regional aspirations. Unable to adapt to the new reality, Israel, in the Turkish perception, has increasingly isolated itself in the region and emerged as the source of regional instability.

    Believing that Israel can no longer afford to act in a business-as-usual fashion in the new Middle East, Turkey has moved to adopt moral politics, seeking to correct Israel’s policies. Consequently, the shared ground and joint strategic outlooks that enabled the Turkish-Israeli partnership of the 1990s has been replaced by a rather confrontational and competitive dynamic, which provide the background for the recent successive crises, especially since 2008. Through its moral politics, Turkey hoped that it could publicize Israel’s inhumane treatment of the Palestinians in various international forums, make it accountable before the international community, and eventually force it to recognize the Palestinians’ rights. Turkey somehow hoped the new foreign policy vision promised by the Obama administration would facilitate its pursuit of a moral politics with regard to Israel.

    Unwilling to yield to Turkey’s new posture, however, Israel refused to back down. At the same time, the complex dynamics of Israeli domestic politics limited the prospects for a negotiated settlement with Turkey, including some form of an apology and compensation to the victims of the Mavi Marmara raid. In this environment, Turkey’s insistence on linking the Mavi Marmara dispute with its demand that the Gaza blockade be lifted further pitted the two countries against each other, as the Israeli side was apparently unconvinced that the closure of the Mavi Marmara incident alone would settle the dispute. Last but not least, though the United States has not come out against Turkey’s increasingly assertive stance against Israel, it has not joined Turkey’s bandwagon either, rendering Turkey’s moral politics largely ineffective. The declining influence of the US has in effect meant that there is no actor capable of mediating between the parties. Turkey’s constructive role in the recent Hamas-Israel prison swap deal and its implementation raised expectations that the Turkish-Israeli tension might ease, as well. After all the events that have transpired, however, there will be no easy going back, and it will be hard to salvage the relationship without a significant transformation in the strategic outlooks of both sides. Turkey expects Israel to change drastically, which is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future.

    *Şaban Kardaş is an assistant professor of international relations at TOBB University of Economics and Technology in Ankara.

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